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—
THE DUTIES
OF
NAVAL ATTACHÉS
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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

THE DUTIES
OF
NAVAL ATTACHÉS



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NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, January 1, 1919.

This publication on The Duties of Naval Attachés has been drawn up by Lieut. Comdr. Stewart F. Bryant, U. S. Navy, for the information of officers preparing for duty as naval attachés. It is not to be shown to persons other than commissioned officers of the United States Navy, except by permission from proper authority.

ROGER WELLES,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., January 6, 1919.

Approved:
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CHAPTER I

MISSION

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CHAPTER I.

MISSION: TO PROCURE INFORMATION FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE NAVY FOR WAR.

During the time of peace, this mission covers the fundamental duties of a naval attaché. From it there should be no doubt in an attaché's mind of the importance of his assignment. Primarily, his object is to put the Navy Department in complete knowledge of the Navy of the country to which he is accredited. He must consider at all times the possibility of war between the two countries. He must be vigilant in anticipating a possible enemy.

At the same time, he must never lose sight of the great value of continually striving toward improving the relations between the two countries, in remembrance of the doctrine that the greatest victory is the one obtained without battle.

Information is the source of advantage in peace, and of success in war. The attaché is the officer on whom the Department relies for its information concerning a particular navy. He should bear in mind that the value and scope of his work will be limited only by his own initiative and ability.

One of our most experienced attachés has written:

In military operations of any character, the service of information is an essential element. Peace is the golden time for war preparation, and certainly the obtaining of information is a vital preparation, neither to be neglected nor slighted. If, when war comes, we in the Navy do not know all that it is possible for us to learn during peace about our probable enemies, we shall have no one to blame but ourselves. Our probable enemies are not neglecting their opportunities of this kind.

A navy's chief interest lies in its foreign competitors. We are not a coast guard. The development and employment of our service will never be dependable unless it be adjusted to our national policy; and such an adjustment requires a more intimate knowledge of foreign national affairs than we have ever sought to obtain.

As our Navy is in competition with other navies, the more we can learn of our competitors, the more confidently may we shape and execute our own plans. We may profit much by a careful study of foreign policies, resources, intentions, and methods. Many improve-

ments, both in matériel and personnel introduced or proposed in our service, have already existed in other navies.

The requirements of one navy may be different from those of another, and methods that are of great value in one service may not be suitable for another. There is, however, after obtaining a knowledge of these methods, no obligation to adopt them. The information may be equally valuable in showing what to avoid and what to adopt. Again, to know one particular development in a foreign navy may often present an indication of future developments.

The value of information in war may reach a certain limit which is—the means to victory. Perhaps the best illustration of the limit so far reached lies in the war of 1870–71. The advantages and consequent success of the Germans in this war were directly traceable to the duties performed by an efficient intelligence department.

Conversely, we may also say that the injury to a cause, resulting from lack of information in war, has a certain limit—a limit which is complete disaster. The war of 1870–71 may again be used to illustrate to what extent defeat may be traced to lack of information.

The quick defeat of the French was due chiefly to the want of a thinking department to coordinate information and to arrange the best concentration of resources. The offensive campaign across the Rhine was abandoned because the horses for the pontoon trains had been forgotten, and intelligence officers were without railway maps such as a Bradshaw would supply. Wholly ignorant of the transport facilities of the country round about, the most absurd rumors as to the movements of the German troops gained credence. The result was collapse.

The mission of an information system is intensified upon the approach of war. Its importance will be particularly felt by our forces abroad. An opinion on this importance may be cited from a statement of the First Lord of the British Admiralty, expressed as early as 1888:

Although the continuance of such a department will entail a certain increase of expenditure, there is no outlay connected with the naval votes which the nation or the navy could less afford to dispense with than that which will enable the full strength of our naval resources to be put forth in as short a time as possible, and will give prompt and efficient cooperation to all the component parts of a navy stationed, in the necessary performance of its duty, in all quarters of the world.

Aside from the function of furnishing information upon which proper plans of mobilization may be based, an intelligence system has the responsibility of furnishing a fleet commander with information that will enable him to know his enemy. Such information concerning the enemy's forces must include details of matériel, efficiency and morale of personnel, and prevalent ideas and peculiarities of strategy and tactics.

There is a familiar saying of Napoleon on this subject, which, though it directly concerns an army, applies equally well to a navy:

Every general who operates (not in a desert but in a populous country) and who does not have information, does not know his trade.

After the outbreak of war, the mission of an attaché may take on a new rôle, particularly if he should be stationed in the country of an ally. During the war of 1917–18, the following doctrine from the Office of Naval Operations outlined the mission of officers stationed in allied countries:

(1) To supply information to assist the production of material at home.

(2) To facilitate operations at the front.

With regard to the first case, new sources of information were thrown open, and in the cases of the greater Allies a vast amount of information was made available. This procedure was necessary to bring about the maximum of mutual assistance and cooperation in defeating the enemy. To take the fullest advantage of the greater experience of the Allies, naval and civilian experts, and scientists were sent abroad on special missions for such subjects as listening devices, submarine engines, and fire-control apparatus.

In the second case the word *front* was broadly interpreted to include the extent of the enemy's operations at sea, as well as on land. This part of the mission covered the transportation of troops and protection against enemy submarines. To meet the situation two services were necessary: one was a system of agents to obtain information of the activities of enemy submarines; the other was a counter espionage system to prevent information concerning convoys and ship movements from reaching the enemy.

The mission of the attaché under these conditions was thus greatly broadened. It included not only the peace-time function of obtaining information, but, in addition, the supervision of a number of specialists and the direction of a field intelligence service.

CHAPTER II

OUTLINE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

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OUTLINE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

working knowledge the country

Before taking up in detail the work of naval attachés, an outline will be presented of the elementary features of a system of intelligence. The various steps that concern attachés will be arranged in chronological order,—from preliminary training to the final destination of reports.

(1) PRELIMINARY TRAINING.

To successfully fulfill the mission of an attaché, an officer should not only have a broad knowledge of international affairs and of the naval profession, but must undergo adequate preliminary training. This should include—

- (a) A course at the War College.
- (b) A short term of duty at the Office of Naval Intelligence that comprises—
 - (1) A study of the system of classification of the archives.
 - (2) A study of the reports of previous attachés on the country to which he is to be accredited.
 - (3) A study of other material on hand in the office on naval establishments, conditions, customs, and language of the country to which he is going.

(c) Visit to the State Department for acquiring available information similar to paragraph (b) (3).

(d) Instruction in the method of writing reports. The attaché must not only learn to observe, but to reproduce in his reports the facts which he has observed. The writing of a report is one of the most important phases of intelligence work as both the Office of Naval Intelligence and the General Board are dependent upon the statements contained in the reports.

Training for duty as an attaché is indispensable. The average naval officer can no more efficiently occupy the important post of naval attaché without definite training, than the average college man

can go prospecting for valuable ores without having had a metallurgical education.

Officers abroad are allowed the greatest latitude. They are, as a result, dependent upon their own resources, upon their own judgment, and more than all other factors, upon adequate knowledge of their profession.

Lieut. Froment, a French writer, in his book on Military Espionage, remarks upon the position of attachés as follows:

When officers are sent abroad on missions, it is generally the custom to give them precise instructions about what they are to observe and to indicate to them the questions upon which they should make reports. Without wishing to deny that this method of procedure might be both useful and even necessary, we can not admit that it is a good one to cite as a general rule. We believe that there should be left to the officers on missions the greatest latitude, with the condition of choosing only such men as have already studied, reflected, and are capable of exercising good judgment.

(2) COMMENCEMENT OF WORK ABROAD.

In orienting himself to this new position abroad, an attaché is dependent upon his predecessors. He may either begin his work with no local advantages or he may begin very nearly where his predecessor left off. Hence the value of each attaché keeping on record all information that will enable his successor to acquaint himself with local conditions, with sources of information, records of information already gathered, and names of reliable agents that may be called upon for special assistance or for enrollment in the event of hostilities. These records of an attaché are not only of invaluable assistance to a relief but serve for the use of visiting naval officers and for supplying duplicates to the department of any reports that may have been lost.

(3) POLICY OF THE ATTACHÉ ABROAD.

In his dealings with foreign officials, the attaché must reflect the policy of his own Government. There is no nation on earth so frank and above board in its dealings as is the United States. It is therefore believed that it is most inadvisable for an attaché to resort to any methods that might cause him or his country a loss of prestige in the eyes of a foreign Government.

In addition to forwarding naval information for the use of the Department an attaché must develop in himself a rounded-out knowledge of the country in which he is on duty, and at the end of his tour be prepared to draw up a report that will furnish the Department a complete up-to-date and reliable exposition on its naval resources. The value of these reports to the naval service is potential. A great deal of information in them may never be used; at the same time

should critical conditions arise in the relations with another country the information at hand on its naval establishment would be of the most vital importance.

In addition, the attaché must look upon himself as the best container of information, and upon returning to the Department be available for comparing and supplementing desirable reports.

Like other officers in the service, the attaché should keep in mind that a fundamental requisite of a military organization is preparedness for war. In view of this he should keep a record of local agents and other assistants whom he may call upon in the event of strained relations or mobilization of a prospective enemy country.

With regard to the functions of an attaché there have been various opinions. It has been said that his principal duty is the study of characters; again, that he is to collect information, particularly about matériel. Other views would indicate that the attaché, by gaining the utmost confidence of the naval authorities, would be privileged to share their secrets about tactics, strategy, plans of campaign, and mobilization. Under average conditions a combination of all three policies, combined with regard to existing conditions and customs, would probably give the best results.

The policies of attachés of foreign powers with regard to the use of secret agents have widely differed. In some countries the use of secret agents has always been accepted as part of a military organization; in others such a custom is considered very obnoxious.

Lieut. Froment says of this:

As a means of preparation for war, it is quite wrong to reproach an enemy for making use of spies; in endeavoring to gain information, he is only doing his duty; it behooves the people to be on guard against them and to police their territory thoroughly. Evidently espionage, espionage in time of peace especially, has nothing dishonorable about it; the dangers encountered, especially with us, are small; in Germany they are very great, and the means employed by the spies who seek to curry favor everywhere and abuse the confidence of the people present no points worthy of consideration.

The policy of attachés of the United States Navy regarding the use of secret agents in peace times is treated in Chapter XIV.

(4) OFFICE ARCHIVES.

Having outlined the work of an attaché and the character of his activities abroad, the disposition of the information that he obtains will next be considered.

The reports of attachés, when received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, require a reliable system of cross indexing and filing. In war time it may become important to assemble information on a certain subject in the quickest possible time. For this there is required a

system of filing (which must necessarily assume great proportions) so indexed that information on a particular subject may be expeditiously obtained by reference to date, branch, subject, country, or attaché.

In the system of branch and subject classification there is brought out a vital element in the office organization. Its classification scheme is designed for the following uses:

(a) To provide each attaché with a reference list that will enable him to determine what information is desired and what is most important concerning each subject.

(b) To provide a system upon which the attaché may base the arrangement of the details of his reports. This would enable him to draw up his reports in a standard form, so that when received in the home office they could be methodically filed under corresponding headings.

(c) To furnish a practical, simple, and reliable means for filing all information received.

(d) To provide a system upon which collation of information on particular subjects may be based.

(e) To provide an outline upon which publications of the office, that may be particularly needed in the event of war, may also be based.

For example, supposing that an officer at a foreign post is in a position to make an inspection of a new destroyer. Before this inspection, by referring to the classification scheme, he is enabled to learn what salient points are to be looked for while going over the vessel. At the same time he may make sure that important points will not be omitted.

Again in arranging his report upon the destroyer he may use the classification as an outline in drawing up his material. If he should have in his possession a copy of an office report on foreign destroyers he may check up his information with what is already on hand.

His report, when received in the home office, may be filed in a folder which contains previous reports on the same subject.

In cross-indexing on this destroyer there will be less liability to confusion in the card index system and less chance that the report may be lost in the files.

The report will be arranged in such form that it may be forwarded to the bureaus concerned without revision or the copying of extracts.

In collating material on destroyers it will be of advantage to find the data in the report arranged in the same form as other reports previously received.

Should it be desired to compile a publication on foreign destroyers the task would be simple, provided all the data were on hand in the form of reports written in accordance with the standard classification scheme.

(5) COLLATING SECTION.

After registration a copy of an attaché's report is forwarded to the Collating Section.

In this division, data on such subjects as numbers and characteristics of foreign ships, status of merchant tonnage, and information for port directories must be kept up to date for departmental use. In addition, collations are made on important subjects as they arise. A good illustration was furnished by the war with Germany, when, due to the ravages of submarine warfare, it became important to know the status of tonnage of merchant ships lost and completed.

To conform to the general scheme, the arrangement of statistics should be based on the standard classification of subjects and branches in the archives.

(6) DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTS.

In peace time reports from attachés have been distributed as follows: one copy kept for the archives, one copy routed through the collating section, and the remaining copies forwarded to the Office of Operations, bureaus, or force commanders concerned. During war time it becomes necessary for the distribution section to furnish the forces afloat, in addition to the Department, with information concerning the enemy, particularly on matériel, personnel, submarine and antisubmarine activities, new devices and methods of operation. At this time the reports of the attachés will become of increased active value.

It has been advocated that the Office of Naval Intelligence issue in peace times to all officers of higher rank a confidential bulletin of information on foreign navies. In this connection it is thought that the Office of Naval Intelligence "should aim, as Moltke always did, and as Sir John Fisher used to do in the Mediterranean, at drawing out all the best that lies in the officers, broadening their minds beyond their ship life by the fructifying influence of a stream of information flowing from a real intelligence department."

Lieut. Froment speaks of this subject in connection with an Army periodical of the same nature:

It can keep the Army, by means of a periodical military publication, in touch with what is thought, and what is written about military matters in other countries; it furnishes translations or analyses of the most important writings. It can thus cooperate in expanding, in increasing, in deepening, and in rejuvenating.

nating instruction in the Army and particularly among the personnel of the officers. If it becomes necessary, it can, in a manner, furnish the higher authorities of the Army very confidential data relative to the strategical plans of such or such a power whose acts and intentions there is reason to scrutinize, as well as data concerning the probable logistical development of its supposed plans.

It is sometimes the function of the distributing section to supply, by direction, information to attachés of foreign nations. In such cases it is worth while to advise our attachés in the proper capitals of what information has been supplied in order that they will be in position to request reciprocity. As a rule it is best that information furnished to foreign nations be sent through attachés abroad, in order that they may take advantage of the credit gained by presenting the information.

It is one of the particular functions of the distribution section to prepare answers to inquiries from all naval sources. This work must be done in cooperation with the archives division. To meet all demands, this work requires an officer familiar with every branch of his profession. The billet is one that a prospective attaché would do well to occupy. There is no better way in which he may become familiar with the information that is sought by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(7) INSPECTION OF REPORTS.

A particular function of an intelligence office lies in the valuation of reports received from attachés. In some foreign systems, a great deal of attention has been paid to this feature. Due to the wide latitude and independence of an attaché's position, there must be some particular method developed to keep up the stimulus for the most efficient work on his part. It has paid to have officers on duty in the home office charged with the up-keep of this efficiency. There must be both appreciation and criticism of attaché's reports. For an officer abroad to know that excellent work on his part will be so noted in the home office, is a great source of incentive in his work. On the other hand, it is necessary for an attaché who is not producing the best results, to know that there are comparative records periodically submitted to the Director of Naval Intelligence that present at a glance his relative expenditures and results.

Another method of increasing the value of reports is to forward to attachés from time to time questionnaires requesting information that is particularly needed.

With regard to the value of questionnaires, an ex-attaché says:

The home office can vastly extend the usefulness of the attaché by constantly outlining to him specific points to be looked up. Each technical bureau in the navy department and the general board, in their investigations and

discussions, must find points that need elucidation. A note to each attaché to investigate that specific point will bring forth great results. In my experience no other work gave as much satisfaction, and I believe no reports were more accurate than those which were made at the distinct request of the home office.

Another possible function of the inspection division would be liaison work with officers detailed for the instruction of the personnel of smaller foreign navies. Such officers, while having a special duty, are in a particularly favorable position to acquaint themselves with the work of the smaller navy. These officers, by virtue of their intimate relations with the personnel of the service to which they are temporarily attached, may furnish the Office of Naval Intelligence with detailed information that would, under other circumstances, be difficult to obtain. With regard to this policy of sending instruction officers abroad, there is a give and take. The foreign navy undoubtedly gains a great deal from the instruction of trained officers of a larger and more developed naval service. On the other hand, the instructors gain a very intimate knowledge of the smaller service.

(8) CONFERENCES.

There is a custom among some foreign powers for attachés from important posts to gather yearly at the home office for a general conference. At these meetings important developments are discussed, information is compared, methods of operating are outlined, and incomplete reports are filled out.

It has been suggested that for such a conference American attachés on duty in Europe could, during one or two months of each summer, be absent from their station without detriment to their work. It has also been suggested that when attachés have completed their tour abroad, they report not only to the Office of Naval Intelligence but also to the War College, Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and bureaus of the Navy Department, to be available for questioning upon subjects of recent or particular importance concerning the foreign navies that they have been studying.

CHAPTER III

REQUISITES OF AN ATTACHÉ

CHAPTER III. REQUISITES OF AN ATTACHÉ.

(1) PROFESSIONAL.

The essential requisite of a naval attaché is a thorough knowledge of naval affairs. In addition, it is indispensable that, as an officer occupying an intelligence position of importance, he be possessed of large interests and a broad knowledge of international affairs. His standing and consequent success depend upon these professional and educational qualifications.

Rank carries with it the value of prestige. It is not always an advantage, however, as much depends upon the personal equation of the man himself and the fact that his professional associates will judge him by his knowledge and personal qualifications.

An attaché should be well read, especially in the history, customs, and habits of thought of the people of the country to which he is accredited. The better informed upon all subjects he is, the greater prestige will he secure both for himself and his country.

Lieut. Froment, in his book on Military Espionage, quotes from the German Rustow as follows:

Deliberate
We have often heard it said that the attachés should be but officers of the salon, of representation, having no function themselves, but intended rather to cover the actions of other officers charged in a secret or official manner with temporary missions. Such is not our opinion. What is of most value is to choose well the attaché. In this, exterior advantages of all kinds are not to be passed by, as they always facilitate the establishment of useful relations. But these advantages alone will not suffice. They must be supported by an extended knowledge of the military profession, of politics, and of European history, by a natural gift of observation and by the desire to see everything.

Lieut. Froment continues:

The necessity of choosing distinguished officers to fill such positions has been understood in France, and it can be said that our military representatives abroad are all men of great worth.

Quoting again from Rustow:

The powers that wish to keep themselves prepared to resist attacks or to undertake them themselves, must look with favor upon officers traveling abroad

to study foreign armies. But it is necessary that these travels be regulated intelligently and that the officers be suitably chosen.

It would be a useless luxury to send abroad officers not knowing their profession sufficiently to make the necessary comparisons and who do not speak the language of the country to which they are sent. They would allow themselves to be impressed by things altogether secondary; they will judge according to the dinners with which people will endeavor to astound them, and they will not be impressed by the essential things. Unfortunately, bad selections are often made that must be laid to favoritism and often also to economy. Rich men are chosen for these journeys in order to save the State several millions of francs, believing itself to be thus represented in a more decent manner without any outlay. In this the State is frequently deceived, as the rich are often more shabby than the poor. The State should carefully choose the officers sent abroad, and should not be too parsimonious toward them, because the most economical man can not live while traveling as he can while in garrison. An officer thus sent on a mission should not be hampered by ridiculous niggardliness, the bad repute of which will fall back upon his whole country.

It goes without saying that military travels are useful only in the countries that may become enemies or allies. It would be a costly luxury for most of the countries of Europe to have these travels made among the Esquimos.

Professionally, a good all around officer is better than one who has specialized in some particular branch of matériel. The duty of an attaché is primarily military and only secondarily for matériel. Specialists in matériel are always obtainable from the home country; but military information is obtained, and reliable opinions formed, only by an officer who knows how to value what he finds in the course of extended everyday association and occasional opportunities.

(2) PERSONAL.

Among the important personal requisites of an attaché there is one which will affect his every association. He will find that the rare accomplishment of tactful, discreet, and yet interesting conversation will greatly aid his efforts.

In the business of getting information there must be a give and take. A considerable amount of information may be acquired from public documents which can be used in conversation without betraying any trust. This, however, necessitates the most careful restraint and judgment on the part of the attaché in distinguishing between nonconfidential and confidential information, as the latter must be jealously guarded.

It is difficult to be both interesting and close-mouthed. The solution lies in being a good listener and an adept at determining what will most interest a friend; then, by unconscious suggestion leading him to discuss his favorite topics. Some believe that the possessor must be born with this trait, but, like most things, the ability can be developed by effort and practice. It is quite possible to acquire a

pleasant tone in one's voice, to learn to be optimistic in one's ideas, to enjoy being a good listener, to refrain from educating one's superior officers, and to remember that the adoption of a mysterious tone immediately brands a man as the worst sort of amateur.

A successful attaché will inevitably find himself at some time suddenly put in possession of valuable information. The betrayal of such a *coup* by word or expression might under certain circumstances forever end that particular source, and even result in the demand for a promise not to repeat the information obtained. Hence the necessity for self-possession in emergencies.

Too much emphasis can not be laid upon the importance of reticence in conversation. To the average individual the disclosure of any sensational "secret" news affords the keenest delight. It is needless to say that such action is most unbecoming in an officer. Again, there is the temptation to obtain valuable information by parting with an equal amount as a sort of inducement. Such a practice is not only wrong, but has proved to be a failure, in that an exhibition of flagrant indiscretion would only tend to put another man on guard.

An attaché is honored with information concerning his own service that is both a trust and a responsibility. An appreciation of both will play the largest part in the development of his powers of discretion.

Among the more important mental faculties which are called into play may be listed tact, judgment, observation, memory, accuracy, and careful phraseology. A visit to a navy yard by an unobserving person will yield little information. Keen powers of observation and judgment are required to note the important details and to select the salient points of interest. Upon the completion of the visit the quality of memory will then play its part, for with a poor memory many of the details will be forgotten by the time the attaché has the opportunity to write his report. The extreme importance of accuracy and careful phraseology becomes evident when it is recalled that the report will be scanned in an office where the attaché is not present to explain obscurities in phraseology.

Just in proportion to the ambition and desire of an attaché to forward useful reports, so will there be the temptation to make his report seem as valuable as possible by the addition of coloring matter that may appear insignificant to the writer. It is needless to say that the addition of such extra details might cause a great deal of harm and lead to dangerous confusion. The accuracy and reliability of all reports must be placed before any considerations that might reflect undeserved credit upon an attaché's work.

(3) LINGUISTIC.

Real facility in the language of the country to which he is accredited is indispensable, and reasonable fluency in French is desirable for all attachés. One who can not speak the language of the country without embarrassment to himself and to the officials with whom he has to deal is an absurdity, and it is an imposition to send such an officer on duty abroad. The question of accent and correct grammatical construction is of less importance, though well worth mastering as soon as possible. Foreign officers hate above all things to be bored by conducting a stranger about a naval port who can not understand what is said and who can not make himself understood.

The attaché should not be satisfied with the mere ability to get along; he should learn to hear without listening, so as to take in all that is said within earshot. Information of the adoption by the Germans of a larger caliber torpedo was picked up in this way, overheard on a railway train. It would have been lost to an ear unfamiliar with the language. Furthermore, when one talks brokenly or hesitatingly, his listener is constantly reminded of the presence of a foreigner. Consequently he keeps more on his guard and is more reserved than he would otherwise be.

Thus an attaché with a restricted knowledge of the language he most needs during his tour of duty may find his efficiency proportionately impaired.

Fluency in conversation and understanding will, on the other hand, enable him to make the most of all opportunities.

As a thorough knowledge of the language of the country to which an attaché is accredited is of the utmost importance it is essential that he be acquainted with the best methods of studying a language.

The best way to learn a language is to use it; and this should be done whenever practicable by living for a time where no other language is spoken.

Aptitude for study and natural linguistic powers of the individual are of course great factors in acquiring a knowledge of a language, but there is no reason why, with proper concentration, one can not learn to speak any language. In the matter of professional reading in a foreign language, it is not a difficult matter, with persistent study, to acquire a sufficient vocabulary, as the number of words necessary will be found astonishingly small.

(4) SOCIAL.

The question of the social activities of attachés is one that has caused wide differences of opinion. Some of our experienced officers

believe that society as a source of obtaining information should be favorably emphasized. Others believe that an attaché can profit more by meeting men at clubs. Still others claim that the greatest benefit is to be derived from officers of the naval profession.

Conditions in different countries vary too much to indicate any settled policy. All attachés emphasize the importance of conforming to local customs and diplomatic etiquette, and all agree that social fitness may not only be used to advantage, but is indispensable.

The advantage of society in general has been at times overestimated. A continued succession of luncheon and dinner parties given to all sorts of people may give an attaché a certain popularity, but hardly fulfills the purpose for which he is sent abroad. As a source of information, a certain type of society is well-nigh useless, is a tremendous time absorber, and is likely, sooner or later, to get one into social difficulties.

An attaché should however make it a point to be associated with the highest class of people. While he may not directly obtain useful information in this way he may make valuable friends.

Furthermore, the idea of class is such in many foreign countries that if an officer is known to be on friendly relations with people of the highest rank, he will be materially assisted in his associations with members of other classes, who may not be able to move in such society.

Mixing in club life may lead to better opportunities for gathering information, without necessitating the time required for social functions.

In Europe, every capital is full of the so-called Europeanized Americans who can be either a source of great help or great trouble. To this class of Americans belong those who for either business, social, or legal reasons, permanently reside abroad. They represent all kinds, classes, and conditions of society. An attaché will find it impossible so to act and conduct himself as to please them all; the best he can do is to try to strike a happy medium and be on friendly relations with the different classes and cliques. It is well to bear in mind in this connection, that aside from the attaché's duties toward his own work, he has certain obligations as aid to the ambassador, who is the head of the American colony in a foreign capital. Americans abroad look to the ambassador for all kinds of advice and assistance, and it is well for the attaché as a member of his personal staff to assist him, as far as practicable.

Association with naval officers offers the decided advantage of dealing with men who know most about the information that is wanted.

If an attaché chooses to spend his time in professional circles, he must remember, however, that as a member of the ambassador's staff he must be present at all ceremonies and official functions. Also that an invitation from the chief of the mission carries with it the same precedence that an officer would observe in accepting the invitation of his captain on board a capital ship.

The solution of the social question rests upon a study of local conditions and a realization of the fundamental *raison d'être* of a naval attaché, which is that he is abroad to obtain honorably all available information that will be of value to his service. From whom he gets it is of secondary importance. The point is—to get it.

CHAPTER IV

TRAINING OF AN ATTACHÉ

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TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN ATTACHÉ.

The greatest stimulus for efficient service is adequate training for duty. An adjustment between our national policy and the development of our service requires an intimate knowledge of foreign national affairs and the naval strategy of our own country. To know what is wanted, how it is to be used, and how it will fit in with other information cannot be acquired by the attaché without special training. Before proceeding abroad the attaché should spend, if possible, not less than three months (some navies make it six) in familiarizing himself with the conditions of the fleet, navy yards, ship yards, training stations, torpedo works, general electric work, large munition and aviation plants, and various other large industries connected with the building and equipping of ships.

By visiting the War College, General Board, and chiefs of bureaus he may learn the kind of information that they most desire to have.

Considering that a correct estimate of a possible enemy's resources and intentions is necessary to our own military development and dispositions, training in war studies, such as the courses at the War College afford, would be of great help to an attaché in giving him a due sense of proportion and a knowledge of the information necessary to formulate a plan of campaign. It would awaken his interest in matters previously unconsidered. More than that, it would improve the quality of his reports by the better development of his sense of logic and by giving him stricter standards of judgment. War study brings out the importance of studying morale and character, impressing upon one, moreover, care not to seek to confirm a prejudgment, but rather to deduce an opinion from facts patiently ascertained.

An additional period should include a study in the Office of Naval Intelligence of the military, naval, and economic situation of the country to which an attaché is to go. In the course of his preparation, he should become familiar with the navy of that country, as it is described in various official and private writings. By reading

service publications, navy lists, orders, regulations, and instructions, and other official publications of the kind he would use in his own service, an officer may develop an understanding of the naval service of that country similar to the understanding he has of his own. His aim should be to make himself feel thoroughly at home and conversant with the affairs of that country. This will make his subsequent task easier and will give a clue as to procedure, and a basis for comparison of what he finds with what he has read. In other words, preliminary familiarity with the state of a navy on paper will facilitate his verification of actual conditions. Obviously, such preparation is no matter of a few months done in leisure moments "in addition to other duties"; nor can it be well done without higher training than is acquired at the Naval Academy and in average service experience.

Considerable time should be spent in the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, studying the reports of previous attachés on naval establishments and industrial organizations, in order that the attaché may be so well posted on these matters in advance that he could go through a dockyard, or an industrial plant, and determine the changes which have been made since the last report.

While at the home office he should also be indoctrinated with the policy of the Department and become familiar with technical details, forms of reports, accounts, and routine of his duties.

Apart from the purely technical instruction received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, the preparatory training of an attaché should include a study not only of the language but also of the history, customs, government, and current events of the country in which he will work. The more he knows of the country—its geography, resources, and communications—the more efficient will be his work. A knowledge of the customs of the country is important as one that will assist the attaché in his daily relations with its people.

Before leaving for his post it is well for the attaché, through friends in the United States, to secure numerous letters of introduction to both natives and Americans residing in the capital to which he is to be accredited, for one can never tell who may prove to be most useful.

It will sometimes be of advantage for the attaché, before leaving the United States, to have himself proposed in advance at the clubs he intends to join. As a member of an embassy staff he can easily obtain entrance to all the clubs he may wish to join, but a certain amount of prestige is secured at the outset by being socially vouched for in advance of his arrival.

Visits to the Department of Commerce will establish friendly relations which may be of assistance abroad. The many trade agents

of the Department of Commerce would be very useful to attachés if instructed by their department to lend assistance.

It is of greater importance for the attaché, before proceeding abroad, to meet and know officials of the State Department, as his appointment by the Secretary of State may then carry more significance in the embassy to which he will be attached. Also by mixing with the diplomatic set in Washington he may obtain a knowledge of State Department methods and embassy ways that will offer beneficial ideas in advance. For the average naval officer, diplomatic life and the people who compose it are things absolutely new in his experience. The attaché might do well to remember that every set of people have their own peculiar ethics, thoughts, and manner of carrying on business. To this rule the diplomatic officials form no exception. They regard themselves as senior or ranking corps of the Government and according to the Navy Regulations they evidently are. The attaché should bear this fact in mind and accommodate himself to it.

It is helpful, but not essential, to make friends with members of the embassy from the country to which he is going. An acquaintance of this sort may very possibly lead to friendships abroad and will in addition enable the ambassador or minister in America to inform his Government beforehand that a suitable and competent naval attaché is to be stationed in the capital.

Such acquaintances as described in the paragraphs above may provide information that will obviate the necessity of making inquiries as to what to do and how to do it after arriving abroad. A careful study of diplomatic customs of the country in question will give an attaché an insight into the methods of diplomatic procedure and may save him future embarrassment from a lack of knowledge of proper etiquette upon his arrival abroad.

CHAPTER V

THE POSITION OF AN ATTACHÉ

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THE POSITION OF A NAVAL ATTACHÉ.

The importance of the position of a naval attaché as a liaison officer between two navies has been generally established. The attaché is the representative of the United States Navy in the country to which he is accredited. As that representative he makes impressions upon the officials of the foreign Government from which they will largely base their opinion of our service.

The mere assignment by a Government of a naval attaché to another Government is of itself a compliment to the latter, in that it implies that that Government has information, materials, conditions of personnel, etc., worthy of study and investigation. This is peculiarly true of minor countries and of the Orient.

Naval attachés are selected by the Office of Naval Intelligence, but assigned for duty abroad by the Bureau of Navigation or the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and their orders are signed by the Secretary of the Navy. (Naval Instructions, ch. 1, sec. 2, par. 6.)

Their correspondence is at all times under the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence, to which their reports and letters are to be forwarded for dissemination to the several bureaus and offices of the Department to which they may be of interest.

Attachés are ordered to report to the American ambassador or minister to whose staffs they are attached, and are directed to consider him as their superior officer.

The State Department, however, recognizes that the naval attaché is the direct representative of the Navy Department in the country to which he is assigned.

This creates for the naval attaché a dual relation: First, to the Navy Department through the Office of Naval Intelligence; second, to the ambassador or minister, as the case may be.

The attaché is a member of the personal staff of the ambassador and subject to his orders, taking precedence over other naval officers his senior in virtue of the rank of his immediate commanding officer, the ambassador.

The Department has repeatedly laid down the principle that a commander in chief on his own station can not issue an order to a

naval attaché. This, of course, is intended in no way to diminish or handicap the complete cooperation which should exist between force commanders abroad and naval attachés.

The Secretary of the Navy has laid down the following policy in regard to the above question:

At all times, and on all stations, the naval attachés have been entirely independent of the naval authorities present in the countries to which they are accredited. This is necessarily the case, as the naval attachés are designated by the Department of State after it has been ascertained that they will be acceptable to the authorities of the countries in which they are to be stationed. The department in each case directs them to report to our diplomatic representative and to obey his orders. They form a part of his personal staff. The status of our naval attachés is similar to that of naval attachés of other countries, and they may be considered, for the time being, a part of the diplomatic corps. Evidently, they could not be directed to obey the orders of the commander in chief except with the consent of their immediate superiors, the ambassadors or ministers.

Naval attachés should at all times cooperate to the best of their ability with military attachés, the Consular Service of the United States, and with other Government officials in foreign service.

The position of the attaché is above all one that requires tact. The necessity of this may be illustrated by an extract from Lieut. Froment's Military Espionage, which states:

The utility of attachés is incontestable, and their rôle is very delicate. There is no need of stating the fact that they are official agents for gathering information; that they should inform themselves to the utmost, permit nothing to escape them, keep themselves informed up to date of the minutest details, and report everything to their ministry. It is useless to deny that many governments keep them watched in the closest manner, while at the same time inviting them to maneuvers, to demonstrations, and officially communicating to them professional information.

Their situation thus exacts a great deal of address and delicacy.

Student attachés are under the Office of Naval Intelligence. For practical reasons they are attached to the embassies or legations and placed under the supervision of the naval attachés. It is not the intention of the department that the student attachés should be diverted from their studies for any purpose.

CHAPTER VI

EMBASSY RELATIONS

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EMBASSY RELATIONS.

The naval attaché
The naval attaché is by courtesy a member of the diplomatic corps, but he is not a diplomat. He is a member of the embassy staff for special purposes only. It is customary to give him orders to report to the ambassador for duty and to carry out any instructions that the ambassador gives him. At the same time the ambassador is directed by the State Department not to give him any instructions concerning his professional work as the naval attaché is representing the Navy and not the State Department.

Since the naval attaché should regard the chief of mission as his superior officer, he should at all times comply with such orders as he may receive from him. Should he be assigned duties which conflict with instructions of the Director of Naval Intelligence, or should friction or strained relations arise, he should immediately report the matter in writing to the Office of Naval Intelligence and in extreme cases request his recall. As far as possible, an attaché should cooperate in every manner with the chief of mission in the policies which the latter may outline.

Should the request for recall on the part of a naval attaché in such case as the foregoing be made, it will not be noted on his efficiency record as in any way reflecting on his efficiency.

There has sometimes been a certain amount of friction between the naval attaché and the secretaries of embassy. This is often engendered by a lack of appreciation of the other man's work and in time of peace has frequently some basis of social rivalry. A second secretary of embassy is apt to resent being junior in rank and drawing less pay than the naval and military attachés, whereas the attaché is apt to resent the fact that many years service for the Government does not necessarily give him the precedence over the first secretary who has very recently entered the service. These small bickerings can usually be adjusted by the acceptance of the rules of precedence as they stand, by talking the situation over with the other members of the embassy staff, and by stating definitely an in-

any friction between the naval attaché and the secretaries of embassy can generally be avoided by a knowledge and adherence to the

tention to abide by the rules with the expectation that others will do likewise.

Whenever disagreement arises between other members of the staff it is most advisable that the attaché hold himself apart by maintaining a strict neutrality. Due to the special character of his duty he should be able to keep away from such disagreements. In addition he may well follow a strict policy of silence regarding them, and so avoid making enemies.

✓ An attaché should cultivate close relations with the chief of the embassy or legation to which he is attached, for mutual advantage. His chief should rely upon him for advice and information in matters of the military political field, interpreted in the broadest sense; and the attaché should receive from his chief all possible opportunities and assistance in pursuing his duties.

✓ Though an attaché forwards his reports direct to the Navy Department he should keep the ambassador informed as to the information they contain (with the exception of purely technical data) and of the opinions that they express.

✓ While an attaché should show a disposition to render every possible assistance to the chief of the mission he must nevertheless remember that he is a technical officer and that he must be his own judge as to what line of procedure he should follow, and when and where he should carry on his activities. Without this entire independence his work may be seriously handicapped.

✓ An attaché should keep his ambassador informed as to the facilities offered by the Government to which he is accredited in matters of obtaining information and making inspections. The ambassador is unable to render an attaché the best assistance in the performance of his work without this knowledge.

✓ Questions of social etiquette in connection with the embassy staff and foreign diplomats can not be taken up in much detail as customs vary in different countries and more satisfactory advice may be obtained from one of the secretaries.

✓ In general, however, the latest arrival makes the first calls on all proper officials. As one never knows who may be of use in diplomatic circles it is well to extend the list of calls as far as possible without overstepping the bounds of acceptability. In some capitals first calls are made by merely leaving cards, where the rank is not too great. Upon the return of cards, personal calls should follow.

✓ Calls on naval and military officers are, however, almost always made in person.

✓ Extracts from the State Department's Instructions to Diplomatic Officers of the United States that concern an attaché are quoted below. They outline the status and precedence of the members of a mission, including that of the naval attaché.

Grade of diplomatic representatives.—The diplomatic representatives of the United States are of the first, the second, the intermediate, and the third classes, as follows:

(a) Ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

(b) Envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary and special commissioners, when styled as having the rank of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

(c) Ministers resident.

These grades of representatives are accredited by the President.

(d) *Chargé d'affaires* commissioned by the President as such and accredited by the Secretary of State to the minister for foreign affairs of the Government to which they are sent.

In the absence of the head of the mission the secretary acts *ex officio* as *chargé d'affaires ad interim* and needs no special letter of credence. In the absence, however, of a secretary and second secretary, the Secretary of State may designate any competent person to act *ad interim*, in which case he is specifically accredited by letter to the minister for foreign affairs.

Chargés d'affaires ad interim.—A secretary of embassy or legation will, in case of the absence, death, or disability of the diplomatic representative, assume the duties and perform the functions of *chargé d'affaires ad interim* without special instructions or credentials to that end; he will then follow the regulations herein prescribed.

Reticence.—Upon all occasions the secretary must be particularly on his guard against talking to others of the affairs of the mission or disclosing to them, directly or indirectly, anything connected with its affairs.

Chargé d'affaires ad interim.—If at any time, from circumstances or accident, the place of diplomatic representative should become vacant, it will be the duty of the secretary, in the absence of other provision on the part of this Government upon the subject, to retain charge of the seal, cipher, records, books, and archives of the mission, and to take upon himself the discharge of its ordinary functions as *chargé d'affaires ad interim* of the United States until the vacancy be otherwise supplied. In the event of the absence of the head of the mission from his post by permission of the Department of State, the duties of *chargé d'affaires ad interim* will in like manner devolve upon the secretary; and in such case he will be duly presented, in person or by vote, by the head of the mission to the minister for foreign affairs as the officer in charge of the mission.

Attachés.—The law prohibits the appointment of any "attaché" or of any secretary of embassy or legation otherwise than as provided by statute. (R. S. sec. 1674, par. 5.) No such appointment, therefore, shall be made by any diplomatic representative of the United States; and, should it come to the knowledge of a diplomatic representative that any person is representing himself as an "attaché" or styling himself a secretary of the mission without warrant, it will be his duty to report the fact to the Department of State and to informally make it known to the Government to which he is accredited.

How designated.—Naval or military attachés may be assigned by the Department of State from the Navy or Army, to reside at the seat of the mission, when the public interests demand it.

Duties.—Though the duties of naval and military attachés are in no sense under the control or direction of the ambassador or minister, yet it is not doubted that any assistance desired by either, owing to the professional knowledge that such attaché possesses, will be freely and cheerfully accorded.

Relations with heads of missions.—Naval and military attachés although commissioned by the Secretary of State, are designated by the chiefs of their

respective departments and become their exclusive agents in all professional matters connected with their official duties. Each is instructed directly by his department, and each in turn answers in the same way.

Ceremonial representation.—In ceremonial representations naval and military attachés form a part of the official staff of a mission.

Precedence.—Naval and military officers of the United States holding rank above that of captain in the Navy or colonel in the Army who may be attached to missions have place and precedence next in succession to the head of the mission for the time being, whatever his designation. Naval and military officers of the United States holding rank as captain in the Navy or colonel in the Army, or rank of a lower order, who may be attached to missions have place and precedence next in succession to the first secretary of embassy or legation.

In view of the provision of the diplomatic and consular appropriation act of July 1, 1916, creating the grade of counselor in the American diplomatic service, the following changes are made in the instructions of 1897 to diplomatic officers:

Counselors rank after the head of the mission and before the first secretary of embassy or legation.

First secretaries of embassy rank with, but after, brigadier generals in the Army and hold a rank intermediate between rear admirals and captains in the Navy.

Secretaries of legation rank with, but after, colonels in the Army and captains in the Navy.

Bearer of dispatches.—Couriers and bearers of dispatches employed by a diplomatic representative in the service of his Government are privileged persons, as far as is necessary for their particular service, whether in the state to which the representative is accredited or in the territories of a third state with which the Government they serve is at peace.

Reticence.—One of the essential qualifications of a diplomatic representative is to observe at all times a proper reserve in regard to the affairs of his Government, and the knowledge of these affairs possessed by persons belonging to the mission must be regarded as confidential.

Presents and testimonials.—Diplomatic officers are forbidden from asking or accepting from any foreign government, for themselves or other persons, any present, emolument, pecuniary favor, office, or title of any kind. (Const., Art. I, sec. 9, clause 8; R. S., sec. 1751.) It not infrequently happens that diplomatic officers are tendered presents, orders, or other testimonials in acknowledgment of services rendered to foreign states or their subjects. These can not be accepted without previous authority of Congress.

CHAPTER VII

FOREIGN GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

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A naval attaché as a member of the embassy staff is, upon arrival in the country to which he is accredited, usually accorded an audience with the sovereign of the country, or the minister for foreign affairs. As a rule it is expected that no official work shall be undertaken until after this audience.

It is also customary for the embassy to notify the foreign office before an attaché is detached.

A naval attaché should at all times show that he is in sympathy with the people and the Government to which he is accredited. It is highly important that he should win the confidence and friendship of the foreign government officials, without which his efficiency in getting information will be seriously impaired.

The attaché must therefore conduct himself in a spirit of entire frankness and be careful to show himself willing to observe all the local rules regarding forbidden zones and police regulations. Every Government knows that an attaché is detailed to get information concerning the naval establishment and recognizes that he is entitled to take every legitimate means to procure that information.

It is not considered then that any resort to dubious methods would bring results that could ^{compensate} pay for the loss of prestige the attaché would incur in the eyes of foreign officials.

In regard to this policy the Department has directed that the attaché, in the performance of his duties, shall employ "only such means as are consonant with his official position and the diplomatic relations that he bears to the Government which receives him as naval attaché."

An incident related of the time of the French Empire may serve to illustrate an interesting attitude toward the gathering of information by officials in foreign embassies.

de la A minister of foreign affairs, jealous of his prerogatives, on hearing his sovereign at a court ball freely express himself upon the events of the day to the chargé d'affaires of an allied Government, permitted himself to remark to the sovereign in a low voice and in the most respectful terms, about the danger of engaging in political discussions with foreign agents. The sovereign who, neither in his

heart nor in his thoughts, suspicioned any wrong, turned quickly toward the diplomat who had withdrawn and said to him:

Is it true that you report all my words to your court?

The countenance of the envoy fell and he could make no response; the minister intervened and replied for him:

A diplomat would not have a very high idea of the position of your majesty and would fail in all his duties to his Government if he did not faithfully report all that you deemed worthy to tell them.

It is worth while to remember that foreign diplomats sometimes find it difficult to comprehend the frank and open-hearted ways of Americans. The training of foreign officials has been very different and some of our democratic methods have consequently been difficult for them to understand. But they all expect us to act like Americans and when met with a spirit of frankness and sincerity they will ultimately like us all the more for being natural.

In regard to the relations an attaché has with the foreign office, it is necessary to remember that such relations should invariably be arranged through the secretarial staff of the embassy. On the other hand, when the embassy is dealing with matters that concern the ministry of marine, it is customary to refer them to the naval attaché. The same rule would, in the main, hold true with respect to the military attaché and the ministry of war.

An attaché may sometimes be called upon to make a public address or an after dinner speech. Either requires the display of the utmost tact, as an officer at the time is not expressing individual ideas, but is speaking as a representative of the American Navy.

With a little courage the art of speech making is not difficult. To be natural, to be light, to cater to the interests of the audience, to be brief, and to stop just before the listeners are satisfied, are the simplest requisites. To be able to speak is of value, for a few words that are light and entertaining to an after-dinner company certainly provide an opportunity for acquiring friends.

Regarding the associations of attachés, Commander Pye, United States Navy, says in his Service of Information and Security:

The naval attachés, who now form part of the staff of diplomatic agencies abroad, have to watch and report on all matters in foreign navies, in peace and in war, and through their services can afford information of no mean importance. Their duty, however, is of a delicate nature and requires considerable tact, for, being official agents of information, they are closely watched. Their task becomes more difficult as soon as there is some want of cordiality between the Government that sent them and the one to which they are accredited.

The closeness with which attachés are watched to prevent them from ascertaining information on matériel would seem to indicate that their time can be most profitably employed in obtaining information of the personal characteris-

tics of the leading military and naval officers; the ideas of strategy and tactics prevalent in the military and naval forces; the general feeling of the public with regard to our policies; the probable places of mobilization and the time required to complete such mobilization; and the military, naval, and financial resources of the country.

Under certain conditions an attaché must be cautious about applying to a foreign admiralty as official applications for important information will probably lead to a request for reciprocal information. Therefore unless it is definitely desired by the Office of Naval Intelligence that an official application be made, it is preferable for naval attachés to endeavor to obtain the information required unofficially. When requesting permission or accepting invitations to witness confidential and important experiments, permission should be obtained from the Director of Naval Intelligence if time permits, for the reason that in many cases reciprocal privileges will be expected. At the same time this caution should in no way restrict an attaché from benefiting by all ordinary offers that may be available.

Naval information received from foreign Governments is in theory transmitted through the medium of the American naval attachés, who are only to procure information. The naval information furnished to foreign countries is transmitted, via the Office of Naval Intelligence to the naval attachés of the foreign Governments in Washington. An American naval attaché when receiving a request for information from a foreign Government must, therefore, forward the same through the proper channels as stated above.

Any order of the Department to an attaché to procure information presupposes a willingness on the part of the Department to give similar information in exchange. The basis of exchange is not barter and sale but a *quid pro quo*.

The Navy Department may maintain a naval attaché in a foreign country not so represented in the United States, and vice versa; in which case the existing naval attaché is the sole medium of communication.

In practice this principle does not always hold. Frequently foreign naval departments request information from the United States naval attachés abroad to whom the information furnished in reply is sent for transmission. Occasionally, though rarely, the Director of Naval Intelligence requests information from the foreign naval attachés in Washington, who make direct reply.

Free entry of baggage.—There is no fixed practice governing the free entry of attachés' baggage into the countries to which they are accredited. A safe rule is to have the attaché write personally to the secretary of the mission concerned and have the matter arranged in accordance with the practices obtaining in the country in

The naval attaché will refrain from indiscriminate visits to officers at the Admiralty unless personally invited to do otherwise. Even in such cases, the attaché should be accompanied by a senior officer.

question. The department does not ask for free entry in foreign countries.

✓ A naval attaché returning to the United States on leave or at the conclusion of his tour of duty, is entitled to free entry for his baggage. This courtesy is also extended to his family. He should, well in advance, write a letter (or cable) to the Secretary of the Navy (for O. N. I.) and give name of steamer by which baggage will arrive; also the port and date of arrival. This information is absolutely necessary for the guidance of the customs officials. The Navy Department then requests the Secretary of State to arrange with the Treasury Department for the free entry. This is always granted. The attaché has nothing to do beyond sending the letter or cable above referred to.

Normally the presentation of the diplomatic passport at the port of entry is sufficient to ensure this. If, however, the Secretary of the Navy (O. N. I.) is informed well in advance by letter (cable) giving the name of the steamer by which the baggage will arrive, also the port and date of arrival additional steps will be taken through the State Department.

In attending functions for which a uniform has been prescribed for the naval forces of the country, the naval attaché should wear the corresponding uniform prescribed by the U. S. Navy Uniform Regulations.

CHAPTER VIII

DESIRABLE INFORMATION

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DESIRABLE INFORMATION.

Before it is possible to develop a thorough conception of what information is desired by the Naval Service it is necessary to realize why certain information is indispensable in war at sea, and to what use the information that is obtained will be put.

It is the duty of every commander-in-chief to engage the enemy under circumstances favorable to himself and disadvantageous to the enemy. With regard to this, Frederick the Great says:

If one could always be acquainted beforehand with the enemy's designs, one could always beat him with an inferior force.

In conjunction with a knowledge of the enemy's plans it is imperative to be informed of his disposition and movements; his theories of strategy and tactics, the morale of the personnel, the efficiency of his matériel, and his possible use of ruses and new devices.

Gen. Thiebault has said:

War is only doubtful in its results because it is possible to fall into error with regard to the movements of one's adversaries.

Following this thought we may claim that victory in naval warfare may rest with the admiral who has been most accurately and reliably informed by his intelligence service. His decision as to the time, place, and advisability of an engagement, which carries with it a heavy responsibility, is influenced by two factors; one, his own ability and judgment, and the other the information that is furnished him.

Commander Pye, United States Navy, in his Service of Information and Security, says:

The difficulty and delay encountered in the acquisition of information adds greatly to the chance of success of the force that can take the initiative, for the enemy lacking information can only tardily conform to its requirements. A lack of information frequently causes confusion and hesitancy, which are the precursors of defeat.

Accurate, timely information bestows the power of initiative which, if properly used, may be the decisive factor in the campaign. Victory or defeat often rests upon the veracity and opportuneness of the information received. The greatest talent can be of little use to a commander who is provided only with false or greatly delayed information.

One of the important duties of the Office of Naval Intelligence is to supply through its attachés reliable and comprehensive information to the General Board and the Planning Divisions. The importance of this function of intelligence can not be overemphasized, for this information is the groundwork upon which the Department constructs its plans. Uncertainty with regard to the enemy's forces, his probable courses of action, and his development of matériel and personnel constitute vital impediments in the formulation of a plan of campaign. Lack of complete information or delay in obtaining it may paralyze the initiative of a fleet and under critical conditions give it over to defeat.

In addition to information required in preparation of campaign plans, the General Board must be supplied with the data on foreign navies that will enable it to decide upon the size and characteristics of the ships of our own Navy. Also, the Board must determine the proper strategical disposition of the naval forces in the event of war.

The information that is of greatest importance at that time has been summed up by Commander Pye as follows:

1. Policy of each Government, the antagonism of which to our own policy may cause a war.
2. The military, naval, and financial resources of such Governments.
3. The strength and disposition, state of preparation, and efficiency of their naval forces.
4. The ideas of strategy and tactics prevalent in their naval services.
5. The national characteristics that may be exhibited during the war.
6. The characteristics of prominent naval officers and probable assignments of such officers in war.
7. Data concerning the probable theaters of operation.
8. Probable intentions of probable enemies.

Instances of failure to provide such information are far from rare, but such failure has been attended with greater disasters on land than on sea, though this will probably not be true of the future.

In addition to the above classes of information with which all commanders-in-chief should be familiar are the following, which deal more minutely with the operations of a particular campaign but which are required by the commander-in-chief to decide upon the proper strategic operations and dispositions of the fleet:

1. Size, distribution, places of mobilization, and probable date of completion of the mobilization of the active and reserve fleet.
2. The time of departure, the probable destination, and intention of the enemy.

The General Board relies on the Office of Naval Intelligence for its information, which in turn is dependent upon its attachés and agents. The character of information required of them will vary with the state of political affairs.

A logical division of political relations would be (1) peace conditions, (2) premobilization conditions under strained relations, and (3) war conditions.

(1) PEACE CONDITIONS.

Under peace conditions the following general information is desirable for use of the department:

1. Actual strength in personnel and matériel, including reserve resources, their facilities for transporting troops overseas, the adaptability of foreign private-owned vessels to war purposes, and the lines and means of water communication available for such enterprises.
2. Time necessary for mobilization of the reserve and active forces.
3. Organization, administration, cooperation with other governmental functions, progress, policy, and the trend of present activities; that is, the intentions, depth of interest, and extent of unity in purpose of the government.
4. Distribution of reserve and active forces.
5. Training and practice, from the individual beginnings up to the yearly maneuvers.
6. The character of the several categories of officers and men, flag, superior and subordinate officers, petty officers, and lower ratings. This includes discipline, morale, and esprit de corps.
7. Individual characters, and the means employed to develop individual ability and bring it to the front. This includes an estimate of the qualities of those likely to hold commands and other important places in war.
8. Material progress and development; material matters of military importance or interest for adoption or comparison.
9. Defenses, armaments, and facilities for obtaining coal, fuel oil, gasoline, and supplies; and for having repairs made at all foreign ports of the world.
10. General or special plans of campaign, covering the topographic, climatic, sanitary, and other peculiarities of foreign countries which can have a bearing upon naval operations; the facilities on foreign coasts for landing men and supplies, and means for supporting detached bodies of troops in the interior; and the canals and interior waterways available for passage of torpedo boats and other naval craft.
11. The collating and keeping up to date of data relating to the inspection and assignment of merchant vessels under United States registry and of such foreign private-owned vessels as may be indicated.
12. Through correspondence with owners, consulting trade journals, and by any other practical means of keeping track of the status and

Duties Intelligence
location of different United States merchant vessels listed as auxiliaries for war; of sales to other lines; and of changes in trade routes or terminal ports which may make necessary a change in the yard designated for war preparation; and to report such changes in the lists of ships to the department for its information, the information of the General Board, and the Board of Inspection and Survey, in order that a further inspection of particular ships may be made, if necessary.

The subjects mentioned above are to serve merely as a guide, and it is by no means to be inferred that a knowledge of other events, facts, and conditions in the enemy and neutral countries, which are not enumerated here, may not also be important. The attaché must judge for himself without slavishly adhering to the letter of instructions.

The details required on matériel and personnel are listed in the classification scheme of the archives of the Office of Naval Intelligence. This scheme is included in the "Instructions in Regard to Intelligence Duty."

(2) PREMOBILIZATION CONDITIONS.

During the period of strained relations an attaché must report immediately any indications that may furnish the department a basis for presuming that mobilization is about to be effected.

These signs may be summarized as follows:

GENERAL INDICATIONS.

- (a) Limitation of leave and the recall of the officers and men on leave.
- (b) Statistical inquiries by the Government concerning the amount of foodstuffs on hand at large dealers.
- (c) Censorship of the press. Omission of the usual information concerning the movements of ships, etc.
- (d) Status of Government securities. Increase in insurance rates.
- (e) Imports and exports. Importations of coal, foodstuffs, articles of equipment, and other war requirements.
- (f) Incidents in the presumably hostile country which would aid in judging the temper of the Government and the people.
- (g) Permanent or temporary closing of the telegraph or cable lines to foreign countries for Government purposes.

INDICATIONS IN THE NAVY.

- (a) Organization of the information service by the naval authorities.
- (b) Striking changes in the location of ships. (Whether such changes in the distribution of vessels—battleships, cruisers, subma-

rines, and destroyers—constitute a precautionary distribution of forces or are they part of a regular strategical plan for the deployment of the fleet.)

(c) Sudden changes in or interruption of exercises forming part of a regular plan.

(d) Material preparation of the vessels of the reserve formation and of vessels out of commission, such as docking, coaling, and provisioning.

(e) The holding of extra target practices by these vessels.

(f) Mobilization exercises and alarm drills which are not regularly provided for.

(g) Increased activity at Government and private shipyards in the gun, torpedo, and ammunition factories (working overtime and at night).

(h) Preparation of transport fleets. Equipment and distribution of transports, assembling of troops and army material at ports.

(i) Cable steamers and auxiliary vessels. Equipment and destination of cable steamers and auxiliary vessels. Equipment of auxiliary vessels with mines.

(j) Navigation marks. Removal of navigation marks or their substitution by others. Change or removal of landmarks. Changes in the external appearance of lighthouses and in their lights. Removal of conspicuous towers and other distinctive marks on the enemy coasts.

(k) External appearance of warships. Changes in the appearance of presumably enemy warships; for example, by painting a different color. Removal of all articles not needed on board.

(l) Hastened execution or sudden cessation of repairs on ships and small vessels.

(m) Accelerated commissioning of new ships.

(n) Unusual shipments of fuel (coal and oil) and of munitions. Extraordinary purchases of coal and unusual accumulation of fuel at the supply bases. The fitting of suitable colliers.

(o) Increased safety measures in the coast fortifications; extra target practices and alarm drills.

(p) The exercise of guard duty by the harbor flotillas, the putting into operation of the inspection service and of the searchlights of the coast fortifications, the clearing or laying out of floating obstructions, all under the guise of exercises.

(q) Noticeably frequent flights by aircraft seaward (observation service).

(r) The commandeering of private aeroplanes.

(s) Mobilization of crews (possibly in special trains) from the depots of men and from the schools to the ports where the reserve formations and ships out of commission are lying.

(t) Inconspicuous notification of reservists and coast guard or the calling out of reservists (reservist trains).

(u) Increased activity in the barracks.

Much of this information must be obtained during peace, for a declaration of war or the outbreak of hostilities is immediately followed by a cessation of the flow of information through the usual peace channels. Our diplomatic representatives, with the accompanying naval and military attachés, must leave an enemy territory. Not only is military and naval information then jealously guarded, but false information is spread broadcast. Rumors become common. No information can be considered accurate unless verified by trusted agents.

The task of the attaché thus becomes exceedingly difficult during the time of strained relations. Information at that time becomes, however, of the most vital importance and necessitates the utmost vigilance, combined with caution, sound judgment, and decision.

(3) WAR CONDITIONS.

During hostilities the attachés operate with greatest effect in countries bordering upon the enemy. Advantage may be taken of deserters, interns, prisoners of war, commercial travelers, and even enemy agents of doubtful loyalty.

Among the classes of information that increase in importance during war conditions may be listed the following:

- (a) Development of matériel, particularly of speed, armor, and armament of ships.
- (b) Submarines, increase in armament and speed.
- (c) Aircraft, use of kite balloons.
- (d) Seaplane carriers.
- (e) New types of vessels, "mystery ships," distant controlled torpedo motor boats, etc.
- (f) New devices and ruses, changes in disposition of naval forces, movements of ships.
- (g) Plans of operations.
- (h) Mining operations.
- (i) Changes in tactics, smoke screens.
- (j) Enemy losses.
- (k) Economic conditions.
- (l) Financial conditions.
- (m) Political conditions.

When opportunity offers for acquiring information on a specialized subject such as an inspection of a salvaged submarine, the services of a specialist should be obtained if possible. Barring that, recourse should be made to whatever material is on hand for a brief study of

submarine construction. This brings out the advisability of keeping on hand the latest textbooks on professional subjects. They are of great value in enabling an attaché to look up enough data on any subject to know what points are most important in seeking information. Further reference should be made to the classification scheme of the Office of Naval Intelligence archives, which will list the important elements of each unit in the outline. This scheme is published in Instructions in Regard to Intelligence Duty.

During war the attaché will be assisted in seeking information by questionnaires from Washington. These will indicate what points are being emphasized by war developments, and what information may be of vital or immediate importance.

Examples follow of various questionnaires furnished by Germany to its agents during the world war.

(a) 1. Map out the street surroundings of munition factories, and mark any high church towers in the neighborhood, giving the direction of these towers from the factory.

2. Where are munition plants, ship-building plants, docks, and depots of merchandise which can be reached from the sea by gunfire?

3. What are the demands of dissatisfied labor, I. W. W., anarchists, etc., and what indemnity is paid passengers and sailors when the boat is sunk?

4. How are ports of entry protected by mines, aviation, and how are entries to ports guarded, if by buoy, and in what direction?

5. Is there a mine field at Sandy Hook Lightship?

6. Convoys—speed, strength, and protecting squadron; size of convoy, names of boats, size, etc.

7. What are the Alexandria-Genoa and Gibraltar-Genoa routes? What are the Norfolk-Bordeaux routes?

8. How is the Panama Canal watched?

9. What signals do ships show when entering American ports?

10. What foreign warships are in American ports; name, class, flag, and ports visited?

11. Which American warships are in European waters?

12. What do you know about the new British and French small cruisers? British: *Arethusa*, *Cordelia*, *Calliope*, *Castor*, *Constance*, *Cambris*, *Canterbury*. French: *Lamotte-Piquet*, *Nemen*. Have any important alterations been made in them since the war?

13. How many destroyers are there of the M. W. and O. class?

14. Are gas shells used in warships?

15. What shells are used against German airships and aeroplanes?

16. What range finders are used against aircrafts?

17. Any details as to the protection against torpedoes and mine explosions.

18. What materials are they composed of? If possible, get a sample. Which ships are fitted in this way? If so, what is the loss of speed? What speed is possible without damaging the protective arrangement?

19. Why has Commander Gordon Campbell gotten such quick promotion?

[NOTE.—Commander Campbell developed the idea of the "Mystery ships."]

(b) 1. Have they guns above 38 cm. in the British Navy?

2. Have they guns above 15 cm. on the destroyers.

3. Of what caliber are the biggest guns on the classes of the *Lion*, *Furious*, *King George*, *Queen Elizabeth*, and *Invincible*?

4. A new type of tank is spoken of which can go by land or by sea. Does it really exist? Give a description.
5. Is an aerial or naval attack in preparation on Heligoland or Zeebrugge or the German coast of the North Sea?
6. Are armed pontoons of very shallow draft being constructed for this? Their description.
7. Description and, above all, the draft of the latest type of British monitor.
8. Exact information as to the routes taken by the transports for Murman. Do the troops always go by transport, and which troops?
9. Exact information as to the routes of the convoys between America and England, England and France, England and Norway.
10. Is it true that the England to Norway convoys cross directly over the mine fields on their journeys?
11. Information on the types of British submarines H, T, L, M, N, V, W.
12. When convoys leave America, they are guarded by American warships; but on arriving in England or France, they are guarded by the British or French Navy. At what point in the Atlantic do the French or British ships meet the convoys?
13. Information on the types *Cornelia*, *Hush*, and *Hush-Hush* (above all, the last mentioned).
14. Are the "obus à gaz" filled with gas in England?
15. At Newcastle, for Chile, two cruisers are under construction. Has England appropriated them for her own use?
16. Do the British Navy use torpedoes of a more modern type than G. R. F. I. and G. R. F. II?
17. Where are the Curtiss aeroplanes (hydroplanes) stationed and where are the factories situated which build them?
18. Information on the new invention against submarines.
19. Is it true that the British use naval light-ships (des navires phares) painted red as submarine traps? Their descriptions.
20. Routes between Hatteras—Norfolk—Halifax? How are the last two ports guarded?
21. Are "obus à gaz" used in the British Navy? Their description.
22. Numbers of the battalions at Murman, Mesopotamia, Saloniki, etc. [Murman was underlined on the list.]
23. The allies have for some time been using a new kind of gas shell. Have they at the same time a protection against this gas?
24. In Armstrong's yards at Newcastle they are building cruisers with double armor plating with a certain distance between the two. What is this distance, and with what matter is it filled up?
- (c) 1. Way of military transports from United States of America to France, the (armed place) fulcrums on this way (Madeira, Azores) the kind of security, number, and placing together of American men-of-war in European waters. Kind of arming of American auxiliary cruisers. Kind, how they are distributed—near at hand or Gibraltar. Which old commercial steamers are these?
2. The way to attack German submarines? (Edison invention.)
3. Kind of watching of American ports, kind of the distinctive marks to come into American ports?
4. When and how the Japanese will help the allies with fleet and army?
5. Kind of watching in the West Indies and in the front of the Panama Canal?
6. Opportunities to send letters to South America?
7. Military frame of mind and situation.

8. Building of steamers (men-of-war and commercial)? Which ships shall be repaired? (Destroyers, submarines, etc.)
9. When are the German and Austrian steamers ready to go out for a trip?
10. The present situation of the German prisoners?
11. Where are new flying stations, what machine is used by the American Army and Navy?
12. Where are military camps, how many are there, which regiments, kind of training?
13. What quantities of war materials and how many soldiers can be delivered by the United States of America per month to the Continent?
14. Where can be found new fortifications on the American coast? Where are batteries and how they are built?
15. New cables, Madeira—Lisbon. The way the convoys are going?
16. What names of battleships stationed in European waters?
17. Names of battleships serving with convoys from United States of America and South America to Europe?
18. Battleships stationed at Boston and other American ports.
19. Coast defenses?

CHAPTER IX

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

delete It is said that during the Franco-Prussian War, when McMahon attempted his disastrous march to the relief of Bazaine, the first news of this important movement came to Von Moltke through the French and English papers.

With the increasing efficiency of the means of gathering and transmitting news and the pecuniary resources at the disposal of certain newspapers, with the number of correspondents they have in the smallest villages, and with the constantly growing popular demand for late and complete information, it is probable that information conveyed by this means may be even more valuable in the future than in the past.

One attaché habitually read or scanned 10 foreign newspapers as a part of the day's work. After one is accustomed to it, and knows his paper technically, with the characteristics, political and financial affiliations of the owners and editors, the average foreign paper (German excepted) can be assimilated in a few minutes so far as intelligence work is concerned.

There is a strong resemblance between certain duties of an attaché and those of the foreign newspaper correspondent of an American newspaper. The correspondent cables or writes the news to his editor and the attaché to the Navy Department.

The attaché will often find correspondents of assistance. As a rule, they are dependable and trustworthy, but now and then there may be danger from their main idea in life, which is to "beat the game" and score a "scoop" on other correspondents. *delete* [The following experience of an attaché may illustrate this:

delete At one time when a certain embassy staff was secretly engaged in conducting an investigation of an international matter, the attaché was charged with a certain part of the work. As usual, the newspaper men got wind of it, and besieged the embassy for two days. They were in a state of uncertainty and did not know whether the investigation was in progress or not. The attaché received orders to leave immediately for a certain town in connection with this matter, and on going out of the office thoughtlessly told his destination to a correspondent, who soon after reported it to a colleague. This man obtained an interview with the ambassador, enlarged on the information acquired, and impressed on his excellency that the secret was out and that it would be best to give a statement to the press. The attaché's reception on his return to the embassy was not exactly cordial; both the ambassador and attaché had been "framed" by the two newspaper men working in conjunction.

This instance shows that an attaché must sometimes be reticent in his dealings with newspaper men. While cultivating cordial and friendly relations with them, there are limits which should not be overstepped.

delete Newspaper men are usually of a very wide awake and progressive type. It was through one of them, acting in company with some of his French colleagues, that subtle articles appeared in the French press in the spring of 1917, giving the Germans the impression that the first American contingent intended to land at Brest. The American transports reached St. Nazaire without having to pass over a mine field.

Other printed information of value may sometimes be found by examining military libraries, book stores, and publishers' lists. Copies of valuable documents or books may be purchased by means of the special fund provided for this purpose. In addition, the home office should be supplied with the latest editions of official navy lists, yearbooks, and the different drill regulations as they are issued from time to time.

The attaché should know personally all consular officers, who, as a rule, are very approachable and only too glad to assist in every way. Consular reports contain much data concerning the shipping that enters foreign ports. This data may become important in the event of war. With proper questions to be answered by each consular officer, much data concerning anchorage, dockage, coaling, and repair facilities, might be obtained for use in the port directory. *Sailing books*

When visiting various ports, opportunity should be taken to call upon the consul and enlist his support, explaining the nature of the information required and the procedure that should be adopted when forwarding it. Discretion must be used in the case of unpaid consuls and special consular agents who do not belong to the regular Consular Service and may not be American citizens.

In certain cases it may be of value for an attaché to forward reports on the reliability of various consuls and the assistance they might render the Department in emergency. It is always desirable to forward the names of all consuls who merit a letter of appreciation for assistance rendered.

omit In the past, consular officials as a rule have taken little interest in naval matters. One attaché reports that when he asked a consul at a certain port regarding the fortifications there, the latter replied, "Well, they have been hauling past my office a great number of something or other covered with canvas, and I believe they must have been guns for the fortification." When asked the number and caliber of the guns, he answered, "I don't know. We consuls have never been asked to take interest in such matters."

By establishing close cooperation between all our consular officers and the representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, active and intelligent sources of information may be supplied.

In mixing with our own officials it should be remembered that the functions of the Consular Service are very different from those of the diplomatic corps, and that there is also a difference in the social standing of the two services. It is well to appreciate this, and to use tact and discretion in going from one to the other, or in any dealings wherein both are concerned.

The commercial world is always well supplied with information of value, especially with regard to movements and sales of ships, unusual shipments of fuel, and various other transactions of interest. Such items may sometimes prove of unexpected value. It is, therefore, worth while to keep in touch with our commercial houses and brokerage firms.

The heads of these commercial establishments, which are found in every part of the world, are usually patriotic citizens that have reliable opinions on economic conditions. The assistance of these business men may often be used to advantage. They are usually ready to help in any way possible with information that they possess.

In this connection one might particularly mention the agents of American steamship companies and the representatives of American banking companies, who provide valuable sources of information. For example, the National City Bank of New York has a foreign service of its own, composed of well-trained men who are carefully selected and are, in nearly every case, graduates of reputable colleges. These men are trained for permanent service abroad and are in constant touch with resident American business men. They have always been found willing and ready to cooperate in every way with naval attachés.

There are also representatives in foreign capitals of large American corporations. Their duties often assume a particular type of intelligence work along their own lines. These duties consist in watching and reporting the activities of competing firms, both American and foreign; to watch out for chances of possible operations; to watch political and international situations; and to become on friendly and intimate terms with Government officials. It may be difficult to find out exactly who these men are, but when they can be located a source of valuable information has been found. [Examples might be cited of Col. Hunsacker, of the Steel Corporation; Matthews, a former naval officer, of the Bethlehem Steel Works; and Van Lean, of the Standard Oil Co.]

In some foreign countries the representatives of the Standard Oil Co. have a knowledge of local conditions that may excel even that of the local consul, and they can often be of considerable assistance to an attaché.

An officer must remember, however, that these men owe a certain loyalty to the foreign Government under which they transact business; the attaché must use discretion in handling the information acquired through them, for should its source become known their reputation with Government officials would thereby be injured.

One attaché reports that just before the war between Russia and Japan, while visiting an American establishment at Port Arthur, he was able to see the details of the fortifications. Fearing that he might have compromised the concern, he called in uniform on the Russian commandant of the navy yard, which established his position and thereby relieved the American commercial men from any embarrassment.

Attachés should also make the acquaintance of technical men, heads of large manufacturing and engineering plants, and the operating staffs of big business in general. Every attaché must utilize his own personality in forming these acquaintances, for it is not always possible to inherit friends from a predecessor. Each must form and enlarge his own circle of acquaintances.

It is sometimes inadvisable for an attaché to make frequent visits to any one establishment, as for instance the large munition factories in foreign countries. One attaché has said that in Germany he was not expected to visit certain ordnance concerns more than once a year. Conditions may be very much altered, however, when orders for material are placed through an attaché. Prospects of even a small contract will often open the way to obtaining valuable information. [Previous to the great war, Russian and Argentine officials were, on this account, allowed to go almost anywhere in Germany. At that time, the Ehrhardt Co. was very friendly to Americans, because they were building us some field pieces, while the Krupps, on the contrary, were openly hostile.]

The principal official source of information is the foreign Navy Department. It is expected that the attaché will officially ask to visit certain establishments of the Government. In addition, he may apply directly to the Navy Department for desired information. During peace times the data that are supplied him by a foreign Admiralty will but seldom be sufficiently complete to be of much value to our Navy Department. One of our officers is of the opinion that by co-operating and comparing notes with other attachés, it may often be possible to combine their information with that already received, thereby forming a much more valuable report.

Constant application at the Admiralty for detailed information will usually lead to unsatisfactory replies. Consequently, foreign navy departments should not be asked for information that may be practicably obtained from other sources.

It has been found that advantage may be gained by keeping in close touch with other attachés, particularly in regard to requests for information from the Admiralty. By dividing such requests among the different officers, it is possible to obtain a more continuous flow of unduplicated information from the Admiralty, to be shared equally among the attachés, with the consequent result of keeping files more up to date. It has even been recommended by one officer that regular conferences of attachés be held for this purpose; although it probably would not be feasible to include all attachés, it might be practicable to be on such terms with at least one, so that requests to the Admiralty could be divided between them. Such a plan would, of course, best be applicable only in procuring routine information.

An example is given of a request for information made upon the German Admiralty several years ago. It will serve to illustrate the evasiveness that may be encountered in a reply from a foreign navy department:

APRIL 12, 1907.

The undersigned naval attaché of the United States has the honor to request that His Excellency Admiral V. Tirpitz, secretary of state for the Imperial Navy Department, will kindly cause him to be furnished with the information as per inclosed sheet.

This information is requested for the Bureau of Navigation, by whom it will be much appreciated. A like return will be willingly furnished if desired.

The undersigned takes advantage of this occasion to renew to His Excellency the assurance of his most distinguished consideration.

A. B. C.,

*Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy,
Naval Attaché.*

To His Excellency, Admiral V. TIRPITZ,
Secretary of State for the Imperial Navy Department.

The Imperial German Navy: (a) Frequency of docking vessels in commission.

(b) Frequency of docking vessels in reserve or in ordinary.

(c) Frequency of ships assigned to fleet going to navy yard for repairs.

(d) Average time yearly ships assigned to fleet are undergoing repairs at navy yards.

(e) Length of service of ships in commission before first general overhauling.

(f) Length of active service between general overhauls.

The following reply was received on May 17:

I have the honor to answer the questions made in your favored letter of April 12, 1907, as follows:

Questions a and b: The ships of the German navy are, as a rule, docked once a year; a more frequent docking takes place only when required by special conditions.

Question c and f: In general the ships in commission go to the yards for repairs once a year. The duration of repairs depends upon the extent of the work in hand at the time. General overhauling is made only when required.

An attaché can visit naval establishments to much better advantage if he go armed with previous knowledge in regard to them. The bet-

ter he is informed on these subjects before leaving home the quicker he will be able to observe the changes in progress. One of our able attachés has stated that whereas in the beginning it took him many hours to inspect a dockyard, later, as his information increased, he could make a similar inspection in a short time by passing over the general familiar outline of the establishment and observing only the new developments.

There is one point worth remembering with regard to securing information from an admiralty. If the nation is on friendly terms with the United States, it is almost always possible to obtain non-confidential information from this source. Hence, it is never worth while to obtain any such information surreptitiously which could be officially obtained merely for the asking.

Little information may be gleaned from the Government, however, as to the real spirit which pervades the navy, as to its ideas of strategy and tactics, and as to the morale and efficiency of the personnel. A knowledge of these can only be acquired through extensive association with naval officers and officials on duty outside of the capital. Those who are on duty at the ministry are under observation and are often impressed with the desirability of keeping such information from attachés. It is very different with officers in the various naval ports and in the fleet. Association with them is usually productive of better results. An attaché will be surprised to find how a wide acquaintance among all classes of people will increase his sources of information. Particularly among naval officers will he find that in ordinary conversation there is a great deal to be learned by comparison and deduction. In familiar conversation it has indeed proved difficult for an officer to avoid telling more than he realizes when indulging in professional discussion with friends of his own cloth.

Besides knowing as many naval officers as possible, it is advisable to have a wide circle of friends among army officers. In an aristocratic country an attaché should also know as many members of the aristocracy as possible, for they are invariably acquainted with the policy of the government. Contact with cultivated people of this type not only requires that an officer should be well equipped professionally, but that he be sufficiently gifted to make a favorable impression upon individuals of all stations with whom he may be thrown.

An attaché should endeavor to keep himself well informed on professional conditions in the United States by familiarizing himself with home newspapers and magazines. As sources of "trade" information, there are also the annual departmental reports; the Navy Year Book; the proceedings of naval committees; and publications of the Naval Institute. These contain a vast amount of information that has been made public in America and that can, therefore, be im-

parted at discretion to foreign officials. Much of this information would seem confidential to foreigners, who are much more conservative about data that is given to the public. The United States publishes more semiofficial information and statistics about its Navy than any other government. Foreign navies, for the most part, have not fully appreciated the services of the Public Printer in Washington. Again, an officer may be greatly surprised by the important and common information that is sometimes overlooked by a foreign admiralty.

An experience of a former naval attaché in Paris that occurred shortly after the Spanish-American War will illustrate what important information may sometimes be missed.

The assistant chief of staff of the French Intelligence Division was in possession of almost no technical information concerning the damage to Cervera's ships at Santiago. He exhibited the liveliest interest in the details which our attaché was able to give him concerning the destructive effect of gunfire and the ratio of shots fired to hits made. The attaché sent him a copy of the report of the board published in the Army and Navy Register, of which he was in ignorance and for which he was very grateful.

In his association with various classes of people with whom an attaché must come in contact, a great deal will depend upon the personal equation of the officer himself. His comprehension of the temperament and customs of the people among whom he moves will influence his success in a great measure. The attitude and methods which might be useful in one country may be useless in another. With some officials there may be found an appreciation of American frankness and cordiality. With others who may be accustomed to a sort of super politeness, any brusqueness might not be understood.

An attaché may occasionally pick up information of value from inventors, who, in addition, may submit offers of their work. All correspondence and plans pertaining to such inventions should be submitted to the Director of Naval Intelligence. Except in extreme cases, the attaché should not come to any terms or conclude contracts with inventors without reference to the Director.

Inventors should be informed that detailed plans are necessary in submitting their offers, and that such plans may be forwarded through the naval attaché as confidential—also that the department will make no use of them without first informing the inventor and subsequently remunerating him.

The inventor himself must assume all risk in the transit of papers to and from the Office of Naval Intelligence. It is also advisable that he submit definite ideas regarding acceptable prices in order that protracted correspondence may be avoided.

The following instructions issued by the Department of State to the American diplomatic and consular officers in Latin America are applicable to the duties of naval attachés.

CHAPTER X

ACCURACY OF INFORMATION

CHAPTER X.

ACCURACY OF INFORMATION.

The naval attaché is one of the chief sources of information in the intelligence service. Experience has indicated that the details of information on foreign navies may be ascertained more completely and thoroughly from attachés than from any other source. An attaché may render invaluable service as a censor of truth. His rôle in some respects is similar to that of a press correspondent. He may correct and censor the news of naval import, keeping the Navy Department accurately informed. An alert officer in a foreign country can find many facilities for discriminating between false and true information, and may soon qualify himself to read between the lines of press reports and periodicals, recognizing quickly what is probable, improbable, or intended to mislead. Very often data published in Jane, Brassey, Engineering, or quoted in the Naval Institute, and other publications, would not find credence by an attaché who was alive to his opportunities, for some of this misinformation is occasionally published with deliberate intention to mislead for political or military purposes.

It is important that the reliability of every informant or source of information be thoroughly judged and in addition clearly indicated on each report. The Office of Naval Intelligence is, in most cases, dependent upon the judgment of its representative in estimating the accuracy and reliability of information that is received. Information may be utterly useless without a knowledge of the source. For example, suppose it is reported that a late type of foreign submarine made in its trials a speed of 26 knots on the surface. If the informant was thoroughly reliable and well versed in submarine affairs, this information would be of great value, due to its influence on antisubmarine tactics. It would also indicate a radical change in the construction of submarines of that particular country. With a questionable informant, such information as the above would, in all probability, have to be disregarded.

Another example may be cited: A report forwarded to the home office during war-time in 1918 stated that the German high seas fleet

was taking on board great quantities of stores in order to put to sea. In view of the extreme importance of this information, a careful analysis of the source was necessary. The informant, who had observed the loading of the stores on board the ships, was believed to be reliable and his judgment and general intelligence were believed to be sound. Upon interrogation, he could not give information as to the class of stores that were received on board. The point was that he very probably could not distinguish between sea stores and ammunition. Every battleship periodically receives on board great quantities of stores. Food alone for a thousand men or more might occupy considerable bulk in one shipment. Ammunition allotments are often forwarded to a fleet for the purpose of completing an allowance when there is no intention of the fleet putting to sea at all. If the German fleet were actually going to put to sea, one of the first precautions would be the arrival of stores in small quantities at shorter intervals.

It will be seen from the above incident that it would be highly necessary to gather as many details as possible from an informant regarding the exact amount of stores and general activities in the vicinity of the ships, and, if possible, the kind of stores received on board. This example should serve to bring out the varied considerations affecting information of this sort and to emphasize the necessity of looking at such information from all angles. It must also be remembered that the character and paramount importance of certain information, of which the foregoing may be taken as an example, very easily may bias an informant and excite his imagination out of all proportion to the actual conditions.

Another event in the war with the Central Powers may be given that illustrates the importance of estimating information correctly. This event stands out as a striking example of the heavy penalty that may be incurred by the use of incorrect information.

The cessation of the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the allied fleets is believed to have been directly due to information furnished by intelligence agents in the Balkans, to the effect that great quantities of ammunition had been previously forwarded from Germany to Turkey, via Roumania. It has been said that, acting upon these reports, the allied Governments decided not to press the naval operation against the Dardanelles. If the Germans had really succeeded in getting ammunition to the straits there was no telling how many ships would yet have had to be sacrificed before the Dardanelles could be forced and Constantinople taken. And the war was still too young to risk many line ships of the allied fleet.

Later evidence seems to indicate that the reports of this transportation of ammunition through Roumania were not true. It has been reported through several sources that when the allied ships with-

drew from the bombardment the Turkish forces had very little ammunition left. Had this condition been known to the allied fleets, it is possible that the entrance to the straits could have been forced.

Consequences of the failure of the fleet to force an entrance were momentous. They included the loss of over a hundred thousand lives in an attempt to force the straits by land; the war was prolonged for an additional period, and the collapse of Russia was due partly to the inability of the allies to maintain communication with her via the Black Sea.

If the information, which was based upon nothing better than the reports of overzealous intelligence agents, eager to make a showing with their superiors, could have been carefully checked up, and had a reliable report on the actual conditions been placed in the hands of the allied naval commander, it is possible that the fleet might have taken Constantinople.

There is, perhaps, no better example in all the great war of the necessity and value of efficient and reliable intelligence work.

An attaché must constantly be on his guard against false information and deliberate attempts to dupe him. Rumors must be investigated and their accuracy determined. Only by checking up original data from as many sources as possible, can this result be obtained. The original source, probability, confirmation from other sources, disinterestedness or the reverse of the informant, the reputation and character of the source are all elements that must be considered. The final test, however, and the one that outweighs all others in the judgment of information, is the completeness of professional knowledge of the attaché himself.

This is particularly true during mobilization and throughout the progress of the war.

CHAPTER XI

CORRESPONDENCE AND RECORDS

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CHAPTER XI.
CORRESPONDENCE AND RECORDS.

The paragraphs that follow are arranged from current departmental instructions, and information pertinent to the correspondence of attachés.

MAIL FROM THE ATTACHÉS.

1. The correspondence of naval attachés with the Navy Department (Office of Naval Intelligence) consists of—

- (a) Reports.
- (b) Letters.
- (c) Acknowledgments.
- (d) Indorsements.
- (e) Cablegrams.
- (f) Memoranda.
- (g) Printed matter, newspaper clippings and translations.

2. Reports, letters, and indorsements will be numbered by the attaché in one and the same series, beginning with No. 1 on the 1st of January of each year. An attaché assuming duty during the calendar year will continue the numbered series of his predecessor for that year. A record of the attaché's numbered correspondence is kept in the Office of Naval Intelligence. The omission or duplication of numbers breaks the continuity of the series and leads to confusion.

3. No acknowledgment of the attaché's numbered series of reports, letters, and indorsements will be made by the Navy Department (Office of Naval Intelligence) unless required by the exigencies of the case. Where acknowledgment is required it will be made by letter. When the record shows a number of the series to be missing the attaché will be notified by memorandum and he will immediately furnish a duplicate.

4. Copies of all written correspondence should be kept in the attaché's office, not only for reference and for the information of an attachés successor, but also for forwarding to the Department duplicates of reports that may have become lost.

5. All written correspondence must be typewritten when practicable, reports in *triplicate*, letters in *duplicate*.

6. Official correspondence is to be addressed to "The Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D. C." This will insure delivery direct to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and avoid delay caused by handling in the mail room at the Navy Department.

7. In packing mail for transmission, group the individual units into a single package or a number of packages of convenient size. Inclosures or documents accompanying a numbered unit should be so marked as to be easily identified.

8. The diplomatic dispatch pouch is to be used for transmitting official mail. The open mail may be used only when it is important to gain time and the matter transmitted is not of a confidential character.

9. The use by a naval attaché of the State Department pouch service should be limited as much as possible to the official business of his office. However, the State Department has no objection to its use for personal letters and packages to be posted in the United States after receipt, provided postage is prepaid in full by means of postage stamps of the country of origin, the same as if said matter were posted in the mail. Such matter should be forwarded in the State Department pouch, and not in the O. N. I. pouch, as the regulations require that it shall bear the stamp of the State Department before being deposited in the United States mails. Mail matter received here without prepayment of postage will be returned, as the O. N. I. has no funds that can be properly used for the payment of postage on private mail matter. The personal use of this pouch service by naval attachés is a privilege and not a right, and they are cautioned not to abuse it.

10. Attention is directed to chapter 44 of the Naval Instructions, 1913, containing the general rules of the Navy Department regarding correspondence.

REPORTS.

11. Professional information, whether originating with the attaché or sent in response to a request from the Office of Naval Intelligence, will be communicated in a report and not in a letter. Single sheets of cap paper (8 by 13 inches) will be used for reports. Write on one side only. The first page of the report will bear the following printed heading:

Subject: _____
 From _____ No. _____ Date, _____, 191--
 Replying to O. N. I. No. _____ Date, _____, 191--

Forms for the above are to be procured by the naval attaché from local printers.

12. At the end of such report give a list of inclosures. Maps, plans, photographs, drawings, and sketches should accompany reports, when they throw additional light on the subject. Mark the inclosures plainly in order that they may surely be identified as accompanying such report. Date inclosures.

13. Any report containing information of a confidential nature must have the word "Confidential" at the upper left hand corner or in the margin abreast of such information. If this, however, is to be confidential for a certain time, as for example in the case of advance extracts of publications, the time for which it should be held should be stated.

14. Reports will not be signed by the attaché making them, but after the word "from" in the printed heading will be stamped conspicuously the letter of the alphabet designating the attaché. The particular letter of designation is communicated to the naval attaché by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The signature will be omitted from the reports in order that they may be sent in their original form to the bureaus to which the contained information pertains. If seen there by unauthorized persons, or if lost, there will then be nothing to indicate the authorship of the reports. The personality of the attaché must not appear in the text of the reports.

15. Ordinarily the attaché should not state the source of his information, but limit himself to a careful notation of the degree of reliability. He thereby protects both himself and the informant in case the report should go astray.

16. By receiving copies of reports in triplicate the Intelligence Office is relieved of the labor of making copies of the whole or parts for the use of bureaus and offices concerned. When from the nature of valuable reports it is apparent that copies must be sent to several bureaus, it is of great assistance to the office to have additional copies forwarded by the attaché. Familiarity with the organization of the department will enable an officer to judge for himself as to the number required.

17. It is of the greatest importance in the work of the office that attachés submit *separate reports on separate subjects*. Failure to do this in the past has caused much useless work, and at times confusion in the archives.

Each report that contains statements of different subjects not only obliges the office force to make separate copies of each subject but causes delay in forwarding reports to the various bureaus. Correct arrangement of reports is one indication of an attaché's efficiency and the officers who receive them will judge him accordingly. To be able to properly arrange the material in his reports an officer must make

a study of the classification of the archives, which is outlined in Instructions in Regard to Intelligence Duty, a copy of which is in the possession of each attaché. For example, having visited construction works of M— Construction Co. at Brest, do not head the report "M— Construction Co. at Brest" and describe ordnance, engines, and destroyers in the same report. Place under separate headings such as "12-inch guns," "Parsons turbines," "French destroyers," the remarks that pertain to each. Then under the title of "M— Construction Co. at Brest," include only material which pertains to the establishment itself.

18. In drawing up a report the salient points should be epitomized in one or two lines below the heading in order that the reader can tell the contents at a glance. Details are worked in later. While all material that may be of value should be included, it is nevertheless most desirable that reports be written in short, pithy sentences based on facts and not deductions.

19. Care in regard to the following details is necessary to avoid incompleteness and ambiguity of details.

- (a) Do not use uncommon abbreviations.
- (b) When using local terms, give their definition.
- (c) In describing naval establishments, be particular to use correctly naval terms in their English signification and scope.
- (d) All measurements of distances and sizes should be given in figures. Comparative terms, such as "large," "small," "wide," "narrow," and "ample" should be avoided.
- (e) Express directions by compass bearings. Note that the terms "right," "left," "front," and "rear" always depend upon the direction in which the observer is facing at the time, while the compass bearing does not change.
- (f) In making sketches observe the following:
 - (1) Put on a compass rose or north point.
 - (2) Put on a scale (if the sketch is a free-hand one give an approximate scale or name the distance between given points).
 - (3) Put on some names or landmarks which can be identified on the chart.
 - (4) Indicate in what direction a river is flowing; refer to the right or left bank looking downstream.

20. In arranging reports and sketches on facilities for landing forces, refer to Col. Dion William's text on Naval Reconnaissance, a copy of which is in the possession of each attaché.

21. When it is impossible to obtain information requested by the Office of Naval Intelligence or when it will take a long time to obtain the same, the fact should be reported in a letter. Certainly within two months the attaché should be able to report that he had

investigated the subject and that a further report may or may not be expected.

22. The great body of the attaché's correspondence will be in the form of reports. This professional information is filed in the registered archives and is *separate* from business correspondence. When compiling data for the use of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department and other officials, the letter files are never examined. Therefore it is important to observe strictly the distinction laid down between reports and letters.

LETTERS.

23. Letters will be numbered by the attaché in the same series with reports. They will be duly signed and addressed to the Navy Department (Office of Naval Intelligence). They will pertain solely to such matters of business connected with the office of the attaché which are important and of permanent interest. Under no circumstances shall they contain professional information. Such letters unless they are copied for the information files are not available when needed. When information on any subject is compiled, the letter files are not examined. Every letter should be numbered.

24. *Separate letters shall be written on separate subjects.* Failure to comply with this requirement necessitates the making of copies or file checks in the office. The number of letters should be reduced to a minimum.

25. Do not write a letter of transmittal with a report. The report should be complete in itself.

26. A carbon copy of each letter, with the attaché's printed letter, should be sent with the original. The carbon copy should be signed and marked "Duplicate."

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.

27. Acknowledgment of letters from the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, will be made upon unnumbered slips, unless reply is made by separate letter.

INDORSEMENTS.

28. Indorsements may be used by the attaché to forward and return papers. When used they will be given a number in the same series with his reports and letters. See Naval Instructions, 1913, article 5307 (1).

CABLEGRAMS.

29. The address for cablegrams to the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, will be "Navintel, Washington."

30. Cablegrams sent by the attaché will be signed with his surname and will not form part of his numbered series. They will be confirmed by him in an unnumbered memorandum on the date of transmittal. Cipher messages will be confirmed in cipher. Cablegrams from the attaché will not be acknowledged unless from the nature of the case such acknowledgment is required.

MEMORANDA.

31. Memoranda will not be numbered and should not be sent in duplicate. They will not be preserved in the files of the Naval Intelligence and after they have served their purpose will be destroyed.

32. Memoranda should include matters which are of passing interest, and not of permanent or historic value, or of sufficient importance to form the subject of a numbered report or letter. They may include a variety of subjects such as personal matters, prospective movements, promises of information from official or private sources, requests for blank forms and public documents and minor corrections to reports previously made. A judicious use of memoranda will serve materially to decrease the amount of paper work.

33. Memoranda should not be used for communicating matters which require action or decision on the part of the Navy Department; use numbered letters for this purpose.

PRINTED MATTER, NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS, AND TRANSLATIONS.

34. Books, periodicals, advertising circulars, etc., will be sent without letters of transmittal.

35. Special publications, when desired, will be ordered from the attaché by the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, in unnumbered memoranda. When these orders are filled by the attaché an unnumbered memorandum of transmittal, specifying the date of the order, will be attached to the publications sent.

36. If it is desired to invite attention to any portion of a book or periodical, a memorandum should be made and attached thereto. If the subject is deemed of sufficient importance, a formal numbered report should be made.

37. Newspaper clippings should also be sent without letters of transmittal. Important clippings should be pasted on slips and marked "Important," and, if in a foreign language, the subject should be translated.

38. In forwarding translations, if the original is not sent, there must accompany the translation a detailed statement of the document or book translated. Translations, where practicable, should be in triplicate.

MAIL TO THE ATTACHÉS.

LETTERS.

39. Letters to the attaché are signed by the Director of Naval Intelligence. The number appearing on the letters is the Office of Naval Intelligence case number. In replying to letters always refer to the case number and give the date. All letters referring to the same subject bear the same case number, and all papers relating thereto are filed in the same jacket. This jacket contains the complete correspondence. This again emphasizes the necessity of attachés writing *separate letters on separate subjects*. *Debit*

INDORSEMENTS.

40. Indorsements will be used, when desirable, to forward and return papers to the attaché. They will bear the Office of Naval Intelligence case number. *debit*

CABLEGRAMS.

41. Cablegrams to the attachés are usually signed by the Director of Naval Intelligence. Where the subject matter is of great importance, they will be signed by the Secretary of the Navy or the Acting Secretary; attachés will immediately acknowledge, by cable, the receipt of cablegrams so signed.¹

42. All acknowledgments of cablegrams, regardless of the signature, will be addressed "Navintel, Washington."

43. Cablegrams to the attachés will be confirmed by the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence.

44. Naval Instructions 5350 give the cable and radio addresses in abbreviated form of the Navy Department bureaus and offices, with instructions for the method of using them. The cable address for all naval attachés is ALUSNA: this address must be kept registered at the cable office.

45. Routine printed matter will be sent to the attachés without an invoice, and no receipt for the same will be required. A record of all printed matter sent to the attachés is kept in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Confidential printed matter will be accompanied by an invoice which will be receipted and returned promptly to Office of Naval Intelligence.

46. The correspondence and confidential publications of the attaché should be kept in a safe in his office provided for that purpose.

47. When an attaché is relieved he will forward the following separate transfer receipts signed by his successor:

¹ In order to secure the advantage of reduced rates, all cablegrams to Paris are signed by the Secretary of the Navy or the Acting Secretary. Where acknowledgment of such message is required the word "acknowledge" will occur at the end of the message.

- (a) For all ciphers and codes.
- (b) For all confidential publications of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

RECORDS.

The work of a succeeding naval attaché could be increased in value if his predecessor would keep a record of all information of permanent value to attachés. It is suggested that the record be kept in loose-leaf form and arranged according to subjects, in order that leaves may be added from time to time and conveniently kept up to date. The material should include:

- (a) The sources from which information may be gathered, with names and pertinent remarks.
- (b) Names of Americans residing in the country who may be called upon for various assistance, with such remarks as may be of value.
- (c) Data in regard to agents and assistants employed, including reliability, expenditure, and value.
- (d) Records of inspections of navy yards and industrial concerns.
- (e) Visits aboard men-of-war.
- (f) Confidential experiments witnessed.
- (g) List of information furnished by the Admiralty.
- (h) Statistical data of a permanent nature regarding the country to which the attaché is accredited.
- (i) List of confidential books and publications of the Navy Department on hand.

Naval attaches will keep a record of the leave of absence granted civil employees each service year. A certificate of the amount of leave granted and the amount accrued and due will be entered

It is very important that no one who is not a citizen of the United States of America be employed in the office of the naval attaché on either permanent or temporary duty if there is any possible way that such (precarious) conditions can be avoided.

Due to the difficulties that occasionally arise in finding capable interpreters, foreigners have at times been employed in embassies with injurious results. There is, however, hardly any country where, with sufficient endeavor, an American can not be found among the missionaries, business residents, or students, who can read and speak the native language enough to carry on the translation and office work required by the attaché.

Another factor that has induced attachés in the past to hire interpreters from among the natives of the country is that of economy. This idea is fundamentally wrong. It is not considered economical from any point of view to allow any one but an American citizen to be in a position where he may have unrestricted access to the files in the possible absence of the naval attachés.

on the travel orders of employees returning to the U.S. on leave or upon separation

As a general rule, then, it is best to have no one connected with the office of the attaché except citizens of our own country whose reliability is unquestionable.

EXAMPLES OF ORDERS AND INDORSEMENTS.

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
REQUESTING THE DESIGNATION OF AN ATTACHÉ.

OCTOBER 17, 1918.

SIR:

It being the desire of this department to detach Captain -----, U. S. N., from duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, and to order him to duty as naval attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, as the relief of Captain -----, U. S. N., I have the honor to request that he be so designated and that the proper diplomatic officials be so informed by cable.

Sincerely, yours,

The Honorable
The SECRETARY OF STATE.

In reply address
The Secretary of the Navy
and refer to No.
N-31/Le
16.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 17, 1918.

To: Captain -----, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department
(Chief of Naval Operations).

Subject: Detached Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department; to duty as naval attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain.

1. When directed by the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, you will regard yourself detached from duty in the office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, and from such other duty as may have been assigned you; will proceed to Madrid, Spain, by such route, and at such time as the Director of Naval Intelligence may direct.

2. Upon your arrival in Madrid, you will report to the American ambassador in person, if he is present, otherwise by letter, for duty as naval attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, as the relief of Captain -----, U. S. N., taking over from that officer such Government property, including Government funds, in his possession as he may transfer to you.

3. Any disbursing officer is hereby authorized to secure the necessary transportation for you in carrying out these orders.

4. You are authorized to perform such travel as may be necessary in the proper performance of your duties.

5. You will keep a memorandum of the travel so performed, certifying to the same in your statement of disbursements made at the end of each quarter.

6. This employment on shore duty beyond the seas is required by the public interests.

7. Forward immediately to the Identification Section, Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, your photograph (unmounted 3 by 3) in uniform, age in years and months, height in feet and inches, weight, color of eyes, hair, and complexion for an identification certificate. It is absolutely necessary that you have this certificate before sailing.

Copy to: Operations.
Office of Naval Intelligence.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

In reply address
The Secretary of the Navy
and refer to No.
N-31/Bn.

17

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, October 17, 1918.

To: Captain ———, naval attaché, American Embassy, Madrid Spain.
Subject: Detached Naval Attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain; to special duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

1. Upon the reporting of Capt. ———, U. S. N., you will regard yourself detached from duty as naval attaché, American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, and from such other duty as may have been assigned you; will proceed to Washington, D. C., and report to the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, and the Director of Naval Intelligence for special duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.

2. This employment on shore duty is required by the public interests.

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

HWS/GMP.

1st indorsement.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., October 18, 1918.

ROGER WELLES,
*Rear Admiral, U. S. N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.*

Copy to: Operations.
O. N. I.

1. Forwarded.

CHAPTER XII

CODES AND CIPHERS

CHAPTER XII.

CODES AND CIPHERS.

This chapter which outlines the use of codes and ciphers is quoted from the United States Navy Radio Regulations.

As applied to United States publications, the words "code" and "cipher" are used as follows:

(a) *Code*.—A book containing artificial words or groups of numbers which represent English words, phrases, etc. Coding is the substitution of code words for English words and phrases of messages to be transmitted. Decoding is the translation of a code message into plain language.

(b) *Cipher*.—A system by which the numbers or letters composing code groups are transposed or rearranged with a view to preventing a translation of the message into plain language, even if the code book is available, unless the cipher is at hand.

Enciphering is the applying of a cipher to a code message, and deciphering the process of translating a message in cipher into code with a view to further translation into plain language.

It should be borne in mind by all concerned that notwithstanding the character or qualifications of officers, long experience has demonstrated the fact that the fewer the people having knowledge or access to secret information, the smaller is the chance of its being compromised by inadvertence or espionage.

It must always be assumed that the enemy in time of war has a large, scientifically organized, and efficient office, whose only duty is the breaking of codes and ciphers, and that code and cipher systems which may appear absolutely secure to a person not expert in such work may, in the hands of the enemy's cryptographers, be comparatively simple. In this connection and as warning against an undue sense of security, attention is invited to the fact that men who have made a study of such work are able to decipher ancient inscriptions, manuscripts, etc., in which the language, written characters, and subject matter are entirely unknown. Compared with this the deciphering of cipher messages in which the language and general character of the subject matter are known is relatively simple.

It must also be remembered that codes and ciphers are more often compromised by careless drafting of messages than by the actual code books falling into the hands of the enemy.

The principal risk to which the secrecy of codes and ciphers is exposed consists in the possibility of reconstructing the vocabulary or breaking the cipher by comparing the messages with their literal translations. It is prescribed, therefore, that the number of written translations shall be reduced to a minimum, that all copies shall be accounted for, and that if it is necessary to furnish a translation which will not at all times be closely safeguarded, such translation should be a careful paraphrase of the message. It is specifically provided that translations and paraphrases of dispatches shall be so handled as to remove all possibility of their getting into the hands of the operators and by mistake being sent in place of or in addition to the code or cipher form of the dispatch.

Cases of this kind have occurred which might in time of war well endanger the safety of ships and the lives of many men. Officers or men responsible for such occurrences may expect to be court-martialed.

Translations of messages should be kept under lock and key in confidential files. Work sheets should be destroyed by burning as promptly as possible; the initials of the officer decoding or deciphering the message should be transferred from the work sheet to the translation when the translation is written. Carbon paper or stencils shall be destroyed.

A code message and its translation must never be placed on the same sheet (except as is necessary on work sheets) or in the same envelope, nor shall copies be filed in such manner as to compromise the code. When exact translations are required for file the coded copies shall be destroyed.

CHAPTER XIII

DISBURSEMENTS

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DISBURSEMENTS.

The attention of naval attachés is particularly invited to the fact that, in the performance of their duties as naval attachés, they are held strictly accountable for the following public moneys: Fund A, Treasury account; fund B, confidential account.

FUND A.

When an officer is ordered to duty abroad as naval attaché he is given orders making him a special disbursing officer, and, as such, he is held strictly accountable to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and, in turn, to the Auditor for the Navy Department for all disbursements made from the Treasury account (fund A).

In obtaining funds for the Treasury account (fund A), request should be made to the Director of Naval Intelligence, who will take up with the proper authorities the question of having the funds deposited to the credit of the naval attaché requesting same. As soon as the funds requested by the naval attaché have been deposited to his credit in a Government depository, a cablegram is sent to the naval attaché informing him that the deposit has been made and giving him the warrant number covering same.

The following is a list of expenditures that are properly chargeable against the Treasury account, and is furnished as a guide for naval attachés in making up their quarterly returns:

1. Pay of officers and enlisted men attached to the office of the naval attaché.
2. Commutation for heat, light, and quarters for officers attached to the office of the naval attaché.
3. Collection of information.
4. Expenditures from the special allowance granted naval attachés and assistant naval attachés for entertainment.
5. Clerk hire and other office help.
6. Traveling expenses, when not incurred in secret intelligence work.
7. Office rent.
8. Office expenses.

9. Miscellaneous expenses that properly belong to the routine of the office.

10. Loss and gain on exchange.

Naval attachés should, whenever possible, use the regular prescribed forms issued by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, such as pay rolls for officers and enlisted men, pay receipts, vouchers for commutation for heat, light, and quarters, etc., in keeping their records and in collecting substantiating vouchers for their quarterly returns. By so doing naval attachés will not only minimize the chances of errors in the keeping of their records, but will also facilitate the auditing of their returns by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and the auditing for the Navy Department. These forms can be obtained by making request on the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, via the Office of Naval Intelligence.

In connection with the item, "Clerk hire and other office help," especial attention is invited to the fact that, under no circumstances, should clerks be hired and paid a salary until authority has been obtained from the Secretary of the Navy, through the Director of Naval Intelligence, authorizing such hire and stating the salary to be paid.

Miscellaneous expenses should, if practicable, never be contracted until authority therefor has been obtained from the Director of Naval Intelligence.

In view of the fact that the Treasury accounts are audited by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and the Auditor for the Navy Department, naval attachés are cautioned to be extremely careful to submit all substantiating vouchers obtainable when forwarding their Treasury accounts, and to see that they are accompanied by an "Account Current" and a "General Account of Advances." On the form "General account of advances" naval attachés should enter gain or loss on exchange. Treasury accounts should be submitted at the end of each quarter and should be forwarded through the Director of Naval Intelligence.

FUND B.

Naval attachés are held strictly accountable to the Director of Naval Intelligence for all expenditures made from fund B ~~or the secret intelligence fund.~~

Upon arriving at his post of duty, a naval attaché should, as soon as practicable, submit a request to the Director of Naval Intelligence for such funds as he considers will be necessary to carry on his intelligence work for a period of at least a quarter; this request should also state the name of the bank at which it is desired to have the funds deposited. Thereafter, requests for funds should be submitted at least a month in advance of anticipated needs in order to allow for

any delay that might ensue in the transfer of the funds requested. Ordinarily, transfers of funds require from one to three weeks, depending on the place to which the transfer is made.

Against the ~~secret intelligence~~ fund are properly chargeable all expenditures made by naval attachés in connection with the obtaining of confidential information for the Office of Naval Intelligence, such as:

1. Newspaper subscriptions.
2. Clerk hire necessary to keep confidential records.
3. Messenger service in connection with confidential work.
4. Travel expenses when on secret intelligence work.
5. Payment for information obtained from outside sources, such as from deserters in time of war.
6. Advances to and expense accounts of agents.
7. Miscellaneous expenses, such as club bills and dues incurred in cultivating the acquaintance of persons that might be useful in obtaining valuable information.

Naval attachés should always inform the Director of Naval Intelligence, preferably by cable, of their intention to hire clerks for purely confidential work, stating the salary they intend to pay such clerk or clerks, in order that the necessary authority therefor may be granted by the director. (This same procedure also holds good in the case of the hiring of special agents and in incurring club bills and dues. Failure of naval attachés to follow out this procedure will result in his accounts being checked for making unauthorized expenditures.) *delete*

Naval attachés may submit their confidential returns each month, especially in times of war, but during peace times it is considered that the submission of confidential returns once a quarter is sufficient. In submitting returns naval attachés should be extremely careful to see that the following information accompanies same: Balance sheet in United States currency and loss and gain sheet.

The balance sheet should show all moneys received during the month, such as from the Director of Naval Intelligence, from refunds, from interest gained on bank deposits, and from gain on exchange, if any; also all disbursements made during the month, in which should be included loss on exchange, if any, and the true balance remaining on hand at the close of business each month. The loss and gain sheet should always be made up when funds are received from the Director of Naval Intelligence in order to show what the gain or loss on exchange was. These two sheets are absolutely necessary in order that the books in the Office of Naval Intelligence may at all times show the true balance in the hands of the naval attachés.

In times of peace naval attachés should not require the services of many secret agents—probably none at all—due to the policy of our Government to always be frank and aboveboard in all of its dealings with foreign Governments in obtaining information. However, in times of war, it becomes imperative to use the services of secret agents, and for this reason the following regulations relative to agents and their expense accounts is furnished as a guide:

When an agent is sent from the Office of Naval Intelligence to report to a naval attaché, he will be advanced a sum of money sufficient to cover his expenses up to the time of his reporting. At the same time a letter or cable will be dispatched to the naval attaché to whom such agent is to report, stating the amount that has been advanced, the purposes for which this money is to be used, and the rate of pay and subsistence of such agent. The naval attaché will then have the agent account directly to him for the total advance and according to the prescribed regulations hereinafter stated. The naval attaché will be held responsible for the money advanced.

In the case of an agent returning to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the naval attaché shall close said agent's accounts up to the date of his departure and furnish said agent with necessary transportation and funds to enable him to reach his destination. At the same time the naval attaché shall cable this office a full statement of the agent's account, in order that it may be in a position to settle such agent's account upon his return.

Naval attachés are in a better position to determine the necessary expenditures of agents than the Office of Naval Intelligence. Consequently, the accounts of all agents who are under the direction of naval attachés should be submitted direct to the attaché who is held responsible by the Intelligence Office for proper accounting.

All expense accounts of agents submitted as vouchers for the expenditure of confidential funds by naval attachés should have the written approval of the naval attaché on the face thereof. Only original expense accounts of agents should be submitted with naval attachés' returns, and they should be accompanied by all vouchers obtainable to substantiate expenditures shown thereon.

The attention of all naval attachés is invited to the following "Memorandum for all employees." All disbursements made from the confidential funds to agents (civilian, officers, or enlisted men of the Navy) for naval intelligence work shall be made in strict accordance with these instructions unless written authority is obtained from the Director of Naval Intelligence to do otherwise.

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EMPLOYEES.

I. LODGING AND SUBSISTENCE.

(A) To some of the employees a daily allowance is given for lodging and subsistence. This allowance covers lodging and subsistence, baths, tips at meals

and at hotel. In no case must it be exceeded and charged to the company. Where a per diem allowance is inadequate to cover the above items it will be raised only on condition that hotel bills for lodging and subsistence for at least one consecutive month are furnished and the circumstances clearly warrant it. Do not charge a higher allowance, however, until you are authorized by the company to do so. On per diem allowance no vouchers for the above items are required.

(B) In the event that an employee is not on a per diem allowance, he shall charge actual expenses incurred, and submit hotel or lodging bills as vouchers.

1. No employee shall charge more than 75 cents for a midday meal (other than on a train), or \$1.25 for any other single meal. A tip for a single meal must not exceed 15 cents.

2. Employees not on per diem allowance will be allowed tips at hotels per day, including tips at meals, not to exceed 50 cents or not to exceed \$2.50 for one week at the same hotel.

3. In addition, it is necessary to certify that you have actually spent whatever amount your account shows for tips, in addition to your receipted hotel bills.

II. TRANSPORTATION.

Transportation will only be allowed when an employee is carrying out the orders of this company or its representatives. It must always be stated in the account under whose orders you are traveling, or in the event that time will not permit the necessary authority, it is required that a statement be affixed to the account showing the reason for such travel that you may perform upon your own initiative.

(A) Under land transportation may be charged:

1. Actual cost of transportation, including Pullman fare. This means a Pullman seat or berth, and not a section or drawing-room.

2. Stateroom for night water travel, where stateroom is extra, not to exceed \$2.

3. Meals. No single meal shall exceed \$1.25, and tips for one meal shall not exceed 15 cents.

4. Tips on train must not exceed 50 cents per day; for trips of less than five hours, 25 cents.

5. No excess baggage allowed unless specific orders are obtained and attached to account.

6. Expressage and storage of company's books, papers, and instruments will be allowed. Receipted bill for same must be submitted.

7. Transfer baggage must not exceed \$1.25.

8. In the transfer of employees to and from stations and docks, public conveyances must be used as much as possible. If a cab is used, a statement showing the necessity for same must be submitted for each time that cab is used. When traveling by rail, employees must not charge per diem allowance but actual expenses. (See par. 1, sec. B.) When private launches or boats are engaged, the necessity of this should likewise be noted in the account.

(B) Under sea transportation may be charged:

1. First-class passage on all steamships will be allowed.

2. Dates of sailing and landing must be shown.

3. As the fare on steamship lines usually includes berth and meals, employees, on per diem allowance, are cautioned not to charge per diem allowance while on board ship.

4. Tips for sea travel must not exceed 75 cents per day, or a total of \$10 for entire trip.

III. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. *Entertainment*.—A reasonable sum will be allowed for the entertainment of persons whose acquaintance is deemed necessary to your work. However, great care should be exercised in this matter, and a reason for same must be attached to the account.

2. *Personal expenses*.—Under no condition will charges for purely personal items, such as clothing, bar charges, shaves, pressing of clothes, laundry, mineral waters, cigars, cigarettes, personal stationery, etc., be allowed.

3. *Equipment*.—A reasonable sum will be allowed for the purchase of equipment that is absolutely necessary for your work. It must be thoroughly understood that all such equipment purchased must be turned in to the company in first-class condition (suitable allowance being made for wear and tear incident to service), otherwise you will be charged the full amounts shown by your expense accounts.

4. *Exchange*.—Loss on exchange will be borne by the company, provided a statement is issued with the expense account showing the rate at which the funds were converted, and the amount ultimately obtained. Gain on exchange must be placed to the company's credit, as also should interest gained on bank deposits, if any. On no condition will the company accept an account except in United States currency. The separate items that go to make up the day's expenses may be left in the local currency, but the total for the day must be in United States currency, and the rate shown.

5. *Rendition of accounts*.—An itemized statement must be rendered promptly at the end of each month by all employees. This statement must show the balance on hand at the beginning of the month, and at the close of the month. If any salary is taken out, the full amount must be shown. Attach all vouchers and certified statements to the back of the account, numbering them in the order that they appear on the expense account. Certify on the bottom of the expense account that it is true and correct, and that all vouchers obtainable are attached.

6. *Special authorizations*.—Special authorization must be obtained from the company to expend funds for any other purposes than those enumerated in the above memorandum.

In conclusion, naval attachés are particularly cautioned in regard to the absolute necessity of keeping their fund A, or ~~Treasury account~~, separate and distinct from their fund B, or ~~confidential account~~. Naval attachés are also cautioned against allowing either fund "A" or fund "B" to run so low that it becomes necessary to transfer money from one fund to the other. In case this procedure should be found necessary, naval attachés should make refund to the fund from which the transfer was made as soon as possible. Failure of naval attachés to carry out this procedure will result in the holding up of their accounts by both the Auditor for the Navy Department and the Director of Naval Intelligence.

CHAPTER XIV

POLICY IN REGARD TO AGENTS

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This policy may be discussed under two headings, one that applies to peace and the other to war.

I.

In times of peace it has been the policy of the Navy Department that our attachés should never resort to methods of obtaining information that might result in causing them (and, through them, their service) a loss of prestige in the eyes of the foreign Government. With regard to this the department has directed that naval attachés in the performance of their duties shall only employ such means as will be consonant with their official position and the diplomatic relations that they bear the Governments to which they are accredited. The department does not countenance the frequently quoted assertion that a naval attaché is a spy under the protection of international law. At the same time this should not be interpreted to mean that an attaché must ignore the use of agents whose employment may be rendered necessary in the investigation of any questions that bear upon national defense or loyalty to his own country.

By employing agents that resort to dubious methods an attaché assumes responsibility for their actions and in so doing risks the loss of confidence of the officials upon whom he depends in carrying on his work.

deliberate The attaché, in addition, is at best an amateur in secret-service work. In the past our Government has not resorted to the methods used by some foreign countries in developing an extensive system of espionage and as a rule the larger foreign powers will possess methods of counter espionage with which it may be difficult to cope. Some of our experienced naval attachés have held the opinion that our officers should have no connection whatever with secret agents. Others have held that agents may be employed in peace times under express instructions and particular circumstances that render such assistance necessary. Even in such case it has not been considered best that methods be resorted to which might bring disgrace upon the attaché.

There have been several occasions when foreign attachés have been caught while indulging in questionable activities that were intended to bring in particularly desirable information. In each case the reputation and career of the officer concerned did not profit by their mistaken zeal.

There have been many intrigues and many complicated methods of obtaining military information in foreign courts. An interesting illustration may be quoted from Lieut. Froment:

A few years ago a very high personage of a great power, inconvenienced by lack of money, resolved to sell confidential military documents which he had in his possession. He communicated with the military attachés accredited to the court and proposed to sell them the documents.

The French attaché was very indignant, spurned the bargain, and declared that he would not profit by the treason of a prince of the reigning house. He even believed it his duty to make known to the sovereign the proposition he had received, but instead of such loyal actions being appreciated by the sovereign as he had hoped, the latter was unwilling to involve his relative in such turpitude, so that our attaché, as the sole recompense for his honesty, ceased to be persona grata.

Another had not the same scruples and paid a good price for the documents offered him.

A third demanded to look over the documents first to make certain that he did not already possess them, in which case he would refuse to buy them. The prince let him have them for 24 hours in order that this verification might be made. The attaché did not lose any time; he assembled all the clerks of the embassy and without delay employed them in copying the voluminous dossier; they worked all night and on the morrow the copy had been completed. When the prince presented himself to conclude the transaction, he was told "that they were sorry not to be able to accept his proposition as they already had all the information in question."

II.

When the United States is at war, our naval attachés in neutral countries may have to undertake all phases of intelligence work. The extent of their efforts will be dependent upon local, political, and military conditions. They may be called upon to develop systems that include espionage, counterespionage, gathering information on technical subjects, propaganda, political and economic conditions, and at times intelligence work in the field.

The personnel for this work is best recruited from reliable Americans of education, good standing, and, in most cases, of good social position. They may be of both sexes. In Europe there can always be found a class of typical Americans in each capital, who, from patriotic reasons, are only too glad to offer their services. If, at times, it should become necessary to have detective work done, it is better to employ a professional man of good standing. Such an assistant should be employed through the intermediary of some prominent American. In this case a detective would not know whom he was

The extent of their efforts will be dependent upon local political

Particularly in those countries that are contiguous to the enemy country.

if favorably situated

attaché should ostensibly have no connection with espionage, or spies. An assistant for such duties could be counter espionage, or spies. An assistant for such duties could be favorably located in the office of the Consul General, preferably as a consul.

actually working for, or, in most cases, for what department he was working.

In regard to the recruiting of personnel during war time, Lieut. Froment remarks as follows:

The principal obstacle is encountered in the recruiting of the personnel itself. It is necessary to make the profession somewhat honorable, and to have intelligent, conscientious, and faithful persons. It is not easy to find them. A bad spy is dangerous; a spy for the occasion only can not render good services and may compromise those who employ him.

Of the reliable auxiliaries, there may be mentioned great merchants and bankers whose business extends everywhere and whose sentiments, like their affairs, are international. Bismarck, on many occasions, reaped great profit from the information furnished him by the great Jewish bankers, notably the Rothschilds.

While being distrustful of spies, they should not be permitted to observe it; it is worth much more to appear to have great confidence in them so they will not believe that they are mistrusted.

The identity of all agents employed must be guarded with secrecy. It is considered very inadvisable to disclose to anyone the organization of the personnel with regard to number or names or the special means they use for acquiring information. It is also inadvisable to use employees of other services, or to share in the expenses of maintaining joint agents with any foreign attachés.

During war time, a naval attaché, ^{in agents should create} may have the opportunity to cross-examine a deserter ^{travelling and from the enemy country.} from one of the belligerent forces, in which case it is of great importance to ascertain whether this deserter has already been interviewed by a representative of the attachés service, or possibly an allied service. In this connection it is always best not only to obtain the name of the man, which may be easily changed, but to endeavor to obtain a photograph. By an organized exchange of photographs it will often be possible to avoid paying a deserter for information already sold.

An example of the above may be taken from an incident which occurred in South America during the war with Germany. A certain individual attempted to sell an attaché a German code message, claiming at the same time that he could supply the translation. Not content with this he proceeded to sell the same message to other attachés. It was only by a prompt warning to all attachés that the Office of Naval Intelligence was saved from a ridiculous situation.

Particular caution must be observed in relations with strangers. Dealings with such informants carry with them hazardous possibilities.

A stranger may be a spy in the pay of the enemy who is really seeking information; he may be a man that is being paid to mislead the attaché and give him false information, or he may be a man that really has information to sell. In the last case it may be difficult, if not impossible, to check up his information and difficult to estimate the value of the judgment of the man himself. Also, such procedure

involves the necessity of one more individual having an unpleasant knowledge of an attaché's activities.

It is not intended in this book to go into any detail regarding espionage work. A few of the elementary principles may be outlined as follows:

1. Personnel for an intelligence system should be assigned before the outbreak of war, in order that selection would not have to be made in haste and without due regard to qualifications.

2. Communication with agents should at all times be through an intermediary. For this purpose consular officials have been used by many nations, and serve as an excellent means. Care must be exercised, however, in avoiding the employment of consular agents who are not native Americans.

3. Reports of agents should be studied with a view to distributing the beneficial experiences of each one for the benefit of the remainder.

4. Efficiency in agents is more liable to be developed by steady, careful work than by endeavoring to gain a reputation through a single stroke.

5. Unrecognized agents that offer for sale such material as ciphers, letters, and secret inks, should invariably be regarded with mistrust until their status is proven. These men are very often in the pay of the enemy and are only acting with the purpose of gaining information. Their wares are expensive and seldom will lead to anything more than the means of running down a case.

6. An agent should, whenever possible, be chosen for patriotic motives and high ideals, rather than for pecuniary reasons. His work should be considered under war service for his country. While he should be paid enough to provide for his comfort, there should not be any compensation greatly above that required for his needs.

7. Agents should always be impressed with the confidence and complete trust of their employer, particularly when suspicion may be attached to them.

8. With regard to allowances, provision should be made for honest expenditure. The accounting of funds is best put on an efficient basis by care in the selection of the men. Receipts may not be available in many cases because of the evidence that they might establish against an informer.

9. The use of immoral women as agents is regarded as being very precarious. A woman that will sell herself is usually willing to sell her employer. In addition, women of this type exert a very demoralizing effect upon the men under whom they are placed.

10. Enemy agents will generally be individuals least likely to be suspected for ordinary reasons.

Even in time of war the department has wished to impress upon attachés that it is not their duty to pry into the private lives of

others except in so far as their actions bear upon questions of our own defense. An attaché should also cultivate the tact and judgment to know when and where to stop in investigations. In such proceedings he must unavoidably become the possessor of information which may be of no ultimate value to his own work and yet by its knowledge stand a chance of compromising his position.

The following reprint of Confidential Instructions Issued by the German Admiralty to Their Agents, Berlin, 1914, is appended. It may serve to give an attaché a conception of the methods of the German espionage system.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR A CORRESPONDENT OF THE WAR-INFORMATION SERVICE SENT OUT BY GERMANY.

[Printed by the Admiral Staff of the Navy. Berlin, 1914.]

This book belongs to the service regulations of the imperial navy, the loss or divulgence of which to unauthorized persons would result in great damage to the German Navy.

The book may be issued only to officers of the imperial navy who are officially employed in the war-information service, and to those who are bound by solemn pledge as reporters and confidential agents.

Every recipient of the book is held to strict secrecy concerning it.

Any violation of the pledge of secrecy will be punishable by the law against the betrayal of military secrets of July 3, 1893.

PREFACE.

The instructions given in Part I indicate in general terms the aim and scope of the activity to be expected from those engaged in the information service. They contain hints and suggestions for the accomplishment of this work, and, finally, give directions which are to be followed by those concerned in certain definite cases. Part II contains special instructions for the locality in question.

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE WAR-INFORMATION SERVICE.

1. The war-information service must supply full information concerning events in the enemy country, as well as concerning any measures taken by the enemy which could be of value to us in our conduct of the war at sea.

2. The war-information service will, as early as possible before the outbreak of hostilities and during the period of political tension which precedes war, * * * in which all the possibilities, means, and ways which the correspondent can utilize for obtaining information are to be fully treated. They depend, on the one hand, on the local conditions and, on the other, on the discretion and energy of the individual correspondent. Consequently only such means and ways of obtaining information as are likely to be found in the majority of places will be referred to here. It must be left to the individual correspondent to perform his duties by utilizing every aid to the fullest possible extent and to discover additional ways and means which, though not mentioned here, are suitable to his purpose. To this end a thorough study of his possible future activities in time of war must be made in time of peace.

3. (a) Correspondents must first of all avail themselves of the aids which modern intercourse offers. They must endeavor to establish relations with

newspaper reporters, editors, and employees of telegraph offices and signal stations, and must take steps to have important news transmitted to them without delay, under promise of good pay when necessary. It will be worth while for the correspondent to cultivate relations with such persons in time of peace, without, however, permitting his object to be guessed, as this will pave the way for the development of more intimate relations in case of need.

(b) At places which are engaged in traffic by sea with enemy ports correspondents must endeavor to obtain information from members of the crews of incoming ships. The services of local pilots, enlisted for this purpose by the correspondent, may be found of great value, as it will often be possible for the pilot to obtain all the information worth having from first source, namely, the captain, while piloting the vessel into port. As a rule correspondents will do well to regard the officers only as a suitable source of information, but not the sailors and stokers.

(c) It will be possible for certain correspondents, owing to their location with respect to the enemy country, by direct observation of enemy ports and water ways or of stretches of the enemy coast from neutral territory, to obtain a knowledge of events which will be of great value to us in our conduct of the war. Fishing vessels and yachts under a neutral flag can perform valuable intelligence service, and it may also seem desirable to establish a chain of outposts by means of such vessels to observe and report the departure or passing of enemy forces when such operations are in question.

(d) Finally it will often be possible for the correspondent to obtain information by sending specially chosen individuals to important points in the enemy territory. The employment of such individuals requires the greatest caution. They must in no case become a part of the admiralty war-information service, but must simply stand in a personal relation to the correspondent. The correspondent will, of course understand that obtaining information by the aid of reliable agents in the enemy country is the best means that can be employed, and for this reason he must seek such opportunities and take advantage of them whenever they offer. That unreliable agents will do us more harm than good in the enemy's country need hardly be mentioned.

The service of such agents, reporting directly from the enemy country, will be of value chiefly during the period of tension which will presumably precede the outbreak of hostilities. It is their task to remain in the enemy country without attracting attention and to observe and ferret out any work or preparations that would point to the coming war. Information should be transmitted to the correspondent by telegraph as long as this is feasible. As it will be impossible to transmit information of the kind in question by means of an ordinary commercial code as a cipher, it will in most cases, unless the local conditions afford some other practicable means, be necessary for the correspondent and his agent to use for their purpose a specially prepared code in the form of simple sentences, in which all preparations and war measures will be reported under cover of simple sentences on commercial subjects. Whether these conventional sentences are to be transmitted in plain language or whether the telegram is to be framed in words taken from a code in common use at the place in question will depend upon circumstances. In any case the latter method is to be employed as long as no obstacles are raised in the country in which the agent is residing to telegraphic correspondence in code, for the reason that commercial telegrams in plain language are not customary and will therefore attract attention as long as correspondence in code has not been forbidden.

In Appendix I, a conventional code of this kind is given as a sample. Each correspondent who will have occasion to employ agents will do well to pre-

pare such a code in time of peace, with special regard to the wares commonly handled in his district.

The correspondent can reply from time to time to the telegrams received in a similar vein, so that in case a censorship be established no suspicion will be aroused by the one-sided correspondence. Such answers, which are otherwise to be regarded as nonvaleurs, may, by the use of certain words, serve to announce the receipt of information or to report the nonarrival of information expected.

Should the agent encounter insuperable obstacles to his communication with the correspondent by telegraph, and even by mail, he will have to limit himself to observing all that goes on in the enemy country without, however, keeping any compromising records. If important matters come under his observation which he thinks should immediately be communicated to the correspondent, he must either convey the information in person or proceed to neutral territory and telegraph it from there. When the local conditions are such as to suggest the latter procedure, the best and safest method of transmitting information will be to have two agents work together, one of whom will make the observations while the other will carry the information across the frontier into neutral territory and transmit it in code to the correspondent.

The foregoing measures, if carefully carried out, will make it possible to ascertain and report, during the short period required for the mobilization of a fleet, the most important preparations in the enemy harbors, such as the fitting out and assembling of ships, before the agents are compelled to leave.

4. It is, of course, obvious that an activity of this kind carried on by an agent during the period of tension, that is, when war has not yet been declared and mobilization not yet begun, may be annoying, but is not punishable by law. It also goes without saying that, in view of this fact, correspondents will be particularly active in the interests of the war intelligence service in the country of a probable enemy during a prolonged period of tension; and it is precisely during such a period that the most important information for our conduct of the war may be obtained.

With circumspection, energy, and devotion the correspondent will in this way be able to render valuable service to his country. The nature of the services expected is such—this must again be emphasized—that when the circumstances require, the correspondent must not shrink from employing any means or method that will enable him to perform his task and benefit the fatherland.

Correspondents may be certain that the Admiral Staff of the Navy will see to it that every meritorious service of this kind receives fitting recognition.

III. INFORMATION WHICH IS IMPORTANT AND WHICH MUST BE REPORTED AS SOON AS THE WAR INFORMATION SERVICE IS ESTABLISHED.

The subjects mentioned below are to serve the correspondent merely as a guide, and it is by no means to be inferred that a knowledge of other events, facts, and conditions in the enemy and neutral countries, which are not enumerated here, may not also be important. The correspondent must judge for himself without slavishly adhering to the letter of these instructions. It will generally be correct to assume that it is better to send in too much than too little, as several reports in the same tenor which singly might appear of little value, may as a whole, under certain circumstances, furnish a correct picture of events and thus lead to important conclusions.

(A) DURING THE PERIOD PRECEDING MOBILIZATION.

1. GENERAL INDICATIONS.

Limitation of leave and the recall of officers and men on leave.
Statistical inquiries by the Government concerning the amount of foodstuffs on hand at the large dealers.

Censorship of the press. Omission of the usual information concerning the movements of ships, etc.

Status of Government securities.

Increase in insurance rates at Lloyds (consult the English and also other European papers).

Imports and exports. Importations of coal, foodstuffs, articles of equipment, and other war requirements; the dispatch of steamers laden with such goods and the destination of the same; route of export and import from and to the presumably hostile country; changes in this route; change of flag by the steamers engaged in this import and export trade, and the intermediate ports at which these steamers touch probably only on account of the threatening war. Information concerning the assembling of ships, embargo, and convoy by warships. The latter is especially of value when it involves materials necessary to enemy industries (in the case of England, for example, wool, cotton, grain, and meat).

Incidents in the presumably hostile country which would aid in judging the temper of the Government and the people; for example, increase in the price of important foodstuffs, the shutting down of large factories, the laying up of large merchant ships, important events on the stock exchange, outbreak of revolts, the persecution of foreigners, etc. (in Russia: detention of Polish harvesters at the western frontier).

Permanent or temporary closing of telegraph or cable lines to foreign countries for Government purposes.

2. INDICATIONS IN THE NAVY.

Organization of the information service by the naval authorities.

Striking changes in the location of ships. (For example, in the case of England, the stationing of powerful squadrons on the west coast or in the channel, with destroyers and submarines on the east coast, as a precautionary distribution of forces, or a regular, strategical deployment of the fleet. Possible recall of the west Atlantic cruiser squadron. Changes in the distribution of vessels in the Mediterranean.)

Sudden changes in or interruption of exercises forming part of a regular plan.

Material preparation of the vessels of the reserve formations and of vessels out of commission (such as docking, coaling, and provisioning).

The holding of extra target practices by these vessels.

Mobilization exercises and alarm drills which are not regularly provided for, Increased activity at Government and private shipyards in the gun, torpedo, and ammunition factories (working overtime and at night).

Preparation of transport fleets. Equipment and distribution of transports, assembling of troops and Army material at ports. (In France, preparations at the ports of northern Africa and southern France, probably also of Spain, for the transportation of the Ninth Corps from North Africa to France.)

Cable steamers and auxiliary vessels. Equipment and destination of cable steamers and auxiliary vessels. Equipment of auxiliary vessels with mines.

Seamarks. Removal of seamarks or their substitution by others. Change or removal of landmarks. Changes in the external appearance of lighthouses

and in their lights. Removal of conspicuous towers and other distinctive marks on the enemy coasts.

External appearance of warships. Change in the appearance of presumably enemy warships, for example, by painting a different color. Removal of all articles not needed on board.

Hastened execution or sudden cessation of repairs on ships and small vessels.

Accelerated commissioning of new ships.

Unusual shipments of fuel (coal and oil) and of munitions. Extraordinary purchases of coal and unusual accumulation of fuel at the supply bases. The fitting out of suitable colliers. (In England the putting into effect of the "Emergency clause." The return of private contracts for the purchase of coal and its transportation by rail marked "Urgent".)

Increased safety measures in the coast fortifications; extra target practices and alarm drills.

The exercise of guard duty by the harbor flotillas, the putting into operation of the inspection service and of the seachlights of the coast fortifications, the clearing or laying out of floating obstructions, all under the guise of exercises.

Noticeably frequent flights by aircraft seaward (observation service).

The acquisition of private aeroplanes.

Transportation of crews (possibly in special trains) from the depots of men and from the schools to the ports where the reserve formations and ships out of commission are lying.

Inconspicuous notification of reservists and coast guards or the calling out of reservists (reservist trains). In England the calling out of the immediate reserve (this can legally be done before actual mobilization).

Increased activity in the barracks.

3. INDICATIONS IN THE ARMY.

Increased activity and reinforcement of the working personnel under the military authorities.

Noticeable transfers and assembling of troops, for example, in camps, but also in the coast works.

Sudden changes in or interruption of exercises forming part of a regular plan.

The holding of alarm drills not otherwise provided for.

Increased activity in the military factories.

TRANSPORTATION OF MUNITIONS.

The holding back of relief troops for the colonies.

The holding of rolling stock in readiness for the transportation of troops. In the special case of a probable war with England the following measures are also to be kept under observation:

The assembling of the territorial army at preparatory positions, especially the assembling of bicycle battalions at points on the east coast, for example.

The calling in of horses that are boarded out; these are horses which at the completion of their training are turned over to private individuals who become responsible for their care. They remain at the disposition of the troops for the more important exercises and in case of war. Each regiment has 83 such horses.

The commencement of the purchase of remounts (the appearance of purchasing officers at the rendezvous headquarters for divisions of troops throughout the country).

The transportation of horses and the prompt sorting out of horses unfit for service.

The listing of motor trucks. The expeditionary corps requires about 1,000 motor trucks, as the greater part of the ammunition columns and trains will be equipped with means for mechanical hauling. Only a small proportion of such means is kept on hand with the troops during peace.

Preparations for the transfer of the expeditionary forces to the continent, such as:

The assembling of mobile troops at their stations.

Transfers of troops by rail and on foot to places on the coast, such as Southampton, Portsmouth, Portland, Plymouth, London, and the mouth of the Thames, Harwich, Hull, Dover, Belfast, Dublin, Cork.

Preparations at these places for the housing and feeding of the troops.

The assembling and fitting out of transports in the aforesaid harbors.

The detail of naval officers and signalmen for duty on the transports.

Preparatory measures at the places of disembarkment, such as Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, Seebrugge, Antwerp.

Work on the harbor installations and quays at the last-named places.

The clearing of the harbors of private ships and goods and the clearing out of sheds and storehouses.

The provision of means for unloading at the quay and in the roadstead (tugs, lighters, landing boats, steam cranes, foot bridges, etc.) at the places of debarkation.

Preparations for the housing and feeding of troops at the places of debarkation.

Special supervision over foreign ships at the places of debarkation.

Accumulation of rolling stock for the removal of troops from the places of debarkation.

Inquiries after English interpreters.

Arrival of English officers at the places of debarkation who put themselves in touch with the local authorities.

The looking up of landing places by English officers outside of the regular places of debarkation.

Safety measures for the places of debarkation.

The appearance of English warships in the waters of the ports of debarkation.

4. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE WEATHER.

Of importance also is all information concerning the weather in the country of a probable enemy (such as weather maps, storm warnings, etc.) which may be published at the place of the correspondent. The prompt transmission of such information (by telegraph in the case of serious changes in the weather) may be of great value under certain circumstances, as the weather plays a very important part in the operations of a fleet, and therefore weather reports from the probable enemy country will receive as much attention as other information.

(B) IN TIME OF WAR.

In addition to the points mentioned under (a), the following are also to be kept under observation:

Mobilization. The commissioning and assembling of enemy warships, the formation of several warships into groups, the calling in of reserves, the accumulation of war material and supplies.

The movements of enemy and German ships. The detention, movement, purpose, and condition of enemy fleets and of individual enemy ships. The movements of German warships abroad, and of imperiled German merchant vessels.

Encounters, battles, minor engagements, etc., between ships of both sides. Encounters of German ships with those of the enemy.

Land warfare. Information concerning the enemy which would be of importance for conducting the war on land.

The information service of the enemy. The enemy information service in the neutral country in which the correspondent is located.

Neutrality. Events in the neutral country which point to the manner in which neutrality will be handled; especially important are cases in which an intentional or unintentional favoring of the enemy has occurred.

(C) TRANSMISSION OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED.

This will be governed by the local conditions at the place in question.

Information which the correspondent considers as doubtful will be indicated as such; information which can be assumed for a certainty to be false will be kept back.

A safe rule to follow is to transmit all military information by telegraph so long as this is possible without attracting attention and when the degree of its importance is not such as to require transmission by telegraph in any event. Long reports only, such as detailed accounts, descriptions, etc., will, if not of special importance, be transmitted by mail.

Specially urgent and important information can be transmitted over two or more different telegraphic routes. It is recommended that in such cases the telegrams be worded differently.

Letters will be inclosed in envelopes and addressed in the manner customary in the country. It is recommended, as a rule, not to register them but to send them as ordinary mail. It is not customary to acknowledge the receipt of information. If, however, there is reason to believe that telegrams do not reach their destination or are delayed, or if the contents of a telegram is of such importance that it appears desirable to have a guaranty for the correct receipt of the information, an acknowledgment of receipt may be requested, in which case the procedure will be as described in the Coding Instructions. A record will be kept in a special journal of all the information sent out. Telegrams will be entered exactly as sent (cipher telegrams will be entered in code so that the code words and their meanings may never appear together); letters will be entered in an abridged form or as copies. The book in which this record is to be kept will be arranged as indicated in Appendix 2.

These entries are necessary in order that it may be possible to establish facts in cases of doubt or inquiry.

In case there is danger of the journal falling into unauthorized hands, it, as well as the other articles of equipment, must be completely destroyed while there is still time.

(D) DIRECT INTERCOURSE WITH GERMAN NAVAL OFFICERS IN COMMAND.

Direct intercourse with German naval officers in command who may call at the port where the correspondent is located or come within the vicinity thereof shall not be entered into except when absolutely necessary, and then only in the most unobtrusive manner. As the distinguishing signal for the ships and boats required for communication with warships flags V and M of the International Signal Book will be used by day, V being hoisted above M.

The correspondent will use this signal, however, only when he could not otherwise get on board.

If a warship wishes to enter into communication with a correspondent she will hoist the same signal. The correspondent will immediately endeavor to go on board in the most inconspicuous manner possible. On board ship, also, everything will be avoided which would in any way indicate a connection between the signal and the visit of the correspondent.

At night three white lanterns displayed side by side, two meters apart, will have the same signification.

IV. PREPARATIONS IN TIME OF PEACE FOR THE CONDITION OF WAR.

1. A careful preparation in time of peace for the activities in time of war will essentially contribute to success in the event of a war. The reliable working of the Information Service previous to and during the first days following mobilization is of the utmost importance for our conduct of a war. Correspondents will be given an opportunity, by visits to the prospective locality of their future activities at intervals of about two years, to acquire necessary information.

2. Each correspondent must, even while the Nation is still at peace, make a careful study of all the directions which his activities will take in the event of war and form a clear conception of the most effective way in which the prevailing conditions and the influential people of the locality in question can be utilized under the different problem cases of war and grouping of powers to the advantage of the information service. It is highly desirable that the correspondent be not taken by surprise by the sentiment of the people or the political attitude of the National Government for or against Germany in waging the war; the correspondent should be able to judge with fair accuracy at the outbreak of hostilities what limits will be imposed upon his activities by the attitude of the National Government, and to what extent he may count upon a further unofficial tolerance of his efforts.

3. The correspondents must determine in time of peace through what persons and by what means in their locality they will be able to obtain information in case of war. They must ascertain in particular what newspapers furnish reliable naval news and what newspapers have reliable and capable reporters abroad. It is recommended that the probable political attitude of the more important papers in the event of Germany's becoming involved in a war, be ascertained.

4. In cases where the sending of agents into the enemy country in time of war * * * that they collect a large number of telegrams whose contents relate to the trade of the locality and whose form corresponds to local usage. The more comprehensive this collection is, the greater will be the aid it affords the correspondent in framing sentence telegrams.

5. The expenses incurred in peace-time preparation should be reported to the admiral staff; they will gladly be refunded.

V. THE EQUIPMENT OF INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH THE WAR INFORMATION SERVICE AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE VARIOUS PARTS OF THIS EQUIPMENT.

The equipment of the correspondents consists of various books and lists which are turned over to them when the war information service is put in operation. Correspondents must carefully guard their outfit and use every means to prevent its being seen by unauthorized persons. The mere fact of their possession of the outfit would betray the existence of a war information service and mark the possessor as an agent of the organization. Both would jeopardize the safe operation of the service if not render it absolutely im-

possible. All persons who are in any way connected with the war information service are hereby once more admonished of the absolute necessity for secrecy in everything relating to the service.

The equipment consists of the following articles:

1. The "Instructions" for correspondents of the war information service (the present book).
2. List A.
3. The coding facilities.
4. Lists of ship stations.
5. Information code.
6. Weyer's Pocket Book.

2. LIST A.

This list contains the code addresses¹ and code signatures¹ of the admiral staff of the navy.

The admiralty staff needs these code addresses for the reason that telegrams sent from abroad in time of war, under the official address of the admiral staff of the navy, would have little prospect of being transmitted or of reaching the addressee. There can be no doubt that telegrams sent from abroad to one of the Berlin or foreign code addresses of the admiral staff are less exposed to danger of this sort.

Definite directions as to which address is to be used can not be given; the choice will depend upon considerations of a general nature, such as the reliability and rapidity of the telegraphic routes coming up for consideration. The nationality of the cable and the political bias of the cable companies must also be given due weight.

It can be assumed with a fair degree of certainty that no neutral nation, for the reason that Germany is carrying on war with another nation, will prohibit telegraphic correspondence in code within her own limits or with another neutral country. From this point of view, the code addresses for places near the frontiers of countries bordering Germany should be selected. The admiral staff will be responsible for the transmission of the telegrams from these places to Berlin.

Such code addresses as are for places in the enemy country can not be used; for example, London in the case of a war on the part of Germany against England. The code addresses for Brussels and Rotterdam can be regarded as feasible only when the neutrality of Belgium and Holland has been respected by our enemies and it is certain that an invasion of these countries on their part has not taken place; otherwise Holland and Belgium are to be regarded as enemy territory unless Germany has occupied both countries.

Column 3 of list A contains the code addresses to be used for telegrams, while column 4 contains the code addresses to be used for letters. Should acceptance be refused in the case of telegrams to an abbreviated address (such, for example, as that provided for Berlin and for New York) as happened on the part of the English in South Africa during the Boer war, the letter address can of course be used for telegrams.

The last division of list A contains the signatures of which the admiral staff makes use in order, on the one hand, to conceal the identity of the sender of the telegrams and letters from the outside world, and, on the other, to indicate this identity to members of the war information service. These three

¹ "Deckadressen" and "Deckunterschriften," i. e., addresses and signatures under cover of which correspondence is sent.

code signatures which the admiral staff reserves to itself, to be used at will, must at all times be thoroughly familiar to every correspondent.

The admiral staff of the navy, however, reserves the right under certain circumstances to use instead of a code signature or in conjunction therewith, the cipher equivalent for "admiral staff of the navy" appended to the text of the telegram.

3. CODING FACILITIES.

(a) The coding facilities consist of the Coding Instructions; the Correspondence Code, third edition; the designated key number and reserve key number; the A B C Code, fifth edition.

The Coding Instructions give full information regarding the arrangement of the Correspondence Code, the way in which it is to be used for coding purposes in conjunction with the A B C Code, and the employment of the key and reserve key numbers. The following points, however, will be briefly referred to here.

1. Two methods of coding are open to the correspondent: (a) Coding by means of the code words of the A B C Code; (b) coding by means of sentence telegrams.

Coding by means of code words of the A B C Code is the method ordinarily employed in both peace and war. Telegrams coded by this method have the external appearance of ordinary commercial telegrams, and therefore do not attract attention.

Telegrams will be framed as sentence telegrams in time of war whenever code telegrams are no longer transmitted or when there is reason to believe that they will be held up or purposely mutilated.

(b) Delivery and care of the coding facilities: The coding facilities will be turned over to the correspondent at the time of his departure. The key number and the reserve key number will be noted down by the correspondent in some inconspicuous place. Use will not be made of the reserve key number until especially ordered. (See Coding Instructions, abstract for correspondents, pp. 47-48.)

The Correspondence Code and the Coding Instructions are quite secret in character and it is of the utmost importance that they do not fall into the hands of unauthorized persons; they must be kept in the safest possible place—the key number and the reserve key number being inconspicuously noted down in a different place—and always under lock and key.

4. THE LISTS OF SHIPS' STATIONS.

The Lists of Ships' Stations are designated to keep the correspondent informed concerning the distribution of the warships of foreign nations. They are, of course, strictly correct only at the moment of their publication.

The principal purpose of these lists is briefly to designate foreign warships without mentioning their names, but merely by means of the number which stands in the first column of the lists, in front of the name of each ship. We say, for example, "English warship No. —." The Correspondence Code contains a code number for each English warship No. — (with a reference to the List of Ships' Stations for the number in question) under the word "England," the same being done in the case of France and other nations.

5. THE INFORMATION CODE.

The Information Code contains information of a kind which the correspondent might often have occasion to transmit. It is designed to enable him to transmit such information quickly without having to put it in cipher. Directions for its use with examples are contained in code.

Information furnished in this way must always be confirmed in writing at the earliest possible moment in order to avoid misunderstanding.

6. WFYER'S POCKETBOOK.

This book is to be had at bookstores and contains information on the navies of the world. It will enable the correspondent to familiarize himself with the external appearance of foreign warships.

VI. SECRET NATURE OF EVERYTHING CONNECTED WITH THE WAR INFORMATION SERVICE.

The correspondent must exercise the greatest care in war as well as in peace to prevent his activities from attracting attention or arousing suspicion in any way. It goes without saying that the admiral staff of the navy counts upon the most absolute secrecy on the part of those pledged to this service; the admiral staff is likewise convinced that it can depend upon the maintenance of secrecy for all time by those correspondents whose relations with the navy have, for any reason, been terminated.

When there is danger that the "strictly secret material" of the war information service may fall into the hands of unauthorized persons, it must certainly be destroyed; by fire, for example. This necessity will arise automatically at all information stations which are located in the enemy country at the outbreak of war or which may be occupied by the enemy during war. But even without this assumption, it may become necessary to destroy this material if the government of the country in question is so under pressure by the enemy power that it must be regarded as practically an enemy country. Finally, it may also become necessary to destroy this material if the government of the country in question, while officially neutral, shows such goodwill toward the enemy of Germany in the exercise of its neutrality that the correspondent must count upon the probability of his quarters being searched and his material seized in case his activities become known.

It is better for a correspondent to bring his activities to an end by destroying the secret material in his possession rather than incur the danger of its falling into the hands of the enemy through lack of preventive measures taken in time.

VII. FUNDS AND SALARIES.

1. FUNDS.

When the war information service is put into operation, correspondents receive an advance in money. It goes without saying that any expenditures in the interests of the war information service which may exceed the amount so advanced will be made good by the admiral staff upon proper notification.

To facilitate the checking of accounts of expenditures for the war by the superior auditing divisions which will naturally follow the war, correspondents must keep a record of their expenditures in the simplest form in a cashbook for the purpose. So far as possible receipts and certificates should accompany the accounts as vouchers; otherwise, a certificate by the correspondent that the amount has been paid will serve as a voucher. In danger of compromise, this book together with all vouchers must be destroyed.

Although the admiral staff of the navy takes the position that correspondents should shrink from no expense in the interests of their cause, the interests of the treasury must also be protected so long as this is compatible with the successful working of the information service.

The suggestions given below regarding the pay of agents are the result of practical experience.

First of all, the cash expenditures of such persons for travel, maintenance, and the time lost from their regular work must be made good, after which they must be paid for the actual work accomplished. Too great liberality should be avoided, especially in the nature of unnecessarily large advance payments. The latter are as harmful as too great niggardliness in the payment of services well performed. Promise should be exacted for the performance of good work. Agents frequently are of the opinion that the mere acceptance of a delicate mission is a deed which should be paid for, and are prone to set too high a value on their performances. They should be made to understand that it is simply a question of work and its reward. This does not mean that a person who has once been recognized as useful should be paid a disproportionately higher amount for work of a less valuable character merely for the sake of having his services.

2. SALARIES OF CORRESPONDENTS.

Correspondents, provided they are not entitled to higher salaries in accordance with the war-pay regulations as former officers or as officers on furlough, receive for the period of their employment as war correspondents, a monthly salary of 525 marks, with a daily war allowance of 5 marks, and 500 marks for equipment. The proper pay and allowances are to be charged against the advance funds. Travel expenses (at the rate of 0.13 marks per kilometer abroad and 0.09 marks at home) and a daily allowance (30 marks per day abroad and 17 marks at home) will be paid in case of railway travel undertaken in the interests of the war information service, and are to be drawn directly from the funds on hand against proper receipt vouchers. In case of travel by other means of conveyance (steamer, carriage, automobile), expenses will be paid in accordance with the allowances specified in the travel order; that expenses incurred in excess of these allowances will be made good goes without saying.

The admiral staff of the navy knows and recognizes that all correspondents look upon their activities as a duty of honor performed for their Fatherland. The salary received is therefore in no way to be regarded as payment for services to the Fatherland, but, just as in war-reserve officers recalled to duty receive for the period of their service pay in accordance with their rank, so purely formal grounds require that a salary be paid to correspondents. This is all the more justifiable for the reason that correspondents are often put to expense in their intercourse with persons whose services may be of use to them, but expense of such a nature that it can not always be entered as strictly and entirely in the interests of the war-information service.

APPENDIX I.—SAMPLE CODE.

(For communication between the correspondent and the agent or agents sent by him into an enemy or neutral country.)

PREFATORY NOTE.

The following sample code is based upon the supposition that in a war between Germany and England, in which France remains neutral, a correspondent at The Hague has an agent at Edinburgh, by whom he is to be kept in-

formed of important military happenings in the Firth of Forth through the medium of apparently harmless telegrams.

1. (Number —) battleships lying in roadstead ready for sea. Bill due (date number for the current or next month indicates the number of battleships).
2. (Number —) large cruisers lying in roadstead ready for sea. Remain until (as in No. 1).
3. (Number —) small cruisers lying in roadstead ready for sea. Lowest rate (price number indicates number of small cruisers).
4. (Number —) torpedo boats lying in roadstead ready for sea. Bought to arrive (as in No. 1).
5. (Number —) battleships have entered roadstead or harbor. Regular rate is (as in No. 3).
6. (Number —) large cruisers have entered roadstead or harbor. Bought at (as in No. 1).
7. (Number —) small cruisers have entered roadstead or harbor. Pay draft No. (if three and four place numbers are chosen for the numerical indication only the tens and units count).
8. (Number —) torpedo boats have entered roadstead or harbor. Draft No. (as in No. 7) been paid.
9. (Number —) battleships have put to sea. Can secure you — (hundred) shares at price named (a possible hundred added to the number does not count in indicating the number of battleships).
10. (Number —) large cruisers have put to sea. Samples reach you (as in No. 1).
11. (Number —) small cruisers have put to sea. Can not sell — (hundred) shares at your limit (as in No. 9).
12. (Number —) torpedo boats have put to sea. Offer in force for reply to arrive before (as in No. 1).
13. Mine obstructions have been laid out. More particulars wanted.
14. The vessels (recently reported as having entered the roadstead or harbor, or as lying in the harbor) intend to put to sea on (date). Insurance cargo (as in No. 9).

REMARK.—In actual practice the conventional sentences to be used in telegraphic correspondence will be taken from a code in use at the place in question (in the above sample Libers Code) and by proper abbreviation of expression suited to the telegraphic style. If the telegraphing of commercial matter in plain language arouses suspicion—and this will, of course, be the case when telegraphic correspondence in cipher is prohibited, even with sub-mission of the code—the corresponding code words can be used instead of the above sentences. In using the code words they must be arranged in accordance with the original English text so that the telegram will make sense. If this is not possible the information will have to be transmitted in two or more telegrams.

APPENDIX 2.—SCHEME FOR A CORRESPONDENT'S LETTER BOOK.

Letters received.			Letters sent.			
Date and hour of mailing.	Date and hour of arrival.	Brief summary of contents.	Address.	Date and hour of mailing.	Brief summary of contents.	Remarks.

CHAPTER XV

TRANSITION FROM PEACE TO WAR

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If strained relations should arise between the United States and any foreign power, the naval attaché in the capital of that power will find himself in a difficult position. The local Government may put restrictions upon his means of communication. Again, the attaché himself may consider it inadvisable to risk the transit of highly confidential matter, even through the embassy pouch, for cases have been known where foreign Governments have surreptitiously examined embassy mail.

At the same time it will be of vital importance for an attaché to forward to the Department notice of all events indicative of mobilization. In this case it may be necessary to employ a courier.

Naval attachés situated in countries bordering upon a possible enemy are placed in a somewhat different position. Their activities will not be influenced by the same restrictions, their means of communication will, in most cases, not be vitally affected, and consequently it becomes of the greatest importance to organize a system of secret agents.

For this purpose it is necessary to select a reliable representative through whom communication with agents is effected. Some times a prominent and trustworthy American business man may be available. Such a policy not only serves better to protect the identity of the attaché and his assistants, but secures permanency in the intelligence organization, should the attaché be relieved.

Information during a mobilization period will assume an importance which can not be overemphasized. It may even bring about the initial victory or defeat of naval forces; the victory lying with the navy which possessed power of initiative obtained from the first warning as to the opening of hostilities. The information of greatest value during this period is outlined in the chapter on "Desirable information."

After the outbreak of war, the scope of information required from an attaché will be greatly enlarged. It may be summarized under the following headings, each of which will be discussed separately:

(a) Passport control.

- (b) Suspects, enemy activities and espionage.
- (c) Trading with the enemy.
- (d) Propaganda.
- (e) Enemy war operations.
- (f) Technical information on new tactics, methods, and devices.

The particular information that may be desired from or obtainable by each attaché will of necessity be greatly influenced by local political conditions existing at the time in the country in which he is stationed.

(A) PASSPORT CONTROL.

While the issuing of passports in time of peace is exclusively a State Department function, it was found advantageous during the war with the central powers to supplement the consular duties by coordinating therewith the effective aid of the military and naval attachés, in order to take advantage of their peculiar facilities in this regard.

An attaché, therefore, must be prepared to undertake these additional duties in time of war and to carry out such instructions as may be from time to time issued by the State Department.

A number of regulations were made during the war of 1917-18, the salient features of which follow.

All applications for visés were submitted, in the first instance, to the naval and military attachés, whose province it was to make investigations of the applicants and report their conclusions to the consuls. They were allowed, if necessary, opportunity to examine the declarations in the consulates and to question the applicants. Their recommendation that a visé be refused, when based on military grounds, was definitive. Military grounds were broadly defined by the State Department to cover any reasons relating to the prosecution of the war and the safeguarding of the United States against enemy machinations, but not to include reasons purely economic or industrial. In case of a difference of opinion between the consular officers and the attachés, the question was to be referred to the head of the mission and decided by him after consultation with the Department of State if necessary. Visés were to be refused by diplomatic and consular officers in all suspicious cases, whether or not there was tangible evidence to support the suspicion that the bearer of the passport desired to proceed to the United States for enemy purposes. Severe restrictions were imposed on travel to this country and attachés and consuls were instructed to take into consideration the real urgency or necessity of the proposed journey; where no satisfactory proof to that effect was furnished, visa was to be refused.

The performance of these duties placed on the attachés the obligation of making investigations of every applicant for a passport re-

ferred to them, and of securing adequate information to determine whether or not the application should be granted. This entailed the maintenance of a sufficient number of agents properly to prosecute these investigations, and of a filing or card system whereby the information procured in regard to any individual could be immediately available on demand either by the head of the mission or to the home authorities.

Many instances occurred where known enemy agents were prevented from coming to this country. The working of the system may be said to have been satisfactory on the whole, owing largely to the spirit of cooperation which existed in most cases between the attachés and the consular and diplomatic officials.

A variation of this method of passport control was introduced in Paris and London toward the end of the war, consisting in the appointment of a board composed of a secretary of the embassy and the naval and military attachés, to whom all applications were referred, and whose decision was final. This control was found to be most efficient and to have the advantage of a concentration of authority by eliminating the action of the consuls, among whom a certain diversity of opinion and practice necessarily prevailed. It also relieved the head of the mission of the pressure constantly brought to bear on him by friends of applicants, to whom visas had been refused, to reverse the decision of the attachés. As it was contemplated to extend this system to all the foreign countries, it is believed that some such organization would be adopted in any future war.

Closely connected with the subject of passport control was the inspection of ships and crews sailing from foreign ports. Masters of vessels were obliged to submit to the consuls, some time in advance of the sailing date, a complete list of the crews and personnel of their vessels with photographs attached. These lists were then submitted to the naval and military attachés for their recommendations, the procedure being similar to that followed in passport cases. So strict in some instances was the supervision that even captains and officers have been removed before the ship was permitted to sail.

This control was enforced by the power of the consul to refuse clearance papers until his requirements in this regard had been complied with. The methods of inspection varied in minor details in different countries, and had necessarily to be adapted to local conditions in a greater or less degree.

(B) SUSPECTS, ENEMY ACTIVITIES, AND ESPIONAGE.

During war time it will be a particular function of naval attachés to procure and forward to the Intelligence Office, information in regard to the following subjects:

- (1) Enemy agents and other suspicious characters.
- (2) Activities of enemy agents, including notice of intended departure to the United States.
- (3) Carriers of enemy mail and senders of suspicious cables.
- (4) Persons providing assistance to the enemy, such as giving aid to submarines.
- (5) Unauthorized radio stations.
- (6) Cases of suspected submarine bases.
- (7) Data on the organization of enemy Intelligence Service.
- (8) Methods used by the enemy to injure unfriendly war plants, with a view to determining what practices may be expected in the United States.

(C) TRADING WITH THE ENEMY.

During war conditions, it will be important that the American Government receive as much information as possible on the activities of enemy or neutral firms that are trading with the enemy or are serving as cloaks for enemy concerns. In the war with Germany, information of this character was transmitted to the representatives of the War Trade Board. This organization was purely a war creation, the functions of which were intended to cease with the conclusion of war. Representatives of a War Trade Board should be communicated with by a naval attaché and information on trading with the enemy should be forwarded to such representatives. If none exist, it should go directly to the Office of Naval Intelligence. On the outbreak of war, it will always take some time for a war trade commission to make its organization effective. Until such time, the attaché will be called upon to perform its functions in connection with acquiring information upon enemy trade. [An illustration concerning such activities may be cited in the case of Switzerland during the war with the central powers.]

It became known through an attaché that Switzerland was exporting into Germany large quantities of material used in the construction of aircraft. A knowledge of this situation put the United States in a position to restrict exports to Switzerland unless the aircraft supplies to Germany were discontinued. The stoppage of shipments of this material into Germany thus became a direct and material loss to the enemy.

(D) PROPAGANDA.

War brings about an increased importance of the activities of the press. It is certain that the enemy will take every opportunity to influence and take advantage of the power of the press in neutral countries. Wherever possible, propaganda will be spread to injure our own cause and assist that of the enemy. To meet this form of

warfare, attachés are not expected to engage in any work of counter propaganda of an insidious nature, but they should keep the office advised of all political developments and changes in attitude as expressed by the local press and of instances of hostile propaganda spread by the enemy. The various forms of propaganda include:

- (1) The purchase of newspapers.
- (2) The purchase of moving picture establishments.
- (3) The maintaining of news bureaus where the worthiness of the cause and the various achievements of the enemy may be displayed for the entertainment of the public.
- (4) The spread of advantageous rumors by the use of secret agents.

To meet these attempts, an attaché may not resort to the purchase of newspapers, as such a method has been against the policy of the Government. Experiences in the war with Germany brought about as a counter measure the issuing of bulletins of reliable information to the press that would, in a measure, counteract the efforts of the enemy.

During this war, the functions of counter propaganda were, as soon as the body could be organized, placed with the Committee on Public Information. Bulletins and moving pictures, disseminated by this committee, were of a nature that gradually taught the public that they were to be relied upon. Until the efforts of the committee became effective, the attachés were called upon for assistance, and after that they afforded such cooperation as was possible.

(E) ENEMY WAR OPERATIONS.

In war time, the important activities of the enemy forces will be guarded with the utmost secrecy. With the development of air craft, information concerning his movements will, for the most part, originate with our own operating forces. Under certain conditions, however, attachés will be in a position to gain information of this nature and, due to its vital importance, should exert every effort to obtain it.

There may, however, be special conditions arising that will furnish opportunity for gathering data on enemy activities at sea. An illustration of this was furnished by survivors of torpedoed ships. European attachés were called upon to assume considerable work in this connection. It became necessary to have representatives in neutral ports who would obtain data from survivors regarding German submarines, such as the methods used in sinking the ship (by torpedo or by gunfire), data on zigzagging of the ship, relative position of the submarine, disposition of the secret codes, range of the submarine, its armament, caliber of the guns, shelling of ship's

boats, appearance, description, and maneuvering ability of submarine.

To meet the emergency caused by the outbreak of war and expeditiously to obtain information described in the preceding paragraphs, the attaché must have a skeleton organization of the assistants that he may call upon and that may serve as a nucleus for developing an adequate organization.

Upon the eve of war in which the United States will be engaged, an attaché will probably receive from the Intelligence Office a portfolio that will outline the general policy and the general instructions that he will follow.

Should an attaché be stationed in the country of a prospective enemy, the portfolio may, in addition to the outline of the policy, include what information the department can furnish on the following:

- (a) Direction as to procedure should relations be broken.
- (b) Direction as to change of station and disposition of personnel.
- (c) Instructions regarding funds.
- (d) Names and characteristics of additional agents that might be employed in the absence of an attaché.
- (e) Means of establishing communication with agents.

In the case of an attaché situated in a prospective neutral country the portfolio may contain information on the following subjects:

- (a) List of names and characteristics of any special agents, resident Americans, Government officials, that would be of use to the attaché.
- (b) Instructions on any additional means of or changes in communications. Also names of any couriers that could be relied upon.
- (c) Instructions regarding funds.

(F) TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON NEW TACTICS, METHODS, AND DEVICES.

A state of war always brings about radical changes in the employment of tactics, methods, and devices. In case the United States should be one of the countries at war, information on these new developments might become of vital importance, particularly so in the case of those employed by the enemy. Many illustrations may be found in the war with Germany, that include submarine armament, submarine listening devices, submarine tactics against convoys, new fire control apparatus, and the use of German raiders.

In case an attaché should be situated in a country that was allied with the United States, his functions would be greatly broadened by the sources of information that would be freely thrown open to him. As an illustration, the work of the attachés at London, Paris, and Rome during the war with Germany may be cited. For these offi-

cers a vast amount of information became available by which the United States Navy was able to take full advantage of the previous experiences and developments of the allied services.

A great deal of this information was of a highly technical nature. As a result, the Office of Naval Intelligence carried out the plan of sending abroad a number of specialists. These included experts on temporary missions (usually naval officers), experts on permanent missions, and scientists for research work.

With regard to the naval officers on special missions, it became the practice of the Navy Department early in the war to send abroad officers from each of the different bureaus to Great Britain and to France for the purpose of obtaining special information considered important in the development of matériel. The duties of the naval attaché under these circumstances included a thorough knowledge of the bureaus in the foreign navy department, through which the arriving naval officers could be put in immediate touch with the foreign officers concerned, and their subjects expeditiously handled. As examples of the subjects there may be cited, submarine engines, gun sights, binoculars, gas, and methods of antisubmarine warfare.

By directing and coordinating the work of these officers, the attaché was able to prevent considerable duplication of effort and waste of time.

The experts on permanent duty during the war included those on the interallied radio board and the interallied board of inventions. They kept the United States Navy Department and the offices concerned in touch with the new developments of the allies. They passed on the value and possible application of new methods and inventions, as illustrated by the French long-range gun, submerged radio signals, listening devices, and visual signals by special waves.

Scientists that were sent abroad during the war, were particularly intended to take part in laboratory work. They, as a rule, were selected from professors in American colleges that were experts along certain lines. Their work abroad consisted mainly in the development of scientific appliances used in the war, such as poisonous gas, listening devices, special apparatus for signaling, and smoke devices. These scientists worked in close contact with both the naval and military officials and kept our own department in touch with all developments of their work abroad.

Due to the character of the work of scientific attachés, it became necessary to take measures that would insure complete cooperation with the naval and military attachés. The final result developed into the formation of branch information committees in London and Paris, and a joint information committee in Washington.

The duties of these committees were outlined as follows:

JOINT INFORMATION COMMITTEE.

OBJECT.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the Council of National Defense, have authorized and approved the organization, through the National Research Council, of a joint information committee to have its headquarters in Washington and to have branch committees in London and Paris, for the purpose of coordinating the scientific and industrial research work carried on by the several departments of the Government, and by the various unofficial scientific organizations in the United States which are working on problems connected with war production and invention.

ORGANIZATION.

The joint information committee sitting in Washington consists of:

1. The Director of the Bureau of Standards.
2. The Chief of the Military Intelligence Branch.
3. The Director of Naval Intelligence.

The branch committees in London and Paris consist of:

1. The scientific attaché.
2. The military attaché.
3. The naval attaché.

DUTIES OF JOINT INFORMATION COMMITTEE.

1. Coordination of activities and prevention of duplication of work by the War Department, Navy Department, Council of National Defense, and the various research agencies in the United States.

2. The investigation of necessity for proposed research work abroad and recommendation to State Department regarding granting of passports to investigators. Persons to whom passports are granted are regarded as representatives of the joint information committee and are directed to report upon arrival in London or Paris to the branch committee.

3. The collection, analysis, and compilation of scientific, technical, and filing, and transmission or distribution of reports, cablegrams, etc.

DUTIES OF BRANCH COMMITTEES.

1. The development of contact with all important research agencies.

2. The maintenance of continuous contact between such agencies and the offices of the military and naval attachés in order that all duplication of work or crossing of effort may be avoided with the consequent waste of time and energy and the confusion resulting from crossed or duplicate effort.

3. The collection, analysis, and compilation of scientific, technical, and industrial research information.

4. The investigation and preparation of such information and its transmission to the joint information committee in Washington for distribution in the United States.

5. Distribution of information received from joint information committee to commanders of United States military and naval forces abroad and to the officials of the allied Governments.

CHAPTER XVI

THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

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THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

A memorandum of the Office of Naval Operations of August 1, 1918, has outlined the functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence as follows:

The Intelligence Division is charged with the collection of information for the department and for other naval activities which require it. It publishes and disseminates such information to the Navy and to Government officials requiring it. It cooperates with the other executive departments of the Government in discovering and bringing to justice persons engaged in activities against the United States. It directs all naval attachés abroad, and is the official channel of communication for all foreign naval attachés in the United States.

It is the duty of the Office of Naval Intelligence to keep in close touch with all naval activities, both in and out of the Navy Department. The office handles all classes of information excepting purely operating information, which is usually (and should always) be forwarded by the senior officer present direct to the Chief of Naval Operations. Such information is under the cognizance of the Division of Operating Forces.

THE DIRECTOR.

The Director of Naval Intelligence is the senior officer on duty in the office and is charged with the supervision of all work of the office at home and abroad, including the naval attachés.

It is the function of the Director of Naval Intelligence to formulate the policies which the Office of Naval Intelligence shall adopt and devise the plans for its operation. It is his duty to confer regarding such policies and plans with the Chief of Naval Operations, under whose direction the office is placed.

The director is a member of the General Board of the Navy.

THE OFFICE ORGANIZATION.

For information regarding the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence, an attaché should consult the latest edition of Instructions in regard to Intelligence Duty.

During the war with the central powers many emergencies had to be met by the Office of Naval Intelligence, which resulted in a rapid expansion of its activities. Upon the declaration of the armistice with Germany the organization was approximately as follows:

Section A.—Domestic affairs.

1. Liaison.
2. Examination of suspicious mail.
3. Naval districts and branch offices.
4. Censorship, inspection, trade matter, radio.
5. Investigations.
6. Navy contracts, factories, sabotage, shipyards.

Section B.—Foreign affairs.

1. Europe and north coast of Africa.
2. South America, except Colombia and Venezuela.
3. The Far East.
4. Mexico, Central America, Canal Zone, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba, West India Islands.

Section C.—Collations of the following subjects.

1. War resources, finances; communications, water and land; armies, bases, supplies; politics.
2. Organization, United States and foreign navies; movement of war vessels; operations; strategy; tactics; aeroplanes; ordnance; target practice; submarine activities on Atlantic coast of United States.
3. United States and foreign merchant marine.

Section D.—Dissemination and archives.

1. Registration, carding, filing, dissemination of reports, printing, drafting, and censorship.
2. All matters relating to armed guards; State Department papers.
3. Compilation of all information regarding submarines and destroyers; war diaries.
4. Compilation of all information not handled by desk 3.
5. All information relating to camouflage.

Section E.—Translation.

1. French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Scandinavian, German, Russian, Dutch, Chinese, Japanese, and other languages.

Section F.—Legal matters.

1. Legal matters, interdepartment matters, alien enemies.

Executive aide.—

1. Dispatches.
2. Disbursing, accounting, and supplies.
3. Office orders, suspect cards, personnel, travel orders, telephones, employees, records, files, card distribution, messenger service.
4. Passes, passports, printing, general orders, civil service.
5. Office keys, registering mail, routing mail to sections.

It is essential that each attaché acquire a working knowledge of the Navy Department, and in particular the Office of Naval Operations of which the Office of Naval Intelligence forms one division. This knowledge can best be obtained from a study of the Naval Regulations, chapter on the Navy Department.

Perusal of this chapter will familiarize an attaché with the work of each bureau, and the material handled thereby furnishing better insight into the proper arrangement of reports.

CHAPTER XVII

ATTACHÉS OF OTHER NATIONS

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ATTACHÉS OF OTHER NATIONS.

JAPANESE.

Japanese naval attachés, before being sent abroad, are given special training to indoctrinate them with the organization of intelligence systems. The training, as a rule, consists of a course at the war college, a course at the intelligence bureau, and a period of study of the language of the country to which the attaché is to be accredited. Particular stress is laid upon instruction in the customs, traditions, and distinctive characteristics of the people among whom the attaché is to be thrown.

The necessity for diplomacy and tact is also emphasized.

The mission of an attaché is considered as one that may bear an important influence on peace relations. The attitude of an attaché affects the local admiralty. In turn, the admiralty has, through its intimate connection with strategic problems, an influence on the relations of the Government with other countries.

It is well known that Japanese officers are habitually very reticent about their own naval affairs.

The following may serve as an example of the training of Japanese naval attachés: One attaché, Rear Admiral Yashiro, who occupied a post at Berlin in 1907, had traveled extensively and was well trained in staff work. He was executive officer of the *Hatsuse* when she was sunk by a mine, and later became captain of an armed cruiser at the battle of Tsushima. From that duty the admiral became head of the Japanese War College.

His successor at Berlin, Capt. Ito, had already been attaché at Berlin twice before. He had at least six officers to assist him, some of whom were in training as future attachés to Germany. At the same time the Japanese attaché at Washington had, several years previous, spent two years in training for the American billet.

The training of a Japanese attaché derived from his home office does not end upon arrival at his post. There he is kept supplied with instructions and information that will enable him to keep thoroughly

informed upon the development of his own navy and on international conditions as well. The material supplied to the attachés may be classified as follows:

(a) Instructions, Navy Department orders, and questionnaires for information desired.

(b) Bulletins of a professional and educational nature enabling the attaché to keep informed on the progress of each department of the Japanese Navy.

(c) Bulletins of general information upon international conditions.

(d) Information concerning the country in which he is stationed.

It is believed that the information furnished about his own navy and general naval developments enables an attaché to estimate to much better advantage the value and the accuracy of the information that he himself gathers.

The bulletins of professional information are of undoubted value in his general training. It has been reported that these bulletins contain data from the following sources:

(a) Various reports from naval attachés.

(b) Naval information received from the foreign office.

(c) Essays written by higher Japanese officers on strategy, tactics, politics, and various activities of naval interest.

(d) Digests of books and extracts of periodicals of sufficient importance for general dissemination. These extracts are taken from such sources as the writings of residents in foreign countries, travelers, diplomats, historians, and newspaper correspondents.

GERMAN.

Germany maintained naval attachés who as a rule were admiralty staff officers. They belonged to the Imperial Admiralty during their tenure of office, but reported to the admiralty staff. The very greatest care was taken in their selection, social fitness being particularly considered. They held their posts from three to five years.

Before proceeding abroad they were appointed to the admiralty and admiralty staff for about three months for study. One attaché, after having been on duty in the admiral's staff (which combined our General Board and Intelligence Office), spent six months on duty in the high seas fleet as squadron flagship navigator. After that he spent three months on special duty in the German intelligence office before departing for Washington. Another German attaché was definitely selected for duty two years in advance. During this time he had charge of the naval information bureau where material for the *Marine Rundschau* and *Nauticus* was edited and where information was prepared for the press. Previously he had had admiralty

staff training. The two years' preparatory training included duty as navigator and executive officer on the staff of the fleet flagship as well as several months' special duty in the intelligence office.

In this connection it is interesting to note that in 1909-10 Capt. Hopmann, of the cruiser *Bremen*, who came direct from the staff of the high seas fleet, had before that been attaché in Port Arthur during the siege; and became later the secretary's chief of staff. A later captain of the *Bremen* came from the secretary's immediate staff, where he acted as chief for six months. Previously, as executive of the *Panther*, he saw much service in the West Indies, especially in Santo Domingo.

The German Admiralty took great pains to qualify their attachés to observe and report upon the information desired. They required reports, press news, printed matter, and books, but they looked upon the man himself as the best container of information. A written deposition was admissible only in default of better. They demanded the attachés' impressions while they were fresh. Nearly every spring the attachés at Washington, London, Paris, and Rome went back to Germany, where, for from one to three months, they were in attendance on the secretary both in Berlin and on his rounds of inspection of dockyards, training stations, and naval establishments. They were also at the disposition of other naval authorities, who proceeded to pump the attachés dry. At the same time they were instructed in what was further wanted, so that the attachés returned to their posts freshly primed for another year. Moreover, most of these attachés embarked in one of their own ships for maneuvers as observers under instruction. They then returned to their posts with renewed vigor and broadened outlook for another year. Thus the German Navy sought to keep abreast of the times. Its information was accurate, thorough, and recent.

It is incontestable that the masters in the art of espionage, those who made of it a true science with its rules, its precepts, its organization, and its directory, were the Germans. They did not consider the occupation of a spy dishonorable. They regarded their attachés as "privileged spies under the protection of international law" and encouraged the employment of agents.

To go into details of the German system of agents would require a separate volume. To become familiar with their activities the attaché is advised to read *The German Spy System in France*, by Paul Lanoir, and *The German Secret Service in America*, by Jones and Hollister.

FRENCH.

A section of the French intelligence service at one time published a confidential bulletin containing articles written by officers of the

navy and edited under the following circumstances: Officers were invited to write papers on any subject pertaining to naval matters and to send the same to the general staff, where they were examined by the section or by the general staff, according to the importance of the paper; if necessary, the paper was criticized by pointing out mistaken facts, false conclusions, or material that had better be omitted or inserted. Then the paper was returned to the writer, who after correction, returned it to the chief of the staff. A compilation of the best of these papers was printed three times each year for distribution to the various vessels and stations. These volumes were not published and could not be obtained by the public. Subjects were in all cases chosen by the writer, not by the staff.

It is believed that these articles were of considerable value.

CHAPTER XVIII

EXTRACTS FROM NAVY REGULATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

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PRECEDENCE OF DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS (R1116).

(1) First secretaries of embassies rank with, but after, brigadier generals in the Army and hold a rank intermediate between rear admirals and captains in the Navy.

(2) Secretaries of legation rank with, but after, colonels in the Army and captains in the Navy.

(3) Secretaries of embassies and legations shall be given the side honors and courtesies due their rank, but, they shall not be saluted with guns except when acting as chargé d'affaires, in which case the provisions of article R1115, paragraph 4, shall govern.

HONORS TO THE NATIONAL ANTHEM (R1100).

(2) Whenever the national anthem is played on board a vessel of the Navy, at a naval station, or at any place where persons belonging to the naval service are present, all officers and enlisted men not in formation shall stand at attention facing toward the music (except at colors, when they shall face toward the colors). If in uniform, covered or uncovered, or in civilian clothes, uncovered, they shall salute at the first note of the anthem, retaining the position of salute until the last note of the anthem. If not in uniform and covered, they shall uncover at the first note of the anthem, holding the headdress opposite the left shoulder and so remain until the last note of the anthem, except that in inclement weather the headdress may be slightly raised.

VISITS OF COURTESY (R1271).

(3) An officer joining a ship or naval station shall, in addition to reporting for duty, make a visit of courtesy to his commanding officer or commandant within 48 hours after joining.

VISITS BETWEEN NAVAL AND DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS (R1273).

Upon arrival in a foreign port where there are diplomatic or consular officers of the United States, the following rules in regard to visits of ceremony shall be observed by officers of the Navy:

(a) A flag officer or commodore shall pay the first visit to a diplomatic officer of or above the rank of chargé d'affaires. He will receive the first visit from consular officers.

(b) A commanding officer shall pay the first visit to a diplomatic officer of or above the rank of chargé d'affaires and to a consul general. He will receive the first visit from other consular officers. (R1117, par. 3.)

(c) Diplomatic and consular officers in charge of legations or consulates shall be notified of the arrival of the ship in port.

(d) The senior officer present, when notified, shall, if necessary, arrange to furnish a suitable boat to enable a diplomatic or consular officer to pay official visits afloat. A commanding officer shall, when notifying these officials of his arrival, offer them a passage to the ship at such time as they may select.

ORDERS INVOLVING TRAVEL (R1528).

(1) All orders from commanding officers or others to their subordinates, involving travel, must be in writing, and must state specifically what duty is to be performed.

(2) All such orders to enlisted men of the Navy or Marine Corps must state on their face the cause or necessity therefor.

(3) Officers shall not perform travel on Government duty, unless said travel has been authorized by proper authority, except in cases of emergency, and when there is not time to communicate with the department by telegraph.

PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION FORBIDDEN (R1534).

(1) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy Department shall convey or disclose by oral or written communications, publications, or any other means, except as may be required by his official duties, any information whatever concerning the Naval or Military Establishment or forces, or any person, thing, plan, or measure pertaining thereto, when such information might be of possible assistance to a foreign power in time of peace or to an enemy in time of war.

(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or indirectly, or communicate by interview, private letters, or otherwise, except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of the Navy Department.

(3) Officers and other persons in the naval service desiring to publish articles on professional subjects, except translations from foreign publications or articles of a purely historical nature, shall submit the manuscript of such articles to the Department (Office of Naval Intelligence) for scrutiny before publication. Such articles must be couched in proper and temperate language and free from personal attacks on, or impugment of motives or conduct of, persons in the Government service, and must conform strictly to the requirements of paragraph 1 of this article. The publication of such articles, if authorized, shall be over the signature of the author.

(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers from forwarding to the department, through official channels, well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, such suggestions are invited but they should be in regard to things or methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, if approved by the Department, will be entered on the officer's record and he will be duly notified to that effect.

R1535: No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy Department shall act as a correspondent of a newspaper or other periodical without the express permission of the Department. Every person authorized by the Department to act as a correspondent on board any vessel or at any place under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department shall, before forwarding an article or news item for publication, submit it to the commanding officer for scrutiny, and the commanding officer shall suppress it, wholly or in part, if in his opinion the public interests so require.

INDORSEMENT OF ORDERS (R4493).

1. Any officer paying traveling expenses or mileage shall indorse over his signature on the original travel orders, as well as on the copies retained for vouchers, the date of payment, the amount paid, and the points of departure and arrival.

2. In case an order is confidential, or several subjects are embraced in it, an extract pertinent to the service for which payment is made shall be taken and used.

TRANSPORTATION (R4494).

Transportation furnished upon an officer's orders to or from duty shall be indorsed upon his original orders, and a certified copy of such orders must accompany the vouchers for the expenditure.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE (I-1).

(1) The Office of Naval Intelligence shall keep a record of all naval information furnished by the Navy Department to foreign naval administrations, and of all similar information furnished by foreign naval administrations to the Navy Department.

(2) To relieve foreign ambassadors and ministers from some degree of formal correspondence, foreign naval attachés are authorized to communicate directly with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Further authorization of communication is not given, since it is desirable, for the maintenance of a correct record, that there shall be only a single channel of communication. Professional visits to the Navy Department by foreign naval attachés, excepting the usual visits of courtesy, are expected to be made at the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(3) Chiefs of bureau and other department officers desiring information from foreign Governments, shall obtain the same by means of a memorandum of the required information furnished to the Director of Naval Intelligence.

(4) Information for attachés or other foreign officials in Washington or abroad shall be furnished through the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(5) All correspondence with United States naval attachés shall be under the direction of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(6) By the term "information," as employed in this article, is meant all information of value, either printed, written, or verbal.

(7) All reports and letters from naval attachés shall be addressed to the Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, which office shall, without delay, furnish the several bureaus and offices of the department with such information in regard to such reports and letters as may be of interest to them.

(8) Receipt shall be required and given for papers taken from the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence for the use of bureaus and offices.

(9) When information of special professional interest is received by any bureau or office of the department, a memorandum of the same shall be furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence, in order that all such information may be registered and carded in that office for future reference, and that requests may not be made to foreign Governments for information already in possession of the Navy Department.

OFFICERS ORDERED TO A FOREIGN COUNTRY (I-6).

(1) No officer of the Navy or of the Marine Corps shall proceed to a foreign country on special duty connected with the service

except under orders prepared by the Bureau of Navigation or by the Commandant of the Marine Corps as the case may be, and signed by the Secretary of the Navy.

(2) A copy of each such order shall immediately be filed in the Bureau of Navigation and in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(3) The Bureau of Navigation shall in each such case prepare a letter for the Secretary's signature informing the Department of State of the intended visit and the general nature only of the duty on which the officer is to be sent, in order that the diplomatic representatives of the United States in the countries to be visited may be informed in regard thereto.

(4) The written official report made by any such officer with respect to his mission shall be transmitted by him to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further reference and ultimate file.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (I-2511).

The commanding officer shall require the officers of his command to cooperate with him in acquiring information for intelligence reports.

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS (I-3647).

Marine officers may be required to make intelligence reports upon such subjects as the commanding officer of the ship may direct.

MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS (I-5272).

By naval attachés, quarterly, account current; to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; original and duplicate; accompanied by all vouchers pertaining thereto; to be forwarded through the Office of Naval Intelligence.

DUPLICATE CONVEYANCE OF IMPORTANT PAPERS (I-5331).

Flag officers and others on foreign service shall forward to the Navy Department by different conveyances, duplicates, and, if necessary, triplicates of all important letters, stating at the top of each copy, in red ink, when and by what conveyance the original was sent.

CORRESPONDENCE (I-5301).

(1) Correspondence shall be minimized as much as is compatible with the public interests, both as regards the number of letters written and their length.

(2) Officers shall endeavor to use accuracy, simplicity, and conciseness in official correspondence, confining themselves to the subject at hand without omitting essential details, and arranging paragraphs of letters in logical sequence.

(3) Tables, diagrams, and sketches shall be used, if practicable, when they add to clearness.

I5302: Official correspondence between officers of the Navy and with officials of the public service must be courteous in tone and free from any expressions of a personal nature, but courtesy shall be indicated by the substance and feeling expressed rather than by artificially polite phrases and formulas.

I5303: Matters involving questions of jurisdiction, or conflict of authority, which can not be reconciled by correspondence between officers, must be referred, by officers of the Navy, to the Navy Department.

I5312: (16) The file number of the letter or indorsement shall be placed in the upper left-hand corner, about 1 inch from top and 1 inch from the left edge of the page. The abbreviation or initials of the section or division preparing the correspondence to follow on the same line as the file number.



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By AP NARA. Date 7/18/17