O. N. I. - 22.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Office of Naval Intelligence

NOTES ON ESPIONAGE, COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

AND

PASSPORT CONTROL.

O.N.I. 22.

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE)

1935

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Foreword.

There are many works on Intelligence and Secret Service that simply state that agents were uncovered, or that incriminating evidence was discovered, without giving any hint as to how this is done, where to look, or what to look for. The following notes have been taken from many sources, and may be added to and amplified as more material becomes available.

These notes should be of value to those untrained in intelligence work; enable those engaged in espionage to avoid the errors of others and escape the traps laid for them; and also serve to aid those engaged in counter-espionage to uncover and apprehend enemy agents.

A bibliography of works on intelligence and secret service is appended, and is recommended as a field of further study that should be of value to anyone who contemplates either espionage or counter-espionage work.

Others who have written notes or articles on this subject, and who recognize their paragraphs, will understand that no plagarism is intended in this compilation, which was prepared only to bring into a compact form such pertinent information as has been found at this writing.

Constructive comments and concrete recommendations for improvement of, and pertinent additions to, this pamphlet are desired.

In connection with the general system herein described and recommended, it must be remembered that the success of any organization is principally a question of the ability and application of the persons employed, and is not especially due to the merits of the system. The system of organization is only a means of coordination for concerted action. This is particularly true of intelligence work in the field where the individuals are so very dependent upon their own efforts and resourcefulness for success.

The assistance of personnel of the Passport and Visa Divisions of the Department of State; the Bureau of Immigration of the Department of Labor; the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department; the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department;

Foreword (Continued).

the Division of Investigation of the Department of Justice; and the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, and the Bureau of Navigation of the Department of Commerce, has been fully given in the compilation of these notes, and is gratefully acknowledgod.

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CHAPTER ONE

Functions of Various Fields of Intelligence.

101. Success in penetrating the plans, preparations and intentions of an enemy, or potential enemy, gives an adversary such a great initial advantage that all nations now seem to engage in strong efforts to obtain all information possible. It is an axiom of intelligence services that an increase in the activities of any government in their efforts to gather information is one of the first, and quite a sure sign of hostile intentions. At the same time that governments endeavor to obtain information of another, they take careful steps to guard their own government from having its plans and information discovered.

102. Both of these activities are functions of the intelligence service. The gaining of information, when carried on secretly, falls under the general head of Espionage; the denying of such information by enemy agents (called "confidantes" in some services) is the field of Counter-espionage.

103. (a) Espionage seeks information concerning enemy forces, organization, plans, needs and powers in the military, naval, political and economic fields.

(b) Counter-espionage seeks to uncover and unmask enemy activities, to locate and neutralize the foreign agents, and to prevent espionage, sabotage, propaganda, treason and sedition.

(c) The information sought by espionage is sometimes called "positive" or "offensive" intelligence, while that sought by counter-espionage is called "negative" or "defensive" intelligence.

104. The intelligence service of a navy is its barometer. In both peace and war it reveals approaching storms as well as probable areas of fair or foul weather. It welds into a usable whole the scraps of information received from many sources; some proved and trusted, some of doubtful accuracy. It weighs such information, and collects the resulting intelligence for future use or immediate dissemination.

105. By reason of the immense distances and tremendous forces involved in a modern war, an intelligence service must cover the whole world in war. A piece of information gathered by a naval or

military attache', a State Department official or consular agent, an agent in a neutral port, by the interception of the censor, or by a spy in the enemy territory, may in itself be only an uninteresting scrap; but placed in its proper place in the huge "mosaic" of world news, together with hundreds of other bits, it helps to form the complete picture by which the Intelligence Service gives the responsible commanders the situation as it exists; and keeps them informed of changes as they occur.

106. In time of peace sources of information are much more available and open. Such sources are constantly combed for information, and voluminous compilations are made. Much technical information, which the various powers would keep secret, is gathered by naval, military, diplomatic and commercial attaches by personal observation, from the press, by watching legislative bodies, and by any other legitimate available means. Furthermore, communication is easy and relatively secure. There is no obvious censorship, and travel is practically unrestricted and unhampered. Persons and their baggage are theoretically free from seizure and search, except, of course, regular customs examinations and seizures for which due considerations and preparations must be made when carrying secret documents, or other material, in some manner at all times so that a customs examination, either perfunctory or searching, may not disclose the information desired to be hidden.

107. In time of war this easy state of affairs changes drastically. When hostilities commence many of the sources of information dry up and information of the enemy becomes exceedingly difficult to obtain; and this is exactly at the time when information is most vitally needed to furnish the "combat intelligence" required by the commanders in the field.

108. The complexities of a modern war and the absolute necessity for information make imperative the establishment of an efficient foreign intelligence system before the outbreak of hostilities.

109. After the commencement of hostilities, combat intelligence may be gained: -

I. By employment of spies.

II. By questioning prisoners and deserters.

III. From information from merchant ship personnel and travelers.

IV. From travel agencies and tourist bureaus, particularly in neutral countries. (Excellent field for planting espionage agents).

V. From information in enemy and neutral press.

VI. From attaches and agents in neutral countries.

VII. From the censorship organization's interception and study of mail, telephone, telegraph, cable and radio communications.

VIII. By interception and capture of enemy scouts, agents, spies and couriers.

IX. From naval district intelligence sources.

X. By radio interception and decoding of enemy radio messages, and use of directional radio equipment.

XI. By air, surface and subsurface reconnaisance.

XII. By screening and linking vessels.

XIII. From information supplied to the flagship by the forces engaged in various fields and phases of an action, before, during and after the main encounter and engagement.

110. The evaluation of information coming in to a flagship simultaneously from many sources in the midst of a fleet action is a heavy task. From this the changing panorama of the field of action must be kept before the commander at all times. The Battle of Jutland furnishes examples of the failure of this feature of intelligence work in all the phases of the action when good contacts

were made before and during the action, and several during the night when the Germans were retreating toward Horn Reef Channel.

111. The importance of information regarding the strength and initial disposition of the enemy forces, his operations, the condition of his bases and his service of supply is probably greatest during the first few weeks of a war. Whatever is lacking in these fields at the outbreak of war must be supplied by spies.

112. An efficient foreign secret service can no more be built up at a moment's notice than can a modern battleship, particularly after war has closed up all regular channels of communication. The speedy acquisition and transmission of information is so surrounded with difficulties that there is little chance for an efficient intelligence service unless the lines are laid well in advance. This is well and carefully done regularly by most foreign governments, of which there are many records in O.N.I., and which are well exposed by various writers in works published since the world war. These works, because of the necessity for popular appeal, deal almost entirely with the romantic side of secret service, some are studied propaganda efforts, and all treat exclusively of the successes of catching spies. They are of value because from them can be culled the modus operandi of apprehending espionage agents. They are tales of agents who finally failed to evade detection. Unfortunately we do not get the stories of the successful agents who succeeded in keeping themselves under cover. No doubt they are still under cover, and still may be active.

113. The methods of secret service are elemental. There is no great intricacy of technique. Success may be said to depend upon the careful laying of a ground work long before war breaks out. This requires the careful selection and training of executives, and the selection, and if possible the "planting" of a nucleus of trusted agents. Actual secret work will usually resolve itself into careful, tedious routine, and an ability to sense and avoid traps, rather than the heroics of romantic books and moving pictures.

114. It is also axiomatic that espionage must have no visible and detectable connection with the government it serves. Espionage agents are habitually repudiated by their own governments in order to preserve their "friendly" (?) relations.

CHAPTER TWO.

OBJECTIVES OF ESPIONAGE.

201. (a) Information is indispensable in war because commanders and leaders must be apprised of enemy plans and operations in order to avoid being surprised by unexpected developments. Espionage is one of the means of obtaining the necessary information.

(b) The espionage divides itself into two fields:

I. Strictly military(naval) information of the combatant forces, their operations and plans; and

II. Information on technical, industrial, economic and political (diplomatic) matters, from which enemy plans may be deduced, and the internal conditions and morale of the enemy may be learned.

(c) These two fields of inquiry differ as to the matters investigated, and hence the method of approach, and the kind of personnel employed.

202. The requirements of a naval secret service differ greatly from those of military operations ashore, as it is impossible to maintain espionage traffic between opposing fleets. A military spy may operate close (or fairly close) behind the enemy lines, or even frequent the enemy front, and get reports through to his own headquarters with comparatively little difficulty. Such close observation is out of the question at sea. Information on strength present, dispositions, and movements of enemy fleets must be secured principally by scouting in the theatre of operations. But such information can be greatly augmented, strengthened and supplemented by information from spies in enemy ports and bases, by agents on ships travelling the trade routes (especially routes frequented by enemy vessels), and by agents in neutral information centers. From such information the plans

of an enemy may often be learned definitely, or may be deduced.

203. Gathering information is but one phase of secret service, and the easiest. Every agent must have a full appreciation of the three essential principles of espionage: -

I. To get the desired information.

II. To transmit it so that it will reach the proper headquarters, (O.N.I. for example), in time to be of use.

III. To leave the enemy feeling that his security has not been compromised.

204. An amateur spy, excited by the ease with which he has secured some desired information, will often, in his false enthusiasm, betray both himself and others by hurried and careless efforts at transmission. The trained and indoctrinated agent, grimly aware that his greatest danger is yet ahead, will observe every precaution in communicating his information to his superiors.

205. Both Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, the British Commander at the Battle of the Falkland Islands, and Admiral von Spee, were surprised at the other's presence there. Although the departure of the battle cruisers "Invincible" and "Inflexible", their objective and almost their itinerary, was published in the neutral press, von Spee had not heard of it, while Sturdee thought the German squadron was at Valparaiso. Had this campaign taken place a little later in the war, when the agents of the two countries were working more efficiently, and when they realized how vital such known movements were, this contact would have been avoided, and might never have taken place.

206. It is evident that the world wide scope of naval operations requires that the intelligence web cover every possible source of information, no matter how distant it may be from the main theatre of operations.

207.(a) With the modern, highly organized systems of international news gathering, much information that belligerents succeed in keeping from enemy espionage operatives will be published in neutral papers, which are a fertile field of information, always being careful to avoid being misled by intentionally false information. (A most illuminating and important example of the value of information to be derived from the press is given by Sir George Aston in his book "Secret Service", pages 202 to 206). Maintenance of a thorough espionage service requires that all periodicals that can be obtained be closely scanned, including apparently harmless advertisements, articles on "feature pages," etc. A small "country weekly" is as dangerous as a large metropolitan daily.

(b) At the same time that care must be taken to avoid being misled by intentionally false information of the enemy it may frequently be possible for the espionage organization to disseminate false information itself for enemy consumption. This might seem to fall in the field of our propaganda activities, but that organization may find it very desirable, and the espionage organization can find it quite possible to permit seemingly inadvertent information or data to fall into the hands of enemy agents or forces, which, if acted upon by them, would prove to be highly disadvantageous to them, and vice versa.

208. Intelligence demands information that is correct, and accurate in its technical aspects. An agent who is nothing more than an eavesdropper is useless. Inaccurate or erroneous information is worse than useless. This is another reason why intelligence executives and key men must be selected carefully, and specially trained, and also why the actual operatives should be selected and instructed in their duties before the emergency.

209. It is important that an officer in charge of a distant secret service center be one who can be trusted to cull out false news from true before forwarding it.

210. Communications will be discussed in a separate chapter, but it should be noted here that every secret operative should

be firmly impressed with the importance of three factors necessary to obtain the objective of the secret intelligence service.

I. Accuracy. The difference between what he has actually seen or knows, and what he has heard (rumors).

II. Simplicity. Forwarding only precise information in terse language, and avoiding ambiguous phraseology.

III. Expeditious, but carefully guarded, transmission. The most enlightening information is of no value if it reaches headquarters too late to be used; and unless it is transmitted with the greatest care and secrecy it is apt to result in the apprehension of the agent and the uncovering of the network. (See Art.203(c).

211. In some states the espionage service has also been the activity that engaged in sabotage, either actively on the part of the agents themselves, as in the case of the Austro-Hungarian service (See "Espionage in Industry and war" by Ronge), or supervised a bureau and obtained the services of "saboteurs" as was done by Boy-Ed in this country during the World War. While sabotage is a valuable means of attacking an enemy behind his lines, it is not espionage, but should be a separate field of endeavor, and attacked by separate personnel.

CHAPTER THREE

Espionage Organization and Personnel.

301. The struggle between espionage and counter-espionage during the World War led to the development of seemingly incredible means of hiding information, and of getting it across enemy frontiers; and to equally ingenious methods of combatting this traffic. German naval intelligence gained most of its secret information through commercial firms in Sweden, Denmark and Holland, while British naval intelligence used Holland, Denmark and Norway as bases for similar organisations. Switzerland was used by all the nations, in both directions, and was a hot-bed of intrigue, espionage and counter-espionage. A secret war was fought there between the agents of the various countries, and it was filled with "covers", "post offices" and "exchanges."

302. It is said that the best example of a good agent, who combined every attribute and quallfication of accuracy, transmission and deception (see par. 203) was a young British Intelligence Officer who became a highly regarded member of the staff of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. He was thus at the very fountain head of information at both Mons and Lille, and not only succeeded in forwarding information regularly to the War Office but held his post as a German officer without suspicion until the Armistice.

303. Both sides used representatives of business firms in distant neutral ports for espionage during the war, and the British, in particular, put to good use the officers of their own and neutral shipping, and journalists at definite posts throughout the world supplementing the information service rendered by the Consular Service.

304. Espionage in every field of operations must adapt its operations, and lower echelons of organization to the situation peculiar to its area, determined by such factors as to whether the enemy country is an island, or has neutral boundries, and the character and location of adjacent or nearby neutral countries that may be used as bases for espionage operations; the patriotic temperament of the enemy people and their racial characteristics, (i.e., whether they could be persuaded to spy on their own forces; the degree of heterogeneity of the enemy

population; whether there are neutral aliens available and willing to act; and the available means of communication).

305. Selection of the lower echelons of operatives should be left to specially trained intelligence officers, executives or leading operatives who understand thoroughly the requisites and unteachable qualities of the ideal secret agent. Colonel Nicolai says, "In secret service there are only two sets of people who can be relied upon; the persons in control of the system, and those spies who act out of purely patriotic motives and whom I would term 'national spies.' (p. 251)

"Secret agents, all sorts and conditions of men, need, first of all, a commanding personality in every sense of the term to command them. He must have a knowledge of humanity, a dispassionate judgment and a skill in handling men. - - - - The Intelligence Service is a service for gentlemen. It breaks down wherever it is placed in the hands of other persons. (p. 252)

"Intelligence service provides, when it is honorably done, many a disappointment. It is one of its peculiarities that bad agents send in a great deal of news and good ones very little." (p. 252)

306. Before the World War General Cockerill, of the British Intelligence Service, spent several years on roving duty for the purpose of weaving the many threads of information sources into a giant web. British subjects of every profession and station were voluntary links in that web, in addition to paid agents and trained intelligence officers at strategic points. His organization included

(a) Naval and Military Attachés at many capitals.

(b) Operatives in Consulates at strategic points.

(c) Nationals and neutrals employed by commercial firms in foreign countries expected to be either allied or neutral in a war with the Central Powers.

(d) Agents in the crews of neutral merchantmen, and in shoreside shipping activities; not only shipping companies, brokers and forwarders, but firms supplying ships' needs. Ship

chandlers should be particularly useful for these individuals sell not only ships' stores, but also purvey to the personal needs of the officers and seamen. It is current practice for them to provide entertainment for the commanding and subordinate officers. The Department of Justice finds the ship chandlers an ideal type to secure information of great value, and a prolific source of authentic information and data on ships' activities other than official news from the company offices. It is the source that gets the intimate information and details of ship activities and operations. These sources lead also to valuable sources of information in dance halls, brothels and other places of entertainment and relaxation frequented by seamen and merchant marine officers.

(e) Journalists in British, allied and neutral press.

(f) Trained intelligence officers and paid agents at strategic points in enemy and neutral territory.

(g) Liaison with services of enemy trade, passport and travel control and censorship.

307. "Finding out secrets in peace time is not the main function of secret service. Rather it is the patient and thorough building up of an organization that will stand the test of war when frontiers are sealed, and the obtaining and passing on of intelligence is a real mans job. The backbone of such an organization must be its executives and key men, selected because of special qualifications and specially trained, and placed during peace if possible" (Touhy - "The Secret Corps").

"A secret service is not to be built up on money alone, if it is not to do more harm than good. The essential part of a secret service is the personality of its servants". (Nicolai - p. 103).

308. An intelligence officer must have a calm and well balanced mentality, and not be given to excitment. Much information received will be entirely false, and put out purposely to deceive, much will be contradictory. One must have, or acquire, the ability to sift the true from the false, facts from rumors. This may be done by methodical reflection, by careful comparison with similar cases; from the nature of the information; by a knowledge of the characteristics and habits of the

enemy; and by a good knowledge and evaluation of the exact source. Knowledge of the original source and circumstances under which secured will often provide substantial clues as to the credibility of the information, and no effort may be considered wasted in vigorous and comprehensive investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the sources in question.

309. A good knowledge of the organization, strategical principals, and tactical combinations of ones own forces will unconsciously make easier the work of learning the truth as to the enemies plans from observation of their movements and preparations behind the lines. Further, naval information of value is often so technical in nature, and navies are usually so set apart in their social tendencies, that it is difficult for an outsider to make contacts, or to estimate the value of information obtained.

310. In the organization of the service three basic principles have been evolved:-

I. (a) Secrecy. The service is of no value unless its personnel and operatives are absolutely secret. Likewise, in counter-espionage, the most successful services have been those whose members were not only unknown to outsiders but to each other as well. While this is a basic principle there are occasions where this rule is necessarily broken when several agents must work together, as for example in a matter of continuous and protracted observation of a person, place or thing. (Colonel Redl was caught by such a net continuously watching for weeks for a person who would eventually call for a certain letter). Also, there are cases where it is a decided advantage, if not a necessity, for an operative to know some other operative, located geographically close to him, with whom he may communicate for aid, or for assistance in transmitting information, or for other purposes. Sometimes agents may be given some recognition sign whereby they may identify each other, as for example the "safety-pin men" who worked in occupied Belgium.

(b) The following method for mutual identification and verification for agents when meeting and communicating with each other personally and orally when exceptional circumstances made this necessary was devised and used successfully by one of our Attachés during the World War.

(1) Each agent was assigned a password, which might be the same for several agents.

(2) The password was made up of the initial letters of some verse from the book of Proverbs as contained in the King James version of the Bible. Both word and verse were thoroughly memorized by the agent.

(3) When a communication was to be sent to an agent, being delivered by another agent or confidential messenger, previous notice was given if possible, either by post or telegraph, such notice being the sending of the number of the chapter and verse selected. That agent receiving the notification looked up and memorized the verse immediately.

(4) Upon meeting the procedure was:-

Resident Agent:- "What news have you for me", or "what information have you", or "what do you know", or some similar question.

Courier:- Replies by giving the password.

Resident Agent:- Gives the quotation whose initial letters make the password; and adds "what else do you know", or some similar question.

Courier:- Then gives the quotation from Proverbs in full.

Resident Agent:- Replies by giving the chapter and verse.

Thus the identity of the two was mutually established. The Bible was used because all agents could carry it without any suspicious condemnation, and in case of confiscation it could be replaced quickly almost anywhere, or a copy could be borrowed, or could be found in a library. The password was also expected to be used as a key-word in coding telegraph messages. In case there was no opportunity to send a preliminary notice, the courier himself sent a letter to the resident on arrival giving nothing more than the number of chapter and verse on a slip of paper, no signature.

(c) However, such violations of the principle of secrecy should be made only in the case of tried and trusted operatives. The reason for this principle is that in the case of discovery or capture of any one agent it is impossible for him to involve any others.

II. Decentralization. No executive has been able to direct efficiently more than a few subordinates. Also this promotes secrecy of the organization.

III. Direct Communication. Official channels cannot be used. Such channels retard rapid transmission, and also destroy secrecy of information. It has also been found inadvisable for the intelligence officer to communicate with his agents personally very far down the echelons, except under extraordinary circumstances, and in most guarded ways. Consequently, agents are instructed through the various echelons of decentralized control, and their reports are transmitted direct to their executives by mails, or other available means. Agents, of course, pass news to their executives also, when they meet, to keep them informed of what is going on in their districts, and as to the activities of the agents, etc.

311. (a) The usual organization consists of the primary control being in the person of the Naval Attaché or District Intelligence Officer. This control is not, however, open. He deals through a trusted executive officer called No. 1, with whom he has very casual or very secret contacts, or both. There may be several such executives under the attaché, covering different fields either geographical or according to the nature of the intelligence, or both. The Attaché or intelligence officer should under no circumstances have any surface dealings of any sort with the lower echelons of the organization as such. He may not even know that the barber who cuts his hair or the doorman at his hotel are his men, and vice versa.

(b) Each executive, or No. 1, is responsible for covering his designated field. He has the task of selecting and controlling the personnel of the second echelon, lesser executives known as Nos. 2. None of the Nos. 2 should know anything about the Attaché nor about each other. (In France, during the World War, one of our most successful services was ostensibly for a private person for his business. See History of Naval Attaché, Paris, 1914-1918, by Lt. Comdr. C. O. Maas, U.S.N.R.F., pp. 5, 15, 16, 21, 39, 84 et seq., 92, 93, etc.).

(c) Similarly, the actual agents, (under the Nos. 2) should know nothing about any part of the organization except their own particular No. 2.

(d) Instructions are given by the Attaché to No. 1, who in turn transmits and assigns the work down the line, Nos. 2 assigning the agents who actually make the contacts and get the information by such contacts or by observation.

(e) It has also been found desirable for No. 1 to have under his immediate control several agents with roving commissions, who can be commercial travelers covering a definite territory, and special operatives he can send to obtain any <u>particular</u> information. The reports of these special agents are found invaluable in checking the reports coming up to No. 1 from the lower echelons of the regular organization.

312. All personnel should be carefully selected from people whose civil occupations permit them to proceed about their work of espionage or counter-espionage without creating any suspicion. (See pars. 112, and 203(c)).

313. (a) Experience indicates that No. 1 should be a business or professional man of high repute and long residence in his community. His secret work is thus cloaked under his civil pursuits with a minimum chance of detection. His wide acquaintance also aids him and the Attaché in selecting suitable subexecutives, (Nos. 2). No. 1 may even be a national of the state wherein he resides. Where it is necessary that No.1 be a naval officer he should be given a position with some reputable business concern sufficiently in advance of mobilization to allay any suspicion engendered by his presence.

(b) The best executives of an organization in a neutral country are usually officials of various branches of the shipping business, such as officials of the lines; ship brokers; cargo forwarders; ship chandlers; fuel dealers; ship, engine and dry dock companies; or officials of firms dealing regularly with the enemy, such as steel companies; machinery manufacturers; financial houses; firms supplying food and raw materials; or any others maintaining a regular staff of travelling representatives between the firms office in the neutral country and enemy information centers. Newspaper correspondents sometimes are especially fit for <u>special</u> operatives. They are appointed to their posts because of proved ability in gathering news, and are experts in the use of the subterfuges of their profession in nosing out information. They are active physically, keen observers, have retentive memories, and are quick at analyzing situations and unearthing the underlying facts. They also have the ability, usually,

to sift false from true. The Department of Justice finds, however, that as a general thing newspaper men make the poorest investigators. They become prone to color news and to jump at conclusions. The longer they follow the newspaper pursuit the more interested they become, often unconsciously, in the dramatic values, and the less able to evaluate dispassionate accuracy in the procurement and transmission of information, and, too, they develop a craving for personal publicity that must be combatted and suppressed. Their first loyalty appears always to be to the press and to publicity, and the vast majority of them think entirely in monetary terms. Accordingly caution and discretion must be exercised in dealing with them.

314. The men in the next echelon should also be residents of the district, and intimately acquainted with its business, social and industrial activities. They should be persons of such known ability, discretion and probity that they can be fully trusted to select reliable agents for particular espionage tasks. They, also, may be (probably will be) nationals or long residents of the state where residing. They might well have frequent reason to travel on business.

315. This plan assumes that the organization will be established in a neutral country adjecent to that of the enemy. It is likely that operations of the agents, at least Nos. 2 and lower echelons, will carry them into enemy territory (ostensibly on legitimate business), were their neutral status, and bona fide passports and travel papers, will give them a marked advantage over either American citizens, or even over enemy subjects who might consent to engage in espionage. Another means is for the "cover" firm to engage enemy nationals ostensibly as agents, keep them unaware of any taint of suspicion of being agents, send them on business trips to their own country with instructions each time to bring back certain information <u>for the promotion of the business of the firm</u>, and on their return not only get this information, but also pump them for any other news they will have absorbed unconsciously. Native agents may not be procurable, but where they can be used in a way in which they can be trusted, it is preferable to use them.

316. Another important factor affecting the establishment and effectiveness of an espionage organization is the attitude of the neutral state toward the belligerents. All neutral states

publish "Neutrality Proclamations" that invariably prohibit the operation of an espionage service within their boarders. This is another reason why such a service must be carried on secretly. Neutrality proclamations may establish a censorship which increases the difficulty of communication. However, neutrality is not always very strictly enforced toward a belligerent with whom the neutral state is particularly friendly, or because of inherent racial or political enmity toward the other. If such a benevolent neutrality is favorable toward us it makes the work of our agents easier, and increases the difficulties of the enemy agents. For example, in a war with Japan we might expect to find a benevolent neutrality toward us in China, and toward Japan in Mexico.

317. Where the neutral state is unfriendly toward us the espionage must be carried on with the utmost caution, and where the neutral state is friendly care must be exercised not to give our enemy any plausable cause to complain of unneutral acts on the part of the friendly state. Furthermore, in a friendly state, operatives must be very careful not to let the easy situation lead to becoming careless in his habits so as to expose his activities, his contacts, in his field of operations to the forces of the enemy operating in the same neutral state. Such enemy agents would be only too glad to uncover such activities, and so turn them to account as to perhaps turn the attitude of the neutral state from being friendly to being strictly neutral or even hostile (Vide, the German activities in the U. S. during the World War).

318. The suggestion has been made that the personnel of the espionage service should be limited to American citizens of good education, good standing, and in most cases of good social position, and of either sex. This is impracticable in many cases, as the best agents in any locality are those of long residence and recognized standing therein. Therefore, it appears quite necessary to use neutrals in some places unless American citizens already well established on the ground are available, or can be "planted" sufficiently in advance to cover their real reason for residence. It is quite possible that the No. 1 in some localities may have to be selected from neutrals.

319. However, American citizens will be of inestimable value in the world wide net, for the necessity for world wide information requires the use of every consular, diplomatic and

commercial representative of the Government, as well as American business and professional men in well placed centers of information. Such persons are already largely on their stations throughout the world, but their services would be separate from the actual secret espionage service under the Naval Attaché as outlined in pars. 311 to 315(a). In general, then, the organization would consist of:-

I. The purely espionage branch, functioning under the Naval Attaché through No. 1.

II. The world wide information service composed of the regular consular, diplomatic and commercial governmental agencies, and their contacts and informants comprised of American nationals in their localities.

III. Special agents sent on special missions, and perhaps not regularly employed, but selected for specific tasks.

Such an organization has stood the test of actual war.

320. (a) An example of this organization is taken from the operations in Belgium. The state was divided into areas, such as Ghent, Antwerp, Liege, etc., each in charge of a No. 1, who knew intimately the conditions and many of the leading residents in his area. He was left very largely free to run his area. He knew nothing more about the service than his own area. He had no idea, for example, who was the No. 1 in any other area. No. 1, who was a man in a definite trade or profession, would make no efforts to gain any German confidences. Instead, he organized his own network of Nos. 2 who, knowing the residents in his sector intimately, selected in turn as many as four reliable "satellites". Each No. 2 would then tell each of his agents exactly what information he wanted. None of these third line operatives knew anything whatever about the organization except his own particular No. 2. The Nos. 3 were such people as a café proprietor; a railway station agent; a doctor; a clergyman; a policeman; a postman; a clever woman perhaps; and hotel personnel, such as desk clerks, bell boys, chamber maids, etc.

(b) The Nos. 3 would operate thus:-

The café man would overhear the conversations of German; perhaps encourage a barmaid to tell him what she

overheard also. The station agent would report movements of passengers, note distinguishing marks on uniforms, the quantity and kind of freight, different kinds of baggage and luggage and any interesting markings on same, the destinations of passengers, especially distinguished passengers, and conversations heard in his station, and count or estimate numbers moving. The doctor encouraged his patients to unburden themselves, to relieve their minds, and sometimes might even have German patients. The clergyman would obtain many bits of news while making the rounds of his parish, and build up many German contacts. The policeman and postal employee would pick up many bits of information on their beats, and through their wide and varied contacts. The women might learn a bit here and there through social contacts. (Immoral women were usually avoided as untrustworthy and apt to "sell out" for a sufficient offer). Hotel personnel are extremely valuable sources of information. Conferences are held in hotel rooms, baggage may be searched with proper regard to secrecy, those under surveillance may become intoxicated or careless, and trash baskets often contain many items of much interest.

(c) Third line agents forward their reports direct to a "cover" address, changed frequently by being passed down through No. 2. From the "covers" the reports were collected for No. 1 by a trusted messenger, and at irregular times.

(d) Each little circle of agents was always on the watch, noting types and quantities of artillery; ammunition moving toward the front; number and types of aircraft flying over and the direction; numbers and unit designations of troops moving, their direction and often their destination. Much information was gleaned from officers' conversations.

321. Selection of Agents.

(a) This requires great skill on the part of the executives. The success of the organization rests principally upon the work of the agents of the third line. No matter how well the executive knows his district he will have difficulty in finding men having the ideal qualities, hence in selecting the executives men must be found having a thorough knowledge of human nature, dispassionate judgment, understanding personality, and great tact in handling and leading persons of every social station. Such men are not unusual in the business world; among

lawyers, especially "trial" lawyers; and in the higher brackets of the newspaper field.

(b) Incentives for undertaking espionage work are many; patriotism, desire for adventure, revenge and greed are usually present. An executive must be able to handle every type, either seeking them out or coming by them by their own application. Those who come in because of greed are the least desirable and most dangerous as such may "sell out" to the enemy. Records are full of tales of the "double spy".

(c) Many qualifications must be sought for in the agents who are to be exposed in the field. They must be not only absolutely reliable, but also have plenty of common sense, an innate air of credibility, and, if possible, the faculty of inviting confidences without arousing suspicion. They require intelligence, resourcefulness, probity, thoroughness, accuracy, great patience, appreciation, courage, and the willingness to submerge self advancement and sacrifice acclaim. Stealthiness and deception are requisites; poise and naturalness are essential. An agent must "fit" in the picture. He should have ability as a "mixer" when necessary, without being obtrusive. Those in contact with the underworld, and who must pose as members thereof, must, for obvious reasons, speak the "vernacular".

(d) "The first rule for a spy is that he should avoid any conspicuous clothing" (Nicolai, pg. 152). In addition those selected for personal espionage should not in any manner be conspicuous in themselves because of stature or build, or of sharp or unusual features, noticeable scars, the wearing of glasses, weight, etc. Some individuals meet naturally into a crowd, and their features, dress or physical characteristics cannot be recalled easily by even a close observer. Individuals of this type, slim (but not thin) and of small or medium stature, are equipped by nature for this kind of work. Of course, the racial characteristics, such as coloring and hair, predominant in the place where the activity is to be carried on should be a governing factor. It is essential that he be highly observant, analytical, and accurate in his acquisition of information, and must possess a retentive memory as quite often information gathered should not be placed upon paper at all, or at least until some time later, and in a place of full security. While the foregoing are defensive qualities, an agent should also possess the faculty

of sensing the time and place for exhibiting qualities of daring, even to the point of recklessness. Some emergencies would call for, or even demand, these latter qualities. Though they occur rarely, too great caution manifested at such a time might mean the loss of a highly important objective.

(e) Operatives must be emphatically instructed to keep themselves free from any pre-conceived ideas or theories concerning any matter under inquiry. It has been found by the Department of Justice that operatives very often predicate upon one or two items of information an elaborate mental picture of a situation which they then attempt to substentiate by further collateral inquiry. Accordingly, they not only waste time attempting to prove their nebulous theory, but likewise fail to cognize and report other facts coming to their attention, and to evaluate these facts in a cold, methodical, unprejudiced and practical manner.

322. Treatment of Agents.

(a) The executive must remember that there are always present in some degree, but in varying individual propositions, two basic characteristics; some motive of self-interest and some vanity. These he must use as incentive to spur on his agents. Anything that plays upon or appeals to his sense of value and importance should be used somewhat, and the personal motive must be determined and always be remembered and used. These two interests apply to all classes in both the social and economic scales. Severity or threats of exposure are always dangerous. An agent who feels he has been unjustly or unduly censured may transfer his allegiance, while a "double spy" who thinks he is suspected will disappear. The treatment of agents also depends upon their social status, education and intelligence, as well as upon vanity and motive.

(b) In assigning tasks it is not only useless, but positively dangerous to send an agent for information he is not equipped to get, particularly information of a technical nature. This points again to the necessity of "planting" executives sufficiently in advance of hostilities to permit early and leisurely selection of agents having the necessary qualifications, or else the "planting" of the agents also. Executives must always demand accurate information, even though the subordinate may not be able to transmit it for long periods of time. Where agents are sharply pressed for substantial

results the temptation will come to submit inaccurate, hurried or colored reports. It must be remembered by all that no information at all is preferable to that which is erroneous or inaccurate in any degree.

(c) Some agents will volunteer their services without compensation, but few are able to do this. The vast majority, if not all, of the personnel will be actuated solely by patriotic motives, but appropriate compensation is not only absolutely necessary for the support of the agent and his dependents, but the compensation should be liberal in view of the risks entailed. Also, it must be borne in mind that temptations of an unusual character, coupled with a real need for funds, might prove to be not only the undoing of the individual agent, but cause great damage to the operations underway as well. Emoluments should be for an agreed sum either on a monthly basis, or the agreement should be for stipulated sums on a C.O.D. basis.

(d) An agent or operative should never be given an impression that he is distrusted. He should be led to believe that particular confidence is reposed in him and that his services are highly valuable. If there is distrust he should be tested in some way, perhaps being set to obtain some information already known, or be placed under surveillance of some other operative of known reliability. If his services are no longer desirable or needed his separation from his work should be accomplished diplomatically, and with some advance emolument so as not to cause any bitterness that might lead him to make disclosures to the enemy, or neutral state, that would be damaging or detrimental, unless, of course, treachery on his part is plainly evident or well known. In such latter case he probably has already done all the damage possible.

323. Under no circumstances should operatives or executives be given written instructions. They should study the written, basic instructions, (such as this pamphlet) in some secure place, and should be given precise and thorough oral instructions and quizzes. They should be given examinations and tests before being sent into the field to determine if they have grasped the sense of their instruction. They should be similarly instructed in the use of the codes or cipher they are to use. But once in the field the less there is in writing the better, and this applies to executives as well as to the operatives. Instructions

in the field, both to No. 1, and from him down the line should be entirely verbal. Under no circumstances by any means avoidable should any written instructions ever be given the actual espionage workers.

324. Enemy agents will almost certainly seek employment in our own organizations during war. Those who approach an Attaché with enemy information proffered either gratis or for sale should be looked upon with grave suspicion, and should be thoroughly investigated and be kept under surveillance until their attitude and status is truly determined.

325. The Attaché, an executive, or any agent must often rely upon his memory, for frequently a person revealing valuable news in what appears to be a casual conversation will cease to talk or will change the subject if he observes that his listener is taking notes. The framing of productive questions, or prolongation of a conversation on a wanted topic is an art in itself. Lawyers are often good at it. Often valuable information may be gained by indirect questioning or from negative replies where nothing can be gained by direct interrogation. There is often a vast difference between what people say and what they know or think.

326. Every operative must thoroughly understand the importance of knowing well, and practicing always the three essential factors of espionage as given in paragraph 203. Of these three the third is the most important both for the safety of the agent and the organization. Every spy of any consequence captured during the war was taken because of disregard of the third essential of espionage. A writer of a vitriolic book on secret service (Rowen) states that "the longer a spy stays in one place, the less secure he becomes. Over-confidence and carelessness are the fatal diseases of resident espionage." The best and most innocent attitude is that of the ordinary, alert, everyday man "interested in everything but curious about nothing."

327. Rules for Agents taught in a German School.

"Never hurry when approaching a point from which to begin work; appear to have a quite different destination as long as possible.

"Collect every available bit of information, but without showing interest in any of it. Never fasten upon some item of

intelligence you think you can or must obtain, and so go about pursuing that single fact, making conspicuous inquiries, exposing your determination to learn a particular thing.

"Conceal what linguistic gifts you have, in order to encourage others to talk more freely in your hearing. Remember that a German agent speaks or writes no word of German while on duty abroad - and this applies, even if German is manifestly not your native tongue.

"Train yourself at all times to have an impassive countenance and leisurely manner. Never talk or behave mysteriously - except in this one instance: a communicative person with matters of genuine value to impart will perhaps yield them the more readily if he, or she, has been told something - no doubt wholly fictitious - in a flattering and confiding way, with a slightly mysterious air.

"Always record your findings in terms of absolute innocence. Figures or dimensions you have to report may best be remembered as items of personal expenditure. In Portsmouth you have seen ten heavy naval guns on trucks, ready for mounting. But you remember that excellent dinner of sea food you enjoyed at Portsmouth, costing you ten shillings.

"When obtaining information by direct bargaining, try to make your informant travel as far as possible away from his home - and away from your immediate field of operations as well. Have him travel the distance by a tedious route, if you can, preferably at night. A tired informer is less cautious or suspicious, more relaxed and expansive, less disposed to lie or bargain shrewdly - all advantages in the transaction which you reserve to yourself.

"Do not burn a letter or other paper and treat the charred or ashen fragments as unreadable. Microscopic examination can do a great deal with paper ash. Tearing up papers and throwing them away, in secret service, does not destroy them. Paper scraps are never disposed of with absolute security even in lavatories.

"Confide in no one, and never associate a display of admiration or affection with trustworthiness. The most skillful operatives of counter-espionage, whether men or women, are

those who can inspire confidence easily, pretend devotion, even infatuation, yet remain entirely immune to sentiment of any kind.

"Never be careless about your personal possessions. Some really insignificant article, mislaid, or left behind in travelling, may later on be turned to account and help your enemies to incriminate you.

"Be equally careful in handling, receiving, or disbursing any considerable sums of money. Many agents have been traced through cash remittances. Particularly beware of amounts out of keeping with the part you have elected to play.

"Not major blunders but barely perceptable errors of judgment, tact or strategy will betray you. Be most conservative when relying upon an assumed name or borrowed identity, however briefly, or in admitting experiences of the past which may be necessary to the part you are playing, yet quite foreign to your actual past experience.

"Avoid every temptation to be too original or inventive about communicating tricks or other secret service dodges, unless you are positive your notion is really new. In a contest of wits the agent on duty abroad is bound to find himself working against enormous odds.

"If required to transmit written matter to a fellow agent or confederate, manage it so that you and the other are never to be found together, even momentarily. You both may feel sure you can arrange an unobserved meeting. But you can be certain only of your own precautions. No agent must risk the success of his mission by linking it with the quite unpredictable caution, or carelessness, or timidity of another."

CHAPTER FOUR

Communications

401. The second principle of espionage (see Art.203(b)) requires rapid and sure communication. To acquire information is often simple, but to get it speedily to one's superiors without violating the third principle of espionage is the rock on which many agents have been foundered (see Art. 321, last sentence). Communication is considered by many as both the most difficult, most dangerous, and at the same time the most important phase of the work.

402. Operatives reports are expected to be sent to No.1 through "cover" or "post office" (Arts. 310(c), & 316 (c)). They should be mailed to a name (usually fictitious) and address selected by No.1, and passed to the agents via No.2. No. 1 should never personally collect this mail for if a report were to fall into enemy hands, and the cover were then watched, apprehension of No. 1 would uncover the entire net. It is suggested that reports, in business style, might be mailed to some regular business concern, there to be obtained at irregular intervals by a messenger. To avoid possibility of surveillance it may be necessary to break up the channels of their delivery to No. 1. All reports should be signed with fictitious names, assigned to the operatives by Nos. 2, who supply No. 1 with the real and false names of their men. Numbers, like S-17 for example, should never be used to identify agents. They at once arouse suspicion. Anything appearing theatrical or mysterious must always be avoided.

403. Where censorship, or other barriers, make the use of the mail impracticable, the ingenuities of executives and agents must be used to devise safe and expeditious methods of communication. Codes, ciphers and secret inks may be used, but there are scores of other methods, some examples of which, from which ideas may come, are given below. The method used must depend upon the field wherein the operations are taking place, the nature of the obstacles to be hurdled, and the capabilities of the agents.

404. In the British War Office museum is a charred copy of the paper "L'Etoile Belge", of a date in August, 1914. A ragged hole is burned out of its center, and the whole paper is filthy and disreputable in appearance. It arrived in England early in the war wrapped around a pair of old shoes carried by an ostensible Belgian refugee, but written in invisible lemon-formation ink across its greasy pages, leaving off where the hole begins, and taking up the message on the other edge, is a complete, accurate account of all the German troop and supply trains passing through Liege up to August 22nd, 1914. The man who compiled that information had lain hidden in a culvert alongside the railway for nearly two weeks,

counting the cars of every train, carefully estimating the number of troops, and the character and quantity of material going forward. His information was of inestimable value to the British before Mons. Secret inks of themselves, however, are not the final answer. Throughout the war there was a struggle between such inks and the developers used by censorship and counter-espionage, and the developers won.

405. Nor are ciphers impregnable. Cryptographers emphatically declare that no cipher has yet been devised that cannot be broken, given enough time and sufficient messages. Codes are much more difficult, but have been solved. Besides not being undecipherable, censorship usually prohibits their use, except for a few well known codes, which are listed and prescribed. Any messages in an unauthorized code, and all cipher messages never get beyond the censor.

406. Besides secret inks, codes and ciphers, the countless methods of secret communication include secret mobile radio stations, carrier pigeons, trained dogs, visual signals by lights, heliographs, balloons, use of windmill arms, window shutters and shades, colored clothing, placing signals on the ground to be seen by aviators, microscopic photography, floating articles down streams, by uneven or ragged hems or seams in clothing, colored or shaped beads in necklaces or bracelets, apparently harmless drawings (especially when containing brickwork or mosaics), newspaper advertisements, etc.

407. Numerous subterfuges have been used to get mail "around" a censorship. Letters have been sent to non-existent prisoners of war, and in the World War German agents in England got soldiers returning to France from leave to post on French soil letters and small packages to "friends" or "relatives" in France, because "censorship took out the goodies". Of course the information then reached Switzerland, perhaps by hand, and from there it was no trick at all to send anything into Germany, even bales of cotton, machinery and foodstuffs.

408. A German code that was broken was in the form of an illustrated cigar catalogue, various types of naval craft, Army organizations, munitions, etc., and their movements and quantities being represented by the numerous types and brands of cigars. The trouble was that the ostensible office to which their various orders for consignments and deliveries were sent was found to be no tobacco firm at all.

409. An interesting example of a code for transmitting messages to a confederate by means of the number and direction of strokes in drying windows by a charwoman in an embassy abroad is given by Rowan (p.169), the strokes being observed by a confederate through binoculars.

410. Reports, generally, should be as brief and succinct as possible, and to the greatest extent codified. A seemingly trite business letter should be able to be so cast as to contain all the information desired or necessary, and also, an innocent appearing business document seems to arouse the least suspicion. Codes and ciphers may not only be solved, but they always arouse suspicion. Letters purporting to be social and domestic are next best after business letters. It is dangerous for an agent always to post his mail at the same place. It is also of value as protecting the agent if the handwriting can be changed or altered.

411. It is an important function of the headquarters to which reports are being transmitted, to keep the field informed as promptly, and in as detailed manner as possible, as regards any new instructions in order to avoid confusion, and to keep those in the field who may be effected thereby, informed as to changing conditions in the channels of transmitting information.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Organization, Operation and Selection of Personnel of Counter-Espionage.

Note. Much of the substance of this chapter applies equally to matters of Espionage, and should be so considered and used where applicable.

501. Denial of information to the enemy is as important as gaining information from him. To maintain the security of a nation's frontiers and operating bases against the attacks of the enemies' espionage forces requires the closely coordinated efforts of the censorship, counter-espionage, radio listening and crypt analysis services. The effect of counter-espionage cannot be gauged through the positive results obtained. Indeed, experience shows that its greatest importance lies in its negative consequences. The fact that counter-espionage exists is always a deterrent to enemy agents. The better the organization, the more successfully will it prevent the operations of spies and suspects. The mere fact that one does not, in this kind of intelligence work, actually succeed in arresting many spies, and having them convicted and sentenced, must not be regarded in the slightest degree as discouraging.

502. The function of counter-espionage is preventive and informational, rather than punitive. Its MISSION is to collect information on espionage, treason, sabotage, sedition and subversive activities. Upon this information the proper executive authorities will then be expected to act. It does not presume to usurp the authority of the Department of Justice in arrests or disposition of civil cases, nor that of the Judge Advocate General in preparing evidence for courts-martial, though it does collect and turn in such evidence.

503. Counter-espionage requires an agency in the Navy to observe constantly what is published in the press, etc., and to suppress news items either in the press or movies that disclose secret matters; also to censor articles intended for publication by those having access to secret matters to prevent inadvertent disclosures, and to control visits to the fleet, to naval stations, and to plants doing confidential work for the Navy. This is done through the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence. In the operations of the Fleet counter-espionage requires security of radio and visual communications and safeguarding the confidential parts and equipment of the ships. In the case of a force operating at sea in strategic areas adequate screening is necessary to deny information of strength, disposition and movements from enemy scouts.

504 (a). Counter-espionage requires also close coordination of all activities at all times to prevent the disclosure of information concerning the conditions within our naval and military forces, as to our political, economic and psychological situation, and to detect any plans or attempts at sabotage, treason, or subversive activities. With our form of government this is almost impossible in our country, but we can be aware of the activities of enemy or subversive agencies, and be prepared to end them whenever the authority exists.

(b). The matter of entering our naval service through enlistment is comparatively easy, and a man with any reasonable amount of ability and tact would have little trouble in becoming a petty officer. It is an easy field for a foreign agent. No one would realize more than he the possibility of detection, and with this in mind he would always be prepared for suspection and search. He would have no incriminating evidence on hand. But with the surroundings encountered in our service his task would be simple. As a radio operator he could obtain data as to regulations, codes, equipment, methods and new improvements. As a quarter-master he might copy parts of signal books. As a fire control man he could obtain information as to methods, equipment and accuracy, and gather much from conversations of plotting room officers as to forms and objects of various practices, and their results. As a yeoman he might copy parts of codes and get the gist of confidential papers, if not the papers themselves. In the engineers department he could obtain data and methods as to our engineering practices. As a gunner's mate he could report on all ordnance matters coming intimately under his daily observation, and might even make easy arrangements for blowing up the ship. These are but a few hints as to what we should guard against in time of peace, and must guard against in war. And it is not necessary that foreign agents be nationals of the state for which they are working. A disgruntled or disloyal American, or one in dire need of money, or to whom money has a strong appeal may so act, and such an one may be someone already in the service. (O.N.I. has at this date a report of the sale of certain unknown information regarding one of our newest cruisers by two of her crew to a Japanese agent during a shakedown cruise abroad for the reported paltry sum of $500.00). It is taken for granted that officers are loyal to their service, but such is not always necessarily true. The case of Col. Redl in Austria is a most glaring example of the perfidy that may exist.

505. No counter-espionage is effective that leaves any portion of our naval or military forces, or the national war effort, open to any unobserved operations of enemy agents. In time of war, certainly, there must not be left any loop-hole through which information may reach the enemy, or through which he may pour debilitating propaganda. Hence, counter-espionage requires activities not only at home and within our military forces wherever they are,

but also at important centers in neutral countries where espionage activities against us must be discovered, and the sources denied.

506. Our long and open border lines permit easy access to and transmission of information by many routes by land, sea, or air, and our heterogeneous population facilitates the operation of many types of nationals against us. Some analogy may be had in the conditions behind the Western Front in France during the war. France, also, is full of many nationalities, and during the war there were also thousands of refugees there.

507. The French were not alive to the danger in this situation for a long time, but the British were. In their case they subdivided the area under their control into several main areas, each in charge of an officer. These areas were further divided into districts of about fifty square miles, and these were further parcelled out into "communes" of about five square miles each. The division was not regular, but was more on the basis of normal population than actual size, having on the average, about 3,000 inhabitants. Each commune was watched by a trained intelligence officer, having under him French civilian "indicators" who had close personal knowledge of the regular inhabitants. No newcomer could enter, nor any regular inhabitant leave without the fact being known to the "indicators". These civilian operatives were often the mayors of villages, parish priests, postal employees, tax office clerks, and café proprietors. In addition each executive had a few special operatives directly under him for special work. These men were usually trained detectives. Some were women.

508. The counter-espionage organization is always separate from the espionage organization, though they may both come to a head in a neutral country in the person of the naval attaché, though secretly in each case. In general the organization for counter-espionage follows the principles of espionage, viz:-

(I) Decentralization. This rests upon the experience learned during the war that no executive could control efficiently more than eight to ten agents, and at the same time watch his area. When it becomes necessary to have more than ten operatives it becomes necessary to make a new subdivision, or create lower echelons, each division under a separate executive. The degree of decentralization necessary will depend upon the demands of the local situation, and must be determined by the intelligence officer on the ground.

(II) Secrecy. Unless the existence of a counter-espionage organization is secret its value is vitiated. Surveillance must never be used in any way that attracts public attention, and past experience has shown that the most successful organizations are those in which the members are unknown even to each other, except that sometimes an executive may throw two or three together as a group for continuous tracking or surveillance, for a search, or for some special job.

(III) Direct Communication. This is faster than passing information through many hands, preserves secrecy, and reduces to a minimum the chances of compromising the organization. Of course, agents keep their immediate executives informed as to the progress of work, but do not delay their reports by passing them through their hands.

509.(a) This organization is also adaptable to, and is recommended for use within naval districts, operating bases, or ships. The head of the organization would be the Intelligence Officer (corresponding to Attaché, par. 508). The fact that there is such an organization exists in the unit should be kept secret.

(b) Echelons of Control. Directly associated with the Intelligence Officer, but absolutely under cover as such, should be an officer, designated as No.1, to be the sole point of direct contact between the intelligence officer and his counter-espionage organization. The executives of the first echelon, Nos. 2, serve directly under No. 1. Each No. 2 will have a designated area, and will personally direct a limited number of sub-executives, Nos. 3. Each No. 3 will control a few operatives who would be the direct contacts for surveillance and investigations.

(c) Under this plan, each operative would know only his particular No. 3, and no other member of the organization, unless two or three operatives are put to work together for some task. Each No. 3 should know only his respective No. 2, and should know nothing about No. 1. Should any field under a No. 2 or No. 3 become so active as to require more than ten operatives, there should be a readjustment of fields of endeavor, and the creation of smaller fields with new Nos. 2, Nos. 3, and operatives, to take care of the increased load.

(d) No. 1 should have under him also a few special operatives for special and particular tasks, and these operatives should be experts.

(e) No. 1 assign the areas and/or tasks to Nos. 2, and so on down the line to the operatives.

(f) Reports should be transmitted by operatives direct to a "cover" address or addresses, supplied by No. 1 via the echelons of control. No.1 must obtain this mail secretly, perhaps by using his special operatives. One method is to have it dropped in a waste basket under waste paper. This is removed by a charman who is an agent, who slips it through a secret pipe into an adjoining basement when the agent messenger receives it for delivery. The method of receiving the reports is a problem for No. 1 to solve on the spot, depending upon the "cover". Where no danger to the organization ensues from packets being too bulky, it may be desirable for reports to be submitted in duplicate, so that both the Chief Intelligence Officer and No. 1 may have copies, or to furnish a copy to O.N.I. when desirable. Of course, duplicate copies can always be made exactly and very quickly by the use of the "Photoflor".

(g) The organization should leave no loop-hole for undetected enemy activity in any area in which the work is undertaken. It is given as an axiom by many writers that two or more agents, or groups of agents, should always be sent after the same information, but unknown to each other. This is used as a means of testing their accuracy and loyalty, of guarding against enemy agents within own organization, and to provide against the possibility of one agent failing or being apprehended. When this is done they should be sent by different routes or to different sources for the same information,and at different times to avoid the liklihood of their meeting or of comparing notes if known to each other. Their reports should be sent in through different covers. The use of such duplication will reveal double dealing, usually, and enables the executive to evaluate the worth of his different operatives. This requires that provision must be made to cover everything twice, which appears to be an unnecessary duplication, and involve a large personnel, each additional person being not only difficult to obtain, but becoming an added danger. (Two's company, three's a crowd). It is no doubt a wise and necessary precaution in checking up the work of new, untried operatives, or in checking up on anyone suspected of double-dealing, but with tried and trusted men it introduces an unnecessary element of dangor - there is double the chance of detection. Also there are cases where it may be impossible, or most undesirable, as, for example, the entry of a room or office to peruse or copy some document, or to ascertain the nature of documents in a safe or desk.

(h) The actual number of echelons of decentralization, and the numbers and distribution of operatives must be determined by the intelligence officer himself, dependent upon the intensity of the surveillance required in any particular area. He must make his dispositions to meet the situation with which he is confronted.

Obviously the demands on an organization within a naval unit will differ materially from that necessary in a larger industrial area, a port of embarkation, a large city, or an operating base.

(i) Obviously, the intelligence officer must keep his list or card file of the set-up and membership of his organization, and any names of substitutes or other available operatives, in a secure place, preferably of access only to himself and his No. 1.

(j) If any member of the organization becomes known his value is greatly decreased or entirely lost. Upon such compromise his connection should be terminated at once, but tactfully, with due regard to the fact that a disgruntled operative may tell everything he knows. This also emphasizes the need for decentralization, and for not having the various members of the organization know each other.

(k) The organization should also have a central office for searching suspects and their belongings. This office should function under a special No. 2, should be composed of experts, have a laboratory for examining suspected articles, and must have both men and women operatives, for suspects must frequently be examined minutely in the nude. A man and woman doctor are desirable among examiners for the physical examination of suspects. (See Art. 613 below).

510. The above organization is not mandatory. It is recommended because it has stood the test of actual warfare, and also because it follows the lines of the successful secret services in operation in civil departments that have proved their worth. The purpose of the suggested organization is to provide intelligence officers a picture of the framework for a counter-espionage service, which may be revamped to suit the needs of situations that may be encountered either within the naval service, in civil areas within this country, or in neutral zones. Such an organization will fit in with the zone subdivisions of the District Intelligence organizations as contemplated in the "Intelligence Manual", Articles 3013 to 3017 inclusive.

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SELECTION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

511. (a) Selection of personnel who are efficient and trustworthy is the most difficult part of forming the organization since the service will stand or fall, depending on the ability and loyalty of its executives and operatives.

(b) It requires personnel possessing discretion, courage, patience,, keen intellect, quick wits, resource, imagination, intuition, industry, probity, and frequently linguistic gifts, and this from top to bottom in as great measure as possible. Operatives should be good mixers, without being obtrusive or loquacious. They should be good listeners with the gift of inviting confidences. Attractiveness to women is a great asset, since much information often comes from women with whom suspects associate, or a woman herself may be an espionage agent. Good manners and deportment are therefore a need in many cases.

(c) One who thinks himself a "gum shoe artist", or is offensively egotistical, is out of place in this work. His "pussy-footing", secretive and furtive methods and actions at once lay him open to suspicion on the part of those he is trying to watch. Also, he is liable, to satisfy his own sense of self-importance, to trump up, or "frame" a case at the expense of both the suspect and the good name of the service.

(d) Selection in time of peace is a long step toward efficiency, since time is available for careful observation and inquiry into qualifications. Mistakes have invariably followed too quick recruiting both of executives and operatives.

512. (a) Rank of Personnel. It is intended that all executives will be trained intelligence officers, with the possible exception of lower echelon chiefs in civilian areas. The usual procedure of rank and seniority would be followed insofar as it does not interfere with the peculiar needs of the counter-espionage service.

(b) It is not desirable to employ petty officers as operatives among enlisted personnel, except as observers of petty officers. It is essential that an operative in such circles be on most intimate terms with the group he is observing, both on duty and off, so that no question of rank or privileges must be allowed to bar such free intimacy. Therefore C.P.O.'s or P.O.'s le should not be operatives. Further, the promotion of a man in recognition of counter-espionage work is fatal. Any promotion must be won in the regular course of his purely military work. Such a promotion may destroy his further usefulness in counter-espionage. This must be explained by his superior in echelon, and his suggestions for selection of his successor should be sought. By tactful handling his cooperation with the organization may be retained.

(c) Use of civilian operatives in observing both for civilian and military suspects and subversive activities near, or within, naval reservations is needed. The use of officers or men in civilian clothes for this work is dangerous because of the liability of recognition by their comrades in the service, which immediately compromises them. Canteen and news stand operators, and in general those selling supplies to the vessels or men of the fleet are usually well placed to be observers and operatives. Extreme care should be taken that every individual selling to the fleet, particularly those with stands or shacks at fleet bases for vending food, refreshments, tobacco or liquor, and the loafers, pimps, and hangers-on around such places, be rigidly and comprehensively investigated, and watched constantly. Such places are not only excellent vantage points for our own surveillance, but are usually the eyes and ears of enemy agents and often the bases for sabotage agents. Ostensible deliveries of soft drinks in sealed cartons, etc., may actually be bombs or chemicals or germs to poison food and water supplies.

513. (a) Instruction may be in classes after hostilities commence, but operatives from any one area should not be in the same class. Classes must be small both for that reason, and also that the instructor may give intensive instruction and at the same time be able to evaluate each pupil carefully, and report on him to No. 1.

(b) The Intelligence Officer is responsible for adequate instruction of the echelon executives and operatives. He may prepare mimeograph sheets of simple instructions, perhaps based on this pamphlet and others, and including any other ideas of his own, to be distributed via the echelons of control. Such sheets should carry a notice that the instructions are to be kept in a thoroughly safe place until well learned, and then be burned. Instruction sheets for the executives should explain the desired method of obtaining prospective operatives, manner of swearing them in, and of impressing them with their mission; their place of high trust; the absolute necessity of secrecy; the device of the use of fictitious names by operatives; the "cover" to which reports are to be sent; and the method of issuing necessary funds to them. Lower echelon executives may instruct their operatives verbally as necessary.

(c) At the start all operatives must be warned to keep their eyes and ears open, and their mouths shut. They will be placed under oath as to faithful service; and not to discuss their work with any person other than their superior or designated by him; and likewise not to reveal that they are engaged in secret service work. They must be carefully warned against indicating in any way, by any air of mystery or untoward actions among their associates (even immediate family) that they are in any

way connected with such an organization. They must be trained to be natural, and instructed always to have a good reason for their presence anywhere, i.e., to "fit into the picture" wherever they are.

(d) In order that intelligence officers may be trained for their work they must be selected during peace, and by study prepare themselves for their duties. To aid in this training the Office of Naval Intelligence has prepared a correspondence course, in addition to which a thorough knowledge of this pamphlet would be valuable.

514. Identification. During the last war the Office of Naval Intelligence prepared identification cards that were issued to operatives as required to assist certain of them in certain phases of their work. Issue of these cards was restricted principally to operatives sent out directly from that office, but some were issued on request of District Intelligence Officers in special cases. This system would be followed again in case of necessity.

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION.

515. Counter-espionage operatives fall into three classes by the nature of their work, as follows :

(I) Regular operatives, assigned to a particular area, or to definite groups of individuals. They are expected to be generally alert; to be, or become, thoroughly familiar with their assigned area and all its activities; and to seek particularly to locate and know those they come to suspect of enemy traffic or subversive activities. They may or may not become acquainted with those they suspect, but must be able to point them out. They are general observers of all things within their small fields. They follow such investigations as may be directed by their superiors, and initiate investigations of such persons and activities as they come to suspect. They are news gatherers, and they must always be careful to maintain their secret status, which is vital to their successful work.

(II) Special operatives are those usually controlled by No. 1 or Nos. 2. They are given special tasks in any area or on special cases; to collect specific information on a particular person, group, firm or activity. Sometimes they will be in a roving status; often they are "planted" where sabotage or espionage has occurred, or where some particular act is expected. Unlike the regular operatives, the discovery of their status as agents is not necessarily fatal to their usefulness as they may disappear, to reappear in some other case or other area. Such an

uncovering is to be deplored, and avoided. (See par. 203 (c)). Special operatives should always be selected from those who are regular, reputable, and successful detectives or secret operatives in time of peace.

(III) Occasional operatives are those not regularly connected with the counter-espionage organization. It is often desirable to employ some individual, as for example a member of a commercial concern for a single occasion. Such an operative could be employed through his immediate superior in the firm without compromising the counter-espionage service. Likewise, by previous arrangement with the executives of the firm, an operative may be given employment within the plant or office.

OPERATIVES REPORTS

516. Operatives are expected to report promptly all occurences of importance that come to their notice, and to make regular routine reports at least weekly, even if it state "there is nothing to report". As stated above (par. 509 (f)), all reports should be made direct, by mail if possible, (and perhaps in cipher if this is considered desirable in certain cases), to No. 1, through a "cover" address. Oral reports to their immediate superiors may be permitted in extraordinary circumstances, but this is not to be encouraged. From time to time the operatives contact their executive, and keep him informed of their activities, but only at the call and by arrangement of the executive. To prevent identification of operatives in case their reports are intercepted, operatives are usually assigned fictitious names, but mystical aliases are to be strictly avoided. (See par. 402). A complete file of all operatives, with their aliases, will be kept in the Intelligence Officer's secret papers in his own safe. Reports must be transmitted by a method that will not only be expeditious, but will not create suspicion. Regular mail service may be utilized, with the possible exception of operatives reports from neutral countries, especially those showing partiality to the enemy. In such cases secret methods of communication must be used to get by the censor.

517. Types of Reports. Four distinct types of reports seem to have evolved from experience. Each of these relates to a different type of information, and because of the division of effort in the Office of Naval Intelligence it is undesirable to mingle information of different natures as this adds to the work of using it. The usual types of reports are as follows :

(I) Reports on Individuals. These should give - (a) the full name. (Initials cause confusion) of the suspected person or firm; (b) The address, or similar information if address is not available; (c) Citizenship; (d) Profession or business; (e) discription and other pertinent information; (f) Close associates; (g) Concrete facts, such as usual activities, character of offence or suspicious acts, place and date committed, source and reliability of information; and sometimes (h) steps taken, or disposition made, desired or contemplated. Unless these reports are made carefully, and every effort made for accuracy, a large number of useless suspect cards will result.

(II) Situation Surveys. Every District or Force Intelligence Officer will be expected to render to the Director of Naval Intelligence an estimate of the local situation at regular intervals to be decided by him. These will enable the Director to form an adequate idea of the circumstances under which the service is working, and of the activities and work going forward. District officers, (and their Nos. 1) may require such reports from their subordinates all the way down the line as needed or desirable.

(III) Special Reports cover such matters as special cases or sudden changes in the local situation such as new activities, change in morale, rapid changes in shipping, or an accumulation of minor matters none of which warrant a separate report. These reports should be in sufficient detail to give a good presentation of the new picture, and in a form closely approximating an individual report (#1) so far as it applies.

(IV) Summaries. These may be required monthly by the Director from District Intelligence Officers and from those in charge in other fields, giving a general summary of all counter-espionage operations for the period covered by the report. The following subject classification is suggested, at least to begin with :

A - ENEMY ACTIVITIES

I. Espionage.
(a) Political and economic secrets
(b) Naval and Military information.
(c) Trade espionage.
(d) General information.

II. Sabotage.
(a) Against life and health.
1. Civilian
2. Naval personnel.
(b) Damage to factories, shipping, docks, material, crops, etc., by explosion, arson, etc.

III. Propaganda.
(a) Political
(b) Pacifist
(c) Pro-enemy.

IV. Treason.
(a) Naval Personnel.
(b) Government employees.
(c) Civilians.

V. Industrial.
(a) Fraudulent contracts and Graft, either individual or organized.
(b) Labor agitation or obstruction of industrial efforts.
(c) Marked inefficiency in production of material or performance of construction work for the Government, for use directly or indirectly in connection with the conduct of the war.
(d) Supplying the enemy.

VI. Suspicious circumstances.
(a) Character or connections.
(b) Activity of unusual nature.
(c) Suspected disloyalty.
(d) Miscellaneous or unclassified matters.

B - CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

I. Violations of military law referable to naval authority.
(a) By naval or military personnel.
(b) By civilians.

II. Cases under the jurisdiction of civil authority.

III. Cases referred or referable to War Department, Department of Justice, or any other proper Government Department.

513. Funds for pay and expenses of operatives may be supplied to them at intervals of several weeks by their superiors in echelon, these disbursements being certified by receipts and vouchers back to the Intelligence Officer upward through the various echelons, and eventually to the Office of Naval Intelligence. It is expected that the District Intelligence Officers will receive funds by check from the Office of Naval Intelligence, but the funds for the lower echelons should preferably be by cash and by hand. The use of checks is apt to uncover the organization. Government checks are strictly to be avoided. The methods of handling funds, their transmission, receipt and accounting may vary according to local or special conditions and circumstances, as for example, a lone agent in a foreign field may have to receive his funds through the assistance of a business concern under color of commissions, etc. In general, however, the method outlined above is considered desirable.

519. Documentary Evidence. Operatives will frequently come into possession of letters and documents that are or were the property of suspects. Such material should be forwarded quickly to the "cover" address, and the Intelligence Officer, if he considers it advisable, will forward such matter to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Many papers that look harmless to the inexperienced eye may contain messages in code or cipher, or may carry hidden messages in secret ink. If possible the original document should be forwarded. When this is impossible photographic copies should be sent rather than a manual copy. Careful notes should be made and sent in with the paper giving time, place and the circumstances of the procurement, and all the papers should be so initialed or otherwise marked as to make later identification possible in court if necessary.

520. (a) Covering the Mails. Censorship will certainly uncover much valuable information on enemy activities, but their authority for examination may be limited by the legislation establishing their work to censorship of matters leaving or entering the country. The examination of domestic mails is another matter. No legal right exists for any person to open or tamper with first class mail travelling within the United States, except in the "Dead Letter Office", without a search warrant. Army authorities have contended that soldiers mail comes within their jurisdiction as soon as it is delivered to Army control, but this moot question yet remains to be settled by competent legislative authority in the event of a future war.

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Post Office Inspectors or agents of the Department of Justice have no authority to open mail, but both have been trained and have methods of securing information from the mails, and their cooperation is to be expected when needed.

(b) Censorship is supposed to prevent leaks via postal, telegraph, telephone, cable and radio communications not only of enemy agents but in the communications of those who may simply be innocently indiscreet. It does more than that. It detects spies, their methods, whereabouts and activities; locates enemy goods in storage; uncovers fraudulent sales; unmasks illicit trading with the enemy; uncovers artificial price fixing; gives tips on sabotage and propaganda efforts; and helps to provide a War Trade Board with the picture of where there are stocks of materials and how they are moving. It is a prolific source of information on a multitude of subjects to the Intelligence Officer. On the other hand, Intelligence must supply censorship with lists of suspected individuals and firms, and their activities, and must frequently make investigations of persons, firms and activities requested by censorship. The two organizations are closely allied, and must work together in close sympathy and harmony. This cooperation is essential to each.

521. Other Sources of Information. At naval stations information on enemy activity may be gained by "covering" all visitors groups, especially frequent visitors and loiterers; all tradesmen regularly supplying the base or officers quarters or any messes; by exchange of information with other naval intelligence organizations, the local or nearest Army organizations, other government organizations (especially Department of Justice agents, Secret Service and Postal inspectors), state and municipal police. Much information, and many "leads" have come from watching the classes and postmarks on mail entering and leaving postal stations, by inspection of newspapers and periodicals received and sent by suspects, and by establishing a waste basket censorship. Two bodies of observers and informants are already organized in the Boy and Girl Scouts. Through liaison with the local Scout Leaders these organizations might be most useful, but extreme care is necessary in the contact and in the selection of the individual children for such work. The American Protective League might also be reorganized. (See Chap. IX, "Fighting Germany's Spies", by French Strother). However, the Department of Justice is opposed to this as they seem to have found this auxiliary of little practical value, and its operations cluttered up the counter-espionage channels with avalanches of worthless reports. Their desire would be to expand their own organization as much as necessary.

522. (a) Disposition of Information. It is obvious that it is impossible for any single District Intelligence Officer, or the officer in charge in any foreign field, to collate the information except in his own field. Also, apparently unrelated bits in any one field may be most illuminating when matched up with something from another field. This is the function of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Accordingly, counter-espionage information must be carefully evaluated by each responsible head in the field, who either directs further investigation, or forwards the information to the Director of Naval Intelligence, or both. It also is apparent that there must be close cooperation between District Intelligence Officers, and also between intelligence heads (attachés) in countries abroad, and between similar organizations in other Government Departments and State and Municipal organizations.

(b) Great care must be exercised in reporting suspects. During the World War the card files on suspects grew to overwhelming proportions. There were more than 450,000 suspect cards on file in the Office of Naval Intelligence. The majority of these cards concerned innocent persons, so that efficient operation of that section was blocked by the flood of needless data. In a future emergency it is expected that intelligence officers will weigh carefully the evidence against suspected persons or firms, and will not label cards "Suspect" without reasonable grounds for definite suspicions. At the same time it must be realized that information on individuals and firms is a fundamental requirement of the censorship. The first information a censor requires is, "who is the sender?", next, "who is the addressee?", and third, "who are those mentioned in the text?"; this before he even considers the subject matter of any communication. Therefore, censorship cannot have too many information cards. But the information must be accurate, as full as possible, and the cards must not be classed as suspect cards unless the reason for suspicion is well founded.

(c) The forwarding of suspect information must, therefore be left largely to the discretion of the responsible intelligence officers in the various fields, Districts, Forces, Commands, and abroad. This means that information that is indefinite or that concerns only the local situation, should not be forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence. On the other hand, any information that may in any way affect the general situation, or of a case whose ramifications may extend beyond the jurisdiction of an intelligence officer, should be forwarded at once, with copies to the other intelligence officers obviously involved as speed and early advice is essential frequently to prompt cooperation.

523. Precautionary Measures. The first, best, and fundamental rule, especially for those in the military or naval service is to "Keep your eyes and ears open, and to keep your mouth shut." All personnel must be warned frequently not to discuss the war or any knowledge of any operations that they may possess in any place or way that it could possibly reach the enemy. This applies as well to the writing of letters. All personnel must particularly avoid speaking of ships movements, manoeuvers, or the names of vessels in any location within hearing of any strangers, or even friends or acquaintances whose status is not thoroughly known, especially within the hearing of others in cafés, hotels, or other public places. These precautions should also be extended to the general public, and particularly to employees within naval activities, and the personnel of the merchant shipping industry. In France during the war the nation was well placarded with posters in terse language, "Méfiez-vous! Taisez-vous!" ("Be on your guard! Keep your mouth shut!"). This necessity for guarded silence should be impressed upon the whole nation, and particularly upon legislators and those in all government positions. Wives are prolific sources of leaks. "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." (See "Secret Service" by Sir George Aston, pg. 124, for an illuminating example of gossip).

CHAPTER SIX.

Hints as to methods of Uncovering, Examining and Searching Suspects:

601. These notes have been gathered from an examination of many writings on Secret Service work, both espionage and counter-espionage, including written reports, orders, printed articles and books. Some of the sound material is from Confidential papers in the Archives of the Office of Naval Intelligence. While these notes cannot cover the whole field of human ingenuity, they will give hints, and open up trains of thought that will be productive in discovering who are acting as espionage agents, and should be a sort of "check off list" in examining them and their belongings to discover evidences of their activities. At the same time these notes may serve to give our own espionage operatives help as to what to avoid, since foreign counter-espionage services have more experience, and probably a greater fund of written material such as this.

LOCATING SUSPECTS

602. Persons engaged in espionage, sabotage, propaganda or subversive activities have been located by the following means:-

(a) Reported by loyal citizens as suspicious because of their actions, activities, speech, and associates. Intelligence offices are flooded with such reports from voluntary sources, particularly when there is a "spy scare".

(b) Uncovered by Censorship through their communications by mail, telegraph, cable or radio.

(c) Discovered by post office authorities because of the volume, character, source, or sending addresses of their mail; or because of fictitious names or addresses; or by reason of failure to receive mail via "General Delivery" from which it went to the "Dead Letter Office" where it was opened and studied.

(d) By observation and reports of the operatives of our counter-espionage service.

(e) Reports from citizens, police, postmen or our agents as to loiterers or those living easily with no visible means of support.

(f) Through the Red Cross.

(g) Reports from hospitals, hotels and shipping companies.

(h) From newspapers and news agencies as to those who insert, answer or inquire about advertisements that have a suspicious air. The papers, by long experience, are able frequently to spot and report any matter presented to them that is not bona fide.

(i) From banks and banking connections. These institutions quickly detect those making deposits and withdrawals that are suspicious, and also can follow marked or known currency that is under investigation or suspicion.

(j) Hotels. Room clerks, bell boys, porters, door men, maids, and hotel detectives, are prolific sources of information, and easily follow the movements, contacts, etc., of guests; and also soon acquire the ability to locate and report suspicious persons and activities.

(k) Railway, Pullman, Bus and Airplane services. Their employees are observant and frequently are keen sources of information as to identities and movements, and frequently report suspicious or furtive travelers.

(l) Telephone and Telegraph Companies. Their operators and personnel overhear much, constantly are on guard for wire-tappers, and are in and out of buildings, working on lines etc., constantly. They are a most loyal and useful body of observers and informers. Their records are so complete and meticulous as to afford much information as to calls, persons and locations. Requests for special services are always secretly investigated.

603. After the finger of suspicion points to an individual, a firm or activities, confirmation should be obtained by careful observation first, if possible. When the suspicion is confirmed, or if there seems to be liability of the person or persons involved decamping, or examination and search of the individuals is deemed necessary the arrests should be made either by the police, civil or military, or by regular federal agents. The civil authorities usually cooperate in these arrests.

EXAMINATION OF SUSPECTS

604.(a) The oral examination of suspects is an art acquired only by experience and practice. Usually lawyers experienced in cross-examinations in Court, or police officials familiar with the "grilling" of criminals make the best examiners. Newspaper men, versed in the wiles of "interviewing" would seem also to be indicated as desirable for this kind of work, but the Department of Justice does not find this borne out by their experience. (see Art. 313(b)). "Strong-arm" methods are to be avoided absolutely. Such methods always do more harm than good. If the examination and search is not conducted by officers of the intelligence organization, they should always be present, and perhaps guide the course of the interrogation.

(b) Two interviewers are sometimes, a very effective combination, working simultaneously, one of whom will be somewhat severe, and the other sympathetic, for the purpose of consecutively applying the differing methods to the person interviewed. Such pairs, if often used together, develop an excellent and very effective teamwork, but must exercise care not to let their methods get into a rut. All individuals do not respond in the same way and the teamwork must be suited to the individual.

(c) The interviewer should know the rudiments of practical psychology. Some interviewers have the gift of being able even to gain the confidence of the suspect. There are few times when a suspect can be forced against his will to reply to questions, and even if this be done, the answers are liable not to be truthful. The interviewer should be able to "speak the same language" so that slang expressions and technicalities may be understood in their proper meaning. An interviewer should have a good memory so that he can revert to apparent discrepancies later during an interview without referring to notes as such a reference invariably puts the suspect on guard.

605. In examinations accuracy is paramount. The suspect must be warned that "anything he may say may be used against him", and a stenographic record should be carefully made. The record may be recorded mechanically if dictographic equipment is available. The stenographer may be out of sight in another room, either with the door ajar or taking the notes over a hidden dictophone, or through a thin partition. The wall may have an opening, covered by a large map, etc. The report should be typed promptly while the memory of the interview is fresh. Replies should be carefully studied and compared, as discrepancies in statements give the opening for breaking down often very plausable stories.

606. The first axiom of interviewing, and evaluating the information received is to determine the abilities and limitations of the interviewed, to determine his degree of intelligence and competence. This axiom has many ramifications. The interviewer himself must be able to ask intelligent questions which presupposes a general basic knowledge of the subject, must be alert to recognize the import of statements made and to further develop the theme, and to detect avenues opened that may lead to new and unsuspected information. Much valuable information has been uncovered almost accidentally by recognizing "indicators" or leads that uncover new information and sources of development and investigation.

607. The following mental types have been classified, each of which requires different treatment and method of attack. The most dangerous suspects come under the first classifation.

(1) Individuals who are observant, accurate, and with education and background sufficiently comprehensive to enable them to appreciate and understand what is seen. With this type the interviewer will have no truble if the suspect will talk and tell the truth.

(2) Individuals who are observant and accurate, but whose background does not enable them to realize the import of what is seen or heard. This type is usually accurate in discription, and will frequently recall things seen, but forgotten because of lack of impression. Proper

use of leading questions will often help. This type is usually not misled when their memories are stimulated.

(3) Individuals whose powers of observation are not keen, and who have little ability to understand. This type is a rather hopeless one, but cannot be disregarded because corroborative information may be developed. They are usually sluggish, and not very often dangerous as agents.

(4) Individuals with preconceived ideas, whose minds are closed against anything tending to contradict such ideas, or who twist all material into such form as to support such ideas. This is the "Reformer" type, dangerous as agents or propagandists because fanatical, and prone not to count the cost. Often self-sacrificing to the extreme, blind to what they do not want to see, but eager to proselyte.

(5) Individuals lacking in observation, but whose imaginations supply supposed facts, not only not seen, but which frequently do not, or cannot, exist. This is often the type of voluntary informants, often super-suspicious, and who jump at conclusions. This type, however, is peculiarly susceptable to leading questions, but care must be exercised to avoid planting an idea that later may be flatly stated by the individual to be a fact borne out by observation. Not the "agent" type, and should be avoided as operatives.

(6) Individuals expert in some one field and keen and competent observers in that field, but who do not observe nor recognize limitations in other fields. This type may engage in special lines of activity or sabotage, and are usually very expert in one special line to the extent of being blinded in others.

608 The above types may each be further classified into the following groups, depending upon the tendency toward loquaciousness or taciturnity of the individual, and these characteristics always influenced by self-interest.

(1) Individuals who talk freely, and state accurately within the limits of their ability, and who recognize and admit their limitations. This type usually is also type 1 above, and usually presents no trouble other than the

willingness of the individual to talk. (See 6,9,10,12, 13 and 14 below)

(2) Individuals who talk freely as to what they believe, but without substantiation by facts or observation. Types 4 and 5 above are often in this class.

(3) Individuals who talk freely, but for the purpose of concealing facts or to prevent the questioner from directing the interview or keeping it in a direct line. This class usually is attempting to withhold information and is the most wily type to deal with. Real suspects are frequently of this type.

(4) Individuals who are too willing to talk, but have nothing to say, nor any facts to disclose. They repeat platitudes, or hearsay statements they have accepted without substantiation. Types 4 and especially 5 above are often in this class.

(5) Individuals who are unwilling to talk, but must be led out by direct or leading questions. These persons comprise the timid or shy who hesitate to express themselves for fear of argument, ridicule or contradiction. They lack force, and usually are harmless and far from helpful as agents.

(6) Individuals who refuse to talk. These persons present the hardest problem. There is no legitimate way to force the person to talk, and if there were there is little assurance of the statements being true. Furthermore, under duress the statements are usually either what the person thinks the interviewer wants to hear, or that will cause a release of the pressure without any other regard. Fortunately this type is rare.

(7) Individuals who have difficulty in expressing themselves, but who often have keen powers of observation and intelligence. These persons can be drawn out by being put at ease, by using easy conversational style rather than abrupt questioning, and by leading questions.

(8) Individuals who deliberately lie. This type is usually quickly discovered, and the truth eventually uncovered by exposing the lie. Suspects frequently start in this way,

and thereafter every statement made must be thoroughly verified.

(9) Individuals who avoid talking about themselves either through modesty or because the subject is dangerous or unpleasant. This type will often rise to the bait of correcting misinformation if the matter can be put in that form by the questioner.

(10) Individuals who talk freely so long as questions do not impugn their motivies or actions. This classification may generally be included in any and all others, as it comprises almost all human beings who in general are unwilling to tell or listen to anything tending to place the individual in a bad light. This characteristic is most important psychologically in drawing out the truth, and is of frequent use in dealing with difficult individuals.

(11) Individuals who resist direct questioning, sometimes because of pride or resentment. These can usually be drawn out by pursuing conversational or discussional lines, the questions being gradually introduced at intervals in the interview, and the information being put together later. (see 12 below)

(12) Individuals who hesitate, or resist divulging information he believes of value or importance either from innate stubbornness or which for some reason he does not want to disclose. In such cases the difficulty is increased by any appearance of eagerness, but the information must be drawn out skillfully in bits without the person realizing he is being pumped. This type is frequently the "double-spy" and usually wants compensation for his information. (see 11 above).

(13) Individuals who talk freely and reveal information readily, even when he realizes he should not, when the interviewer appears to have considerable information already. This type of interview usually partakes of the character of a two-sided discussion or argument.

(14) Individuals who divulge information, either readily, or with some degree of hesitancy or reticence, because of fear that he will become implicated or endangered if he does not. Usually such information is of a nature that involves others.

609. From the above it is evident that there is no universal rule in interviewing. Each person presents a distinct problem. The types given in paragraph 607 are seldom clear cut. Border line cases are the rule, and their reactions under interviews usually introduce a blanding of several of the classifications given in paragraph 608. Indeed, frequently individuals will shift from one classification to another during the course of an interview as their reticence is either broken down or built up. The interviewer must have some understanding of psychology, and an open mind. Some cases are insoluable because of adverse personal reactions between interviewer and interviewed, in which case the interviewer must avoid creating a prejudice, and turn the case over to another interviewer.

610. While there are no fixed rules, there are well recognized methods of approach with which interviewers must be familiar as follows:-

(a) The first necessity is to get as much accurate background information as possible as to nationality, age, married or single, children, place of birth, school attended, usual residence, names of friends and associates, business, personal characteristics, personality, habits, hobbies, prejudices, likes and dislikes. As much of this as possible should be known before the interview as it is invaluable to the interviewer to enable him the better to develop his theme, and to aid him in checking the information given, or to discover an assumed pose. It is also invaluable in opening an interview, which is usually best done in a conversational manner. However, the interviewer must be careful to make no claims to information that he does not actually possess, except under exceptional circumstances. Such claims or attitude are almost a universal weakness of interviewers, and frequently permits the person being interviewed to gain the distinct impression that the interviewer is bluffing. When this occurs the interviewer finds himself suddenly at a great disadvantage. (see Art. 608 (13)).

(b) The interviewer must play up to the temperament and characteristics of the interviewed. If his type is not already determined the interviewer must endeavor to make the classification as it is of great assistance in developing the interview, and an early determination of the type as given in

paragraph 307, and a further determination of a classification as given in paragraph 308 is of major value to the interviewer.

(c) The conversational start is of value in all interviews. It places the interviewed at his ease, frequently breaks down reticence, and tends to cloak the particular object of the interview which is sometimes necessary or advisable. It also enables the interviewer to determine his method of attack with difficult subjects, for some persons will talk when they are made angry, when they are flattered, when they are handled with dignity, when the veracity of their statements is challenged, when they respond to the use of liquor, or any other trick that may be used to get them to talking.

(d) The interviewer must have an open mind. He must bear in mind that no two people ever see the same thing alike, or have the same reactions. For example, even two news reporters sent to cover the same story will differ in their reports of an interview except where a written statement is given out that they can copy. Another peculiarity is found in the observations and reactions found between expected and familiar events and the unexpected. For example, a "fan" will expect, and will see, many things at a base ball game that will escape one unfamiliar with the game. Because of the excitement and tumult one unfamiliar with the action will have seen but fragments while often believing he has seen it all. They are not mentally tuned to the sudden happenings that burst on their minds, and are not prepared to watch the entire field, even if they could. In fact, the suddenness of an event may paralyze the powers of observation, and naturally dull their accuracy, even in the case of a veteran observer. Hence the interviewer must not be misled, and must determine what was actually observed and what was imagined.

(e) A participant has one viewpoint, a spectator another, so the interviewer must get the perspective of the interviewed, and realize the bearing the interview may have on the freedom, even the life of the interviewed.

(f) It is necessary to be wary of information too easily obtained. It is usually transmitted for a purpose. Determination of the motives actuating the interviewed is then necessary, and the interviewer should seek that line of information, too,

and very carefully, in order to determine the credibility of the information. It is true that often "when thieves fall out" truth begins to break out in many devious ways, but it is also true that "red herrings" are often dragged over trails to break the scent.

(g) As a general thing, information is more apt to be disclosed when it can be made evident to the person interviewed that his self interest will be benfitted thereby. Every effort should be made to emphasize this basic feature. Vanity or the self esteem or personal interest of the person interviewed should be appealed to and played upon whenever possible.

(h) From the above it is apparent that interviewing is primarily an art, to be mastered only by each individual in his own manner.

(i) In connection with the interrogation of suspects an apparatus known as the "Keeler polygraph", or "lie-dector" of the psychologists, may come into use. This is proposed as a regular part of the equipment of the G-2 Section of the Army staffs. This apparatus, through very definite reactions, indicate whether or not the person under examination is telling the truth. The instrument has already been used successfully in hundreds of instances in this country in the past few years and has conclusively demonstrated its worth. It is as valuable in determining innocence as guilt, particularly in cases of circumstantial evidence. In this instance the guiltless person has nothing to conceal, and has nothing to fear from the operation of the device. Guilty parties, on the other hand, when confronted by the evidence recorded against him by the polygraph usually break down and confess.

611. Evaluation.

(a) People, even those in jeopardy, are usually willing, or can be inveigled, to talk. The main problem thereafter is to appraise the information given. Everyone tends to color his statements, (even when given in all honesty), with what he believes, and most people are unable to determine the precise line between belief and fact. Similarly, our inhibitions and prejudices influence our actions and reactions to some degree. The tendency to color statements may be deliberate or sub-conscious.

(b) The interviewer, to the best of his ability, and with the least possible distortion due to his own beliefs and prejudices, must cull out facts. He must determine what the interviewed could know, could have seen or heard from an authentic source, his ability and / or willingness to transmit his information accurately, and the bearing of the information on the person interviewed.

(c) Evaluation is based on background information. Without that there can be no appraisal or checking of reports and information against facts. Much of this background is dependent on the activities and abilities of the field operatives, and the accuracy of their reports. If these are reliable and trustworthy, tests of value have been made, or will be made at once in their fields of activity, for evaluation must start with the gathering of information (facts) at the source in order to check information against probability, possibility, or their reverses.

(d) The information from interviews, then, must be checked against the general information forming the background, (known facts), and the possibility or probability of corraborative information on new points.

(e) It is by patching together the essentials that the complete, comprehensive, and true story is obtained.

(NOTE. Metropolitan publications have on their staffs those who are expert authorities in various fields aside from their newspaper work. These persons are used to appraise news arising in their fields to determine its value and pass judgement as to whether or not it is worthy of notice. One of their principal tests is the sincerity of the source. Other factors in the appraisal are the dependability, ability and motives of the source).

SEARCHES OF SUSPECTS AND THEIR EFFECTS.

612.(a) There are listed below a number of places where illicit communications have been discovered in searches of suspects and their belongings. While this list is no doubt incomplete in that human ingenuity will find new places and methods of concealment, nevertheless it will be of value as a starting point for examinations and check off list, and should initiate a line of thought as to what to examine; for what human ingenuity may evolve anew human ingenuity will discover.

(b) This list includes all places disclosed so far in a wide range of reports and books.

1. False bottoms in trunks, boxes and hand luggage.
2. Pasted under trunk and hand baggage linings.
3. Inner linings of clothing.
4. Under hat ribbons and sweat bands.
5. Inside shirt collar bands.
6. Inside soft collars and cuffs.
7. In hollow canes and ferrules.
8. In umbrella handles and ferrules.
9. In kodaks and kodak films.
10. Under the hotel and baggage stickers on baggage.
11. In and on the packing around fruit, flowers, etc.
12. In the stiff board covers of books.
13. In notes between the lines in books.
14. Pin pricks marking letters in books, magazines and newspapers.
15. On corset steels.
16. In samples of all kinds.
17. In trade catalogues, which are also sometimes code books.
18. In toys.
19. Worked into soap, sausages, stuffed fruits, candy and cakes.
20. In boxes of laundry.
21. In medicine pills and capsules.
22. In tooth paste and shaving cream tubes.
23. In jars of cold cream and cosmetics.
24. In cans of lard, paint, etc.
25. In cigars and cigarettes.
26. Under the dottle in pipes and in specially made pipe bowls.
27. In pipe stems, and cigar and cigarette holders.
28. In a hollow-tooth brush handle.
29. By marked or special playing cards.
30. Pin pricks on paper money.
31. By specially made up and marked calendars and time tables. These have also been used as ciphers for encoding messages that were never solved until the key was accidentally discovered.
32. In the fuel space in cigarette lighters.
33. In mechanical pencils, fountain pens and pocket flash lights.

34. Under linings of wallets and pocket books.
35. In hollow cuff links.
36. Inside buttons, especially cloth covered buttons.
37. In the rectum and in the vagina in women.
38. Inside false teeth and bridge work.
39. In ear, nose and mouth cavities.
40. Under glued down wigs.
41. In furs and feather boas.
42. In the hollow quills of feather trimmings on hats.
43. In hollow stems of flowers.
44. In womens' hat trimmings.
45. In hollow heels, under linings and in soles of shoes.
46. In the metal tips of shoe laces.
47. In watch cases, lockets, hollow rings, broaches and trinkets.
48. In the head of a hat pin.
49. In a tiny glass tube, intended to be carried in the body, containing an autograph letter from the Kaiser, reduced photographically to almost microscopic size, and to be enlarged before delivery.
50. Unevenly cut hems and seams in clothing, and seemingly frayed or raveled threads in seams have carried messages in code; the apparently awkward efforts of a poor seamstress or tailor being really the result of most skilful and painstaking labor by an expert.
51. Under stamps on letters and in the seams or pasted joinings of envelopes.
52. On cigarette papers, both made up and loose.
53. On cigar and cigarette packages, boxes and wrappings.
54. In the "scores" of music, the words being some popular song, but the position and value of the notes being a code. Try playing the piece. It may be unplayable or most discordant. (see Rowan pg. 228 for an example).
55. Apparently harmless "jingles" on an editorial page were discovered to contain code messages.
56. Be very suspicious of strings of beads or bracelets of multicolored beads or of different shapes, embroideries, or pictures wherein there are mosaics, blocks, brick walls, houses, cattle, animals, etc. in repetition, or apparent architects designs. Such things may easily carry messages in a "Biliteral Cipher" (see O.N.I. Archives Reg. No.11110, P-10-b)
57. The head has been shaved, written upon, the hair then allowed to grow, and on arrival at destination a reshaving, dry, revealed the message. The body also has been written

up with invisible ink. Therefore, cause the suspect to be shampooed, and to bathe, the water being treated with a solvent. Lime or lemon juice eradicates all tracings or markings. If the searcher can discover nothing, be sure no one else does.

58. Suspect freshly painted metal surfaces (in ships too). Often such surfaces had messages scratched on them which become visible by removal of the paint with a solvent.

59. Any papers, handkerchiefs, collars, shirts, underware, etc., can carry invisible writings. Examine suspected articles in strong sunlight, perhaps under a good magnifying glass or microscope, for suspicious marks, submit to heat tests, or have examined by an expert. Iodine brings out many secret writings.

60. Starched collars, cuffs, shirts, etc., and neck ties or scarf can be treated with a chemical. They can then be dipped in warm water, and thus produce an ink for secret writings.

61. Buttons or pins are sometimes identification badges between agents.

62. Examine fruit skins and plant leaves for writings in invisible ink or scratched with a sharp instrument.

63. Inside hollow spectacle rims.

64. Under the rubber eraser of a lead pencil.

65. A message may be written on a mirror with tailor's French chalk; this is rubbed off, but writing becomes visible if one breathes on the glass.

66. Bombs, both explosive and incendiary are made in a number of forms, and some are very powerful and dangerous. Some are made to look like fountain pens and pencils, and similar easily carried pocket forms.

67. Similar to the above, containers for poisons and disease germs are carried, for use in contaminating water and food supplies and sources, and for causing outbreaks of sickness.

68. Lumps of sugar have been found, containing, in an inside capsule, germs for spreading fevers, and causing death to animals, especially horses and mules.

69. Dangerous bombs, both explosive and incendiary have been made to look exactly like lumps of coal for starting fires in cargo, and for damaging locomotives and for sabotage in industrial plants.

70. Fish in an old trawler concealed bombs for destroying water front works, docks and locks.

71. A powder has been invented that carries poison gas, can be inconspicuously strewed about, and gives off lethal gases for days after the action of air upon it.

72. An ordinary candle may contain dispatches, inks, chemicals, explosives, etc.

73. A woman's sewing kit may contain contraband. Messages were carried inside pin cushions, and also by the kind and arrangement of pins in a cushion.

74. A false bottom in a bucket carried a camera that took pictures through the bottom.

75. The photograph on a passport was covered by a fine, transparent, invisible film, on which were more than three thousand words in code, accounting for recent German troop movements. That photo was passed and stamped by a German visa officer and went to France.

76. An ink of vinegar and alum is used on the shells of hard boiled eggs. These, included in a box of fresh eggs, ostensibly going to market, are later removed, the shells opened, and upon the solid albumen will be found distinct, dark brown lettering.

77. Stitching on gloves has carried code messages.

78. A stamp collector's album, and the mailing or exchange of stamps, sometimes rare ones, was a code.

79. Player piano rolls, ostensibly music, were contrived as a code, and while unplayable or discordant, were successful for a while.

80. Picture post cards have concealed messages within the card, under the picture.

81. Code messages have been transmitted by price tags on articles in store windows, to be read by an "interested" shopper, by the graduated level of water in small tanks and aquaria in a pet shop window, and by the kind and arrangement of bottles and glasses in a wineshop window.

(c) An examiner must not be mislead by size. The Lord's Prayer has been legibly engraved on the head of an ordinary pin. During the world war great progress was made in microphotography, and since then even greater development has taken place both in the technique and in the material for reducing and enlarging pictures. The rule is to suspect and examine every thing, regardless of the apparent possibility or probability of the concealment of contraband.

(d) There are handwriting, ink and photographic specialists whose expert services would be most valuable, and in many cases essential, in uncovering illicit correspondence. An interesting pamphlet on this matter is contained in the Office of Naval Intelligence Archives, Register No. 21001, P-10-a, which should be reproduced and distributed when needed.

613. During the world war the following instructions were issued for searching women suspects. Except for such special parts of these instructions as apply to women only, the same instructions are equally applicable to men. There are quoted here as a guide in conducting such searches of the persons and apparel of suspects:-

1. (a) All examinations of female suspects should take place in the presence of at least two female inspectors, inspector number 1 being equipped with power to make vaginal, rectal, and other cavity examinations, and inspector number 2 to act as watch while inspector number 1 is apparently engrossed.

(b) Inspecting equipment to consist of sterile rubber gloves, tube of "Ky" (a lubricant), a vaginal speculum, rectal speculum, a sponge stick with cotton sponges, nose and ear specula, a powerful pocket lens, a sharp penknife, and wide camel's hair brush.

2. (a) Starting with the jewelry, all watches should be opened and examined on both inner cases with pocket lens for code numerals or other marks. All lockets and similar hollow cases should be opened, contents removed, and the inside of the cases and the contents similarly examined under the lens for the same code numerals or marks.

(b) All tortoise-shell combs and hair ornaments or pins with silver, gold or other metal trim, should be first given the intensive light test, and if put together in suspicious fashion, decorations should be removed.

3. (a) Clothing, hats, all inner linings ripped with a pen-knife, crinoline underlinings removed and tested for sympathetic writing; all bands, ribbon loops, fur and trimming opened, and if made of sheer material, passed before

strong light for shadow test; if washable, tested for sympathetic writing; if decorated with large ornamental buttons, the buttons must be tested for possible cavities containing contraband, if cloth covered examination must be made that nothing is concealed under the cloth.

(b) Coats. All seams must be subjected to minute bi-manual test, and light test if feasible, if there is the least uncertainty the seams must be opened. Collars, lapels and all doublings require minute examination bemanually and by light test. All pockets must be opened for false bottoms, doublings or linings. All shields must be opened at seam for examination for sympathetic writing on sheer muslin lining, which must be tested. All large buttons must be tested as noted above. Linings. If too thick for subtile hand examination or satisfactory light test, linings must be ripped open.

(c) Skirts. All seams and hems must be subjected to bi-manual and light tests if feasible; if any uncertainty exists these parts must be opened. Double waist bands must always be ripped. All large or fancy buttons must be examined as noted above. Washable skirts must be subjected to sympathetic writing tests.

(d) Blouses. If washable tested for sympathetic writing, given light test, shields opened, buttons searched, all elastic waist bands stretched and twanged. If of silk or heavy material, trimmed suspiciously, all seams are to be searched, shields opened, wire or crinoline stiffening removed from collars, and all metal ornaments removed, and all minutely examined.

(e) Underwear. All seams and hems are to be subjected to light test, and all shadows inspected by seam opening, all patches and doublings are to be minutely examined, and opened if necessary. All elastic bands are to be examined as in blouses.

(f) Corsets. Must be given thorough bi-manual and light tests; all elastic garters opened, stretched and snapped; all shadows beyond bones investigated by ripping; all

small pads and doublings removed or opened; all corset bones or steels removed and searched under lens.

(g) Stockings. All hems light tested.

(h) Footwear. Test for false heels, false soles, false linings, including inside of tongues. Careful examination must be made even down to the toes.

(i) All garments must be examined on both sides, and all must be turned inside out.

4. If suspect insists on being protected while being stripped, then examining inspector number 2 must stand in rear while number 1 goes ahead with the examination from the front. The protecting towel or sheet must be held in place by both hands of the suspect and she must be required to spread her feet wide apart so that anything she may have held between the legs would fall.

5. Body examination. Hair to be taken down, unbraided and combed. Examine minutely for wig glued down; remove false hair, curls, switches, etc., and examine minutely; test for sympathetic writing along all hair parts, bald spots, and over old wound tissue. Inspect ears with speculum for ear wads, examine all crevaces of the ears carefully. Inspect nose with speculum for nose packing. Remove false teeth; examine mountings, particularly those of upper jaw having a false roof in the mouth. Examine carefully under tongue, and in all cul-de-sacs. Examine cheek cavities either with speculum or finger. Examine axillas, arms and fingers, creases back of knees, between the toes, and under nails if they are long. Examine creases under both breasts. Vaginal and rectal examination should be made using sterile rubber gloves and specula, always being sure assistant is present and ready to help. All sanitary napkins should be inspected, and if at all disturbed, tested for sympathetic writing or enclosed papers. Tests for sympathetic writing should be made with wide camel's hair brush, sopped on over all broad expanses of flesh.

6. In extreme cases an intestinal test is also considered advisable. This consists of an ample enema, using a solution of Epsom salts in warm water.

614. Notes and Instructions on the visit and search of ships outside of neutral or national waters are contained in the "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare", and notes to aid in the examination and search of vessels within our own ports are contained in the "Instructions and Orders for Port Guards and Naval Ship Inspectors".

SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS

615.(a) It is impossible to state any definite rules or established procedure for the conducting of a surveillance of any person. Each case requiring this type of activity is different from every other case, and the circumstances of each case require different tactics. It is possible, however, to state a few general principles which should be considered by persons engaged in conducting a surveillance. These principles are offered solely as suggestions and are not to be considered as constituting a set procedure to be followed in each case, but it is believed that these suggestions in whole or in part can be profitably applied in giving consideration to each case as it arises.

(b) In conducting a surveillance there are two primary considerations to be kept in mind: first, that the person under surveillance should be within sight of the shadower constantly, and secondly, the person shadowed should not be aware of the fact that he is being watched, and followed, and he should not, of course, know the identity of the person or persons who are shadowing him.

(c) If such procedure is possible before taking up the surveillance of a person, the operative should familiarize himself with all known contacts, places of residence, places of business and recreation, and the general habits of life of the person shadowed, so that in the event he does lose the trail, he may be thereafter able to again locate the shadowed person. The operative should also become familiar with the appearance of the subject of his surveillance. He should know

in detail his facial features, both front and profile views, and should also be familiar with the color and kind of clothing that the shadowed person wears, as well as being familiar with the peculiarities of build and gait. He should likewise be familiar with the shadowed person's appearance from the rear. If the operative is familiar with the shadowed person along all lines indicated above, he will be able to recognize him from any angle, as well as from any distance. The details of appearance set out above can, of course, be best obtained only by actual observance of the subject of the surveillance, although in emergency matters observation of photographs of the shadowed person and a study of a furnished physical description may be satisfactory. Wherever possible the subject of the surveillance should be pointed out to the operative by someone who has actually seen and is acquainted with the subject of the surveillance.

(d) Executives instructing subordinates to conduct a surveillance of a person should consider all circumstances in each case before deciding upon the number of operatives who will be assigned to maintain the surveillance in a particular situation. In a fairly crowded city, the best results can generally be obtained by the use of three operatives. One operative should follow the subject closely, another should follow farther behind, while the third operative should follow the subject on the opposite side of the street. In the event the subject becomes suspicious of any operative, this operative should, of course, immediately discontinue his surveillance, permitting the other operatives to continue the assignment.

(e) If the person under surveillance uses an automobile frequently, an operative should be furnished with an automobile, so that he can follow whenever the subject uses this means of transportation. Operatives having a person under surveillance should be prepared to follow him wherever he goes. If the shadowed person boards a public conveyance to go to some other city or town, the operative should, of course, be prepared to follow him. Operatives should always have pre-arranged plans as to the action they will take in the event the subject uses a different mode of transportation than is his usual custom Operatives should, of course always carry sufficient money with them to permit them to travel to any point.

(f) If the person shadowed is of a suspicious nature or may suspect that he is being followed, the operatives conducting the surveillance should be changed as often as possible. Where automobiles are used in a surveillance their drivers as well as the cars themselves and the license plates should be changed frequently.

(g) The fundamental consideration in maintaining surveillance of a person is for the operative to at all times act naturally and to appear to be following some ordinary business. The operative should not act suspiciously or be self-conscious, as such actions may be observed by the subject. The operative should at all times be as inconspicuous as possible; this of course entails the wearing of ordinary clothes of a style and type which will fit in with the environment, community and pretext which the operative is using in doing his shadow work. Under no circumstances should there be anything unusual about the appearance of the operative in relation to his surroundings. In the event the subject confronts the operative and demands to know why he is being followed, the operative should emphatically deny that he is shadowing or following anyone. No hesitancy should be shown in making this denial.

(h) In the event the subject of the surveillance enters a building or dwelling or public place into which it is not deemed advisable for the operative to follow, the operative should, while awaiting the reappearance of the subject, appear to be engaged in some type of activity which will not look unusual.

(i) The utilization of any pretext making the operative appear to be casually present at the particular point should be encouraged. If there is a street car stop near, the operative can appear to be waiting for a street car, or he can be looking into shop windows or otherwise appear to have a good reason for being in the neighborhood.

(j) When it is necessary for an operative to follow a subject from one city or town to another city or town by train or public conveyance, arrangements should be made to relieve the operative by another operative immediately upon arrival at the destination, since the subject will have be-

come fairly familiar with the appearance of his fellow passengers and should he therefore observe one of them at several different places in the destination city, he will naturally become suspicious.

(k) Operatives engaged in the surveillance of a person should never openly contact one another or even recognize each other. They should not congregate in groups and when one operative relieves another, it should be accomplished without any sign of recognition. When two or more operatives are engaged in the surveillance of a person, they should arrange for some simple method of communication with one another which will not be noticed by the subject. Some system of signals will be necessary for instance to indicate that one operative finds it necessary to discontinue his surveillance because his identity has become known or for some other reason and therefore he desires his co-operative to replace him. Signals may be arranged to indicate that the person being followed has made the expected contact and that it is now time to take the necessary action, which may be to cause his arrest, or to summon assistance or to discontinue the surveillance. Any system of communication adopted should be as simple as possible and comprehensive enough to provide for the secret transmission from one operative to another of such information as may be found necessary in each case.

(l) A precaution that should always be taken in conducting a surveillance of a person is to watch for and guard against the shadowed person being accompanied by a confederate who follows at a distance or on the opposite side of the street for the purpose of determining whether anyone is shadowing the subject.

SURVEILLANCE OF PLACES

616 (a) In planning a surveillance of a house, apartment, room or building, a careful survey should be made of the premises to be watched. Discreet inquiry should be made to determine the character of the neighborhood and of the houses or buildings adjacent to or across the street from the house to be watched. Discreet efforts should be made by the operative to obtain quarters in a building from which the premises in question may be observed. The utilization of the dwelling

house or other premises of a person known to be reliable and who will permit his property to be used for surveillance purposes is at times very valuable. In some cases it is desirable to rent quarters under a suitable pretext. Any premises obtained for this purpose should of course be as close as possible to the building, apartment or rooms under surveillance, and should be physically so situated as to give a clear view of all possible exits and entrances to the premises.

(b) In particular situations consideration should be given to the establishing of a means of communication between the operative maintaining a surveillance of certain premises and his associates so that information developed or activities observed may be promptly transmitted without abandoning the surveillance. The telephone is of course the best means for such communication. If the circumstances require such tactics, consideration should be given to the desirability of maintaining in the immediate vicinity of the premises occupied by the operative, an automobile or other appropriate means of transportation, for use of the operative in continuing a surveillance of an individual who may come out of the premises under surveillance.

(c) In occupying premises while maintaining a surveillance of a building, rooms, apartments or other property, the operative should so situate himself as to be unobserved by persons on the outside. This procedure will generally require that the shades on the windows of a room occupied be drawn and that lights be extinguished in the evening. Operatives entering and leaving quarters occupied for surveillance purposes should do so in such a manner as not to arouse suspicion. It has been found valuable for operatives to use entrances whenever possible, and when such action would not in itself excite suspicion. Operatives should not arrive and depart in groups, nor should they leave and enter their cover any more frequently than is absolutely necessary. The house, apartment or room occupied by the operatives should give every appearance of occupancy by regular inhabitants.

(d) Where the premises under surveillance are located at some distance from the vantage point, binoculars can very often be used to advantage.

(e) Where it is necessary to conduct surveillance of an apartment or of a room in a hotel, it is often possible to secure the assistance of the management of the hotel where such management is known to be reliable and trustworthy. In such cases, assistance may be obtained from switchboard operators, bellboys, porters, elevator operators and other employees who are in a position to observe and report on the activities and contacts of the occupants of a certain apartment or room. Where conducting a surveillance of a room or apartment from similar premises occupied by the operative, an effort should be made to obtain a room or apartment as near as possible to those under surveillance, and preferably on the same floor, situated in such a manner as to give a clear view of as much as possible of the place under surveillance. The occupancy of such quarters and entrances and exists thereto should be made in such a manner as not to arouse suspicion. The rooms under surveillance can be observed through a transom or by keeping a door slightly ajar.

(f) Where the house or building to be watched is in an isolated location or so situated that no places are available from which a surveillance can be maintained, the desired results may be obtained by having an operative cruise past the place periodically in automobiles. In such cases, it is imperative that the automobiles and drivers be changed frequently so that suspicion will not be aroused. When conducting a surveillance from an automobile, it is not advisable to keep the car parked in one location with several occupants in it as strange men waiting in a parked automobile usually arouse suspicion.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Inspection and Control of Passports and Seamen's Identity Cards

701. A passport is nothing more than an identification certificate, which, as a general rule, is unreliable in war. The manufacture of false passports, and the changing of genuine passports for use by persons other than those to whom they had been originally issued became a very important activity of all espionage organizations during the war. Methods were developed by all the belligerents for counterfeiting both military passes and passports so that they could not be distinguished from the genuine. Embossed covers, water-marked and engraved paper, leporello foldings, all were counterfeited, and signatures were forged with astounding accuracy. The Germans developed a glue that prevented the removal of passport photographs, and the French retorted by blotting out the photograph, re-sensitizing the paper, and then printing on a new photograph. The ordinary, peace-time control of travel by passports is not safe in war. Agents, especially, are certain to be provided with credentials that are to all appearances, genuine. An illuminating report of such authentic German activities is in ONI Archives, Reg. No. 4941 - E-1-a, dated 3 Aug. 1915.

702. In spite of the above remarks, passport control is a very important factor in preserving security, and its various phases must be thoroughly studied by those officers who may have to scan such papers and pass upon the desirability of permitting their bearers to enter the United States during war.

703. Captain W. R. Sayles, U.S.N., in some notes from Paris while attaché there reported that:-

> "During the war every nation that I came in contact with not only changed its form of passport, but the method of obtaining them and their supervision several times. It was well nigh hopeless to keep in touch with the various rules and regulations concerning them, that were adopted by the various Governments. Likewise the necessary visas to have on them to pass from one country to another.

"In one notable instance at least they were a prolific source of graft for minor officials. To discover a false one took very much of an expert. As a method of preventing the passage of an enemy agent they were useless. They did serve, though, to stop and prevent people from travelling, at least those that did not know the method by which the official ways might be greased. In numerous cases we discovered that they had been left with hotel keepers, saloon keepers, etc., as security for unpaid bills. They were even used as collateral to secure loans.

"It took over three years and a half of war to secure any real attempt at supervision or control over them. Of course this is not primarily a function that belongs to a Naval Attaché, or an Intelligence Service. It is a State Department paper, and as such the regulating and control of them should rest with a representative of that Department. The system that was finally used in France after repeated urgings by both Army and Navy Intelligence Services, seemed to work very well and spared the individual as much inconvenience as possible.

"A central bureau was established under State Department representatives. Every night at five p.m. a list was made up of all applications received during the day, either for extensions, renewals, applications, or permission to travel. This list was sent by messenger to the Naval Attaché where it was checked over with the card index system, and the old files of the same list. If a name was not found in either of these lists it was passed, and the passport bureau informed the next morning. In case a name appeared that was on the black list, suspect list, or suspected nationality list, the matter was held up for further investigation. Thus no visa could be secured or passport issued until both Army and Navy Intelligence had given their permission.

"After a great amount of labor, State, Army and Navy representatives working together, a census was finally obtained of all civilian American citizens in France. It was fairly accurate and correct I think. If memory serves me right it amounted to about nine thousand names. Every American, civilian, that entered France from anywhere was immediately added to this list. As soon as he had obtained a visa to leave the country his name was struck off the list after he had been checked at the port or place of departure. Theoretically under this system track was kept of every one of our nationals in the country. It was an excellent system and served its purpose admirably, but it took a long while to make the authorities at home see the necessity for it. But if other nations from the beginning of the war had adopted the same system in principle, or had adopted any real system, it would have helped the Allied cause greatly. Under this system a check was kept on every American citizen once in six months, passports being issued only for that length of time. If the time of renewal had been three months instead of six, this would have improved the control just so much more.

"Anyone who was familiar with the work of the various Intelligence Departments of the various Governments knows the necessity for rigid passport control. This pertains whether your own country is a belligerent or not; Americans in large numbers with American passports, were used indiscriminately by both parties to the war for espionage and propaganda work, especially during those years when officially we were a neutral nation." (See Archives 3699, E-1-d).

704. During the war there was, for a time, some lack of cooperation on the part of U.S. Consulates in regard to travel control in general (See Archives Reg. No. 11505, U-4-b), and efforts were made to have Vice-Consuls placed in Consulates who were to represent the Naval Attaché for

passport control work, and to be directly responsible to him as the representative of the Ambassador for passport control, but this arrangement was not approved.

705. Under date of 5 June 1918, the State Department issued a "Supplement No. 1 to General Instructions No. 535 of 26 July, 1917" to clarify and direct the "Control of Persons Coming to the United States During the War." After the receipt of this Supplement in some instances the Naval Attachés were designated as Passport Control Officers, and all Consular Officers were directed to cooperate actively to the fullest extent with, and to refer all applications for visas, verification of passports, new or emergency passports and registrations to, the Naval Attaché for his specific recommendation. This, of course, slowed down the movements of travellers. Before that the Consulates had gone on the assumption that they were to expedite travel, while exactly the opposite was desirable. People who are in too much of a hurry to travel, unless they be on official business, are always immediately under suspicion. And if their travel is official the Embassy will see to it that their movements are properly accelerated, and made as easy as possible in the natural course of events.

706. (a) The first point in passport control is the consideration of the person seeking to travel, his real status. He must be checked against a list of known enemy agents or suspects, those suspected of trading with the enemy or members of firms under such suspicion, or those having sympathy with the enemy. Such lists must either be on hand already, or must be compiled or furnished as quickly as possible, and must thereafter be carefully kept up to date.

(b) The next point to consider is why the travel is desired.

(c) If either of these points discloses reasons for refusing the visa or permit it is withheld.

707. Under date of 8 August, 1918, the President of the United States issued a Proclamation to carry out the provisions of an act of Congress entitled "An Act to Prevent in Time of War Departure From and Entry Into the United States

Contrary of the Public Safety", approved 22 May, 1918. The Proclamation stipulated in part that:-

> "1. No citizen of the United States shall receive a passport entitling him to leave or enter the United States, unless it shall affirmatively appear that there are adequate reasons for such departure or entry and that such departure or entry is not prejudicial to the interests of the United States.
>
> "2. No alien shall receive permission to depart from or enter the United States unless it shall affirmatively appear that there is reasonable necessity for such departure or entry and that such departure or entry is not prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

708. (a) For carrying out the Presidential Proclamation mentioned above the Secretary of State was made principally responsible, and he is turn issued, under date of 8 August, 1918, confidential instructions for the "Control of Foreign Travel."

(b) Art. 3 of these instructions, with regard to U. S. citizens, said in part that "The Secretary of State upon receipt of an application for a passport shall forthwith submit notice thereof to the Military Intelligence Branch, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice for such information as said respective intelligence services may have available upon the applicant and for such comments as they desire to make."

(c) Art. 27 of the instructions, with regard to aliens, said "The Secretary of State, upon receipt of an application to depart from the United States transmitted by a permit agent, shall forthwith submit copies thereof to the Military Intelligence Branch, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice for such information as said respective intelligence services may have available upon such applicant, and for such recommendations as to granting or withholding permit to depart as such services shall desire to submit."

(d) Art. 49 of the instructions said, with regard to the examinations of travelers, "Representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Branch, and the Department of Justice shall be entitled to attend and participate in all examinations of aliens or citizens about to depart from or enter the United States. If any of such representatives objects to the departure or admission of an applicant the Control Officer shall temporarily refuse permission to depart or enter and shall forthwith refer the case to the Secretary of State for final decision; provided that no American passport shall be taken up without the consent of the Secretary of State."

(e) The said instructions also gave a complete list of the forms required to be filled out when applying for visas or permission to travel, and showed the requirements for passport photographs required to be submitted with each such application.

709. (a) The rules above, while applicable to the whole subject of passport control, were primarily designed for action in the United States at ports of entry. In order to obtain greater cooperation with this service at home, and to obtain better cooperation of Consular Agents abroad, the supplementary instructions mentioned in art. 705 above were issued.

(b) Art. 1 of this supplement said in part "It has been found advantageous to complement the Consular function by coordinating therewith the effective aid of certain military attachés, who are to be regarded as experts having special training and as being in a position to take advantage of their facilities in the discharge of their particular function.

"It has been found in practice neither needful nor convenient that military and naval attachés have desk room in the Consulates. Their rank and status classes them with the diplomatic, rather than the consular, branch. Their special function in the matter of Passport Control is coadjutant, being neither subordinate nor directory. It is their province to make special investigation in cases relative to enemy activities, and it is expected, that in this regard, they will be consulted by Consular officers before visas are granted or refused, in order that all information possessed by or accessible to the attachés may be before the Consul in each case.

This can be effected at each Consular Office by sending all visa declarations to the Military or Naval Attaché (or to both at Missions where both are assigned) calling attention by accompanying memoranda, to cases which may seem doubtful; or, when such a course be practicable, by affording to the Attachés opportunity to examine declarations in the Consulates and to question the applicants for visas. In either case, recommendations by Attachés that visas be refused, which are based on military grounds, are to be followed by Consular Officers, but cases which involve only the administration of the immigration laws are to be decided solely by the responsible Consular Officers. The latter, moreover, may refuse visas in cases where the Attachés may not find grounds for categorically recommending that visas be refused. In short, Consular officers are charged specifically with the due administration of the regulations, and Military and Naval Attachés with the collection and coordination of the intelligence upon which the prescribed control may be properly effected; and herein it should be understood that the word "control" is used in its primary, and now-Continental, sense of supervising, verifying or ascertaining the correctness of certain administrative action, and not as indicating the exercise of directory authority or restraint. The functions of both Consular and Military or Naval officers in the matter of Passport Control are under the direct supervision of the heads of Missions. These latter are expected to see that Consular officers and the Attachés limit their activities to the conscientious and effective discharge of the duties respectively assigned to them, and to decide in the case of any differences of opinion which may arise between Consular officers and attachés, reporting to the Department of State in the latter case."

(c) Art. II of the Supplement said in part "The Department expects that diplomatic and consular officers will refuse visas in all suspicious cases, whether or not there is tangible evidence to support the suspicion that the bearer of a passport desires to proceed to the United States for an enemy purpose."

(d) Art. III of the Supplement said in part "- - - Cases will, no doubt, frequently arise when it will be necessary for the Consulate to refuse to visa passports of aliens

who propose to go to the United States. In view of the probability that a person who desires to go to the United States for an inimical or objectionable purpose, and who has been refused a visa by one Consular officer, will apply for a visa to another Consular officer, you are instructed to notify the Mission and the principal Consular officers in the country in which you are stationed of your refusal of the visa, and to furnish them with the name, nationality, age, passport number and a brief statement of the reason for the refusal of the visa. Consular officers will at the same time inform the Missions in the countries through which it is possible for a traveler from their districts to pass, or whence he might sail for the United States, that he has refused a visa in the case under consideration. The Mission in each such country will thereupon inform the principal Consular officers in that country that the passport visa has been refused in each particular case. A Consular officer should, where possible, retain for investigation the passport of an applicant if the visa is to be refused, for a sufficient length of time to enable him to inform the American representatives in the country in which he is stationed. If the applicant for a visa declines to deposit the passport at the Consulate, the Consular officer will telegraph the Mission and the principal Consular officers in the country in which he is stationed and inform them that a visa has been refused, so as to prevent the applicant from obtaining a visa at another Consulate what has not been informed of the action taken."

(d) Art. VI of the Supplement said:

"In determining whether a passport should be visaed, all Consular Officers should take into consideration the real urgency or necessity of the proposed journey. When there is no satisfactory proof that the journey is necessary, a visa should be refused. The Department does not deem it advisable to attempt to prescribe fixed rules as to the interpretation of the word "necessary" which will cover all possible cases, but prefers to grant wide discretionary powers to Consular Officers in determining whether necessity exists in a particular case. The following rules; however, should be observed by officers:

"a. Emigrants, such as laborers, skilled or unskilled, farm hands, mechanics, domestic servants, etc., should be permitted to proceed to this country unless reasons exist to the contrary in particular cases. (But see paragraph 14, General Instructions 535, July 26, 1917, and paragraph 7 infra.)

"b. Persons whose only, or chief, object in desiring to proceed to, or through, the United States, is pleasure or recreation, should not be granted visas.

"c. Persons who wish to come to the United States merely to visit friends or relatives or for reasons of health should ordinarily be refused visas, but unusual cases, particularly those of persons desiring to obtain special medical treatment, should be referred to the Department. In such cases references in this country should be given, and if a telegram is sent to the Department the applicant must bear the expense.

"d. Persons who allege business as a reason for the journey, should be required to produce satisfactory evidence, preferably documentary, in support of their allegations; if such proof is presented, a visa may be granted, in the discretion of the Consular Officer.

"e. Persons desiring to come to the United States to take advantage of educational facilities not obtainable in their own countries, may be granted visas unless reasons exist to the contrary in particular cases."

(e) Article XI of the Supplement stated:

"Consular officers will not only turn over immediately all suspicious visa applications, for investigation, to the Military or the Naval officer attached to the Mission in the country in which they are stationed, but will also refer to the Military Attaché all persons having military intelligence to convey.

"The Military Attaché is to be furnished as well with all information of a military character which comes to the Consul's attention. The Department regards such cooperation as vitally important for safeguarding the United States."

(f) The Supplement was preceded by some special instructions by cable to the American Legation at Copenhagen for their further distribution, under date of 2 October, 1917, which said in part:

> "The Department has decided that the so-called passport control shall be administered by Consular Officers and work of visaing passports shall be performed by them as prescribed by Circular Instruction five thirty-five of July twenty-six last, now enroute. Diplomatic Missions will have general supervision of Consular Officers which supervisory authority heads of Missions may in their discretion exercise through the Military or Naval Attaché in each country, - -
>
> "Military and Naval attachés are being similarly instructed." (See O.N.I. files 20956 - 26).

This despatch was evidently incorporated in modified form as part of the provisions of the Supplement, which superseded the despatch, and did not give the attachés as strong a position in the passport control.

710. (a) A confidential circular letter from the Director of Naval Intelligence was sent out to attachés under date of 29 March, 1918, (ONI file No. 20974 - 12), in part as follows:-

> "Subject: Passport Control.
>
> 1. For your information a brief outline of the method of handling crews and passengers on neutral ships arriving in and departing from this country is hereby furnished.
>
> Under the Espionage Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, the authority of the law governing all these matters is vested in the Treasury Department. Last Summer this office found that no attempt to carry out the provisions of these Acts was being made by the Treasury Department other than the usual steps taken in time of peace. The Treasury Department stated that it did not have sufficient force to properly handle this work and asked this office for assistance, which was immediately given.

Realizing from the beginning the importance of this Control, continual efforts have been made to perfect the system and it is believed now that these matters are reaching a point where there is at least partially perfected control. Arrangements have been made with the Treasury Department whereby the Office of Naval Intelligence has taken certain classes of the work.

All ships upon arrival in this country are boarded at Quarantine and upon all neutral ships a guard is placed which remains on board during the vessels entire stay in port. These guards are for the double purpose of protection of the ship and prevention of smuggling information out of or into the country. Each member of the crew is searched and this search undoubtedly prevents the carrying ashore of any except specially prepared and cleverly concealed documents.

The only method of preventing desertion from the vessel is to keep the crew on board during the vessels stay in port. This office has, for some time past, been trying to put such an arrangement into effect. All members of the crew are mustered and inspected and only those having the proper identification papers are allowed to go ashore or to sail when the ship leaves.

In addition to this, an arrangement has been made through the State Department whereby the masters of all vessels bound for the United States furnish to the U. S. Consuls a crew list which is forwarded to the Naval Attaché. The Naval Attaché by this time should have a list of suspects with which the crew list should be compared. The U. S. Consul will not issue a bill of health to the ship until the Naval Attaché reports that no members of the crew are on his list.

The treatment of passengers arriving in and departing from this country is as follows:

The names of all persons in Scandinavian countries, Holland and Spain applying for visa are cabled to the State Department who refer them to this office before granting the visa. In this way, a number of persons suspected as enemy agents or enemy sympathizers have been prevented from coming to this country.

The names of all persons applying for passports to leave the country are furnished to this office, Military Intelligence Section and the Department of Justice. Any information at hand concerning those applying is immediately furnished the State Department with a recommendation that the passport either be or be not granted. Upon the arrival of a ship at port from a foreign country, all passengers are examined by what may be termed a Committee consisting of representatives of this Office, Military Intelligence Section, Treasury Department and Immigration Bureau.

All suspicious passengers are thoroughly searched.

The baggage of all passengers is now searched in a very thorough manner by the Customs authorities. The same steps are taken with regard to departing passengers."

(Note: In connection with the above see the Office of Naval Intelligence pamphlet "Instructions and Orders for Port Guards and Naval Ship Inspectors").

(b) The following information was furnished the District Intelligence Officers under date of 5 April, 1918, as shown in O.N.I. files 20974 - 17.

"1. This office is now furnished by the Department of State with a list of all persons applying for passports.

2. The names of these persons are passed through our files to ascertain if there is any information concerning them.

3. This list consists of the number of the passport, to whom issued, together with witness (the witness' name is always the second name), residence, countries to be visited, the probable port of departure and the object of the visit.

4. These names will be furnished to you from time to time in order that you may know what persons intend departing from the ports of your district. When any information is on file concerning these persons, this will also be furnished you.

5. These lists are also furnished to the Military Intelligence Bureau and the Department of Justice."

(c) The following questions were contained in an interrogatory form used at one station during the war (See O.N.I. files 20974 - 473). It is more complete than the Consular form. Separate forms were required for each individual, except children not over 12 years old accompanying adults, such children being covered in the adult's questionaire.

1. Family and Christian name.
(for women; maiden name)
Also nom de plume, artist's name, or other alias.
Children.

2. Family position. Single, married, widowed, separated, divorced.
(for women: family name and Christian name of husband also).

3. Station (Profession).
By what means are you at present making your living?
(For women: profession of husband).
Name, address and nationality of employer.
For merchants and similar professions:
Firm position filled, Kind of activity.
What credentials are available? (Should be attached).

4. Year and date of birth.

5. Place of birth in detail.

6. Citizonship - Since when?

7. Did you formerly have another citizenship?
Which? Until when?

(In case of married people: citizenship of husband _____ wife____? Earlier citizenship of husband?)

8. Names and Nationality of parents?

9. Names and Nationality of grandparents?

10. Religion? Former religion?

11. Residence.

12. Where are you stopping at present?
(Country; City; Street; House number)
For how long?
(Police certificates of stay are to be presented).
Name, address and citizenship of house-agent.

13. Did you formerly live in other cities of the same country?
In which ones? (Street and house numbers)
At what time? (Police certificates of stay are to be presented).

14. Address of parents.

15. Name, address, citizenship, profession, and employers of brothers and sisters.

16. Where were you at the beginning of the war?

17. Were you before the war or during the war in any one of the countries now at war?
In which one? From to
For what purpose?
At what place?

18. In what places in Germany have you ever been?
At what time?
For what purposes?

19. In what places in Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey have you been during the war?
At what time?
For what purposes?

20. In what neutral countries have you been during the war?
    At what time?
    For what purpose?

21. What Consulate, or other authority, gave you your traveling pass?

22. When did you leave your native country?
    For what reason?
    Route of travel up to present place of residence?
    On what railroad systems or sea route?

23. By what authorities was your pass granted?
    Date issued? Number?
    Place of issue? Valid until?

24. Do you possess any other passes?
    By what authorities granted?
    Dates of issue? Numbers?
    (To be attached).

25. What other vouchers have you in addition?
    (To be attached).

26. What is your military status?
    (If on furlough, for how long and by whom granted?)

27. Where do you wish to travel?
    From to
    (Places, districts, countries, streets, house numbers).
    Once (there and back)? Several times?
    Through trip?

28. Detailed reasons for the contemplated trip?
    (General statements such as "on business", "family affairs", "Inheritance", "purchasing", "visiting relatives", "pleasure", "health", "education", etc., are not sufficient).

Certificate. I hereby state explicitly that the trip is to be conducted solely for the purposes given and that I will not make purchases or conduct any business of a different nature.

29. Time of beginning trip? Earliest
Latest

30. Route of trip?
Boundaries crossed?

31. At what places is the trip to be broken?
Why?

32. Length of stay at destination?

33. In the case of a return trip, when will you start to return?

34. In the case of a "passing through" trip, what will be the duration of your stay in each country?

35. Do relatives or acquaintances live at the destination? Along the route?
Their names?
Addresses?
Occupations?
Nationalities?
Will you see any of them enroute?
Who? Where? Why? When?
Do they expect you?

36. What firms are to be visited?
What is the business of these firms?
Their addresses?
What goods are to be sold or purchased, in what quantity, and for what delivery?
For how long have you had relations with these firms? Did they exist before the war? Have you ever visited them on business before? When? Why? (list each visit). As buyer or seller?
What other firms in that country have you

done business with? Does that business still continue? If not, why not?
Any other pertinent facts?

37. Have you previously been a resident at the destination of your trip?
When?
Address?

38. Where will you stop on arrival at destination?
Have you reservations?
When made? How?
Are they expecting you, if no reservations made?

39. Who, at this place, can identify you or vouch for you?
How?
Can you identify yourself to any bank or business firm here? How?

40. Remarks.
(Money for travel, tickets, reservations, etc., etc.)

Place _____ Time _____,

Address _____ Telephone _____

Signature.
(In own handwriting).

711. (a) It will be noted in par. 709 (b) above that the wording of Art. 1 of the Supplement of 5 June, 1918, made it mandatory for Consular officers to consult the attachés "in each case", but the final decisions rested with the Consular officers except that "recommendations by attachés that visas be refused, which are based on military grounds, are to be followed by Consular officers - - -". Hence it was possible for visas to be granted over the protests of attachés. However, the confidential instructions

of 8 August, 1918, (see par. 708 (a) above) contained, in Art. 49 (see art. 708 (d) above) the provision for a further action on the part of Naval Intelligence. Therefore, if a visa were granted against the advice of an attaché, a cable from him either to the Office of Naval Intelligence, or to the Naval Intelligence Officer at the port of arrival, would put the Service in the United States on guard, and would require admission to the country to be held up at least until the matter could be brought to the attention of "the Secretary of State for final decision." It is doubtful if such decision would be counter to the strong recommendations of either the War or Navy Departments.

(b) At the end of the World War the following system was in operation in France, where it had been evolved under the heat and stress of actual war, and close to the scene of action, and where it provided reasonable and satisfactory control.

A traveller, when he presented himself at the U. S. Consulate for a visa for a port in the United States was put through the following routine:

I. He was made to fill out the usual Consular application blanks.

II. He was then sent to the offices of the U. S. Navy and U. S. Army Intelligence officers where he was thoroughly examined, particulars taken and filed, and his name passed through the American and British suspect lists. If nothing was found against him the Army and Navy Intelligence Officers indorsed a card stating that they saw no objections to the applicant receiving a visa.

III. He was then sent to the offices of the "Police de la Navigation" where he was examined and his name was passed through the French suspect lists. If nothing was found against him these authorities endorsed the same card which the American Intelligence Officers had already signed.

IV. With those three endorsements the applicant presented himself again at the Consulate, and in two weeks time (a Consular regulation to permit time to submit the case to the Attaché, to Washington, or for other inquiry and investigation) he received his visa. (See Archives, Reg. No. 11830, C-10-j, report from Nantes of 7 May, 1918). (For Control in Japan see Archives No. 11505, U-4-b, and O.N.I. files 20964-2178 report of 28 Feb. 1919.)

712. (a) Fundamentally, the State Department is responsible for the detection of fraudulent papers permitting entry into the United States, both in peace and war. In war, however, it is incumbent upon the Navy to furnish all possible assistance in this work, primarily by furnishing all possible information as to individuals, and secondarily in determining whether or not the papers and documents submitted are genuine. Only actual experience in handling such papers, and collaboration with the regular trained control officers will give the experience necessary to enable one to know the secret marks (changed from time to time) and to get the "feel" of genuine papers, even though they be of foreign origin.

(b) When passports were examined for visa, while it was seldom that a fraudulent passport could be detected from a genuine without a laboratory examination, yet certain things were often noticeable. Any erasure on a passport was deemed most suspicious. Anything that required a change was crossed out and initialied, not erased. Certain confidential marks could therefore be placed in predetermined places. (A list of the markings once used is given in O.N.I. file 20974 - 64). Such marks, numbers, etc., will again play an important part in passport control, and even today certain signs are used on U. S. passports to determine the genuine.

713. (a) The Passport Division of the State Department has no plans prepared at this writing for the war-time control of passports or travel. So far as that Department is concerned no passports are required by U. S. citizens desiring to travel abroad, though they issue great numbers of them to U. S. citizens at their request to enable such persons to meet the demands of foreign officials when travelling.

(b) In case of war, or other emergency, requiring stringent control of travel the Passport Division would immediately bring out their rules and regulations, dependent for their form and requirements on the Presidential Proclamation that would be issued. We might then expect to have a Presidential Proclamation, followed by an order from the Secretary of State combining, and bringing up to date the provisions that were previously contained in the State Department "General Instructions No. 535" of 26 July, 1917; the

"Supplement No. 1 of General Instructions #535" of 5 June, 1918; and the confidential instructions for "Control of Foreign Travel" of 8 August, 1918. (See arts. 707, 708, 709 above, and Archives records, Reg. Nos. 10651-A, c-10-g and 11830, C-10-j).

(b) The Passport Division has changed the physical form of Passports several times since the war, each time making it more difficult to counterfeit. This Division maintains also a section constantly engaged in studying the matter of passport frauds, detecting them, and devising means to combat them. The Passport Division is concerned wholly with U. S. passports. Foreign passport matters, visas, and immigration papers and visas are handled by an entirely separate division, covered below.

714. (a) A section of the Passport Division of the State Department is constantly engaged in studying matters of passport frauds, and from time to time issues mimeographed bulletins setting out frauds that have been discovered, and describing the discrepancies that have led to the discovery of the fraud. The detection of these frauds requires the most minute examination of the fraudulent paper and meticulous comparison with a genuine passport, and usually the original detection must be made by an expert. After detection and publication of a fraudulent paper, the bulletin issued by the State Department gives sufficient data to enable those in the field to detect similar fraudulent papers.

(b) A sample of the information given in such a bulletin is quoted from a bulletin of 11 Feb. 1931:-

> "1. It has recently been brought to the attention of the Department of State that American passports are now being counterfeited in their entirety. The ones found have been numbered between 139,000 and 140,000. Some defects in the counterfeit passports are as follows:
>
> "The covers are shorter and the corners instead of being rounded have been cut off squarely; the printing on the inside of the covers is not clear; on page one there

is no line under the "o" in the abbreviation of "number", and the stars in the field on the printed seal are irregular; on page two there are no commas after "I" and "undersigned"; no arrows in the eagle's claw of the impression seal, and no stars on the rim of the seal; the legend machine impression on page four is irregular especially the "o"s, "s"'s and "g"'s; on page five the "t" in the first "limited" is not crossed, while the "t" in "shorter" and the "d" in "period" are cut off at top; the watermark on all of the pages is too clear and is of a green-brown color; and the numbers on the pages were made from a different type than that used on our passports and they are unevenly placed."

(Note: See O.N.I. Archives 10651-A, C-10-g, for this and other bulletins).

715. (a) The Visa Division of the State Department is concerned with the verification of visas placed on foreign passports by our Consular officials, and on immigration permits issued abroad. They determine the genuine or false character both of the foreign passports themselves, of the substantiating papers, and of the visas themselves. During peace they find few attempts to falsify ordinary passports, or visas thereon, but frequent attempts to enter for permanent residence by immigrants because of the quota system of controlling immigration from abroad. In this work the Visa Division of the State Department works in close cooperation with the Bureau of Immigration of the Department of Labor. Between them they uncover many attempts at fraud, and have accumulated a large amount of experience in detecting frauds or attempts at fraud. In this work they have not only genuine U. S. papers, but also genuine samples of all foreign papers for purposes of comparison to discover fraudulent papers.

(b) Among the many methods of gaining admission to the United States unlawfully, used by aliens, are the use

of, (1) Counterfeit American passports; (2) genuine American passports fraudulently obtained; (3) genuine American passports altered or presented by persons other than the rightful bearers without alteration; (4) fraudulent "reentry" permits; (5) valid reentry permits fraudulently obtained; (6) valid permits altered through substitution of photographs and sometimes substitution of names; (7) immigration visas (quota, non-quota and reentry); (8) non-immigrant visas.(Diplomatic visas are issued by our Diplomatic Missions abroad for foreign diplomatic personnel, and are considered as falling within the non-immigrant visa classification. No frauds have ever been discovered or suspected in diplomatic visas, but are not impossible).

(c) Only persons who enter as immigrants, either quota, non-quota or reentry, may remain legally in the United States permanently. Quota and non-quota entrants are those entering for the first time as immigrants to take up permanent residence in the United States. Such immigrants are granted permission, on proper application to the Department of Labor, to leave and return to the United States. Such reentries are under three classifications: (1) By Reentry Permit from the Department of Labor, issued to any alien previously lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, valid one year; (2) Readmission without Reentry Permit or visa, for aliens previously lawfully admitted who go abroad for less than six months to certain contiguous countries only (Canada, Cuba, Mexico); (3) Citizens of these adjacent countries, regardless of place of birth, without passport or visa for short, temporary stay. Non-immigrants are those from abroad, including countries not contiguous, whose stay in the United States is purely of a temporary nature.

(d) The frauds in cases (1), (2) and (3) in paragraph (b) above are under the cognizance of the Passport Division of the State Department (see art. 714). Reentry permits are issued by the Department of Labor as being immigration matters, to immigrants whose naturalization has not yet been completed, and who have presumably entered legally. After naturalization regular passports must be obtained from the State Department as for regular citizens. Close cooperation of the Immigration Bureau of that Department and the

Visa Division of the State Department is constant in uncovering fraudulent use of reentry permits under cases (4), (5) and (6) above and the attempts at entry into the United States of aliens who claim to have been legally admitted previously for permanent residence.

(e) The frauds under cases (7) and (8) in paragraph (b) above are the principal concern of the Visa Division. The largest number of visa frauds have occurred in the quota visa category. These visas purport to have been issued by an American Consular officer, but were not. These frauds can be classified as (1) counterfeit visa forms fraudulently filled out and with forged signature; (2) genuine visa forms with forged signatures; (3) fraudulent foreign passports with genuine supporting documents, presented to obtain genuine visas; (4) genuine passports with fraudulent supporting documents such as birth certificates, police certificates or so-called "certificates of conduct", military records, etc.; and (5) variations in the combinations of the above, some papers being valid, and some fraudulent.

(f) The frauds above in (e) are detected in many ways, by comparisons with genuine samples as to quality of paper, errors in printing, method of preparation of visas, poor forgeries of signatures, and fee stamps. More frauds are uncovered from the fee stamps than in any other way, forgers finding it very difficult to counterfeit these stamps that must be affixed in certain ways to certain of the papers.

(g) Non-quota frauds have been principally through impersonation by Portuguese, Spaniards and Italians as being natives of Brazil, Argentina and other South American countries. These frauds consist principally in the presentation of fraudulent birth certificates, the other documents being genuine; or in some cases the use of genuine birth certificates belonging to other persons actually born in non-quota countries, but the other papers being fraudulent passports and supporting documents. Other aliens have obtained non-quota visas fraudulently by claiming falsely to be the wives, husbands, or minor children of American citizens. Fraudulent marriage certificates and fraudulent birth certificates have been used extensively. Collusion on the part of bona fide American citizens is nearly always present in these cases. Mala fide ministers of religion, professors and students, have gained admission, and are still attempting to do so.

(h) Non-immigrant visas are presumably for business, travel, study, medical help, etc., and are unlimited by quotas. Frauds are unnecessary, and none are known. However, no comprehensive system of checking these visas has ever been instituted. It is known that a rather large number of aliens admitted on these visas simply disappear. This type of fraud seems difficult to stop, and has been a matter of serious discussion between the Departments of State and Labor on various occasions. So long as the individual does not come under police notice, and have to establish his identity, he seems to be quite safe unless this country adopts the "police card" systems required in many foreign States.

(Note: See O.N.I. Archives 10651-A, C-10-g for further discussion).

716. (a) The Department of Labor has cognizance of immigration matters, and is active in its control. Bona fide immigrants are now issued cards, and these have proved to be exceeding difficult to counterfeit. Very few frauds have been discovered. By means of these cards an alien is able to establish his legal status. Without such identification an alien is promptly suspect, and liable to arrest for false entry.

(b) During the World War the Department of Labor had a lively sense of the dangers that might come from alien sources. To carry out their part in safeguarding the United States an order was issued, as quoted below. No plans are known at this time, other than that the old safeguards would be immediately enforced, and great care would be exercised in the admission of any immigrants.

(c) "No. 54274/General.

U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of Immigration
Washington

July 10, 1917.

To Commissioners of Immigration and
Inspectors in Charge:

It is of the utmost importance that alien enemies, spies, and "slackers" shall be prevented from leaving the United States as seamen employed on vessels sailing foreign. Precautions are being observed, through other means and by other methods, to prevent this in cases of vessels of American registry and vessels flying the flags of allied countries. To prevent it in the case of vessels of neutral registry the following instructions are issued:

(1) Every vessel of neutral registry about to sail foreign from a port of the United States shall be boarded by an immigration official who shall require the Master of the vessel to furnish the list of seamen specified in Section 36 of the Immigration Act, "containing the names of alien employees who were not employed thereon at the time of the arrival but who will leave port thereon at the time of her departure," etc.

(2) Before formally accepting the list such official shall examine the employees whose names appear thereon for the purpose of ascertaining which of them, if any, are not in possession of the seamen's card of identification prescribed by Rule 10 of the Immigration Regulations, and who and what those not in possession of such identification card are.

(3) If the immigration official ascertains that any of such seamen are alien enemies within the meaning of the President's Proclamation of April 6, 1917 (i.e., are "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects" of Germany), not in possession of a permit to depart issued by the Attorney General, he shall decline to accept the list or to take steps toward the clearance of the vessel unless and until such alien enemies are delivered to his custody for conveyance to the local immigration station and detention until they may have opportunity to apply for a permit to depart and such application may be granted.

(4) If the immigration official ascertains that any of such seamen are spies, or "slackers", or if existing facts or circumstances cause him to suspect

that they are such, he shall likewise decline to accept the list or to take any steps toward the clearance of the vessel, unless and until such seamen are dismissed from the vessel and placed in custody of the proper officer of the Department of Justice.

(5) In carrying out the foregoing specific instructions immigration officers will constantly be upon the alert to discover incidentally any and all instances in which, in connection with the departure of vessels of neutral registry, violations or evasions of the laws and regulations that are being enforced in various connections with the purpose of furthering the interests of the United States and her allies in the war.

Alfred Hampton,
Acting Commissioner General

Approved July 10, 1917.
W. B. Wilson
Secretary. "

(Note: See O.N.I. files 20974 - 12).

717. (a) The identification of seamen is a serious matter as this is an avenue not only for the illegal entry of undesirable aliens, but is a frequent avenue for the activities of enemy agents. (See art. 2 of O.N.I. - 16).

(b) All governments issue certificates of identification to their seamen. The United States names the ones issued by it "Seamen's Certificate of Service and Protection." They are called unofficially by various names, such as "Seamen's Passports", "Seamen's Cards", and "Seamen's Identifications". These certificates take many forms, depending upon the practice of the issuing State, and even different kinds of identifications for nationals of the same State. However, the general purport and purpose is identical in every State, i.e., to furnish a definite identification of the person and nationality of the seaman, and so establish his right to be a member of the crew of the vessel, and entitle him to the protection of the diplomatic and consular officers of his

State, and entitle him to such rights and privileges as may be legally accorded to him by the foreign States in whose ports his ship may touch.

(c) The status of every member of the crew of incoming foreign vessels is determined jointly by agents of the Bureau of Immigration of the Department of Labor and the Division of Customs of the Treasury Department. (See arts. 56 to 79 incl. of O.N.I. - 16).

(d) As to the control of alien seamen in our ports, the safest, and therefore most desirable, plan is to require them strictly to remain aboard their ships. This was a rule that England enforced rigidly during the war, excepting only certain of the principal officers of ships, such as the Captain, First Officer, Chief Engineer and Purser. Such an outcry of protest was raised against a similar rule in this country that it was never required, as it should have been. Instead, the Customs' officers issued Alien Seamen's Identification Cards after an examination of the alien and his papers, which card entitled the alien seaman to land for recreation, etc. Customs' officers were also authorized to issue identification cards to alien seamen who had absolutely no papers of identification (See O.N.I. files 20973 - 3, Treasury Department Circular Letter No. 6 of April 1, 1918 and Department of Commerce letter of Nov. 23, 1917).

(e) Under date of 21 July, 1917, the Department of Commerce issued a general circular letter #151 governing issue of Seamen's Certificates, which in general required closer scrutiny as to identity. (See O.N.I. files 20973 -3).

718. (a) Two forms of Seamen's Papers are used by the Department of Commerce for issue to U. S. seamen for identification. At this writing one form is issued to persons who produce evidence of being bona fide citizens; another form is issued to aliens who produce proof of having filed a declaration of becoming a citizen, and also proof of having served for at least three years on merchant or fishing vessels of the U. S. of more than 20 tons burden.

(b) Both forms, when issued, bear a photograph of the person to whom issued, his finger-print, and are sealed with the seal of the Department.

(c) These papers are called officially a "Seaman's Protection Certificate", for U. S. citizens, or a "Seaman's Certificate of Service and Protection" for aliens not yet naturalized. They are generally spoken of as "Seamen's Cards" or "Seamen's Passports."

(d) The Seamen's papers are issued by authority of the Bureau of Navigation of the Department of Commerce, but the actual issue is made for the Department of Commerce by the Treasury Department through the Collector of Customs at the various ports of entry.

(e) The issue of the papers seems to be rather loosely run, at least in time of peace, and there is much fraud in obtaining the papers. Furthermore the Department of Commerce reports that there is a regular factory in Germany where counterfeit papers are turned out so well as to be most difficult to detect. The Bureau of Navigation of the Commerce Department is constantly uncovering fraudulent papers, and, through the Immigration Bureau of the Department of Labor, apprehending and obtaining the deportation of aliens illegally in this country with false seamen's papers.

719. (a) Agents quickly find certain routes to their objectives that free them from observation, and relieve them of applying for passport visas in any quarter that may arouse suspicion. Certain centers soon become recognized headquarters for obtaining fraudulent passports, or where visas may be obtained. Eventually counter-espionage locates these sore spots, and learns the routes. During the World War there was a very lively movement of travelers, many of them under suspicion, from Spain to Cuba, and thence to Mexico, and presumably to the United States. Often new Cuban passports were obtained in Cuba, and the traveller ceased to be a Spaniard, and became a Cuban (our ally!). Holland was a great center, as well as Switzerland, for the traffic in false passports. From Holland the route was often first to Argentina, and thence - anywhere. The Scandinavian countries

were also a favorite avenue for agents moving out from the Central Powers. After the war Constantinople was a great center for passport frauds, and was the principal avenue for Red agents, propagandists, and organizers sent from Russia to the United States.

(b) In another war the centers for such activities and the avenues of travel will depend upon the location of the belligerents, the nature of the war, politics, benevolent neutrals, etc., and are therefore very much matters of conjecture. However, they will certainly exist, and their discovery, and possible preventive steps, will be a function of counter-espionage. The better the counter-espionage the sooner will the activities become known, and the better will the travel be controlled and entry prevented at home.

ONI-22
Original

CHAPTER EIGHT

Tests and Methods of Detection of False Passports

801. The passports most often falsified are those issued by other countries. Many of these countries do not take very great precautions in issuing them, nor are they very proof against forgery. They are easily obtained by enemy agents in war, either genuine or spurious. However, our own passports were forged during the World War, the copies being carefully engraved and lithographed by the Germans, and such spurious forms were found in use by German agents. However, those forgeries were easily discovered as it is comparatively easy to discriminate between a carefully engraved document and a lithographic reproduction. It is a mistake, however, to believe that because crude falsifications were discovered all forgeries will be crude. On the contrary, such obvious examples of crudeness must put examiners even more on the alert.

802. The dangers of undesirables entering is not only from travellers with passports, but foreign seamen are provided with a number of papers (such as passports, shipping permits, discharges, discharge and continuous service books, and identification cards issued by our own customs authorities in the United States to foreign seamen) anyone of which enables the seaman to sign-on on any vessel other than American, bound for the United States. Consequently many seamen, when well supplied with such papers for his own use, do not hesitate to sell those he can spare to others who use them illegally.

803. Fraudulent passports are of three kinds, depending upon whether the (1) passport has been reproduced as a whole; (2) falsified in part, or (3) secured under false pretences. In each case the method of detection is necessarily different.

804 (a). The reproduction of an entire passport, if carefully done, will be very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to detect. An engraving of such a passport can be made that is an exact likeness of the original document, or the passport can be photographed, and a line cut made.

(b) In such case the forgery is detected by noting the smooth surface of the signature in the false passport as compared

with an original. A drop of alcohol will aid detection as writing fluid will smudge much more rapidly than printer's ink.

(c) In partial falsification the elements to be considered are numerous; the handwriting may be falsified, the photograph or seal may be substituted, or the paper may be imitated. As a rule the quality of paper, type and watermark can be imitated perfectly, but in some instances differences may be found by careful comparison with the genuine. In some cases, though rare, differences from the original have been found in the wording. In some forged Danish passports the stamp on the edge of the photograph bore the word "Politiekseigel", whereas the genuine passport had the same word without the "k" in it. Also at the foot of the first page the price was put at five kroner, whereas the genuine had a price of two kroner.

(d)In the matter of impersonation the suspect will often have a certificate of identification which has also been either completely or partially forged. To discover impersonation the description of the original owner must be carefully compared with the actual bearer, especially with regard to the trade recorded, and close attention paid to the suspect's dialect or accent.

REPRODUCED PASSPORTS

805. (a) The principal points to consider in examining a whole document are:-

I. Variation from genuine forms in design, size, completeness, abbreviations.

II. Arrangement of matter on the pages, including spacing between lines and words, and all margins.

III. Continuity, consistency, abrupt and unnatural changes in the size, slant or rapidity in writing.

IV. Undue attention to unimportant details as shown by labored production of first and last strokes of words, careful and uniform"t" crossings, accurately placed "i" dots, carefully drawn flourishes, graceful lines or unnecessary strokes.

V. Pen lifts at unnatural places, or in what should be free strokes or curves and ovals, the careful joining of the ends of the fine strokes at unusual places, unnatural stops in the middle of letters.

VI. Patching, retouching, added shadings to letters first made without shading.

VII. Close similarity or exact identity in repeated words or combinations of letters, indicating that one model was used from

which to trace several parts.
VIII. Character, frequency, and exact location of all shadings.
IX. Alignment of words and whole lines.

(b) Give attention to materials, including paper, pen pencil, ink, composition, subject matter, style, idioms, grammar, spelling, use of capitals, punctuation, division of words, titles, use of numerals or words to express numbers, corrections, errors, interlineations, abbreviations, folding, creases, worn portions of paper, machine cut, hand cut, torn edges of paper, size and shape of paper, and watermarks.

(c) The watermark is made by running the soft pulp on a wire screen on which a design of some kind is placed. When the pulp is raised out of the rut there is less pulp over the raised design than over the rest of the sheet, although the subsequent pressure to which the paper is subjected prevents the eye from detecting the difference in thickness. Other marks are introduced by the "dandy roll", a light roll covered with raised wires in the form desired pressing lightly on the paper while still moist, while the other side has a mark of the wire cloth. If the "dandy roll" be covered with wire cloth the two sides appear alike, and the paper is called "wove". Any such marks in the paper furnish excellent means of establishing whether or not one or more of the sheets of the documents have been substituted. Their exact position with reference to the original should be measured and the water marks should be carefully scrutinized to see if they correspond exactly with the original. This latter method forms an excellent way of detecting a reproduced document, especially when a highly complex watermark, with or without cipher is used.

FALSIFIED PASSPORTS

806 (a). When the scrutiny of the contents of the document gives no result, or only insufficient proof, we have recourse to the critical examination of its exterior form. Usually an expert only is capable of this, he knowing the various processes to be employed. But it may be necessary that the inspector himself, far away from the help of experts, should rapidly decide whether there has been a forgery.

(b) The procedure recommended is: (1) examine the writing with a good magnifying or engraver's glass for any suspicion of changes, erasures or rewritings; (2) repeat the full examination, this time placing the writing over the pane of a window, so

as to observe by transmitted light what has already been seen by reflected light. The magnifying glass may also be used in this examination at suspicious places. A large percentage of this type of fraud cannot withstand this scrutiny; (3) examine the writing under the microscope; (4) finally consult a chemist if desired for clearing up any suspicious parts.

(c) Handwriting may be forged either by the art of tracing, or by free-hand writing. Freehand forgeries require much greater skill than traced forgeries and are far more difficult to detect because they usually do not show the broken lines of a traced forgery, but have the smooth, even-running hand of an original. In free-hand forgeries the letters, though of the same height and width as the originals, are usually spaced farther apart, making the words longer than the original. This lack of proportion is generally the result of making the lines that connect the letters of the copy longer than those of the original. If the original has a strong down stroke on the capital letters the movement will be free and will leave the pen lines with smooth edges, but the copyist who is imitating such letters cannot trust himself to the same free movement of the pen, and the result under a magnifying glass or microscope shows hesitancy and uncertainty. Free-hand forgeries by persons not skilled in the art usually have a studied appearance as if written under restraint.

(d) Tracing can be employed only when the signature or writing is present in the exact or approximate form of the desired reproduction. When the signature is an exact reproduction the comparison with the original will reveal the forgery, since no two signatures by any individual are ever identical in every particular. To obviate this difficulty the clever forger will vary the spaces between letters, but even the tracing forgery will be evidenced by the exact similarity of individual letters. When the writing is present only in the approximate form of the desired reproduction the forger may trace separate letters and connect them together to form words. This method of writing shows uneven heights and uneven distances between the letters.

(e) Strong, smooth, free and rapid writing is the hardest to imitate because it cannot be reproduced by slow movements. Slow and hesitating writing is most easily copied.

807 (a). Two methods of tracing may be employed. (I) The writing to be forged may be placed under the paper on which the

forgery is to be made, and over a strong light so that the outline of the writing will appear sufficiently plain to enable the tracer to produce a very accurate copy on the superimposed paper. If the outline is with pencil it is afterward marked over with ink. (II) Tracings are also made by placing transparent paper over the writing to be copied and then tracing the writing over with a pencil. This writing is then penciled or blackened upon the reverse side of the tracing paper, and transferred to the desired paper by retracing the writing with a stylus, or other smooth, hard point which impresses upon the paper underneath the faint outline which is then gone over with ink.

(b) Evidence of such forgery is manifest in:
I. The broken, nervous lines.
II. Uneven flow of the ink.
III. Often retouched lines and shades.
IV. Changed relation and proportions of letters.
V. Slant of writing.

808 (a). In the examination of a forgery it is of the utmost importance to pay particular attention to the lines made by the pen nibs, visible under the microscope, since they differ for every variety of pen employed. A stiff, fine-pointed pen makes two comparatively deep lines a short distance apart which appear blacker than the space between the two furrows. In this way retouching or hesitancy on the part of the writer is clearly discernible. Tracings made by an untrained hand will appear knotty and uneven, whereas the tracing of a weak but trained hand will be uniformly thin and generally tremulous.

(b) In addition to these evidences of forgery by tracing, where pencil or carbon guide lines are used which must be removed by rubber, some slight fragments of the tracing lines usually remain, while the mill finish of the paper will be impaired, and its fiber more or less torn out, so as to lie loose upon the surface. The ink will be more or less ground off from the paper also, thus giving the lines a gray and lifeless appearance; and as retouchings are usually made after the guide-lines have been removed, the ink, wherever they occur, will have a blacker and fresher appearance than elsewhere. All these conditions are plainly manifest under the microscope.

as to observe by transmitted light what has already been seen by reflected light. The magnifying glass may also be used in this examination at suspicious places. A large percentage of this type of fraud cannot withstand this scrutiny; (3) examine the writing under the microscope; (4) finally consult a chemist if desired for clearing up any suspicious parts.

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ERASURES

809 (a). An inspector examining a passport suspected of falsification must determine carefully whether there have been any mechanical or chemical erasures.

(b) When writing has been removed by mechanical erasure, the erased spot is usually apparent to the naked eye on account of the rough, wrinkled, fibrous aspect of the surface, which will also be thinner than the rest of the paper, and therefore also transmit more light. The action of mechanical erasures on the paper will depend largely upon the quality of the paper and the kind of ink used.

(c) If the paper is coarse erasing will usually remove a noticeable amount of paper, leaving a rough surface easily detected by the naked eye. Especially against a strong light the paper will show the thin spots where erasure has taken place, and there is no way for a forger to remedy this obvious indication that the document has been tampered with. A number of passports are made of special paper, carefully sized and often glazed. This paper is usually so thick that an erasure does not noticeably reduce the thickness. Some countries have the surface of their passports marked with a fine design that will disappear upon erasure, and is almost impossible to replace. In this case the efforts of the forger usually prove unsuccessful. But where plain paper is used, without any surface design or water-marks, the forger can usually force the documents successfully. In the case of sized or glazed paper mechanical erasures destroy the sizing and the surface of the paper is no longer water or ink-proof. If a drop of water is placed on the suspected surface the erased spot will absorb the water sooner than the surface where the glazing has not been disturbed. This is caused by the disturbance of the sizing which fills up the pores or interstices of the paper, producing the comparatively non-absorbent quality of the surface. This water test is simple and effective, and it has the advantage of not changing the document provided the water be promptly dried.

810. The clever forger, however, will try to render the surface smooth again, either by polishing the paper with a hard or close-grained substance, such as an ivory paper knife or a thumb-nail, or by pouring or spreading on the surface various substances such as a solution of gum, gelatine, starch, rosin in alcohol, paraffine, alum, casein, or powdered sandarac (i.e. the

resin of the Sandarac tree), or the old-fashioned "Pounce of the scriveners". When the erased surface has been thus prepared the paper is again rendered ink-proof, but without such resizing the ink would run on the paper, presenting to the eye a jagged rough line. These resizing operations can usually be detected by the naked eye, and still more clearly under a magnifying glass, for the portion of the paper which has been polished or resized always presents a different appearance from the rest of the surface. This is especially visible at the edges of the portion artificially prepared.

811. Erasures on thick paper are not quite so readily detected as those on thin paper, such as cheques, but the same methods of examination apply to both: holding the document to the light, or level with and horizontal to the eye. A very effective application of the latter test is to bend or curve the paper, making an arc. The bending tends to stretch and widen the resized part, and if any smoothing substances, such as starch or wax, has been applied to restore the glossy finish to the scraped portion, it will usually reveal itself by separating and coming away in dust or tiny flakes. Iodine vapors show all traces of erasures effected by India rubber very plainly, giving their location with perfect certainty, the erased parts assuming a yellow brown or brownish tint.

812. If an erasure is effected by means of bread crumbs instead of India rubber, and care is taken to erase in one direction only, the change escapes notice; and it is generally impossible to detect it should the paper thus handled be written upon again unless exposed to iodine vapors, which caused the paper to take on a violet shade of great uniformity. This peculiarity is due to the fact that the upheaval of the fibers caused by rubbing creates a larger absorbing surface and consequently a larger portion of iodine can cover the rubbed parts than if there had been no friction.

813. If the erased spot is not recognizable by optical and chemical means, a photograph will usually make the irregularities of the surface manifest by the unequal strength of the shadows.

814 (a). Besides erasures by scraping, certain chemical compounds will make writing disappear. The most important chemicals which obliterate ink are:

I. Oxalic acid. This is mixed with a little water, applied with a fine brush, and afterwards washed off.

II. A mixture of equal parts of carbonate of zinc, common salt, and rock alum. This is boiled for half an hour in white wine in a perfectly clean vessel and applied with a fine brush.

III. A mixture of equal parts of saltpeter and sulphuric acid dissolved by heat and applied in a diluted solution with a fine brush.

IV. Any alkali mixed with finely powdered sulphur. This is enclosed in a small bag of very fine material, and the writing rubbed therewith.

V. A solution of muriate of tin in double its quantity of water, applied with a brush and followed by a washing with pure water.

VI. Hypochlorite of soda and chlorine. This is used as in V. above.

(b) All these processes except IV are dangerous for the forger because they leave a slight discoloration, usually yellow. Moreover, it is easy to ascertain their employment by touching the place in question with a piece of moist blue litmus paper, which will turn red wherever there is a trace of acid. If the acid has to all appearances effaced the writing, it can be made to reappear by careful painting with ammonia dissolved in water. It is also possible to reproduce erased writing by washing the erased portions with a 1-10 normal solution of nitrate of silver and to place it for a short time in the direct sunlight, which brings out the old characters clearly.

815. Sometimes writing erased by mechanical and chemical means can be reproduced by photography. Since the forger desires to preserve the surface of the paper as intact as possible he will cease to erase the moment all visible trace has disappeared. But the highly sensitized photographic plate will often record writing imperceptible to the naked eye. In the case of erasure by scratching, a hot iron passed over the erased spot will cause the writing to reappear. If a chemical eraser has been used, invisible particles of oxide of iron will remain which can be made to reappear by the application of a solution of gallic acid. But both these methods of detection have the disadvantage that they discolor the document. Hence photography is the most available means. In this it is absolutely necessary to have the assistance of an expert.

816. A highly sized and calendared paper most clearly reveals attempted erasures, because the coating is removed and the surface warped by the application of liquid erasers. A thin, highly sized and calendared paper, such as is used for the Mexican passports, cannot be successfully manipulated without leaving traces clearly perceptible to the naked eye. When such paper, which has been first partially wet, and then dried, is subjected to the action of iodine vapor, the parts which have been wet take on a violet tint, while those which have not been wet become either discolored or brown. The intensity of the coloration naturally varies according to the length of time the paper is exposed to the iodine. Sometimes, the forger, after he has warped and taken the gloss off the paper by liquid erasure will dip the entire document in water in order to conceal the evidence of erasure by removing the gloss from the entire manuscript and warping it. But even should this piece of paper be thoroughly wet afterwards, the erased portions when subjected to the action of iodine will take on a darker tint than the rest of the document.

ADDITIONS AND INTERLINEATIONS

817. In trying to remove writing with the aid of an eraser, destroying the sized surface finish of the paper, such surface absorbs the next ink applied. Consequently lines written on such surface will not have the distinct, sharply marked edges of the original writing, but will be torn and jagged because of the porosity of the surface. An enlarged photograph shows this condition distinctly. The more ink on the pen at time of writing, the greater the overflow. Even if the forger takes the precaution to use little ink, and to press very lightly with his pen, such overflow will be visible in an enlarged photograph. If the forger has resized the surface before writing these marks will be absent, the only perceptible differences in the appearance of the surface will be a brighter or duller finish, in some cases a slight discoloration, depending upon the quality, kind, and quantity of the sizing used.

SUPERIMPOSED WRITING

818 (a). If it is suspected that writing has been added to a passport, and it is desired to ascertain whether the writing was added at the same time or at different times, certain diluted

acids should be applied. The more recent writing will react more rapidly to the chemicals than the older writing. But this test will be unsuccessful if the inks are either too old or too young. Hence it is usually safer to resort first to photography, which method will not affect the paper. Photography, like chemistry, will give no result if the writing is too old, but it almost always permits determination of the comparative age if the lines of the different writings cross at any point.

(b) Superimpositions are readily visible. The crossing of two lines of different ages is most evident when a large amount of ink was used in writing. Superpositions can be detected by a marked relief with the aid of a stereoscopic apparatus, the degree of relief varying according to the quantity of ink used and the quality of the paper. A well finished paper will give the greatest relief; a poorly finished paper, though showing no relief, will usually reveal super-position by the spreading of the superposed ink. This is more noticeable if the lines which cross are made with different inks. When one line crosses another of earlier date, the light zone produced by the separation of the pen nibs will be darkened up to a certain distance from the point of crossing by the spread of the superposed ink along the older line. The quantity of this spreading will be determined by the quantity of ink used and the pressure exerted by the forger.

WAX SEALS

819 (a). A wax seal over a photograph or sealing a document is no guarantee that the document has not been tampered with, or the photograph changed, for the reason that it is a very simple operation to remove a wax seal. In the majority of cases the seal may be removed without in the least changing its form and appearance by lifting it off the paper with a cold knife, and then reheating and replacing it. A few experiments will convince an inspector that such a seal is no guarantee of validity. In the case of letters the removal and renewal of such seals, if carelessly done, can be detected by an examination of the inner side of the envelope or paper to see if the paper had been damaged in the removal. If the wax has been poured upon very thin tissue paper it will be impossible to remove the seal without destroying and tearing the paper because the hot wax is absorbed to some extent by the paper and becomes part of it.

(b) Sometimes the sealing wax is heated somewhat before removal, but if the sealing has been done skillfully it is very difficult to remove and replace the seal without allowing the fact to be apparent on close inspection, as remelting usually rounds the edges left by the impress of the seal. The stamp of a seal on a sufficient body of wax presents the appearance of a depressed cup, at the bottom of which the design of the die is produced in relief. The sides of the depression are precipitated toward the center toward the level of the paper. When the sealing wax is softened or remelted the sharp edges of the imprint are always destroyed and become rounded, and if the softening has been over a large part of the wax the design is distorted or partially effaced, and this is true even if a hot blade has passed between the paper and the lower layer of wax; the heat from below serving to round off and destroy the sharpness of the design.

820. Seals can be counterfeited by making a new die. For this work it is not necessary to be an expert engraver. Forged dies need not necessarily be of metal; lead with a certain quantity of tin or zinc to render it more durable; wood; stealite (French chalk such as tailors use); or slate will answer the purpose. The tool with which the forger works is often no more than an ordinary sewing needle, the eye of which is embedded in the longitudinal section of a small piece of wood about the size of a pencil to form a handle for the instrument.

821. A much simpler method of removing and replacing a wax seal is to carefully place a rim of wax around the seal and a pulp of the best freshly burned plaster-of-Paris poured on the carefully oiled seal. When the plaster has set the negative is slowly raised, the seal is broken, and is afterwards renewed from the greased moulds. Then the little pieces of plaster must be carefully removed. Under the magnifying glass these are generally found and betray the process employed. The manipulation is easier when instead of plaster-of-Paris kneaded fresh bread crumbs are used. The paste is pressed on firmly, and the seal is taken up and dried with heat. Chemically, or with the microscope, traces of bread can be found attached to the seal. If the seal is not well washed the chemist can discover the use of bread crumbs with iodine.

INK SEALS

822 (a) India rubber stamps which can be used only in conjunction with aniline colors can be copied easily. By pressing

a fresh and well inked stamp upon an elastic, thick, half damp substance, such as an apple cut in two, half a potato, the white of a hard boiled egg, half dry glue, etc., one obtains a clear negative copy of the seal, which is particularly good if the substance has been slightly dampened with spirits. If one now prints the negative copy from the white of an egg, etc., on dampened paper, a faultless reproduction of the true print of the seal is obtained, and there is no means of proving its spuriousness.

(b) Such a rubber stamp print may also be reproduced by the simple means of painting. If water colors are used they will immediately run if moistened, but such evidence of forgery will not be present if India ink is used in making the copy. The only way of detecting such fraud is by careful scrutiny of the lines, say on a photograph, and where they also continue on to the paper of the document itself. Falsification is most evident in stamps having human figures as part of them as the face and hands are copied only with extreme difficulty.

EMBOSSED SEALS

823. In order to remove a photograph from a United States passport and substitute another without spoiling the embossed United States seal, the following method has been used: the original photograph was moistened, and the new photograph, also dampened, affixed by means of adhesive tape. When the new photograph is thus fastened to the passport there remains a sort of vacuum in spots between the new picture and the old, because of ridges made by the seal. The passport is then turned upside down, placed on a soft cushion or silk handkerchief, and then with a dull-pointed paper cutter the letters are traced on the seal. The result is that the new photograph looks exactly as if it had been stamped with the United States seal, and can be substituted for the original photograph.

INVESTIGATION OF IDENTITY

824 Impersonation is a method used widely to introduce enemy agents into a belligerent country. To discover whether a person is in illegal possession of a passport the description of the bearer should be carefully compared with the description given in the passport. By making the applicant for visa talk as much as possible it is quite likely that he may betray himself by contradictions or statements that do not bear verification. It is important to ascertain his trade since the person usually has

certain distinctive marks indicative of his trade. For example, by constantly handling a plane the joiner becomes lopsided; tailors and shoemakers from the sedentary nature of their occupation develop a characteristic curvature of the chest and shoulders; hair dressers have one shoulder higher than the other; handling the reins produces wales on the inner sides of the fingers of coachmen; the chisel causes thickening of the skin between the forefinger and thumb of engravers; the traces of the last are seen on the right thumb and upper part of the thigh of cobblers; the skin on the ball of the little finger of printers who tie their type together with string is thickened; writers, students, clerks, and artists frequently have a wale on the right middle finger from holding the pen or pencil as well as an imperceptible thickening of the skin of the left elbow; seamstresses have plentiful needle pricks on the left forefinger; glass blowers have saggy cheeks, and muscular jaws and neck glands; painters and varnishers have calouses where the brush rubs between thumb and index fingers. Moreover, the dialect, accent or use of words frequent in a trade or profession often betray both origin and real occupation.

825. In seeking to determine true nationality it is helpful to remember that each nation has its own peculiar sports and pastimes. For example, the Germans fancy fencing and duelling, and it is considered an honor among German students to bear marks of honor. Few graduate from their universities without these scars.

826. An example of fraud discovery. A man giving an American in Jersey City as a reference, and bearing a Swedish passport, applied for a visa to enter the United States. Not being satisfied with the applicant, and desiring to see him again, the Consul wrote asking for a call to "make a deposit." A few days later a young man about the same age and type, but somewhat different in appearance, called with the letter, and asked why it was desired to visa his passport. Upon investigation it appeared that an advertisement for work had been inserted in a newspaper by the real applicant who received a reply from a person who gave an address but no name. A meeting followed, and the real owner of the passport was asked for his "Prastbetyg" (extract from the Parish Register) and, among other questions, was asked whether he knew anyone in America and what that person's address was. Thinking that the purpose was to investigate his references he handed over the "Prastbetyg" and gave the name of a friend in Jersey City. The pretended applicant then took the "Prastbetyg" and his own photographs to the Governor-

General's office where a passport was issued to him. His own photograph was attached to the passport and the official stamp of the office was imprinted on both sides of the photograph. Underneath was the pretended signature, apparently in the disguised writing of the false applicant. The passport was thus an official document issued in the name of a real person to one who was not entitled to it. The ease with which the passport was issued in another name by the Swedish authorities in perfectly good faith indicates the necessity of rigorous inspection of passports, and careful questioning of the bearers, to determine if the bearer is really the legitimate owner of the document.

(Note: This chapter based upon notes in Archives Reg.No. 3699 A, E-1-d, compiled by Lt.(j.g.) F.V. Martinek, U.S.N.R.)

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