



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

16 MAY 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Senior Member, Board to Review Functions and Workload,
Office of Naval Intelligence
To: Director of Naval Intelligence

Subj: Report of the Board to Review Functions and Workload,
Office of Naval Intelligence, forwarding of

Ref: (a) Director of Naval Intelligence letter "ONI Functions
and Workload, establishment of a Board to review,"
dated 20 February 1952

Encl: (1) Report on Review of Functions and Workload, Office of
Naval Intelligence

1. The Board convened by reference (a) has completed its survey, and prepared its report, which is furnished herewith as enclosure (1).
2. The Report as a whole is SECRET, due to the classification of one of its Appendices. Individual portions may be of lower classification.
3. An original and five (5) copies of this report have been made; additional copies will be reproduced if desired. The initial distribution is one copy to the Director alone; other copies are in the custody of the Recorder, and will be distributed as directed by the Director of Naval Intelligence.

/s/ W. R. WILSON,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Senior Member,

/s/ S. E. JONES,
Captain, U. S. Naval Reserve - Member,

/s/ N. D. ZIMMERMAN,
Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve - Member,

/s/ C. F. PICK, Jr.
Commander, U. S. Naval Reserve - Member.

/s/ B. D. WILLIS, JR.
Lieutenant, U. S. Naval Reserve, Recorder

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REPORT
ON
REVIEW OF FUNCTIONS AND WORKLOAD,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Enclosure (1) to Letter, Senior
Member, Board to Review Functions
and Workload, Office of Naval
Intelligence, dated 16 May 1952

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Op-32
Serial 3353P32
20 Feb 1952

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From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: Captain W. R. WILSON, USN
Subj: ONI functions and workload, establishment of board to review

Ref: (a) OPNAV Internal Instruction 5000.2 dated 1 February 1952

1. Reference (a) announces that as of 1 February 1952 military allowances and civilian ceilings are frozen, and that additional military or civilian billets needed to perform new functions or to handle increased workloads must be absorbed within the present prescribed allowances and ceilings. Further, reference (a) directs the immediate establishment of a continuous review of functions and work load to assure maximum use of military and civilian personnel, the aims of such review being:

- a. To insure that only those activities are located at the seat of government which must be so located because of the nature of activities, the source of material or necessary collaboration with other activities.
- b. To eliminate nonessential functions.
- c. To streamline administrative and operating procedures.
- d. To insure that personnel skills are used to the maximum.

2. Incident to the above, an Office of Naval Intelligence Board will be established to compile lists of officer billets, and enlisted and civilian personnel by organizational component in the order in which they may be reassigned. These lists will be based upon considerations of workload, functions performed, and streamlining of administrative and operating procedures, to the end that the functions of ONI may be impaired to the minimum if such reassignment is necessary. This Board will be constituted as follows:

- CAPT W. R. WILSON, USN, Senior Member
- CAPT S. E. JONES, USNR "
- CDR N. D. ZIMMERMAN, USNR "
- ODR C. F. PICK, JR., USNR "
- LT B. D. WILLIS, JR., USNR, Recorder

Necessary clerical assistance will be provided by Op-323.

COPY

Op-32
Serial 3353P32

Subj: ONI functions and workload, establishment of board to review

3. The board is authorized to call upon all ONI branches, sections, units and desks for any and all data which it may require in the performance of its functions. By copy of this letter Branch heads are requested to take steps to see that there is complete cooperation with the board on the part of personnel under their supervision.

4. The board will make its first report of findings and recommendations to the Director of Naval Intelligence not later than 15 March 1952.

/s/ R. F. Stout
R. F. STOUT
By direction

Copy to: All branch heads
Op-32B1
Op-32B2
CAPT S. E. JONES
CDR N. D. ZIMMERMAN
CDR C. F. PICK
LT B. D. WILLIS, JR.

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Auth:
REPORT OF THE BOARD TO REVIEW FUNCTIONS AND WORKLOAD
Date: 21 58 98
OFF. NAME - EXTENSION - UNIT: AK-8022

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APPENDIX V
DISCUSSION OF
INVESTIGATIVE SECTION
OF-821D

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Date: 228898 Unit: NCIS 22

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INVESTIGATIVE SECTION - (Op-321D) *ED12938*
Auth:

1. BACKLOG: The operations of this Section, although complex, may be broken down into two major types of interlocking operations; investigations, mostly background, and NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS. The National Agency Checks may be described as a form of investigation within the definitions employed by this Section. A backlog exists in both of these categories. In the investigative category the Section has further broken the backlog down into *known cases* *now opened* 50 man-months background investigations (1282 investigations) and *43 man-months added*

months backlog for other types of investigations. The Section states that administrative personnel assigned are not able to maintain *now adequate* headway against the input of investigative backlog, and in order to do so, two additional clerical positions *change* will be required. In the category of National Agency Checks, Section states that there is a backlog of approximately *reduced* 46 man-months *12 back log in Bureau Plan*

months. It is a known fact that processing of these checks in the Office of Naval Intelligence requires *reduced to 90 days* 11 to 12 months, and that repeated complaints have been received from other activities in the Navy Department because of this delay. To some extent the tide of new NAO's can be reduced by dint of overtime work by personnel assigned, and by the loan of personnel from other parts of ONI, and from the Receiving Station. Such assistance, however, is not adequate to cope with the problem and should not be depended upon

exclusively as a means of keeping abreast of input. The only relief available is either augmentation of *done* personnel assigned, streamlining *done* operating procedures, or reduction in minimum standards imposed by U. S. Navy Security

not done Manual and the Secretary of Defense's directive, dated 14 June 1950,

subject: "POLICY ON CLEARANCE AND INVESTIGATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL". Further discussion of the problem of the above backlog will be dealt with in paragraph on general remarks.

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- 2. DUPLICATION OF CONDITIONS: None. *NCS 22*
Date:..... Unit:.....
- 3. TASKS ASSUMED SINCE JUNE 1950: The basic function of this Section has not changed. However, the running of NAO's as a form of investigation has been imposed since June 1950, in accordance with the directives referred to in Section 1 above. In November 1950 by agreement between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army, investigation of personnel employed in industrial concerns engaged in naval contracts was imposed on the Navy, having previously been performed by Army investigating personnel. In February 1951, the directive of Secretary of Defense in regard to NAO's was made applicable in many cases for clearance for access to "restricted data". As a result, investigations for such access have devolved upon ONI, which duties were previously performed by FBI. In addition, legislation now pending, if passed, will eliminate "Q" clearances, and make it mandatory for ONI to sponsor investigations of all naval personnel having access to restricted data. Investigative units have been established for certain outlying commands incident to expansion of the Naval Establishment, and activities of the Section have thereby increased to some extent in the training field for personnel assigned. McCarran Act name file checks are now required from the Navy Department by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Section states that initial impact of the implementation of the requirements of this Act was approximately 30,000 checks, but that in the course of time this will level off to about 1500 checks per month.
- 4. PERSONNEL ON LOAN: One GS-3, Clerk-Typist, is now being used by this Section although presently assigned to *now assigned 321D* OP-321A.
- 5. GENERAL REMARKS: The activities of this Section break down into eight functional subcomponents which will be dealt with individually.

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a. Supervisory: Head of Section, one ODR/1100; one GS-11, Investigator; and one GS-5, Secretary-Stenographer. Date: 22 Sep 58 Unit: NCS 22

b. Investigations involving Civilians and the Loyalty Program: One GS-13, Investigator; three clerical positions, GS-4 and below; and one enlisted person. *Janet m*

c. Investigations involving Naval Personnel (Background on those not assigned to DIO cognizance): One GS-13, Investigator; three clerical positions, GS-4 and below; and one enlisted man. *MacCallie*

d. Investigation of Fraud and Industrial Cases: One GS-13, Investigator; and three clerical positions, GS-4 and below. In addition, one agent is presently performing administrative functions in connection with industrial security cases. This may be warranted in view of personnel limitations but vitiates the effect of ceiling limitations and introduces the hazard of being compelled to place agents under such limitations. *Scott*

e. Special Investigations (Homosexual, Rape, etc.): One GS-13, and one enlisted man. *Murkin*

f. National Agency Check Unit: One LCDR/1635 and five enlisted men.

g. Local Investigations: One LCDR/1635; one GS-5, Secretary-Stenographer; two clerical positions, GS-4 and below; and one enlisted man.

h. RuPers Unit: One LT/1635; two clerical positions, GS-4 and below; and four enlisted men.

Not included in the above accounting are, one LCDR/1635, who is presently on loan to GINNSIM, and one enlisted man who handles the mail for the Section. In connection with the last named position, mail for this Section is handled on a bulk basis and no duplication of mail room functions is involved. Section states that 100,000 pieces of mail are handled per month. The Section has furnished an analysis of operations in connection

*McLean
Scott*

Reel - new book

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Date: 22 Sep 98 NCR 22

with the processing of NAC's to the Board, ~~and it is appended hereto.~~ ^{Units} An analysis of the assignment of the personnel to NAC's reveals that although 15 personnel are required only nine are assigned to this on a full time basis, leaving six clerical personnel required to keep abreast of input. This estimate is predicated upon continuance of operations with no methods improvement. It is the opinion of the Board, however, the methods of operations are susceptible to some improvement which individually might be small, but ^{done} cumulatively would result in substantial personnel savings.

Examples are:

- a. duplicative ^{working on new form} recording of the completion of investigative leads;
- b. maintenance of a ^{necessary} card file of pending investigations in Op-321D;
- c. an unnecessarily complicated and involved method of record-keeping now existing between Op-321D and Op-321M5 with respect to homosexual cases; ^{will be eliminated by transfer of obsam files to M5}
- d. use of separate forms OPNAV 32-316 and ONI 5521-7 instead of (combining the two forms thereby eliminating one altogether);
- e. use of a clerk-typist to perform mechanical function of assembling reproduced material; and ^{isolated plenums}

f. absence of a numbering system for NAC forms for associating returned form components. ^{not practical - another log equating names + numbers would be necessary. Many (over half) are controlled by Districts}

In the area of manpower utilization it occurs to the Board that there is a multiplicity of supervisory personnel performing duties in this Section. Four investigators, OS-13, perform exactly the same type of work broken down into cognizances or categories, but the bulk of this work is of a routine nature in spite of the fact that a noticeable backlog has been accumulated as noted in paragraph 1 above. It is believed that some supervisory functions could be consolidated to a considerable extent

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resulting in availability of several of the personnel to other duties. The Board takes cognizance of the fact that experienced investigators of a high GS rating must be kept available for use in ONI for contingencies, and that they will properly be employed in OP-3210, but suggests that several could be made available for duties within the section other than those they are now performing. Another possibility suggests itself to the Board for reducing the workload on a long range basis:

a. It is understood that the Defense Department (or OSD) basic directive does not make mandatory an examination of a subject's service record as part of a NAC. The U. S. Navy Manual for the Security of Classified Matter (see Art. 1503) does make such an examination mandatory. However useful such an examination may be, it is considered that the combined pressure of personnel austerity policy, plus a growing backlog of NAC's, dictates a reexamination of this matter, and the acceptance as a calculated risk of whatever loss of security may result from dispensing with any procedures other than those specifically required. It is estimated that the elimination of this routine in the NAC would make available one civilian and three enlisted clerical personnel for positions on a priority list for reassignment.

b. Moreover, it is considered that requests for NAC's might be brought more in line with existing production capacity by the sponsoring by ONI of a proposal to SecDef via JIC and JCS that a reexploration be made looking for: (1) a reduction in the classes and types of cases in which NAC's (and other more comprehensive investigations) are necessary; (2) a waiver or elimination of the requirement for a NAC in certain cases in the discretion of the DIO where he may consider a local agency check as useful, or more useful, than a NAC; or (3) elimination of the mandatory provision

Not the proper channel

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that the MAG include the ^{Auth: records} ~~how~~ records:.....

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: ^{Date: 21 8 58} It is recommended: ^{Unit: NCPS 22} Unit:

a. That the Sections institute a stringent survey of methods and manpower utilization within the Section, considering the application of suggested methods improvements and re-evaluate its requirements for personnel increase to keep abreast of input. *done*

b. That based upon the results of above recommended survey, there be some augmentation of clerical personnel, either enlisted or civilian, to the extent necessary to maintain workload current, but in no case to exceed six positions. *done*

c. That one GS-13 Investigation billet be considered as available on the priority list for reassignment, and that in the methods survey recommended above, consideration be given to a further reduction of supervising personnel.

d. That the possibility be investigated of obtaining enlisted personnel from the Naval Reserve on annual training duty for utilization in Op-321D in addition to the other expedients presently reported to, to assist in reducing MAG backlog. ✓

e. That the provision in the U. S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Matter requiring examination of service records as part of a MAG be eliminated. X

f. That the Section initiate a proposal from the DNI to Joint Intelligence Committee for a report by that Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for ultimate transmission to the Secretary of Defense, to reduce the classes and types of cases in which MAG is required; to permit the substitution of some form of local agency check for the presently required MAG under conditions where absence of a MAG will produce no significant X

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security risk; and to eliminate the mandatory requirement of checking HQIA records.

g. That upon the acceptance of recommendation e. above, and the elimination of the requirement that an NAC include a check of subject's service record, the billets of one GS-4, Clerk-stenographer, and two YN2s and one YN3 be made available for the performance of other functions within the section. X

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Op-321D

Date:

22 Sep 78

Unit:

NCIS 22

MEMORANDUM for ONI Survey Board

Subj: Workload in the Office of Naval Intelligence - National Agency Checks

OPERATION in Op-321D

	MONTHLY INTAKE		BACKLOG - 1 MAR 1952	
	Volume	Man Hours	Volume	Man Hours
A. NAC requests - Tabulating, screening alphabetizing, disassembling and dispatching leads to National Agencies.	8,000 cases	340	1,600	64
B. BIPERS checks (conducted by personnel of Investigations Section) - processing, ordering jackets, reviewing and writeups when necessary	3,000 pieces	640	24,000 pieces	9120
C. Review of ONI records	2,000 pieces	80	8,000 pieces	320
D. KNUAA checks - search of House files, also other miscellaneous checks such as XANS and Coast Guard	9,000 pieces	168	38,000 pieces	680
E. Sorting into DIO and ONI Control, stamping DIO Control, packing individual checks to mail to DIOs	40,000 pieces	676	122,000 pieces	2061
F. Filing ONI Control	17,500 pieces	210	53,000 pieces	636
G. Transmittal of completed ONI Control cases	3,500 pieces	222	12,000 cases	750
H. Finish file stamping of NAC reports	8,000 pieces	5	36,000 pieces	35
TOTAL MAN HOURS WORK - Op-321D		2,941		7,747
TOTAL MAN MONTHS WORK - Op-321D		14.6		48.4

MEMORANDUM for ONI Survey Board (cont'd)

MONTHLY INTAKE BACKLOG - 1 MAR 1952
Volume = Man Hours Volume = Man Hours

OPERATION in Op-323M5

A. ONI (Intelligence files) checks, processing, searching, pulling and returns to file

8,000 640 32,000 2560
pieces pieces

B. Finish file processing into ONI file

8,000 850 56,000 5958
pieces pieces

TOTAL MAN HOURS WORK = Op-323M5

1,490

9,666

TOTAL MAN MONTHS WORK = Op-323M5

9.3

60.4

TOTAL ONI OPERATIONS

TOTAL MAN HOURS WORK = ONI

3,891

18,284

TOTAL MAN MONTHS WORK = ONI

23.9

108.8

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APPENDIX VI

DISCUSSION OF

SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE, COUNTER-SUBVERSION SECTION

OP-321B

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DISCUSSION OF SANDTAGE, ESPIONAGE, COUNTER-ESPIONAGE SECTION

(Op-321E) Date: *21 Sep 58* Unit: *NCSS 12*

1. BACKLOG: This Section has no backlog which is represented in terms of statistical averages, and at no desk is there any backlog which can be considered other than normal. In the Western Hemisphere Unit, some items of low priority reaching back several months have not been taken up on the special control cards which are maintained in this Section for analysis and research purposes, and the material has not been filed, but have been routed for information to those parts of the Section, and other components of ONI which have an interest.

2. DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS: This Section does not duplicate functions in the broad aspect which are actually assigned to the functional cognizance of other elements of ONI. An extensive amount of cross-referencing and filing of summaries of information for research and analysis purposes is done in this Section, which might be considered by superficial estimate to be a duplication of file functions performed in Op-323M5. However, in the performance of its mission with expedition, the Section requires locally maintained control systems which are broken down into various categories; topical, by activity, by type of activity, and by geographical area. For the special purposes of this Section, a large number of special counter-intelligence categories has been instituted above and beyond those contained in the Intelligence File Index (IFI) System. These are used in Op-323M5 and in the control systems referred to above and are for the exclusive convenience of Op-321E. It is un-

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dersted the number of these special categories further into the thousands, and ~~data~~ ²⁰⁸⁸⁹⁸ ~~has~~ ^{NCS JJ} ~~been~~ ^{Unit} ~~constantly~~ ^{being} ~~added~~, thus increasing

(3)

the potential number of cross-references. The line of demarcation between the functions of Op-321E and some of the functions of Op-322Y is not clearly defined, but must be deduced from the basic mission of Op-321E, and from experience of the workings of ONI. It is possible that the detailed objectives of Op-321E in this respect could be rewritten more clearly to delineate this line of demarcation. The mission of the Section, however, is clearly understood by supervisory personnel, and it is believed that there is no substantial duplication of function between these two Sections.

3. TASKS ASSUMED SINCE JUNE 1950: Generally speaking, no new function has been assumed by this Section since June 1950, but volume of work has increased with the intensification of all security, loyalty, and counter-intelligence programs, and the institution in this connection, of certain new programs such as the screening of merchant seamen under the President's volunteer screening program and under Executive Order 10173.

4. PERSONNEL ON LOAN: None.

5. GENERAL REMARKS: The organizational functions and detailed procedures were presented to the Board in great detail by a series of presentations very ably organized by the present acting Section Head. The work of this Section is extremely diffuse, even to the extent that it performs all the functions associated with an integrated intelligence activity; it exists primarily for analysis and research in its special field, in order;

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- a. to answer queries about individual organisations and areas
- b. To produce studies similarly categorized
- c. to predict trends
- d. in some cases, to actually operate in connection with the Bureau of Naval Personnel, in subversive cases
- e. to formulate policy in its special field

? action to
remove report
under Security

In order to perform these manifold functions it has, organizationally, first, a geographical breakdown, further broken down into functional components in the case of the United States Desk of the Western Hemisphere Unit. These functional components are:

- a. civilian suspects, employed in the Naval Establishment and by contractor firms
- b. suspects in uniform (Naval personnel)
- c. Merchant Marine suspects

A special device employed in this Section as a research aid is known as WAG (World at a Glance). This consists of files of control cards on all significant material available to the Section for research purposes, by the categories referred to in Section E, maintained at each desk. In the case of the functional components of the United States Desk of the Western Hemisphere Unit, this system is further extended by the use of control files which are broken down by alphabet, by Naval District, and by activity.

In regard to the cross-referencing done in this Section, in one case amounting to 1000 cross-reference sheets on one FBI report

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alone, and the extensive system of files maintained for reference purposes, the Board is unable to come to a firm opinion. This cross-referencing is done for the purpose of research and analysis, and there is no doubt that such devices are useful to control and consolidate research material. It appears, however, that a large portion of the effective man-hours of this Section is employed in the maintenance of the control system, abstracting, and cross-referencing.

The Section is organized according to a well understood arrangement, insofar as personnel assigned to the Section are concerned. However, comparison of the allowance list with the actual organization of the Section reveals many discrepancies, and discussion further reveals that personnel are employed according to their special abilities and degree of experience, without regard to the billets currently authorized. The acting Section Head is a civilian with the rating of GS-14, Naval Intelligence Analyst. In the past few years the billet, ODR/1300, for the Section Head, has been unoccupied for extended periods of time, notwithstanding the fact that many subordinate military personnel are assigned. In some cases military personnel are under the direct supervision of subordinate civilian personnel. In the opinion of the Board, the latter is not especially significant, provided that the overall supervision of military personnel is exercised by an officer. It is noted by the Board that one authorized billet, GS-12, Naval Intelligence Analyst, has been unfilled for about three years.

J.G. idea

7 continuity

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Auth: 8012958

In spite of added workload, the Section performs its mission with no significant backlog with personnel presently on board.

Date: 21 Sep 58 Unit: NCFB 22

The functioning of this Section with its present effectiveness and its high degree of indoctrination is believed to be largely attributable to the experience and industry of the present acting Section Head, and it is believed that personnel are utilized with the utmost effect.

It should be noted that the ratio of authorized supervisory or analyst personnel to clerical personnel is 10 to 20, and that a definite unbalance exists. The only way that this can be justified is on the grounds of the quasi-mechanical operations performed by some of the clerical personnel, and by the fact that several of the enlisted personnel, by reason of purely fortuitous special qualification, perform officers' or analysts' work.

State had file - not applicable small groups

6. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended:

a. That an examination be made of the system of special control categories employed by this Section for research aid, with a view to establishing the necessity for each category employed.

under constant surveillance

b. That the authorized position for one GS-12, Naval Intelligence Analyst, which has been unused for a long period of time, be considered as available for the priority list for reassignment.

now filled

c. That efforts be made to keep the officer billet for the Head of the S.E.C. Section continually occupied.