

*N. J. Parman*

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# GUIDE FOR SECURITY ORIENTATION, EDUCATION AND TRAINING (U)



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**Auth: .....** *EO 12958* **.....**

**Date: .....** *21 SEPT 98* **Unit: .....** *NCK22* **.....**

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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## Guide for Security Orientation, Education and Training (U)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Office of Naval Intelligence  
Washington, D.C.

## LETTER OF PROMULGATION

25 February 1965

1. ONI 63-2, Guide For Security Orientation, Education and Training (U), is an unclassified (For Official Use Only) Non-Registered Publication. This Publication is effective upon receipt. This Publication is published in accordance with SECNAVINST 5510.13 (current edition) and serves as a guide to assist commands with the implementation of the applicable Sections of Chapter 3 of the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information (OPNAVINST 5510.1 current edition).
2. The purpose of the Publication is to provide guidance and technical assistance for implementing a security orientation, education and training program.
3. Requests for this Publication may be submitted in accordance with ~~ONI Instruction 05601-4~~ <sup>OPNAVINST 3822</sup> (current edition). Other than U. S. Naval Activities may submit requests through appropriate interagency channels.



J. O. JOHNSON  
Captain, USNR  
Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence  
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Our Commitment To National Security



"America's position of free world leadership carries heavy responsibilities in this complex, revolutionary period of history. We are faced with vast problems that must be met with patience, fortitude, and understanding. Communists, using force and intrigue, seek to bring about a communist-dominated world. Our convictions, our interests, and our life as a nation demand that we resolutely oppose that effort with all our might and all our resources. An enlightened citizenry is our greatest hope in meeting this challenge."

--President Lyndon B. Johnson

\*\*\*\*\*



"History demands of us that this great nation be the principal bulwark against the multitude of forces, often obscure, which are constantly working against freedom wherever it exists."

--John Fitzgerald Kennedy

\*\*\*\*\*



"Our liberties rest with our people, upon the scope and depth of their understanding of the spiritual, political, and economic realities which underlie our national purpose and sustain our nation's security. . . it is the high mission of the Armed Forces to develop such understanding among our people and their military and civilian leaders."

--Dwight D. Eisenhower

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
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 CHAPTER 1  
 INTRODUCTION  
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## 0101. THE IRON CURTAIN.

1. On the 5th of March 1946, Winston Churchill stepped to the rostrum of an auditorium in Fulton, Mo., carefully arranged his notes, and began an address he had prepared for the graduating class of Westminister College. His audience sat quietly, most of them hearing for the first time personally the voice they had come to know so well through the medium of radio, and they listened attentively because they knew and respected Briton's elder statesman. A considerable portion of the world, in fact, heard or read what Mr. Churchill had to say on that March day.
2. The words he spoke had a sense to them, the sense born of over a quarter century's close contact with international politics. They were not glib words, nor were they particularly comforting. Mr. Churchill felt that he had to tell Westminister's graduates, and in a large sense, all the peoples of the world, of a new threat to their tranquility. World War II was over, Hitler dead, fascism in disrepute, and yet a world searching for peace could not settle back and say "It's all over". Fascism had faded, true, but Soviet ambitions for world domination had not been renounced - in fact, with the close of the war these ambitions were re-emphasized and implemented with the seizure of nations, the formation of the Cominform, and the incitation of colonial rebellion. Mr. Churchill wanted, on that 5th day of March, to present an idea which has since been brought home to free men all too vividly -- that Communism is the avowed enemy of freedom everywhere, and that the Red regime will stop at nothing to undermine and in the end destroy all democratic nations no matter how powerful they may be.
3. Most of the speech that Churchill delivered in Fulton has by now faded in the memories of even those privileged to sit on the college platform close by his elbow. The text of his Fulton address has been consigned to the micro-filmed copies of newspapers filed away on dusty library shelves. The idea he presented remains, of course, but the words he used to bring out that idea are today recalled by only a few. And yet, Churchill's Fulton speech will be remembered as long as history itself, if merely because of two words he spoke - three syllables, eleven letters which he hung together and presented so appropriately. IRON CURTAIN!
4. Iron Curtain .... two words which point up Red domination to a greater degree than a hundred photographs or a thousand stories. An Iron Curtain welded around the Communist sphere of influence as strong and forbidding as any prison wall. An Iron Curtain of road blocks and guard houses, of stone walls and barbed wire, of soldiers and secret police and bloodhounds. An Iron Curtain behind which the Communist leaders brew hate and suspicion like some grim witches' potion in a bubbling kettle over an open fire.
5. The Iron Curtain is, for all intents and purposes, the most extensive and formidable barrier in the modern world. Not since the Great Wall of China has any country or group of countries sought to sever itself or themselves so completely from the rest of the world. Not since the days of the early Czars has Russia closed its frontiers so completely to the West.
6. Why is such a barrier necessary? Why, if the Soviet Union is such a worker's paradise, are the Communists so reluctant to exhibit their "Utopia" to the free world?
7. Why, if the Soviet Union is as earnestly interested in peace as it claims, is such a barrier built, a barrier which can only discourage any peaceful negotiations between nations?

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8. The reasons, ~~there are five major ones, are simple.~~

a. First, the Communists do not want the rest of the world to see that they are beset by social, economic, and political problems - that, in fact, the worker's paradise is a totalitarian state, low wages, and a poor standard of living.

b. Second, the Communists do not want their people to find out the truth about the United States and other freedom-loving nations. The Reds want their citizens to believe that the United States is a hot bed of exploitation, starvation, and bigotry.

c. Third, the Communists do not want their people to have an easy way out from under the Red yoke. A poorly defended frontier might prove too inviting for discontented "heroes".

d. Fourth, the Communists do not want the free world to realize the magnitude of their plans for eventual world domination. Without an Iron Curtain, these armed legions might be too readily recognized for what they really are: armies of conquest and not defense.

e. Fifth, and most important, the Communists do not want outsiders to learn the truth about the tyranny of Communism, the terror of the Secret police, the absence of democracy, the poverty of the people. They must perpetuate the "big lie" about their superiority by denying to others the opportunity to observe life behind the Iron Curtain as it actually exists.



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9. The Iron Curtain has shown the Communists hatred, hostility and distrust of the free world, its unwillingness to live harmoniously and compatibly with the world of free enterprise, its need to hide its own weakness, and its requirement for deceit, cunning and camouflage to conceal its ambitions for a world domination. The Soviets have made many changes and peaceful overtures in recent years. However, they have continued, at an increasing rate, to conduct espionage and subversion against the United States.

NO IRON CURTAIN HERE

"We can speak freely, without fear of government retaliation.

We can publish the truth even if it shows the government in the wrong.

We can attend the church of our choice without government meddling.

We can work at jobs we choose in locations we select.

We are safe from unlawful search and seizure.

We can belong to any clubs or organizations we choose.

We cannot be tried for a major crime without a grand jury indictment or affirmation.

We cannot be placed in double jeopardy.

We cannot be forced to testify against ourselves.

We cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

We cannot be deprived of property for public use without just compensation.

We are innocent until proved guilty.

We can vote in open, free elections."

0102. NECESSITY FOR SECURITY

1. The United States, in stark contrast to the Communists, has no Iron Curtain, because we have nothing socially, politically, or economically to hide. The American way of life is a success, we know it, we like it, and we want to show the rest of the world that man, being born free, will prosper most when he retains that freedom. We know that our military operations will be interpreted, by all but the most prejudiced observers, as the preparations of a nation which desires only to defend itself. Travel is not discouraged in the United States; we encourage it. We welcome and even invite foreign visitors into our cities, and into our factories. We are anxious to display the production methods which have placed America in the forefront of world industry. Americans as a people are as proud and eager to exhibit their country as they are to show their new car and the latest additions to the family.

2. Yet, this country has military defense secrets which must be safeguarded in some way. The Communists, remember, performs the function with her Iron Curtain barrier, a barrier we will not create - a barrier which would destroy human dignity and the God-given right of individual freedom. What, then, can the United States do to protect information and material vital to our national defense? What can we do to prevent our secrets from being stolen and exploited?

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
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3. The answer lies in security: a security based on our desires to protect our way of life and on each individual's personal responsibility to keep the United States secure. We must establish and maintain an effective security program which will keep our secrets secret. We must, at all times, put a security classification on military defense documents which are of potential value to the enemy, and most important of all, we must establish a systematic and continuous security program which will make all Naval military and civilian personnel security conscious.

4. The Communists are playing for keeps, and security is our first line of defense. The more we can keep our enemies from learning about our defense preparations the less they will be able to exploit our weaknesses. But our security cannot be effective until everyone in the Naval service understands the why and how of security. Some method must be adopted to get security requirements across to all Naval personnel, and in the end, to make every individual, military or civilian, security conscious. Security orientation, education and training is such a method.

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0103. COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

1. An optimistic Communist Party, USA, moved into more open activities during the 1965 fiscal year in its efforts to gain new influence and promote its programs. It pressed with renewed vigor in all areas of its operations, giving special attention to slashing attacks on American foreign policy, the infiltration into the Civil Rights Movement and specific youth recruitment.
2. Although the Communist Party loudly proclaims its independence of foreign control, its every action rends this facade and clearly demonstrates that it owes allegiance only to the Soviet Union and is absolutely committed to the world communist movement. Ample evidence of this was the reaction of Party leaders to the June 22, 1964, decision of the United States Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional the passport section of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which prohibited any member of the Communist Party, USA, from applying for, using or attempting to use a United States passport. As soon as passports became available to them under this ruling, many Party functionaries traveled to the Soviet Union where they were feted, shown much favor, and indoctrinated for new assaults against their homeland.
3. The Communist Party's traditional opposition to any facet of American foreign policy which serves to impede international communism reached new levels of invective with all-out attacks on this country's commitments in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. Denouncing U. S. action in South Vietnam as "brutal" and "barbarous," the Party has instructed its members to cooperate with all protest groups in order to intensify these activities and weaken the Government's position. The Party is making a concerted effort to exploit to its advantage the various demonstrations against American involvement in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.
4. The communists have been much encouraged by the current wave of social unrest in the United States. They view this situation as the development of a climate favorable to their operations and are constantly probing to exploit areas of discord. It is a rare civil rights activity, whether it be a voter's registration drive, a demonstration, march or picket, that does not attract communists to some degree.
5. A striking example of this was seen in the riots which erupted in the Harlem area of New York City in July, 1964. The Progressive Labor Movement (since renamed the Progressive Labor Party), a dissident and highly militant splinter group of the Communist Party, USA, was involved in prolonging these demonstrations by deliberate incitement of the rioters. Representatives of this group distributed provocative literature and delivered inflammatory street corner harangues which increased the tension in the riot area to a marked degree.
6. In general, legitimate civil rights organizations have been successful in excluding communists, although a few have received covert counseling from them and have even accepted them as members. The Communist Party is not satisfied with this situation and is continually striving to infiltrate the Civil Rights Movement at every level.
7. The 1964-1965 school year was a busy time for communist leaders in all areas of the country as the Party intensified its efforts to attract young people through public appearances on college and university campuses. Party leaders, encouraged by earlier successes, spoke to more than 37,000 students in 56 appearances during this period. This concentration on college campuses was aimed at gaining acceptance for the Party as a legitimate political activity, creating an aura of respectability and understanding for the Party and spreading communist propaganda. Communist Party leaders also appeared as guests on numerous radio and television programs.
8. Another major weapon which the Communist Party is directing against young people is the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America. This Party-oriented youth organization was founded in June, 1964, at the invitation of the San Francisco, California, Defenses Committee.

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which was dominated and controlled by communists, has as its basic aim the promotion of Marxism-Leninism ideology. The Marxists believe that these Clubs, which are centered on college campuses, have great promise in reaching youth.

#### 0104. LEGAL ACTION

1. In June, 1961, the U. S. Supreme Court upheld the findings of the Subversive Activities Control Board that the Communist Party, USA, was directed and controlled by the Soviet Union. The order for the Party to register as required by the Internal Security Act of 1950 was openly defied, leading to the initiation of prosecutive action by the Government. The Party was convicted in the U. S. District Court, Washington, D. C., on December 17, 1962, on twelve counts of failure to register, and a maximum fine of \$120,000 was imposed.
2. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed this conviction on December 17, 1963, holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was available to the officials of the Party as a legal justification for refusing to register. The Court further held that the Government could retry the case provided it could produce a "volunteer" who would offer to effect the registration if authorized by the Party to do so. Otherwise, the Government was to move to dismiss the indictment. The Supreme Court declined to review this decision.
3. On February 24, 1965, the Government presented evidence to a Federal Grand Jury in Washington, D. C., that the Party, subsequent to February 12, 1965, had knowledge of the identity and availability of an individual who was willing to sign the registration form and statement. A new indictment was returned on February 25, 1965. This was consolidated with the earlier indictment against the Party, and trial was set for late 1965. By June 30, 1965, the Department of Justice had petitioned the Subversive Activities Control Board to order 44 national and district functionaries of the Communist Party, USA, to register as Party members under the appropriate section of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Hearings have been held in all of these cases. Based upon the evidence developed and witnesses supplied by the FBI, registration orders have been issued by the Board against 37 of the respondents, all of whom have filed notices of appeal.

#### 0105. COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

1. There is little of social or economic significance occurring in the United States which does not interest the Communist Party as a means of furthering its objectives. The Party is continually striving to propagandize its programs through existing front organizations or by creating new ones. It pictures itself as the champion of Negroes and other minority groups by claiming that their interests are its own. Actually, the Party has no real concern for these groups--but merely hopes to ensnare them in order to extend its own influence. Nonsubversive, legitimate organizations are constant targets for infiltration. The communists aim at gaining control of the policy-making machinery of these groups for the purpose of injecting the Party line without any open identification with communism.
2. The FBI investigates newly formed known or suspected communist front organizations to determine their true nature and whether their activities come within the FBI's jurisdiction. In conducting inquiries regarding communist attempts to infiltrate these organizations, the FBI is concerned only with possible communist penetration and not with the legitimate activities of the groups. Information developed is referred to the Department of Justice for consideration in instituting proceedings under the provisions of Executive Order 10450 and the Internal Security Act of 1950.

#### 0106. COMMUNISM IN THE CARIBBEAN

1. The unrelenting efforts of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Castro regime in Cuba to foment unrest and subversion throughout the Caribbean require that the FBI maintain efficient coverage of the United States, broad coverage of

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activities in that area. The outbreak of the revolt in the Dominican Republic in April, 1965, underscored the importance of good intelligence as heavy communist overtones in that uprising posed the threat of the establishment of another communist government in the Caribbean.

2. While there has been a lessening of open activities on the part of the pro-Castro organizations, the Cuban Government has continued its efforts to infiltrate intelligence agents into the United States. This factor, coupled with Cuba's close alignment with the Soviet Union, necessitates constant alertness. This is especially true with regard to Communist China, a country which represents a grave long-range danger to the security of the United States. Expanding Chinese communist operations throughout the Western Hemisphere require that full intelligence coverage be maintained.

#### 0107. NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES

1. Several small, but highly vocal, Puerto Rican nationalist groups have advocated independence for Puerto Rico by any means, including violence. Members of these organizations, many of whom are eager partisans of Cuban-style communism, have engaged in acts of violence in the past, although prompt action by the FBI and local authorities in Puerto Rico has done much to forestall such operations.

2. In the United States a number of Negro nationalist groups which are antiwhite and actively promote racial hatred have become the focus of increased attention. These included organizations such as the Nation of Islam, frequently referred to as the "Black Muslims", the Muslim Mosque, Inc., the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Black Liberation Front. All of these have considerable potential for violence as evidenced by various recent incidents such as the plot by members of the Black Liberation Front to dynamite the Statue of Liberty and other national monuments. This scheme was crushed by FBI agents and New York City police on February 16, 1965, with the arrest of the conspirators, who were subsequently tried and convicted in Federal Court.

3. The Ku Klux Klan and other hate-type organizations have been investigated due to their past history of violence and lawlessness, when they advocate, condone or incite the use of force or violence to deny others their constitutional rights.

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
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# MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF COMMUNIST-BLOC REPRESENTATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES




## PENETRATION

- \* INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
- \* CONGRESS
- \* DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- \* TECHNICAL ORGANIZATIONS
- \* DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- \* ANTICOMMUNIST GROUPS


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- \* NUCLEAR, MISSILE AND SPACE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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- \* DEFENSE PLANS
- \* POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS



## PROPAGANDA

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- \* RADIO AND TV APPEARANCES
- \* PERSONAL CONTACTS
- \* DELEGATIONS AND VISITS BY OFFICIALS



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On the job



Protect the job

**SECURITY is up to you**

## CHAPTER 2

## SECURITY GUIDE FOR INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT

0201. General. One of the most important aspects of an initial security briefing should be directed to individual conduct. This Chapter lends itself to such a guide. Individual commands may adapt this guide to their own peculiar situation. The guide is prepared in a manner which permits its use in lecture form or to be read by each individual.

0202. Guide to Individual Conduct.

1. Scope of Individual Responsibility for Maintaining Security

a. General. All military and civilian personnel or personnel associated with the Naval Establishment, in any manner whatsoever, have a personal responsibility for maintaining the security of any classified matter of which they have knowledge. All persons have the obligation of controlling their own words and their own actions at all times and in all places. They are also requested to report to the proper authorities anything which might actually or even possibly reveal the improper release of classified information to persons not authorized to possess it. Careful and unceasing attention to this responsibility is an essential part of the services demanded of every individual by the United States Government.

b. Classified Information. The term "CLASSIFIED INFORMATION" means official information the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interests of national security. There are three categories of classified information (CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET AND TOP SECRET). Information, official or otherwise is not classified unless it requires protective safeguarding in the interest of the security of the United States. In accordance with SECNAV Instruction 5570.2A dated 6 June 1957, the term "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" may be used within the Naval Establishment to protect from unlawful dissemination such information as would not meet the requirements for classified material but is of such nature that it would not have unrestricted public dissemination. This information must be handled with the same respect that classified information deserves. The unauthorized disclosure of such information will not be tolerated.

c. Brief of the Pertinent Statutes. During your security briefing you will read certain Criminal Statutes of the United States Code relating to defense information. Specifically, these are Sections 793, 794 and 1001; Title 18, United States Code. In these statutes you are informed as to those acts which, committed advertently or inadvertently, are punishable by law. To assist you in remembering them, they are summarized below:

- (1) Communicating or giving to unauthorized persons any information relating to the national defense.
- (2) Permitting such information in your custody to be stolen or destroyed through your own gross negligence.
- (3) Failing to report to your superior the known loss or destruction of such information.
- (4) Hiding or shielding any person whom you believe or suspect has taken, communicated to unauthorized persons, or lost such information; or who has permitted any such information to be stolen or destroyed.
- (5) Making defective in any manner an article or material which is to be used or is in any way connected with the national defense.

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- (6) Damaging or destroying any building, property, or equipment used in connection with the national defense.
- (7) Taking, stealing, or damaging any property which is being made for or which belongs to the government.
- (8) Photographing or making any map or sketch of anything relating to or being manufactured for the national defense, except when authorized or in the performance of your regular duties.
- (9) Disobeying any order or regulation published by the Secretary of Defense, or his designated representative, which relates to the security or protection of any national defense plants.
- (10) Reproducing, publishing, selling or giving away photographs, sketches, pictures, drawings, maps, or graphical representation of any military installation or equipment.
- (11) Possession of classified material or material which would be detrimental to the United States except in the proper work area. This includes the taking of classified material to an individual's home without proper authorization.
- (12) Knowingly and willfully falsifying or concealing of material fact.
- (13) Making false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations.

## 2. On-duty Responsibility.

- a. While on duty, you, as a military member or civilian employee of the Naval Establishment, are responsible for such security responsibilities in your office or space as may be assigned by your supervisor. You may not delegate this responsibility.
- b. It is your responsibility to safeguard classified information from unauthorized disclosure. This may be accomplished by constant reference to the clearance status and "Need to Know" requirement on the part of those persons being given access to classified information under your control. Every member of the Naval Establishment verified as being cleared may disclose classified information to other individuals in the course of official activities only after the following determination:
  - (1) After you have determined the clearance status of the other party, you must then determine that the person to be given access to the classified information concerned has the official "Need to Know" which necessitates such access. This procedure is not necessary for those personnel known to you and involved in day-to-day working relationship. Once again, it is emphasized that the basic responsibility for safeguarding the security of classified information rests with each individual having knowledge of such information.

3. Off-duty Responsibility. Even the most casual examination of the "off-duty" security obligations of all personnel of the Naval Establishment reveals limitations upon the freedom of choice and action by such employees in the conduct of their private lives. Discretion should be exercised when participating in public activities in which such participation would reflect adversely upon the Naval Establishment. This is particularly true in cases where matters of national security are involved. An opinion either expressed or implied by a member of the Naval Establishment may mistakenly be interpreted as the official position of the Navy in such matters. Participation in activities such as these must be avoided so as not to focus undesirable attention on military and naval operations and its personnel. Nothing herein shall be construed as preventing

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## CHAPTER 3

## ENEMY AGENTS AND YOU

## 0301. EVERYONE IS A POTENTIAL TARGET OF ENEMY AGENTS

1. In novels, movies, and TV thrillers, espionage is generally shown as an exciting and fascinating theme. Often the most adventurous and gripping stories are based on real-life incidents.
2. These fictional or dramatized espionage stories seek only to entertain us. The real espionage operations by enemies of the United States have a far more serious purpose -- to destroy us.
3. Every American serviceman is a potential target of espionage activities. The reason is that he either knows something that an enemy agent would like to know, or is regarded as a possible means of obtaining such information.
4. The term "enemy agent" has a special meaning here. Usually "enemy" applies to wartime, when it is proper to speak of enemy armed forces, enemy governments, enemy activities. But espionage is a never-ending activity. Even when our country is not at war there are logical reasons for describing espionage against the United States as the work of enemy agents.
5. All Navy and Marine Corps personnel and civilian employees must know how to recognize and defend themselves against possible attempts at espionage. They should know exactly what to do if they suspect that such an attempt is being made to involve them or get information from them. This chapter gives the main facts about espionage methods, and some basic rules for guarding against them.



**Everyone is a potential target of enemy agents.**

## 0302. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?

1. Espionage is the secret (or undercover) aspect of a broader activity known as intelligence. Before turning to the particular subject of espionage, it might be well to look briefly at the intelligence field in general.
2. Intelligence is knowledge about the enemy. It includes facts about his capabilities, plans, and intentions. However, facts by themselves are information rather than intelligence. Information becomes intelligence by means of the following important steps:

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- a. The information is evaluated to test its factual accuracy and to weigh the possibility that it is entirely true, only partly true, or even entirely false.
  - b. The information is studied for its meaning or significance.
  - c. The information is related to other known facts or fully developed intelligence, to determine whether it adds to, changes, or clarifies, existing intelligence.
  - d. The information is interpreted or analyzed to reach conclusions about its meaning with reference to already established intelligence on that subject.
3. This is how information is transformed into intelligence. What began as unchecked and unevaluated information is now ready to be used as intelligence to guide a government or military force in planning its activities.



**Espionage activities are entertaining only if you are not involved.**

### 0303. SOME FAMILIAR "INTELLIGENCE" OPERATIONS

1. We are all familiar with a number of activities that resemble intelligence operations. The field of organized sports has several examples. Professional and college football teams have "scouts" who are expert at watching and analysing the playing styles and strategy of opposing teams. During the season they help their teams prepare for upcoming games by making detailed "intelligence reports" on the opposition. There is nothing secret or underhanded about this. Many of the scouts are well known and respected as specialists of the game.
2. In organized baseball, managers and coaches are always gathering "intelligence" about the other teams. From their own observations and word of mouth they learn the strengths and weaknesses of opposing players--their hitting and throwing abilities, their speed on the base paths, the individual mannerisms of pitchers and countless other bits of "inside baseball." Many a tight game has been won by remembering and acting upon some obscure fact at the critical moment.
3. The business world also makes legitimate use of many kinds of "intelligence"

Department of the Navy military personnel and civilian employees from participating in elections or local politics, as long as the activities do not violate the provisions of the Hatch Act which governs political activity by government employees. Another limitation is that which pertains to the keeping of personal diaries. No classified matter pertaining to the Department of Defense may be mentioned directly, indirectly or by suggestion in personal diaries. While the observation of these and other limitations are part of the service for which the employees are paid, a very real form of compensation is the justifiable pride and satisfaction which the employees are entitled to feel as the result of their unique contribution to the national security.

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I was gratified to be able to answer promptly  
and I did. I said I didn't know.  
(Mark Fagan)

DEVELOP THE HABIT OF SAYING "I DON'T KNOW"  
Your friends and relatives will soon stop questioning you about your activities if you develop the habit of consistently saying "I don't know." They will respect your desire to keep quiet. Only when you pretend to know something will your friends and family question you to satisfy their natural curiosities. Developing the habit of saying "I don't know" is one of your best weapons in guarding against loose talk.

4. Discussion of classified aspects of your work should not be carried on at military or civilian social gatherings, even though all personnel present are cleared. Furthermore, classified material shall not be removed from the confines of your ship, station or activity except on approved official business. Extreme care should be exercised with members of your family or your friends. They are not cleared. They have no "Need to Know" and lastly they have not been indoctrinated in the necessary safeguards required for the security of classified information.

5. A General Guide. It is not possible to provide each individual with a complete list of "do's and don'ts" as far as security is concerned. There are, however, two "rules of thumb" which will usually help in answering the questions "Should I do this?" or "Should I say this?"

Rule 1. Could spies or traitors possibly learn anything from this?

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Rule 2. Could this possibly help spies or traitors verify something that they already have ideas about or have guessed?

If there is the slightest possibility that the answer to either of these two questions might be "Yes", "Probably", or even "Possibly", the action should not be taken or the statement should not be made. One of the personal restrictions that working with classified material requires of an individual is that conduct and speech must always be guarded. The goal of the Security Program is to train military and civilian personnel to the point that whenever and however a topic comes up which has even the most remote bearing on classified information, the employees will automatically become alert, watchful and on their guard against security slips.

6. Applicable Questions and Their Answers. In addition to the foregoing "rules of thumb" and as a means of providing guidance for military and civilian personnel in some of the more common situations having security aspects, the following are typical questions and their authorized answers.

a. Q: May I disclose the command that I work for and where I work?

A: For all practical purposes, you work for the Department of the Navy, at the address to which you are assigned. Using utmost discretion, for example, you may give the official address of the command you work for. You may not indicate the purpose of your work. The mission of your ship, station or activity is not for general consumption.

b. Q: What may I say regarding my assignment or employment when making application for a charge account, loan, or rent application?

A: You may state the command that you work for, the address at which you work, your "general" job title, your grade and salary, and length of service, if required. If any further information is desired by persons or firms with whom you may be dealing, instruct them to request such information by letter addressed to your commanding officer.

c. Q: May I give my office telephone number to persons not connected with the Naval Establishment?

A: Except in special circumstances, ship, station, or headquarters telephones are to be used only for official business. You may, however, give the office phone number to members of your family and/or others who might have to contact you in an emergency. Pay telephones are normally provided for personal calls. Remember, no classified information may ever be discussed over the telephone.

d. Q: What may I reply to questions by members of my immediate family concerning the place and nature of my assignment or employment?

A: The answer to Question a. is applicable. In addition, you may state that your work is classified and that the law prevents you from revealing the type of work in which you are engaged. Caution your family not to discuss your assignment or employment with others.

e. Q: What shall I instruct members of my immediate family to reply to questions from friends about where I work and what I do?

A: The answer to Question a. is applicable here also. Instruct your family that they do not know what your duties are, and that your family knows about your job,

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the less likely they are to unwittingly reveal information of value to foreign intelligence.

- f. Q: What do I say when a complete stranger is overly persistent in questioning me about my job?
- A: Simply inform him that you do not care to discuss the subject further. Quiz him as to his name, address and purpose of his inquiry. He will probably drop the subject. You may leave his presence, if circumstances permit, or change the subject. In all cases, report the facts and circumstances to your Commanding Officer.
- g. Q: May I discuss classified matters outside the Ships, Station or the Headquarters in other secure government spaces?
- A: While in official capacity only, and if it is necessary in order to effect your business. First determine the clearance status of the other party and the other party's "Need to Know" in conjunction with that business. The information will be limited to that which is necessary to carry on official business.
- h. Q: What organization may I join?
- A: You may become a member of any reputable organization, society or group. This includes social, scientific, cultural, religious groups, organizations or societies. It is the responsibility of each employee to determine, prior to joining an organization, the status of that organization. Find out all you can about it, determine its policies, its stated aims, names of officers and sponsors and past history of the organization. The cited "List of Subversive Organizations" published by the Attorney General and the "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" prepared by the House Committee on Un-American Activities may be used as references. Lists maintained by various state committees on Un-American Activities may also be useful. If, after joining an organization, there is some question in your mind regarding its policies, activities, etc., report your observations to your Commanding Officer. Remember that as a military member or civilian employee of the Naval Establishment you should not enter into any action or discussion which discloses military or naval operations, activities or the mission of your assigned command.
- i. Q: May a member of the military service give his service specialty number and identify it by its appropriate title to an outsider? Especially can a member leaving the service identify his service number and title when seeking employment with private industry?
- A: Generally, service specialty numbers and their titles are unclassified and may be given to outsiders.
- j. Q: May I associate with non-citizens on a close social basis?
- A: This is normally permitted. However, any contact other than official, with Sino-Soviet bloc personnel should be reported to your Commanding Officer immediately. Meetings with other nationals normally need not be reported.
- k. Q: Are there any restrictions on going overseas after leaving your present assignment, either for a new assignment, a government agency or privately?
- A: Yes. The specific answer to this question is dependent upon

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the type of classified information to which you may have had access and the area of the world to which you wish to go. The length of time the restriction is imposed depends upon what assignment you held. Restrictions on going overseas privately are the same, plus certain others that are imposed by the State Department. When leaving your present assignment or employment you will be informed as to what restrictions apply, if any.

l. Q: Are there any security requirements concerning vacation or business travel?

A: Yes. Specifically, if you intend to travel to or through Sino-Soviet Bloc countries or prior to attending conferences outside the United States where it can be anticipated that Sino-Soviet Bloc representatives will participate or be in attendance, you are required to notify the Security Officer or Commanding Officer, at least ten (10) days in advance of your departure. Additionally, military personnel contemplating travel outside the United States in a leave status should consult Article 11107, BuPers Manual.

m. Q: What requirements of citizenship must be met by military and civilian personnel for a security clearance?

A: Security requirements state that the individual should be a U.S. citizen or immigrant alien. However, an immigrant alien shall have formally declared his intent to become a U.S. citizen before a naturalization court and must have been the subject of a Background Investigation. Foreign Nationals may be granted access to classified information, on a limited basis, provided they have been the subject of a Background Investigation and access has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence).

n. Q: If I marry an alien while assigned to or employed with my present command will it affect my status?

A: Your intended marriage to an alien should be reported to your commanding officer. You will be informed of its effect on your assignment or employment. It is not likely that marriage to an alien will result in withdrawal of your clearance.

o. Q: What may be written or said for public consumption about the status, mission, composition, organization or function of the command I am presently assigned to or the results it obtains?

A: Generally speaking, nothing. Of course, certain information as discussed in prior questions may be printed for public consumption, but only the commanding officer or his designated representative may release such information. Requests for authority to release information to the press, periodicals, as lecture material, or in connection with judicial proceedings, will be submitted through official channels for processing with copies of the information for which release is desired.

p. Q: What action should I take upon learning of what appears to be a security violation by the press, by the radio or through television, or by any other means normally available to the public?

A: Bring it to the attention of the Security Officer or Commanding

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Officers state the facts: What, When, Where, How and by Whom --  
~~Determinted material~~ Unit copy thereof or an actual clipping properly identified.

- q. Q: Why am I told to be so reticent about discussing my work with other people, when the newspapers seem to tell everything?
- A: From time to time you may wonder why you are required to be so security conscious, and it is understandable; however, remember that because certain things appear in the periodicals or newspapers, it does not necessarily mean that their publication was authorized. Normally, such releases are the educated guesses of the author. These may or may not be correct. Do not deny, affirm, or comment on such material; it will only aid in establishing as fact that which, before, was only suspected.
- r. Q: May my security badge be shown as a means of identification?
- A: It should be used only when proof is required that you are a government employee and no other identification is available. Military personnel need not use their security badge as they have their ID card.
- s. Q: Should I discover that I have lost my security badge, what steps should I take?
- A: Report the facts and circumstances immediately to the security office or issuing office.
- t. Q: When I separate from the Naval Establishment, what may I say concerning my employment so as not to violate security? Especially, what may I say when applying for a job elsewhere? How may I best describe my duties?
- A: It is difficult to put down on paper a stock answer to this question. You may state that you were assigned or employed by a particular command. You may give your general job title which is unclassified. It is recommended that prior to your separation or transfer you write a complete job description of your duties and responsibilities. Under no circumstances may you include Department of Defense classified information. Take your resume to your division officer or supervisor for his advice and assistance.
- u. Q: What job title or part of the job title may I use in filling out forms for schooling and what classes or machines that I have studied may I list?
- A: There isn't much to add to answer this question that has not already been said before. Your general job title, and the standard office machines with which you may be acquainted, are generally unclassified. If you have doubts, they should be referred to your division officer, supervisor, or the administrative officer.
- v. Q: What documents set the security standards for military personnel and civilian employees of the Naval Establishment?
- A: Executive Order 10450 as amended; Executive Order 10501 as amended; Department of Defense Directives 5210.7, 5210.8, 5210.9; the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information; and Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions. The division, unit or office to which you will be assigned will

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have a copy of the Security Manual available for you to read. You are encouraged to fully acquaint yourself with the contents of the Security Manual as soon as possible after you receive your permanent assignment.

w. Q: May I accept part-time employment elsewhere?

A: Yes. Normally, there will be no objection to your part-time off duty employment elsewhere. However, such part-time off duty employment must not reflect any conflict of interest or reflect upon your abilities to perform your assigned duties. Military personnel are required to request permission from their commanding officer prior to accepting part-time off duty employment.

x. Q: How can my personal conduct result in the termination of my assignment or employment?

A: There are three prime and unchanging qualifications that an individual must possess. They are (1) unquestioned loyalty to the U.S.; (2) excellent character; (3) utmost discretion. These three qualities cannot be waived. Executive Order 10450 sets forth certain qualifications that an individual must have in order to work in a government organization such as the Navy. Section 8(a) of Executive Order 10450 is herein quoted verbatim:

"Section 8(a): the investigations conducted pursuant to this order shall be designed to develop information as to whether the employment or retention in employment in the Federal service of the person being investigated is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. Such information shall relate, but shall not be limited to the following:

(1) Depending on the relation of the Government employment to the national security:

(i) Any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy.

(ii) Any deliberate misrepresentations, falsifications, or omission of material facts.

(iii) Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction, or sexual perversion.

(iv) Any illness, including any mental condition, or a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the employee, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such cases.

(v) Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security.

(2) Commission of an act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or

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sedition, or attempts, threat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with, or aiding, or abetting, another to commit or to attempt to commit any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.

(3) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or representative of a foreign nation, or any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States or the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(4) Advocacy of use of force or violence to overthrow the government of the United States, or of the alteration of the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(5) Membership in, affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or shows a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of the government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

(6) Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person of security information, or of other information disclosure of which is prohibited by law, or willful violation or disregard of security regulations.

(7) Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.

(8) Refusal by the individual, upon the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, to testify before a Congressional committee regarding charges of his alleged disloyalty or other misconduct."

7. Excerpt from Espionage Act. Paragraph 1 gave a summary of the pertinent statutes. The following are excerpts from the Espionage Act:

a. Section 793. Gathering, transmitting or losing defense information.

(1) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, fueling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, research laboratory, or station or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or of any of its officers, departments, or agencies, or within the exclusive juris-

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diction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, stored, or are the subject of research or development, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or any department or agency thereof, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or

(2) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or

(3) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain it, that if it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter; or

(4) Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photographic negative, photograph, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(5) Whoever, having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(6) Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been

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in violation of his trust, or lost, or stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft, abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(7) If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

b. Section 794. Gathering or delivering Defense Information to Aid Foreign Governments.

(1) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(2) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, communicates or attempts to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

(3) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

c. Section 1001. Statements or entries generally.

Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency, of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme or device, a material fact or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

8. Summary.

a. The questions and answers furnished in this pamphlet will guide military and civilian personnel of the Naval Establishment in the conduct of his daily social life in regard to his position and place of employment. They do not, however, cover every circumstance which may arise.

Should a situation arise which is not covered in this chapter, no statement should be made by the individual. He should report the situation to

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his superior, security officer and/or commanding officer, and an appropriate answer will be given for future guidance.

c. The security of the United States of America and of the Naval Establishment is the individual responsibility of each military member and civilian employee.

d. The individual military member or civilian employee alone is responsible for any violation of security he may deliberately or unintentionally commit. He is urged to become fully acquainted with the contents of the Security Manual as soon as possible after receiving his permanent assignment. Moreover, he must always vigilantly guard against violating the trust which has been placed upon him. To relax security, but for a moment, is to invite disaster.

e. In the Naval Establishment there are "no channels to Security." The Navy recognizes that, to properly discharge its responsibilities to our country, the continued alertness and cooperation of all military and civilian personnel regarding security matters are necessary. If an individual military member or civilian employee feels that a matter should be brought to the attention of security personnel, he is encouraged to report directly to his security officer or commanding officer.

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
# FULL SECURITY



EVERY MINUTE...  
EVERY MAN

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
operations. Companies regularly study the products and operating methods of their competitors. They know that their own success depends partly upon their keeping up with or surpassing their competitors in the quality of their products.



4. Intelligence is most often thought of as an activity of competing nations and governments. One country wants to know all it can about the capabilities, plans, and intentions of another country. Such information has an important bearing on a nation's decisions, plans, and actions in international affairs.

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6. In certain fields it is easy to understand the enemy's interest. Take, for example, our scientific and technical programs for developing new weapons and equipment. Enemy agents have three main reasons for trying to get information about these activities. First, they want to know how well we are doing in the effort to improve our means of national defense. Second, they want to compare our newest weapons and devices with their own. Third, in cases where we have progressed more rapidly than they, data about our programs can be used to help them catch up with or surpass us in those items.



An enemy agent is interested in almost all areas of military life.

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
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
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1. Enemy agents use many different methods and techniques. The most skillful ones always carefully fit their operations to the particular job. It is especially important to keep in mind that an agent is almost always part of a spy organization or network. As such, his mission at a given time may involve only one small portion of the whole espionage mission in which the network happens to be engaged. As the following description will show, agents often spend much time and effort gathering information for other agents to use in performing the actual espionage job.

2. Let's suppose that enemy agents have been assigned to procure the designs, scientific and engineering data, and related TOP SECRET information concerning one of our most successful missiles. How would they go about getting such information? (One thing they are almost sure not to do is immediately try to break into the headquarters to steal the TOP SECRET files.) Even if it seemed possible, they would probably not do it, because the most effective espionage is designed to achieve its purpose without arousing the victim's suspicions.



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3. How, then, would the agents proceed? They would first concentrate on getting information that will indicate the most promising means of accomplishing the mission. Here are the most important questions they would try to answer:

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
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Enemy agents give special attention to the human element.

5. Notice that some of the questions in this preliminary "casing" of the job are about the people assigned to the installation. Enemy agents know that the more highly classified the desired information is, the better the physical means of guarding it are likely to be. They expect protective fences, gates, buildings, and safes to be of high quality. Consequently they devote special attention to the human element--the people who guard, maintain, and perform the classified work of the installation. They always hope to discover one or more persons who, knowingly or unknowingly, will make the espionage job easier to do.

6. They are always seeking answers to certain questions about the people connected directly or indirectly with a "target" installation. The general or overall questions are:

- a. Who is employed there?

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b. What are their jobs?

c. Which individuals have access to the "key" areas?

7. With these questions partly or wholly answered, the agents can start on the next phase--gathering facts about individuals. While they usually want to know more about the person who holds the "key" positions, no one is entirely ignored in the search for "soft spots" in the security system. That's why every serviceman, regardless of his job or rank, can assume that his name and certain facts about himself sooner or later will become known to enemy agents.

8. What kind of questions do enemy agents ask about individuals? Here are some typical ones:

a. How much education does he have?

b. What are his hobbies and other outside interests?

c. In his work, is he careless and indifferent? Diligent and conscientious?

d. Does he show any special interest in political matters, including the international picture?

e. Is he married? Is his home and family life marked by any unusual circumstances, such as continuing discord or long illnesses?

f. Does he normally live within his means? Does he have any unusually heavy financial obligations?

g. In personality, is he usually friendly and sociable? Aloof and withdrawn? Suspicious and resentful?

h. Is he inclined to boast about himself? Does this include a desire to impress others with the importance of his work? Does he ever discuss classified information with unauthorized persons? If so, does he seem motivated by vanity? Or, is he merely cynical about security requirements? Or just plain stupid?

i. Who are his friends and relatives? Do any of them know the nature of his work? Which ones, and how much do they know? What is their work? What kind of people are they? Should their backgrounds be checked further in connection with this individual?

j. Does he have any habits or weaknesses (heavy gambling, excessive drinking, and so on) that might influence his judgment or otherwise be used to their advantage?

k. Is he involved in any serious personality clashes, feuds, jealousies, with fellow workers or neighbors?

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1. Does he seem dissatisfied with his work or with his present living conditions in general?
  - m. Is there anything in his present or past that he would be particularly anxious to conceal from his associates, superior, or wife?
9. To repeat--these are only some of the facts enemy agents try to learn about people connected with an activity under scrutiny. They are typical of the facts that permit agents to select, from a complete personnel list, the more promising prospects for their purposes. By itself, no fact about a person is unimportant. Instead, agents judge its importance by relating it to other known facts about the person and about the espionage mission itself.
10. How do agents use their detailed information about individuals? They know, first of all, that only these kinds of people can help them:
- a. People who are willing to help, for money or other motives.
  - b. People who can help unknowingly, by carelessness, ignorance, gullibility, or other faults.
  - c. People who can be forced to help unwillingly by blackmail or other pressure techniques.
11. The first category is extremely small. (Very few Americans would even think of belonging to it, and very few ever do). A voluntary act of espionage against the United States is, of course, an extremely serious crime with fittingly heavy penalties for those committing it. It is primarily the sincere and deeply felt loyalty of Americans toward their own free institutions that explains why there are so few willing traitors in our history. While enemy agents are always looking for people who might cooperate willingly, they know that it is highly risky to make such a proposition to anyone, and that the chances of success are very small. For this reason, they consider the other two categories more promising--people who might help them unknowingly or unwillingly.

## 0306. THE UNKNOWING HELPER

1. A careless and indifferent person whose job gives him access to classified documents is always a top prospect as an unknowing helper of enemy agents. They know that sooner or later such a person will be careless in his handling of security information. They try to make sure that when this happens, they will be able to take full advantage of his carelessness.
2. An even better prospect is the individual who cannot resist trying to impress people by telling what he knows. Enemy agents know exactly how to get him started talking, and under what circumstances he is likely to talk most freely. That is why they often hang around bars and restaurants, and why they sometimes have bartenders, waiters, and waitresses in their pay. Alcohol loosens the tongue and confuses the mind, and the flattery of a suave stranger or attractive woman can complete the process.
3. Sometimes a chronic boaster limits his loose talk to people he knows quite well--relatives, close friends. "I know you won't tell another soul--" he begins; but actually he cannot know this. The friend or relative may be a braggart like himself, and the classified information begins to circulate--until it reaches an enemy agent. No one can ever be certain, moreover, whether a trusted acquaintance is subjected to pressure by enemy agents. The only safe rule is to avoid all unauthorized discussion of classified information.

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
## 0307. THE UNWILLING HELPER

1. Agents find most of their prospective unwilling helpers among people who have personal "secrets" relating to past or present misconduct or weakness. When the agents discover these secrets, they apply pressure--"Tell us what we want to know and we won't tell anyone what we know about you."

2. Here are some typical cases:

a. Agents discover that a married man with a family is having an affair with another woman. The agents photograph them together at a restaurant, in a hotel lobby, and walking along the street. They also "tap" his phone and make recordings of his conversations with the woman. With this evidence, they approach him, demanding specific information or assistance in return for their silence. Faced with the exposure of his infidelity, the man follows their wishes. Now, of course, they have an additional hold on him. They point out that unless he continues to help them, they will tip off the authorities about his initial cooperation.

b. A member of the Armed Forces stationed overseas has violated local regulations regarding transactions in American and foreign currency. His profit has been only a few dollars, but he knows that if the offense is discovered he will be in serious trouble. He soon has reason to regret his illegal act. A stranger contacts him, shows him photostats of documents he signed in making the transaction. To keep this proof from reaching his superiors, the serviceman agrees to give the stranger certain classified information. As in the first example, once he has actually done so, he finds himself even more firmly under the enemy agent's control.




Agents offer to trade secrets they know about you for secrets you can furnish them.

3. Another type of unwilling helper has no embarrassing personal "secret" to hide. His motives for succumbing to pressure are more honorable, but the harm to national security is the same. A few years ago, our Government revealed that many Chinese-Americans with relatives in Communist China had been similarly pressured to give money, information, or other assistance to the Communist conspiracy. To prevent this kind of espionage, our security regulations provide that Americans who have close relatives living in specified foreign countries cannot hold positions requiring access to certain highly classified information.

4. Sometimes enemy agents pick out completely innocent persons and try to "frame" them into cooperating with them. One young soldier overseas, for example, struck up a casual tavern conversation with a man about his own age. Soon the man invited the soldier to his home. Shortly thereafter, the man suddenly went to an open window and began shouting loudly that the soldier had



made improper advances. A "neighbor" immediately entered and claimed that he had witnessed "everything". After threatening to call the police, they began to "change their minds." Finally they offered to let the soldier go in return for certain military information. Now realizing their purpose in staging this little scene, the soldier pretended to be terrified and promised to obtain the information. Instead he immediately reported the incident to his superiors. Not only did the "frame-up" fail, but the agents were arrested by the authorities of that country.



Don't expect an agent to say, "I'm a spy. I need your help."

#### 0308. STANDARD "APPROACH" TECHNIQUES

1. Espionage agents are usually versed in applied and practical psychology. They know how to size-up people. Their training teaches them to play whatever part may be appropriate at the time. They know how to pretend ignorance or disinterest; or they can give plausible reasons for being interested and curious about certain subjects. Above all, the typical agent is subtle and tactful. No one should ever expect an agent to make this kind of approach: "My name is Smith. I'm a spy. I think you can help me get some secret information my country wants." This is definitely not the way they operate.

2. Their initial motives for approaching an individual have already been mentioned:

- a. To get him to help voluntarily.
- b. To get him to help unknowingly.
- c. To get him to help unwillingly.

3. The second of the above purposes, as we have seen, is sometimes achieved without any personal meeting between the agent and his target. For example, the loudmouth type described earlier might simply be overheard by an agent as he was letting some close friends in on some details of his job. However, in many instances the agent has to become personally acquainted so that he can decide upon the best method of getting the individual's cooperation.

4. The initial meeting is likely to seem entirely accidental or logical to the intended victim. The agent plans it that way. The succeeding steps are also designed to avoid arousing suspicion. If the agent has no "pressure" weapon to use against the individual, he will concentrate upon gaining his friendship and confidence. Some time may pass before he makes the first actual attempt to obtain information. When he does so, he either is quite direct in his request, or gives a glib and convincing reason--"A friend of mine has applied for a job at your installation. I told him you would probably be glad to explain in a little more detail the nature of the work. Especially in Building 4, which is where he

will be working."

5. There is literally no limit to the kinds of excuses agents can invent for their interest in a particular subject. The most effective excuses, of course, are those that arise naturally out of the particular situation. The agents ask themselves, "What kind of story will this person believe?"


6. Sometimes agents cultivate confidence by posing as agents or employees of the United States. Using fake credentials combined with an appropriate explanation, they try to convince naive individuals that it is a patriotic or military duty to cooperate with them.

7. A multiple approach technique is sometimes used, for various reasons. The individual becomes acquainted with several agents, at one time or in succession over a period of time. Sometimes the individual is given no reason to believe that the several agents know each other. In other cases, he is allowed to know that they are a group of "friends." Each agent applies a different method of gaining the subject's confidence. Whichever agent seems to get the best results remains on the assignment and the others quietly drop out of the picture.

8. Agents are always alert for signs that an individual might be induced to engage in espionage for pay or other reward. As pointed out earlier, they rarely find such persons, but when they do, the advantages are considered worth the risk and effort. In the first place, the person who cooperates voluntarily becomes by that act an enemy agent himself--a co-conspirator in a serious crime. The other conspirators never let him forget that he is "now in the same boat" with themselves. He is now firmly under their control. They can demand that he perform further and increasingly dangerous missions for them. In general, moreover, agents regard the willing helper as less dangerous to their mission. They know that an unknowing helper may eventually get suspicious and report their activities; an unwilling helper may likewise decide to expose the plot even though it will mean that his personal "secret" will come out, and that he will be subject to trial and punishment for his crime. However, the voluntary helper is trapped. He knows that there are no mitigating circumstances for his intentional betrayal of his country. This tends to keep him in line for continued cooperation with the enemy.

9. Perhaps the most promising prospect, from an enemy agent's point of view, is any American who indicates that he favors some foreign ideology over that of his own country. Agents try to exploit the confusion and instability of such persons.

10. Espionage, as all the above makes clear, is a "no-holds-barred" business. Enemy agents are ruthless, usually clever, and always determined to get what they want by any means that may be necessary. They are ready to use any form of physical or mental torture, and even to kill. No one who becomes involved with them, innocently or otherwise, should expect them to show any mercy or softness. They are shrewd and merciless, and therefore dangerous. Their operations can be frustrated only by trained and experienced counterintelligence personnel. For this reason, the following instructions are extremely important.



What should I do?

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## CHAPTER 4

## GUIDE FOR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRIEFING



## 0401. Foreign Intelligence Collection Efforts Directed Against the U. S. Navy

1. Foreign intelligence services are actively engaged in collecting information on the U. S. Navy. This is especially true of the Soviet Bloc, whose intelligence efforts are extensive, persistent and aggressive. All hands should be constantly aware of the existence of this threat, and should report any known or suspected foreign espionage, sabotage, defection, or subversive efforts (Refer to Chapter 3 of OPNAVINST 5510.1 current edition).

2. This Chapter, although directed primarily against Soviet Bloc intelligence efforts, is also applicable, to a lesser degree, to intelligence efforts of all foreign countries. Any nation, no matter how friendly, may be expected to take advantage of any opportunity for the collection of intelligence information on the U. S. Navy.

## 0402. Hostile Intelligence Efforts

The United States Naval Service, as a consequence of its world-wide commitments in the defense of the United States and our allies, has been and is a target of espionage and subversion directed by the intelligence services of the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries. Instances in which these hostile intelligence activities have sought to subvert Naval Personnel or enmesh them into espionage, so far as is known, has not been as numerous as in other services. Although some known incidents have occurred and for a time were successful. There are no indications that these hostile activities against the Naval Service will decrease. To defend against them, it is of importance that all Naval personnel, military and civilian, be aware of the nature and techniques of hostile espionage and subversion. It is the purpose of this Chapter to contribute to such an awareness by presenting some background information and reference material concerning communist directed espionage and subversion related to the Naval service in recent years.

## 0403. Espionage, an old concept in warfare.

1. Espionage is not a new concept in Warfare. Far from it. To discover the earliest recorded reports of spying, we must turn to a book written two thousand years ago -- the Bible. And even in the Bible, we are reading of occurrences long before the birth of Christ. Regarding espionage, the Bible says:

"The Lord spake unto Moses saying, "Send men, that they may search the land." And Moses sent them to spy out the land and the people, whether they be strong or weak, few or many. And what the land is, whether it be good or bad, and what cities they dwell in, whether in tents or strongholds."

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2. Espionage or the act of spying has become an increasingly important factor in modern warfare where production capabilities, raw material stockpiles, technological development, and scientific discoveries play such a major role in determining the winning side.

3. All recorded history is sprinkled with frequent references to spies. Benedict Arnold was a British spy during our own Revolutionary War. The head of a famous detective agency, Allen Pinkerton, formed a force of spies for the Union Army during the Civil War. The Confederate forces had their agents too, and a considerable number of Germans and Japanese agents were rounded up in this country in the early days of World Wars I and II.

#### 0404. Guide For Counterespionage Briefings

##### 1. General Introduction.

a. Espionage against the United States is being conducted on a daily basis. Foreign intelligence services are diligently seeking United States information on an infinite variety of subjects. Their targets range from general data available in newspapers and magazines to highly classified information vital to the security of the United States. The U. S. Navy, including its personnel, operations and installations throughout the world, is a primary target of foreign intelligence efforts.

b. The most massive and aggressive espionage effort is directed by the Soviet intelligence agencies, which conduct operations through agents attached to official diplomatic installations and through undercover spies. Soviet espionage capabilities are considerably increased through the services rendered by the intelligence agencies of the Satellite countries and by the support and assistance of Communist Party elements throughout the world.

c. In addition to the Satellite nations, friendly countries also seek United States information. All modern countries have intelligence agencies and have varying capabilities to collect the information they regard as necessary for the formulation of their national policies. Although friendly countries may be reluctant to become involved in any activity which, if exposed, would disturb harmonious diplomatic relations, we must assume that any country will exploit an opportunity to acquire strategic information.

d. U. S. Navy personnel stationed abroad and fleet personnel visiting in foreign ports may therefore be targeted by a variety of elements, including any one of the Soviet Bloc intelligence services, by local Communists, or by the intelligence service of the host country. Foreign intelligence services, friendly as well as hostile, may use a variety of techniques to monitor or control the activities of foreigners located in their country. All countries have a capability to use electronic listening devices, to tap telephones and to censor mail. Any may place a target person under surveillance or monitor and circumscribe his movements through other discreet means.



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
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
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6. In certain fields it is easy to understand the enemy's interest. Take, for example, our scientific and technical programs for developing new weapons and equipment. Enemy agents have three main reasons for trying to get information about these activities. First, they want to know how well we are doing in the effort to improve our means of national defense. Second, they want to compare our newest weapons and devices with their own. Third, in cases where we have progressed more rapidly than they, data about our programs can be used to help them catch up with or surpass us in those items.



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
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
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2. Let's suppose that enemy agents have been assigned to procure the designs, scientific and engineering data, and related TOP SECRET information concerning one of our most successful missiles. How would they go about getting such information? (One thing they are almost sure not to do is immediately try to break into the headquarters to steal the TOP SECRET files.) Even if it seemed possible, they would probably not do it, because the most effective espionage is designed to achieve its purpose without arousing the victim's suspicions.



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- a. Where in the installation is classified work performed?
- b. Where are the security files?
- c. How closely is the installation guarded?
- d. What kind of documents or passes are needed to get in and out of the area? Who issues them?
- e. What types of containers and locks are used for the security files?
- f. Where are the safe combinations filed? Do any of the authorized personnel carry safe combinations on their persons? Have any employees written combination numbers on calendars, walls, or other locations?
- g. Is there any reason to believe that safe combinations have been set at easy-to-remember sequences (such as 10-20-30) or to match an employee's birthdate?

4. Answers to any of these questions may provide an agent with his first promising lead toward a successful mission. For example, he may discover that one of the gate guards occasionally neglects to examine each pass carefully before admitting its bearer. To the agent this suggests the possibility of using a counterfeit pass to enter the restricted area, either to complete his mission or to examine the layout in greater detail.

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
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Enemy agents give special attention to the human element.

5. Notice that some of the questions in this preliminary "casing" of the job are about the people assigned to the installation. Enemy agents know that the more highly classified the desired information is, the better the physical means of guarding it are likely to be. They expect protective fences, gates, buildings, and safes to be of high quality. Consequently they devote special attention to the human element--the people who guard, maintain, and perform the classified work of the installation. They always hope to discover one or more persons who, knowingly or unknowingly, will make the espionage job easier to do.

6. They are always seeking answers to certain questions about the people connected directly or indirectly with a "target" installation. The general or overall questions are:

- a. Who is employed there?

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- b. What are their jobs?
- c. Which individuals have access to the "key" areas?

7. With these questions partly or wholly answered, the agents can start on the next phase--gathering facts about individuals. While they usually want to know more about the person who holds the "key" positions, no one is entirely ignored in the search for "soft spots" in the security system. That's why every serviceman, regardless of his job or rank, can assume that his name and certain facts about himself sooner or later will become known to enemy agents.

8. What kind of questions do enemy agents ask about individuals? Here are some typical ones:

- a. How much education does he have?
- b. What are his hobbies and other outside interests?
- c. In his work, is he careless and indifferent? Diligent and conscientious?
- d. Does he show any special interest in political matters, including the international picture?
- e. Is he married? Is his home and family life marked by any unusual circumstances, such as continuing discord or long illnesses?
- f. Does he normally live within his means? Does he have any unusually heavy financial obligations?
- g. In personality, is he usually friendly and sociable? Aloof and withdrawn? Suspicious and resentful?
- h. Is he inclined to boast about himself? Does this include a desire to impress others with the importance of his work? Does he ever discuss classified information with unauthorized persons? If so, does he seem motivated by vanity? Or, is he merely cynical about security requirements? Or just plain stupid?
- i. Who are his friends and relatives? Do any of them know the nature of his work? Which ones, and how much do they know? What is their work? What kind of people are they? Should their backgrounds be checked further in connection with this individual?
- j. Does he have any habits or weaknesses (heavy gambling, excessive drinking, and so on) that might influence his judgment or otherwise be used to their advantage?
- k. Is he involved in any serious personality clashes, feuds, jealousies, with fellow workers or neighbors?

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1. Does he seem dissatisfied with his work or with his present living conditions in general?
- m. Is there anything in his present or past that he would be particularly anxious to conceal from his associates, superior, or wife?
9. To repeat--these are only some of the facts enemy agents try to learn about people connected with an activity under scrutiny. They are typical of the facts that permit agents to select, from a complete personnel list, the more promising prospects for their purposes. By itself, no fact about a person is unimportant. Instead, agents judge its importance by relating it to other known facts about the person and about the espionage mission itself.
10. How do agents use their detailed information about individuals? They know, first of all, that only these kinds of people can help them:
  - a. People who are willing to help, for money or other motives.
  - b. People who can help unknowingly, by carelessness, ignorance, gullibility, or other faults.
  - c. People who can be forced to help unwillingly by blackmail or other pressure techniques.
11. The first category is extremely small. (Very few Americans would even think of belonging to it, and very few ever do). A voluntary act of espionage against the United States is, of course, an extremely serious crime with fittingly heavy penalties for those committing it. It is primarily the sincere and deeply felt loyalty of Americans toward their own free institutions that explains why there are so few willing traitors in our history. While enemy agents are always looking for people who might cooperate willingly, they know that it is highly risky to make such a proposition to anyone, and that the chances of success are very small. For this reason, they consider the other two categories more promising--people who might help them unknowingly or unwillingly.

## 0306. THE UNKNOWING HELPER

1. A careless and indifferent person whose job gives him access to classified documents is always a top prospect as an unknowing helper of enemy agents. They know that sooner or later such a person will be careless in his handling of security information. They try to make sure that when this happens, they will be able to take full advantage of his carelessness.
2. An even better prospect is the individual who cannot resist trying to impress people by telling what he knows. Enemy agents know exactly how to get him started talking, and under what circumstances he is likely to talk most freely. That is why they often hang around bars and restaurants, and why they sometimes have bartenders, waiters, and waitresses in their pay. Alcohol loosens the tongue and confuses the mind, and the flattery of a suave stranger or attractive woman can complete the process.
3. Sometimes a chronic boaster limits his loose talk to people he knows quite well--relatives, close friends. "I know you won't tell another soul--" he begins; but actually he cannot know this. The friend or relative may be a braggart like himself, and the classified information begins to circulate--until it reaches an enemy agent. No one can ever be certain, moreover, whether a trusted acquaintance is subject to pressure by enemy agents. The only safe rule is to avoid all unauthorized discussion of classified information.

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
## 0307. THE UNWILLING HELPER

1. Agents find most of their prospective unwilling helpers among people who have personal "secrets" relating to past or present misconduct or weakness. When the agents discover these secrets, they apply pressure--"Tell us what we want to know and we won't tell anyone what we know about you."

2. Here are some typical cases:

a. Agents discover that a married man with a family is having an affair with another woman. The agents photograph them together at a restaurant, in a hotel lobby, and walking along the street. They also "tap" his phone and make recordings of his conversations with the woman. With this evidence, they approach him, demanding specific information or assistance in return for their silence. Faced with the exposure of his infidelity, the man follows their wishes. Now, of course, they have an additional hold on him. They point out that unless he continues to help them, they will tip off the authorities about his initial cooperation.

b. A member of the Armed Forces stationed overseas has violated local regulations regarding transactions in American and foreign currency. His profit has been only a few dollars, but he knows that if the offense is discovered he will be in serious trouble. He soon has reason to regret his illegal act. A stranger contacts him, shows him photostats of documents he signed in making the transaction. To keep this proof from reaching his superiors, the serviceman agrees to give the stranger certain classified information. As in the first example, once he has actually done so, he finds himself even more firmly under the enemy agent's control.




**Agents offer to trade secrets they know about you for secrets you can furnish them.**

3. Another type of unwilling helper has no embarrassing personal "secret" to hide. His motives for succumbing to pressure are more honorable, but the harm to national security is the same. A few years ago, our Government revealed that many Chinese-Americans with relatives in Communist China had been similarly pressured to give money, information, or other assistance to the Communist conspiracy. To prevent this kind of espionage, our security regulations provide that Americans who have close relatives living in specified foreign countries cannot hold positions requiring access to certain highly classified information.

4. Sometimes enemy agents pick out completely innocent persons and try to "frame" them into cooperating with them. One young soldier overseas, for example, struck up a casual tavern conversation with a man about his own age. Soon the man invited the soldier to his home. Shortly thereafter, the man suddenly went to an open window and began shouting loudly that the soldier had

made improper advances. A "neighbor" immediately entered and claimed that he had witnessed "everything". After threatening to call the police, they began to "change their minds." Finally they offered to let the soldier go in return for certain military information. Now realizing their purpose in staging this little scene, the soldier pretended to be terrified and promised to obtain the information. Instead he immediately reported the incident to his superiors. Not only did the "frame-up" fail, but the agents were arrested by the authorities of that country.



Don't expect an agent to say, "I'm a spy. I need your help."

#### 0308. STANDARD "APPROACH" TECHNIQUES

1. Espionage agents are usually versed in applied and practical psychology. They know how to size-up people. Their training teaches them to play whatever part may be appropriate at the time. They know how to pretend ignorance or disinterest; or they can give plausible reasons for being interested and curious about certain subjects. Above all, the typical agent is subtle and tactful. No one should ever expect an agent to make this kind of approach: "My name is Smith. I'm a spy. I think you can help me get some secret information my country wants." This is definitely not the way they operate.
2. Their initial motives for approaching an individual have already been mentioned:
  - a. To get him to help voluntarily.
  - b. To get him to help unknowingly.
  - c. To get him to help unwillingly.
3. The second of the above purposes, as we have seen, is sometimes achieved without any personal meeting between the agent and his target. For example, the loudmouth type described earlier might simply be overheard by an agent as he was letting some close friends in on some details of his job. However, in many instances the agent has to become personally acquainted so that he can decide upon the best method of getting the individual's cooperation.
4. The initial meeting is likely to seem entirely accidental or logical to the intended victim. The agent plans it that way. The succeeding steps are also designed to avoid arousing suspicion. If the agent has no "pressure" weapon to use against the individual, he will concentrate upon gaining his friendship and confidence. Some time may pass before he makes the first actual attempt to obtain information. When he does so, he either is quite direct in his request, or gives a glib and convincing reason--"A friend of mine has applied for a job at your installation. I told him you would probably be glad to explain in a little more detail the nature of the work. Especially in Building 4, which is where he

will be working."

5. There is literally no limit to the kinds of excuses agents can invent for their interest in a particular subject. The most effective excuses, of course, are those that arise naturally out of the particular situation. The agents ask themselves, "What kind of story will this person believe?"


6. Sometimes agents cultivate confidence by posing as agents or employees of the United States. Using fake credentials combined with an appropriate explanation, they try to convince naive individuals that it is a patriotic or military duty to cooperate with them.

7. A multiple approach technique is sometimes used, for various reasons. The individual becomes acquainted with several agents, at one time or in succession over a period of time. Sometimes the individual is given no reason to believe that the several agents know each other. In other cases, he is allowed to know that they are a group of "friends." Each agent applies a different method of gaining the subject's confidence. Whichever agent seems to get the best results remains on the assignment and the others quietly drop out of the picture.

8. Agents are always alert for signs that an individual might be induced to engage in espionage for pay or other reward. As pointed out earlier, they rarely find such persons, but when they do, the advantages are considered worth the risk and effort. In the first place, the person who cooperates voluntarily becomes by that act an enemy agent himself--a co-conspirator in a serious crime. The other conspirators never let him forget that he is "now in the same boat" with themselves. He is now firmly under their control. They can demand that he perform further and increasingly dangerous missions for them. In general, moreover, agents regard the willing helper as less dangerous to their mission. They know that an unknowing helper may eventually get suspicious and report their activities; an unwilling helper may likewise decide to expose the plot even though it will mean that his personal "secret" will come out, and that he will be subject to trial and punishment for his crime. However, the voluntary helper is trapped. He knows that there are no mitigating circumstances for his intentional betrayal of his country. This tends to keep him in line for continued cooperation with the enemy.

9. Perhaps the most promising prospect, from an enemy agent's point of view, is any American who indicates that he favors some foreign ideology over that of his own country. Agents try to exploit the confusion and instability of such persons.

10. Espionage, as all the above makes clear, is a "no-holds-barred" business. Enemy agents are ruthless, usually clever, and always determined to get what they want by any means that may be necessary. They are ready to use any form of physical or mental torture, and even to kill. No one who becomes involved with them, innocently or otherwise, should expect them to show any mercy or softness. They are shrewd and merciless, and therefore dangerous. Their operations can be frustrated only by trained and experienced counterintelligence personnel. For this reason, the following instructions are extremely important.



What should I do?

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## 0309. WHAT TO DO ABOUT SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

1. If you ever have reason to believe that you are the target of attempted espionage, remembering and sticking to a few simple rules may actually save your life. Here they are:

- a. DO NOT SHOW THAT YOU ARE SUSPICIOUS. Any marked or sudden change in your manner will alert an experienced agent. If you have been cordial and friendly before, do not switch suddenly to a distant or hostile attitude.
- b. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TELL YOUR COMMANDING OFFICER OR OTHER PROPER AUTHORITY ABOUT YOUR SUSPICIONS. DO NOT TELL ANYONE ELSE.
- c. Your commanding officer will promptly report the incident to the proper authorities. These authorities may ask you to help in handling the case; if so, DO ONLY WHAT THEY TELL YOU--NO MORE, NO LESS.
- d. DO NOT TRY TO INVESTIGATE OR "CRACK" THE CASE YOURSELF. This is a complicated job for trained professionals.

## 0310. INDIVIDUAL DEFENSE AGAINST ESPIONAGE

1. No matter how big or important an enemy agent's mission might be, he usually gets his information piece-by-piece, item-by-item. In order to do this, he is always looking for individuals who will supply him with the bits and pieces--because of carelessness, ignorance, weakness, or outright disloyalty.

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2. Some servicemen whose regular duties do not involve the handling of classified documents are inclined to think that they don't know anything of value to enemy agents. This is a serious error. To repeat: EVERY SERVICEMAN KNOWS SOMETHING THAT AN ENEMY AGENT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW.

3. It follows, then, that all Navy and Marine Corps personnel and civilian employees have a personal responsibility to defend the Naval Service and their country against espionage. This responsibility can be met by adhering strictly to a few simple habits of thinking and acting, on duty and off:

- a. Be security conscious--every day, 24 hours a day.

b. Know and observe strictly all regulations affecting your duties regarding the proper handling of classified papers and material.

c. Never discuss classified information--

(1) With unauthorized persons.

(2) Over a telephone.

(3) In any place where you might be overheard.

d. Always remember that a person's clearance for a certain category of classified information does not entitle him to knowledge of everything in that category. It only authorizes him to have access to information he needs to know in order to perform his duties.


e. Avoid any kind of public or private conduct that enemy agents might use as a blackmail weapon against you.

f. Be cautious in all new friendships, especially if they develop out of strange and unexplained circumstances.

g. Avoid groundless or foolish suspicion. BUT--if you feel there are good grounds for suspicion, report them immediately to your commanding officer or other proper authority. Tell no one else.

h. Never attempt any "counterintelligence" work on your own. This is a complex and highly dangerous job that only trained experts can handle successfully.

i. Always remember that the Government of the United States is a freely chosen institution of the American people. As an American citizen and member of the Armed Forces, your unshakable faith and trust in your country and your Service are essential to their strength. That same faith and trust are your strongest armour against the insidious and deceptive activities of enemy agents.



The target is you.

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e. It is imperative for U. S. Navy personnel to realize the nature and extent of foreign intelligence activities both in the United States and abroad and to know how to defend themselves against espionage and subversion. They must understand the necessity for tight security and for conforming to the security procedures prescribed by the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information (OPNAVINST 5510.1 current edition.)

## 2. Scope and Effectiveness of Soviet Espionage.

a. Some insight into the scope and effectiveness of Soviet world-wide espionage activities may be gained simply from reading the daily newspapers. The cases of Judith COPLON, Alger HISS, Julius ROSENBERG, Rudolf ABEL - to name but a few, dramatically exposed the highly successful accomplishments of Soviet Intelligence in the field of covert operations. More recently, these disquieting events were reported in the press:

(1) On 22 October 1962, William John Christopher VASSALL, a civilian employee of the Royal Navy, was sentenced to serve 18 years in prison for selling British secrets to the Russians. VASSALL had been assigned to the office of the British Naval Attache in Moscow, USSR, from 1954 to 1956. An admitted homosexual, he confessed that he had been blackmailed into serving Soviet Intelligence from 1955 until his arrest in September 1962.

(2) On 3 July 1963, the U. S. Department of State declared Gennadiy SEVASTYANOV, Cultural Attache, Soviet Embassy, persona non grata. During April-May 1963, SEVASTYANOV attempted to recruit an alien employee of CIA who had access to classified information. Using the employee's brother, who was sent from the Soviet Union for this purpose, SEVASTYANOV tried to play on his sympathies and, through veiled threats and promises, to solicit his cooperation in an intelligence capacity.

(3) On 12 June 1964, a Swedish Federal Court convicted Colonel Stig Eric Constans WENNERSTROEM and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The 57 year-old retired colonel in the Swedish Air Force had confessed to spying for Russia from 1948 until his arrest on 20 June 1963. He served in Washington as Sweden's air attache from April 1952 to May 1957.

(4) On 5 October 1964, the trial of Alexander SOKOLOV and his wife, held in Federal Court, Brooklyn, New York, was halted abruptly after five days in order to protect U. S. counterespionage operations. The SOKOLOV's, operating illegally under the names of two bonafide American citizens, Robert and Joy BALICH, were arrested by the FBI on 2 July 1963 and charged with conspiring to pass U.S. defense secrets to Moscow over a period of six years. Following the aborted trial, the SOKOLOV's were cleared for deportation to the country of their choice, Czechoslovakia.

b. These events represent only a sampling of exposed cases involving efforts of Soviet Intelligence to obtain strategic Free World information. They may be compared to the exposed part of the iceberg, nine-tenths of which is concealed and permanently hidden from view. Even the casual reader of the daily press must conclude that Soviet Intelligence is active, aggressive and dedicated to the task of providing the Soviet Union with the intelligence needed for the fulfillment of its immediate and long-range goals.

## 3. Current Soviet Organization for Intelligence Collection.

a. Communist Party Control of all Intelligence

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
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(1) There are two major Soviet intelligence organizations engaged in espionage on a world-wide basis. These are the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvenny Bezopasnosti - KGB) and the Chief Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravleniye - GRU) of the Ministry of Defense. The Soviet Government has fully appreciated the role and importance of intelligence in advancing the goals of international Communism and has delegated broad functions and responsibilities to these two organizations. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has absolute control over the two agencies and has established safeguards to ensure their continuing firm subordination to the dictates of the Party. Career personnel of Soviet Intelligence must be members of the Communist Party or of unquestioned loyalty to the Party. Acting from deep ideological convictions, Soviet agents, as a rule, may be expected to perform dangerous missions, regardless of the personal risks and sacrifices involved, with dedication and determination.

b. The Committee for State Security (KGB).

(1) The KGB is the direct descendant of the CHEKA, the GPU, OGPU, NKVD, MVD and MGB. It is a civilian organization. However, its members have simulated military ranks. Rudolf ABEL, who was arrested in New York City in 1957 on charges of being an illegal agent, for example, was a Colonel in the KGB. The KGB is responsible for counterintelligence both within the Soviet Union and abroad. It is the dreaded Secret Police of the Soviet Union, and has been characterized since its inception in 1917 by the use of vast numbers of informants and by methods of provocation, violence and terrorism. In addition to its counterintelligence and security functions, the KGB also engages in positive intelligence collection abroad. It has other assorted missions, and is roughly comparable to our FBI, CIA, Secret Service of the Treasury Department, and military counterintelligence security services, all combined into one.

c. Chief Intelligence Directorate, Ministry of Defense (GRU).

(1) The GRU is a part of the general staff of the Ministry of Defense and is responsible for the collection of positive intelligence in connection with the Armed Forces and the military capabilities of all nations outside the USSR. The mission includes the collection of relevant scientific, economic and political intelligence. The GRU is a consolidated military intelligence organization and collects strategic naval intelligence as well as army and air intelligence.

d. The Satellite Intelligence Services.

(1) Soviet Intelligence possesses a great advantage in its collection program in the services rendered by the intelligence services of the European Satellite countries, which may be regarded as extensions or auxiliaries of the KGB and GRU. Each of the Satellite countries has intelligence agencies which are modeled after their counterpart Soviet agencies. Defectors have stated that the Satellite agencies are controlled effectively by the Soviets through a so-called "Advisory System." By this system, Soviet Intelligence officers are attached to the Satellite Services. They have complete access to the intelligence data obtained by the agency to which they are assigned. Although they are theoretically charged only with training and guidance, in reality, they monitor and control Satellite intelligence activity.

(2) It is readily apparent that the potential of Soviet Intelligence is greatly enhanced by the personnel and resources of the Satellite agencies. The Polish and Czechoslovak intelligence agencies have long been recognized as competent, professional organizations. The East German intelligence services have an extremely high capability for penetrating and collecting information on United States forces and installations in Germany as well as on the West German Government and Armed Forces. German security authorities currently estimate that there are some 9,000 Soviet Bloc agents permanently active in the Federal Republic in spite of the relatively high number of agents neutralized each year by

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the Federal Republic's counterintelligence and security organs.

(3) In their operations abroad, Satellite intelligence personnel often have greater freedom of movement and are not hampered by the travel controls and other restrictions which may be imposed on the Soviets. Additionally, the Satellites have been able to exploit refugee organizations for the planting and recruiting of agents. The Soviets have capitalized on these advantages and have levied intelligence collection requirements on the Satellites.

(4) The newest Satellite, Cuba, has established an extensive intelligence apparatus mounting operations against the U. S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, against the United States, and against the nations of Latin America. Under the guidance of experienced Soviet Bloc intelligence personnel, it may be anticipated that Cuban intelligence capabilities will expand and will become an increasingly serious threat to United States interests.

#### 4. Operational Techniques Used by Soviet Bloc Intelligence Agencies.

Both the KGB and the GRU engage in espionage in foreign countries through two distinct types of operations, which have been designated as "legal" and "illegal" operations. Both types represent espionage against the foreign country in which they are located, and thus are equally illegal as far as the laws of the host country are concerned.

##### a. The "Legal" Operation.

(1) The "legal" operation has been so named, or misnamed, because the intelligence officers directing it reside legally in the countries of operations as diplomatic or military officers attached to the Soviet Embassy or other official Soviet agency. The chief agent of the operation is known as the "Resident"; his cover location is designated the "residentura" or "residency." Thus, the Soviet Embassy of any country, the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, or a Soviet Trade Delegation may house also a KGB and a GRU "legal residentura." The "legal" agents, ostensibly serving as diplomatic or military personnel, possess diplomatic immunity and, therefore, if apprehended in espionage activities are declared persona non grata and expelled from the country. They are normally not subject to legal proceedings and imprisonment. The "legal" agent may collect information from publications and other open sources, but in addition he attempts to recruit local citizens and to set up spy networks to obtain the classified secrets of the host country.

(2) By way of example, Vladimir PETROV, who was serving as Third Secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Australia at the time of his defection in 1954, was a "legal" agent of the KGB. Petr EZHOV, Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., who was declared persona non grata by the Department of State and was expelled from the United States in July 1960, is another example of the "legal" agent. EZHOV had recruited and paid a commercial photographer more than a thousand dollars for intelligence information, including aerial photographs of American cities and certain military installations.

(3) A former Soviet intelligence officer has estimated that between 70 and 80 per cent of the Russian officials in the United States have an intelligence assignment. During the period from 1960 through 1963, twelve Soviet and seven Satellite officials were declared persona non grata and ordered to leave the United States or were denied readmission to this country because of their involvement in intelligence activities. In addition, two Cubans were ordered out of the country in November 1962 in connection with a sabotage plot, bringing to twenty-one the number of Communist officials who were excluded from the United States during the past four years.

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(1) The Soviet and Satellite intelligence organizations operate "deep cover" espionage operations, known as "illegals." "Illegal" agents have no overt association with Soviet Bloc official establishments, but operate clandestinely. The almost invariably live in the target country under false identities backstopped by forged identification documents, and they make full use of secret communication channels and other underground techniques of operation. Some concept of the nature of "illegal" operations may be gained from the Rudolf ABEL and Gordon LONSDALE cases, which are summarized below.

(a) The ABEL Case. Rudolf ABEL, who was arrested in New York City in June 1957, is a classic example of the "illegal" agent. ABEL, a Soviet citizen, entered the United States in 1948 on a false passport. He then assumed a new identity by obtaining a birth certificate of Emil R. GOLDFUS, an American who had died in infancy. He set up his own cover in the form of a photographic studio in Brooklyn, and twice each week he received coded short-wave messages from Moscow containing his espionage assignments. He was a past-master in the art of concealing microfilm and coded messages in hollowed-out coins, jewelry, bolts and other innocent appearing articles, which would be picked up at prearranged "drops" by a trusted courier for transmittal to Moscow. ABEL operated successfully in New York for nine years. His arrest came about, not through counterintelligence efforts, but as the result of the defection of one of his subordinates.

(b) The LONSDALE Case. Another example of an "illegal" operation was exposed in Great Britain in early 1961. The master spy was a Soviet national who used the name, Gordon Arnold LONSDALE, and was well equipped with forged Canadian papers. He passed himself as a "company director" of a small London manufacturing firm. Included in his ring were Peter and Helen KROGER, alias Lona and Morris COHEN, whose cover was a modest book business. The COHEN's were American citizens, suspected of espionage, who mysteriously vanished from New York in 1951 and entered Great Britain in 1954 on fraudulent New Zealand passports as the KROGER's. Other members of the net were Harry HOUGHTON and Ethel GEE, civilian employees of the Underwater Weapons Establishment at the Royal Navy's Portland Base. HOUGHTON, GEE and LONSDALE were arrested when Miss GEE was handing LONSDALE a parcel containing secret Admiralty documents. In addition, considerable compromising equipment was seized in the homes of these individuals. All five members of this network are in prison, having received sentences ranging from 15 to 20 years.

#### c. Soviet Emphasis on "Illegal" Operations.

(1) The "illegal" operation has dual functions: (1) to bolster the espionage activities of Soviet Bloc officials, and (2) to be prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of a break in diplomatic relations. "Illegal" operations are cloaked in the greatest secrecy and enjoy maximum security. As a result, it is very difficult for counterintelligence to detect and neutralize "illegal" agents.

(2) During the decade 1950-1960, the Soviets placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations. It has been reported that the KGB has created a special directorate for the sole purpose of handling "illegal" agents. A former Soviet intelligence officer has stated that he was told, while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to prepare "illegal" organizations which could function without interruption under any conditions. Considering their known successes achieved through this type of operation, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviets will place increasingly greater emphasis on "illegal" operations.

#### 5. Local Communist Party Support of Soviet Intelligence.

a. Espionage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. There are Communist Parties or "movements" in more than ninety countries. These parties range in estimated size from about 100 members in Ireland to over a million and a half members in In-

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donesia and just under that number in Italy. In addition, scattered throughout the world there are thousands of national and about a dozen international "front" organizations, whose primary function is to support and advance the cause of International Communism. It is apparent that a great deal of support could be and is in fact given, wittingly or unwittingly, to the Soviet espionage program by the dedicated members of these parties and the often politically naive members of the front groups.

b. In general, the Soviets prefer not to employ local known Communist Party members for espionage, mostly for obvious security reasons. Also, if a Party member is arrested for espionage, the Communist Party finds it difficult to maintain its claim that it is a bonafide political party and that it is not directed by the Soviet Union.

c. In all countries, the local Communist Party is obliged to assist the Soviet Intelligence "apparat" in every possible way. The following are typical tasks that local Communist Parties are able to perform:

- (1) the spotting and assessing of potential new agents;
- (2) furnishing couriers;
- (3) supplying cover addresses;
- (4) providing false documentation in the form of birth certificates, passports, etc.

#### 6. Targets of Soviet Intelligence.

##### a. General.

(1) Soviet Intelligence appears to be interested in every aspect of life in the United States. Its "want lists" cover an imposing array of subjects, ranging from unclassified miscellanea to critical Top Secret data concerning United States plans, capabilities and achievements. Areas of interest include political, economic and industrial situations and developments, but primary Soviet targets are military ones or have military applications. Other priority targets are in the scientific and technical fields with emphasis on the latest research and development programs.

(2) The U. S. Navy, its ships, equipment and men, are priority targets of Soviet Intelligence. The nuclear submarine, Polaris and other missiles, anti-submarine warfare, and Navy research and development projects are particularly attractive targets. Additionally, the Soviets have shown interest in naval aircraft; radar and anti-radar devices; oceanographic research programs; composition and deployment of the Fleet; U. S. and NATO naval maneuvers; and Navy publications, films and training courses.

b. Navy Personnel are Targets. Every member and employee of the U. S. Navy is a potential target of hostile espionage operations. Elements under Soviet control and direction throughout the world are charged with spotting and assessing U. S. Naval Personnel, including Reservists, civilians, and industrial employees working on classified Navy contracts as well as active duty personnel. These elements frequently collect data concerning the target person's knowledgeability and his personality with emphasis on any derogatory information. Particularly sought, are data disclosing that the target person indulges in excessive drinking, loose talk, extra-marital love affairs, sexual perversion, or any shady or illegal activities. The individual is also appraised concerning his attitude toward Communism - if he is "liberal" or sympathetic to Communism, if he is politically naive, or if he is mercenary and can be bought. The information collected is studied and if the prospect seems favorable, the best method of approaching and recruiting the individual is determined. Refugees and emigres from Iron Curtain countries, now serving in the Navy or working as industrial employees on Navy contracts, have been singled out in

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certain cases as vulnerable by Soviet and Satellite Intelligence. Pressures may be applied to refugees through the hostage leverage afforded by the fact that they have close relatives still living in the old country.

c. Attempted Penetrations of U. S. Naval Installations Abroad.

(1) Through a variety of techniques, Soviet and Satellite Intelligence have attempted to penetrate U. S. Naval Attache offices and naval bases and facilities abroad. These techniques include: the planting or attempted planting of electronic listening devices; the recruiting of indigenous employees for espionage purposes; and approaches to an actual recruitment of U. S. Naval personnel.

(2) Crew members of navy ships in foreign ports have been targets of hostile operations. In this connection, crew members of the Polaris Nuclear submarine have been specifically targeted. Evidence has also been developed that ship movement information has been obtained illegally by certain foreign businessmen and women operating in the Mediterranean and Far Eastern areas. While this information may have been obtained for purely commercial reasons, the possibility exists that it has been transmitted to hostile intelligence, thus providing the Bloc with valuable operational intelligence and Order-of-Battle information.

d. Contact with Soviet-bloc Merchant Crews.

(1) In some American and foreign ports of call, the number of Russian and Soviet-bloc merchant ships using port facilities has substantially increased in recent months. On one noted instance this resulted in a "unique situation" wherein at least one Soviet-bloc ship remained in port for thirty days or more.

(2) Although Soviet Embassy personnel and other foreign registered agents are under certain travel restrictions and limited to specified areas, these ship's crews are normally restricted only insofar as the distance and places they may visit during the length of the in-port periods. It is significant that many of these ports of call are within close proximity to major U. S. Defense Installations. U. S. personnel and foreign crews frequently wind-up patronizing the same bars, restaurants, theaters and other public places in adjacent ports and neighboring cities. Consequently, it must be assumed that given such an opportunity hostile intelligence forces can be expected to utilize such made-to-order overt potential social contacts for espionage and subversive exploitations.

e. Marriage, An Avenue for Espionage.

(1) A refugee from a Soviet-bloc country became engaged to an American serviceman serving in a NATO country. This in itself is not uncommon. However, during a pre-marital interview, the girl revealed previous organizational affiliations in a bordering Soviet-bloc country. Here again, it is not uncommon for refugees to have "belonged" to certain communist organizations while residing behind the Iron Curtain. In many cases it is necessary to retain membership simply to avoid harassment from neighbors, police or Party members. In this instance, a background investigation failed to disclose any additional unfavorable information, and interviews with both the serviceman and his prospective bride resulted in denials concerning any intelligence activity or questionable associations on their part.

(2) If the investigation had been terminated at this point, the serviceman's command probably would have approved the marriage. However, the validity of the girl's denial was questioned, simply because it was known that she had frequently traveled into the Soviet-bloc country despite her refugee status. Past experience reveals such travel to be extremely hazardous and most difficult for a refugee to perform--unless the subject has sanctions of safety from border police and the country's intelligence service.

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(3) Consequently, the prospective bride was reinterviewed with these results:

a. She finally admitted she indeed had been in contact with Soviet-bloc intelligence agents.

b. She had received money from them.

c. They had provided her with a contact address for her future use in communicating with them after her marriage and resettlement.

(4) This case provides evidence to support the fact that hostile intelligence agencies do attempt to establish long-range latent intelligence sources through marriage of foreign nationals to American servicemen. It graphically illustrates the importance of a command interview of the prospective spouse prior to authorizing the marriage between an American serviceman and a prospective refugee spouse from a Soviet-bloc country.

(5) As in the above case, the statements of personal history received from prospective spouses are not always entirely complete or truthful. Obviously, hostile intelligence services could furnish the necessary guise so that a prospective bride could completely disclaim any communist affiliation. In many instances the refugee spouse may be completely innocent of any actual contact or intent at the time of her marriage. Later the unsuspecting bride may be approached by foreign agents of her native country and enjoined into providing them with information and services. This is often accomplished through ideological rationale, blackmail, money or hostage threat to living relatives still residing in her native land.

(6) The purpose of premarital interviews or resultant investigations is to minimize the potential threat to our security and to preclude any moral or other derogatory implications from wrecking the marriage at a later date. This reduces the possibility of a hostile intelligence service using marriage as an avenue for espionage and may determine any unfavorable information that may prevent admittance to the United States.

#### 7. Most Frequently Used Espionage Approaches.

a. Described below are some of the techniques which have been most frequently used in efforts to recruit Navy personnel into Bloc intelligence activities.

(1) Friendly Cultivation. A member of an official Soviet Bloc installation (who is actually a "legal" intelligence agent) meets accidentally or by design a person connected with the U. S. Navy. The meeting may occur, either in the United States or abroad, at a cocktail party, diplomatic reception or other social affairs, or it may occur at a sports event, a scientific or industrial convention, or, in fact, at any recreational, cultural or professional gathering. The intelligence agent becomes very friendly, makes arrangements for a future meeting, and subsequently wines, dines and entertains the target person. Frequently, the intelligence agent will bestow gifts on the target person. The object of this solicitous treatment is flattered, is "softened up" and is placed under obligation to the agent. He is usually requested at first to provide unclassified information for which he is well paid. The receipt which he signs to show he has received payment may later be used to coerce him, if necessary into supplying classified information.

(2) Romantic Entanglements. The oldest technique, still widely used today, is the approach through sex. Soviet Bloc Intelligence has exploited effectively the illicit love affairs of married persons, sexual abnormalities and the simple fact that some individuals may succumb to the charms of the opposite sex to the extent that they will disclose classified information. In some cases, the intelligence agent has exploited the misbehavior of U. S. personnel; in other cases, target personnel have been entrapped in pre-planned and arranged

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episodes similar to the old "badger game".

(3) Ideological Motivation. The Soviets are constantly looking for individuals with access to classified information who are sympathetic to Communism or who, although not members of the Communist Party, are convinced of the superiority of Communism. These persons, if recruited, make good agents and the Soviets have achieved some of their outstanding intelligence successes through the dedicated service of such agents or informants. These individuals, in addition to complete loyalty, may be depended upon to exert an all-out effort on behalf of the "cause". Furthermore, the ideologically motivated spy, if arrested may be counted on not to divulge the names of his confederates or other incriminating information.

(4) Money or Personal Gain. Agents are always alert for signs that an individual might be induced to engage in espionage for pay or other reward. They have sought out individuals having serious financial problems and particularly persons who have incurred extensive gambling debts. Corrupt persons who need funds to cover money they have embezzled or to support them in expensive vices have been targeted. While not as dedicated or reliable as the ideological spy, the mercenary agent is valued since he cooperates voluntarily and knowingly.

(5) Blackmail.

(a) Soviet Bloc agents have been quick to seize on any evidence of illegal, immoral or indiscreet behavior to blackmail Westerners into working on their behalf. For example, an American serviceman stationed overseas may have violated local regulations regarding transactions in American and foreign currencies. His profit has been only a few dollars but he knows that if the offense is discovered he will be in serious trouble. When approached by a stranger, who has proof of his wrongdoing, he agrees to give him classified information to keep the proof from reaching his superiors. Once he has actually turned over classified material, he finds himself even more firmly under the enemy agent's control.

(b) In addition to blackmailing on the basis of embarrassing personal "secrets", enemy agents have used the hostage situation to coerce individuals who have relatives living in Communist countries. Threats of harm, or promises of assistance, to the relatives have been used to pressure these individuals into espionage activities.

8. Conclusion.

a. It may be seen from the foregoing that the Soviet Intelligence agencies are efficiently organized and possess tremendous assets in the Satellite intelligence agencies and in the Communist Parties of the world. There is firm evidence that the Soviet agent today is well-trained, highly motivated, and carefully backstopped whether he is serving in a "legal" or "illegal" capacity. He is provided with the latest technical equipment to assist his espionage endeavors. If given the opportunity, he will literally stop at nothing in his efforts to penetrate a Naval installation or to recruit a member or employee of the U. S. Navy. It is anticipated that these activities will be intensified during the coming years, and it is therefore imperative that our security be reinforced and that effective countermeasures be enforced.

b. Fortunately, Soviet intelligence operations have not always been successful. Naval personnel, as a rule, are security conscious and follow conscientiously the rules set forth in the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information.

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c. Chapter 5 includes case histories which are brief summaries which illustrate some of the operational techniques used by Soviet Bloc intelligence agencies. Although they represent only a few of the cases which could be cited they may be useful in security briefings to emphasize the need for constant security vigilance and the importance of maintaining high standards of personal conduct, in accordance with Navy tradition.


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CHAPTER 5

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CASE HISTORIES

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## 0501. OPERATION TECHNIQUES

This chapter will illustrate the emphasis that Bloc intelligence services place on the detection of character weaknesses, indiscretions, and evidence of emotional instability on the part of the Department of the Navy military and civilian personnel, all of which may be used to involve them in espionage operations. It also shows the manner in which these hostile services exploit blood-ties between residents of Communist countries and military members of the Department of the Navy, its civilian employees, and its local foreign employees in overseas commands. Summaries of actual cases are presented to show the manner in which our enemies bait their snare with money, alcohol, and sex, or resort to the use of threats and other forms of mental duress to bend their victim to their will.

## 0502. ENTRAPMENT

1. The following case illustrates the lengths to which hostile espionage services are prepared to go to entrap their target. In determining how best to effect recruitment of his target, the foreign intelligence agent considers no piece of information insignificant or irrelevant. Any evidence of misconduct is exploited to the utmost, and if there is no evidence, it may be contrived. Entrapment is a common technique.
2. The American, referred to here as Kelly, was an inactive Naval Reserve Officer and who had also been employed by another U. S. Government agency in the capital of a communist country. Kelly had resigned from his overseas employment because he was suspected by his employer of sexual perversion. When Kelly returned to the United States he became a member of the teaching staff of a university. As a teacher, Kelly had an extreme interest in Slavic culture and languages and he was a frequent traveler to Slavic nations. On each of these trips, he usually included a stop-over at a resort area located in a communist country.
3. At no time during any of these visits did Kelly detect any incident of intelligence value. However, on his last summer vacation to the resort area, which he had always visited, he met a girl on the beach with whom he became friendly. The girl, referred to here as Margo, introduced Kelly to a male friend of hers. This friend we shall refer to as Henry. The three became good friends, visiting the beach together and discussing their views of life in their respective countries. They also attended the theater, ballet and other social affairs and generally became good friends.
4. As Kelly's vacation came to an end, Margo invited him to a private dinner party as a farewell gesture. Kelly met Margo at the theater where she was accompanied by Henry and another male friend, whom we shall refer to as Fred. The four departed the theater together and went into a small apartment nearby the theater. The apartment, though small, showed signs of considerable preparation. There were many flowers and the table was loaded with food and delicacies. Henry opened a bottle of wine to offer a toast, but found there were no glasses. Fred went into the kitchen and obtained four cups. Henry poured the wine and offered a toast. Kelly, at this time, noticed that he got the bottom cup. Henry and Fred urged Kelly to gulp the drink, bottoms up, as was their custom for the first drink. After about three minutes Kelly noticed that he was feeling rather strange and that his speech was somewhat slurred. His first thought was to attribute his feeling to the drink and to the extremely warm temperature in the room.
5. After several drinks, Margo announced that she should get a couple of her

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girl friends and left the apartment. Just a few moments after Margo left, Henry suddenly turned out the lights; both Henry and Fred grabbed Kelly, pulled him down on the couch and forcibly removed his clothing.

6. Just then the door burst open, a camera flashed and the lights came on revealing three police officers. Kelly had been entrapped. Kelly was arrested and taken to police headquarters where he was interrogated by intelligence officers. The intelligence officers described Kelly's background with amazing detail and accused him of being a spy. Under duress and of fear for his life, Kelly signed a confession. Kelly further agreed to cooperate with the Communist Intelligence Service if they would release him.

7. The intelligence officers briefed Kelly on how to make contact with a Communist agent in the United States. He was then taken to the airport and after being cautioned that if the "episode" was revealed it would result in a scandal which would probably cause him to lose his job and respectability and being reminded of his pledge to cooperate with the Communist intelligence service, he was placed on a plane departing for the West. Upon arrival in the West, Kelly went directly to U. S. officials and described his ordeal.

8. The Kelly case demonstrates the timing of a smooth operation. He had been watched for a long time, and data on him collected for over 12 years. The hostile foreign intelligence service knew all his weaknesses and a record of his activities were kept. A plan of entrapment was developed and run off like clock work. Kelly was maneuvered into a compromising position and set up to conduct espionage against the United States. Fortunately for Kelly and the United States, he went straight to U. S. officials and reported the entire affair. The most important aspect of this case is that it demonstrates how a foreign intelligence activity will spend an enormous amount of time and effort in developing a prospective espionage operation while awaiting the opportune moment to entrap an individual.

#### 0503. HOSTAGES

1. There are thousands of persons associated with the Navy who have close relatives or friends residing in countries under Communist control. They include the alien enlistees, some of them refugees from Communist countries who have since acquired citizenship, foreign born scientists and technicians employed in research and development for government agencies or military contractors, immigrant civilian employees of the Navy in the United States, local foreign employees of overseas commands on the periphery of the Communist empire, and foreign born dependents of servicemen. These people have chosen freedom and, with rare exception, have shown their loyalty to their adopted country. Nevertheless, they are often the targets of Communist espionage operations which seek to use their relatives and friends who are still subject to Communist controls as hostages to obtain their ends.

2. A military man on duty in a Western European country became involved in such an operation when he visited his grandparents in an Eastern European country. He had scarcely arrived when he was summoned to the local city hall, apparently for the purpose of validating his travel documents. There he was taken to a private room where he was questioned by two men who did not identify themselves. After a few preliminary remarks with regard to his military assignment, the men discussed the strained relationship between the United States and their country which they attributed to American support to West Germany. The military man was then asked about U. S. military establishments in Western Europe and information concerning missile sites. He was also asked if he would be willing to "work for their country" upon his return to duty; thus it was implied, it would be to the benefit of his grandparents who might otherwise suffer for his lack of cooperation. When the man declined the offer, he was admonished not to reveal the approach if he wanted to avoid endless interrogations by American security authorities.

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3. This case is only one of many cases. It is not only overseas that such cases arise. A number of approaches have been made in the United States where the basic techniques have been similar. In the case of travel in Communist countries, the intelligence services learn of the scheduled arrival of their target from their consulates or other diplomatic installations which issue visas and entry permits and from their border control units. In other instances, surveillance of postal communications gives them leads to ties between their nationals and relatives and friends in the West. And when the target has been identified, he or she is contacted either directly or by mail and an effort is made to solicit cooperation by threatening the well-being of relatives or friends living under Communist control. Although there is little or no evidence that these threats are ever carried out, the mere fact that they are made by representatives of a society in which such things are possible is enough to lend them plausibility and give concern to those to whom they are made. In these cases, as in other hostile intelligence approaches, the best solution for all concerned is to report the approach as quickly as possible to the nearest U. S. Government agency or to your commanding officer.

0504. MR. MATA HARA

1. It is not only the male who is the target of hostile intelligence agencies. There have been a number of cases wherein unwary women have also fallen into a snare carefully prepared by hostile agents. The following summary describes one such case.
2. An American secretary, referred to here as Eleanor, was employed in the office of a U. S. Government agency located in a Western European country. One day at an American club, Eleanor met an attractive male, Paul, who claimed to be a naturalized U. S. citizen. For Eleanor, it was a case of love at first sight and she and Paul began dating each other.
3. The romance which appeared harmless enough went along smoothly until one day Paul announced that his work required moving to West Berlin. Nevertheless, the two lovers agreed to remain in close touch with one another by mail and telephone. The relationship continued in this fashion for sometime until Eleanor received a telephone call from West Berlin from an individual claiming to be a friend of Paul's. The caller advised Eleanor that Paul had been seriously injured and was hospitalized in East Berlin. Eleanor was thoroughly shaken by this news and decided to go to East Berlin to see Paul at once.
4. At the hospital in East Berlin, Eleanor was ushered to Paul's room where she found him lying bandaged in bed. At the end of the visit, Paul handed Eleanor a package with a roll of film which he asked her to deliver to the landlord of his West Berlin apartment. Eleanor took the film when she left. However, immediately upon leaving the hospital, she was accosted by East German Police, who confiscated the package. Before taking her to headquarters, they permitted Eleanor to see Paul again for a moment. When she told him what had happened, Paul appeared to be greatly perturbed and stated that the incident would cause him a great deal of trouble because he was working for a Western intelligence agency.
5. Eleanor was taken to an East Berlin Police station and shortly thereafter turned over to a Soviet official. The latter explained to her that she and Paul were in great trouble because the film found on her person contained pictures of various items of East German military equipment. Turning a deaf ear to Eleanor's protestations of innocence, the Soviet pointed out the severe penalties that could be applied to both of them as a consequence of this matter. When it appeared that Eleanor was sufficiently shaken by this information, the Soviet dropped his harsh attitude and adopted a softer tone. He told Eleanor that he would be willing to arrange for her and Paul's release if she would agree to obtain copies of coded U.S. cables between her office and the United States. Eleanor agreed. Before leaving, however, she was reminded that Paul would suffer if she failed to keep her part of the bargain.

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6. Fortunately for herself as well as her country, Eleanor suppressed her feelings for Paul, went straight to her superiors, and reported the entire affair. Shortly, she learned from U. S. investigators that she had been duped. The case investigation disclosed that Paul was in actuality a Soviet Agent and the Soviet official who had interrogated her was a known intelligence officer who only a few years earlier had been expelled from the United States for espionage activities.

#### 0505. NELSON CORNELIUS DRUMMOND

1. On 29 September 1962, Yeoman First Class Nelson C. DRUMMOND, a native of Baltimore, Maryland, who was stationed at the U. S. Navy Base in Newport, Rhode Island, was arrested on a charge of engaging in espionage for the Soviet Union over a 5-year period.

2. Based on reports connected with this case, DRUMMOND's motivation was unquestionably his greed for money. At the time of his arrest, he had recently bought a bar and grill in Newport and was the owner of two cars, financed with money paid him by the Soviets for services rendered. In all, he reportedly collected as much as \$24,000 for his efforts.

3. During 1957-58, DRUMMOND was assigned to the office of CINCNELM (now CINCSNAVEUR) in London. There is accumulated evidence gathered from his co-workers and associates that because of his expensive vices he was always in debt and borrowed money constantly. In October 1957, according to DRUMMOND's testimony, he was first approached on a London street by an individual who later identified himself as a "colonel" in the Russian Army. This individual stated he was aware of DRUMMOND's financial difficulties and offered him the sum of £250 (about \$700) in exchange for a Navy identity card. This was easily procured and DRUMMOND "readily" signed a receipt for the money. He was then told he would receive \$400-500 a month for passing on classified Navy documents. Before his departure for the U. S. in 1958, he was given instructions on how to renew his contacts in New York City.

4. After his return to the U. S., DRUMMOND was assigned as administrative assistant to the Mobile Electronics Training Unit at the Naval Base in Newport, Rhode Island where, because of his Cosmic Top Secret clearance, he had access to vital defense data. When investigation of a compromise of classified information led to DRUMMOND as a suspect, he was placed under close surveillance. On 28 September 1962, he was trailed to New York City and early the next morning he was arrested in the act of passing eight classified Navy documents to his Soviet contacts. In addition, a miniature camera was found secreted in the trunk of his car. The arrest took place at a diner in Larchmont, New York, and named as co-conspirators in the indictment were two secretaries of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Claiming diplomatic immunity, these two Russians were declared personae non gratae and returned to the USSR. DRUMMOND's first trial ended on 23 May 1963 with a hung jury. The second trial began on 24 June and on 15 August DRUMMOND was sentenced to life imprisonment.

#### 0506. CASE OF "JOHN X. SMITH"

1. The following is an actual case from the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence although the names and dates have been changed for security reasons.

2. John X. SMITH, YN1, was assigned to the Office of the U. S. Naval Attache, Moscow, in the mid-1950's. Shortly after his arrival, he became acquainted with Olga PETROVA, who was employed as a bar maid at American House where SMITH lived. He accepted several invitations to go to her home and it wasn't long before he was spending two or three nights a week at her apartment. On his own admission, he gave her presents of watches, costume jewelry and, on one occasion, rubles.

3. During the course of this affair, SMITH was subjected to a four or five hour

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recruitment attempt by a Russian known to him only as "Alex". This individual stated that his organization (identified later in the discussion as the Soviet Intelligence Service) would pay SMITH \$10,000 for oral information concerning the activities of the U. S. Embassy, particularly the Naval Attache's office. SMITH was to meet "Alex" clandestinely every four days and the money would be paid to him personally or deposited in a bank of his choice.

4. It is significant that "Alex" was well-informed of SMITH's past personal life and future plans. He was aware, for example, that SMITH was due for discharge shortly, and suggested it would be preferable for him to reenlist in the Navy. According to the plan discussed, SMITH's period as an informer would cease when he left Moscow, but could be resumed any time within the next four years, and he was to be provided with names and addresses of mail drops. No mention was made of blackmail although "Alex" stated "they" could make things as bad for SMITH as "they" could, and it would be foolish for him to get in trouble with his own people.

5. SMITH agreed to meet "Alex" five days later, and gave him miscellaneous information about personnel attached to the Naval Attache's office to seal the bargain. However, he immediately reported the matter to the Naval Attache, and was flown back to the United States a few days later.

6. SMITH voluntarily submitted to lie detector tests on his return. Results indicated that the admissions and statements he made were true but also indicated he was attempting to conceal further information. These tests coincided with the expiration of SMITH's enlistment, and he was not accepted for reenlistment but was released from active duty.

#### 0507. THE DUPES

1. Foreign agents have succeeded, in some instances, through subtle tactics in duping American naval personnel into unwittingly supplying information of interest to them. The following is an actual case from the records of the Office of Naval Intelligence although the circumstances have been somewhat altered for security reasons.

2. A few years ago an assorted group of Orientals, practically all of whom had a history of narcotics traffic, smuggling and suspected espionage, were successful in obtaining classified ship movement information from U. S. naval personnel stationed at a naval base in the Far East. Under the simple but effective cover of a ship chandler company, the group sought advance notice of ship arrivals and departures on the pretext of seeking the business of provisioning the ships. Two U. S. naval officers, a Chief Quartermaster, and two first class Petty Officers were cleverly duped into supplying the desired information.

3. Investigation disclosed that members of the network included Chinese who were believed to be members of the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service, an individual who was known to have worked for the Soviets at one time, as well as an unidentified Caucasian. Aside from cover of the ship chandlery business, members of the network were employed in innocuous occupations as launderers, tailors and cabaret owners. The pertinent questions they asked and their avid interest in acquiring information about U. S. fleet activities led to the conclusion that information damaging to the interests of the United States, additional to that disclosed by the investigation, was obtained.

4. The Navy men involved received only small sums of money and certain gratuities as free laundry, clothing and food. Occasionally they were entertained at Chinese dinner parties. Thorough investigation, including lie detector tests, confirmed that they were duped into releasing classified Navy information to unauthorized persons. It had not occurred to any one of the group that the ship chandlery was a cover for Chinese Communist Intelligence, or that the information that he had released had been given to a hostile intelligence organization.

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0508. SGT ROBERT LEE JOHNSON AND JAMES ALLEN MINTKENBAUGH

1. On April 5, 1965, The Attorney General of the United States announced the arrest of a former Arlington, Virginia, real estate man and a Sergeant in the U. S. Army assigned to Fort McNair, Washington, D. C. The charge was espionage. The arrested men were identified by the FBI as Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson, aged 43, and James Allen Mintkenbaugh, aged 48, who was residing in San Martin, California at the time. Named as a conspirator was a Russian National, Vitaly Our-joumov, formerly assigned as an attache to the Soviet Embassy in Paris, France.
2. Robert Lee Johnson was first recruited into Soviet espionage while stationed in Berlin, Germany, in 1953. James Mintkenbaugh, also in the Army at the time, was recruited in the same year as an accomplice by Johnson. Mintkenbaugh was discharged from military service in 1956, but continued his espionage activities for the Soviets and extended his commitment by taking special courses in Moscow covering codes, secret writings, microdots, photography and other related intelligence subjects.
3. Johnson and Mintkenbaugh were particularly concerned with furnishing classified information relating to military installations, missile sites and intelligence activities of the U. S. Government at both foreign and domestic locations. Both men received money from the Soviets. Johnson, between February, 1957, and April, 1958, while assigned to a California Nike missile site, received \$300 a month from the Soviets for his services. During this period, he furnished photographs of classified technical manuals relating to the site, as well as of certain portions of the site itself, to the Soviet Union through Mitkenbaugh.
4. Johnson made his first contact with the Soviets early in 1953 at their headquarters in Karlshorst, East Berlin, and a short time later began photographing classified documents at his duty station in the G-2 (Army intelligence) Section of the U. S. Army Headquarters Command in Berlin. He then delivered the films to Soviet agents in East Berlin. Johnson continued this operation until transferred from Berlin, Germany, in April, 1954. Mintkenbaugh, recruited earlier by Johnson assisted him in photographing classified documents in the G-2 Section.
5. Johnson was discharged from the U. S. Army in July 1956, at Camp Irwin, California, but reenlisted in February 1957, for duty at a Nike missile site in Los Angeles, California, for the specific purpose of continuing his work for the Soviets. At this Nike missile site, he photographed technical manuals relating to the site and had the film delivered to the Soviets by Mintkenbaugh. Between April 1958 and September 1959, while assigned to a missile training school at the Air Defense Center, Ft. Bliss, Texas, he photographed a manual containing the schematics of the Nike Ajax Missile electrical systems and other classified manuals used by the students under training. As before he continued to deliver these films to his Soviet contacts via James Mintkenbaugh.
6. Between November 1959 and May 1961, Johnson was assigned to the U. S. Army Ordnance Agency at Orleans, France. Shortly after his arrival he met his new Soviet contact named "Viktor" and during this period, Johnson managed to furnish "Viktor" with classified information concerning the mission of the Ordnance Agency at Orleans and anti-tank missiles.
7. From May 1961 through September 1963, Johnson was assigned to the Armed Forces Courier Station at Orly Field, Paris, France. Johnson reported to his Soviet contact the fact that he handled large quantities of sealed envelopes which were marked "Confidential", "Secret" and "Top Secret", from the classified vault. His Soviet handlers were delighted with this arrangement. They assigned a team of "specialists" to assist his Soviet contact "Felix" in an operation wherein the contents of the sealed envelopes were carefully removed, photographed, rewrapped, sealed and returned to the vault by Johnson. In order to expedite the delivery of this material Johnson often volunteered to take other men's week end duty tours. (all this, without any extra compensation). He was seemingly a most dedicated and model watchstander!

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8. From September 1963 through April 1964 he performed duty with the AG's Classified Control Section under the Seine Area Command in France. Here he continued to furnish classified information to the Soviets. Included was highly sensitive U. S. Army emergency plans. Learning that he would be transferred in May 1964 to the Pentagon, he received instructions on how to make contact with the Soviets in the United States for the purpose of continuing his espionage role. Up to this time he had been regularly receiving \$300 a month plus bonuses.

9. James Mintkenbaugh was assigned to the U. S. Army, Berlin, Germany, from June 1953 through April 1954 and again from September 1954 through February 1956. Mintkenbaugh's Soviet contact in East Berlin was known to him by the code name of "Paula". "Paula" requested any information which was classified and gave Mintkenbaugh a 35 mm camera with instructions on how to develop microdots and conceal microfilm in various items. "Paula" also gave Mintkenbaugh contact paper with instructions in its use in writing secret messages to the Soviets. Mintkenbaugh thereafter furnished "Paula" with whatever information he could gather and met with him at periodic intervals.

10. Mintkenbaugh returned to the States and was discharged from the Army in March 1956. Soon thereafter, he received a coded letter from "Paula" indicating that "Paula" desired a meeting with him in Berlin. Subsequently, he returned to Berlin the latter part of 1956 at which time he was advised by "Paula" that a new Soviet contact had been arranged for him in Washington, D. C. in 1957. Early in 1957, he met his new Soviet contact who introduced himself by the name of "Charles". He was instructed by "Charles" to act as a contact between Robert Johnson and the Soviets. Hereafter Mintkenbaugh, from 1957 through 1959, made periodic contacts with Johnson at the Nike Missile site in Los Angeles and at the training school in Ft. Bliss, Texas, collecting information and material obtained by Johnson. At these meetings, Mintkenbaugh also passed to Johnson the money and bonuses for Johnson's services.

11. Sometime in 1959 or 1960, Mintkenbaugh's Soviet contact in Washington, D. C. was changed from "Charles" to another Soviet with the code name of "Yuri". During his association with both "Charles" and "Yuri", Mintkenbaugh performed periodic assignments, including the photographing of rental applications of Government employees, location of missile sites in the Southwestern part of the United States, and the obtaining of birth certificates in the United States and Canada.

12. Johnson and Mintkenbaugh were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury on April 6, 1965, after an extensive investigation by the FBI, and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage and failure to register with the Secretary of State. On July 30, 1965, after entering guilty pleas, both were sentenced to 25 years.

#### 0509. GEORGE JOHN GESSNER

1. Gessner was born 23 August 1936 at Homestead, Pennsylvania, the son of John George and Hazel Blanche Gessner. Following his graduation from high school in Corpus Christi, Texas in June 1953, he enlisted in USAF on 10 November 1953 and was granted a secret clearance. He served until 15 August 1957 when he received an honorable discharge to return to school. During this period of Military service, he studied propulsion and propellants and was trained as a mechanic in aircraft control systems. His parents, both described as heavy drinkers, were divorced sometime in 1953. His mother later married Anthony C. Hooker, whom she divorced in April 1958.

2. On August 25, 1958, Gessner was hired by the Martin Aircraft Company, Cocoa Beach, Florida, issued a Secret clearance, and worked on the Titan and Atlas Missile guidance and propulsion systems.

3. Sometime after his mother left Hooker, his father came to Cocoa Beach and lived with her and their son although the parents never remarried. On 15 February 1959, while all three were out drinking, they were arrested by the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. The father resisted and his son went to his aid resulting in the latter being confined for 74 days in the Brevard County Jail at

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Titusville, Florida. He became embittered about this affair. As a result of this incident, Gessner's employment at Martin Aircraft and clearance were terminated on 15 February 1959.

4. From February 1959 to January 1960, Gessner was unemployed. During this period he lived in Florida and Kingsville, Texas, where his father had found employment at the Naval Auxiliary Air Station. In the fall of 1959, he briefly attended Rollins College at Winter Park, Florida and later worked for about a month as a laborer on the King Ranch in Texas. He could not find employment in the Missile field nor could he reenlist in the USAF because of his arrest in Florida.

5. On 15 January 1960, the Army waived Gessner's arrest record and permitted him to enlist at Jacksonville, Florida. He began training 20 January 1960 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and transferred to Sandia Base, New Mexico on 17 February 1960. En route to Kingsville, Texas, he visited his father.

6. At Sandia Base, Gessner was assigned to a Nuclear Ordnance Special Weapons Maintenance class from April 1960 to August 1960. Although being somewhat of a disciplinary problem, he was considered a good student, and ranked 5th in his class. During a CIC interview, he admitted failing to list on his Statement of Personal History his arrest in Florida, which he described as a "vagrancy arrest" by the Brevard County Sheriff's Office. He was permitted to prepare another SPH to include the so-called vagrancy arrest.

7. Upon completion of the course at Sandia Base, he was transferred to Fort Bliss on 4 September 1960 and assigned to the Center Ordnance Unit. He worked in the electronics bay on maintenance of the Mark VII warhead, a Nuclear warhead, and adaption kits relative thereto. Within four days of his arrival, he became extremely unhappy with his assignment and obtained a weekend pass to visit Juarez on 8 September 1960. From here, he purchased a bus ticket to Mexico City and considered going AWOL. However, he reconsidered, cashed in the bus ticket and returned to Fort Bliss. Thereafter, his associations were made predominantly with disgruntled persons.

8. Gessner initially had access to some 39 classified manuals in connection with his work in the electronics bay. About 15 November 1960, because he was a disciplinary problem and lacked manual dexterity, he was transferred to the test and repair bay where he had less access to Restricted Data.

9. On 30 November 1960, he went on sick call; but the doctor refused to see him. He then wrote "Quarters" on his sick slip, drew his pay and went to Juarez, Mexico, returning about midnight. For this his superiors charged him with being AWOL for 6 hours, and with malingering and failure to report for duty. From 30 November to 6 December 1960, he was assigned strictly military duties, including that of latrine orderly.

10. On 2 December 1960, Gessner told the chaplain that he was "fed up" with the world. Four days later, he was read the Court Martial charges against him. Late that night he went to Juarez, purchased a ticket to Mexico City, and departed Juarez the following morning. He arrived in Mexico City on 8 December 1960, where he shared a room at the New York Hotel with a Canadian he met enroute, but did not register. He told the Canadian he had come to Mexico City to visit friends.

11. On 8 December 1960, Gessner visited the Soviet Embassy and requested political asylum in Russia. He was given a request for asylum to be filled out and addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and also a statement of personal history to complete. Gessner, in the meantime, gave the Soviets various manuals and documents he had brought with him from Fort Bliss concerning U. S. nuclear weapons. This included information pertaining to the MK-7 Nuclear Warhead; to equipment used in various missiles; to the "gun" assembly-type atomic weapons (8 inch and 280 millimeter); and to certain other United States missiles. He was

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# GEORGE JOHN GESSNER



1964

## CHARACTERISTICS--

Described by associates as intelligent, loquacious, overbearing, loud, arrogant, lazy, effeminate, immature, lewd in conversation, a braggart, a liar, a heavy drinker, a lone wolf, a person lacking common sense, but a person with a very developed retentive memory.

## Army Deserter Accused As Russian Atom Spy

From the Herald Tribune Bureau  
WASHINGTON

Federal authorities yesterday charged a U. S. Army deserter with passing restricted information about the nation's nuclear and guided missile systems to Russian agents.

The soldier, Pfc. George John Gessner, 25, who had worked in the missile program for almost seven years, was named in a warrant filed in Kansas City, Kan., charging violation of the espionage section of the Atomic Energy Act.

## Giving Reds A-Data Charged to Deserter

Kansas City, Kan., March 16 (AP)—An Army deserter charged today with passing restricted data to a representative of the Soviet Union. The warrant naming Pfc. George John Gessner, 25, was issued by the U. S. Court at the request of Newell A. George, U. S. Attorney for Kansas. Gessner had the warrant issued on a complaint of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

## NUCLEAR-AGE PRECEDENT IN GESSNER TRIAL

A PERSONAL tragedy of the nuclear age came to its grim climax yesterday with the conviction of George John Gessner for passing atomic weapons data to the Soviet Union. The trial in a Kansas City, Kansas, courtroom drew nationwide interest due to its unusual nature. It was the first case tried under the Atomic Energy Act. Gessner, 25, was sentenced to life imprisonment and execution. But that husband-and-wife team of atomic spies was charged under a 1917 espionage act for crimes committed in 1944-45 when the United States was at war. Gessner was charged with perjury crimes. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the penalty could have been death.

## JUDGE ORDERS SPY TRIAL FOR GESSNER

Ex-Army Private Is Accused  
of Giving Russians Data  
on Nuclear Cannon

## AFTER A SANITY HEARING

Psychiatrist Testifies He Is  
Competent to Aid Defense Counsel

George John Gessner, charged with passing restricted atomic weapons data to Russian agents, will be tried May 25 in the United States District court in Kansas City, Kan.

## IDENTIFY REDS AT SPY TRIAL

George Gessner, charged to Russian Colonels,  
Witness Says

## PROSECUTION TO REST Expected to End Late Today

## JURY HEARS OF RUSSIAN OFFER

Witness at Trial Says  
They Wanted Gessner  
as Agent

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# The Soviets Renegade

Gessner, after visiting his father in Kingsville, Texas, returned to Mexico City on January 2, 1961. Contrary to their attitude prior to his leaving Mexico, the Soviets did not appear to be eager to see him. They told Gessner that they had changed their minds about helping him and that he should seek help from some other quarters if he desired to go to Cuba. Gessner then visited the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City seeking assistance in becoming a defector, but to no avail.

POLISH EMBASSY



CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EMBASSY



CUBAN EMBASSY



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able to furnish this data, since he had worked on these weapons; was knowledgeable of the mechanical features involved; and with his retentive memory was capable of recalling even minute details.

12. From 8-16 December 1960, Gessner was interviewed daily by the Soviets who offered to assist him in getting to Russia via Cuba. He was instructed to furnish his biography and a current photograph and was given \$200 by the Soviets to defray his costs of transportation to Cuba and living expenses in Mexico while awaiting approval of his visa. He was also instructed to try to obtain an American passport. He later identified his two Soviet contacts from photographs as Aleksandr Georgiyevich SDOROV, and Dimtriya KUZNETSOV, Military and Naval Attaches, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

13. Gessner left Mexico on 22 December to visit his father in Kingsville, Texas. On 27 December 1960, Gessner, falsely indicating thereon that he was a "student" and intended to travel to Jamaica, submitted a passport application to the Department of State.

14. Gessner returned to Mexico on 2 January 1961 from his visit with his father. The Soviets then informed him that they had changed their minds and to look elsewhere for assistance, if he still wanted to go to Cuba. He then visited the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City for assistance in becoming a defector but to no avail.

15. In the meantime, Gessner had been declared a deserter by the U. S. Army who requested the FBI to locate him. The FBI learned that Gessner's father had received a letter from his son postmarked in Panama on 18 March 1961. Gessner was arrested for lack of proper papers by the Panamanian police, turned over to U. S. Army authorities on 22 March 1961 and flown to Fort Hood on 29 March 1961.

16. On 30 March 1962, Gessner was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in Kansas City, Kansas, on 5 counts of furnishing classified atomic energy information to the Soviet Union in violation of Title 42, Section 2274 (a), U. S. Code (Atomic Energy Act). On 9 June 1964, Gessner was found guilty on each of the 5 counts and sentenced to life imprisonment. This was the first conviction under the espionage features of the Atomic Energy Act.

17. On 21 December 1965, his conviction was appealed, reviewed and reversed by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals early in 1966 on the grounds that a question of coercion was involved and alluding that his confession may have been involuntary. Consequently, although Gessner had served only a year, he was released on 8 March 1966 and walked out of prison a free-but still bitter man. With the confession nullified, the U. S. Attorney stated the Government lacked sufficient evidence to try him a second time. (While the Gessner appeal was pending, the U. S. Attorney had said the convicted man "still may have atomic secrets in his head. . . in no other country could such a man go walking free!").

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
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(Map showing where and when Gessner went 12-7-60 to 3-29-61)



<b>PASSPORT APPLICATION</b> NAME: GESSNER, J. J. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/22/1928 PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible] OCCUPATION: [illegible] ADDRESS: [illegible] SIGNATURE: [illegible] DATE: 1/16/61		PHOTO TAKEN AT: FOTO GALVESTON STUDIO
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PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AT FOTO GALVESTON STUDIO

<b>PASSPORT APPLICATION</b> NAME: GESSNER, J. J. DATE OF BIRTH: 12/22/1928 PLACE OF BIRTH: [illegible] OCCUPATION: [illegible] ADDRESS: [illegible] SIGNATURE: [illegible] DATE: 1/16/61		PHOTO TAKEN AT: FOTO GALVESTON STUDIO
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PASSPORT APPLICATION



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
## Proving Gessner Visited Foreign Embassies

Gessner furnished information and rough drawings from which sketches of the exteriors of the Soviet Embassy; the interior of the various rooms at the Soviet Embassy he claimed to have been in; and a picture he had seen on the wall of a room he visited at the Soviet Embassy were drawn. He also furnished data from which sketches of a room he had been in at the Polish Embassy and a number of rooms he had visited at the Czechoslovakian Embassy were made.


The FBI located witnesses who could testify that they had been in these Embassies during December, 1960, and/or January, 1961, and that the details of the sketches were substantially accurate.

The following sketches were prepared by the 902d Counter Intelligence Corps, U. S. Army, based on the information and the rough drawings furnished by Gessner.

PARTIAL ROOM PLAN SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY



PICTURE IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY MEXICO CITY,  
described by Gessner as the Siege of Leningrad.




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


"PLANS SO DETAILED AS TO LEAVE NO DOUBT"


PLAN OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY




A PORTION OF THE GARDEN OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, as seen by Gessner from a window of the Embassy.




ONLY ROOM ENTERED IN POLISH EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY



CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY



ROOM IN CZECH EMBASSY, MEXICO where Gessner was questioned.



FBI EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT GESSNER'S TRIAL

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## 0510. COL RUDOLPH ABEL &amp; REINO HAYHANEN

1. It is interesting to note that spies often have strange "bedfellows". Col. Rudolph Abel, the master spy and for years chief of Soviet espionage in the U. S., for example, was a cultured gentleman with a fine sense of humor, well educated, loyal to his family and friends in "Mother Russia" and took great pride in his personal habits and appearance. He was learned in six languages, had a background in chemistry and nuclear physics, was an electronics engineer, amateur musician, painter, mathematician and cryptographer. Undoubtedly, Abel was one of the most brilliant intelligence agents in the Soviet spy network. Yet, from October 1952 until shortly before his arrest in 1957, Abel worked closely with Reino Hayhanen, his assistant and coconspirator. This man's character and habits were in marked contrast to those exhibited by the suave Abel.

2. Hayhanen, a native Russian, was employed by the Soviet Government from 1939 to 1957. He arrived in New York in October 1952 under the name "MAKI" as a member of Abel's mission to be resident assistant in espionage work. His passport, which was fraudulently obtained, gave his cover name as "Eugene Nicolai Maki". This name had been assigned to him in Moscow (whereas the real MAKI was an American citizen, born in Enaville, Idaho, who had disappeared in 1938 while traveling in Finland with his parents).

3. Hayhanen graduated from a teachers' college in Russia at the age of nineteen. After 3 months as a teacher, he was drafted into the Russian Secret Police (NKVD). At the time he came to the U. S., Hayhanen, alias Maki, left his wife and young son behind in Russia to whom he said he was "devoted". In the U. S. he soon turned his affections towards an attractive young Scandinavian woman who became his "wife". His former neighbors in Newark, New Jersey, where he and his "wife" lived during 1955-56, testified that Hayhanen had done considerable drinking at home and littered the hallways of his building with beer and whiskey bottles. He fought often and violently with his "wife", who spoke no English and never worked, but always had money for whiskey and a car. Hayhanen was described as portly and untidy with the general appearance of a somewhat comical but confirmed alcoholic. His drunken brawls on a number of occasions brought him to the attention of the police. In general, he was considered a miserable character who led a sordid life. It was almost unbelievable that this man was a LT. COL. in Soviet Intelligence.

4. Abel had instructed Hayhanen to spend more time with native-born Americans to overcome his heavy accent which Abel feared would attract too much attention. Abel later remarked to his defense attorney, "I could not believe he was such an incompetent"; otherwise, "they never would have sent him".

5. At their last meeting in April 1957, Abel gave Hayhanen \$200 and a false birth certificate and told him to go home to Russia for a vacation. On 24 April 1957, he sailed for Le Havre aboard the French liner 'Liberte'. In Paris, he followed Abel's instructions and held two meetings with a Russian official who gave him some francs and 200 American dollars. The day after their second meeting, he was scheduled to leave Paris for West Berlin and then on to Moscow. Instead, he went to the American legation in Paris, identified himself as a Russian espionage officer with the rank of LT. COL. and indicated he then wanted to help the Americans. He gave no reason for his defection at the time, but Abel suggested later that Hayhanen must have finally realized how incompetent he was as a spy and therefore was afraid to return home.

6. At Abel's trial, which began on 14 October 1957 in the U. S. District Court in Brooklyn, New York, with Judge Mortimer W. Byers presiding, further evidence was developed of Hayhanen's incompetence as a spy and his disloyalty to his superiors. For example, he stated that in June, 1955, he and Abel went to Bear Mountain Park to bury \$5000 for Mrs. Helen Sobel, wife of Morton Sobel, convicted member of the Rosenberg ring. Since Abel was then preparing to go to Moscow, he convinced Hayhanen to take Mrs. Sobel to the Park, give her the \$5000 and determine her qualifications as an espionage agent. He reported to Abel and to

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the KGB in Moscow through a drop that he had located Helen Sobel, given her the money and told her to spend it carefully. At the trial he calmly and deliberately admitted that instead he had dug up the money and converted it to his own use. He also admitted lying to Abel on another occasion when he offered as an excuse for not returning to Russia, after Abel had ordered him to do so, a story that he thought he was being followed. There were numerous examples of contradictory statements in his testimony.

7. At the trial, Hayhanen took comfort in the fact that the Brooklyn Courthouse and the Kremlin were separated by some 4600 miles. Yet, he acted and looked more "like a sad-faced clown in a circus" than a spy. A federal agent remarked that Hayhanen could not get a job as a spy in a Marx Brothers movie. His clumsy testimony with his Baltic accent was described as a mixture of the bizarre, the startling and sometimes the ludicrous with the cloak-and-dagger trappings of a Hollywood thriller.

# 0511. ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON

1. Thompson, a high school drop-out, enlisted in USAF at Detroit, Michigan on 9 December 1952. After completing basic training at Sampson AFB, N.Y. and advanced mechanics' school, Sheppard AFB, Wichita Falls, Texas, he was assigned as a mechanic in a B-29 squadron at McClellan AFB, Sacramento, California. As a result of a back injury, he was reassigned as a mail clerk in the same squadron. He was shortly thereafter promoted to Corporal and in December 1954, transferred to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey for further assignment to the European theater. He departed Kilmer in January 1955 for Germany with orders to the 7493rd Special Investigation Wing (OSI(IG), USAF, in Berlin.

2. In Berlin, Thompson learned the German language and preferred associations with Germans in order to get away from what he later described as "Big Brother stuff". In the meantime, he became critical of U. S. policies concerning the Berlin uprising in June 1953, for failure of the Americans to protect the Germans from Russian tyranny, and in short for what he generally described as "the way the West took advantage of so many people under one guise or another". He also became quite critical of his military superiors, seemed to be suffering from a very deep-seated inferiority complex, and began drinking heavily.

3. On 10 February 1956, he married 18 year old German-born Evelyn Matthes in the Berlin City Hall. They were married again the next day at the American consulate and the following Saturday in a Berlin church ceremony. He seemed quite happy with his new life and reduced his drinking habits considerably. In fact, he indicated he was happier with his wife's family in Berlin than he had been with his own in Detroit. But he still disliked his job, especially as he felt he was required to perform duties inappropriate to his job description as an Administrative Airman. He gradually resumed drinking and began to quarrel frequently with his wife. Their first child, Patricia Ann, was born in October 1956.

4. In December 1956, he became drunk in a bar at lunch time and lost a 38 cal. revolver from his jacket which he had removed. After he missed it, he took another 38 cal. revolver from the supply room, planning, so he said, to buy a replacement later on the black market. He was caught beforehand.

5. At his Summary Court Martial in January 1957 for the revolver incident, he was reduced 1 grade to Airman 2nd class and fined two thirds of his military pay for 1 month. His commanding officer informed him that his wife and baby must return to the States and Thompson must live on the military installation. His wife and baby, therefore, left in February 1957 to reside with his mother in Detroit, Michigan.

6. Thompson became more bitter over what he considered his unfair treatment and increased his drinking considerably. He also became involved with a West German girl.

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'For a while I was happy—in my marriage, not in my job.'



IN STRIKING  
CONTRAST--  
THE NUPTIAL  
HAPPINESS OF  
FEBRUARY, 1956;  
AND THE FINAL  
DESPAIR AND  
MISERY REFLEC-  
TED BELOW IN  
JANUARY, 1965

'I hope that  
my kids won't be  
bullied because  
their daddy  
was a spy.'

UNCLAS



Family portrait, outside their house in  
Bay Shore, L.I. The Thompson children  
are Patricia, 8; Dean, 4; and Karen, 6.

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7. One Saturday morning in June 1957, while off duty, Thompson went to the OSI office in uniform to catch up on some filing. He removed his tie. When his CO arrived, he reprimanded him for being out of uniform and also for needing a shave. This infuriated Thompson. He left the office, proceeded to a bar where he met his girl friend, and began to drink to excess. When he left her, he decided to go to East Berlin and seek asylum "to get even with him (his CO)".
8. He walked into East Berlin, contacted the Berlin secret police, and told them he was an allied soldier and of his desire for asylum. Thompson was interviewed at length and kept overnight but was sent back the next day. A few days later, he was picked up by one of the Soviet interrogators, returned to East Germany and questioned again. This time he was given a sum of money, a miniature camera for photographing classified documents and reminded that his wife's family still resided in the Eastern Zone.
9. Thompson began at once to work for the Soviets and estimated that he gave them 50-100 photographs every 2 weeks for the next 3 months. Later he obtained a 5-day pass and was taken by the Soviets to a resort area on the Black Sea where he was given a special spy course in the use of radio equipment and the Russian language to enable him to read ciphers. He was also asked to plant a radio transmitter in the OSI office upon his return to West Berlin.
10. Thompson imbedded the transmitter as directed in one of the walls of the OSI office and even "bugged" the CO's office. He continued to photograph confidential and secret reports which crossed his desk and also furnished information about American intelligence organizations in West Berlin. The Soviets paid him a small amount, about \$12.50, for each batch of photographs. Obviously his motive was revenge rather than money.
11. In January 1958, Thompson's Berlin tour ended, but he still had another year of his enlistment to serve. He was reassigned as a clerk-typist to Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls, Montana. Before leaving Berlin, the Russians gave him \$1000 to buy a short-wave radio, a distinctive cigarette lighter, and another camera with complete instructions as to how he would continue his "cooperation" with them upon arrival in the U. S.
12. Thompson returned to the U. S., picked up his wife and daughter in Detroit and then after a few days with relatives, left by automobile for Great Falls, Montana, where he purchased a house trailer. There he was contacted by one of the women he had previously met in the Soviet Spy school, working as a barmaid in Black Eagle, Montana. Through her his contacts with the Soviets were resumed with appropriate instructions for their future "cooperation". He finally began to feel the Soviets were making too many demands on him. Becoming apprehensive for his future safety, he requested a transfer to Goose Bay, Labrador.
13. His transfer was approved in the summer of 1958, and Thompson sent his wife and family back to Detroit to stay with his mother while he finished his enlistment. In the meantime, apparently figuring that he would be free of them once he was out of the service, he reneged on some of his instructions from the Russians. He received an honorable discharge as an Airman 2/c in December 1958 and returned to his family in Detroit.
14. Upon his arrival in Detroit, he learned that a man had been looking for him and would return. On or about 17 January 1959, the man came to Thompson's mother's home in Detroit, introduced himself to Thompson as John Kurlinsky, and inquired what Thompson was doing. When he learned Thompson was no longer in the military service, he gave Thompson \$200 with instructions that he reenlist in USAF or USA or find employment with the FBI. He told Thompson he would return in about a month. Kurlinsky had several other contacts during 1959 with Thompson who offered him more money, each time insisting that Thompson reenlist, go to work for a Federal Agency or return to Russia for a different assignment, but Thompson kept

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

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
# SOME OF THE "TOOLS OF THE TRADE"--USED BY THOMPSON

*Micropoint process reduces eight-by-ten document to dot-size on specially prepared cellophane.*




*In final steps, spy slits edge of postcard, picks up cellophane scrap, inserts this in slit, then mixes dab of paste to seal the incision.*

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'I felt that the Soviets must think I was a valuable man.  
This made me feel pretty good.'



Secret compartment in cigarette case held the  
pod of code sheets that Thompson had to use to  
decipher orders sent him by radio from Russia.

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Robert Glenn Thompson, a former Air Force enlisted man, was arrested by the FBI as a Soviet spy on January 7, 1965. Pictured above are two of the items given to Thompson by Soviet Intelligence personnel in connection with his espionage operations. A similar battery contained instructions from Thompson's Soviet principal for preparation of microdot messages (information photographically reduced to microscopic size). The telescopic viewer was used to read microdots. The picture at bottom left was taken by FBI Agents during discreet investigative coverage of the activities of Thompson. He was self-employed as a fuel oil dealer at Babylon, New York, before his arrest.

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15. Finally, after over a year without pressure from the Soviets, Fedor Kudashkin, former chief of Russian translators at the UN, arrived in Detroit in mid 1961 and threatened Thompson with exposure unless he resumed his work for the Soviets. Frightened, Thompson left Detroit for Long Island, N. Y., where he went into the fuel oil business.

16. In November 1961, Kudashkin tracked him down in his new surroundings and again threatened to expose him unless he resumed his spy work without further stalling. Thompson agreed. Kudashkin wanted information concerning water reservoirs on Long Island, on gas lines between New York and Long Island, power plants and gas storage in these areas as well as background information on certain people of interest to the Soviets in the states of New York and New Jersey. Thompson complied and estimated Kudashkin paid him about \$400 in all for these services.

17. Thompson was arrested 7 January 1965 and charged with 13 overt acts of espionage in furnishing military data to the Soviets from 1957 to 1963 for a total of \$1700, and released on \$15,000 Bail. He first denied the charges but in March 1965 entered a plea of guilty to the espionage charges in the United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N. Y. The two Russians, named as coconspirators in the indictment, were no longer in the U. S.

18. On May 13, 1965, he was sentenced to 30 years and is presently serving that sentence at the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. Anticlimactic as it may be, the tragedy of Thompson's case, as with all who choose the misguided path of treason, can be summed up in Thompson's words: "I am sorry for what I have done. And I don't worry about how I have hurt my wife and kids--not financially so much, for my wife Evelyn is a good book-keeper, and she can make a living all right, running my oil business. But I worry about what I have done to my family psychologically. I hope my kids will not be bullied in school, or anything, because their daddy was a spy. And I hope my wife won't be made to suffer because she stuck by me."

"THE END OF THE ROAD"

FBI agents escort spy to Bureau's New York office following his arrest on Jan. 7, 1965.



THOMPSON'S FACE REVEALS OBVIOUS RELIEF UPON HIS FINAL APPREHENSION--THUS ENDING COUNTLESS SLEEPLESS NIGHTS OF CONTINUED FEAR, FRUSTRATIONS, AND UNCERTAINTY.

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## 0512. STIG ERIC CONSTANS WENNERSTROEM

1. On 12 June 1964, Stig Eric Constans WENNERSTROEM, retired Colonel in the Swedish Air Force, was convicted by a Swedish Federal Court of gross espionage and sentenced to life imprisonment. He had confessed to spying for Russia from 1948 until his arrest on 20 June 1963. WENNERSTROEM had served in Washington as Sweden's Air Attache from April 1952 to May 1957. Previously, he had represented his government in a similar capacity at Moscow where he had been on intimate terms with the U. S. Ambassador.

2. He claimed he went to Moscow as an American agent and was recruited into the Soviet Intelligence Service. By his own testimony, when he began his activities in 1948, he considered himself an agent in the American Intelligence system and an undercover agent in Soviet Intelligence. His sympathies began to shift, however, so that after a certain time, WENNERSTROEM considered himself as firmly engaged in Soviet Intelligence and as an undercover agent in the American Intelligence system. This shift in sympathies, as explained by WENNERSTROEM, was occasioned by his belief that the problem had reduced itself to the USA against the Soviet Union and NATO against the Warsaw Pact with Soviet Intelligence being purely defensive and American Intelligence being offensively oriented. (WENNERSTROEM's claimed service with U. S. Intelligence has never been confirmed).

3. Preparation for his illegal Intelligence activities in Washington actually began before WENNERSTROEM left Moscow on 3 January 1952 for Stockholm enroute to the U. S. for his new assignment. He gave his contact man in Moscow a report about the legal work he would perform in Washington. The most interesting fact reported was the existence of a purchasing office there under the Air Attache and staffed with personnel of the Swedish Air Administration which afforded a unique opportunity to establish contacts with a large segment of the American war industry and to obtain technical descriptions and publications concerning war material.

4. WENNERSTROEM preparatory to assuming his duties in Washington, which were to be largely of a technical nature, arrived in Stockholm on 7 January 1952 for comprehensive work within the Swedish Air Administration. General JACOBSON, who had spent much time in the USA, was able to give him many helpful hints as to how to establish and maintain useful contacts with a minimum of delay which were to stand him in good stead later on. The WENNERSTROEM family left for the U. S. on 26 March 1952.

5. When WENNERSTROEM reached Washington on 8 April 1952, he immediately entered upon his duties, which included study of the entire development of the military aviation organization, as Swedish Air Attache. To this end, he became accredited to both the U. S. Navy and the Air Force. Major General Viktor KUVINOV, the Soviet Air Attache at the time, was established as his first contact man within Soviet Intelligence in Washington. Three methods were worked out for the exchange of material between them, as follows: First, at gatherings, when they shook hands upon arriving and departing, they would exchange objects, usually rolls of film. Second, when groups of attaches met with the Americans, WENNERSTROEM and his contact man would stand next to each other and pass objects from the right hand of one to the left hand of the other and vice versa. The third method was used only at the Russian Embassy and consisted of leaving objects in the topcoat of the one to be picked up by the other. It should be noted that in the second and third methods there was no necessity for the parties to converse. Both parties availed themselves of all opportunities to make deliveries, especially at those meetings which were official in nature which would provide a complete cover for their exchange of materials.

6. WENNERSTROEM's official position and the wide range of personal contacts he established enabled him to perform his Soviet espionage work without detection or suspicion. His illegal activities were completely interwoven with his legal duties. He described as "fantastic" the opportunities thus afforded him in obtaining important information without detection for Soviet Intelligence concerning tactics, equipment, training, organization of air units, designs,

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drawings, coupling schemes, etc. These and other similar data were his almost for the mere asking.

7. In a similar manner, WENNERSTROEM extended his illegal activities to Canada where he made numerous visits to contact installations of the Canadian Air Force and the aircraft industry. The material from these sources were turned over to the contact man upon his return to Washington. He claimed he received about \$750 per month from the Russians during his Washington assignment.

8. When he returned to Sweden in June 1957, WENNERSTROEM took several months vacation and then on 1 October 1957, after a period of orientation concerning developments in the Swedish Air Force, became Chief of the Air Section in the Defense Command Office in Stockholm. Here his contact man in Moscow, a Soviet General, gave him instructions designed "to avoid miscalculation". His principal task was generally the same as before: to procure American technical publications. He was to watch Sweden's neutral position and report any changes therein. He was also to follow up on the visits of important American military men or other persons to Stockholm and attempt to ascertain the purposes of their visits. In December 1957, WENNERSTROEM met personally with the Russian General and fully briefed him of the opportunities the new post at Stockholm afforded him from an intelligence point of view. At this meeting, it was recognized that WENNERSTROEM had opportunities for intimate contacts with Americans stationed at the Embassy in Stockholm, as well as with Americans visiting the Embassy. These contacts were to be maintained in addition to many along with many others WENNERSTROEM already knew in the U. S. and elsewhere. WENNERSTROEM was also to use the "Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between the USA and Sweden," entered into in 1952 concerning shipments of war material, as the basis for following up with the U. S. authorities for technical descriptions similar to those procured with considerable success while stationed in the U. S. He was also to concentrate on the intelligence material concerning NATO, such as where the bases were located, military forces assigned, how they were armed and organized, changes therein, plans for maneuvers, etc.

9. Following the personal contact in December 1957, WENNERSTROEM also met with the Soviet General in March 1958 in East Berlin, again in the spring and fall of 1959, three times in the fall of 1960—once in Leningrad and twice in Moscow, and in June and November 1961. A 1962 meeting planned for Vienna was cancelled when the contact man became occupied with the Cuban affair. WENNERSTROEM's arrest on 20 June 1963 altered plans for a Vienna meeting that was to occur later that year.

10. During the entire period WENNERSTROEM served at the Defense Command Office in Stockholm from 1 October 1957 until his arrest on 20 June 1963, he not only continued the illegal activities begun in Washington, but, through contacts established there and elsewhere, he actually expanded their nature and scope and stepped up their pace to keep Moscow informed of significant developments concerning the U. S. and NATO. In addition to personal contacts, he furnished the General in Moscow with frequent and informative letters.

#### 0513. JOHN SEMER FARNSWORTH

1. Happy-go-lucky, good natured John Semer Farnsworth of Cincinnati, Ohio, graduated with honors in the class of 1915 from USNA where his classmates recognized him as an able scholar and tactician. He received his "wings" at Pensacola in 1922 and by 1925 had been promoted to Lieut. Comdr. USN. His promising Naval career ended dismally on 12 November 1927 when a General Court Martial at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania dismissed him from the Naval Service for borrowing \$1000 from an enlisted man and committing perjury by disclaiming indebtedness.

2. With enough social grace to make him acceptable in the best Washington society, this brilliant and popular ex-Naval officer soon became a heavy drinker and began to pick up bits of information principally from Navy wives, and piece them together. As far back as 1932, according to his statement, he had sought employment as an aviation instructor with the Governments of China, Brazil,

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Argentina and Peru but without success. Finally, he approached Japan, and requested a salary as a Commander in the Japanese Navy and \$50,000 in advance.

3. The Japanese began negotiations with Farnsworth, but first requested evidence of his qualifications for the job. He accumulated a number of photographs of U. S. battleships and also furnished the Japanese a copy of the confidential document "The Service of Information and Security", first published in 1916 for circulation among commissioned USN officers. His contacts were Commander YOSIYUKI ITIMIYA, Asst. Naval Attache at the Japanese Embassy (October 1932-December 1934), Lt. Comdr. ARIKA YAMAKI, his successor (December 1934-November 1935) and Comdr. BUNJRO YAMAGUCHI, also of the Embassy staff in Washington. Once, feigning drunkenness and posing as a Commander, Farnsworth boarded a destroyer at Annapolis, Maryland, tricked an Ensign into giving him maneuver data, rushed back to the Japanese Embassy, had them photostated and returned them the next day. Farnsworth later claimed that during the period 1932-35 he received from the Japanese for these services \$100 per week and expenses for a total of approximately \$23,000.

4. All went well for Farnsworth until November 1935 when Comdr. YAMAGUCHI supplanted Lt. Comdr. YAMAKI and resolved to pay Farnsworth on a piecework basis. This sudden drop in income forced the liquor-sodden and desperate ex-Naval officer, whose wife by this time had divorced him, to make a startling offer to Fulton Lewis, Jr., then the crack Hearst correspondent in Washington. He proposed to write for the Hearst papers a series of articles entitled: "How I was a spy in the American Navy for the Japanese Government". His price - \$20,000, condition: that he be given 72 hours head start to catch the Hindenburg for Germany. Lewis promptly notified ONI.

5. From the time Lewis reported Farnsworth's activities, the ONI and FBI jointly placed Farnsworth under constant surveillance and alerted Key Government Agencies of his activities.

6. Lewis then demanded proof of Farnsworth's relations with the Japanese. Farnsworth called Comdr. YAMAGUCHI in Lewis's presence and told him he needed the money at once. A meeting was arranged and Farnsworth tried to get Lewis to masquerade as a cab driver and accompany him, but Lewis refused. So anxious was Farnsworth to prove his authenticity, however, that he took Lewis to the office where he had previously had the photostat work done and his story was corroborated.

7. Farnsworth was arrested in July 1936 at the Washington home of his divorced wife by FBI agents and charged with betraying Naval Secrets to Japan. He protested his innocence saying: "Whatever I gave them, it was nothing that would injure the United States--after all, I am an American". He also denied receiving pay for his services at first but later admitted receiving \$1000 for 2 articles, neither of which, he insisted, contained USN secrets.

8. On 23 July 1936 Farnsworth was indicted under Title 50, Section 34, U. S. Code, by the District of Columbia Grand Jury on the charge he sold in May 1935 to the Japanese a confidential document entitled "The Service of Information and Security". About a week later he was indicted on the more serious charge of conspiracy, the indictment naming as his coconspirators Comdr. ITIMIYA and YAMAKI, both of whom were no longer in the U. S. (Comdr. YAMAGUCHI was not named as a coconspirator). On 15 February 1937 he pleaded "nolo contendere" to both charges and on 26 February 1937 was sentenced to four (4) to twelve (12) years in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia.

9. Never before in American history had a "spy helper" accusation been lodged against a former American Naval Officer.

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
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CHAPTER 6

DEFENSIVE SECURITY BRIEFINGS

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## 0601. GENERAL

1. Personnel having access to classified defense information who visit or travel outside the United States and particularly the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries will be of interest to intelligence services of such countries. These intelligence services can be expected to compile dossiers on all U. S. officials or military personnel visiting their territories. If they cannot at once exploit the information gained, it will remain on record against the possibility that there will be an opportunity to do so at some future date.

2. Equally desirable for hostile intelligence services are personnel who attend international conferences or participate in scientific, cultural, or commercial exchange programs. This is true regardless of the country in which such activities take place, and especially where it can be expected that representatives of Sino-Soviet Bloc countries will also be participating or in attendance. While the opportunities for obtaining information from attendees at such conferences will be limited, nevertheless such efforts may be expected. Therefore, personnel in this category shall be provided a special briefing prior to performing their travel.

GUIDE FOR DEFENSIVE SECURITY BRIEFINGS

## 0602. INTRODUCTION

1. Tremendous numbers of American citizens are traveling abroad and since 1955 the numbers visiting Soviet Bloc countries have increased substantially. Among these travelers are individuals under Navy cognizance who are traveling officially or for business, pleasure or other personal reasons. Persons having access to classified information are of interest to foreign intelligence organizations and particularly to the intelligence services of the Soviet Bloc countries.

2. All modern countries have intelligence organizations and, in general, all are interested in acquiring classified United States military and related scientific data. Each possesses electronic equipment which can be used to overhear private conversations, tap telephones and monitor other forms of communications. Allied and friendly countries normally operate on an "ethical" basis, and seek information overtly through official, diplomatic channels. Any country, however, if given an opportunity to acquire strategic information with absolute security against detection, may be expected to exploit that opportunity. Additionally, even in the friendliest allied countries, secretly-placed Soviet Bloc agents and local Communist Party members and adherents may be directing their energies and talents solely to the obtaining of United States information. U. S. Navy personnel, both military and civilian, as well as DOD contractor personnel are specific targets for the efforts of these individuals.

3. The Soviet Union and its European Satellites, in spite of the reforms instituted since Stalinist days, remain police states. United States visitors, in whatever capacity they may be traveling in these countries, are of interest to the Communist intelligence and security organizations. Individuals having access to classified information are primary targets of these agencies.

4. Each person traveling outside the United States, whether in a civilian or military status or otherwise affiliated with the U. S. Navy, becomes his own security officer. The purpose of this paper is to provide a guide which will aid the traveler in his personal safety and in safeguarding classified information entrusted to him. Part I provides information applicable to travel in all foreign areas. Part II sets forth data on the espionage techniques used by the

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Soviet Bloc intelligence and security services and emphasizes the need for additional security precautions on the part of persons having access to classified information when visiting or traveling through areas under Communist control.

## PART I

SECURITY PRECAUTIONS APPLICABLE TO TRAVEL IN ALL FOREIGN AREAS

## 0603. Protection of Classified Material by Personnel in a Travel Status

1. A traveler should not carry classified information on his person or in his luggage. Article 0704 of the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information (OPNAVINST 5510.1 current edition), quoted below, applies in cases when persons within the Naval Establishment, because of the time element involved, find it absolutely necessary to carry classified information:

- "1. A determination shall be made to ascertain whether the necessary classified material is available at the destination of the traveler. If the material is available, no additional transmission shall be authorized.
- "2. If the needed classified material is not available at the destination of the traveler, commanding officers shall, whenever possible, have the classified material transmitted to the activity being visited by means other than personnel escort.
- "3. If it is impossible to comply with either paragraph 1 or 2 above, commanding officers may authorize appropriately cleared personnel to carry or transmit classified material on their persons between their duty station and the activity to be visited, subject to the following conditions:
  - "a. The classified material shall be in the physical possession of the individual at all times if proper stowage at a U. S. Government activity is not available. Classified material shall not be left in such places as locked automobiles, hotel rooms, hotel safes, train compartments, private residences, public lockers, etc.
  - "b. Classified material shall not be read, studied, displayed, or used in any manner in public conveyances or places.
  - "c. Written statements authorizing the transmission or carrying of classified material shall be provided by commanding officers to all individuals traveling outside the continental United States. This authorization statement, together with official travel orders, should ordinarily permit the individual to pass through any customs without the need for subjecting the classified material to inspection. If difficulty is encountered, the individual should refuse to disclose the classified material to customs inspection and should insist upon the assistance of the local U. S. military or State Department representatives at the port of entry or departure.
  - "d. A list of all classified material carried or transmitted by individuals traveling will be maintained by the command to which the individual is attached. Upon return of the traveler, all classified material shall be accounted for.
  - "e. All individuals authorized to carry or transmit classified material while in a travel status shall be fully informed of the provisions of this article prior to their departure from their duty station."

2. Before leaving the United States, the traveler should determine the location of the U. S. Embassy and/or military installation nearest his destination. Upon arrival, he should determine the location of the nearest U. S. military or State Department representative to have classified or other important documents.

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ments stored with the security officer of the U. S. Embassy or military installation. Although it may be necessary because of the time element to carry classified documents to a foreign country for the purpose of a meeting, arrangements should be made whenever possible to have these documents returned by U. S. Registered Mail in U. S. military postal channel (Secret and Confidential only) or by the U. S. Embassy pouch system.

#### Care of Classified Notes

3. Classified notes made at overseas meetings should be safeguarded at all times. They should not be retained in hotels or temporary residences overseas. They should be given the same security as classified documents and handled in accordance with the procedures described above for handling classified documents. Classified notes of no further use should be destroyed. An authorized destruction method is burning the material under the personal supervision of a responsible U. S. official.

#### Diaries

4. The carrying or keeping of diaries overseas is discouraged except as may be necessary for the purpose of transportation, expense accounts, travel vouchers, etc. Under no circumstances should such notes contain personal opinions, names of individuals, or classified information.

#### Release of Classified Information to Foreign Governments

5. No person in the Naval Establishment shall convey orally, visually, by written communication, or any other means, any classified information to any foreign government unless such disclosure has been specifically authorized in writing by the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence).

#### Participation in International Professional Meetings

6. Participants in international conferences who have knowledge of classified aspects of agenda topics must be extraordinarily cautious during the discussions. The attendee should have clear in his mind in advance of the conference those areas of information which cannot be discussed; when there is doubt as to the propriety of disclosing any information, it must not be discussed.

#### Telephone Security

7. Classified information must not be discussed over telephones. It should be taken for granted everywhere, and particularly in foreign countries, that telephone conversations are monitored. Accordingly, care must be exercised in using telephones not to discuss any matters or express opinions which might embarrass the U. S. Government.

#### Censorship of Mail

8. Personal correspondence passing through the international mails is subject to control and censorship by various countries. In certain areas, the censorship is apparent and exercised in accordance with law or custom. In other areas, while it may not be legal, certain technical means may be used to open and reseal envelopes in a manner which cannot readily be detected. Accordingly, care should be taken not to reveal classified information in personal correspondence or to express personal opinions or write on controversial issues which might prove embarrassing to the U. S. Government, the writer of the message.

#### Discretion to be Exercised Outside of Secure Official Spaces

9. Under no circumstances should classified information be discussed in hotel rooms, apartments, private residences, cafes or bars. Rooms can be "bugged" and conversations recorded by electronic means without any apparent physical penetration.

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tion. In many countries, luggage and the personal belongings of hotel guests are secretly and thoroughly searched by hotel employees who report to the police.

### Black Market Activity

10. Black market activity is illegal. There always is a demand for certain "hard-to-get" items which American travelers might carry or be in a position to obtain. Travelers should not trade their possessions for other articles which might have a considerable value. Violation of the laws pertaining to black market activity can cause considerable embarrassment to the traveler and to the U. S. Government, or could harm the mission of any individual or group.

### Currency Regulations

11. Travelers should seek in advance information concerning the currency regulations of countries to be visited which will enable them to comply with the requirements pertaining to legal rates of exchange, the use of U. S. currency and allowable sums of money to be taken into or out of countries.

### Use of Cameras and Other Equipment

12. Restrictions vary on the carrying and the use of cameras and portable radios in certain countries or areas. The regulations of each country to be visited should be determined in advance. Normally, the Customs Services of these countries take an interest in such articles, especially if they are new. Photographs must not be taken in "restricted" areas in foreign countries, and, in particular, in Communist-controlled countries. The carrying of firearms is prohibited.

### Travelers Will Maintain High Standards of Personal Conduct

13. Each person should conduct himself in such a manner that he cannot be compromised or become involved in any incidents that will embarrass the office he represents. Individuals should not attempt to act as intelligence agents for the U. S. The gathering of intelligence information should be left to professionals. Any "cloak and dagger" activities by unauthorized individuals could result in serious embarrassment to the U. S., or drastic personal consequences to the individual attempting such activities.

### Subversion Attempts

14. All U. S. travelers in a foreign country are under the technical jurisdiction of the local U. S. Ambassador or U. S. Consul. A traveler can and should appeal to a U. S. consulate or embassy in the event assistance is required. Any attempts or suspected attempts at subversion, efforts to obtain U. S. classified information through unauthorized means, or other unusual incidents should be reported promptly to the U. S. Naval Attache or the U. S. Embassy Security Officer. If this is not possible, in view of time elements or travel arrangements, a full report should be made upon return to the United States to the Director of Naval Intelligence, via appropriate command channels. Remember that American officials overseas are there to help you. Let them know immediately if you get involved in any difficulties.

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SECURITY GUIDE FOR TRAVELERS TO THE SOVIET UNION  
AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES

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0604. Techniques Used by the Soviet Bloc Espionage Agencies

1. The Communist regimes, through such means as travel controls and restrictions, surveillance and harassment, seek to hide from foreign visitors as much as possible, except that which may contribute directly to their political and propaganda

aims. Additionally, these regimes have sought to discredit, subvert, and to recruit for espionage purposes U. S. citizens who have been traveling the Bloc for business, pleasure or personal reasons. Tight police controls over the movements of all persons give the Soviet espionage service, the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, Committee of State Security) and the Satellite espionage services great advantages in terms of opportunities to observe and evaluate the U.S. traveler, and to exploit or entrap him. The techniques used against foreign visitors have been extremely clever and range from psychological to technical. They include:

- a. Careful control of the visitor through travel arrangements made by Intourist, ORBIS, CEDOK and other Communist travel agencies.
- b. Physical surveillance of the visitor.
- c. Extensive use of telephone taps, clandestine listening devices, clandestine photography, mail censorship, etc.
- d. Exploitation of human weaknesses, indiscretions and vices.
- e. Coercion of U. S. nationals by threats against or promises of assistance to relatives in Iron Curtain countries.

#### Control of Visitors by Communist Travel Agencies

2. Guides and interpreters are members of, or cooperate with, the secret police agencies. They act as the "eyes and ears" of the KGB or Satellite espionage services, and their personal accompaniment of the tourist services as a form of surveillance; therefore, it is important that the visitor be cautious in what he says and does.

3. Some of the guides are well-trained, experienced intelligence personnel, and effective in taking advantage of U. S. travelers for intelligence and propaganda purposes. For example, a civilian employee of the U. S. Navy was questioned minutely by his Intourist guide concerning his research in a highly technical area of science. The guide, although well in his thirties, explained that he was a college student working for his degree and needed this information for his thesis. It is obvious, however, that the KGB had learned of the scientist's specialty and sought to extract important data from him. In another instance, statements by a Naval Reserve Officer on inactive duty were highly publicized by the Communist propaganda agencies as praising the Russian way of life over the free enterprise system of the West.

#### Physical surveillance

4. Delegates to international conferences, members of exchange groups, scientists, industrial contractors, Naval personnel on active duty, and other particularly knowledgeable individuals are of great interest to hostile intelligence. Persons in those categories must assume that following application for a visa to a Soviet Bloc country, biographic and intelligence data on the traveler are forwarded to the intelligence service of the country being visited. These individuals may be subjected from the moment of arrival to obvious surveillance or to surveillance so discreet as to be undetectable. It may be conducted by male or female agents on foot or in cars and may cover all travel performed by the visitor whether by train, plane or other means of transportation within the country. The Soviet and Satellite intelligence services have the personnel and facilities to keep the target individual under total surveillance at all times if they so desire.

5. Should the traveler become aware that he is being "tailed", he should act normally and avoid any actions that could be even remotely considered compromising or embarrassing. He should not attempt to "play games" with the surveillants or attempt to lose them or embarrass them.

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Technical Surveillance Devices

6. On 26 May 1960, Ambassador Lodge displayed at the United Nations a wooden plaque of the Great Seal of the United States which had been presented by the Soviets to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow in 1945. It was not until 1952 - three Ambassadors and seven years later - that a hidden listening device was found concealed in the plaque. Described as very small, the microphone is even today considered to be an extremely advanced piece of electronic equipment.

7. Mr. Lodge stated that in recent years security personnel had found more than 100 concealed listening devices in United States embassies and in the residences of American personnel in Soviet Bloc countries, including 25 in Poland.

8. Shortly before Vice President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviets planted a secret listening device in the embassy residence in Moscow, but it was discovered and removed before Mr. Nixon's arrival. The device was found concealed in a study that was later used by Mr. Nixon for consultations with the American Ambassador. It was described as a highly sensitive and sophisticated device that, on a given command from an outside control point, could pick up and relay a conversation to a point outside the embassy residence.

9. It was also reported that other guest houses and hotels where Mr. Nixon and members of his party stayed were "bugged". Evidence that listening devices had been installed was furnished in one instance as a result of an experimental conversation. This was a discussion about a U. S. citizen, in which he was given a rank he did not actually hold. The following morning, Soviet officials addressed him by that rank and treated him with greater courtesy than he had previously received.

10. Intourist, ORBIS, CEDOK and the other Communist travel agencies invariably arrange for American travelers to stay at the better class hotels, and there is evidence that in many cases the U. S. travelers are assigned rooms in which listening devices have been more or less permanently installed. Devices have been detected in telephones, radios, lighting fixtures and furniture, and have also been concealed behind wallboards and imbedded in walls. One may be certain that telephones in these hotel rooms are tapped. Secret listening devices have also been planted in bars and restaurants frequented by tourists, and may be installed in automobiles.

11. Instances have been reported of hotel rooms equipped with window mirrors, that is, treated glass which appears as a mirror on one side, but through which an individual on the other side can observe or even photograph anything going on in the room.

12. A number of instances have been reported where in the rooms of U. S. travelers have been entered surreptitiously and their baggage searched. There was evidence, for example, that the baggage of members of Mr. Nixon's party who stayed in a Moscow hotel had been opened, examined and photographed. While diaries, letters, notes and film, both exposed and unexposed, may be left in hotel rooms, the visitor is urged to bear in mind that these may be examined, photographed or confiscated. Any notes or films valued by the tourist should be kept on his person but he should never have in his possession any material which could possibly be interpreted as compromising or incriminating.

Clandestine Photography

13. Along with developing extremely sensitive listening devices, the Soviets have made significant technological advances in the field of photography. They have miniature cameras with which they have made photographs without the knowledge of the tourist. With telescopic lenses, they can produce identifiable pictures of persons at a great distance from the cameras. Additionally, through the use of infrared, pictures can be taken at night or in darkened areas, with the subject of the photograph completely unaware that his picture has been taken. As in the

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case of listening devices, cameras loaded with infrared films and with infrared flash bulbs may be planted in hotel rooms or may be used through mirror windows, and photography accomplished completely without detection.

14. Although no television cameras have been discovered as yet, there is every reason to believe the Soviet intelligence agencies are using closed-circuit television as its latest and most thorough form of surveillance. A camera for such purposes could be as small as six by five inches, or about the size of a pocket radio. It could be effective through an opening only a little larger than a pin-head.

15. Indigenous photographers accompanying large groups of American tourists in Soviet Bloc countries have occasionally requested permission to take candid poses of individuals in the group. Such photographs can be altered to make them embarrassing and, thus, useful for attempted blackmail recruitment of U. S. visitors to serve as Soviet agents on their return to the United States.

#### Mail Censorship

16. All mail to and from the Soviet Bloc countries is subject to censorship and provides a fruitful field for intelligence exploitation. The KGB and its counterpart agencies in the Satellite countries examine the mail of U. S. tourists from both a counterintelligence and a positive intelligence point of view. The tourist should be extremely careful in writing to or about relatives or friends in these countries, as these people may then become targets for investigations or exploitation. Extreme care should be taken to avoid revealing any information which might be of positive value to the Soviet or Satellite intelligence collection effort. In addition, personal and family problems of a confidential nature, or any information which might be self-incriminating should not be discussed in correspondence mailed through international or foreign mails since these matters can be used to develop pressure points against the individuals concerned. The U. S. traveler is cautioned to be careful in both what he writes and to whom he writes.

#### Exploitation of Human Weaknesses, Indiscretions and Vices

17. When seeking to subvert, to compromise, to blackmail, and to recruit the U. S. visitor for espionage purposes, foreign intelligence agents are fully aware of the human weaknesses. These agents are alert to detect immoral and indiscreet behavior of U. S. travelers. Personal habits, traits of character and mannerisms are watched to determine any immoral relations. Suspicion of irregularities in matters of sex, liquor, smuggling, black-market activities, illegal currency exchange, etc., are exploited to the utmost. Failing to detect a weakness, foreign agents have in some cases attempted entrapment of innocent travelers. They have deliberately arranged situations involving the U. S. visitor in illicit sex affairs, have planted compromising material in his possession, and have worked on his sympathies to involve him in some illegal or improper act.

18. The U. S. traveler should maintain a high level of personal behavior at all times. He should remember that he is a guest in a foreign country and a representative of the United States. He may be the only U. S. citizen whom some Soviet citizens have ever seen. He should be temperate in his drinking. Aside from creating embarrassing or even scandalous scenes, the U. S. traveler, by overindulgence, may set himself up for compromise and a possible recruitment effort. Cases have been reported wherein drunken U. S. visitors have been maneuvered into sexual and homosexual activities, which were photographed, and formed the bases for blackmailing them into espionage. Sexual relationships with Soviet or Satellite citizens are to be avoided. This is one of the most favored methods of compromising an individual, particularly if photographic evidence is presented at a later date.

Medical and Dental Service

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19. Medical or dental service should be obtained only from a U. S. Government facility or from individuals or institutions approved by U. S. Consular Officials. Speech-inducing drugs, medicines, serums, and anesthesia are known to have been used under the guise of medical treatment for the purpose of aiding in interrogations. Consideration should be given to the possibility that they might be used in certain circumstances where an enemy may be interested in obtaining highly sensitive information. Normally, the only place where a traveler might be exposed to this type of treatment would be in the private-type clinic or office of a doctor. Except under emergency circumstances, medical treatment or services should not be utilized or sought in Sino-Soviet Bloc areas, other than from the U. S. Embassy.

### Conclusion

20. The foregoing discussion can be summarized in the following set of rules:

#### DON'TS

1. Do not take classified material outside the U. S.
2. Do not discuss classified information outside of secure official spaces.
3. Avoid all moral indiscretions or vices which could lead to compromise by blackmail.
4. Do not engage in blackmarket activities, especially the purchase of art treasures or the sale of currency.
5. Do not accept letters, photographs, packages or any other material to be smuggled out of the country for any reason.
6. Be careful of statements which may be exploited for propaganda purposes. Do not sign petitions, however innocuous.
7. Mail in the Soviet Bloc is subject to censorship. Be careful what you write and to whom you write.
8. Do not photograph military installations or other "restricted" areas or military personnel.
9. Beware of overly friendly tourist guides, interpreters, or other citizens. Be particularly suspicious of guide personnel who just "happen" to know your special field.
10. Avoid attempts by photographers to take candid poses of you. The results may be anything but flattering.

#### DO'S

1. Report any apparent or suspected attempts at subversion to the Embassy Security Officer. If you have been indiscreet or have become otherwise compromised, you can discuss the situation in confidence with him. He is not interested in ruining your reputation but in protecting the United States, you and the classified information you possess.
2. Remember that, as a U. S. citizen affiliated with the U. S. Navy, you may be a target for attempted exploitation by Soviet and Satellite intelligence organizations.

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
(Speak louder, I can hardly hear you)

# CHAPTER 7

## CLANDESTINE DEVICES

### 0701. ELECTRONIC AND OTHER DEVICES USED IN ESPIONAGE

1. For centuries spies have used their ears and eyes to collect information. Modern science has produced devices that greatly increase their hearing and seeing power. Their eavesdropping no longer depends on their being within actual earshot of a conversation. Nor do they have to be close enough to see a "secret" with their naked eyes.
2. Today's devices for "bugging" a room can be as small as the eraser on a pencil. Instead of being connected by wire with some distant listening post, these tiny devices are self-centered radio transmitters, easy to conceal and hard to detect. Everything said in a "bugged" room can be tape-recorded as far as a mile away without the use of any telltale wires.
3. Agents themselves are now often "wired for sound". Tiny microphones and recorders concealed on their persons preserve an accurate record of anything said in their presence. Agents no longer have to rely entirely upon their memories when they report to their superiors; the tape contains exactly what was said.
4. One of the most useful espionage devices, if it is not properly guarded, is the ordinary telephone instrument. Give a trained agent a few minutes alone in a "secure" office and he can convert its telephone into a listening device that operates even when the phone is on its cradle. Only a telephone company employee or trained counterintelligence specialist can tell that the instrument has been "bugged". For this reason, phones in certain security offices are equipped with special switches or plugs. When the phones are not actually in use they are physically disconnected from the lines. Interoffice communications are even more vulnerable to this kind of "bugging" than the regular telephone lines.



Enemy agents seek people who are careless, indifferent or conceited about their knowledge of security matters.

5. These are some of the newer developments in the field of "wiretapping" and other electronic methods of eavesdropping. They merely increase the necessity for every person who possesses classified information to "button his lip" no matter where he is, or until he knows that a particular place has been proved safe for legitimate discussion of classified matters.
6. In the optical field, similar improvements have been made. There are telescopic lenses powerful enough to photograph items in great detail from great distances. For example, a readable photograph of a newspaper page has been made from a mile away. A trained lipreader, from a similar distance, could use such

a lens to pick up a conversation by two people who had taken all the normal precautions against being overheard. Various types of mirror-window devices are available when agents want to see without being seen. One use they make of these is to photograph individuals in circumstances that will make them vulnerable to blackmail pressure.



7. An individual cannot know at any given time or place whether he is within range of one of these modern listening or watching devices. His best safeguard is to assume that he is and to govern his speech and his conduct accordingly. Specially trained military counterintelligence experts are available to assist commanders in protecting their installations from this kind of espionage. For example, before a particular room is used for a highly classified conference, it may be searched for hidden devices by the use of special detection equipment. (Refer to the effective edition of OPNAVINST 005500.46).

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
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2 o'clock  
meeting



67.21  
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150.63

62  
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248  
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Check all  
safes!!

SECURITY EDUCATION PROGRAM

CHAPTER 8 *Declassified* / Downgrade to *CONFIDENTIAL*  
 PROPAGANDA: *ED 12958*  
 Date: *23 SEPT 78* Unit: *NC 522*

## 0801. GENERAL

1. In pursuit of its goals of world domination, Communists are conducting a full scale propaganda program to subvert free men. The main theme of this propaganda seeks to dupe those to whom it is addressed into believing in the professed "goodness" of Communism contrasted with the asserted "wickedness" of the West. In the military field, the predominant Communist proposition asserts the superiority of the "peace loving" Soviet forces which, ignoring the brutal Soviet repression of popular uprisings in Eastern European countries, are painted as the "invincible" protectors of the "peoples' democracies" and the newly emerging nations and as such are contrasted with the "aggressive" military forces of the "decadent" western "colonial" powers.
2. This may sound trite, but Communist propaganda is not mere bombast. It is a tool often cleverly used in countless ways to achieve interim aims in pursuit of the final goal. One of these aims is to roll back the strength of the free world, to erode the purpose of the United States and its ability to rally Free World unity, and, in practical terms, to disrupt or destroy the alliance of the United States by manipulating and sharpening tensions between Free World nations.
3. Thus on the world scene, in the United Nations, in speeches of Soviet and Satellite leaders, in the representations of their Ambassadors, and in the columns of their newspapers and magazines, Communist charges against "Pentagon War mongers" have been loud and profuse. Every opportunity to distort United States military policies and discredit American military forces has been seized upon by the Communists in an effort to torpedo the NATO, SEATO and CENTO alliances and foster disintegration of the Free World's defenses. Even international blackmail has been employed by the Soviets in threats to "atomize" the "olive groves of Italy" and tiny Holland in an effort to prevent the stationing of American NATO special weapons units in those countries.
4. Against this international backdrop, Communist intelligence and psychological warfare services produce a particularly vicious type of propaganda which more directly seeks to estrange United States forces from their allies, to incite the populace of friendly foreign nations against the presence of American military personnel, and to undermine the morale and loyalty of American military personnel. Although it echoes the main Communist theme, this propaganda is usually localized to suit a particular situation in a particular area or a current event of but local significance. Much of it is black or grey propaganda in which the Communist origin is concealed and even, in some cases, made to appear as though it originated with sincere, well meaning "patriots" in the West and is therefore, all the more insidious.
5. It is the purpose of this chapter to cite examples of Communist propaganda in order that similar propaganda, wherever it may appear, may be readily recognized as such by military and civilian personnel of the Department of the Navy.

## 0802. ANTI-POLARIS PROPAGANDA


1. Since the establishment of an anchorage in Holy Loch, Scotland for a U. S. Navy Submarine Tender, to service SSBN class submarines, there has been concerted efforts on the part of several peace organizations to subvert the Navy's efforts to retain this afloat base. These peaceful non-violent organizations have the backing of the Communist Party, Great Britain (CPGB) and the CPGB has continued to participate in these efforts by contributing propaganda and marchers. An example of the CPGB participation is an effort to oust our floating base and subvert the defense efforts of the United States and its allies occurred in the spring of 1963.

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2. In February 1963, the Daily Worker, official organ of the Communist Party, Great Britain, published plans for an anti-Polaris demonstration to be conducted at Holy Loch, Scotland on 25 May 1963. Holy Loch is the anchorage of the U. S. Navy Submarine Tender, which services SSBN class submarines operating from Holy Loch. In May the Daily Worker continued to place emphasis on the demonstration, and the intent of the Communist Party to build and maintain interest in the proposed demonstration. One edition of the Daily Worker reported the following:

"A film for world-wide distribution is to be made of the anti-Polaris demonstration at Holy Loch on 25 May 1963. The British Peace Committee announced yesterday that a team of expert cameramen, producers and script-writers had been formed....People in Britain do not realize sufficiently that the campaign to close down foreign bases and to create nuclear - free areas is becoming a world wide movement.... The Holy Loch base in Scotland is the largest, most dangerous and most politically significant American base in the Western Hemisphere. The film of the 25 May demonstration will set out to show the strength of the movement in Britain which is striving to close down the base."

DAILY WORKER Saturday May 25 1963

# World's most dangerous spot

By Our Parliamentary Correspondent

THE Polaris submarine base to be built on the Gareloch will make the West of Scotland the most dangerous place in the world to live.

## HOW TO DISRUPT, OBSTRUCT AND SUBVERT THE WARFARE STATE

NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE TO WAR

To the apathetic public: This is a leaflet inciting you to get off your backside and DO SOMETHING!

Copies are being sent to the Special Branch, some Army and R.A.F. Camps, Civil Defence, Trade Unions, some M.P.s, the I.L.P., Peace Committee, C.N.D., Committee of 100, and the Press. Pass this round your friends. This is a mild leaflet but the next ones will be more subversive.....

## Challenge to Polaris

From PETER ZINKIN

A CHALLENGE to the decision to build a £25 million Polaris base at Gare Loch, Scotland, is to be made by Mr. Emrys Hughes (Labour, S. Ayrshire) on Wednesday on the adjournment debate in the Commons.

His action should increase support for the British Peace Committee's demonstration against the Polaris base at neighbouring Holy Loch on May 25.

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Unit: N4572

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 Unit: NLS 22

DAILY WORKER Monday May 13 1963

COMMUNIST ACT-FOR-PEACE CALL**Spread the fight  
against Polaris  
to all Britain**

Daily Worker Reporter

A CALL to make the May 25 anti-Polaris demonstration in Scotland

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Auth: EO 12958Date: 23 Sept 78 Unit: NCIS 22

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DAILY WORKER

May 15 1963

**CONCERTED  
CAMPAIGN  
AGAINST  
POLARIS**

Daily Worker Reporter

GLASGOW, Tuesday.

PEACE organisations throughout Scotland are staging a concerted "act against Polaris" campaign as the time draws near to the May 25 demonstration at Holy Loch.

In Edinburgh 4,000 leaflets have been circulating in factories and offices and by door-to-door canvassing.

Housewives in Motherwell yesterday handed out over 2,000 leaflets at the town's main shopping centre and in neighbouring Lanarkshire campaigning will bring the total distribution for the county to well over 10,000.

3. The demonstration did show up on 25 May 1963, the crowd marched in cadence to "Polaris-out-out-out". The parade was approximately a quarter of a mile long and the demonstrators marched six abreast. Among the marchers, there were placards and banners representing the Communist Party of Great Britain and many Communist Front Organizations. The Daily Worker and subversive leaflets were distributed along the line of march.

**0803. SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA**

1. In the European area, there has been a perfect example of Communist propaganda duplicity in an effort to estrange Naval personnel from our allies and at the same time turn them from us. A series of English language leaflets addressed to "Fellow Americans" and signed by a fictitious "executive Committee of American Military Personnel in Europe Against War" has been mailed to Naval personnel located in NATO countries and aboard ships in the European area at intervals since 1959.

2. Purporting to be an appeal of the "Executive Committee", the leaflets urged American military men not to fight a "senseless atomic war for foreign interests" and to "organize committees in the fight against military ventures." Some of them were accompanied by a prepared letter, written in the same vein as the leaflets, which were addressed to "Dear Mr. President" and signed "American Servicemen in Europe Against War." Recipients were asked to send the letter to the White House.

READ AND PASS ON1

**"Fellow-Americans!**

We, of the American Army appeal to you.

We are all ordinary Americans. Although we may have various outlooks on life, one thought unites us:

**WE MUST NOT PERISH IN A SENSELESS ATOMIC WAR!**

We are not cowards, we are ready to defend the freedom and independence of America, where all is near and dear to us, just as our fore-fathers did before us. HOWEVER, WE REFUSE TO BE PAWNS IN THE HANDS OF THOSE WHO DO NOT VALUE OUR LIVES!

Remember, Korea achieved nothing except the loss of thousands of our brave soldiers.

We are constantly being assured of the superiority of our military strength over the Russians. Now it is evident that this superiority is non-existent. The Russians have weapons of great destructive power and war with them can only result in mutual annihilation.

WASHINGTON DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THIS AND CONTINUES ITS DANGEROUS GAME!

Our country has lost prestige everywhere as a result of our foreign policy. We are met with hatred in Germany, England, Japan, Latin America and elsewhere.

Our actions in Lebanon resulted in a new wave of hatred towards us by the Arabs. Nevertheless, our leaders have again brought us to the brink of world conflict. This time because of Berlin.

We firmly declare that Berlin is not worth risking the lives of our soldiers. And this can happen if Washington cannot come to agreement with Russia.

WE MUST NOT FIGHT FOR FOREIGN INTERESTS!

American soldiers cannot remain indifferent to the situation. We appeal to all military personnel irregardless of their political beliefs - SAVE YOUR COUNTRY, YOURSELVES AND DEAR ONES FROM DISASTER. JOIN US IN THE FIGHT!

FELLOW AMERICANS! WHETHER YOU ARE IN GERMANY, ENGLAND, JAPAN, ITALY OR AFRICA, ORGANIZE COMMITTEES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY VENTURES!

Our task now is to build up and strengthen our organization. Explain to the soldiers the danger and urgency of the situation. Global war must be averted.

WE ARE STRONG ENOUGH NOT TO FEAR COMING FORWARD IN THE OPEN IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY!

Our representative will contact you in the near future to set up permanent contacts and come to agreement as to our plans for the future."

ED 12958  
23 Sept 98 Unit: NCB 22  
"Executive Committee  
American Military Personnel in  
Europe Against War"

Part of a leaflet received by Naval personnel in the European and Middle East Area.

#### 0804. UNSOLICITED SOVIET PROPAGANDA

1. Communist agencies never cease to explore new possibilities for disseminating their propaganda. During recent years, arrangements between the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. and Crosscurrents Press, Inc., a printing firm with offices at 156 Fifth Avenue, New York City, have resulted in an increase in the dissemination of Soviet propaganda in the United States, much of it directed to Naval Installations and personnel.

2. One of the first examples of cooperation between Crosscurrents Press and the Soviet Embassy was the publication of Khrushchev in America, a Communist-colored account of the Soviet leader's visit to the United States. In meticulous compliance with the provisions of U. S. Public Laws which are administered by the Foreign Agents Registration Section of the Department of Justice, Crosscurrents Press reported that an order for the printing of 50,000 copies of this pamphlet had been completed on 20 January 1960 and that all copies had been delivered to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Among the ultimate recipients, however, were Naval Stations, station libraries, service-clubs, and other quasi-military facilities. The entire edition was mailed out on an unsolicited basis by the Soviet Embassy in unsealed, open-to-inspection envelopes under the bulk rate postage permits, all within the framework of existing U. S. postal regulations.

3. Shortly thereafter, Naval installations in the United States reported receipt of the following additional unsolicited propaganda leaflets, all of which had been printed by Crosscurrents Press and mailed by the Soviet Embassy:

- a. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- b. Khrushchev Reports to the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party, USSR.
- c. Khrushchev on the future.

4. Other overt Communist propaganda materials have been printed by Crosscurrents Press and directed by the Soviet Embassy to the shelves of Naval Station libraries. OPNAV Instruction 5700.8 of 25 February 1961 established the policy and defined the action required by commands which receive such propaganda.

#### 0805. UNSUSPECTING SAILORS

1. Units of a U. S. Fleet visiting certain ports in the European area have been subject to intelligence and propaganda activity by special squads of English speaking Communists.

2. The distribution of propaganda material aboard ships was entrusted to visitors or unsuspecting crew members, the Communists seldom ever board the ships.

3. The sailors were usually approached in the ports' entertainment spots, where the Communists take advantage of these sailors in an intoxicated state to elicit information from them.

4. The Communists have attempted to obtain useful information from the crew members, not so much the ships' characteristics and armament, but have placed special interest in the composition and numerical strength of the ship's crew, recent voyages and maneuvers.

#### 0806. COMMUNISTS "HATE" PROPAGANDA

1. Communists "hate" propaganda is addressed not to personnel of the Naval service but to the local populace in areas where Naval personnel are stationed or where fleet units periodically visit. This propaganda seeks to incite the local populace against the presence of the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps by seizing upon every incident in which Naval personnel are involved and distorting or magnifying the incident to somehow blame all Americans for the incident or picture it as typical of Americans. Every automobile accident, every street incident, every bar brawl, every shooting of an unknown intruder, every unfortunate incident involving Naval personnel, no matter where the fault lies, is depicted in Communist and Communist-oriented newspapers and publications throughout the world as the fault of the sailor and marine and the result of his alleged arrogant, (selfish) behavior toward the local populace.

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2. A recent edition of Akahata (Red Flag), the official Japan Communist Party (JCP) press organ, reported an incident involving U. S. Forces personnel. Akahata reported that three U. S. military personnel in Aomori City, Aomori Prefecture, assaulted and robbed a National Railroad worker and threw him into the bay. The article further reported that the victim was told by the officials of the National Railroad not to report the incident to police. While an incident did occur in Aomori similar to that reported by Akahata, no U. S. personnel were involved. At approximately 0330, 16 September 1963, a railroad worker in Aomori was attacked by three males. The victim did not report the attack to local police because he did not want it known that he was out at a time when he should have been on duty.

3. This Akahata article is yet another example of the JCP's attempts to slur U. S. personnel and is typical of the distorted news items published by the JCP. Akahata had a daily circulation of approximately 145,000 as of June 1963, and a Sunday Edition circulation of 343,000. Its many anti-U. S. articles are aimed at promoting adverse sentiment towards U. S. personnel in Japan. All indiscretions of U. S. Forces personnel, however slight, add to the JCP's ammunition.

#### 0807. PROPAGANDA CIRCULARS DISTRIBUTED TO PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

1. An American serviceman stationed in Vietnam, whose recent promotion had been announced in his wife's home town paper in California, received a circular entitled "Attention All Military Personnel". The circular, originated from the so-called Vietnam Day Committee of Berkley, California, accuses U. S. officers of ordering troops to shoot women and children. It also charges that the South Vietnamese consider U. S. forces their enemy. The circular claims the Central Intelligence Agency was responsible for the overthrow and murder of President Diem as an alternative to elections. It parallels actions by Americans in Vietnam with those of the Nazis during World War II, and alludes that a soldier under orders is legally and morally responsible for his actions as determined by the War Crimes Commission in 1945. Americans, who have refused to fight in Vietnam are lauded as being courageous, and others are encouraged to do as little fighting as possible.

2. This propaganda circular discloses a clever approach to gaining the attention of military personnel. It represents an attempt to produce an authentic looking military-like handout. In the upper corner appear the words, "Approved for Posting". The letters "VDC Form 2017-5, 16 October 1965" appear at the lower left corner and the words "All Previous Editions Obsolete" was printed at the bottom of the first page.

3. Because of its official appearance, the possibility of such propaganda inadvertently being accepted and posted on military bulletin boards cannot be discounted. Further, it is significant that other American servicemen stationed in the Republic of Vietnam have received similar propaganda circulars.

#### 0808. HARASSMENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST FAMILIES OF U. S. SERVICEMEN

1. Information indicates that certain individuals and questionable groups have initiated a campaign of harassment and threats against families of U. S. Servicemen in Vietnam. Their activities include anonymous telephone calls requesting money and, in exchange, offering to provide information about the service member. In some instances, the caller falsely advises that the member is dead. In other instances, families of deceased members have received derisive and abusive letters and postcards, requesting contributions from the deceased's insurance proceeds to organizations, such as the "Viet Cong Sympathizers Arms Fund".

2. Incidents of such abusive or threatening calls have occurred in several areas throughout the country, but many reported harassment cases appear concentrated in areas near Navy and Marine Corps installations. Several of the contacts did not involve actual abuse, or threat, in that the caller made no conversation, but held the line briefly before hanging up. Generally,

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the content or tone of these reported abusive communications make or imply some reference to the war in Vietnam, such as the following:

a. An enlisted man and the parents of a Navy aviator, killed in Vietnam, both received postcards that equated the U. S. involvement in Vietnam with the atrocities of Nazi Germany in 1940, and in the latter case expressed joy at their misfortune.

b. Parents of a deceased Marine from Florida, were threatened with harm if they attempted to display the American Flag at their son's gravesite.

c. In several instances dependents (usually wives) were advised not to meet their spouse's ship upon its return from Vietnam to home port, and in one case the wife reported the caller threatened her with bodily harm if she disobeyed him.

d. Parents of an enlisted man from Ohio, were visited on two separate occasions by an individual, described as dressed in a military-type uniform. This unidentified individual claimed to be a representative of the military, notified the parents of the death of their son in Vietnam (later proven false), and requested cash payments for certain unspecified burial services.

3. This type harassment is slanted as part of the anti-Vietnam propaganda. It is detrimental to morale and is investigated whenever reported to ascertain any subversive involvement. The effectiveness of such investigations, depends in part, on timely receipt of information related to such incidents. Whenever such incidents come to the attention of any member of the Navy, he should report the matter promptly to his Command Security Officer, for referral to the nearest Naval Investigative Service Office.

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


# A GOOD RECORD...

WIND UP  
WITH

NO

SECURITY VIOLATIONS



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## CHAPTER 9

## SECURITY VIOLATIONS

## 0901. SECURITY VIOLATIONS ARE BAD HABITS

1. Security violations result from bad habits and often pose a threat to national security. Security violations take on a more serious aspect when they occur in installations located in foreign countries because of their greater vulnerability to hostile exploitation. If a specific type of security violation is repeated, it is an indication of a bad habit.
2. These bad habits are usually the result of haste, convenience, or carelessness in the daily handling of classified documents. As a result, many violations are caused by failure to completely identify documents, especially when they are listed for destruction. The officer conducting an investigation of a security violation involving a document that cannot be accounted for frequently reaches the conclusion that the document was probably inadvertently destroyed. This may have resulted from carelessness in checking the documents to be destroyed or from the intermingling of classified documents with unclassified waste. On the other hand, the document could be in existence and in the possession of hostile intelligence.
3. The only violations known, of course, are those that have been discovered and reported. No one will ever know how many actually occurred, but were not discovered: A secret document left on top of a desk overnight; a safe left open overnight; or the discussion of classified information over the telephone in so-called double talk.

## 0902. REPORTED SECURITY VIOLATIONS

1. During the fiscal year of 1964, there were approximately 1,000 security violations reported in the Department of the Navy that involved compromise or possible compromise. This number does not include those administrative security violations acted on by each command in accordance with article 0814 of the Department of the Navy Security Manual for Classified Information.
2. The leading causes for security violations are....lost classified documents, classified material probably destroyed (no record), classified material left in taxis, bus or private automobile, loose talk ultimately resulting in press release.
3. A review by the officer Performance Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, of investigations which reflect adversely on officer performance, revealed 42 incidents involving security violations. This number represents 8½ percent of the total number of adverse incidents reported in 1962.
4. Over a period of time, security violations will continue to occur because of human error. Through an extensive indoctrination program, serious and conscientious efforts to avoid compromise will, however, greatly reduce both the probability and number of security violations.

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## CHAPTER 9

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**THERE'S  
NOTHING  
OLD  
FASHIONED**

*about*

**QUALITY**



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CHAPTER 10  
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a. PROMOTING SECURITY - An important aspect of the Security Orientation, Education and Training Program is satisfying the day-to-day effort in selling security. Literally, we are a nation of "medicine men", and the methods used in the professional advertising field may be used to advantage in selling this essential element to our national survival as well. We say "selling" for unfortunately, we do have to sell SECURITY. Many persons, particularly those working constantly with sensitive material and information, have to be constantly reminded (sold, that is) on the necessity against security apathy and carelessness in handling classified material to preclude compromise.

b. SECURITY INDIFFERENCE - You may become exposed to the busy individual who is too involved to become concerned in reviewing or hearing about good security practices. He is just too busy to attend and participate in any security programs or lectures - until the day a violation is perpetrated in his spaces. This individual may not respond to any of the previously listed stimuli and will require special attention. One approach, which has almost universal effectiveness, is the appeal to the individual for help in overcoming a problem common to both the supervisor and the security representative. The approach must of necessity be tailored to the characteristics of the individual who displays apparent security laxness.

c. RECOGNITION - Personal recognition can also aid in selling security. A security cartoon, cross-word puzzle, poster and article contest conducted within the local command will often produce some startling results in originality and effectiveness. If the Command takes the time and effort to select and recognize officially an individual who has done an effective security job or some other contribution to the security education program, this recognition will go far in selling security to others in the command. A letter from the Commanding Officer, an article or notice in the Plan of the Day, is certain to stimulate competition and interest in this endeavor.

2. SECURITY POSTERS - There are some proven methods to obtain results. One of the most obvious is the employment of posters as a visual aid reminder. Planning and displaying posters properly is an art and precision job. A poorly selected subject or improperly placed poster might as well not be displayed at all. Some good rules to apply are:

a. Develop established display areas so all personnel will come to expect security posters in those areas. Select locations where they can be seen at eye level by the maximum number of people. This means that they should be displayed in cafeterias, at the head of stairways, fountains, or where people congregate during the course of their daily duties.

b. Posters must be fresh, clean, rotated frequently, and appeal to the viewers' intellect. There should not be the too often noted pattern of the same poster displayed throughout the entire activity at the same time. People soon tire of seeing the same poster and message all day long wherever they go, and soon, no matter how well founded the picture message may be, they shut it out of their mind with violent rejection. It is far better to mix different posters for simultaneous viewing throughout the activity.

3. SECURITY CARTOONS - Most installations with periodic bulletins utilize the left over space in the unofficial sections to good advantage by inserting safety slogans, accident prevention reminders, moral leadership quips, etc. By compiling a series of security cartoons, security word scramblegrams, security type

horoscopes, etc., and presenting them to the readers through whatever media may present itself, the SOET Program can be given a boost in reaching the "unscheduled" audience.

4. SECURITY REMINDERS - Another media for security education is the security reminder. These serve the same purpose basically as posters, but on a more individual basis. Some very effective reminders are soft drink dispensers, plastic or wax type coffee cups, blotters, emery boards for the ladies, book matches, napkins, stickers, etc., with a pointed security cartoon, reminder or slogan thereon. However, it is well to keep in mind that too much emphasis or reliance on these reminders can become a dangerous crutch in the security program.

5. PICTORIALS - For use with overhead projector. The pictures included in this guide may be converted locally into transparencies or utilized, as is, with an overhead projector. Most of the pictures are designed to be used with the material provided in Chapters 1, 3-5, 7 and 8. They may however, be used for other purposes.

#### 6. FILMS

a. The Department of Defense (DOD) has assigned to the Army responsibility for maintaining a stock of security motion pictures and related audio-visual slides for use by the DOD and its contractors. Provision is also made for the exchange of motion pictures, security briefings and other training material among DOD components, wherein such exchange will be materially beneficial.

b. Below is a selected list of recommended intelligence and security oriented films, which may be obtained through a Navy or Air Force Film Library, or Army Audio-Visual Aids Support Center in the cognizant command area. Letter prefix designations preceeding film numbers indicate the following information or source:

AFIF - Armed Forces Information Film	OSD - Office of SecDef Film
DOD - Department of Defense Film	SFP - Special Film Project
FS - Film Strip	TF - Training Film
MF - Misc. Film Subject	TF 1 - Air Force Training Film
MN - Navy Training Film	TF 30 - Army Training Film
AIF - Army Information Film	WA - World Affairs Film Excerpts

The following abbreviations and codes are used to indicate film usage, source of production, etc:

Comm.	- Commercial subject adopted for military use
PE	- Public exhibitions (non profit)
TV	- Television (non sponsored)
TH	- Theatrical
PS	- Public Sale
D/A	- Army subject adapted for AF use
D/N	- Navy subject " " " "
RCAF	- Royal Canadian Air Force
AF	- Air Force production

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(1) AFIF 147 "CONFIDENTIALLY YOURS" (30 Min. DOD 1965)

Involves a compromised classified document at a joint U. S. service headquarters in Naples, Italy. Dramatically enacts events leading to its loss, investigation of individuals concerned and stresses need to observe security regulations.

(2) DOD-IS-8 "UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE" (12 Min. B&W 1965)

Depicts situations where unauthorized disclosures of classified defense information could occur. Viewer is motivated to follow proper procedures to prevent unauthorized disclosures and is furnished convincing arguments against indiscriminate release of classified defense information.

(3) DOD-IS-7 "THE ENEMY AGENT AND YOU" (25 Min. B&W 1965 DOD)

A new film depicting some of the security pitfalls an unwary American Government representative could fall prey to in a foreign land. Covers the area of clandestine listening devices, blackmail and sexual entrapment.

(4) MN-10106 "THE RPS CUSTODIAN" (17 Min. Color, animated cartoon, 1965)

A most effective and timely film for indoctrinating RPS assigned personnel with particular emphasis to those in command positions. Concerns regulatory, accountability and handling the Navy's Registered Publications System (RPS). Note: this film may be obtained by applying through RPS Issuing Offices, Navy Film Libraries or Communications Security (COMSEC) Inspection Teams.

(5) TF-5664 "SENTRY DOG" (21 Min. B&W 1965 AF)

Pictures USAF Sentry Dog School and Program at Lackland AFB. Portrays sentry dog's important role in safeguarding U. S. property. Outlines dog care, conditioning, and obedience training. Shows details of dog's learning to detect and attack intruders.

(6) TF 1-5160 "ROYAL AIR FORCE POLICE DOG TRAINING" (30 Min. B&W 1965 RCAF)

Demonstrates each phase of training from the day the dog is inducted to completion of the six weeks RCAF police dog training course.

(7) SFP 1494 "THE CASE OF JOHN ERRONEOUS" (7 Min. Color 1965 D/A)

Animated cartoons show why habits and training which condition attitudes to accept mediocrity must be replaced by personal desire to attain perfection. This film is primarily for use in the Zero Defects Program and has been found to be very adaptable to Security Education.

(8) TF 5818 "SAFEGUARDING DEFENSE INFORMATION - WHY WE NEED SECURITY" (29 Min. TF 30-3434 B&W 1964 D/A)

Explains why our country and military forces require effective security measures. Points out how enemy agents are constantly engaged in espionage, sabotage and subversion. Demonstrates importance of lead time over adversary in cold war as well as in actual war. Shows how espionage agents piece together small bits of information to uncover military secrets. Emphasizes responsibility of each individual to safeguard classified information.

(9) AFIF 134 "ESPIONAGE TARGET, YOU" (29 Min. B&W 1964 DOD)

Objective of this film is to show that espionage is a part of life and one of the main targets is U. S. Servicemen. The dramatized situations are adopted from actual cases in intelligence files of the military intelligence services. Stresses following points: Anyone might be engaged in subversive espionage; members of armed forces are prime espionage targets; communists find ways to

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exploit the smallest slip; enemy's approach is often deceptively casual; personal weaknesses can be helpful to the enemy; information the enemy seeks is not necessarily classified; our best defense is to be alert; and when the enemy is detected tell the proper authorities.

(10) TF-5710 "SO LITTLE TIME" (27 Min. Color 1964 Comm.)

Reenacts a security violation incident at an aircraft plant to demonstrate importance of a sound security program in industry and government. Points out the personal responsibility of each individual whose duties require him to handle classified data. Illustrates direct bearing of security on lead time.

(11) SFP 1302 "THE LAST DAY" (25 Min. B&W 1963 Comm.)

As host, Jack Webb sets the pace for this action packed story about a typical American town, a pretty school teacher, and a saboteur. The story races to a surprise climax when the real identity of the characters and precise locale of the town are revealed. The story is more than just another spy thriller as it reveals the true nature of what we are up against in the area of the trained espionage agent. The film is based on true experiences that led to the arrest of the Soviet spy, Colonel Rudolph Abel.

(12) OSD 6-63 "THE SECRET UNDERWORLD" (25 Min. B&W 1963 DOD, PE)

The results of the 1961 public spy trials in England. Reveals the organization, techniques and devices communists used to glean information from persons concerned with defense matters.

(13) TF 30-2562 "RESIST" (29 Min. B&W 1959)

Designed to teach military personnel methods used by enemy to indoctrinate POW's. Ways in which the captured soldier can resist communist collaboration.

(14) TF 30-1523 "SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION" (17 Min. B&W 1949 D/A)  
TF 1-4601

Covers handling of classified material in accordance with security regulations and stresses necessity of military and civilian personnel, keeping eyes open and mouth shut.

(15) AIF 1 "DEFENSE AGAINST ENEMY PROPAGANDA" (29 Min. B&W 1957 D/A)  
TF1-5193

Defines enemy propaganda, enunciates its aims, and shows how it is used to influence thought and action. It points out the aims pattern of enemy propaganda in America and occupied countries, Soviet occupied areas and Korea--means of combating it.

(16) SFP 118 "SECURITY MAN (Industrial Security)" (17 Min. B&W 1961 DOD)  
MF 30-9663  
DOD IS-5

A government security man visits an industrial facility and points up some of the problems encountered. Based on actual case histories, it shows how loyal Americans compromise security thru ignorance and carelessness.

(17) TF 5711 "DOCUMENT 449" (22 Min. B&W 1960. NATO).

This is about NATO and the security aspects of a highly classified document. Film shows what happens when Doc 449 is reproduced and distributed to need-to-know users. The ensuing security violations demonstrate the various ways that sensitive information can be unwittingly divulged.

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- (18) MF 30-9257 MA 9545B "THE DAILY ENEMY" (14 Min. Color 1960 DOD)  
DOD IS-4 TF 5707

Reveals how conscientious and loyal Americans in defense projects can unwittingly divulge information to enemy agents. Depicts the daily activities of a high level executive, a secretary and a shop mechanic, and reveals how careless talk and improper disposal of classified material can jeopardize national security.

- (19) MA 9545 "THE HOLLOW COIN" (30 Min. B&W 1960 DOD)  
TF 5708  
MF 30-9259  
DOD IS-3

A documentary concerning events leading up to, during, and following the trial of convicted Soviet espionage agent Col. Rudolf Abel. The film furnishes proof of the continuing espionage activity against the United States.

- (20) MF 30-9209 "SECURITY RISK" (60 Min. B&W 1960 Comm.)

TV drama on role of counterintelligence Corps in providing protection against espionage and subversion in matters of national security.

- (21) TF 1-5316 "SECURITY SUBVERSION" (21 Min. B&W 1959 RCAF)

How to recognize the Communist party line is demonstrated through the experience of a Canadian airman who is taken in by a pretty girl and her communist spy father.

- (22) DOD IS-2 "MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY" (9 Min. Color 1959 DOD)  
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Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, explains the importance of security in defense work to scientific and engineering personnel involved.

- (23) MA-8892 "TRANSMISSION SECURITY" (30 Min. B&W 1958)  
TF 30-2555

This film explains the meaning and increasing importance of transmission security with the intent to develop security consciousness at all levels in the military communications chain. A series of situations are portrayed to illustrate how security can easily be violated, and how it can be maintained. The responsibilities of all persons concerned with communications, from writer to recipient are outlined.

- (24) TF 30-3342 "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY--PART I" (23 Min. B&W 1964)

How intelligence corps agents conduct preliminary phase of survey of military installations at request of Commanding Officer. Planning, logistical preparation, initial checks, and tour of installation to assess security.

- (25) TF 30-3343 "COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SURVEY--PART II" (27 Min. B&W 1964)

How intelligence corps agents conduct detailed inspection of installation to assess physical, personnel, and information security. Recommendation to Commanders for tighter security.

- (26) SFP 476 "FORBIDDEN AREA" (75 Min. B&W 1957 Comm.)

Full length feature film version of Pat Frank's novel about a communist saboteur who is responsible for the inflight explosion of several AF bombers. Reveals background training of Soviet agents in a suspense packed climax as saboteur is finally apprehended. Charlton Heston stars.

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- (27) SFP 453 "SECURITY AND YOU" (16 Min. Color 1957)  
MF 11-8842

Col. IMRIE, Chaplain, USA, emphasizes security, integrity, loyalty, trustworthiness and similar attributes of character paramount to national defense.

- (28) TF 5859 "SECURITY, YOUR PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY" (16 Min. B&W 1957 D/N)  
MN 8242

Reveals that civilian and military personnel who handle classified information can unwittingly divulge military secrets to enemy agents. Emphasizes the personal responsibility of each individual in every situation involving handling classified information and material.

- (29) OSD IS-1 "THE CASE OF COMRADE T" (23 Min. Color & B&W 1956 DOD, PE, TV, TH, PS)  
SFP 483  
MF 30-8706

Experiences of a communist agent in several industrial plants. Stresses an awareness of security by individual worker whose alertness had defeated the agent's efforts to sabotage plant. Reveals techniques employed by hostile agents to steal and photograph classified material.

- (30) SFP 356 "THE MAN BEHIND THE BADGE" (24 Min. B&W 1954 Comm. PE)

Shows how an alert security patrolman and an effective security system foiled the plans of saboteurs to wreck a B-47 mission.

- (31) TF 1-4862 "LOW TREASON" (26 Min. B&W 1953)

Film on common security violations that could result in compromise of classified information.

- (32) MF 19-8027 "SECURITY CONTROL - YOU NEVER CAN TELL" (40 Min. B&W 1952)  
MN 6947  
TF 1-4685

Emphasizes awareness of security program responsibilities on and off the job--carelessness of well intentioned employees--proper handling of classified information. (adapted to industrial security).

- (33) AFIF-150 "THE MIDDLE EAST" (20 Min. B&W 1965)

Covers Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, Muscat and Aden. Social, religious, cultural, economic and political aspects are illustrated, as are the problems and promises of this turbulent land. Points out contrasts found in the Middle East--the ancient and the modern, the fertile and barren, the Arab and Jew. An essential briefing media for personnel traveling or performing duty in the areas.

- (34) SFP 1299 "DOLLARS AND SENSE POCKETBOOK MORALITY" (19 Min. Color 1965)

One of our major security dangers is the money problem. When a man is involved in financial trouble over his head he becomes vulnerable to entrapment by seemingly "friendly" foreign agents. For this reason this film is strongly recommended for security education to show how money problems affect security.

- (35) TF 5538 "UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE - Personal Responsibility" (16 Min. B&W 1963 AF)

Dramatizes the financial responsibility of an Air Force sergeant living beyond his budget. From the ~~legend of Dr. Dred~~ he learns about the military man's obligations to pay his just debts. Heeding sound advice, the sergeant takes steps to meet his responsibilities and protect his reputation.

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- (36) FM-61-9912 "IT'S YOUR MONEY" (27 Min. B&W 1963)

Pitfalls leading to indebtedness, guidelines to avoid high cost of credit buying, and requirements for good personal financial management.

- (37) AFIF 92 "YOUR LEGAL STATUS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY" (48 Min. B&W 1959)

Outlines the legal status of American servicemen and their dependents in West Germany. Various everyday situations, including a hit and run accident, are dramatized to point out the legal implications that could occur. Chet Huntley narrates this film.

- (38) AFIF 125 "SOUTH OF THE SAHARA" (20 Min. B&W 1963 DOD)

This film reports on that part of Africa, excluding the Union of South Africa, which lies south of the Sahara desert. Shows how newly independent nations emerge from an obscure, primitive past as they try to find a place in today's world. Focuses on the contrasting situation in Congo and Nigeria. Also explores Free World versus Communist interests in the future of this undeveloped continent.

- (39) TF 30-1565 "MILITARY CENSORSHIP" (20 Min. B&W 1949)

Stresses the need for censorship in time of war-case histories-influence of strict censorship upon successful outcome of mission.

- (40) TF 30-2972 "STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL (SIS) AREA FILMS STUDIES NO. 1- USSR" (31 Min. B&W 1960)

History of U.S.S.R. from 1917 to present; progress under present regime-political, military, technological and economic.

- (41) TF 30-2993 "SIS AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 3 - COMMUNIST RULED COUNTRIES OF EAST CENTRAL EUROPE" (29 Min. B&W 1961)

A study of the satellite nations. Their individual charters, status, progress, and dilemmas. Political significance to the U.S.S.R. and the West.

- (42) TF 30-2990 "SIS AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 4 - AFRICA" (28 Min. B&W 1960)

Strategic potential of Africa. The trend towards self-government and economic progress. The challenge of "Pan-Africanism" to the free world.

- (43) TF 30-2988 "SIS AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 5 - MIDDLE EAST" (27 Min. B&W 1962)

Strategic importance and potential of the Middle East. Changes and problems wrought by modernization since World War I. Significance of area to the U.S.

- (44) TF 30-2992 "SIS AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 6 - SOUTHEAST ASIA" (29 Min. B&W 1962)

An appraisal of the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Indo-China, Malaya, Singapore and Thailand. Relation to world power struggle.

- (45) TF 30-2989 "SIS AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 7 - SOUTH ASIA" (30 Min. B&W 1961)

Economic, socio-religious, and political problems of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Tibet, Ceylon, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.

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- (46) TF 54361 "DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL AREA FILM STUDIES NO. 9 - LATIN AMERICA" (30 Min. B&W 1964 D/A)

Studies the geographical, sociological, economical, and political aspects of South American countries. Points out the fast growth in population, wide mixture of races and languages, and the contrast between modern city and primitive rural life. Also cites medical and educational problems, subversive activities, and civic action programs.

- (47) TF 30-1569 "LOCK SECURITY (U)" (14 Min. B&W 1949)

Film is classified CONFIDENTIAL.

- (48) AFIF 149 "WHY VIETNAM - FACT SHEET" (32 Min. B&W 1965 PE)  
DOD FS-25

Opens with President Johnson's address on 28 July 1965. He elaborates the basic points set forth. Scenes show struggle in Vietnam and U. S. position. Sec. of State Dean Rusk explains the numerous attempts to bring about a cease fire. Sec. of Def. Robert S. McNamara gives assurance that U. S. seeks no wider war. The film makes these basic points: U. S. Forces are in Vietnam to fulfill pledge of assistance against communist aggression; we will not surrender nor retreat; that appeasement is invitation to further aggression and we are always ready to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

- (49) AFIF-133 "RED CHINA" (21 Min. B&W 1965 DOD, PE, TV)

Excellent and timely up-dated treatise on China under Communist regime. Covers impact of Red China on world of today and future. Reviews cultural and religious background, industry, economics, education, and world position as a new atomic power. Narrated by Lowell Thomas.

- (50) AFIF 137 "AMERICA'S CRITICS ABROAD" (20 Min. B&W 1965 DOD PE)

Explains how to counter adverse criticism of U. S. when abroad and how to reply to questions about American habits, attitudes, and policies. Presents several do's and don'ts on becoming involved in arguments or discussions. Also points out the servicemen's responsibility to be accurately informed when representing the position of the U. S. Government.

- (51) AFIF 127 "THE CON MEN" (29 Min. B&W 1964 DOD)

Techniques used by Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo and the political strategems of today's dictators promises of prosperity is compared to the false promises of the fast talking swindler who pushes worthless products. In flashbacks the notorious dictators resemble the cure-all peddler making his sales pitch. The speeches and techniques are similar to the deceptive practices of today's dictators who sell communism, the false pledge of a better world under dictatorship--one of the consequences that befall a nation when personal freedom is abolished. Actors are Tom Ewell, Jim Bachus, Howard Silva and Alvy Moore.

- (52) SFP 1186 "CUBAN CRISIS" (14 Min. B&W 1963)

Documents the Cuban crisis of 1962 in which U. S. vigilance and military power exposes and arrests Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. Traces rapid chain of events triggered by aerial survey and depicts the swift mobilization of U. S. forces and arms quarantine of Cuba.

- (53) AFIF 123 "THE THIRD CHALLENGE TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE" (45 Min. Color 1963)  
PE, TV, TH, PS, FS, DOD

In meeting threat of communist nuclear and large-scale conventional war with powerful deterrent strength, the free world now faces a third challenge. Labeled "unconventional warfare" and used by communists whenever appropriate,

this new technique comes in such forms as revolutions, insurgency, wars of liberation, subversion, etc. This film deals with that third challenge and depicts U. S. capability to fight this type of war in the far flung reaches of the globe.

(54) AFIF 116 "COMMUNIST TARGET - YOUTH" (35 Min. B&W 1962 PE, TV)

Illustrates communist techniques to gain control over youth world-wide. View of schools behind Iron Curtain reveals manner in which young minds are trained. Discusses methods of extending communist influence in free world: exploitation of education systems, degradation of law and justice, infiltration of legitimate organizations, soviet sponsored youth rallies and loss of hope for freedom.

(55) TF 5738 "COUNTERINSURGENCY" (21 Min. B&W 1962 D/A)  
MF 7-9744

What it is, its traced history, nature and scope of insurgency since 1945. Portrays current role of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in foreign countries. Cites importance of U. S. counterinsurgency policy to our national security.

(56) AFIF 119 "ROAD TO THE WALL" (33 Min. B&W 1962 DOD, PE)

Narrated by James Cagney, this documentary traces the rise of communism from the time of Karl Marx to present. Mr. Cagney takes viewer back through time to witness the Russian Revolution and other violence that have accompanied communist growth and expansion behind the Iron Curtain, and in China and Cuba.

(57) SFP 1170 "COMMUNIST POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION TECHNIQUES" (Parts I & II, Total 52 Min. B&W 1962)

This film is classified CONFIDENTIAL. As a training experiment, an Air Force bombardier volunteers to become a "prisoner of war" to learn the communists' technique of interrogation and indoctrination.

(58) AFIF 107 "COMMUNIST EUROPE" (18 Min. B&W 1961 DOD, PE, TV, PS)

Studies communist countries of Europe - Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and East Germany. Points out geographical, political, social and economic differences of these Soviet satellites except Yugoslavia whose unique status within the Communist bloc is explained.

(59) AFIF 108 "THE ANATOMY OF AGGRESSION" (27 Min. B&W 1961 PE, PS)

This film documentary traces the world-wide communist aggression since WW II and actions by freedom loving people to counteract this growth. Concludes with the late Pres. Kennedy stating how the U. S. and the Free World will surmount communist aggression, so that freedom can prevail and peace endure.

(60) TF 1-5391a "DYNAMICS OF MORAL LEADERSHIP-COMMUNISM" (18 Min. Color 1961 PE)

Can power and peace go together? LTGEN Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and former Inspector General, USAF, discusses this question with some thought-provoking facts about the rising power of communism; factors which contribute towards its success and our best means of arresting its growth.

(61) AFIF 98 "THE CHALLENGE OF IDEAS" (31 Min. B&W 1961 PE, TV)

This film depicts the ideological struggle confronting America and the Free World today, a struggle fought not on the battlefield but through the words of diplomats, gestures of friendship, cultural demonstrations, foreign aid programs and military power. It describes the everyday war of ideas of communism vs. democracy. Host narrator is the late Edward R. Murrow, noted commentator.

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- (62) AFIF 105 " A STUDY OF THE USSR" (22 Min. B&W 1960 PE-Public Showings restricted to zone of interior)

Reviews the Soviet Union's political history geographical expansion, natural resources, and political philosophy. Also describes Soviet educational, scientific, economic, and industrial development.

- (63) WA 11 " SOUTHEAST ASIA AND INDIA TODAY" (22 Min. B&W 1960 DOD, PE, TV)

Mr. Ernest K. Lindley discusses American foreign policy in this heavily populated and important area. Film portrays the struggle of these peoples for a better way of life and for maintenance of a place in the Free World against the surge of communism.

- (64) WA 8 " COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA" (42 Min. B&W 1958 DOD)

Mr. George V. Allen, former Director of the U. S. Information Agency, discusses the extensive Soviet propaganda program and answers related questions posed by officers attending the National War College.

- (65) SFP 801a " THE DIALECTION OF COMMUNISM" (30 Min. B&W 1958 Comm.)

Explains the theory behind communism and points out how and why the communist mind distorts and accepts truths based upon the Marxist "system" of thought rather than on reality.

- (66) SFP 801b " COMMUNIST MATERIALISM" (30 Min. B&W 1958 Comm.)

Discusses the communist creed, "nothing exists but matter, and everything is explained on a material basis".

- (67) SFP 801c " COMMUNIST HISTORY" (30 Min. B&W 1958 Comm.)

Explains the communist concept of history as the result of economic factors alone.

- (68) SFP 801d " COMMUNIST SOCIETY" (30 Min. B&W 1958 Comm.)

Shows how the communist builds his program of society and the future of human race upon class struggle leading to a classless society.

- (69) WA " EXCERPTS WORLD AFFAIRS" (20 Min. B&W 1957 DOD, PE, TV, TH)

Excerpts from the first five films of the "World Affairs" series are combined to provide a better understanding of complex world situations that affect our security.

- (70) AFIF 76 " COMMUNIST BLUEPRINT FOR CONQUEST" (33 Min. B&W 1956 PE, TV, TA, PS)

Mr. Borjes H. Klosson, Dept of State, explains the methods and techniques used by the Communist Party to seize power in a country.

- (71) AFIF 75 " THE COMMUNIST WEAPON OF ALLURE" (34 Min. B&W 1956 PE, TV, TH, PS)

Dr. Warren G. Walsh, professor of Russian History, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, explains methods Communists use to enslave the minds of men.

- (72) AFIF 44 " HOW TO GET ALONG IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY" (16 Min. B&W 1955)

Provides valuable information for Americans abroad, especially service personnel stationed in foreign lands, in countering Communist efforts to discredit America.

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(73) AFIF 21 "FACE TO FACE WITH COMMUNISM" (26 Min. B&W 1951 DOD)

American citizens simulate a communist seizure of their community to illustrate what could happen in the U.S.A.

(74) AFIF 5 "COMMUNISM" (32 Min. B&W 1950 PE, TV, PS)

Traces communist history from its beginning and shows how communists propagate world-wide revolution. Also describes communist activities in America.

## 7. ARTICLES, PAMPHLETS AND REPORTS

### a. Publications of House Committee on Un-American Activities

"Pictorial Summary of Communism in Action"

"Communist Controls on Religious Activity"

"Communist Legal Subversion, The Role of the Communist Lawyer"

"Communist Methods of Infiltration"

"Facts on Communism" - Vol I - "The Communist Ideology"

Vol II - "The Soviet Union - Lenin to Khrushchev"

"International Communism - The Communist Mind"

"International Communism - Revolt in the Satellites"

"One Hundred Things You Should Know About Communism"

"Twelfth Report on Un-American Activities in California"

"Guide to Subversive Organizations & Publications (House Doc No. 398)"

"Security Practices in the National Security Agency" (Defection of Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin, Aug 13, 1962)

### b. Senate Committee on Judiciary Affairs Publications

"The Soviet Empire - A Study in Discrimination & Abuse of Power"

"The Techniques of Soviet Propaganda"

"The Wennerstroem Spy Case - How It Touched the U. S. and NATO"

"Wordsmanship-Semantics as a Communist Weapon"

"Communist Threat to the U. S. Through the Caribbean"

"Communist Workers Parties Manifesto - Adopted November-December 1960"

"Communist Anti-American Riots"

"Murder International, Inc. - Murder and Kidnaping as an Instrument of Soviet Policy"

"The Pugwash Conferences"

### c. Articles and Speeches by J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation

"Expose of Soviet Espionage" **Declassified / Downgrade to .....**

"America--Soviet Espionage" **EO 12858**

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"Why Reds Make Friends with Businessmen"

"The U. S. Businessman Faces the Soviet Spy"

"Deadly Duel"

"Internal Security"

"Time for Decision"

"Keys to Freedom"

"Counterintelligence Activities" (Reprint of FBI Annual Report FY-65)

d. Dept. of Health Education & Welfare (FDA)

"First Facts About Drugs"

"FDA Student Reference Sheet - Habit Forming Drugs" (SR-2)

"FDA Student Reference Sheet - Drug Side Effects" (SR-4)

"FDA Student Reference Sheet - Hallucinogenic Drugs" (SR-14)

e. Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)

"Your Duty" - Booklet on Federal laws relating to sabotage, espionage, security regulations, etc.

f. Dept. of Navy Publications

"Serving Your Country Overseas" - NAVPERS-15211

"Standards of Conduct for Military & Civilian Personnel" - SECNAVINST 5370.2C

"Personnel Reliability Manual" - NAVMED P-5090

g. U. S. Information Agency

"A Primer on Communism"

h. Committee on Foreign Affairs (U. S. Congress)

"Strategy and Tactics of World Communism"

i. Miscellaneous Material and Sources - Effective and timely security oriented films, articles, bulletins or leaflets are commercially produced, published and available from various other non-Government sources. Commands may deal directly with such sources in determining the availability and validity of such media for their particular security education programs. As in the case of all commercially motivated and produced security training aids, it must be emphasized at the offset that the public display, promulgation or showing of such commercially sponsored media, should not in any manner be construed as an endorsement of the company or its products, either by the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy or the local Command. A sampling from the vast array of available material and sources is listed herein:

(1) FILMS

(a) "TARGET YOU!" (30 Min. Color 1964 Comm.)

This film, narrated by Ronald Reagan, describes the communist

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threat, the importance of personal and physical security to our national security, and dramatically portrays the lead time lost through espionage. Note: Film is available on loan basis from Martin Co., P.O. Box 179, Denver, Colo., or may be purchased for \$135.00 from F. K. Rocket Prod., 6063 Sunset Blvd., Hollywood, Calif.

"IN YOUR HANDS" (15 Min. Color Comm 1964)

This excellent film covers a series of related individual leaks, pieced together to show how foreign intelligence capitalizes on our thoughtlessness, deeds, and words. Produced by Western Electric and available on a free loan basis.

"YOU'VE GOT A SECRET" (13 Min. Color)

A filmstrip dealing with the vital subject of security regulations in defense plants. Available from Ford Instrument Company, Division of Sperry Rand Corp., 31-10 Thomson Ave., Long Island City 1, N. Y. Free Loan.

"GUARDIANS OF INDUSTRY" (20 Min. B&W)

Deals with the field of Industrial Security prepared by Camden-Philadelphia, Camden Chapter. Available from National Headquarters, American Society for Industrial Security, Washington, D. C.

"WHEREVER YOU GO" (12 Min. Color)

Covers the hazards of hand carrying of classified information and how employees are subjected to espionage agents while in a travel status. Available on loan from Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, N.M.

The following four feature-length films were produced by Armstrong Cork Co., for their television programs. They may be borrowed for showing by contacting C. O. Hess, Public Information Department, Armstrong Cork Co., Lancaster, PA.:

"THE SPY NEXT DOOR"

60 MIN.

"SECURITY RISK"

"SECRET DOCUMENT X256"

"INVITATION TO TREASON"

(2) ARTICLES

(a) Wall Street Journal excerpts

"Business Spy" - March 3rd, 1959, page 6

"Electronic Advances Aid Snoopers Using Eavesdropping Devices"  
(by William M. Carley)

"The Secret Stealers" - October 5, 1962, page 1

(b) "Are They Listening In on You" - State of the art of electronic snooping by Popular Science Monthly, 1965

(c) "How Russia Stole America's Atomic Secrets" By Bob Considine, Hearst Headline Service, New York, N.Y. Also available through Mitre Corporation, Bedford, Mass.

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- (d) "Teaching About Communism and Democracy - Case Studies" Reprinted for the 7th Annual National Military, Industrial and Educational Conference by the Institute for American Strategy - 140 S. Dearborn St., Chicago 3, Illinois
- (e) "Two Reports on Subversion" - by Francis E. Walter, Philadelphia Inquirer or available on request from Dow Chemical Co., Rocky Flats Div., Golden, Colorado
- (f) "The Mosler Security Letter" - Published in the interest of national security by Gov't Sales Div., Mosler Safe Co., 2461 Wisconsin Ave., N. W., Washington, D. C.
- (g) "Spies Invade Big Business" - by James Daniel in Evening and Sunday Bulletin, Dec 31, 1961 (Reader's Digest Condensation)
- (h) "Competitive Intelligence" - Information, Espionage, and Decision Making" - Harvard University, Graduate School of Administration (1959)
- (i) "Foreign Countries Stealing U. S. Products Cause Loss of Revenue," From the Corning Leader, July 12, 1962
- (j) "Myths and Truths" (Article on the ideological war) by Coast Federal Savings and Loan, 855 S. Hill St., Los Angeles, Calif (1961)
- (k) "Selling Security" by Robt. L. Loomis in Industrial Security, Volume 4, No. 1, page 12, January 1959
- (l) "The Industrial Employee Faces the Soviet Spy" by Leonard P. Bienvenu, June issue of American Society for Industrial Security, 1965
- (m) "What Makes A Spy" - by Allen W. Dulles, Reprint from "This Week Magazine" copyright 1963 by United Newspapers Magazine Corporation
- (n) "We Can't Lick Communism Without Understanding It" - by Allen W. Dulles, Reprint from December 1960 issue of Reader's Digest
- (o) "The Meaning of Freedom" - by A. M. Rosenthal (former N. Y. Times Warsaw Correspondent) A reprint from Jan 24, 1960 issue of the New York Times Magazine, copyright 1960

(3) BOOKS - The following books, listed by author and title, have been selected as representative of numerous novels and documentaries dealing with espionage, counterintelligence and of possible value in security education:


Alcorn--No Bugles for Spies  
 Almond--The Appeals of Communism  
 Anti-Defamation League--The Profile of Communism  
 Army Times Editors--The Tangled Web  
 Barmine--One Who Survived  
 Bazna--I Was Cicero  
 Bentley--Out of Bondage  
 Bialoguski--The Case of Colonel Petrov  
 Borkenau--European Communism  
 Bouscaren--Soviet Foreign Policy, A Pattern of Persistence  
 Budenz--The Techniques of Communism

Bullock--M.I. 5  
 Calomiris--Red Masquerade  
 Chambers--Witness  
 Colvin--Master Spy  
 Crankshaw--Russia without Stalin  
 Crossman--The God That Failed  
 Dallin--The New Soviet Empire  
 Dallin--Soviet Espionage  
 Daniels--The Nature of Communism  
 DeKoster--Vocabulary of Communism  
 Deriabin--The Secret World  
 De Toledane--Seeds of Treason  
 Dijilas--The New Class

Donovan--Strangers on a Bridge  
 Draper--American Communism and Soviet Russia  
 Draper--The Roots of American Communism  
 Dulles--The Craft of Intelligence  
 Evans--Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities  
 Farago--Burn after Reading  
 Fast--The Naked God  
 Fischer--Why They Behave Like Russians  
 Foote--Handbook for Spies  
 Gitlow--The Whole of Their Lives  
 Glazer--The Social Basis of American Communism  
 Granovsky--I Was an NKVD Agent  
 Guevara--Guerrilla Warfare  
 Heare--The Missing Macleans  
 Hoover--Masters of Deceit  
 Hoover--A Study of Communism  
 Howe--The American Communist Party, A Critical History  
 Hunt--A Guide to Communist Jargon  
 Hunter--Brainwashing from Pavlov to Powers  
 Hyde--The Quiet Canadian  
 Hyde--Room 3603  
 Huss and Carpozi--Red Spies in the U.N.  
 Iverson--The Communists in the Schools  
 Johnson--An Instance of Treason  
 Kasenkina--Leap to Freedom  
 Kintner--The Front Is Everywhere  
 Klein--The Counterfeit Traitor  
 Koestler--The Invisible Writing  
 Kravchenko--I Chose Freedom  
 Krivitsky--I Was Stalin's Agent  
 Kurzman--Subversion of the Innocents  
 LeCarre--The Spy Who Came in from the Cold  
 Lewis--Red Pawn  
 Liu--Out of Red China  
 Meyer--The Moulding of Communists  
 Miller--I Was a Spy  
 Monat and Dille--Spy in the U.S.  
 Montagu--The Man Who Never Was  
 Morros--My Ten Years as a Counterspy  
 Newman--Epics of Espionage  
 Ottenberg--The Federal Investigators  
 Overstreet--The War Called Peace  
 Overstreet--What We Must Know about Communism  
 Petrov--Empire of Fear  
 Philbrick--I Led Three Lives  
 Pilat--The Atom Spies  
 Posony--Lenin, the Compulsive Revolutionary  
 Reader's Digest--Secrets and Spies  
 Report of the Royal Commission, Canada, June 27, 1946  
 Rogge--Why Men Confess  
 Rossi--A Communist Party in Action  
 Schwartz--The Red Phoenix  
 Seth--Espionage  
 Shub--Lenin, A Biography

Strausz & Hupe--Protracted Conflict  
 Valertiane & Bohannan--Counter Guerrilla Operation, The Phillippine Experience  
 Seton-Watson--From Lenin to Khrushchev  
 West--The Meaning of Treason  
 West--The New Meaning of Treason  
 Whitehead--The FBI Story  
 Wighton--The World's Greatest Spies  
 Wynn--The Penkovsky Papers

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COUNTRY”

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