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C O P Y

THE COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD

WASHINGTON

May 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR - The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Report of Joint Survey of Port of New York  
by the FBI and GBI.

1. Transmitted herewith are my comments on the report of the Joint Survey of the Port of New York made by the FBI and GBI pursuant to the President's memorandum of April 26, 1942. The general tenor of this report infers that security conditions in New York Harbor are bad, little if any improvement is being made, and that appropriate security measures will not be taken until the responsibility for the security of the port is placed back in the hands of the Naval District Commandant.

2. As used in this memorandum and accompanying comments, the phrase "security measures" refers to the safeguarding of vessels, piers, decks and other structures to which vessels are made fast, excluding vessels, docks, piers and structures wholly under the control of the Navy or the Army. Responsibility for other waterfront property is still under consideration by the War and Navy Departments. Security of individual war material plants is a matter of agreement between the two departments.

3. The Commandant of the Coast Guard desires to point out the following facts, which are set out more fully in my attached comments:

(a) That the present organization placing entire responsibility upon the Coast Guard and relieving the Naval District Commandant of this responsibility, was placed in effect April 7, 1942, approximately three weeks prior to the beginning of the GBI - FBI investigation. (See page 4 of Comments).

(b) That while security measures are not now satisfactory, very rapid progress is being made. (See pages 14 - 16 of Comments).

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(c) That there are several inaccurate statements and inferences in the ONI- FBI report. (For example, see pages 4, 5, 6 of Comments).

(d) that measures which are taken for port security must not be such as will seriously impair the expeditious shipment of war materials. (For example, excluding Italian longshoremen (See pages 5 and 10 of Comments) and requiring permits for acetylene welding (See page 11 of Comments).

4. The Commandant of the Coast Guard desires to see set up the best practicable organization with the best obtainable personnel the country can provide, whether or not the Coast Guard or Coast Guard personnel are used. However, he does not feel that responsibility should be divided between two or more commands within the Navy Department. He believes the present organization is sound and that if given a chance to function with the whole-hearted support of other interested agencies, it will give satisfactory security in our ports.

/s/ R. H. WAGGONER

Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard,  
Commandant.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy,

With cordial regards to your good service, sincerely yours: R. H. Waggoner  
Vice Admiral, U. S. Coast Guard  
Commandant

COPY

THE COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. COAST GUARD

WASHINGTON

May 28, 1942

**COMMITTEE ON THE REPORT OF THE JOINT**

**SURVEY MADE BY FBI AND ONI OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK**

The following specific comments are made on volume 1 of the Joint Survey by FBI and ONI of the Port of New York. My general comments concerning this report as a whole will be found in the attached letter of transmittal.

For convenience, these comments follow the headings and outline of volume 1 of the survey, and references are given to page and paragraph numbers.

**(page 1)**

The first paragraph of the abstract reads as follows:

"The harbor facilities in the Port of New York are presently vulnerable to sabotage and damage by fire through dangerous practices."

The Commandant of the Coast Guard agrees that security measures existing today in the Port of New York are not satisfactory, and, moreover, that absolute security against sabotage and carelessness can never be obtained. Rapid progress has been made during the past two months, however, and is continuing. No mention of those recent steps which have been taken to provide more adequate safeguards is made in the report.

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The second paragraph of the abstract reads as follows:

"Shipping information is obtainable by anyone familiar with shipping procedure. There is no person or agency responsible for, or in authority to control or protect such information."

The Commandant of the Coast Guard agrees with this statement and also with the recommendation that the Port Shipping Administration take the lead in improving this condition.

The third paragraph of the abstract reads as follows:

"There is a state of confusion existing among interested agencies and an absence of energetic leadership."

The Commandant strongly disagrees with this statement, and will comment thereon in detail later in this memorandum.

The fourth paragraph of the abstract reads as follows:

"There is considerable duplication of effort adding to the existing state of confusion."

It is true that there is some duplication of effort, but the Commandant disagrees that such duplication is adding to the existing state of confusion, or that there is at present no state of confusion. Duplication of effort, if not carried to an extreme, is an asset in the prevention of sabotage and in security measures necessary for the Port of New York. There are so many agencies, Federal, State, municipal, and private, that have some responsibility that some duplication is inevitable and not undesirable. The duplication of effort of MID, CII and FBI, for instance, probably is essential for efficient Intelligence work.

The fifth paragraph of the abstract reads as follows:

"There is a dire need for a specific fixation of responsibility, definition of jurisdiction and coordination of effort."

The Commandant of the Coast Guard disagrees with this statement. There is at present a specific fixation of responsibility, and a definition of jurisdiction for the security of vessels, wharves, piers, and other structures in the harbors to which vessels may be made fast. This responsibility and jurisdiction rests in the Coast Guard. Coordination of effort is being vigorously carried on among the various agencies, Federal, State, municipal and private, that have a responsibility in this matter.

**"Introduction"**  
**(page 4)**

**No comments are necessary concerning this section.**

**"Description of the Port"**  
**(page 5)**

**No comments are necessary concerning this section.**

**"Physical Security of the Port"**  
**(page 6)**

On page seven the report states:

"The activities of the United States Coast Guard during peace time were limited, being at that time a Treasury agency with the enforcement of national revenue laws, and the protection of life and property against the hazards of the sea."

This statement is particularly inaccurate. In addition to being responsible for the performance of many other duties, the Coast Guard in time of peace is authorized to enforce all Federal laws on navigable waters (49 Statute 1820) and, in the performance of this duty, has long been very active in New York Harbor. By Executive Order of June 27, 1940 and Treasury Regulations of the same date, the Collector of Customs and the Coast Guard controlled the movements of vessels within port areas, the movements and loading of explosives and other dangerous cargo on vessels and in harbors, the guarding of vessels in port including taking physical possession and the removal of persons therefrom, special emergency licensing of vessels, and the departure of all vessels from United States ports. Specific Anchorage Regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury on October 29, 1940. These national emergency restrictions on shipping and ports were enforced primarily by the Captain of the Port. On 13 October 1941 all vessels of the United States (except those which required clearance by the Collector of Customs) were required to have a Coast Guard movement or departure license, either a general license issued by the Commandant or a special license issued by the Captain of the Port. On 23 October 1941 the Coast Guard started issuing identification cards and shortly thereafter made them a prerequisite to entry on piers and vessels. Enrollment of boats in the Coast Guard Reserve for increasing port security patrols started in June 1941. The Coast Guard was not transferred to the Navy until November 1, 1941 and this country entered the war December 8, 1941.

Page eight of the report states that:

"The coming of war has increased the potential dangers of the security of the port, necessitating numerous reorganizations which have resulted in a state of confusion \*\*\*. An indication of the confusion that exists is the innumerable so-called coordinating committees that have been officially or unofficially organized to study the problem of port security."

This statement is inaccurate. Before the transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy on November 1, 1941, Federal responsibility for the security of the waterfront of the Port of New York was vested largely in the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs. After November 1, 1941, the responsibility for the security of the port was placed in the Office of Naval Operations and in the Commandant of the Third Naval District. On February 28, 1942, responsibility for the security of the Port of New York was placed upon the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting through the Commandant of the Third Naval District, and thence to the

Coast Guard organization under his. On April 7, 1942, the responsibility for the security of the Port of New York was placed squarely upon the Coast Guard organization and the Commandant of the Coast Guard acting directly through the District Coast Guard Officer and the Captain of the Port. For the first time this placed undivided authority and responsibility for security measures in the Port of New York upon the Commandant of the Coast Guard and his organization.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard knows of no "innumerable so-called coordinating committees." There has been organized only one official committee and that has been organized by the Coast Guard, and is headed by Mr. Joseph J. Flynn, loaned to the Coast Guard by the Bureau of Customs, Treasury Department, and brought from Boston to New York specifically to head up this committee because of his record of similar work before the Coast Guard was transferred to the Navy. Mr. Flynn is outstanding in this specialized duty and reports directly to the District Coast Guard Officer. On his committee are representatives of all the agencies that have any responsibility for any activities relating to port security and it is his job, under the direction of the District Coast Guard Officer, to see that other agencies - Federal, State, municipal and private - carry out their responsibilities for security measures in accordance with the specific terms of the Executive Order which placed the responsibility for port security on the Secretary of the Navy and which empowered him to call upon all such agencies for assistance.

Page nine of the report states:

"The most alarming, perhaps, was the fact that there was no accepted responsibility for the removal of fire hazards \*\*\*."

The Coast Guard is specifically responsible for this duty and fully recognizes the responsibility. While small fires occur frequently along the waterfront of New York, no large waterfront fires have occurred in the past two months. Small waterfront fires are daily occurring in time of peace. During the past two months the ratio of losses by fire to volume of goods handled over the piers of New York City is much less than in normal peace time.

Page nine of the report states:

"Individual surveys further reveal that in many instances the fire fighting equipment on the piers was not in good repair and was inadequate. In still other instances, the guards on the piers did not know how to use the equipment, and were not familiar with the fire-alarm boxes or their use."

This statement is correct but is rapidly being remedied.

Page nine of the report states:

"It was of particular interest to learn that enemy aliens were unrestrained, and are permitted on the piers, and may be employed as longshoremen on the ships themselves."

This is true and has been given intensive study by the Coast Guard, which study is still under way. Enemy aliens, mostly Italians, are employed in large numbers as longshoremen on piers and vessels. Most of them, it is believed are loyal, but there is potential danger from this source. However, if all enemy aliens now engaged in longshore work were denied access to piers, present cargoes cannot be loaded expeditiously. Informal discussions with the Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice, the Quartermaster Corps of the War Department, and the War Shipping Administration indicate the impracticability of barring these Italians at present.

#### **"Security of Shipping Information"**

(page 10)

The purpose for which the President requested this survey to be made was "in order to tighten our procedures for preventing disclosure to the enemy of information about ship movements, etc."

Specific comment is not made on that part of the report which deals with the security of shipping information and the use of codes, symbols, etc., as this matter is not a function of the Coast Guard. I agree with the War Shipping Administration should take such remedial steps as may be practicable to control leakages of this type of information.

- 5 - (a)

"Information About Ships' Movements Obtainable  
by Observation Aboard"

(page 15)

Page seventeen of the report states:

"It has long been the custom to fly the "Blue Peter" or sailing flag from the forecastle of a vessel on the day it sails."

Orders were issued on April 4th by the Captain of the Port to prevent the use of this flag by shipmasters and are being enforced.

Page eighteen of the report states:

"The thousands of small harbor craft being operated in the Port of New York also constitute a method by which enemy agents may obtain pertinent detailed information. The committee was of the opinion that pleasure craft not necessary to the prosecution of the war should for the duration be severely restricted, if not prohibited from operating in the harbor of New York."

The operation of small craft in the harbor of New York is severely restricted by Captain of the Port licensees. The total prohibition of all pleasure boating is hardly justified. However, the restriction on gasoline will severely restrain pleasure boating.

(page 19)

The report (page 19) concludes that harbor facilities of the Port of New York are at present extremely vulnerable to sabotage and that fire prevention and fire fighting equipment

are not satisfactory. The Commandant of the Coast Guard recognizes these facts, and the Coast Guard organization is actively striving to improve conditions by enforcing practicable protective measures consistent with the efficient operation of available facilities. It is unlikely, however, that these dangers can ever be completely eliminated.

At page nineteen the report further states that information concerning ship movement is available to any one who may desire to secure it. I have no comments to make concerning the security of this information. The Coast Guard will cooperate in any way possible to enforce restrictions upon information concerning shipping.

The Commandant strongly disagrees with the conclusion stated on page nineteen that there exists a state of confusion and overlapping among existing agencies resulting in the absence of fixed responsibility and definition of authority. Executive Order No. 9974, places this responsibility squarely upon the Secretary of the Navy, who in turn has delegated it to the Commandant of the Coast Guard so that the Coast Guard is the responsible agency for the security of the Port of New York. The Coordination Committee is endeavoring, most effectively, to coordinate the activities of all agencies concerned with port security as provided in the Executive Order.

The Commandant also disagrees with the conclusion stated on page twenty that no one person or agency exercises complete control, jurisdiction and authority over the protection of the Port of New York, and that no agency or person has successfully coordinated all the other agencies concerned in this matter. The Coast Guard has accepted responsibility to coordinate the activities of other agencies which are concerned with various phases of port security, but does not take unto itself complete jurisdiction for all protective measures. It is through the Coordination Committee that the Coast Guard will effectively coordinate the activities of all participating persons and agencies to attain maximum port security.

I disagree with the conclusion stated on page twenty that the Commandant of the Third Naval District should be made personally responsible for the protection of New York Harbor,

although I agree with the corrective measures suggested. I agree that the Secretary of the Navy should accept responsibility for all vessels afloat and for all structures to which such vessels may be secured, together with buildings, structures, and equipment on or contiguous to such structures. The Secretary of War should be responsible for all other property, and the Commanding General already has authority to prescribe restricted and prohibited zones. I also agree that it is advisable that one agency should control all shipping information, and that the War Shipping Administration or the Board of Economic Warfare is best qualified to exercise this function. The Secretary of the Navy must determine which agency of the Navy Department is to carry out his responsibility for port security; I believe that this should be the duty of the Coast Guard, and that it can be most effectively carried on under the direct control of the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

**"Recommendations"**

(page 21)

The following comments concerning the "Recommendations" contained in the report have paragraph numbers corresponding to those listed under that heading.

(1) I do not concur with the recommendation (page 21) that the responsibility for the physical protection of the Port of New York be placed primarily with the Commandant of the Third Naval District. If the Commandant of the Naval District is made primarily responsible, Coast Guard personnel and equipment will be available for him for protective work, but the Coast Guard as an organization cannot function effectively without full authority, full control of its personnel and equipment, and freedom of action in dealing with waterfront interests.

(2) I concur with the recommendation (page 21) that the War Department be made primarily responsible for all facilities adjacent to the waterfront. The areas of responsibility are now being discussed by the War and Navy Departments.

(3) I concur with the general idea (page 21) of Navy Department responsibility to the high water mark, but I believe that the responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy should extend to harbor waters, floating vessels, structures to which vessels can be moored, and buildings, equipment, and materials on such structures or immediately contiguous to them. Bridges, tunnels, power plants, manufacturing plants, lumber yards, office and residential buildings, oil refineries, and railroad terminals should, with specific exceptions, be the responsibility of the War Department. Navy Department responsibility should be confined to shipping and services to shipping.

(4) I concur with the recommendation (page 21) that the War Department be responsible for the shore side of the waterfront subject to the comments in the preceding paragraph.

(5) I agree (page 21) that there should be a close and direct working arrangement between local representatives of the War and Navy Departments to define specific areas of responsibility. Representatives of each department should have full access to the property of the other to investigate conditions threatening damage beyond such property such as the concentration of explosives in waterfront terminals.

(6) I do not believe it necessary for the Commandant of the Third Naval District to define prohibited and restricted areas. The Commanding General has this authority and a procedure has been developed for him to set up such areas after conference with the District Coast Guard Officer. In addition, the Secretary of the Navy has ample authority under the so-called Neutrality Act and Executive Order No. 9071 to control access to vessels and piers.

(7) I do not concur in the proposed appointment (page 23) of a Supervisor of Port Security responsible to the Naval District Commandant. The present Captain of the Port, who is responsible to the District Coast Guard Officer, acts in that capacity.

(8) I do not agree (page 23) that proclamations affecting civilians should be issued by the Commandant of the Third Naval District and be subject to review by the Attorney General of the United States. I believe that such orders should be issued directly by the Secretary of the Navy.

(9) The recommendation (page 23) that the Naval District Commandant control shipping information apparently conflicts with the suggestion on page twenty that such control should be given the War Shipping Administration. The latter is, in my opinion, in a better position to exercise control of shipping information.

(10) I disagree with the recommendation (page 23) that the Coast Guard should be designated the enforcement agency for the Commandant of the Naval District. If responsibility for enforcement is given to the Coast Guard as an organization, it should have authority to initiate regulations subject to approval by the Secretary, freedom to negotiate directly with waterfront interests, and authority to control its personnel and equipment. Responsibility and authority should be in the same organization.

(11) The recommendation (page 23) that the Captain of the Port is not, by the other recommendations, to be relieved of any of his normal duties or responsibilities, appears incompatible with the recommendations that responsibility be placed primarily with the Naval District Commandant and that a Supervisor of Port Security be appointed.

(12) I concur with the recommendation (page 24) that violations of regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy be subject to prosecution. On April 28, 1942 I forwarded to you the draft of a bill to invoke penalties similar to existing War Department legislation mentioned in this recommendation.

(13) a. Adequate authority (page 24) already exists for the Commanding General to designate restricted and prohibited areas and for the Captain of the Port to exclude any person from vessels or piers.

b. I concur with the recommendation (page 25) that alien enemies be excluded from vessels and piers, but only if it is determined that such action would not impede the loading of vessels.

c. I concur with the idea (page 25) that small pleasure craft should be excluded from the vicinity of vital harbor facilities. The extent to which such restrictions should be applied is now within the discretion of the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Captain of the Port, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy.

- d. I disagree with the recommendation (page 25) that visitors should be excluded from piers and ships unless having passes issued by the Naval District Commandant, the Commanding General, or other persons authorized by them. Control of passes should remain with the operators of piers or vessels. The Captain of the Port can control the issuance of passes to a considerable degree by such operators, and does require such visitors to have identification cards issued by him.
- e. I agree that (page 25) salesmen and ship chandlers entering piers or vessels should be interviewed by Coast Guard personnel or by private guards authorized by the Coast Guard at the pier entrance.
- f. I concur with the recommendation (page 26) that regulations governing the use of Coast Guard identification cards be rigidly enforced, but I see no purpose in the recommended "deadline." I concur in the recommendation (page 26) that publicity be given to the fact that Coast Guard identification cards are intended for identification only and not for passes.
- g. I do not concur in the recommendation (page 26) that the Coast Guard be responsible for the removal of fire hazards while acting under the Naval District Commandant in accordance with recommendations of the Supervisor of Port Security.
- h. I concur with the idea (page 27) that the Coast Guard should reduce hazards due to acetylene tanks, but I believe that the issuing of permits as recommended is impracticable without unduly slowing down of production.
- i. I do not concur with the recommendation (page 27) that all members of the armed services be armed while on guard duty. Considerable discretion should be allowed responsible officers on each job.
- k. I concur with the recommendation (page 27) that municipal fire departments should control fire fighting operations on vessels and piers and that members of the armed forces should assist them.

1. I concur with the recommendation (page 28) that railroads be instructed to remove cars blocking access to fires.
- a. Responsibility for vessels and piers (page 28) is vested in the Secretary of the Navy. His representative should obtain the cooperation not only of the Commanding General, but of all other responsible agencies for the correction of any conditions or practices which endanger any vessel, waterfront facility, or cargo.
- b. I disagree with the recommendation (page 28) that the proposed Supervisor of Port Security assume leadership of coordinating activities.
- c. I do not concur with the recommendation (page 29) that the War Shipping Administration collaborate with the proposed Supervisor of Port Security in devising a method for substituting symbols for pertinent information. I recommend that the War Shipping Administration effect this proposal in cooperation with the Board of Economic Warfare and the Customs Service who already exercise considerable control over all exporters.
- d. I do not concur with the recommendation (page 30) that the proposed Supervisor of Port Security collaborate with the War Shipping Administration in eliminating unnecessary practices that may reveal shipping information to casual observers. I recommend that this proposal be executed under the direction of the War Shipping Administration by the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the guards stationed on the piers and waterfront. These agencies are the proper enforcement authorities on ships and piers, and have the facilities, personnel, knowledge, and authority with which to carry out these recommendations.
- e. I concur in the recommendation (page 31) that the War Shipping Administration enforce the regulations with respect to shipping documents, and suggest cooperation in this undertaking with the Customs Service, the organization into which many of these documents normally flow for record and control purposes.

r. I do not believe that the recommendation that fishing vessels be required to maintain detailed logs will serve any useful purpose as these may easily be falsified.

s. The establishment of prohibited or restricted areas (page 31) is a function of the Secretary of the Navy. It is a simple administrative matter to set up such areas wherever and whenever necessary. The Captain of the Port enforces the regulations relative to such areas.

t. The Captain of the Port now has adequate authority to control all anchorages.

u. I concur that the laws governing the guarding of all ships and lighters should be strictly enforced.

(14) I concur in the recommendation (page 32) that the Commanding General place in effect, insofar as they apply to his jurisdiction, regulations similar to those set forth in the 13th (s-u) recommendation of this report to the extent that I have concurred with those suggested regulations.

(15) I do not concur in the recommendation (page 32) that all Government agencies be instructed to confine their activities strictly to those duties imposed on them by law and Executive Order.

(16) I concur in the idea (page 32) that FBI, ONI, and MID, within the fields specified in their agreement of February 9, 1942, should be the primary investigative agencies, but the recommendation as written is far too broad and excludes other investigative agencies that have legitimate functions which do not encroach on the fields of the investigative agencies named.

(17) I concur in the recommendation (page 33) that information relative to port security be referred by all public and private agencies to the agent of the Secretary of the Navy designated by him as the officer responsible for the security of the Port of New York.

GENERAL COMMENTS

Responsibility for the security of the Port of New York was delegated to the Commandant of the Coast Guard pursuant to Commander-in-Chief's, United States Fleet, letter of April 7, 1942. From November 1, 1941 to that date, responsibility for the security of the Port of New York had been delegated to the Commandant of the Third Naval District to whom this report recommends that this responsibility be returned. There is an inconsistency between the report's recommendation that the Commandant of the Naval District be given responsibility for port security and the finding of the existence of measures to take adequate safeguards, when it is remembered that up to approximately a month before this survey the Commandant of the Third Naval District had this responsibility, and that no security measures other than those in existence at the time of the report had been taken by him.

The survey makes little or no mention of the rapid development of security measures since April 7, 1942. In the little over a month between the time when the Commandant of the Coast Guard was given responsibility for the security of the Port of New York and the time of the survey on which this report was based, great strides and improvements have been and are being made. The following steps have been taken:

- (a) The District Coast Guard Officer, who is responsible to the Commandant for the security of the Port of New York, has acquired the services of Captain Francis Louden, USNR, who for many years was in charge of security measures for the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey for the entire Atlantic Seaboard. Also assigned to his staff is Mr. Joseph J. Flynn of the Customs Service to head a Coordinating Committee consisting of representatives of public and private agencies having responsibility for various phases of security in the Port of New York. Mr. Flynn was specially selected for this duty because of his previous experience, and his Committee is functioning effectively.
- (b) Coast Guard and Customs guards have been assigned to all important piers to augment private guards and to increase their efficiency. Although the providing of guards is not an acknowledged responsibility of the Coast Guard, they have been provided as an emergency measure.

(e) Special training for port security personnel has been undertaken at Manhattan Beach Training Station, Connecticut State Police School, and Fort McHenry. Some of this specially trained personnel will be assigned to New York Harbor.

(d) Over half a million identification cards have been issued to persons having business on vessels and waterfront facilities. These are now being issued by the Captain of the Port at the rate of approximately 50,000 a week.

(e) Additional personnel, boats, and equipment have been authorized and land and shore patrols have been increased.

(f) Great emphasis is being placed upon adequate fire prevention and fire fighting measures.

1. Thirty special improvised fireboats are being procured for New York Harbor and patrol boats have been equipped with small fire pumps.

2. Personnel are being specially trained in fire prevention and fire fighting.

3. Special Coast Guard Fire Posters have been widely distributed.

4. Zoning studies have been made to determine the best distribution of fire fighting equipment.

5. Conferences are being held frequently with experts from the National Fire Protection Association, the National Board of Underwriters, the Marine Underwriting Associations, and other similar associations for their advice and assistance. These associations have assigned men to work with the Coast Guard Organization in fire prevention and fire fighting activities and the value of their assistance is just beginning to bear fruit.

6. A pamphlet entitled "Safeguarding Waterfront Properties" has been prepared for the Coast Guard and distributed widely to operators of waterfront facilities.

- (g) A Captain of the Port Manual has been issued to all Coast Guard officers concerned with port security; this manual contains instructions relating to the performance of their work and sets forth the powers, duties, and legal authority of port security officers.
- (h) On April 15, 1942 the Commandant promulgated, pursuant to the powers delegated to him under Executive Order No. 9074, a regulation ordering District Coast Guard officers and Captains of the Port to deny entrance to and remove from vessels and waterfront facilities all persons whose presence therein they deemed to be injudical to the national war effort.

During the past month and a half in which the Coast Guard has had responsibility and authority for formulating measures for the security of the Port of New York, it has been laying the groundwork for the port thorough security program consistent with the efficient operation of the port. Efforts have been made to secure the best available talent in the fields of port security work, and the services of experts obtained as consultants or Reserve officers. Great progress has been made in actual security on piers and ships, and the organization is rapidly gaining effectiveness.