

To: → 05TW
↓
Pg 24
37

NIS

vol 1

20 ¹/_{past}
20X-2


january 1980

QUARTERLY

in this issue:

From the Director's Desk
From the Deputy Director's Desk
Retirement of S/A David J. Kerr
Profile - NISRA Okinawa
Shipboard Fires
Hypnosis - A Forensic Tool
Espionage - A Synoptic Case Review
An Act of Puerto Rican Terrorism
Murder on the High Seas
Importance of Interrogation
Operation Rockbound
Recruiter Malpractice
Protective Services in New York City
Summary - NISO Philippines Narcotics
Suppression Operations
Exchange Laundry/Dry Cleaner Fraud
Transition from the Smith to Ruger
Special Agent Afloat Program
Around the NIS
Retired Ring In
more...more.....

DEPUTY DIRECTOR RETIRING



SPECIAL AGENT EARL S. RICHEY

From the Director's Desk



Realizing that there is "nothing new under the sun," and that NIS Newsletters have been tried in the past, it is still with a sense of optimism that we launch this latest attempt.

From our lofty Headquarters perch it is sometimes easy to forget the trials which plague some of our members out at the end of the operational line. What I consider common knowledge may be a revelation to a SAC in the field. I hear this from visitors to Headquarters and am constantly reminded of it as I travel to the various NIS field offices. While there is an abundance of information flowing vertically between Headquarters and the field, lateral communications leave something to be desired.

With this in mind it will be the goal of this publication to update, inform and provide for everyone's benefit those items of general interest which would not normally be available in official traffic.

As you are all no doubt aware Fiscal 1980 travel funds have been severely reduced by Congressional action. There is a serious question whether we will be able to meet current operational and PCS requirements within these budget constraints. Officially, there is a GEN in the field highlighting these problems and directing certain austerity measures. In addition, I ask each of you to be personally sensitive to the problem and submit any recommendations that you believe will assist in reducing expenditures.



In order to have all NAVINTCOM commands collocated, NISHQ is programmed to move from the Hoffman Building to the Federal complex in Suitland, Maryland. While still in the planning phase, we are tentatively programmed to relocate in late 1980 and will occupy the third deck of the old Hydrographic Building.

Unprogrammed requirements resulting from the world situations, budget constraints, transfers of key NIS people, and, of course, the retirement of Earl Richey are certain to result in a challenging 1980 for all of us. I know we can hack it.


JR Soriano

From the Deputy Director's Desk



As I write these words I find myself in a reflective mood, particularly because it is the beginning of a new year and a new decade, traditionally a time for stocktaking, but largely, I suspect, because I am retiring in February after spending more than half my life with this organization. The temptation to reminisce is great and I do succumb at times, marveling at the solidly professional law enforcement and counterintelligence organization that has developed from the rag-tag, motley crew of investigators I joined in March of 1952. But successes of the past are of little interest now and reliving them merely uses time and energy needed for current challenges and those of the future - and there are plenty of them.

It will fall to the Director and my successor to finally identify those challenges, but I believe that among them must be major claimancy for NIS, enhanced training, especially specialty and management training, further development of the initiative programs and the fraud programs; and finally, some modification of the mobility program to provide greater stability in CONUS assignments. I feel that I am leaving each of these as unfinished business and I will regret not being around to see these problems solved. But a dynamic organization always has unfinished business, and I truly am optimistic that each of them will be solved.



My optimism is grounded in the fact that the strength of NIS always has been and continues to be its extraordinary depth of talent. Unique in my experience are the intelligent, innovative and dedicated people who are the rule and not the exception at every level in this organization. I consider it my great good fortune to have been able to work (and play) with such a professional group for the past 28 years. I really would like to personally say good-bye to each of you, but since that is manifestly impossible, please know that although I may not have so stated, I have always been sensitive to the fact that any successes were organizational and not mine. I have used your ideas, your expertise; I have enjoyed your unfailing support. Thank you.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John M. ...". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Retirement of S/A David L. Kerr



S/A Kerr's illustrious government career began in February 1944 when Dave served in the U.S. Marine Corps as a Radio Operator and Payroll Clerk for two and a half years during World War II. Dave took a break from government service from August 1946 to September 1950 during which time he earned a Bachelor of Arts degree from LaSalle College. In September 1950, he began his career with the Office of Naval Intelligence as "street agent" in Philadelphia, Pa. Because of his strong leadership abilities, Dave was selected as Senior Resident Agent at NISRA Columbus, Ohio in June 1957 and was subsequently promoted to Supervising Agent NISO New Orleans before his 34th birthday. Since 1965, Dave has been the Supervising Agent at NISO San Francisco and NISO Philippines; Head, Criminal Division at NISHQ and finally Regional Director for Operations at NIS' largest component, NISO San Diego.

As NIS' most Senior Special Agent, Dave's contributions to NIS and the Navy have been many and great. His many accomplishments, coupled with his gregarious nature and amazing quick and ready wit, will always be remembered by everyone who has come in contact with Dave during his many years of dedicated service.

All NIS personnel wish Dave and his wife, Doris, a most rewarding retirement.

In Memoriam

Hunter Chappell Curling, 67, of 1124 Mount Pleasant Road, died at Chesapeake, Va., on 9 Dec 1979. A native of Fentress, Norfolk County, he was the husband of Mrs. Olga Jensen Curling.

Curling, the first civilian Supervising Agent at NISO Norfolk, retired after 20 years service. He graduated from Great Bridge High School; the College of William and Mary; U.S. Intelligence College; Armed Forces Industrial College; and Keeler Polygraph Institute. He also studied at the universities of Tennessee and Chicago, Michigan State University, and Northwestern Crime Laboratory.

Other survivors include a sister, Mrs. Marian C. Walston of Chesapeake; and several nieces and nephews.

A funeral was held on 11 Dec in Oak Grove United Methodist Church by the Rev. Larry Adams and Dr. Owen T. Kelly. Burial, with Masonic Rites at graveside, was in Chesapeake Memorial Gardens.

Statistics of Interest

A recent NISHQ Technical Services Department computer analysis of 1979 case openings compared to similar statistics for 1978 disclosed some interesting information which is provided herewith. Total case openings, all categories, for 1979 were 29,132 as compared with 32,741 openings for 1978 - an 11% drop in cases. A further look at some specific case categories disclosed the following:

<u>Case Category</u>	<u>1979 Openings</u>	<u>1978 Openings</u>	<u>Change</u>
2B	46	31	+48.4%
3A	86	48	+79.2%
3C	18	22	-18.2%
3S	1862	2530	-26.4%
4C	66	42	+57.1%
4E	913	1055	-13.5%
4F	214	373	-42.6%
4G	242	119	+103.4%
4H	34	26	+30.8%
4T	99	56	+76.8%
5F	111	173	-35.8%
6A	401	330	+21.5%
6C	148	316	-53.2%
6L	369	488	-24.4%
6N	3075	2911	+05.6%
6R	330	386	-14.5%
6S	4435	4028	+10.1%
6T	1181	1018	+16.0%

<u>Case Category</u>	<u>1979 Openings</u>	<u>1978 Openings</u>	<u>Change</u>
6U	602	569	+05.8%
6V	1141	1124	+01.5%
7B	542	507	+06.9%
7D	960	1264	-24.1%
7E	141	137	+02.9%
7F	698	761	-08.3%
7G	1003	1046	-04.1%
7H	373	372	+0.3%
7N	3902	5356	-27.1%
7R	564	474	+19.0%
8B	108	101	+06.9%
8D	107	114	-06.1%
8F	315	243	+29.6%
8G	701	1628	-56.9%
9A	63	59	+6.8%

In addition, NIS Special Agents, during calendar year 1979, recovered federal property valued at \$11,843,353.05 and personal/commercial property valued at \$1,580,523.95, for a combined recovery value of \$13,423,877.00.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR RETIRING

Special Agent Earl S. Richey, Deputy Director, has announced his plan to retire on 29 February 1980. He will have completed 28 years of service with the Naval Investigative Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence. He was initially hired as a contract agent at the District Intelligence Office, Chicago, Illinois. He subsequently served tours at Great Lakes, Illinois; again at Chicago, Illinois; San Diego, California; and the last ten years of his career at NISHQ.

His career assignments were especially significant in that he is the first "chief civilian executive" of NIS or ONI who has ascended the career ladder in model sequence. During his initial years with NIS he served as a "brick" Agent, an Alternate Senior Resident Agent, Polygraph Examiner, Senior Resident Agent, Assistant Supervising Agent, Supervising Agent, Special Assistant for Operations, Assistant Director for Operations, Associate Director, and in his most recent position as Deputy Director. In each of those positions he received the highest accolades, both from within NIS and the DOD community, for his efforts and achievements.

Among his significant achievements were operational matters such as responsibility for the administration and coordination of NIS agent personnel during the debrief of the USS PUEBLO crew in 1968/1969 and the coordination of investigative leads involving former prisoners of war resulting from the Vietnam conflict. Those operations

were of keen interest to the highest government officials and both Mr. Richey and NIS were commended for excellence of performance in regard to those matters. Additionally, he has been recognized for his outstanding managerial and investigative talents by selection to various governmental working groups such as the Defense Investigative Review Council and other high level groups dealing with various legal and investigative matters. His accomplishments within NIS are manifold and he is largely responsible for the present NIS organization. Many innovative concepts such as the Agent Afloat Program, Initiative Criminal Intelligence Operations, Source Program, Fraud Detection Programs, the Collectors Program and other significant Counterintelligence matters are a result of Mr. Richey's initiative and managerial abilities. Throughout the years, and particularly during the last 10 years, he was keenly attuned to the pulse of the personnel working for and assigned to NIS. As a result of frequent trips, he became acquainted with everyone in NIS. He would frequently comment that the strength of the organization was due to the dedication and quality of people who comprise NIS.

He has announced that he is looking forward to his retirement and spending additional time with his wife, Willy, and family.


NISRA Okinawa - A Unique and Rewarding Experience

By SAC V. L. Kaliher.

Unique among NISRAs, Okinawa stands apart from any other NIS operation. Recently reorganized as a result of a year-long study, NISRA Okinawa closely compares with some NISOs in the number of personnel (27), vehicles assigned (20) and locations (7). The staff is comprised of 19 civilians and USMC Special Agents, USMC CI personnel, USN and civilian clerical personnel. Others include indigenous clerical personnel and interpreter/translators. Three of the seven facilities are day offices out of NISRU Foster which is larger than most NISRAs. Foster is staffed by eight S/A's, two clerical and one interpreter/translator. NISHQ, understanding the complexities of managing the office in a traditional manner, reorganized NISRA Okinawa in September 79, allowing for the RRA at the two NISRUs (Foster and Hansen) to operate quasi-independently by granting them the authority to release ROIs and to complete PERs on their subordinates. The new system, although still in its infancy, seems to have alleviated some of the problems of supervision of personnel and delays in servicing commands.

A Special Agent assigned to NISRA Okinawa will not encounter any differences in the type of work that he or she had been experiencing at most stateside NISRAs. There is currently a high incidence of burglaries, thefts of government and personal property, and the ever present aggravated assaults. An Agent assigned can expect to serve in at least two offices during his two year tour. Camps Hansen and

Schwab, located approximately a one hour drive from the housing areas, are considered to be the lesser desired locations and therefore personnel are rotated on a regular basis. The NISRA is located at Camp Courtney, the site of Third Division Headquarters, but somewhat removed from the "action."



Okinawa is geographically located 1100 miles south southwest of Tokyo. The largest island in this Japanese prefecture, Okinawa is sixty-seven miles long and varies from two to sixteen miles wide. The northern half is comprised of rugged mountains covered with lush forest vegetation with the southern half made up of rolling hills and

large residential and commercial areas. The term "Keystone of the Pacific" is an appropriate nickname for Okinawa due to its strategic location. Within a 600 mile radius lie the north end of the Philippine Islands, the Island of Taiwan, much of Japan and the east coast of the People's Republic of China. Okinawa played a major role in the Pacific theater during World War II with some of the bloodiest battles fought on the southern end of the island. More recently, Okinawa was the staging area for the U.S. Forces in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

A total of 55,000 DOD related personnel are permanently assigned to this island which totals only 1.1 million in population. Approximately 22,000 U.S. Marines, most of whom are assigned on a rotating twelve month unaccompanied tour, are spread throughout the various Marine Corps bases. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force maintains their fifth largest facility in the world at Kadena Air Base. The presence of USAF F-15's along with USMC Phantom Jets are constant reminders of the readiness status of the U.S. Forces at Okinawa. There are over 10,000 USAF active duty personnel with dependents and their support facilities are also available to other DOD employees. The USAF is the housing manager of 5,400 units of family housing on U.S. facilities. Directives have recently imposed a ceiling of a maximum of 212 units which may be inhabited by DOD civilians assigned to Okinawa. This decision, along with the USMC policy change allowing for consecutive unaccompanied/ accompanied tours by staff personnel, has significantly decreased the availability of government assigned housing. However, no Special Agent on orders to Okinawa has failed to locate suitable western style off-base housing within the allotted TLA time frame. The monthly housing stipend in most cases covers

all expenses incurred. Agents assigned to Okinawa should plan for at least a one year wait before government housing will be offered. The USAF will provide all required furnishings including appliances in both on and off-base housing. The limitation on shipments of HHE to Okinawa for all accompanied personnel (2,750 lbs) seems to be adequate for personal needs.

DOD schools at several locations encompass grades K-12. The University of Maryland and a few community colleges have extension programs. The climate is subtropical with ever present humidity. Rainfall is heavy, totaling an average of 82 inches a year. Typhoons compare with stateside hurricanes and the wind and rain can be devastating. Buildings are basically concrete block structures to withstand these severe storms which become a way of life during the months from July to November. A fully equipped NRMHC is capable of handling any medical need. Armed Forces Radio and Television Service provide 24 hour AM and FM radio. One television channel provides 12 hours daily of color programming of taped stateside shows. NFL Monday Night Football for example is one week old. Sports and recreational activities are varied and far ranging. All water activities are popular as the beaches are ideal for snorkeling and/or diving. Many opportunities for inexpensive travel to other nearby countries are available. Each person is also eligible for environmental and morale leave twice yearly via space "A" U.S. government aircraft at the rate of \$10.00 per trip, regardless of the distance. Base exchanges and commissaries compare favorably with stateside stores, at considerably lower prices. Gasoline, for example, is currently 77 cents per gallon and plentiful. Small, inexpensive Japanese used cars are readily available.

As in other overseas or remote locations, a sense of closeness exists between those in the NIS family. There is seldom an unmet need. The mores, customs, culture and history of an ancient civilization await your examination.

Shipboard Fires

By S/As Lionel Barker and Lee Coulter

It represented the might of the nation, but on this cool April morning, it stood impotently on blocks. It had been morning like any morning aboard a ship in major overhaul. Chipping hammers and grinders echoed through the vessel as workmen and crewmembers went about their business in systematic confusion. It was 1149 when all other sound was overpowered by that which strikes the most fear in men who go to sea - fire. The fire bell was crisp as those aboard waited for the words, "This is a drill." They did not come that morning. Fire call was to ring seven more times that day; one man would die and thirty-four would be injured. Before the day was over, the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY would become a media event. Fire aboard a major combatant is newsworthy, but arson makes it spectacular.

The April fire aboard the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY was one of a series of fires during the Spring of 1979. There would be major fires aboard the USS EISENHOWER, USS PIEDMONT, USS IWO JIMA, USS CHARLESTON, and the USS INDEPENDENCE. Much was learned.

The immediate concern of the servicing NISRA in a major shipboard fire is to effect a timely response. There are a number of facets to response. Obviously, prompt response is complicated if the ship is at sea hundreds of nautical miles from the nearest NIS facility. Experience has shown that inundating the ship with full agent resources immediately is neither necessary nor desirable. It has proven useful to alert agents for such duty while responding with a more limited force at the first call. Agents responding to a major shipboard arson are met not only with a great deal of confusion, but with an extremely difficult physical environment. There will be no light in the affected areas and the agents will learn that there are fewer things darker than the bowels of a man of war. Water can be a foot deep and smoke and carbon-monoxide make examination of any scene impossible without an air pack. It is neither the time nor the place for an agent to display his Easter finery.

Ascertaining the point of origin of a shipboard fire can be a monumental task. Immediate contact should be made with the Damage Control Central (DCC) to determine locations of fire/smoke sightings. In reviewing the DCC log, it is likely that the agent will find that numerous such reports have been received. Once the sightings are plotted and tracking efforts commence, it is generally discovered that many of the areas are void of any evidence of fire. This is due to smoke travelling through the ship's ventilation system and exiting through open vents in various compartments. Another problem is fires resulting from heat convection. These are almost always called away as separate fires and in almost all instances it requires an arson specialist to determine causality. From an investigative standpoint, they are treated as

separate fires until that causality is established, thus requiring expenditure of additional time, effort and resources.

Gaining control of the crime scene(s) sometimes can be extremely difficult. If the fire or damage occurs at sea, the command's primary interest will be to make the ship operational again. Even in port, there will be a great deal of pressure to "clean the mess up." The agent is likely to find himself negotiating with the command for the time needed to conduct a proper crime scene. It will be extremely important that he do so because it is difficult to avoid some degree of compromise to a fire scene. When fires of major proportion are being brought under control, there is a routine wholesale removal and/or relocation of resultant debris in order to protect against re-flashing. This is essential to the fire fighting process but it is important that the agents know where the debris is placed in order to assure its availability if needed. Flooding of compartments obviously compounds the problem. Pumping of the water is a normal process. Here again, the agent will want to secure samples of this water for traces of accelerant.

In a major shipboard fire, it may be as long as a day before the agent can spend any appreciable time at the fire scene(s). If a fire specialist has been on the scene, they generally will have a good idea as to whether or not arson is involved. It is now time to give serious thought to the resources that might be necessary to conduct the investigation. There are a variety of factors which contribute to the resource level expended on any given fire. A very important factor is the availability of agent resources at the scene. In a complex such as Norfolk, it is easy to muster such resources, whereas it might be much

more difficult elsewhere. Additionally, the magnitude of the fire and the attention given to it is a consideration, as is the size of the ship and the initial ability to pinpoint the department/division in which possible suspects are located. In the first series of fires aboard the KENNEDY, twenty-six agents participated in the investigation. Because of ground work already undertaken in the first fires, the second series needed only eighteen agents. Major fires aboard smaller ships in the Norfolk area needed only six to eight participating agents. There is a consensus that the ability to flood the ship with as many agents as necessary can be a significant factor in generating the type of intelligence necessary for resolution. It is important that agents, especially those not accustomed to shipboard work, be made aware of the necessity of knowing their location aboard ship relative to egress at all times. This will help to alleviate confusion in the event of reflash or additional fires. Further, an assembly point for all agents should be designated in the event of such an incident. Experience indicates that the establishment of an NIS command post aboard ship is essential when conducting major fire investigations. Further, the use of a "hot line" was found to be an effective way of gathering information which might otherwise be lost or delayed. The "hot line" number can be broadcast over the IMC, and also included in the Plan of the Day. While crank messages relating to the parentage of NIS agents can be expected, the line also can produce some real leads. It was just such a call during the first KENNEDY fires which provided information which led to the primary suspect. Although the suspect's disciplinary record would have caused ultimate scrutiny, the call at least expedited the action. As with other major investigations, an experi-

enced, mature control agent is required and he should have sufficient latitude and authority to pursue the investigation. His burdens can be reduced if another supervisory agent acts as a buffer/liaison link between the investigative process, the command, NISHQ and senior Navy commanders. Also, the operation was found to function more effectively when one special agent was assigned exclusive administration duties for processing DCII checks, NLETS messages, preparation of SSD documentation, initial handling/processing of evidence, etc. The identi-kit can play an important part in developing composites of potential witnesses/suspects who cannot be otherwise identified on a ship with four or five thousand crewmembers. Those composites judged to be of particular importance can be posted throughout the ship.

Major shipboard fires do not lend themselves to a "by the numbers" approach. Judgment and common sense must prevail. Readily apparent leads should be pursued at the onset, i.e., interview of the



person(s) who discovered the fire, watch personnel, members of the fire fighting parties, individuals assigned to affected areas, those recently subjected to discipline or released from confinement, etc. One tested method of approaching multiple shipboard fires is to assign one or two man teams to each fire scene. These teams conduct their investigation(s) independently of the other teams, to include the fire scene examination. The latter of course, generally requires the assistance of an arson specialist. General screening interviews are conducted by another team of agents and a separate team might do the groundwork on problem personnel. At the center is the control agent who is kept apprised of all developments, trends, common denominators, suspicious incidents, etc. The availability of personnel to be interviewed cannot be assumed. If the ship is in port, commands resist delaying the 1500-1530 daily liberty call. The conduct of screening interviews after a major fire on a carrier requires both a dispatcher and a traffic cop. Personnel from the MAA force fit these roles perfectly. They can both round up the personnel and get them to the right agent at the right time. Screening interviews are generally organized along division lines with the same agent or agents handling all personnel from a given division. This gives the agent(s) an insight into the division, and he is better able to assess the information collected.

Although there is generally a lack of physical evidence in a shipboard arson case, there is no lack of leads. Keeping track of their pursuit is a major task for the control agent. There are times when it is best to have one agent working exclusively on one particular lead. This was the case with a pair of glasses found at the scene of the most serious blaze aboard the KENNEDY. Neither members of

the fire party, or personnel working in the area had reported losing a pair of glasses. They could have been the key to the case so one agent was devoted to identifying the owner. His efforts made the glasses merely a footnote in the report, but it might have been different. In this respect, it should be noted that some agents might tend to delay the conduct of leads which do not seem to fit the consensus suspect of the time. This is somewhat of a natural reaction as the agents get the sense of closing in on the suspect. The control agent must be alert to this and insist that all leads be pursued.

In the event that fatalities are involved, it is imperative that an autopsy be conducted. In the first KENNEDY fire, the first consideration relative to the decedant was to determine if he was the arsonist. Once eliminated as a suspect, thought had to be given the possibility that he had seen the arsonist in action and had paid the ultimate price for his observation. Prompt and complete pursuit of these possibilities paid off not only in terms of the investigation, but also in terms of media queries.

There is one thing which has proven indispensable to the conduct of these investigations and that is, daily afteraction meetings attended by all participating agents. Each agent or team presents the results of his/its' efforts and any conclusions drawn. This gives all agents a sense of the total case and allows them to pursue avenues which might not have been suggested by their inquiries. Also, it provides an opportunity for brain storming the case and making a determination on "what do do next."

One should not talk about investigations without thinking about the resultant report. Each agent/

team must be made responsible for prompt preparation of a report covering the results of his/its efforts. The most effective way is to insist on something in writing by the day after the action was taken. Agents' notes are not acceptable for this purpose. The control agent needs something which he can edit for insertion into the report rather than requiring that he compose the entire report.



Where, one might ask, does motive fit into such investigations? Granted that while motive is not an element of the criminal act requiring proof, the establishment of motive in these investigations is important because it usually determines the course the investigation should follow. Although by no means limited to the following, experience has shown that the most common motives for offenses of this nature committed aboard ship are:

1. Revenge

a. Retribution initiated by the individual against the command for some real or fancied punishment leveled against him.

b. Retribution against a specific individual stemming from a personal experience.

2. Avoidance of Commitments

a. Acts perpetrated to prevent scheduled deployment commitments which the individual deems undesirable.

b. Retribution against a specific individual stemming from a personal experience.

3. Intoxication

a. Narcotic - Conduct while under the influence of drugs/narcotics which results in unintended damage to the vessel (careless smoking of marijuana/ hashish, causing accidental fires).

b. Alcohol - Conduct while under the influence resulting in negligence (intoxication on duty resulting in neglect or disregard of established safety procedures).

4. Boredom

a. Individual performing mundane duties seeks thrills to alleviate the monotony perceived in his duties.

5. Heroics

a. The individual is motivated by a need for recognition. (The individual who places foreign objects in the air intake of an aircraft which he later claims to discover in the hopes of obtaining recognition/rewards from command).

6. Mental Disturbance

a. The classic arsonist. (An experienced agent probably will not be surprised at the number of

emotionally disturbed persons in the Navy. Care must be exercised because they are not all capable of setting fires. But they are capable of confessing to having set the fires.)

When suspects are developed, it has been found to be extremely beneficial to have DCII and LAC inquiries conducted immediately. Background information developed by such queries have proven most useful both in narrowing suspects and in the interrogation process. Sources can also be used in certain cases. In one case, a source was planted near the prime suspect and received a spontaneous admission for the arson. In an attempt to follow-up on this admission, a second source was inserted while the suspect was incarcerated. Unfortunately, this merely proved that the proverbial lightning doesn't strike twice.

In the final analysis, these investigations are resolved by prompt pursuit of logical leads, doing all the routine things as quickly as possible, by long hours, flexibility, persistence and quite a bit of self-generated luck.

Interested the Exclusionary Rule as it relates to the Fourth Amendment? NIS-02L has recently written a paper on this subject which looks at the background of this issue and which examines the landmark cases which established the Rule as we know it today. This paper, about 24 pages, will be made available to the students in the basic classes and a limited number will be made available to other interested Special Agents upon request to 02L.

Hypnosis- A Forensic Tool

By S/A Blair M. Gluba

Hypnosis is almost as ancient as recorded civilization itself. Although cloaked in mystery and greatly misunderstood even today, the phenomena of hypnosis has great potential to be of significant importance to the law enforcement community. While it is not the intent of this article to serve as a treatise on the medical/psychological aspects of hypnosis known to the medical community, a few definitions and basic considerations are in order. The term hypnosis was derived from HYPNOS, the Greek god of sleep. While the term finds its roots in the term sleep or a sleep-like state, hypnosis is not actually a sleep-like state when induced in a human being. In fact, even though there is no firm definition of hypnosis which is completely accepted by all hypnotists, a generally accepted definition is that hypnosis is an altered state of awareness or consciousness in a human which is manifested in heightened recall or memory. For purposes of this article, suffice it to say that hypnosis offers the unique capability to elicit a myriad of repressed and forgotten memories from witnesses and victims of crimes, often with a high degree of accuracy. While the function of the human brain and the phenomena of memory is not well understood, the reasons why hypnosis offers a great potential for assistance to the investigator are comparatively simple. Amnesia, trauma, and other factors often accompany the shock of witnessing or being the victim of a criminal act. Important observations and facts vital to successful resolution of the matter are "forgotten" or buried deep in the subconscious mind at the very

time their elicitation by the investigator could solve the crime. Hypnosis allows the witness/victim to experience a relaxed, concentrated state of awareness in which the five senses are heightened to a significant degree. The team effort of the hypnotherapist who inducts the individual into a state of hypnosis, coupled with the trained investigator who then conducts the interview of the victim/witness, hopefully results in elicitation of lucid details of the event in question. As mentioned, interview of an individual under hypnosis may result in heightened recall/memory of an event, and can be used to assist in the preparation of an identi-kit likeness or police artist's conception of a suspect.

Forensic application of hypnosis is comparatively new in the United States, but is presently being extensively used by local law enforcement agencies. In most instances, local agencies have trained investigators/detectives who actually induct the individual into a state of hypnosis and then conduct the interview. The federal investigative community is a late arrival on the scene and presently is operating under a different philosophy and set of guidelines. NIS experience has determined that the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration; Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and Army Criminal Investigations Division have promulgated agency policy which is for the most part uniform. NIS and the above agencies utilize forensic hypnosis in the interview of victims and witnesses but not suspects. In most instances hypnosis is used only after most logical investigative avenues have been explored. A mental health professional, i.e., a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist trained and experienced in the practice of

hypnosis is used as part of a team approach and the mental health professional inducts the individual into a state of hypnosis. At that point, a Special Agent trained in the basics of hypnosis and specialized interview techniques conducts the interview. The case Agent, who is intimately familiar with the investigation, is present to ensure that all areas which require inquiry are covered during the interview. The entire interview is recorded by video transcript.

While NIS experience with forensic hypnosis is relatively new, the technique has been used with rewarding and significant results. During a homicide investigation recently completed, a young sailor reported that he awoke on Sunday morning and found his roommate dead on the floor of their BEQ room. During several sessions of interview the witness advised that he had been quite intoxicated on the night prior to finding his roommate's body. During interview under hypnosis the sailor was able to recall a lengthy conversation with the primary suspect wherein the suspect made repeated threats against the deceased. Additionally, the witness was able to recall entering the BEQ room and observing the victim lying on the floor badly beaten and dying. Due to the intoxicated state of the witness, however, he made no attempt to secure aid for the victim and went to bed. During the same investigation, a second witness reported that he entered the lounge area of the BEQ and observed the suspect sleeping on a sofa. The second witness was also highly intoxicated and his conscious recall of the events was badly distorted. Under hypnosis the witness was able to provide the time he observed the suspect asleep in the lounge and further was able to relate that he saw bloody fingerprints on a pillow which the suspect was clutching in his hands.

The FBI utilized forensic hypnosis in the interview of a school bus driver during the much publicized kidnap case at Chowchilla, California. Under hypnosis the bus driver was able to provide the license number of one of the vehicles utilized by the kidnappers.

While forensic hypnosis has provided some startling results which have assisted in the solution to major crimes it, like the polygraph and other sophisticated investigative techniques, is an investigative tool and not a panacea for all investigations. As long as hypnosis is used as an aid to investigations and held in its proper perspective as one of the many investigative tools available to the investigator its use and potential for more and more acceptance by the legal community will certainly grow.

Espionage - A Synoptic Case Review

By M. W. Harris, 22A1

In August 1979, a NIS component initiated an espionage investigation concerning the reported involvement of a U.S. Navy Petty Officer in the theft and sale of classified U.S. Government documents from a sensitive Pentagon office. The NIS investigation was predicated on information furnished by the FBI, who learned of the suspect's alleged espionage activities from a confidential informant who had been introduced to the Petty Officer by a mutual acquaintance. After receiving nine classified documents from the Petty Officer, who received \$200 earnest money for his efforts, the informant introduced an FBI undercover agent to

the Petty Officer. On the evening of their introduction, the Petty Officer escorted the undercover agent to his sensitive work space, afforded him access to classified documents therein, and willingly removed a classified document concealed under his clothing from the office for the undercover agent. On this occasion, the suspect received \$500 in return for the document. Several days later, the Petty Officer was arrested in his Northern Virginia apartment by FBI and NIS agents. Charges were later filed against the Petty Officer in the U.S. Federal District Court.

Subsequent to his arrest, a search of the Petty Officer's apartment resulted in the recovery of an additional 31 sensitive classified U.S. Government documents. A search of the suspect's assigned work space at the Pentagon resulted in the confiscation of his personal contact file wherein numerous comments having homosexual connotations were noted to have been entered beside entries in the file. During interviews with the Petty Officer, he readily admitted that he was a homosexual, and he provided additional amplifying information regarding the individuals named in his personal contact file. He ultimately identified 28 active duty military or Department of Defense civilian employees as homosexuals. The Petty Officer also detailed a history of both pre-service and in-service use of marijuana and cocaine.

Although it would seem that an elaborate scheme must have been employed by the Petty Officer in order to have successfully removed the classified material from the Pentagon the contrary is true. The 41 classified documents which he selected for theft and later removed from U.S. Government control had been released to him for destruction. However, after making false entries in the command's

secret material destruction log reflecting he had properly destroyed the classified documents, the Petty Officer merely placed the documents in his briefcase which he carried with him on departing his office. The Petty Officer attributed his undetected and safe clearance through two Pentagon check points to his familiarity with the uniformed guard personnel who had come to know him from his previously assigned duties as a courier.

The synoptic account of the foregoing investigation is, at best, a brief summation of the events which led to the downfall of the Petty Officer. However, the entire episode was brief in itself. From the time the first classified document was passed to the informant until the Petty Officer's arrest, a little more than two weeks had elapsed. In this short period of time, the Petty Officer's position plummeted from a seemingly productive member of the U.S. Navy entrusted with national security information to that of a marked individual facing certain incarceration for betraying his government. Fortunately, no hostile intelligence service involvement surfaced during the investigation. The Petty Officer's adamant denials of hostile contacts were satisfactorily substantiated by investigative endeavors and later by polygraph examinations. Nevertheless, the Petty Officer's greed, his admitted homosexuality, and his use of narcotics are textbook examples of factors that could have easily been exploited by professional hostile intelligence service operatives.

In October 1979, four months after the initiation of the investigation, the Petty Officer was convicted in U.S. Federal District Court and sentenced to eight years imprisonment for his illegal activities. It is hoped that the foregoing account of the results of

this investigation will serve not only to illustrate the successful investigative resolution and subsequent prosecution of an individual who posed a serious threat to the nation's security but, perhaps more importantly, to act as a resounding reminder to those of us in the counterintelligence community that such nefarious deeds aimed at undermining the national security can and do occur.

An Act of Puerto Rican Terrorism

By LTJG L. D. Leonard, USNR

On 3 December 1979, a U.S. Navy bus carrying eighteen enlisted personnel at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico was viciously attacked by Puerto terrorists. For the past several years, various groups espousing the independence of Puerto Rico, have committed acts of violence (i.e., bombings and shootings) in Puerto Rico, Chicago, and New York City.

For three centuries Puerto Rico was governed by the King of Spain's appointed representative. In 1868, the Puerto Rican independence movement launched a small revolution at Lares, Puerto Rico, in hopes of overthrowing the Spanish government and establishing the Republic of Puerto Rico. The Spanish forces were able to squelch the revolt; however, in November 1887, Spain recognized the Republic of Puerto Rico in a document known as the "Autonomic Charter." In 1898, the Spanish-American War broke out. With the defeat of Spain, Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States under the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Puerto Rican nationalists refused to recognize the treaty in

1898, and have continued to fight the independence of Puerto Rico ever since.

The most recent attacks and demonstrations have been in protest of the Navy's presence on the Island of Vieques, a small island about eight miles off the East coast of Puerto Rico. It is approximately fourteen miles long and six miles wide and has approximately 8,000 civilian residents. In 1943, the United States government purchased the island for use as a military reservation. Since that time, the U.S. Navy has utilized about 3/4 of the island (land and water) as the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility. With the Navy's pullout from the Island of Culebra in 1975, Vieques has been the primary Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) range on the East coast. Because of the Navy's increased use of the Vieques NGFS range, local fishermen have been restricted in their use of the area. The fishermen of Vieques have received widespread support for their cause, and since 1978, Puerto Rican terrorist groups have utilized this support to justify their murderous acts of violence.

The ultimate goal of these modern day independence/terrorists groups is the independence of Puerto Rico from the United States and the establishment of a Socialistic government. In order to obtain this goal these terrorist have selected the removal of the U.S. Navy as an immediate goal. During the past six months, attacks against military facilities have increased in number and viciousness. The bus ambush at Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, on 3 December 1979, is a bold change from previous attacks carried out by these terrorist groups. The use of indiscriminate murder to voice their demands can be observed as a major milestone in the evolution of these terrorist groups, and an indication

of things to come.

The techniques used by the terrorists in the 3 December 1979, incident in Sabana Seca, Puerto Rico, give evidence of their mastery of current terrorist operational tactics. At approximately 0640, a Navy bus carrying 18 enlisted personnel departed NSGA Sabana Seca, P.R., enroute to a remote receiver site approximately five miles away. As the bus proceeded along P.R. highway 867, the only route to the receiver site, a green pickup truck passed and pulled in front of the bus. Approximately 3/4 a mile down the road, the green pickup began to slow down and then stopped blocking the forward movement of the bus. The bus came to a stop parallel to a white 1973 Dodge van that was parked on the side of the road. Several gunmen in the Dodge van opened fire on the left side of the bus killing two instantly and wounding nine others. The gunmen and occupant(s) of the green pickup departed the area in the white van leaving the green pickup at the scene of the attack. The Dodge van was found abandoned approximately seven miles away. Responsibility for this incident was claimed by three known Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

The incident of 3 December 1979 is presently under investigation by the FBI in conjunction with NIS and local authorities. To date the individuals responsible have not been identified.

Murder on the High Seas

By S/A Raymond Blackwell

At approximately 0100, 2 July 1979, a witness reported to the ship's bridge that the port quarter watch (Subject of investigation) had killed an unidentified sailor on the port quarter at approximately 2300, 1 July 1979, and that Subject had thrown Victim's body overboard. The aircraft carrier, homeported on the east coast was conducting local operations in the Atlantic Ocean at the time of the murder. A man overboard was called and Victim was identified. Subject told the witness he killed Victim in self-defense. The witness stated there were large pools of blood on the port quarter and he and another sailor assisted Subject in cleaning the blood off the deck shortly after the murder occurred. A subsequent crime scene examination revealed blood splatterings throughout the port quarter area. At the time the murder took place, flight operations were in progress, and the port quarter was completely dark. Victim's body was never recovered. Subject, when interrogated, requested legal counsel and stood mute. Subsequent investigation revealed that Subject and a second sailor (Co-Subject) had planned the murder of Victim earlier on 1 July 1979. Victim was lured to the port quarter at approximately 2300, 1 July 1979, because he thought he was going to smoke marijuana with Subject and Co-Subject. Victim was brutally beaten to death with a sawed off, wooden oar, handled by both Subject and Co-Subject, then his body was thrown overboard and it was never

recovered. Co-Subject, when interrogated, admitted to helping lure Victim to the port quarter on the night in question; however, he denied striking Victim with the oar. He stated Subject beat Victim to death by himself. He did admit to helping Subject throw Victim's body overboard when it appeared Victim was dead. Co-Subject was polygraphed on two separate occasions during the investigation and he repeatedly denied actually striking Victim. In the opinion of the Examiner, Co-Subject did attempt deception. The motive for killing Victim was because Subject, Co-Subject, and others believed that Victim was a liar, thief, "NARC," was generally disliked throughout the ship, and that he deserved to be killed. It should be noted that Victim was not working for either NIS or the ship's MAA. Between 29 June and 1 July 1979, Victim had been interrogated in the NIS stateroom on at least three occasions since he was the Subject of an ongoing investigation. Numerous individuals assigned to the Deck Department (both Subject and Co-Subject were also assigned to the Deck Department) were tiling the deck outside the NIS office and Victim was definitely seen entering and exiting the stateroom by such individuals between 29 June and 1 July. They possibly surmised that he was a "NARC," and then spread the word throughout the Deck Department.

On 13 September 1979, Co-Subject plead guilty to conspiracy to murder Victim during general court martial proceedings and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On 5 October 1979, Subject plead guilty to the murder of victim during general court martial proceedings and he was also sentenced to life imprisonment. Subject did state at the trial that Co-Subject had assisted him in beating Victim to death with the

wooden oar.

Both received dishonorable discharges, were reduced to the lowest enlisted pay grade, and were ordered to forfeit all pay and allowances.

Importance of Interrogation

By S/A A. J. Kersenbrock

On 4 August 1979, someone entered the radar equipment room aboard the USS SAMPSON while berthed at Bahrain and with a sledgehammer selectively destroyed several components of the ships mission essential radar. The damage left the ship with no operable air search radar or IFI. Damage was estimated at \$30,000 with no known suspects. Urgent request for NIS assistance was made to NISRA Naples and two agents were dispatched to Bahrain to commence work on one of our toughest categories of investigations. The trip to Bahrain from Naples was no small hurdle being as it is approximately 2,800 air miles in distance. Moscow is closer to Naples than is Bahrain. However, the agents arrived and on 7 August the investigation was underway. The crime scene was completed, interviews were begun and by 10 August a good suspect had been identified. The suspect admitted being in the space during the appropriate time frame but (of course) denied culpability. The real work now began. Numerous items of physical evidence was sent to the lab for fingerprint comparison and detailed and specific inquiries about the suspect were initiated. A second suspect was logically developed, but this later proved to be a non-productive tangent. Subject was reinterrogated

twice more and again denied. Results of the laboratory examinations were of no help. Polygraph examination of the prime suspect was considered but it was decided to make one last effort at an exhaustive interrogation, this time changing interrogators. The interrogation began early on the morning of 7 September 1979, and at 1450 that afternoon the suspect signed a statement in which he admitted causing the damage and to wiping his possible fingerprints from the sledgehammer and other instruments used. Without the suspects admission this case would have forever remained unsolved. With the admission it was closed with a resounding "F" and the reputation of NIS and the special agents involved was what it should be - professionals who can make the big ones. Despite all the necessary time consuming and frustrating preliminary work, the whole matter hinged upon the final interrogation. There is no substitute for the skill displayed by the interrogating agent in that room on 7 September. It may not be appreciated by those of lesser skill, or by those with little or no insight into investigative and interrogation technique. But we appreciate it. We are fortunate to have such skilled agents in NISO Europe. Our reputation is in their hands.

Operation Rockbound

By SAC A. C. Sleeper

During early 1979, NISRA Philippine sources surfaced information indicating several Philippine Nationals, all residents of Olongapo City, R.P., were possibly involved in the illegal acquisition and fraudulent preparation of U.S. and Philippine government documents for use by Philippine citizens to illegally immigrate into the U.S. By the end of June 1979, additional information had been accumulated

which clearly identified three organizations, operating independent of one another illegally engaged in the fraudulent scheme. In essence, the organizations illegally acquired, prepared and sold various pertinent U.S. military and Philippine government documents which enabled the Filipino to travel, via commercial and MAC aircraft, posing as U.S. sailors and U.S. Navy dependents. Throughout the early stages, because of the criminal backgrounds of most of the suspects, numerous sources declined to assist in penetration efforts for fear of severe reprisal. Finally, and considering the potential international ramifications, a joint operation was proposed, utilizing the resources and information of the Naval Investigative Service, Philippine Constabulary and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, to identify, apprehend and bring to justice all persons involved. In addition to one civilian source, three members of the Philippine Constabulary were assigned to NISRA Philippines for use as covert sources.


Independently, the sources penetrated each of the three organizations ingratiated themselves to the leaders and their accomplices and, using assumed identities, purchased U.S. Navy uniforms and related documentation between the suspects at a cost ranging between \$1,200.00 and \$2,100.00. On 15 September 1979, the last source departed the Philippines for the U.S. traveling through the illegal "pipeline." Independently, all sources traveled via commercial air from Manila to Tokyo, Japan. From there they traveled to Yokota Air Force Base, registered for a space "A" MAC flight using the fraudulent documents. After the normal delays they successfully boarded and proceeded to travel via MAC to the West Coast of the U.S. Once in the U.S. they continued in an undercover capacity by contacting certain individuals whose names were

provided by syndicate members in the Philippines prior to their departure. These U.S. contacts would and did in fact assist by arranging for U.S. Alien Registration Cards and Social Security Account Number Cards, necessary documents to obtain employment in the U.S. The operation resulted in the identification and apprehension of numerous suspects both in the U.S. and in the Philippines, in addition to the identification and deportation of numerous illegal aliens both in and attempting to enter the U.S. during the operation. All suspects arrested in the Philippines are currently awaiting trial. The performance by the Philippine Constabulary, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service NISHQ, NISO's San Diego, San Francisco, Hawaii, Japan and numerous NISRA's within these NISO's combined to make the operation a smooth, highly successful and professional product.

Recruiter Malpractice

By S/A Kenneth P. Rodgers

In April 1979, NISRA New York initiated an investigation into allegations of enlistment processing irregularities which occurred at a local Navy Recruiting District. Representatives from the Office of the Inspector General, Navy Recruiting Command, Orlando, Florida, had conducted inspections of Navy Recruiting Stations throughout the Naval Recruiting District as a result of a complaint from a member of the Navy Recruiting District staff. The complaint centered around recruiting irregularities within the District which included fraudulently enlisting recruits who had insufficient education by altering documents to reflect that the recruit had more high school education than he had actually successfully completed.



In some cases "Ringers" were used to take tests for applicants who could not score high enough, and the ethnic background was altered so that an applicant's score would make him eligible for shipping. The residual files at the Navy Recruiting District Headquarters were seized and reviewed. Ninety-one recruiters were considered suspects in the suspected fraudulent enlistment of over two hundred fifty recruits. During the course of the investigation, it was disclosed that in a number of cases, fraudulent/counterfeit letters of attendance, and, in some cases, high school diplomas, were utilized to effect the fraudulent enlistment. Contact with high schools in question disclosed that most of the recruits in question had considerably less satisfactory high school education than claimed on their enlistment forms, or, in some cases, had never attended secondary school. In several cases high school staff members reported that the names appearing on suspect letters of attendance were forged or the names utilized did not represent current or former school employees. Some applications for enlistment show signs that dates of education and level of successful completion entries had been altered by person or persons unknown. Interviews of the recruits involved were conducted on a world-wide basis and high Seat of Government

interest was generated due to the number of suspects involved. Of added note is the fact that one recruiter had recently been selected as the Navy Recruiter of the Year, Navy-wide, and was so recognized at the Seat of Government level. During recruiter interrogations, many claimed extraordinary pressure they were under to meet monthly enlistment quotas or risk ruining their careers by failing to meet those quotas. Some personnel claimed they were rebuffed by superiors when they complained of recruiting violations. Many of the recruits were discharged from the Navy for various causes, and during attempts to locate them in the New York/New Jersey area, it was discovered that some were deceased, fugitives from justice, or imprisoned in various facilities throughout the states. As of this writing, the investigation continues and formal charges have been drafted and sworn against fifty-five recruiting personnel as a result of subject investigation. Some recruiters received Article 15, UCMJ hearings and were awarded fines of up to \$250.00 per month for two months, letters of reprimand, and were transferred from the Navy Recruiting District. Approximately ten have been referred to court-martial and dates have not yet been announced. The Commanding Officer of the Navy Recruiting District has been relieved and formal charges have also been drafted and sworn against him. His case has been referred to special court-martial.

Protective Services in New York City

By S/A Kent E. Walker

Protective Service Operations, although not the primary function of the Naval Investigative Service, have involved almost all of the Special Agent Corps at one time or another. Unlike the U.S. Secret Service, this assignment is levied upon the NIS Agent in connection with his many other duties. The main function of such a detail is, of course, to provide protection and security to the Principal or Protectee. However, a myriad of taskings are always present during the course of the operation and the image of the Special Agent and NIS are constantly on display. Agent conduct and demeanor cannot be overstressed.

NIS has frequently been called upon to render protective services and liaison support in the New York City area. During our Nation's bicentennial celebration, NIS gained wide notoriety among law enforcement and security agencies for its participation in the "International Naval Review" (INR) and "Operation Sail." NIS Agents were not only tasked with protective service responsibilities but also played a key role in liaison functions with many other federal, state and local agencies operating in the city during that time. In addition, NISRA New York personnel conducted, with other enforcement organizations, comprehensive threat assessments six months in advance of the Fourth of July activities. NIS also organized a communications center involving all participating agencies in the INR which processed up to 5,000 daily emergency and request calls.

The City of New York, by its very nature, attracts a tremendous number of visitors on an annual basis from all over the world.

Within the past 15 months, NIS has been tasked with the sole protective responsibilities involving the visit of three foreign dignitaries. These visitors included: The Yugoslavian Federal Secretary for National Defense, General NIKOLA LJUBICIC in September 1978; the Yugoslavian Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Branko MANULA in April 1979; and the Chilean Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jose MERINO Castro during September/October 1979. Special Agents assigned to NISRA New York also served a key liaison function during the Bob Hope USO Show aboard the USS IWO JIMA on 27 May 1979.

The crux of a successful protection operation lies in the pre-planning stages. The relationships developed by NIS Special Agents with federal and local authorities played a necessary and important role in all of the conducted protective details. During the Yugoslavian visits, threat information was provided by the Intelligence Division of the New York City Police Department and the U.S. Secret Service which posed a definite threat to both General LJUBICIC and Admiral MANULA. This information centered upon the increased activities of Serbo-Croatian terrorists in New York City who were threatening to kidnap a Yugoslavian official in sympathy for arrested comrades. The NYPD Intelligence Division assigns two detectives to NIS who provide a motorcade lead, continuing threat assessments and protective support.

During the advancement portion of the protective service, NIS contacts throughout New York City are imperative. Prior arrangements made with officials at the airports, Port Authority Police, United Nations, hotels, restaurants, theatres, World Trade Center and various museums have insured the safety of the Protectee as well as maintaining the desired sched-

ule. The benefits of these contacts were all too evident during the recent visit of Admiral MERINO which coincided with the arrival in New York of Pope John Paul II. Acting on short notice, NIS contacts with various enforcement agencies and hotel personnel insured a safe, smooth operation.

In all of the aforementioned details, the Protectee has visited not only New York City but other locations throughout the United States. The cooperation of various RDO's and SAC's has insured the maximum efficient utilization of NIS resources. Secretarial personnel within NISO New York have voluntarily assisted Special Agents by operating communication centers during the operation. In connection with Admiral MERINO's visit, Special Agents from various NISRA's were assigned to the team and two Special Agents, Frank Kauffman and Debbie Baughman, from NISRA Jacksonville accompanied the Protectee throughout his 17 day journey. Particularly noteworthy was the thorough planning conducted by NISRA New York and NISRA Newport for their portions of the detail as well as the timely assistance of NISRA New London. Additionally, the assistance of NISHQ was evident in securing the initial itinerary and identification of party members. The strong teamwork concepts of "NIS People" has been the primary ingredient in the success of protection operations.

Summary ~

NISO Philippines Narcotics Suppression Operations

By S/A V. H. McPherson

Between 1 January and 1 December 1979, eight narcotics suppression operations were conducted by NISO Philippine components against traffickers in various countries. The traffickers preyed upon members of the Seventh Fleet and their dependents. These operations were conducted in the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Thailand, Hong Kong, BCC and Singapore. Although not a part of any Initiative Criminal Intelligence Operation, Special Agents assigned to this NISO also actively pursued narcotics investigations in Diego Garcia and Sri Lanka. The operations resulted in the apprehensions of 108 local Nationals in various countries and the apprehension of 15 members of the U.S. Armed Forces for either use, possession and/or trafficking of narcotics and assorted dangerous drugs. The suppression operations resulted in the recovery of drugs valued in excess of \$103,401.00 based upon local "street prices." However, it is estimated that the recovery value would have been much higher if these drugs had been allowed to enter the U.S. Some of the highlights of these operations are as follows:

Two suppression operations conducted in Thailand between July and November 1979, resulted in the recovery of 41 vials of 95% pure heroin (approximately 7 grams each); 2,103 Thai sticks; the arrests of forty-nine local nationals and the confiscation of nine vehicles used by the traffickers. A USN enlisted man died from an overdose of almost pure heroin in Thailand during the course of one of these operations

and based upon NIS assistance the seller was identified, apprehended and is presently awaiting judicial action in that country. Although not judged serious by this NISO, persistent rumors are received from the field that narcotics traffickers in Olongapo, Republic of the Philippines are considering taking some type of reprisal action against NIS personnel as a result of several successful "busts."

During the month of September 1979, a Filipino trafficker was apprehended in possession of 800 grams of marijuana and he agreed to lead NIS and Philippine officials to his supplier. As it turned out the supplier had a marijuana plantation in an area that required an eleven hour car ride and an eight hour hike into the jungle. Special Agent Mike Jones, who went along as far as the car ride, had to be moved to another area while awaiting the results of the raid on the plantation. His safety could not be guaranteed by local Philippine Constabulary who were concerned about elements of the New People's Army (NPA). NPA, the Maoist/Leninist paramilitary arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines, openly operated in the area and were suspected to have an interest in the plantation. The Philippine Constabulary was able to destroy the field of marijuana on the plantation which contained crops estimated to be worth approximately \$15,000 on the local market. One week later the NPA attacked the closest Philippine Constabulary outpost to this plantation, killing all eight officers in the outpost at the time.

The efforts of these suppression operations have been noted not only by the "bad guys" but also by other Federal Agencies. NIS/DEA joint suppression operations in Thailand were recently reported in a DEA weekly publication.

Exchange Laundry/Dry Cleaner

Fraud

By S/A A. W. Perrin

A recent investigation disclosed a potential for fraud at the exchange laundry and dry cleaners which may be suitable for NIS criminal initiative operations at other locations. In normal exchange operations, employee thefts are usually disclosed through inventory shortages. Since laundry and dry cleaning operations deal with services, inventories normally balance out and as long as money taken in by cashiers matches cash register tapes, everything is considered satisfactory.

In the case in question, it was determined that when a customer brings in clothes for cleaning, a ticket is made up in triplicate for the cost of the cleaning. One copy of the ticket is given to the customer as receipt so that he can later claim his property after it has been cleaned. A second copy of the ticket stays with the clothes during the cleaning cycle so that they can be identified when the customer picks up his clothes and pays for them. The third copy of the ticket should have been forwarded to the accounting section of the exchange, which would have allowed accounting to determine how much money should have been taken in by the laundry and dry cleaning shop. However, in this case that was not done and the third ticket would be discarded by the cashier. This situation prevented the accounting section from knowing how much money should be taken in by the laundry and dry cleaning shop.

This investigation entailed a surreptitious inventory of all tickets within the laundry and dry cleaning shop over a four day period. Reconciliation of this inventory with the amount of cash taken in by the cashiers disclosed a shortage of over \$200.00 during this period. The primary suspicion centered on the main cashier who was suspected of not ringing up sales on her cash register and pocketing the money. During interrogation, the suspect denied any theft; however, it is noted that she went on "sick leave" the very next day and has not returned to work.

As a result of this investigation, the exchange has instituted procedures requiring a reconciliation of all laundry/dry cleaning tickets with the actual amount of money taken in by cashiers. Recent spot inventories have disclosed only minor discrepancies. The previous system of unaccountability has been in existence for a number of years which could have resulted in a loss to the exchange amounting to thousands of dollars.

Field components might consider similar initiative operations at activities dealing in "services" vice "merchandise" since it is difficult to account for money that should be received if there is not a system for accounting for the total amount of services provided.

Transition from the Smith to the Ruger

By the NIS-25 Staff.

For approximately 16 years NIS issued each of our Agents a Smith & Wesson Model 19, .357 handgun as the standard issue weapon. Beginning in 1973, each Agent was also provided a Smith & Wesson Model 37, alloy frame .38 Special. The Model 19 has been an extremely sturdy and reliable weapon but heavy and difficult to conceal. An increasing number of surveillances and protective details has made concealment a critical factor in the selection of a NIS service weapon.

The Model 37, originally purchased by the Navy as an aviator survival weapon, did permit concealment but was found to be quite unsatisfactory as a police type weapon. It had limited life when fired regularly as is required of NIS weapons and was not repairable. In addition, due to its short barrel length and small size the Model 37 could not be fired with the requisite degree of accuracy; nor could it be quickly reloaded. The shortness of the extractor rod did not allow complete extraction of spent cartridges from the cylinder.

Since neither the Model 19 nor the Model 37 is presently being procured by the Navy and because NIS manpower strength has exceeded the number of these weapons in the NIS inventory, a new standard weapon was desired to replace them. After three years of research on the matter, the new Ruger was selected. A recent FBI study on the best handgun for general issuance played a major part in the selection. This study recommended, in part, the following: 2 1/2 inch.

heavy barrel, .38 Special, fixed sights, non-contact between cartridge and firing pin (in the rest position), etc.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS RUGER GS32-N REVOLVER, CALIBER .357 MAGNUM



Right Side of Ruger GS32-N Revolver

Standardization of equipment used by a homogeneous group is a well known concept in the law enforcement community. This concept becomes paramount when applied to life and death situations as it pertains to the primary defensive weapon of the individual. The revolver is the only weapon which would be immediately available to the Agent in a gun battle. With this in mind, it should be noted that wide spread non-uniformity of revolvers, in use by Special Agents, would create a safety hazard in the same manner as would different caliber handguns. Carrying this one step further, should it be necessary for an Agent to use the revolver of another, and the two weapons were of different manufacture, the operation and function would more than likely be entirely different. One example of this particular point is the direction of rotation of the cylinder. An individual trained instinctively and habitually to load a counter-clockwise rotating cylinder could pay the supreme price if forced to use a clockwise rotating weapon of a fallen or injured partner. Simply by virtue of only having time to load one or two rounds in an emergency situation, the loaded rounds could be incorrectly loaded.

Should this occur, the weapon would not immediately fire, thereby placing the Agent's life in further jeopardy. The same safety hazard is true with regard to the cylinder release latch or thumbpiece. Each manufacturer has a different style of releasing the cylinder, whether it be a slide forward, a slide to the rear, or depressing into the frame of the weapon.

It should be pointed out at this stage, that Smith & Wesson would not bid to the specifications that DOD required, therefore, Ruger received the contract.

The new weapons were fired by the Agents' Basic Class this past November and December. After four hours classroom training and additional familiarization firing on the range, scores of 30 shooters ranged from a low of 48 to a high of 197 out of a possible 240. (The high shooter was a new USMC Special Agent who was not qualified with the Smith & Wesson Model 19.) Fifteen others scored below 150. All of these had "qualified" with the Smith & Wesson Model 19 previously as had the remainder the class. At any rate, the firearms staff had their work cut out for them.

With a little extra time and effort over the next few days, all members of the class qualified and 17 fired scores above 225. The 48 became 191, a 72 became 218, 65 became 190, etc. Only 4 finished below 200.

So what we are saying is that this weapon, like it or not, will hit the target after you become familiar with it and practice with it. Failing that it won't, but neither would your old Smith.

Special Agent Afloat Program

By the NIS-25 Staff

Since the inception of the Special Agent Afloat Program in March 1967, many NIS Special Agents have participated in this challenging and rewarding program. Candidates for this program must exhibit the ability to perform independently and to successfully complete complex investigations. Through the years, Commanding Officers of aircraft carriers and Task Force Commanders have been extremely complimentary of the cooperation, expertise and professionalism of Special Agents Afloat and many have expressed their appreciation to the Director, Naval Investigative Service.

However, previous Agents Afloat have not been recognized in quite the same manner as Special Agent Raymond H. Blackwell who recently completed a tour as Agent Afloat aboard USS FORRESTAL. Ray served as Agent Afloat from 7 November 77 to 6 August 79, an unprecedented length of time. During his tenure, Ray impressed the command to such a degree that the Commanding Officer, USS FORRESTAL bestowed an honor upon Ray that no other Special Agent Afloat has received.

On 6 August 79, a farewell ceremony in honor of Ray was held in the officer's wardroom aboard ship. The ceremony was attended by the ship's Commanding Officer, Executive Officer, Legal Officer, Chief Master-at-Arms and numerous other personnel. Special Agent Blackwell was presented a USS FORRESTAL plaque, an engraved USS FORRESTAL cigarette lighter, and a Letter of Commendation from the Commanding Officer. The letter paid special tribute to Special

Agent Blackwell's dedication to duty, investigative expertise and training of the Master-at-Arms force. The letter recognized S/A Blackwell's "efficient and expedient management of the ship's law enforcement efforts as instrumental in reducing the overall crime rate and a dramatic increase in the percentage of solved cases."

As a special touch, the Commanding Officer honored S/A Blackwell with a huge decorated cake, which was inscribed "Special Agent NIS, Ray Blackwell, Fair Winds and Following Seas." A fine tribute to a Special Agent Afloat in recognition for a superb performance.

Assignment in Europe

By S/A A. J. Kersenbrock

Sardinia is a lovely place. From its rugged northern shore can be seen Napoleon's birthplace, the island of Corsica, and the scenery on the island is clearly reminiscent of Southern California. In fact, most of the island's interior looks like a gigantic movie set for a classy western movie or an early Clint Eastwood epic. The cliffs along the shore line are breathtakingly beautiful, and are festooned with abandoned stone fortresses; some of which are said to date from Phoenecian times. But, it has its modern side too. The small town of La Maddalena is a resort town on a small island off the mainland just opposite the hillside mansion of Garibaldi, one of the few men who remains a hero to all Italians. On approaching La Maddalena by ferry, one is immediately struck by the picturesque beauty of the place. Its waterfront is postcard pretty; white-washed buildings with tiled roofs,


fishermen mending nets in the sunshine and dappled shade, and small boats of every description darting about or tied up in the small harbor. Just the sort of place you might well fantasize about while indulging in escapist dreams. And this is the island to which Bob Robbins reported in August 1979, for a three year tour. For here is located NISRU La Maddalena, responsible for providing NIS support to a Submarine Tender moored offshore as well as coverage of the entire island of Sardinia. At this writing, it is December and Bob is enjoying his tour, accepting and appreciating the local culture and seeing the differences between Sardinia and Boston as just that, differences not shortcomings. Fortunately, this attitude is one he brought along with him for the beginning of his tour was as rocky as the Sardinian shoreline. He arrived with wife and three young children and was taken to a local hotel where he was to live until he could find local housing and to await the arrival of his household goods. As it turned out his household goods were misshipped to the wrong location in Europe and were underway for about 90 days. Meantime, Bob and his family remained in the IL Gabbiano hotel which is not your average Hilton or Holiday Inn. It is owned and operated by a husband and wife team. She runs the check-in/check-out desk, keeps the books, assists with room cleaning, and serves as waitress for evening meals. He is the bartender, chief cook, maintenance man, bellhop, passport checker, and plumber (this alone could be a full-time job given the age of the pipes - some of which reportedly also date back to Phoenecian times). Bob and his family shared two rather small rooms one of which was not a bathroom. The bathroom was down the hall. Bob said that they slowly became accustomed to this inconvenience, but that on occasion while traipsing down the

hall, at one or two in the morning, the place seemed somehow less picturesque. He and his family bore up well however sustained in part by the knowledge that his POV would arrive any day and that being able to get around and do a little sightseeing would ameliorate the rather spartan living conditions. But true to Murphy's immutable law, this too was not to come to pass. His POV followed his household goods to the same wrong European port and he continued to hoof it around the little town. Family shopping did not present too much of a problem since most meals were taken in Signore and Signora's kitchen - good, wholesome, home cooked meals especially appealing if fresh squid and spinach/olive oil pizza are among your favorites. The little shopping found to be necessary was easily accomplished. Using some of the \$500 borrowed from the SAC in Naples because his paycheck failed to arrive for two months, Bob's wife caught the ferry from La Maddalena to the Submarine Tender offshore and shopped in the commissary and exchange aboard. Then, with kids and bags, ferried back and walked the short distance, to the IL Gabbiano hotel.

Bob's office is located in the village of La Maddalena just a few blocks from the town plaza. It is a one room, windowless space on the ground floor of a building owned by a local resident and the upper



floors are occupied as living quarters by the owners relatives. Upon arriving at his office one morning, on what was obviously washday for the upper floor residents, clothes were flapping in the breeze from a clothesline that drooped down across the front of this office. Bob, who obviously doesn't sweat the small things, said he didn't mind the laundry except when it obscured his office sign. That afternoon when he returned there were more clothes still on the line, but the sign was clean and Bob paid little head.



As can be seen, even the best assignments are not without the occasional negative aspect. But Bob and family are fairly well settled in now. Jonathan, their oldest child is attending a beautiful, and in Bob's opinion, high quality school. Their car has arrived and they are comfortably ensconced in their home. They've applied for a telephone and local authorities have assured them, in fact guaranteed them, that it will be in working by September 1981. Seems there is a two year waiting list.

Around the NIS

** NIS **

Roosevelt Roads Champs - The NIS coached Redskins of the Roosevelt Roads Pee Wee Football League captured the Senior Division Championship on 27 October 79 with a 4-2 and 1 record. The 12 to 14 olders beat the tough Vikings 26-6 in the season's finale. The team was sponsored and coached by 05RR's SAC Jim Creaturo, and S/A's Cliff Simmen and Brian Greene. The start of one of the season's opening games was slightly delayed while coaches Simmen and Creaturo responded to a duty call. Unfortunately, the case remains unresolved, however, the game ended in a Redskin victory.

** NIS **

Amateur radio operator assists during hurricanes. KP4FOB (S/A J. B. Greene of 05RR) maintained vital communications link between numerous base personnel and their families in the states during the past hurricane season. S/A Greene logged many hours at the radio maintaining vital communications link between P.R. and the continental U.S. during the recent hurricanes, David and Frederick, which decimated several Caribbean Islands. The hurricane which left Roosevelt Roads area without electricity, water, and means of communication with the outside world, hit within five days of each other. S/A Greene was able to contact families of military members stationed at Roosevelt Roads and pass on emergency messages and status reports throughout the crisis.

** NIS **

S/A Kenneth W. Nickel, SAC, NISRA North Island, is undergoing post-operative treatment following successful surgery for a malignant tumor. Ken is in excellent spirits.

A case involving contract procurement fraud and bribery, initiated in March 1978, recently culminated in successful prosecution in Federal Court in San Diego, CA with the conviction of the president of the contracting company, four highly placed Navy civilian employees, and one former Navy civilian employee. All except the last named (who received a suspended sentence in consideration for his cooperation and testimony) received fines up to \$50,000 and prison terms of from two to nine years. The investigation marked a fine example of cooperative effort of NIS, FBI and the IRS under the guidance of the U.S. Attorney's office. Income Tax charges are still pending against all defendants. Special Agent Archie W. Hooser, NISRA Point Loma, was singled out for commendations from the U.S. Attorney, San Diego; U.S. Attorney General; and the Director, FBI.

** NIS **

Within two hours of discovery of a burglary at the Navy Regional Commissary Store, Long Beach, CA, Special Agents of that NISRA recovered in excess of \$18,000 in stolen government property, apprehended two of the thieves and identified a third at a civilian residence in Wilmington, CA. While on-scene interviews and crime scene examination were still underway, additional Special Agents were checking the residences of two commissary employees who had failed to report to work. It was at the residence of one they observed a stolen Navy truck and the stolen provisions. Physical evidence linking the perpetrators to the crime were collected and a prosecutable package delivered to the U.S. Attorney.

** NIS **

During the last six months, NISRA St. Louis has completed thirty-one 7N cases and eighty-eight 1L cases. Not too many offices in NIS would be able to list that many closed homicides. However, all of these cases involve a review of service records of former military personnel at the Military Personnel Records Center in St. Louis. The requester, in a majority of these cases, has been a local law enforcement agency. These agencies can write directly to the Records Center and obtain information, however, they are only provided with a limited amount of information. Further, the reviewer is usually a GS-2 or GS-3 and does not understand what would really be helpful to an investigator or police officer. When such a lead is sent through O8SL the records will be reviewed with the needs of a criminal investigation in mind.

Assistance to a local law enforcement agency in a criminal investigation or pre-employment check is one good method of establishing liaison with that agency. NISRU Dallas and NISRA Seattle initiate 1L investigations on behalf of their local police departments on every applicant who had prior military service. A suspect, witness or applicant does not have to be just former Navy or Marine Corps. He can also have served in the U.S. Army, Air Force or Coast Guard, as NISRA St. Louis has access to all of these records. Those offices desiring to obtain such information can do so by sending an appropriate lead to O8SL. NISRA St. Louis will perform this service for any state or local law enforcement agency. All federal agencies have representatives in the area and can perform the check themselves.

On 30 October 1979, Special Agent Roger K. Harris, Naval Investigative Service, presented an English translation he prepared of a lengthy Japanese publication concerning Yokosuka, Japan, to Deputy Mayor Masao Yoshino and Liaison Chief Ryoji Machida at the Yokosuka City Hall. An attempt will be made by the City of Yokosuka to appropriate funds for publication of this translation which, in addition to being made available to American personnel in the area, will be used to teach Japanese students in English about the city's history, commerce and geography. Harris, who joined the NIS in 1976, traveled extensively throughout Japan during the period 1968 - 1971 and after earning a BA in Japanese from Brigham Young University, Hawaii, obtained an MA in Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii in 1973.

** NIS **

One morning, just prior to a recent USN pay day, the Disbursing Officer of the USS DAVIDSON (FF-1045) withdrew \$47,500 from the bank of Hawaii at Pearl Harbor. Accompanied by an armed DK, the Disbursing Officer departed the bank and entered a marked USN vehicle. Almost immediately, the two were captured by a lone gunman, who forced them to drive the USN vehicle to the area of the Navy Exchange, where he relieved the Disbursing Officer of the cash and forced the Officer and his escort out of the vehicle. The gunman then made his getaway in the USN vehicle, which was later found abandoned in a nearby shopping center.

An observant USN dependent wife noted the foregoing and followed the gunman to the shopping center

where she watched him switch cars and flee with two accomplices. She furnished a description of the car and its license number to the Special Agents who made the initial response. Motor vehicle traces disclosed that the car was registered to a USN enlisted man who was well-known to many NIS Special Agents, having been apprehended on two prior occasions. During those earlier escapades, he had obtained more than \$45,000 in material by using fraudulent government requisitions and (while awaiting trial for that offense) forced his way into the Disbursing Office aboard a Fleet Oiler and stole a supply of blank U.S. Government checks, which he negotiated for more than \$13,000.

Armed with that information, extensive island-wide investigation was initiated using every available NIS Special Agent on the Island of Oahu; five FBI Agents later enlisted in the effort and several other investigative agencies were mobilized in a support role. Within eight hours, that massive effort resulted in the identification, location and apprehension of our recidivist "mastermind" and three accomplices, as well as the recovery of approximately \$33,600. Follow-on investigation brought the total recovery to \$42,635. Three of the four suspects have been adjudged guilty and sentenced by a Federal Court.

** NIS **

Recently one of NISPAC's finest had to leave the warm tropical shores of Oahu in order to fight crime in Antarctica which is affectionately (and accurately) referred to as "The Ice." That journey of more than 10,000 miles is worthy of note.

To start off with, the Agent had only five hours in which to be fully briefed regarding the investigation, to be ticketed on the

next flight to New Zealand (a nightmare in itself), to return home to pack and then to catch his plane at Honolulu International Airport. Approximately ten hours of air travel from Hawaii brought our tenacious crusader to Christchurch, New Zealand where Detachment Christchurch, Naval Support Force, Antarctica is located. Since 1955, the Navy has been providing logistics support to U.S. activities in Antarctica and Detachment Christchurch serves as the forward staging base and jumping off point for USN/USAF flights to the "The Ice." Upon arriving at Detachment Christchurch our dauntless crime fighter was greeted by the wreckage of a USAF C-1 41, which crash landed a few days earlier upon returning from Antarctica. Even after learning that this aircraft was initially scheduled to take him to "The Ice," our NIS Agent's spirits were not admittedly dampened.

Although the city of Christchurch is a quaint town, known internationally for its beautiful gardens, our Hawaii traveler had no time to do any sightseeing as he was required to undergo a thorough physical examination and be issued approximately thirty pounds of cold weather survival clothing before going to "The Ice." The only problem he encountered in this regard was trying to recall his correct hat and glove size.

The flight from Christchurch to McMurdo Station, Antarctica takes from 8 to 13 hours depending upon the type of aircraft. While patently obvious that Antarctica at the bottom of the world, is the southernmost point at which a NIS Agent may go stomping, it may not be so obvious that Antarctica is the world's largest desert. That's right - desert! At the South Pole, for example, the annual precipitation is equivalent to less than two inches of water. Compare this to

Phoenix, Arizona's 7.2 inches! Also, the coldest temperature in the world, 126.9 degrees below zero (F), was recorded at Antarctica in 1960 so the 50 degrees below zero (F) experienced by our NISPAC traveler was mild by comparison, although quite a contrast from the 80 degrees (above zero) temperatures normally found in Hawaii. Our traveler remarked that there were two things he initially found difficulty adjusting to - namely 24 hours of sunlight (had he arrived 6 months sooner or later, he would have encountered 24 hours of darkness), and the clarity of the air (due to low humidity), which creates a false impression of distances. For example, a mountain range which appeared to be only five miles away was in fact a distance of 65 miles.

His return flight from McMurdo to Christchurch in a noisy C-130 took more than eight hours, but seemed a lot longer since the plane also had a seriously ill Soviet scientist aboard whose condition required that the passenger compartment be chilled down and the "no smoking" sign remain lighted. Our agent's perception of discomfort was not alleviated by the complaints of two fellow passengers, scientists returning from an extended stay at the South Pole, that they were cold!

★★ NIS ★★

NISPAC has suggested the following for consideration in Agent Applicant Screening Tests:

History - Describe the history of the papacy from its origins to the present day, concentrating especially, but not exclusively, on its social, political, economic, religious and philosophical impact on Europe, Asia, America and Africa. Be brief, concise and specific.

Medicine - You have been provided with a razor blade, a piece of gauze and a bottle of scotch. Remove your appendix. If your appendix has already been removed, reinsert it. Do not suture until your work has been inspected. You have 15 minutes.

Public Speaking - 2,500 riot-crazed aborigines are storming your office. Calm them. You may use any ancient language except Greek.

Biology - Create life. Estimate the differences in subsequent human culture if this form of life had developed 500 million years earlier, with special attention to its probable effect on the English Parliamentary System. Prove your thesis.

Music - Write a piano concerto. Orchestrate and perform it with flute and drum. You will find a piano under your seat.

Psychology - Based on your knowledge of their works, evaluate the emotional stability, degree of adjustment and repressed frustrations of each of the following: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Rameses II, Gregory of Nicaea, Hammurabi. Support your evaluation with quotations from each man's work, making appropriate references. It is not necessary to translate.

Sociology - Estimate the sociological problems which might accompany the end of the world. Construct an experiment to test your theory.

Engineering - The disassembled parts of a highpowered rifle have been placed on your desk. You will also find an instruction manual, printed swahili. In 10 minutes a hungry bengal tiger will be admitted to the room. Take whatever action you feel appropriate. Be prepared to justify your decision.

Political Science - There is a red telephone on the desk beside you. Start World War III. Report at length on its sociopolitical effects, if any.

Epistmeology - Take a position for or against truth. Prove the validity of your stand.

Newport Lecture Circuit

By S/A Thomas E. Neary

NIS Special Agents have been known over the years as a "jack of all trades and master of most." If a tour of duty at NISRA Newport is on your career horizon, you might want to join a local toastmasters club or debating society because NISRA Newport means you are on the lecture circuit. Now, most of us get a crack at speaking to some group periodically but when you come to Newport you have reached the pinnacle of public speaking opportunities. This fact is immediately driven home when you realize the office address is, "Naval Education and Training Center," and you are on campus and not on base. Try as you might, there is not a CO or XO to be found onboard, but we have presidents and deans and directors and academic advisors and students, some of whom mysteriously appear with stars on their shoulders and gold on their sleeves whenever a bugle blows. Into this Ivy League environment with halls rather than barracks, comes the hardchanging Special Agent who has read the latest Gen Admin and is anxious to uncover the multitudinous layers of crime and/or evil.


An in depth briefing by the SAC as to the status of the current campus crime wave is concluded by

the casual comment, "Oh by the way, I hope you know NIS inside and out and the present counterintelligence posture of the Navy because here at Newport we occasionally give a few lectures to the students." Not to show any apprehension for that comment, you quickly respond, "No sweat boss, I spoke to the local boy scout troop a couple of years ago on the dangers of glue sniffing and brought the old NIS movie to a stag night at the police department." Being the trained investigator that you are, it's easy to see such a response isn't exactly what the SAC expected, and his following comment preceeded by "Now son." puts things in perspective:

"We, I mean you, as of tomorrow, will be giving the NIS orientation and counterintelligence lectures to the students at the various schools that comprise NETC. Based on experience and student critiques you should structure your lectures to the audience. Tomorrow, as I mentioned, you will be speaking at 0800 to a legal officers class of non-lawyers at the Naval Justice School and at 1600 there is a lecture for nurses and medical service corps personnel at the Officers Indoctrination School. Remember, you can be more detailed with the non-lawyer Legal Officers than the nurses, but don't get in as deep with them as you would with the lawyers who you will meet later in the week. Now, the following day you will really be hopping. By the way, you can run a motion picture projector, handle stage lighting and various sound equipment I'm sure. Anyway, there are back-to-back lectures with two classes of officer candidates, probably about 300 attendees, at Perry Hall, and don't get flustered when everyone jumps to attention when you come on stage. Remember, watch your time because the students are on a rigid schedule and you have to be at SWOS by 1100. Now that will be your most important lecture because if

you don't make a good impression at the Prospective CO and XO class you will incur the wrath of every Special Agent Afloat. Remember to be candid with these guys but very formal at OCS, and when you do the lecture at NAPS, talk to them like you did to the boy scout troop. If you get a chance, stop over to the Chaplain School enroute to the War College. We haven't had a request for a lecture to the padres for a while. Any questions?"

NEWPORT LECTURE CIRCUIT



Never at a loss for words although my grip on the coffee cup was slipping, I responded, "Just a couple in addition to what's a SWOS and a NAPS; and, do you provide a road map and cue cards, and who fights campus crime while we are lecturing?"

The SAC responded, "SWOS is Surface Warfare Officers School and NAPS is the Naval Academy Prep School. I'm sure a Special Agent of the Naval Investigative Service can find his way around campus and lecture off the seat of his pants. As for the campus crime wave, that's what premium pay is all about."

Drug Testing in the Field:

The Problem of False Positives

By S/A Bruce Given

Users of the various "field" or "spot" tests available for presumptive identification of narcotics and dangerous drugs should repeatedly remind themselves of that all-important modifier: "presumptive." The NIS kits Ferguson, Narcoban, Becton-Dickinson, Valtox -- all utilize the development or change of a color in the test reagent. While this type procedure is quick and easily accomplished and usually a valid indicator for the substance under question, the specificity of such tests is, for the most part notoriously unreliable. This deficiency in specificity is the primary reason for the necessary qualifier "presumptive" and is often referred to as the false positive problem.

A "false positive" is the production, by a test reagent, of a reaction identical in appearance to that expected for a particular substance but caused by the presence of some substance other than that for which the test was used. For example, a substance suspected of being phencyclidine is tested and a color identical to the positive reaction is obtained, but the powder actually tested was cocaine. Worse yet, a test shows positive for heroin but the powder was really aspirin.

Another equally hazardous characteristic of many field tests is the tendency for several often unrelated, substances to produce results distinguishable one from another only through an experienced examiner's awareness of subtle differences in hue. This problem is especially hazardous when the

neophyte tester relies upon a written description of the color to be seen as indication of a particular drug's presence. For example the "reddish-violet" descriptor used so often for the reaction of some opium-based compounds in the presence of Marquis reagent sounds similar to the "raspberry red" color of aspirin in the Marquis reagent. These verbal characterizations become particularly confusing when a dynamic reaction is present. What, for example is the difference between an "orange changing to a yellow" and an "orange-red quickly fading to yellow?" It is an ignorance, or misunderstanding, of these similar sounding types of reaction that cause the most difficulty in the use of field tests.

In an attempt to create the impression of great specificity some commercial kits will offer secondary or "confirmatory" tests for certain substances. Seldom will these second tests yield conclusive confirmation of any specific substance and the examiner should not be lulled into complacency through the mere presence of additional solutions within the kit.

A brief discussion of the more commonly seen field tests and their relative merits may be of interest. Unfortunately, some commercial tests kits do not fully identify their tests -- either by name or chemical composition. This creates problems with confidence as well as accuracy should an Agent every be required to give (perhaps in court) a detailed description of the test used. Should such questions of identity every become a point of concern, the Agent should seek the assistance of the Technical Services Department.

MARQUIS REAGENT - This is perhaps the most ambiguous test found in field test kits. It will yield a reaction of some sort to a huge

number of powders encountered in enforcement work. Its primary use is for detection of opium related compounds and amphetamines. Most controlled substances produce reactions in the blue or purple region of the color spectrum. The Becton-Dickinson kit refer to the Marquis reagent as "test A."

MECKE'S TEST - Very similar in function to the Marquis reagent. No better or worse, in specificity, the bulk of Mecke's reactions are in the green-yellow color region.

MAYER'S TEST - Unfortunately there still exists in some quarters the misconception that a negative result from this single solution test rules out the presence of prohibited drugs. This reagent is most effective as a quick screen for plant alkalkoids -- a very broad and mixed group of drugs. If the sought for reaction from an otherwise unidentified single solution test is the formation of a white precipitate, the test is quite likely the Mayer test.

COBALT THIOCYANATE - This is both the principle component of several tests and the proper name of one such test used to identify a variety of compounds -- primarily methadone, demerol, and cocaine. While this test does yield a distinct azure-blue precipitate in the presence of the above name drugs, the number of compounds yielding this appearance severely degrades the specificity of the test. For example, other "-caines" such as procaine and lidocaine will give the same color reaction as will herion and quinine.

DILLI-KOPPANYI - This is one of the two commonly used tests for barbiturates. It is a two-solution test which yields a lavender to reddish-violet color in the presence of barbituric acid or one of its derivatives. As field tests go, this is one of the more reliable.

ZWIKKER TEST - The second of two commonly seen tests for barbituric acid, Zwikker is often seen as a three-solution test. Violet or blue coloration is presumptively positive for barbiturates.

VAN URK REAGENT - This test is typical to several commercially available tests for LSD. The reagent common to all these tests is not at all specific to LSD and will yield so many false positives on such a variety of commonly available substances (such as non-dairy creamers, dry soup mix, cocoa mix) that no real advantage is gained through its use.

PHENCYCLIDINE - At the time of this writing there is no true field test for PCP which does not yield a confusing array of false positives. Technical Services Department may, in the near future have a decent field test for PCP. Once such a test becomes available, an announcement will be made.

DUQUENOIS-LEVINE TEST - This procedure for the detection of cannabis-related materials is the most definitive and reliable of all field tests. In conjunction with a detailed microscopic examination of any vegetable material seized, the experienced user of the Duquenois-Levine test can achieve definitive results. An opinion should never be rendered on the basis of either the chemical or the microscopic examination alone. While there are no known plant materials capable of producing a true false positive, the examiner should have a firm understanding of what other materials can possibly create color changes. For example, some coffee grounds can yield a color reaction, but the resulting hues are so far removed from that produced by the cannabis, the experienced tester will have no problem distinguishing the difference. Three reagents are required for the Duquenois-Levine test.

PCS Questions and Answers

By Mr. N. T. Lutsch

Certain questions have a way of recurring in the realm of PCS moves and, though addressed in NIS-1 they will be specifically treated in this column:

Q. - How long is my period of Temporary Quarters and Subsistence (TQS) upon returning to CONUS from overseas?

A. - Thirty days. No extension can be granted unless transferring from a non-foreign area (i.e., NISPAC, 05RR 12AA) in which case an extension of up to thirty days may be granted.

Q. - If I can't get an extension of TQS after I arrive in CONUS, how do I overcome the problem that I'll encounter due to delay in shipment of my household goods (HHG)?

A. - Upon receipt of orders coordinate with the local transportation officer to determine how long shipment of HHG will take. In most cases, you will be authorized early shipment of HHG and you may utilize TLA prior to your detachment.

Q. - How far in advance of my move will I receive my orders?

A. - Normally, orders will be in hand at least two months prior to the planned detachment date.

Q. - How do I arrange overseas travel?

A. - Your NISO will submit a Port Call with the servicing travel office. The latter will book aboard MAC or commercial depending on availability and issue an authorization for a Travel Request (TR) and/or actual tickets.

Moving On

By S/A Clyde Roach

Q. - I've got unique problems. One of my dependents is nervous about flying and I'm concerned a MAC flight will only make that dependent more nervous. Can my orders be prepared to direct CAT "Z" travel?

A. - No. The only authority in the Navy who can now direct the usage of CAT "Z" is the Transportation Officer. NISHQ can only provide the ability to direct CAT "Z." In every set of PCS orders, CAT "Z" transportation is authorized but determined by the Transportation Officer.

Q. - My orders indicate nothing about the ten day Foreign Transfer Allowance to which I'm entitled and, further, no advance of funds is provided. Is this an error?

A. - No. As in the case of the Temporary Lodging Allowance (TLA), the Foreign Transfer Allowance is administered and paid locally. All receipts, bills, etc., should be retained and submitted with a claim for reimbursement after arrival at the new duty station. Unlike TQS no advance of funds is allowed for either TLA or the Foreign Transfer Allowance.

Q. - When should I submit my application for a passport?

A. - NISHQ will mail to you a DD-1056 (Application for No-Fee Passport) shortly after your transfer is announced. You should process the application as soon as possible. Allow a minimum of five to six weeks for processing.

Most of us associate fraud operations with theft, travel claims and the like. NISO San Francisco has had good success with these, and they are the types of offenses certain to be repeated in time. But the region also has a number of other ICIOs in various stages of development. One of the more interesting is being run by NISRA Mare Island, and is just entering its initial phase.

The concept had its genesis in a newspaper report that the Interstate Commerce Commission was asking more than \$4.5 million in civil penalties from 45 household goods moving companies. The alleged practices included deliberately padding bills - called "weight bumping." NISRA Mare Island felt that if it had happened in the civilian economy, the Navy and Marine Corps were probably likely targets as well.

Structuring an ICIO around this proposition involved a great deal of questioning and agent education. It was necessary to learn some basics of the moving business as well as how the military handled their affairs.

It was learned that active duty personnel are standardly moved by Government Bill of Lading (GBL) unless they opt for a "rent a truck" and move their household goods themselves. For civilians to be moved by GBL, it has to be established that the government benefits by over \$100.00. Paperwork processing for Navy in so called "long-haul" moves - extensive distances or across country - is ultimately handled by the Navy Regional

Finance Center in Washington, D.C. In the case of Marine Corps it goes to Albany, Ga. This obviously posed some built-up problems for the NISRA; however, it was later learned that DOD has a military traffic management agency that in turn designates household goods shipping agencies with assigned areas of responsibility. For Mare Island this proved to be the Naval Supply Depot at Oakland, CA.

It was found that in addition to coordinating long haul and overseas household goods movements, NSD was also authorized to execute local procurement moving contracts for the San Francisco Bay Area, for which it processed the paperwork and paid the carriers directly. The procurement authority extended to Solano County, where Mare Island Naval Shipyard is located. This processing did not include the Marine Corps, who insisted on paying their local bills through Albany.

A number of protocols were found to exist with respect to the manner in which moving companies dealt with the Navy but many were overlooked or ignored. In a typical situation, a company who has contracted to move the household goods of a Navy family obtains a weight ticket from a certified scale either the day of the move or the evening prior, which reflects the TARE (unloaded) weight of the truck, together with whatever equipment or other shipments are on board. After he loads the household effects, the driver is expected to proceed to a certified scale and reweigh the truck to determine the specific additional weight he has picked up. Following delivery, these certified tickets are submitted to NSD together with the inventory and related papers, and payment is made by the government.

On the surface this seemed straightforward enough. But consultation with the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Solano County Department of Weights and Measures disclosed it was far from the case. Weight-bumping can be done in a number of ways. For example, the driver is supposed to appear at the residence with full gas tanks. Trucks may have up to a 200 gallon capacity, and with a gallon of diesel fuel weighing roughly seven pounds, the difference could be considerable. The person being moved is unlikely to climb in the cab to check the diesel gauge. Once the driver has left the home, it is an easy matter to stop and fill his tanks before proceeding to the scales, and thus add 1000 - 1400 lbs to the weight the Navy is paying for.

It is not difficult either for an unscrupulous driver to simply add physical weight to his load between the residence and the scales. Instances were cited of oil drums filled with concrete being found in the trailer; stacked bricks; sand bags on the axles and the like. ICC reported one case where movies were taken by their inspectors of a driver's helper shoving boulders out the back of the truck as it rumbled down the road.

Weighmasters at certified scales do not inspect the contents of rigs, and although state and federal inspectors have such authority, it is rarely exercised. Enforcement is apparently spotty throughout the United States, and there seems to be an abundance of means to subvert the system. Trucking companies can use their own scales fraudulently and provide false weight certificates; phony tickets can be obtained through bribes; and truckers can produce counterfeits with a minimum of effort. DOD policy is for 10% of

all inbound shipments to be reweighed, on a random basis, and 20% of all shipments originating overseas, but there are a number of ways for this to be obviated. If fuel is used to weight bump, for example, all the driver needs do is top off his tanks before the reweigh, and get an additional 1000 lbs, which pays for the trip.

Some other variations on the theme were provided by state inspectors. Certain items such as pianos and other heavy items are assigned a flat rate by movers. If, after the consignee signs the invoice that the shipment was received, the driver adds a piano to the invoice record that goes to the Navy, there is no way the accounting office can know the two versions do not correspond. Another switch is to check the "piano" block when a child's toy piano is part of the shipment. Mare Island was told that in one instance a trucking company substituted a heavy duty cab and changed license plates to effect the weight bump.

Enforcement personnel felt that the Navy and Marine Corps were unquestionably being defrauded. From these conversations, it was decided that a phased operation would be undertaken. The initial segment would be limited to determining if there were clear indications of fraud locally. The second phase would target in on companies suspected of committing these frauds.

A survey check list was developed for use at NSD by the department receiving notification. Sources at NSD were developed and given check sheets on which to profile incoming shipments in the local area. These included such things as consignee, destination address, weight of shipment and time of anticipated delivery.

The survey was restricted to shipments of 3000 lbs or less for a

practical reason; it was planned to weigh the goods after they had been delivered, and a large shipment would simply involve too many hours to check.

Once the profile was made available to NISRA Mare Island, an agent contacted the concerned command and the recipient, and ascertained their willingness to support the ICIO. When this was determined the delivery proceeded as scheduled. After the driver left, the Weights and Measures Inspector, together with the agent, weighed each item delivered and compared it with the invoice given the owner for discrepancies. For those interested in the hands-on aspects, the beam scale is portable, about three feet in diameter and weighs about 50 pounds. The procedure had been for the inspector and agent to individually weigh each box or piece, keeping tab on a hand calculator, and then comparing weight listed by the mover with the actual findings. Final figures within fifty pounds of each other are considered acceptable. On a shipment of three thousand pounds, the procedure takes about an hour and a half. (It is a great deal easier if the shipment is not unpacked; however, this is the decision of the owner in each case. A suggestion that has been used with good effect is that if the consignee elects to unpack himself, he has the confirmation of neutral parties in the event breakage is found.) To date there have been no fraud indicators, but the ICIO is very early into the screening stage. The thinking is to concentrate the screening to as many trucking companies as possible within a compressed time frame, and thus isolate those firms with fraud indicators.

When they have been identified, a number of investigative steps can be taken. One on-scene action would be for the Navy in a

suspected case to direct a reweigh of the truck as soon as it has completed off-loading, and for NIS to follow it to the weigh station to ensure it does not divert and alter the TARE weight. The NISRA is fortunate in this regard in that the Shipyard has its own certified scale for trucks.

The NISRA is also training disbursing clerks at the Naval Supply Depot to look for such things as repeated entries of flat fee items -- pianos, perhaps -- in carrier vouchers. If public scales are not available the driver can choose to bill by cubic feet. A pattern of this would be of interest, and would lend itself to comparison with the consignee's copy to see if cartons had been added. Processing clerks are also asked to be alert for handwritten weight certifications - a frequent indicator of fraud, according to Weights and Measures personnel. Another planned investigative approach is to get a copy of the consignee's invoice and compare it with the one submitted by the carrier to NSD for payment.

In time it is expected that the ICIO will include outgoing shipments also, although this will involve considerably more coordination. Key to the enterprise has been the enthusiasm and cooperation of local authorities, who have a considerable depth of experience in dealing with fraudulent moving practices, and whose expert testimony will be an important adjunct in criminal prosecution.

Some snags have already occurred, and others are certain to appear. The NISRA has had difficulty in getting sufficient lead time to make advance arrangements, for one. On some occasions the survey profile NSD prepares for the NISRA isn't received in sufficient time to take action. In other cases the target profile is simply

overlooked by the clerks. In one instance, the profile fit but the individual did not prove to be one that the agent had confidence in approaching for the ICIO. Timing is a consideration. There are a great many more moves in the summer than the fall and winter months, so spring is probably the optimum time to firm up planning.

Those in the business have stressed that once word of the operation is leaked to the trucking industry, the probability is strong that any fraud activity will stop for at least a cooling off period. This of course can be viewed as a plus, and when the operation is terminated it is planned that such word will be put out.

One challenge of this ICIO is controlling the potentially large time demands that it could impose, and for this reason the initial phase is being limited in the manner indicated. If evidence of fraud is surfaced, however, and investigative cases result, a wide number of techniques can be applied. This article has only touched the surface of the fraud potential in the industry, but it is hoped that it may be of use in shaping the thinking applied to the problem by other NIS elements. The rewards in terms of fraud suppression could be substantial.

Overseas Allowances

The following tables provide information, based on most current data possible, regarding the overseas duty stations of NAVINVSERV. Periodic updates will be furnished in the future.

<u>POST</u>	<u>1/ TEMPORARY LODGING</u>		<u>2/ FAMILY STATUS</u>	<u>3/ HOUSING ALLOWANCE</u>		<u>DIFFERENTIAL RATE %</u>	<u>COST OF LIVING</u>
				GS-14-18	10-13 7-9		
05BM	A/ 33	WF	130	110	90	0	
	B/ 48	WOF	110	90	75		
05GT	6	WF	40	40	40	10%	
		WOF	40	40	40		
05RR	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%
08FA	6	WF	40	40	40	15%	
		WOF	40	40	40		
12AA	-	-	-	-	-	-	25%
60GA	7	WF	43	43	33	0	
		WOF	38	33	23		
60NA	22	WF	86	86	70	0	
		WOF	86	86	56		
60SX	21	WF	62	62	42	0	
		WOF	62	42	40		
60GN	18	WF	45	40	32	0	
		WOF	40	32	28		
60HQ/60LN	70	WF	136	117	94	0	
		WOF	136	94	78		
60KF	6	WF	35	35	30	10%	
		WOF	35	30	22		
60RT	13	WF	51	49	44	0	
		WOF	49	44	38		
80MI/80AG/ 80CM	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.5%

<u>POST</u>	<u>1/ TEMPORARY LODGING</u>	<u>2/ FAMILY STATUS</u>	<u>3/ HOUSING ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>DIFFERENTIAL RATE %</u>	<u>COST OF LIVING</u>
		GS-14-18	10-13	7-9	
80HQ/80BP/ 80HN	6	WF WOF	40 40	40 40	0 0
80KH	-	-	-	-	-
					12.5%
81AJ	24	WF WOF	39 38	38 35	37 35
81IW	19	WF WOF	52 42	52 39	59 39
81MW	31	WF WOF	47 43	43 41	41 41
81HK/81YK	27	WF WOF	75 60	59 50	55 43
81YH	36	WF WOF	94 87	87 60	60 53
81KI	31	WF WOF	56 52	52 52	50 38
83HQ/83SU/ 83PS/83CU	16	WF WOF	36 36	36 35	28 23
83MQ	25	WF WOF	49 49	46 39	39 33
83SM	6		40 40	40 40	40 0

1/ Rate shown per day not to exceed 90 days prior to occupying quarters.

2/ WF - With Family; WOF - Without Family

3/ Rate shown in hundreds per annum.

A/ December 2 - March 15

B/ March 16 - November 30

Retired Ring In



S/A J. Patrick Brennan retired on 31 August 1979 at NISRA Parris Island after a total of 35 years of federal service, 20 of which were with NIS. Pat and his wife, Joan, are residing at 1007 Cypress, Burton, S.C. and spending a lot of time on the golf course and around the family swimming pool. Pat would enjoy hearing from his many friends in NIS located throughout the world.

S/A Raphael R. Maher, former Assistant Supervising Agent, NISO Charleston, retired in January 1979. Ray and his wife, Harriet, and six children reside at 654 Pelzer Drive, Mount Pleasant, S.C. Ray advised he is now a gentleman of leisure; however, he finds time to teach political science at a local college and aspires to contribute his services to one of the South Carolina presidential primaries.

S/A Henry M. Fairley known to associates as "Mac-Sac," hung it up in August 1979, after 27 years in the NIS vineyards. He makes his home in Bremerton (2112 Lexington Dr., N.E. Bremerton WA. 98310, Telephone (206) 692-4063), and says he is mostly occupied with honey-do's ("Honey do this, honey do that.."). He does manage a good amount of hunting and fishing, however, and recently returned from a week in the northwest wilderness. Juanita is a full-time realtor, and their three children attend local schools. The welcome mat is always out at the Fairley household for any of the NIS family who visit the Bremerton area.

S/A Pat Daly and wife, Liz, are enjoying the "good life" since Pat's March 1979 retirement. Using the Daly residence at 369 Orwell Lane, Encinitas Ca. 92024 as their base they've made a few short trips, principally to the Lake Tahoe-Reno and San Francisco Bay areas. Their many friends in the Southeastern U.S. may expect to see them in the spring, when they visit Louisiana, Florida and South Carolina.

S/A Lou Herder and his wife, Gloria keep busy "fixing-up" the house at 12383 Escala Drive, Rancho Bernardo, Ca. 92127, which they reclaimed upon Lou's retirement in the Philippines in June 1979. Lou has no immediate plans other than to retire the items, one by one, on the "honey-do" list Gloria has given him.

S/A Richard L. Vollrath, 829 Prince Phillip Drive, Virginia Beach, Va. 23452, Telephone (804) 486-3217. Dick, at the time of his retirement in 1978 was RDO - 05HQ and is now regularly playing golf and attending a Vocational Tech School in Virginia Beach studying reciprocating engines. He's not in the business of repairing small engines, but knowing he can is both

a personal and financial satisfaction. He advises that in company of Joe Oulahan, Jimmy Jones, George Gurnee (all retirees), he attended the Ryder Cup and Golf Tournament at Greenbriar Country Club, White Sulfer Springs, West Va. in September 1979.

S/A Joseph C. Oulahan, 300 Woodford Drive, Chesapeake, Va. 23320, Telephone (804) 482-2037. Joe, at the time of his retirement in 1979 was DRDO - 05HQ and is now enjoying life on the golf course and puttering around the house.

S/A Jimmy J. Jones, 341 Chesapeake Trail, Virginia Beach, Va. 23462, Telephone (804) 486-4948. Jimmy, at the time of his retirement in 1979 was DRDO - 05HQ and has joined the Tidewater clique of retiree's weekly golf and looking after odds and ends around the house. Following his retirement, he and his wife, Irene, vacationed in Scotland where they enjoyed visiting family and friends and playing golf for about a month. Their flight back has caused them second thoughts about flying again. It appears the landing gear malfunctioned causing the flight to be diverted, fuel jettisoned, all passengers were required to gather in the tail section of the aircraft, and the runway was covered with foam. The problem was, however, corrected, and the aircraft set down safely. Jimmy says he's been in tight spots before, but not with life threatening situations as this was. He and Irene are enjoying good health and are planning to do more traveling (by car) in the states.

S/A George W. Gurnee, 4417 Monmouth Castle Road, Virginia Beach, Va. 23455, Telephone (804) 464-4347. George at the time of his retirement in 1977 was SAC - NISRA Portsmouth, Va. and since that time has done some part-time teaching as well as enjoying a round of golf or two.

S/A William E. Davis 5801 Shervier Place N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016, Telephone (202) 363-3412. Bill retired in 1979, at which time he was assigned to NISRA Washington. Following his retirement, he and his wife, Barbara, drove a mobile home to the West Coast, visiting friends and family on the way. Bill advises he attended the Florida contingent of the NIS Retirees' Conference/Get Together in Sarasota recently.

S/A James Carson, 5305 Watts Street, Suffolk, Va. 23435, Telephone (804) 465-0911. Jim, at the time of his retirement in 1977 was assigned to NISRA Philadelphia. He and his wife, Minn, then chose the Tidewater area and bought a home in Suffolk where Jim spends a good deal of his time working around the house. Minn has kept her fingers in flower arrangements which she does beautifully. Both are enjoying good health.

S/A D. H. Tipton is presently a "Gentleman Farmer" in Chandler, North Carolina.

S/A P. M. Haefeli is the Corporate Security Director for the Western Company of North America which supplies support equipment to the oil industry.

CONTRIBUTION EDITORS:

New York - S/A Kent E. Walker

Norfolk - S/A Bruno E. DeMolli

LCDR J.D. Ennis

Charleston - S/A J.A. Wheeler

New Orleans - S/A John R. Michaud

San Diego - S/A T.J. Hicks

San Francisco - S/A Clyde J. Roach

Europe - S/A A.J. Kersenbrock

NISPAC - S/A William J. Klemp

Japan - S/A Larry E. Ferrell

Philippines - S/A V.H. McPherson

NIS-22 - S/A Troy N. Gillispie

NIS-23 - S/A H.B. Abrams

NIS-25 - S/A J.J. D'Avanzo

S/A B.E. Hudson

NIS-26 - S/A Bruce W. Given

NIS-28 - Mr. N.T. Lutsch

*Special thanks to Kathy Clendenin
for administrative support*

*Design & Layout - Janet Herbert &
S/A Jack Tuckish*

FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The NIS Quarterly was inaugurated in late 1979, and this is the first of what is hoped will be a long continuing publication designed to keep all NIS employees abreast of professional and personal "happenings" of interest. Contributing Editors are identified and should be consulted for assistance in preparing and forwarding articles offered for publication. Comments and suggestions for improvement of this publication are equally welcome and solicited.

