

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

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*NAVY # 60*

*X*  
**ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE - CONSPIRACY**

*X*  
**GERMAN AND RUSSIAN OPERATIONS**

**1940 TO 1945**



*X*  
**EXCERPTS FROM THE FILES OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF  
AND FROM OTHER CAPTURED GERMAN DOCUMENTS**

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APPENDIX III: Glossary: A. German Terms B. Russian terms

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E R R A T A

Page: Line:	Present reading:	Substitute:
2 3 from bottom	Beltrieb	Betrieb
10 10 from bottom	to Army staffs working	to Army staffs, working
13 12 from bottom	such information.	such evaluation.
13 2 from bottom	Naval Relations 1921	Naval Relations 1926
23 1 from bottom	are thus obliterated	is thus obliterated
24 24 from bottom	locomotive	locomotive
37 21 from bottom	are are responsible	and are responsible
42 2 from bottom	Naval Relations 1921	Naval Relations 1926
46 1 from bottom	lectual; he is	lectual; she is
47 15 from bottom	"Forschungsamt"	Air Force General Staff
49 30 from bottom	the Russian intelligence organization	Russian intelligence
66 1 from bottom	to our officers.	to our officers."
91 10 from bottom	ernte which	ernte" which
91 19 from bottom	achieve early success.	achieve early success".
97 11 from bottom	The report, is dated	"The report is dated
112 18 from top	This letter was written	This letter, written
112 19 from top	rubles was handed	rubles were handed
116 23,24,25 from bottom	These lines should be	read as footnote.

Appendices

I/2 8 from bottom	not at all fully	not at all points fully
II/8 6 from top	data about him has	data about him have
III/2 20 from top	(There is a standard	(There is no standard
III/5 2 from bottom	See: Abwehr Anst	Abwehr suboffice

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INTRODUCTION

Scope - On 1 April 1939 the German Armed Forces High Command issued a directive entitled: "Measures to be adopted by the Armed Forces in countering Espionage, Sabotage, and Conspiracy". The need for such measures was pointed out as follows:

"With unabated tenacity foreign intelligence agencies are continuing their attacks against the Armed Forces, the armament factories and other war plants, and against offices responsible for national defense. This is demonstrated by counterintelligence reports for 1938...

"It is evident that sabotage agents are being trained abroad, and that plans for acts of sabotage are being prepared... The Comintern is especially active in this field; it has established a vast sabotage organization in all countries...

"Attempts to foment unrest and create a conspiracy are no less detrimental to the striking power of our Armed Forces. Elements hostile to the state have increased their efforts to disaffect the German people..."

This directive was issued several months prior to the outbreak of World War II. The war itself showed that sabotage and conspiracy, like espionage, represent major weapons in a modern conflict. These weapons are all the more menacing because they may be employed long before the actual outbreak of hostilities. Like all other weapons, their forms and uses were developed considerably in the course of the recent war.

Parallel with this development and refinement, espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy have become more and more interwoven. Occasionally, an operation may still be defined as serving only one of these three functions. Yet, in some theaters and countries, organizations have been established which operate simultaneously in all three fields. German "Fifth Columns" and Russian "Partisan" organizations may be cited as examples.

Probably nowhere were combined espionage, sabotage and conspiracy operations conducted more systematically than on the Russo-German front. Moreover the direction of political and military activities was highly centralized in both countries. Since political ideologies often play a prominent role in the organization and conduct of warfare behind the enemy front lines, Germany and the Soviet Union appeared especially well equipped for such operations. The record shows that both countries made the widest possible use thereof.

For these reasons a report has been prepared dealing with espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy as it was conducted between 1940 and 1945 by German and Russian military and political agencies.

The report is built up on material available to this office, that is, from captured German documents. This material presented an intricate picture, not only of German or Russian operations, but particularly of their interrelation. Just as a strong interplay usually exists between offensive and defensive tactics, so German and Russian activities in the whole field were closely interwoven. No matter whether or not German and Russian methods were based on ideologies and state practices of a similar pattern, in the course of operations these methods became highly competitive. Both sides operated in one area. Both sides employed a combination of military, police, and political methods; and to a large extent, both sides used foreign nationals for espionage, sabotage and conspiracy. Each one strove to outdo the other.



Therefore it can be assumed that some of the German material dealing with sabotage, espionage, and conspiracy on the Eastern Front is typical for the whole conflict, and thus reflects Russian methods no less than it illustrates those used by German agencies. This statement however, must be limited to the specific area and conflict.

It would be misleading, especially in view of the flexibility of Russian methods, to assume that measures used by the Soviet Union as defense against the German invader would be duplicated by her in another area and conflict. A thorough evaluation of the material presented in the following pages will be required to distinguish between ideas and methods typical for the one theater and conflict, and those which may possibly be of a more general nature.

Limitations - The character of this report is extremely broad. Not only are German and Russian activities described side by side and at times within one chapter, but the field of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy itself covers a very wide range of activities, including, for instance, industrial sabotage, counter-intelligence, propaganda, partisans, sedition, and so on. All these activities form part of the "war behind the frontlines" to such an extent that it is often difficult and at times impossible to distinguish clearly where the one activity ends and the other begins.

To bring the available material into some semblance of order, it had to be grouped under the main headings of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy. These parts have in turn been subdivided into sections. While sharp distinctions can readily be made in a final evaluation, in a report restricted to the presentation of documentary evidence this grouping occasions a good deal of overlapping. Many chapters contain material which has equal bearing on several other sections or parts.

Only careful evaluation of the material presented can tie together the various loose ends, and combine the numerous details given on the following pages into one rounded picture. This difficult task must be left to the reader. With regard to such an evaluation the following should be pointed out:

The report is intended to give a series of documents pertinent to the subjects covered. The material is fairly complete in some instances, while in others it remains very spotty. Any over-all evaluation will thus encounter obstacles; it may prove advisable to narrow down an evaluation to specific subjects of particular interest.

Difficulties encountered in translating German documents should be listed among the limitations of this report. The often ambiguous character of German was increased in some documents by the super-cautious attitude of the writer, and by the extensive use of codes. It has been possible to break these codes in all important instances but one ("Walli"); but in some instances there is doubt how close the English equivalent comes to the original German meaning. (\*)

(\*) This is due partially to the German system of double-coding. The German code designation of "radio-intercept", for instance is "B". Yet, this "B" in turn is nothing but the abbreviation of the code-designation "Betrieb". According to Cassels New German Dictionary the literal translation of "Beitrieb" is: Management, trade, profession, workshop, factory - terms far removed from "radio intercept".



The problem of correct translation was increased where the German document was the translation of a document in Russian or some other language. As a rule, it has not been possible to check the accuracy of German translation from Russian, Rumanian, Italian and other sources, and it is obvious that the German translator at times used a typical German operational or organizational term to identify a Russian activity. For the names of persons and places, the following report uses the exact English spelling wherever it could be determined. In all other cases the German spelling of Russian names has been adapted to standard English spelling. The original names of German and Russian organizations active in the fields of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy have been retained to facilitate comparison with other sources.

Finally, the translation had to allow for the fact that such terms as sabotage, sedition, etc., acquire at times a highly specific meaning on a particular front and for a particular unit. Such broad terms should be understood in their very broadest sense, subject to such further definition as may be given in the text.

Sources - The report is based on captured German documents. The German Naval Archives while voluminous, contain only a limited amount of information on the subject. In view of requests for such information, other captured German documents were made available through the cooperation of MID. "Nuernberg Documents" (Source # 46) have occasionally been edited by this office. As a rule, the report gives a source number instead of quoting the full name of the file. Numbers in the text correspond to the source numbers given in the following list:

Source No.

A. Files of the German Naval Staff

1. German Naval Archives.

B. Files of Ausland/Abwehr

2. Akten Abw. I.G. Geheim. Aufbau, Arbeitsgebiet, Arbeitsweise. 3.43 - 6.44
3. Ausl/Abw II. Der V-Mann. Ratschlaege zu seiner Ausbildung im Rahmen eines Einsatzlagers. 1. Heft: Der Osten. Geheim. Abgeschlossen: 4.44
4. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. Geheim. Allg. Taetigkeit. 4.43 - 3.44
5. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. S-Einsatz. g. Kdos. Einsatzberichte. 4.42 - 1.45
6. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. Geheim. S-Einsatz. 10.42 - 4.44
7. Akten Abw. II. Arbeit Osten, Z-Einsatz. g.Kdos. Einsatzberichte 9.42 - 3.44
8. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. K-Einsatz g.Kdos. Einsatzberichte 1.43 - 7.43
9. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. Geheim. Z-Einsatz. 9.41 - 8.44
10. Akten Abw. II Arbeit Osten. g.Kdos. R-Aktionen. 3.43 - 8.43
11. Akten Abw. III Arbeit Osten. Geheim. Allgem. Taetigkeit. 12.42 - 1.43

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Source No.

12. Akten Geheim. Agenten und Sabotageschulen der Feindlaender. 2.43 - 6.44
13. No. 56a20 (Manuscript) Spionage - und Bandenabwehr hinter der Isumfront. Summer 1943
14. Unternehmen "Mammut". gkdos. Anlage zu 2363/44 gKdos. Mil A.3. 10.44
15. Betrachtungen ueber den Abwehrrdienst im Osten, insbesondere im Gebiet des Oberbefehlshabers im Osten, vom Mai 1915, bis zum Ende des Jahres 1916. Von Gempp, Generalmajor a.D. Geheim. 6.38
16. (File with cover missing, contains various Abw. II documents, including: -) Konspirative Taetigkeit und Kleinkrieg im Ruecken des Feindes. Geheim (1945)
17. Belehrung ueber Geheimhaltung. Geheim 7.41 - 10.42

C. Files of various German Army Commands

25. Der Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht. Nr. 3001/40g Abw. III (W). Geheim. Abwehr von Spionage, Sabotage und Zersetzung in der Wehrmacht. Jahresverfuegung 1940.
26. Der Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht. Nr. 3001/41g Abw. III (W). Geheim. Abwehr von Spionage, Sabotage und Zersetzung in der Wehrmacht. Jahresverfuegung 1941.
30. Gliederung von Staeben. (Various notes, prisoner interrogation reports and sketches apparently compiled by the Intelligence Officer, Fremde Heere Ost, Section II.) ca. 1942.
31. Ic-Unterlangen Ost. Nur fuer den Dienstgebrauch, Aufklaerungsforderungen Ost 1944. Nachdruck. Stand vom 1.3.1945.
32. Ic-Unterlagen Ost. Geheim. Merkblatt geh. 11/5. Die Ueberwachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat. 12.44
33. (No originating office, no date) Geheim. Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront. (ca. spring 1944)
34. Abt. Fremde Heere Ost (IIa). Geheime Kommandosache. Decknamenverzeichnis der Agenten der Abwehr I. H. Qu. (type-written memo) .11.44
35. (No originating office, no date; photostat and German translation of a Russian document) "Russisches Merkblatt ueber Ausruestung deutscher Agenten mit russischen Papieren vom Juli 1943."
36. Ic/AO. A.O.K. 11/Abw. Offz. Akte "Sewastopol". Anlagenband 10 zum Taetigkeitsbericht 7.42 - .9.42

D. RSHA Files

40. Reichsicherheitshauptamt. Weisermappe. Initialed Stbaf. Schellenberg. Bericht an den Reichsfuehrer SS und Chef der Sicherheitspolizei. Geheime Reichssache. Berlin, 10 Juni 1941.
41. File, presumably of Amt IV, "Abwehrbeauftragte". 8.35 - 10.44



Source No.

43. Jahresbericht 1942 ueber den Einsatz der Aussenstelle Amsterdam des Befehlshabers der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD fuer die besetzten niederlaendischen Gebiete. Amsterdam, 12.1942
44. RSHA Amt VI/ A 1. Auswertungssystem des Amtes VI. Geheim 1942

#### E. Various Sources

45. German Naval Intelligence. A report based on German documents. Office of Naval Intelligence. Confidential. Washington, Oct. 46
46. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality. Vs. III, IV, V, VI, VII. Washington, 1946.
47. Russia - Radio Systems. Intelligence Report; Monograph Index Guide No. 701-100. Source: German Official: Confidential. August 1946
48. Some Weaknesses in German Strategy and Organization. (British) Chiefs of Staff Committee. Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. Confidential. (London), 20th Oct. 1946.
49. German Operational Intelligence. Military Intelligence Division. War Department - Washington, D. C. Restricted. April 1946.

#### F. Reference Material

50. Order of Battle of the German Army, March 1945. Restricted. Military Intelligence Division, Washington, D. C.
51. The War in Outline 1939-1944. Prepared by the War Department. The Infantry Journal. Washington. 1944.
52. War Department Technical Manual TM-E 30-451. Handbook on German Military Forces. Restricted. Washington. March 1945.
53. A History of Russia. War Department Education Manual EM 248.

These sources should be consulted for further details.

Presentation - The documentary evidence gathered from these sources is presented in the following parts:

I. Organization, covering the over-all organizations, German as well as Russian, active in the field of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy within the limitation of the material available;

II. Intelligence, covering German and Russian espionage, and counterespionage operations, as well as security measures;

III. Sabotage, covering the field in its broadest aspects and including sections on industrial sabotage, shipping sabotage, countersabotage, and anti-"scorched earth" policies;

IV. Conspiracies, again covering the field in its broadest sense and including sections on propaganda, sedition, partisan and guerrilla warfare, as well as German accounts of Comintern activities;



Appendix I "Russian Security Agencies" and Appendix II "Russian Security and Counterespionage Operations on the German Front" are top-level German studies of a fairly recent date. The length as well as character of these studies made it advisable to present them separately and unabridged instead of incorporating the material into various chapters of the report. Appendix III contains a glossary of German and Russian terms encountered in this report.

Most documents are given in excerpt. Additional information related to the documents or linking individual documents to the over-all topic is given in a short summary; these remarks should not be viewed as attempting anything like a complete commentary.



## PART I: ORGANIZATION

Modern military espionage became organized in the 19th century. The 20th century saw espionage organizations branching out into sabotage and various other activities, such as sedition, propaganda, and infiltration, which have been grouped under the term "Conspiracy". Parallel with the trend from fixed front lines to "total war", operation of these secret weapons was extended from the military and naval sphere into the economic, social and political life until it touched upon almost every activity of the enemy state. Finally, modern forms of aggression tended to obliterate the distinction between "state of war" and "state of peace". While guns and ships and fighters in close formation can usually be employed only in the course of hostilities openly proclaimed, the three secret weapons are at the disposal of an aggressor at any time.

It is doubtful whether an organization has yet been developed anywhere which fully lives up to the requirements and implications of this situation. German military and political writers gave theoretical recognition to the new situation in the twenties. Yet the organization developed by German authorities in the thirties showed serious gaps and overlappings. Most of all, it lacked coordinated direction. In the Soviet Union, Leninist doctrines of civil war on a world-wide scale presented a different but no less suitable approach to the organization of secret warfare. The centralized form of Soviet government with its strict control over the Russian Armed Forces as well as over Communist Party cells in many countries appeared especially fitted for the establishment of an effective organization. Thus, it is regrettable that the available material is not sufficient to determine conclusively the extent to which Soviet leaders reached perfection in the organization of secret warfare.

In Germany as in the Soviet Union, a host of organizations was enlisted in the work. Among them were: Military and naval commands; government agencies such as diplomatic missions, trade delegations, international scientific institutes; party and fellow-traveller organizations, many of them outwardly of a "non-political" character; and finally a large number of apparently "private circles" and of single agents operating independently of any of the more obvious organizations.

In both countries, division of responsibility between the various government, party and "private" organizations apparently was often vague. The manner in which their activities were coordinated has not been fully clarified. In addition, both countries reorganized their system on various occasions between 1940 and 1945; consequences of this reorganization have not yet been fully determined. Thus the following account of German and Russian organization is limited mainly to a list of various military, naval, and police organizations known to have been prominent in the field under study.

## Section A: GERMAN STAFF ORGANIZATION

All German armed forces operations were directed by the Supreme Commander, Hitler, through the OKW (Armed Forces High Command). The Armed Forces central agency for espionage, sabotage, conspiracy and counterespionage was the "Amt Ausland/Abwehr", commonly referred to as Abwehr. Army, Navy, and Air Force staffs contained sections for operational intelligence and for the evaluation of material procured by Abwehr.



German security was the primary responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS (RF-SS), Heinrich Himmler. Under totalitarian government, the term security acquires a wide interpretation. By 1940 the RF-SS was active in Germany and German-occupied territory mainly in the fields of police investigation and repression. By the end of 1944 he had assumed control of all German espionage and sabotage activities, of "stay-behind" organizations abroad, and of armed forces activities on German soil, including recruiting and supply. The central agency of the RF-SS for operations in the field of security, repression, espionage, sabotage, counterespionage and subversion was the "RSHA", the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Central Security Agency).

At the outset of the war, Abwehr concentrated on operations in the military and naval field, while the RSHA was active in the political sphere. The dividing line was indistinct; both had agencies and agents in Germany as well as abroad, yet apparently there was little if any coordination of activities, with the exception of operations in the field of counterespionage. There appears to have been only a very limited exchange of information.

In order to evaluate fully the weaknesses and peculiarities of the Abwehr or RSHA organizations, they must be judged against the background of Nazi Germany and of Hitler's conduct of war. However, it is not within the scope of this report to discuss such influences.

#### Chapter 1: Abwehr Headquarters

In World War I the German Army General Staff and the Naval Staff each had its intelligence department.

In World War II the Army and Navy Intelligence Sections were reduced to functions of operational intelligence and intelligence evaluation. Abwehr took over the organization of all Armed Forces espionage and counterespionage, sabotage, sedition and deception. Overt propaganda, however, was handled by a special "Armed Forces Propaganda Section" (W Pr), directing the activities of front-line propaganda units, the so-called "Propaganda Truppen". Economic intelligence reports were provided prior to and at the outset of the war by the Armed Forces Economic Staff (W W1) - most of this staff was later absorbed by the German Munitions Ministry.

The Amt Ausland/Abwehr had been set up shortly before the outbreak of war. It was successor to two former sections of the Reich Defense Ministry, (a) the "Abwehr" section which after World War I had been limited to counterintelligence, but soon became the central agency for the procurement of foreign intelligence, and (b) the "Ausland" section which had maintained official relations between the Reich Defense Ministry and foreign armies and navies. The coordination of these two agencies, and their establishment as "Amt" under the immediate command of the OKW was carried out by Admiral Canaris.

Canaris established the Amt Ausland/Abwehr on a broad basis. The office was divided into four main divisions: Abwehr I was to handle all espionage; Abwehr II was composed of two sections, "S" in charge of sabotage and "I" in charge of sedition, infiltration, and decomposition; Abwehr III was to be in charge of all counterespionage and deception. Ausland, as the fourth section, continued its old activities with regard to foreign missions and attaches; in addition it was to supervise the secret German naval organization "Etappe" and to evaluate intelligence reports for the Armed Forces High Command. "Z" had primarily administrative functions, section "ZK" being in charge of the central Abwehr file, and "ZKV" of the Abwehr agent file.



The central offices of Abwehr I and III were composed of Army, Navy, and Air Force desks ("H", "M", "L"). These desks sifted incoming information for anything of interest to their respective branch and relayed it; they were also to receive any request originating from Army, Navy, or Air Force Staff. No such "H", "M", and "L" units were set up in Abwehr II.

In addition, Abwehr I had the following sections: I I was in charge of radio communications; I G was the "Research and Technical Services Section" responsible for the development of secret writing and photographic processes, manipulation of documents, and for the collection of data on postal routes, border regulations, etc. I Wi, economic espionage, apparently played a minor role.

Abwehr III had, in addition to "H", "M", and "L" desks and to a relatively unimportant economic section (III Wi), a section III F which was headquarters for all Armed Forces active counter-espionage. Section III D handled plans for deception, and III N was responsible for censorship.

Besides this division by function, Abwehr headquarter sections were divided into regional branches. The functional as well as regional division of Abwehr headquarters is illustrated by the following organization chart of the Abwehr II central office (Source # 1), issued on 1 January 1941:

Chief Abwehr II		
"W" (Group West)	"O" (Group East)	"T" (Group Technique)
Administration	Administration	"Wug" (unidentified)
Special Assignment		"Ftg" (manufacture)
Sub-Group "S"	Sub-Group "S"	Laboratory Tegel
S/WN (Sabotage Northwest)	S/ON (Sabotage Northeast)	Laboratory Wiss
S/WS (Sabotage Southwest)	S/OS (Sabotage Southeast)	Officer for Special Assignment
S/M (Naval Sabotage)		Training Camp Quenzsee
Sub-Group "I"	Sub-Group "I"	Training Regiment "Brandenburg"
I/W (Sedition West)	I/ON (Sedition Northeast)	Ia (Administration and Filing)
I/Ueb (Sedition overseas)	I/OS (Sedition Southeast)	



there existed no other top-level agency checking agent reports and evaluating centrally information gathered by Abwehr offices, the repercussions of this situation must be viewed as serious.

Abwehr organization in the field was based on a system of Abwehr-Stellen (Ast-Abwehr office), organized parallel to the Army Corps Areas (Wehrkreise). Many Abwehr operations against Russia were carried out by the Ast Ostland, (Ast Eastern Areas), at Riga. Other Abwehr-Stellen engaged in operations against the Soviet Union were the Ast Danzig, the Ast Cracow and the Ast Ukraine. These Ast's had branch offices (Abwehr-Nebenstellen) and outposts (Abwehr-Aussenstellen).

In the West, activities of several Abwehr-Stellen were centralized by an Abwehr-Leitstelle, (Alst - Abwehr Control Office), at Paris. No material has been located showing that such an Alst existed in the East. However, immediately under Ast Ostland operated a "Dienststelle Walli", (Office Walli); referred to at times as "Befehlsstab Walli", (Command Walli). It was composed of Walli I, Walli II, and Walli III sections in accordance with the Abwehr division of functions. In contrast to the role of Alst Paris, Walli apparently exercised no command authority, but was merely assigned to coordinate activities in the East, and to exchange experiences gained by units in the field.

In the East, Abwehr field operations were carried out through two different systems; one static, the other mobile. The static organization ranged from the Ast's and their branch offices on German or German-occupied territory to "KO's" in neutral or German-allied countries. These KO's were Abwehr operational centers abroad, directing most of the agents. However, the various Ast's and Anst's also had agents abroad; none of these offices appear to have been limited with regard to its territory of operations. The following KO's have been identified as active against the Soviet Union: Finland, Bulgaria, Norway, Istanbul, and China.

In addition to the work of these Ast's and KO's, Abwehr activities against the Soviet Union were supported by the following non-German agencies: Polish Deuxieme Bureau, Bulgarian Intelligence Service, and the "Service Speciel de Information Roumania" (SSIR).

The various agencies of this static system and the supporting non-German offices were responsible for the conduct of Abwehr operations in neutral countries and, if possible, in the Russian hinterland. Abwehr operations at and behind the front were conducted through a mobile system. This system rested on Abwehr Group Commands. Usually, one Abwehr Group Command was assigned to each Army Group Command operating at the Russian Front.


Each Abwehr Group was usually in charge of three Abwehr Kommandos, one each for Abwehr I, II, and III activities. Every Abwehr Kommando in turn was in charge of one or more Abwehr Trupps, which were normally commanded by German junior or petty officers, and composed of Russian prisoners of war or other "volunteers". The Trupps received their assignment either directly from the Kommando, or they were attached by the Kommando to Army staffs working in cooperation with the Army intelligence officer.

The Abwehr Group Command coordinated its activities with military operations by the assignment of Abwehr liaison officers (VO) to the Intelligence Officers of Army Groups and individual Army Commands. The chart on the opposite page of the mobile Abwehr organization in the East has been compiled from various Abwehr documents. It does not represent the organization as of a specific date and the list of identified units and especially of Abwehr Trupps is presumed to be far from complete:

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The Abwehr headquarters organization as well as the Abwehr organization in the field were revised in the spring of 1944. Abwehr was absorbed by Himmler's RSHA; Abwehr I then became the "Mil. Amt" of the RSHA. Abwehr II was split up: One group became section "D" of Mil. Amt, while another was attached to RSHA VI-S, that is, the sabotage section of the foreign countries division. Abwehr III was split up between RSHA IV (Gestapo) and RSHA VI. The Ausland division of Ausland/Abwehr was made a section of the Armed Forces High Command Operational Staff (OKW, WFSt).

In the general line of reorganization, Ast's, as well as KO's and presumably also Abwehr Groups, became "KMG", that is, "Kommando Melde-Gebiete" (Regional Intelligence Control). Abwehr Kommandos and Abwehr Trupps became "FAK" and "FAT" (Front Reconnaissance Kommandos, Trupps). Many were transferred to regular Army Command, but a number of sabotage units remained under the command of Mil. Amt D, and RSHA VI-S, both offices being headed by the SS Colonel Skorzeny, who was looked upon as the outstanding RSHA expert on sabotage, and who had established himself by the rescue of Mussolini.

The absorption of Abwehr into the RSHA had no great repercussions on the situation in the East, partly because of the general deterioration of the German position, partly because the practical consequences in the field were not far-reaching. Yet, it is interesting to note that this reorganization was part of a plan to centralize all German agencies active in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence, and presumably also those active in sabotage and conspiracy, into one central agency, the "Reichsmeldedienst" (Reich Intelligence Service), which ac-



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According to an RSMA document was to be patterned along the lines of the British Secret Service. The SS General Schellenberg is credited with having been the author and sponsor of this plan which, though it was initiated by the developments of 1944, never fully materialized.

## 2. Intelligence Sections of Army, Navy, Air Force, and WFSt

By a Fuehrer Directive of 1938, Ausland/Abwehr was to procure all intelligence, leaving to each branch of the Armed Forces the evaluation thereof. In addition, Army, Navy, and Air Force were to carry out their own operational intelligence.

In the Army, the Intelligence Section was known as QU IV of the General Staff. The Chief of QU IV was designated as "Assistant Chief of Staff for the evaluation of Intelligence for the Army Staff". He exercised his function through the section "Fremde Heere, West" and "Fremde Heere, Ost". These two intelligence sections were the main evaluation agencies of the Army. They appear to have drawn on three primary sources: (a) attache reports; (b) information received from the Army Intelligence officers in the field, containing such data as gathered by reconnaissance, air observation, prisoner of war interrogation, signal intelligence and captured documents; and (c) espionage and intelligence reports received from the "H" officers at Ausland/Abwehr.

Fremde Heere, West, and Fremde Heere, Ost were divided into regional desks; some of these desks were shifted at times from one branch to the other. A lack of proper coordination between activities of the East and West branch is indicated; QU IV, planned as evaluation agency superior to both branches, was dissolved in November 1942.

In the field, Army General Staff intelligence officers (I c) were attached to each Army Group, Army, Army Corps and Division. The I c's were part of the operations staff of their respective command. They directed the activities of the Secret Field Police, and of the Propaganda Officer (W Pr), and were responsible for reconnaissance, military security, and "order of battle" research.

In the Navy, intelligence evaluation was carried out by the evaluation division of the Naval Staff, 3/Skl. It based its daily enemy situation reports and its periodical reports on "Foreign Navies", and "Foreign Merchant Fleets" on the following sources: (a) Intelligence received from Naval Attaches and through the Etappe organization; (b) communication intercepts received from the fourth division, Naval Staff (Communications Division); (c) reports received from naval intelligence officers attached to the Naval Group Commands in the field; (d) Ausland/Abwehr reports. Besides the Etappe, apparently no large naval intelligence organization existed in the field.

The Etappe was a world-wide secret organization for the purpose of gathering shipping and other information, and supplying German naval units with fuel and other provisions from neutral bases. It had been established prior to World War I and was revived in 1936, operating during World War II under Ausland, Section III (Capt. Stoephasius). Due to the organization of Etappe, the Navy nevertheless exercised influence upon most of its activities. Each Etappe base was directed by a "Leiter" (Ltr). Bases in one region were combined into a "Grossetappe" and each Grossetappe operated under the command of the Naval Attache in that area. In his capacity as chief of a Grossetappe, the Naval Attache held the rank of "Militaerischer Leiter" (M. Ltr.). Aside from various Grossetappen a number

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of independent Etappe bases (Einzeletappen) had been established. Under the "M. Ltr." or the "Ltr", two types of Etappe operatives were deployed: Agents, mainly harbor agents, designated as "BE"; and contact men, employed primarily in secret oil deals, transfer of secret funds etc. A 1942 organization chart shows the Etappe as composed of eight Naval Chiefs (M. Ltr.), thirty Base Chiefs (Ltr.), forty nine combined agents and contact men (Vm (BE)), and ninety one agents (BE). The Etappe had at its disposal a net of secret radio communications, and was provided in 1938 with a secret fund of ten million Gold-Marks deposited primarily in banks in Africa and South America. In the course of the war, Etappe activities became more and more limited to gathering shipping intelligence and to the operation of blockade-runners.

From 1939 to shortly prior to the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, a Grossetappe Russia was directed by the German Naval Attache at Moscow, Capt. v. Baumbach. The main outpost of this Etappe was at the secret "Base North" on the Barents Sea. Members of the Etappe were the Vm (BE) Erich Auerbach and Kurt Kroepsch; the latter was on board a German auxiliary cruiser during her secret West-East passage through the Siberian Sea.\*

With regard to Air Force intelligence, no documentary material has been available for this report. In addition to the Air Force intelligence organization, Commander in Chief, Air directed the activities of a special intelligence-gathering agency, the "Research Institute of the Reich Minister for Air" (Forschungsamt des Reichsluftfahrtministeriums), commonly referred to as "FA". FA is reported to have worked in close cooperation with the RSHA and to have conducted large-scale supervision of telephone and wireless communication in Germany, German-occupied territories and abroad. FA agents claim that the organization had a highly efficient decoding section.

To the group of Armed Forces intelligence evaluation agencies there belonged also the intelligence unit of the Armed Forces Operational Staff, WFSt (op). This staff, attached in the later course of the war to Fuehrer's Field Headquarters, was the strategic planning office of the German Armed Forces, it issued many of the top-level directives and orders shaping the German conduct of war.

The WFSt (op) Intelligence Unit consisted at one time of two General Staff officers. It had to rely upon material received from Ausland division of Ausland/Abwehr which was charged with evaluation of all available information for the Armed Forces High Command. Thus this division must be held primarily responsible for any lack of top-level evaluation.

From a study of the records it is apparent that Germany lacked such information. Transcripts of military situation conferences with the Fuehrer show that the Supreme Commander as well as his top advisers, such as the Generals Jodl, Keitel, Halder and Warlimont were at times wholly in the dark not only concerning enemy plans but even enemy potential. General Warlimont of the WFSt is reported to have been assigned the task of issuing overall strategic reports from time to time to the various commands concerned. He has claimed that the last such report originating with the Armed Forces High Command was issued in 1942.

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\* Additional details on the Etappe and Base North are contained in the forthcoming report on "Russo-German Naval Relations 1921 to 1941".



### 3. The RSHA

When Germany attacked Russia, Abwehr was in full control of military espionage, sabotage, sedition, and fifth column activities conducted in coordination with field operations. Yet, following the ground force units, and at times intermingling with them, the "Einsatz Kommandos", the field units of the RSHA, moved into Russia.

The RSHA (Reichssicherheitshauptamt - Central Security Agency) has become best known under the name of one of its main divisions, the Amt IV (Gestapo), just as even today the Russian MGB is commonly referred to by the name of the former division GPU. Such misnomers easily overshadow the actual character of the organization and its true scope. As far as the RSHA is concerned, this agency must be viewed as the executive organ of the Reichsfuehrer SS (RF-SS), Heinrich Himmler.

The SS was the para-military security formation of the National Socialist Party. The (U.S.) War Department Handbook on German Military Forces, 1945 edition, described the SS as follows:

"...Officially an independent Gliederung (branch) of the Party, led by Heinrich Himmler, it actually has a status and importance far exceeding those of the other branches and even those of the Party itself. From its original function of guarding the person of party leaders and speakers, the SS developed, even before the war, into a far-flung organization to protect the entire Nazi movement against all internal enemies. More recently, it has extended its influence and power into every conceivable aspect of German national life and has finally acquired a large measure of control over the Army itself. It is more than a state within a state; it is superior to both the Party and the government.

"The rise of the SS has been gradual but unceasing. Because of its origin and its own experience as an underground organization, it has always understood how to combat systematically and unrelentingly any subversive activities in the Reich and all occupied areas... The Polish campaign in 1939 led to the building up of the Waffen-SS, at first consisting of the equivalent of two or three divisions and finally growing to a substantial and favored branch of the Armed Forces of the nation.

"In 1943 the SS gained control of the powerful Ministry of the Interior, in which it had already constituted the most important group in the form of the police. During 1943 and 1944 the SS gained more and more influence in the Army itself, taking over successively control of political indoctrination, of the intelligence services, and of the whole replacement, training, and material procurement system."

This large and powerful SS organization was guided not by one but by two "brains". As far as selection, training, supervision of personnel and top-level policy were concerned, the offices of the RF-SS, that is, the Reich Command of the SS, exercised absolute control. SS operations in the field of espionage, sabotage, and security were directed by the RSHA. And the RSHA in turn controlled for these operations not only the special SS formations but also all government forces concerned, that is, mainly the police.

Thus, by the outbreak of war, the RSHA was a composite of the following groups:

(a) The SD (Sicherheitsdienst - Security Service) - This was a special SS formation. It had been created by Himmler in 1932 within the ranks of the SS as "information agency", and was commanded from the outset by the SS Col. Heydrich. On



9 June 1934 by order of Hitler, all intelligence agencies existing within the party were made part of this SD.

(b) The Security Police. - Until 1933, the German police was under jurisdiction of the various states (Laender); thus police organization was not uniform. The most important police force was that of Prussia, consisting of three main components: The Orpo (Ordnungspolizei - Regular Police), which carried out all regular police duties such as traffic control, registration, and similar administrative functions, and included also the local constabulary; the Sipo (Sicherheitspolizei - Security Police) which was composed of special detachments to be deployed in case of emergencies such as strikes or political unrest; and the Kripo (Kriminalpolizei - Criminal Investigation Police), composed mainly of plainclothes men and experts. By a Hitler decree, Himmler was made Chief of all German Police Forces early in June 1936. While he left the Orpo under its old administrative control, Sipo and Kripo were brought under the jurisdiction of the RSHA.

(c) The Criminal Investigation Police. - In addition to the developments given under (b), it should be noted that at least in Prussia the Kripo had developed modern techniques in criminal investigation, identification and also prevention. The RSHA tried to make the widest possible use of these techniques for all its activities, furthering this work by the establishment of a Reich Criminal Investigation Office, to which were attached several laboratories and clinics. On the other hand, the organization of the old Kripo was broken up, maybe in view of the fact that many of the crime experts were not party members of old standing; the independent Kripo ceased to exist as such by summer of 1936.

(d) The Secret State Police. - Prior to 1933, Prussia like most other German states had a small "state police" organization. The Prussian state police (CST), while not secret in name was so in fact; its main function was counterintelligence. The Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei - Secret State Police), had little in common with the old CST. This Gestapo had been created in Prussia by Goering in April, 1933. Shortly afterwards Himmler established a similar secret police in Bavaria, and extended his operations gradually into all other German states except Prussia, where Goering retained control. By spring of 1934, however, a Hitler decree made Himmler the chief of all German secret state police, which thus became a central organization for the whole Reich territory.

These four bodies - SD, Security Police, Criminal Investigation Police, and Secret State Police - made up the forces operating under the "Chief of the Security Police and the SD". This office was created on 27 September 1939, concluding the organization of the police and security forces under the RF-SS. The old Sipo as well as the Kripo and the Gestapo were merged into the Security Police. This Security Police, made up of government police forces, and the party security forces of the SD, operated under one command. The old chief of the SD, Heydrich, became the "Chief of the Security Police and the SD"; after Heydrich's assassination the post was filled by Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Headquarters of this new police and security organization was the RSHA.

In its organization the RSHA reflected the various composites. It was divided into a number of divisions, each called "Amt". Over all these divisions was the office of the "Chief of the Security Police and SD". Immediately attached to this office were the Section I a (Chief of Investigation), the Police Attache Section controlling police officials attached by the RSHA to German diplomatic representations abroad, and the "SD School" at Bernau, as well as the Security Police School at Fuerstenberg.

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Amt I was the central administrative division.

Amt II was the technical services division, including sections for finance, communications, documents and transportation.

Amt III, called "Spheres of German Life" dealt with legal and similar problems of a German and European "new order"; it was staffed mainly with SD personnel.

Amt IV was the Gestapo division. Its official designation was "Division for the Investigation and Liquidation of Opposition". The division was directed by the SS Lt. Gen. Mueller who simultaneously filled the post of Inspector General of the Frontier Guards. Amt IV was divided into six main sections as follows:

Section IV A dealt with "Opposition, Sabotage, and Protective Services". IV A 1 was responsible for Communism, Marxism, and fellow-traveler organizations, as well as underground groups and propaganda sponsored from the left. IV A 2 was responsible for anti-sabotage, active sabotage, and seditious operations; many of these functions were transferred later to Amt VI. IV A 3 handled any opposition from the center or the right; its field of activity was described as "Reactionary, monarchistic, or liberal opposition". IV A 4 was responsible for protective services; it is claimed that Himmler used the "protective" shadowing of prominent party or government officials at the same time for the gathering of information to be used in the event of differences of opinion. The section also had a "special assignment" unit which, for instance, carried out the investigations following the July 1944 bomb-plot.

The next main section, IV B, dealt with "Churches, Sects, and Jews".

IV C handled the Gestapo files and was responsible for "protective custody", that is, it administered the concentration camps.

IV D directed Gestapo activities in German-occupied territories and among foreign workers in Germany.

IV E was responsible for maintenance of security in all matters of importance to the Reich. It directed the activities of a net of industrial counterespionage agents (Abwb) in German factories.

IV F handled passports and aliens.

While Amt IV was the Gestapo division, activities of the former Criminal Investigation Police were delegated to Amt V. V A was responsible for Administration and Crime Prevention; V B handled operations (B 1: Capital Crimes; B 2: Fraud; B 3: Sex Crimes); V C was the central search bureau; and V D administered the Criminological Institute of the Security Police.

Amt VI in turn was an office manned primarily by SD personnel. It was headed from 1942 on by the SS General Schellenberg. It was in charge of "Foreign Countries" and it was this office which by 1944 absorbed most of the Abwehr organization.

While several other RSHA Amts were occasionally active abroad, they were mainly concerned with German affairs. The background of the personnel, coming either from the ranks of the police or from the SS training grounds, made the officials rather unsuitable for secret activities abroad, and it has been claimed that the original chief of the RSHA, Heydrich, was so preoccupied with police activities in the Reich and the ever increasing territory occupied by German forces, that he lacked interest in operations abroad. In any event it is presumed that much of the work of the RSHA abroad was due to the initiative of Schellenberg, and that most of the work directed against foreign countries was carried out by Amt VI.



In contrast to the other divisions, Amt VI was composed mainly of country desks. The sections VI B to VI E were in charge of geographic areas, with VI C handling "Russian and Japanese territories and spheres of influence". VI A was the administrative section; VI F was in charge of technical equipment for the espionage and sabotage agents deployed by Amt VI abroad; VI G was a study group set up by Schellenberg for investigation of economic problems pertinent to espionage and sabotage. VI S was the sabotage section under Skorzeny; most of Abwehr II was absorbed into this section by the summer of 1944. Simultaneously, the counterespionage section VI Z was considerably enlarged, taking over almost the entire III F branch (active counterespionage) of Abwehr III. The former chief of Abwehr III F, Col. Rohleder, reportedly became chief of RSHA VI Z.

By spring 1944 a new Amt, the "Mil. Amt" (Armed Forces Affairs Division), was established at the RSHA. This Amt absorbed the old Abwehr I organization. Up to the end of July 1944 it operated under its former Chief, Col. Hansen, who was supervised and directed by Schellenberg. It is reported that Hansen was then arrested by Schellenberg, allegedly by order of Kaltenbrunner and in connection with the "officers plot"; subsequently Schellenberg himself took over the direction of Mil. Amt.

Finally, there was in the RSHA the "Amt VII", the Division for Public Opinion Intelligence. This agency, too, was an SD function; it studied such "Weltanschauungs-Probleme" as were viewed by the Nazis as dangerous ideologies. Amt VII was accordingly divided into sections dealing with Freemasonry, Judaism, Marxism, Liberalism; it also had a section for procurement (Library, Press, Information Office), and another section in charge of archives, museums, and special scientific missions.

The field organization of the Chief of the Security Police and SD followed a pattern resembling that of Abwehr. There was a static organization directed by "Inspector Generals of Security" (I.d.S.) in German districts and "Commanders of Security" (B.d.S.) in occupied territories. These Inspectors or Commanders were in charge of staffs set up similarly to the RSHA central office organization; they commanded the Security Police and SD forces in their district.

In addition to the SD and police forces deployed by this regional organization, RSHA Berlin headquarters deployed individual agents as well as special units which were formed to carry out specific missions under the direct supervision of a Berlin Amt. Such units were formed either as "Sonder-Kommandos", small, highly specialized investigation teams; or they were set up as "Einsatz-Kommandos", that is, fairly large groups assigned to "purging" operations in large areas.

While most of this work was primarily of an investigative or repressive nature, Amt VI is known to have operated its own net of espionage agents abroad. This Amt is also known to have sent sabotage agents abroad on various occasions, and to have given at least some thought to seditious and underground operations.

Other RSHA operatives known to have been engaged in work in foreign countries were agents of Amt IV (Gestapo) and RSHA "Police Attaches". These Gestapo agents are assumed to have been interested primarily in supervision of the official and private affairs of Germans residing abroad. The Police Attaches are known to have been successful in coordinating the secret police activities of occupied or "friendly" countries with the interests of the RSHA. It has not been ascertained whether foreign intelligence of any importance was gained by Gestapo officials abroad or by the Police Attaches.



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Amt VI, on the other hand, is assumed to have been highly active in political and also in economic espionage. Whether these activities netted valuable information has not been ascertained. However, Abwehr and Naval Intelligence files make it fairly clear that little if any information gained by Amt VI reached the Armed Forces.

Section B: ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD

The RSHA and Abwehr field organization was largely shaped by developments at the front. While the schematic Abwehr set-up with its Ast's and KO's for the static, and with Abwehr Groups, Kommandos, and Trupps for the mobile organization, was not greatly affected by these developments, almost everything that went on within this framework reflected the over-all war situation.

In the West, once German armed forces had reached the Atlantic, the front became static. Contact with the enemy was limited for a prolonged period to forays at sea and air engagements. The ground troops, who had come as combat forces, developed into armies of occupation; but the shadow of an impending invasion was ever present and the population of the occupied territories prepared for the hour. Thus the West became the hunting ground for small RSHA "Sonder-Kommandos", investigation units which tried to trace, infiltrate into, and annihilate underground groups. For Abwehr also, espionage and counter-espionage appear to have been the main functions in this theater of limited action. Abwehr I and III, West, extended their agents farther and farther into foreign territory, but the sabotage teams of Abwehr II found little work.

In Russia and in the Balkans, the situation appeared almost the reverse. Here, the threat of the enemy was real at almost any hour and place. Advancing and retreating, the Germans, like the Russians, covered great distances and the tempo of action often outraced the speed of espionage reports. Furthermore, contact with the enemy was not only made along a fixed battle line; in overrun areas nuclei of armed resistance remained which at times grew into large, well equipped partisan formations. Thus Abwehr II with its various specialized sabotage ("S") Trupps, sedition ("Z") Trupps, and guerrilla warfare ("K") Trupps was continuously engaged in the front and in the rear of the enemy, while Abwehr I and III Trupps appear to have been limited at times to operations conducted primarily in support of Abwehr II. RSHA methods were also different; there is little evidence of the employment of small investigation Sonder-Kommandos in the East; operations usually took the form of larger "Einsatz-Kommandos", police and auxiliary police forces trying to "pacify" areas of unrest by violent and ruthless methods.

Finally, the character and methods of the enemy with whom Abwehr and the RSHA had to deal, accounted for differences in espionage, sabotage, and seditious practices in the East as compared with the West. Great Britain and the United States appear to have presented a rather "closed front" which could be penetrated only with great difficulty. In comparison, the Russian front appeared "open"; within the Soviet Union there were apparently a number of social and national opposition groups available for "contact". On the other hand, in the Soviet Union, Germany was confronted with an enemy whose vision and techniques in the field of "secret warfare" were probably

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at least equal to those demonstrated by Abwehr or the RSHA.

Thus, Abwehr operations in Russia centered on sabotage, deception, sedition, subversion, and countermeasures. The RSHA was engaged primarily in the task of crushing any local resistance. This work was carried out by the "Einsatz-Kommandos", mixed Security Police and SD formations who operated either under the regional Commander, Security, (B.d.S.), or who were dispatched directly from RSHA headquarters in Berlin to operate in the rear of advancing German Army units.

In addition, the RSHA was faced with Soviet or Soviet-sponsored opposition practically everywhere on the European continent. A number of Sonder-Kommandos were set up by RSHA, Amt IV, to trace the communist organizers and organizations; probably the best known of these special investigation units was the "Sonder-Kommando Rote Kapelle".

#### 4. The GFP - Secret Field Police

In the combat area, another German organization was active in security and counterintelligence, the GFP (Geheime Feld-Polizei - Secret Field Police). This organization was part of the regular Army forces, and had no headquarters organization of its own. The Army relied largely on the GFP for the safeguarding of operational security.

Organization and function of the GFP were described in detail in a memorandum issued by the Army Command "for the instruction of ground forces" at an unspecified date (Source # 1). This memorandum presents among others the following details.

"I. In the operational area and in the occupied territories in which a military commander exercises executive power the GFP is responsible for:

(a) Detecting and countering high treason and treason, espionage, sabotage, enemy propaganda and sedition;

(b) advising military commands and troops on all counter-intelligence matters;

(c) executing the counterintelligence measures established for the security of the operational area, or supervising such measures;

(d) executing all duties of the security police, whenever these are not delegated to the field gendarmerie or the Chief of the Security Police and SD;

(e) initiating investigations in special cases.

"II. In territories where German troops are present but where the German military commander has no executive power the GFP is responsible for:

(a) Detecting and countering high treason and treason, espionage, sabotage, enemy propaganda and sedition among the mobile units of the German Armed Forces present;

(b) advising military authorities and combat troops (as under I b)."



The memorandum shows further that GFP units were assigned to Army Group Commands, Panzer Group Commands, Army Security Divisions, and to military or Armed Forces commanders in occupied areas; they operated under the authority of these respective army commands. Activities of the GFP were directed by the Chief Intelligence Officer concerned. GFP units were composed of Field Police Officers (Police Commissars and Police Secretaries), Field Police Petty Officers, and military personnel assigned.

The material available indicates that the GFP limited itself to its original purpose; that is, military police duty for safeguarding security in combat and rear areas.

### 5. "Division Brandenburg"

As stated, Abwehr activities in the East were conducted to a large extent by Abwehr II. The backbone of most Abwehr II operations was the "Division Brandenburg".

This Division appeared in various forms in the course of World War II; the U.S. War Department "order of Battle" records the Brandenburg history as follows:

"Panzer Grenadier Division Brandenburg. Home Station: Brandenburg.

"Spring 1939: Formed as Bau-Lehr-Bataillon 800 and later expanded to Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V.800 (800th Brandenburg Training Regiment for Special Assignment).

"1943: Upgraded to division status with 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brandenburg Regiments, a parachute company, and other special units. Original function was sabotage by companies, platoons, and individuals. Personnel included Germans who had lived abroad and spoke foreign languages fluently, as well as foreigners of many nationalities. Regiments have operated separately in the Balkans, in Italy and other theaters. Division Brandenburg came under direct control of the Sabotage Branch of the Armed Forces High Command.

"August 1944: Special function of division and affiliated units taken over by new SS raiding detachments (Jagdverbande).

"October 1944: Reformed in the Vienna area as a Panzer Grenadier Division, and as such came under the Army High Command."

The most important component of the Division with regard to sabotage activities in the East was the 5th Training Regiment "Kurfuerst", to which an Abwehr Training School was attached. Abwehr II Kommandos in the East forwarded reports to this Regiment, which made the material known to officers and enlisted personnel who were trained as leaders of Abwehr "S", "Z", and "K" Trupps. This training was not limited to sabotage, but included the study of German and enemy espionage and counterespionage techniques.

Composition and assignment of the Brandenburg Division was outlined in a memorandum which Ausland/Abwehr sent on 1 April 1943 to Naval Staff. This memorandum (Source # 1) stated in part:

"Special Regiment Brandenburg 800 was reorganized on 1 November 1942 as the Brandenburg Division. It is directly sub-

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ordinate to Amt Ausland/Abwehr. As was the case with the Special Regiment Brandenburg, the Brandenburg Division will also be distributed over all fronts, mainly assigned to Army units in conformity with its special combat tasks. The following information on the organization, duties and mode of committing the Brandenburg Division is given for the information of Army Groups and Army Commands.

"A. Composition and Organization.

1. Composition: The Division is composed of Reich-Germans and persons of German descent, e.g. Germans from the Baltic States, the Black Sea and Volga districts, the Caucasus and the Balkans, also from Palestine, Africa, etc. It is composed of volunteers.

2. Organization: The Brandenburg Division is organized as follows:

a. 1st to 3rd Regiment Brandenburg - each consisting of three battalions of two light, one heavy, and one foreign legion company (Legionär-Kompanie).

b. 4th Regiment Brandenburg - consisting of: Two battalions, each containing two light (German) and three foreign legion companies, one tropical battalion of two light, one heavy, and one foreign legion company, and in addition, one paratroop company and one company for assignments in mountains or on inland waters...

c. 5th (Training) Regiment Brandenburg with one replacement battalion, one Abwehr replacement pool section, and one Abwehr Training School (Abwehr-Schule).

d. Coastal Raiding Division Brandenburg with four companies....

e. Communications Division Brandenburg with three companies...

"B. Duties.

"The duties of the Brandenburg Division are:

a. Combat duty to seize objectives of tactical, operational, or economic importance in order to protect or destroy them.

b. Combat duty in guerrilla warfare in the enemy hinterland.

c. Tactical and operational reconnaissance in disguise.

"The special missions carried out by units of the Brandenburg Division are intended to deceive the enemy by using all types of stratagems, and to create local superiority of numbers for a limited time... In particular:

a. The Battalions of the 1st to 4th Brandenburg Regiments are intended for assignments within the framework of Army units...

...

d. 5th (Training) Regiment Brandenburg (5. (Lehr) Regiment Brandenburg) is set up for individual or small-scale Abwehr missions and for the training of men as Trupp leaders (Unterführernachwuchs) for the Brandenburg Division and for Amt Ausland/Abwehr.



e. The Coastal Raiding Division is set up for special camouflaged combat assignments. These assignments have objectives in coastal areas which are approached from the sea. The Coastal Raiding Division is equipped with assault craft, small craft and rubber dinghies enabling it to cover up to 50 km of water without outside assistance. If greater distances have to be covered, the Coastal Raiding Division has to apply to the competent Naval Command for the necessary equipment..."

This memorandum, signed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command, Keitel, shows the ideas which guided the organization of Brandenburg. The division has been reported active in various operations of a more or less spectacular nature, as when some units were employed in U.S. uniform during the Ardennes offensive. For operations in the East the Brandenburg Division supplied Abwehr-Trupp leaders and instructors, trained in the various techniques of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy.

#### 6. Abwehr-Kommandos and Abwehr-Trupps

The organization and mission of Abwehr front-line units is described in a memorandum issued by "Walli III" and received by the Brandenburg Training Regiment Kurfuerst, (then designated "Unit 805"), on 18 February 1943. This document (Source # 11) states in part:

"Abwehr-Kommandos and Abwehr-Trupps have now seen action on the Eastern Front for about eighteen months... Their field of activity, the demands to be made on them and the tactics to be employed did not become clear until practical experience had been gained. The small and mainly independent units have proved their worth in reconnaissance in depth in Soviet territory (Abw. I), in carrying out special missions in the rear of the enemy (Abw. II), and in combatting enemy espionage and sabotage (Abw. III). In the course of numerous operations they inflicted heavy damage on the Russians, made it possible to defeat important enemy plans, hindered enemy espionage susceptibly, and brought back from their sorties valuable intelligence for our command. Hundreds of V-men have been assigned by Abwehr Kommandos and Trupps on both sides of the Front; they detected and eliminated numerous enemy agents..."

"The standard strength of an Abwehr Trupp is about twenty five men, but all Trupps have had to operate with a considerably smaller number on account of shortage of personnel. Thus even the smallest losses were sharply noticeable. Only recently has it been possible somewhat to alleviate this situation."

Most members of the Abwehr Trupps were non-German. They were referred to as "V-men". In the West, this term was apparently used mostly for high-caliber Abwehr agents, other personnel being described as "source", "sub-source" or by a code-name. In the East, the term V-man was used primarily for Russians or related nationals, usually selected from prisoner of war or deserter cages and enlisted in the ranks of Abwehr.

The situation in a training camp for Russian-born V-men is described in a report, written on 1 July 1943 by Lt. Weyde of the Abwehr School Kurfuerst. Lt. Weyde visited the Ostland training camp at Ulbrake on a trip from 7 to 27 June 1943. He was accompanied by Tech. Sgt. Reschke and two Russian-born "Main V-men" named Grubin and Kolesnikov, and reported (Source # 4, in excerpt) as follows:



"On 10 June, I reported in Riga to the Chief of Abwehr II at the Ostland office, Lt. Col. Marwede and was introduced to Chief of Ostland, Col. Neumerkel. Since Ostland had no practical experience to pass on, it was agreed that I should make myself acquainted with the sabotage and guerrilla training in the training camp for V-men at Ulbroka.

"I learned that it is no longer possible to obtain new V-men from the Northern and Central front sectors, so that fresh men are brought in now from the Southern sector. Lt. Col. Marwede was prepared to transfer some guerrilla agents from the training camp at Ulbroka; I chose four V-men to be assigned to Brandenburg Regiment.

"On 11 June I reported with Tech. Sgt. Reschke and the V-men Grubin and Kolesnikov to the commandant of the training camp at Ulbroka, Capt. Nowak. The V-men accompanying us mingled with the V-men in the camp, using a fictitious history... V-men trained by Ostland are mainly intended for sabotage assignments. Those not used for sabotage will be assigned to other missions, even against partisans, or will be placed at the disposal of other agencies.

"The German Abwehr personnel and all V-men have cover-names. The V-men in the camp wear German uniform, officers and non-commissioned officers have fictitious rank badges. The Russian officers do not seem fully satisfied with this solution - it is no longer true that the Russian has a childish joy in any little star or braid on the sleeve or similar tinsel. He wants to wear an official uniform, such as that of the "Army of Liberation" or a "Free Corps".

"Former Soviet officers are employed everywhere for training and commanding the V-men. It has proved extremely difficult to find officers suitable for such purposes, especially those with experience in handling men. As a general rule the former Soviet front-line officer is not well suited for such duties... It is absolutely necessary to develop an intelligence officer of the type with which we are familiar. Former Czarist officers must never be placed with Soviet officers - this always leads to friction and disagreement.

"Most training camps are organized into companies with Russian company, platoon and squad leaders, staff sergeants, specialists, and training officers. Success was achieved only where the Russian officers were able to influence the Russian personnel through their own authority... The conferring of special privileges on the Russian officers to increase their authority can easily lead to arbitrary behaviour and unjust, despotic action.

"Former Soviet officers who employ Red Army training methods cannot be used for the education, training and leadership of V-men. The Russian soldier whom we want to win over for our cause will recognize these Red Army methods and will find himself exposed again to the communist 'methods of leadership'; the distinction between German and Russian methods, which the Russians have perhaps learned to value, are thus obliterated."



7. The V-Man

Further details on the selection, training and assignment of Russian-born V-men in Abwehr Kommandos and Trupps are given in a report compiled by unnamed Abwehr specialists, and contained in "Kurfuerst" training files. The report is entitled: "The V-man. Suggestions for his training in front-line camps. Vol. 1: The East. Concluded: Easter 1944." This lengthy report (Source # 3) provides among others the following data:

"1. All V-men enlisted by our 'spotters' (Forscher) are subjected to a general check-up by the Camp Command prior to their acceptance at the Training Camp.

"2. After arrival in the camp the agents are investigated by specially trained 'guardians' (Betreuer) who also act as instructors. The agents are handled in small groups, into which they usually form themselves automatically. The guardian is to investigate the opinions, reliability and aptitude of the agents very minutely in the course of communal daily life. He sleeps in the same room as his men, spends the day with them and later participates in their training. He chooses the most reliable man in his group as sub-agent.

"During the first few days each agent writes down his career, with which the guardian must become thoroughly familiar. After a day or two a social evening is arranged with much liquor. The guardian drinks little himself, and chats casually with the men in his group about their experiences; he will compare their replies with the written account given earlier. Any agent whose remarks do not tally is to be watched more closely.

"During this investigation period the agent learns nothing of his future assignment nor of the training schedule. If he proves unsuitable he can still be returned to the cage from which he originated, as he will not possess any secret information.

"3. The V-man must learn only what is essential for his task. Training is to be carried out in four consecutive courses:-

Course I: Elementary sabotage. - Weapon training, general map-reading, use of compass, and parachute jumping are the only requirements for executing such simple tasks as for instance throwing a bomb camouflaged as coal on the tender of a locomotive. Training lasts about two weeks. Training for elementary sabotage is the minimum requisite for any agent and is obligatory for all of them.

Course II: Sabotage - Agents who have successfully completed the first course are given two weeks training in demolition work. Every effort is to be made to see that as many agents as possible master this branch of training.

Course III: Sedition - Agents who are to work independently as organizers of cells and guerrillas in the enemy hinterland are given special training in subversive techniques suitable for this purpose, as well as more intensive instruction in demolition.

Course IV: Radio Technique - After completion of training in category III, suitable agents are trained as radio operators.

"4. The agent must not be given rough treatment during the training period. He must not be punished. There is only one punishment for him: Back where you came from! ... Training must not be carried out in a pedantic or military manner; it must be treated as play. It cannot be emphasized too often that the agent is not working for us but for his own people, and that we only wish to help him in his fight against Bolshevism. If possible, the guardians and instructors are to be of the same nationality as the V-men under training. But if they are



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German, they must at least speak the native language of the V-men.

"5. During the first and second course the guardians and instructors will ascertain which agents are suitable and inclined to organize cells in the enemy territory. Such agents must have qualities of leadership, and must be able to think and act on their own initiative. These men will be thoroughly trained so that later on they themselves can select and train their collaborators.

"6. Agents that have made a good showing in course III and have special interest and aptitude for radio are trained in radio work. They will work as radio operators with the individual cells in enemy territory. These operators must be able to send and receive at the rate of at least 80 to 100 letters per minute, if they are to acquit themselves successfully under present technical standards. According to the aptitude of the student, he will need eight to sixteen weeks to achieve such speeds.

"7. Building up the morale is not secondary to practical training; it is equally important, in fact, often an essential requirement. The aim is to increase the anti-Soviet sentiments of the agents by giving them a solid foundation for a different philosophy. Beware of overestimating the intellectual aspect. Instead of general lessons, casual conversations are to be utilized. Such conversations will have been prepared by the guardian and he will keep them going without drawing attention to the fact. They will be individually tailored to the agent, to his personal position and maturity, his race and nationality... The 165 or more different Soviet nationalities make it necessary to treat each case and each group of agents differently...

"9. Agents from the first and second training groups are usually intended for front-line duties; they will be ordered to make every effort to get back to us after carrying out their mission. Agents belonging to the third and fourth groups are usually sent out on parachute missions and work over a long period. They either await a German advance or are picked up later by our own planes...

"11. If an agent returns to his point of departure after executing his mission, he is sent to special quarters, preferably in a town. He is then checked on...

"The same agent is to be used only once if possible; at any rate he must never be used unrestrictedly. Exception: Front-line agents and volunteers who give good reasons. After an agent has completed a mission successfully, every care is to be given to him, he is to be billeted in the camp and to be free to move about as he pleases. If the agent wishes to work, he is to be employed as far as possible in Germany itself or at some other place where the knowledge he possesses can do no harm."

8. Shortcomings

Documents describing activities of Abwehr Trupps and Kommandos indicate that the degree of success was small. Only by a detailed analysis will it be possible to discern to what extent these failures resulted from faulty organization, or what other factors must be held responsible. An equally thorough analysis will be necessary to clarify the question whether the techniques

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employed by Abwehr Trupps and agents were adopted in conformity with top-level directives and plans, or whether they developed spontaneously and under pressure of daily engagements.

In any event, Germany was no new-comer in the field of front-line espionage and related operations in the East; World War I had provided much experience: "Object lessons" of these experiences had been written down and analyzed by Maj. Gen. Gempp, who in the course of World War I had been Chief Intelligence Officer to the Commander in Chief, East.

In 1927 Gempp had been ordered to prepare a study on "The Army's Secret Intelligence and Counterespionage Service". By 1938, six volumes of this study had been published in mimeographed form, secret, by the German Army Chief of Staff. Vol. VI was entitled "Observations on the Intelligence Service in the East particularly within the area of the Commander in Chief, East, from May 1915 to the end of 1916" (Source # 15). In this volume, General Gempp presented among others the following object lessons:

1. "Except in Courland, it was impossible to employ Germans as agents on Polish or Russian territory. Only natives familiar with the language and the country could be employed.
2. "As soon as the war broke out we tried to plant agents in the ranks of the Russian Army with the task of gathering information and then deserting to our side. To the best of our knowledge only one of these attempts succeeded during the period covered by this report.
3. "It was the duty of every intelligence officer to take all possible precautions in selecting and accepting an agent, and to check against the enemy agent index.
4. "By far the most successful in dealing with agents were the few regular officers who had complete command of the enemy languages and were familiar with the country and the people from pre-war times, as well as many reserve officers who had done business in Russia as merchants, etc.
5. "The variety of nationalities and dialects spoken presented a tremendous language problem.
6. "In contrast to the mass production methods used by the Russian espionage schools, we insisted on the individual training and employment of agents, in order to eliminate the danger that one might reveal another's identity to the enemy. This procedure was also in line with the ever-recurrent experience that in dealing with agents success was to be had and unnecessary sacrifices to be avoided only by carefully planned methods which fitted the ability and mentality of the individual agent.
7. "Although one can never employ too many capable agents, it is better to be content with a few who are well qualified than to concentrate on quantity at the expense of quality and reliability.
8. "Prerequisite for success remained the indoctrination of the agent by the officer, consideration of the individual's qualifications, and intensive training for the projected mission, as well as detailed planning.
9. "Many times the inconsistency of the Russian command and the indecisive manner in which operational plans were carried out, caused us to regard important agent reports as dubious or false... The eastern theater Chief Intelligence Officer directed his intelligence officers to check all new information against the information forwarded previously by the respective unit, sector, etc., and to include findings in the report.

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10. "This procedure was of particular importance when dealing with information whose accuracy and value could be ascertained only on the basis of subsequent reports from agents or other sources."

Abwehr reports indicate that few of these object lessons were heeded in World War II. They show a tendency to outdo Russian activities by employing agents in ever increasing numbers. Furthermore, the organization of Abwehr headquarters in Berlin did not provide for proper checking and counterchecking of reports received from the field. Documents originating with Abwehr Trupps and Kommandos imply that the front-line agencies also lacked facilities for proper checking. Thus, it is not surprising that the previously quoted "Walli III" report which describes experience gained in eighteen months of front-line activities, pointed to various difficulties encountered:

"The operational demands made on the Abwehr Trupps, and to an even larger extent the strain imposed on morale, call for qualified and tough men. The activity of the Trupps is usually carried out on the seamy side of the war. As a rule it does not entail active military operations with their ebb and flow, strain and relaxation. On the contrary, the task of the Trupps remains constantly to come to grips with single enemies attacking unseen or from ambush...

"Methods must be adapted continually to alien peoples, who are difficult to handle. In addition, the work takes place in a depressing atmosphere. This applies most particularly to the interrogation of captured agents who often have to be 'broken-down' by the dreariest and most exasperating work. The turning-back of enemy agents against their employers and the enlistment and direction of our agents are influenced by considerable difficulties arising from the alien mentality."

The difficulties indicated in this memorandum were stated more explicitly in a document attached by Walli III to the memorandum. This document was identified as the diary of a German Abwehr Trupp leader. It shows that the organization of Abwehr activities in front areas in the East had resulted in the following shortcomings:

German Abwehr personnel was ordered to fight Russian methods by Russian methods and with Russian personnel. Thus, the German found himself in the endless Russian landscape, isolated as a rule from the German ground units, surrounded by Russian male and female agents whose language and mentality he could usually grasp only partially. He was not assisted by an efficient staff organization nor were any provisions made to utilize the technical superiority which Germany may have had in special fields. Instead of being able to adapt themselves to the place and its conditions and gradually to develop efficient techniques, the German Abwehr officers and men had to wrestle day and night with numerous Russian espionage and sabotage organizations, until finally they themselves became entangled in this bizarre net, thus being threatened with defeat by their own efforts.

This negative picture of Abwehr front-line organization does not take into account other activities carried out by Abwehr in the rear of the lines and in neutral countries. Yet, the main efforts in the East centered at the front; apparently the best men were sent there. Their experiences are reflected in the following passages from the "Diary of an Abwehr Trupp Leader" (Source # 11), who was presumably on duty in the Black Sea region:

"27 November 1942. It is two in the morning. The interrogation of the Soviet woman agent Barisov is concluded. We caught her after a complicated investigation. Finally she broke



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down, a helpless human being, and still a child. What does she know of Bolshevism? - she was just afraid. She was not motivated by the hate of a defeated people - she was only afraid. Nevertheless, I had to use all my toughness and all the tricks to get to the bottom of her story. Only so was it possible to evaluate her mission and her activities, and to understand the enemy better... What is going to happen to her? She has come into contact with a high-power center of our intelligence system and it is an unwritten law that such contact is deadly. So I am responsible for her life or death, which will be decided at the moment I pass a verdict, even if this verdict is only a short, factual report. Barisov is a child of 17... She comes from a non-party family. Her character is good. She was forced into espionage work under threats against her relatives. The orders she received were relatively important...

"My men are sleeping; I shall reconnoiter the area once more, since we do not have guards here; not enough men. Anyway, the 2nd Company of the Naval Coastal Artillery is stationed next to us. It is bright moonlight outside, far away one hears gun fire; that is in the Rumanian sector.

"28 November 1942. We seem to have picked up some slippery customers today. Among them are a Section Chief of the 3rd Section of the NKVD (Counterespionage) and the Office Chief of the local Komsomol (Communist Youth). We set out at 2200 to get them. Horribly dark and the roads knee-deep in mud. The batteries of our pocket lamps gave out, I could not get through to the Trupp with my car because the roads were too muddy. We struck matches to see the house numbers, since the agent who had traced the two men for us could not accompany us, otherwise he would be a 'dead man'. All the stench of the East reigned in the tumbledown hovel! And a man like this is the Section Chief of a Russian government office. Or is this dirt just camouflage? Anyway, these people think methodically and in a dispassionate and logical way which is alien to most of us.

"It has taken me a long time to get used to the Bolshevik way of living and thinking... Many times I have asked myself when one of these Russians sat there in front of me, vacant and apathetic after confessing: Is there nothing else in this human being, no hope, no love, no self-respect, personality, faith, in other words, the things that make a human being? But I've known now for a long time that there is nothing inside them. And they meet death the same way. Apathetic and dull.

"We soldiers of the German Intelligence Service have to adapt ourselves completely to our enemy and yet we must not sacrifice the smallest of the treasures of our own soul...

"29 November 1942. The agent Alexeyev has arrived! He was busy on a case which took him to a place 9 km from here. Alexeyev is beginning to improve gradually. To start with, I had to give him instructions six or seven times on how he was to work and what interested us. Now he's working first-rate; of course, there's a risk, even with him. After all, he was a Politruk but I saved him from being shot; he'll never cease to be grateful to me for that! You'd like to laugh from sheer helplessness at such meanness; I got him out of a tough spot, posed as his saviour, deus ex machina, miracle of his life, etc.! And all this merely to get him as a tool in our hands. Saved by me! Yes, of course by me, for I must bind him to myself personally, so that he trusts me and confides everything to me, even his crooked thoughts. Offices don't have agents, only human beings have agents; at best, offices have informers working for money, never real men who take risks!

"The interrogations were hard work. Of course, the one denied that he was the section chief of the 3rd Section, but I was able to tell him his collaborators and then he admitted it.

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Then he began lying again. So my expert got to work, he once worked in the 3rd Section himself. He went at it hammer and tongs. I had to break it off; he is to go without food for four days, perhaps that will improve his memory...

"30 November 1942. The SD made a visit to discuss cooperation. They are here now with a Kommando of thirty men: Apparently the former twelve men and two officers were not adequate. We concluded the conference with a general discussion of our work, which showed the considerable differences between regular police work and our activities designed to counter enemy espionage. The work directed against enemy intelligence calls for a closer contact with the military situation and for different methods in dealing with suspects. Our main task is not punishment but the obstruction of enemy operations, and even more so the identification of enemy installations and intentions. Different methods and qualities of character are thus required. On the other hand, it is of definite advantage to us that the SD inform us of every person suspected of espionage, just as we gladly pass on to them any case no longer linked to the investigation of enemy espionage...

"1 December 1942. The prisoners! What a lot I had to learn about them. The Russian officer is merely one of the ordinary people, who was once a workman in some factory or other and is completely indistinguishable from the mass of soldiers. Hence, even the dangerous ones can camouflage themselves very well. You can only find them out by using actual Russians. Only my Russians and myself. We now speak nothing but 'Russian' day in and day out. It's a jargon of Polish, Czech, Ukrainian and Russian, but the German from the East seems to be well suited to this type of work just because of this. After all, you can only get to know the people thoroughly through the language...

"7 December 1942. We've been in the forest! The partisans are really tough! I shouldn't like to have to stick it out in the forest for three weeks when it's raining. They fired like wild things. They lost five men, we got off without any casualties, thank God. This time results were nil from the intelligence angle. A few blank forms for passes, a few rubber stamps, some naval books, unfortunately not the 'guide' for partisans, which we are after...

"When I think back over our constantly changing operations, I sometimes realize what a terrific difference there is between an Abwehr office in home territory and the work done by a Trupp. Here you have to think like a Bolshevik and have a German heart, understand Slavic feelings and yet not injure your German honor, be hard and yet sometimes be able to pray like a child... Now at last for a real sleep and then for new missions..."

This diary had presumably been forwarded by Walli III to show headquarters certain problems encountered in the organization and work of Abwehr Kommandos and Trupps. Nothing in the files available would indicate that steps were taken to alleviate the situation. Superior results were not to be expected from work carried out under conditions and in a spirit such as is reflected in this diary.

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Section C: SOVIET ORGANIZATION

On 1 December 1944, the Chief of Fremde Heere, Ost, Brig. Gen. Gehlen, issued a study entitled "Russian Security Agencies". It covered the work of the agencies NKVD, NKGB, Smersh, and PURKKA, as identified by German intelligence agencies. The study appears to have been made in a critical and careful manner; while at several points, as stated, the material was not sufficient for a complete account, the report apparently covered most aspects of the subject. Therefore, the German study has been incorporated in this report, and appears as Appendix I. In the following, only such details are provided which appear helpful to a better understanding of operations or which contain additional information.

9. Central Organization

A German document has quoted Lenin as describing organization as follows:


"Organization is this: Millions of human beings inspired by one common will resolve to change the forms of their society and work. Their eyes fixed on one common aim, they will alter the places and methods of their activity, synchronizing their means and weapons with the shifting phases and conditions of their struggle."

Study of material related to the Soviet organization for "secret warfare" and security bears out this policy of constant change of place and method. Today, the Soviet organization appears to consist of a multitude of commands, administrations, groups, sections and clubs of all kinds and forms, including military, state, and party agencies of a public or a secret character, on Russian soil as well as abroad. These various organizations appear to be synchronized and directed in a centralized manner by the leadership of the Soviet Union, reportedly vested in the "Polit Bureau" of the Communist Party (VKP (b) ). \*

A chart attached to the Fremde Heere, Ost study gives the following blueprint for the "Organization for supervision, reconnaissance, espionage and counterespionage in the U.S.S.R.":

\* Important changes in the Soviet Security organization are reported to have occurred in the course of the recent Soviet Government reorganization, and in consequence of changed military and political conditions.





This chart is not fully in accord with other German documents concerning Soviet organization. It is believed to represent the assumed set-up rather than an actual blue-print. Nevertheless, it reflects the gradual development of the original Soviet security agencies to the period of greatest expansion reached in World War II.

Many of the agencies of this security system are the offspring of the old Cheka, the "All Russian Extraordinary Commission" founded in 1917 to deal with saboteurs, profiteers, and counter-revolutionaries. In 1924, the Cheka was renamed GPU. In 1934 the GPU was incorporated into the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, NKVD. In 1943, the GPU section of the NKVD, together with other sections active in the field of foreign espionage and counterespionage, was established as a new "People's Commissariat for Security", NKGB\*

As far as the Russian armed forces are concerned, various other organizations were encountered in the field. These organizations, although operating under Army or Navy, appear to have been closely linked to the NKVD or NKGB. The most important of these organizations presumably were the Army and Navy Intelligence branches "GRU" and the organization "Smersh" (Death to the Spies). With the end of hostilities Smersh is reported to have been transferred to NKGB.

Another important organization among the armed forces was PURKKA, the Political Directorate of the Red Army and Navy. The PURKKA organization, supervised directly by the Communist Party, was reported to be the central agency for all party activities in the armed forces. Among the troops, PURKKA representatives, so-called "Politrucks" were reported as being re-

\* In the course of the 1945/46 reform of the Russian government, the People's Commissariats were reorganized into Ministries: The former NKVD thus became the "Ministry of Internal Affairs", MVD; and the former NKGB became the "Ministry of Security", MGB.



sponsible for morale. PURKKA representatives are reported also to have been active in overt and covert propaganda operations directed against German and German-allied units.

Among auxiliary forces in the field of security and secret warfare, the Russian partisans, as well as those partisan and party underground formations in other countries influenced or directed by Soviet emissaries, are known to have played a prominent role. In Russia, command over the partisan units apparently was well integrated into the regular Army command. Partisans reportedly were assigned to important sabotage, seditious, and espionage missions.

In the following pages some material related to these organizations will be presented. However, it should be pointed out that in identifying the Soviet organizations, one may easily find oneself entangled in evidence at times unrelated and at times contradictory. It appears to be part of the nature of Soviet security that the organization itself is constantly in flux, that sections are shifted, that almost always responsibilities appear to overlap. Hardly anywhere are dividing lines clearly defined, nor does there seem to be an end to the host of lesser organizations which at times work for a local agency, but at others are directly subordinate to one of the Moscow top-level headquarters. To make the picture even more confused, individual Soviet agents are liable to appear at almost any place, who apparently are not connected with any of the known organizations, but who may nevertheless represent an important cog in the Soviet machine. Thus, even the most detailed and best documented account is bound to be outdated at some points, and to leave question marks at others.

While the material available shows extensive organizations set up for "security" of any type and brand, nothing has become known which would indicate the existence of special sabotage or seditious agencies within the Soviet organization comparable to the German Abwehr II. Sabotage schools as well as centers for training in seditious operations and "civil war tactics" have been reported in fairly large numbers, but no report has been located indicating the existence of one top-level agency responsible for the conduct of such operations. On the contrary, it would appear that sedition, sabotage, and related acts were not committed primarily by specialized agencies and their operatives, but that such activities formed a sideline to the general military or political duties of organizations such as the partisans and the Comintern.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a basic element of the Soviet organization is security. Thus the organization is built on the principle of consolidating and defending the gains made by the government. The very broad interpretation which the term "security" often acquires in one-party countries has been noted previously. Nevertheless, all material available indicates that this function - consolidation and defense - has been an outstanding factor of the Soviet organization in the fields of espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy.

#### 10. "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" - NKVD

The German study sums up the function of the NKVD as follows:

"The NKVD in its present form is predominantly an administrative department charged with internal Russian affairs. In general usage the term NKVD is used as synonym for agent oper-

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ations and shadowing. While such activities were carried out by the NKVD in the past, they are today the task of the NKGB."

A chart prepared by Fremde Heere, Ost in November 1944 shows the headquarters organization as follows:\*

The organization, which extends into every Soviet Republic and Territory, circuit and district, is headed by the NKVD, USSR. In 1944, this agency was headed by General Beria;\*\*\* headquarters were reported at Dzerzhinski Place at Moscow. Details of the internal organization of NKVD headquarters were reported to be unknown.

Directly under NKVD headquarters operated the following main directorates:

1. Directorate of Guards for the Red Army Zone of Operations;
2. GUPV - Directorate of Frontier Guards; Chief: Maj. Gen. Stakhanov;
3. GUVV - Directorate of Internal Guards; Chief: Stadkevitch;\*\*
4. GUM - Directorate of the Militia (police);
5. GUVS - Directorate of Administration;
6. Directorate of Fire Fighter Units;
7. Directorate of Higher NKVD Training;
8. Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps;
9. Directorate of Prisoner of War Camps;
10. Directorate of Roads and Highways;
11. Directorate of Central Files.

The regional organization of the NKVD was given as follows:

1. Under the NKVD, U.S.S.R., operated the several individual NKVD Administrations of the various Republics and Territories forming the Soviet Union, designated as NKVD, SSR (or ASSR) Crimea, Armenia, Azerbaijan, etc. The Republics' NKVD headquarters are assumed to have some but not all of the directorates which operate under the NKVD, U.S.S.R.

2. Under the dual supervision of the NKVD, U.S.S.R. and the NKVD of the Republics, UNKVD agencies operate in each administrative circuit; they contain some of the directorates that are found in the superior agencies.

\* It may be noted that this chart shows slight variations from the description given of NKVD functions in the report which was issued by Fremde Heere, Ost at about the same time (Appendix 1).

\*\* German translation of an alleged Soviet document, dated May 1942, gives a Maj. Gen. Sheredega as Chief of this directorate.

\*\*\* Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov has been reported to have succeeded Beria.



3. The smallest NKVD unit is the RO-NKVD, the local district agency. Most of these RO-NKVD agencies are supposed to be in charge of a local militia unit, a local fire-fighter unit, a local administration, and, if the situation warrants, local corrective labor or prisoner of war camps, as well as a local administration for roads and highways. Generally, it is assumed that much of the Russian road construction as well as most of the construction of the important inland waterways is carried out by inmates of the NKVD corrective labor camps under supervision of the district or circuit NKVD agency.

# 11. NKVD Activities in Reoccupied Areas

Several German documents deal with the function of NKVD organizations in reoccupied areas. In view of the general division of functions between the NKVD as the agency openly conducting measures designed to safeguard internal security and the NKGB as the agency conducting covert operations, it is assumed that many of the activities in territory reoccupied or newly occupied by Soviet forces were the task of the NKGB. On the other hand, the material available shows that all larger para-military and police formations available for security assignments were directed by the NKVD, while the NKGB relied upon secret agents. Whether NKGB agents were infiltrated into the ranks of NKVD formations and, if so, in what manner operations were conducted by NKGB men in the guise of NKVD soldiers or policemen, cannot be determined from the material available. However, it should be kept in mind that activities which in the following document are said to be carried out by the NKVD, may in the meanwhile have been transferred to the NKGB (MGB), or they may be conducted by NKGB officials utilizing the NKVD (MVD) organization.

Fremde Heere, Ost files contain the following "Directive for the Senior Officers of the NKVD in towns liberated from the enemy", dated May 1942, signed by the Chief of the Directorate of the Internal Guards, NKVD, USSR, Maj. Gen. Sheredega, and "confirmed" by the Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R., Maj. Gen. Appolonov:

"1. By order No. 2221 issued by the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. on 5 January 1942; responsibility for security in towns liberated from the enemy is delegated to the Internal Guards of the NKVD. Their task consists of aiding the NKVD authorities in combatting enemy agents, traitors, and other anti-Soviet elements.

"2. Internal Guards of the NKVD called upon to perform this duty must be prepared at all times to deal with spies and criminals, airborne agents and small enemy units, which manage to get through our front lines or have been left behind in our rear areas after the enemy withdrawal.

"3. The most important tasks of the Internal Guards are to:

a. Maintain the Revolutionary Government in the town in which they are stationed and in their operational area;

b. prepare defenses for the town in which they are stationed and conduct actual defense, should a small-scale enemy breakthrough occur;

c. protect and maintain security of important industries and installations of national and military importance;



- d. guard any persons arrested by the NKVD;
- e. guard all roads leading into or out of towns or villages, check all identity papers or similar documents, including those of members of the Armed Forces, when the bearer passes a security post;
- f. aid the NKVD in its countermeasures against enemy espionage, traitors, and other anti-Soviet elements in towns and districts;
- g. liquidate sabotage units and groups and prevent attacks planned by counterrevolutionary elements that have been left behind by the enemy in the area in which they are stationed;
- h. cooperate in any security measures initiated by the NKVD Guards in the rear areas of the Red Army..."

The same Fremde Heere, Ost document contains a list of "NKVD Military Organizations and Units as of 1 December 1944". This list carries a note, stating: "At present the following NKVD organizations can be assumed to be operating. Several other NKVD rifle and cavalry regiments, NKVD armored trains, and independent communication battalions as well as frontier guard battalions require further confirmation and therefore have not been included."

The list gives the following totals:

1. NKVD Internal Guards: Thirty one NKVD divisions with approximately six regiments each; twenty one NKVD brigades, with approximately three NKVD battalions each; and seven NKVD armored trains;
2. NKVD Frontier Guards: Sixty eight frontier regiments and seventeen NKVD frontier districts each with up to twelve frontier security sections and three frontier security control posts;
3. NKVD Communication Troops, with fifteen identified NKVD Staff-Communication Regiments.

Among the NKVD Frontier Guards listed in (2) appear three "Naval Border Security Sections" for the Vladivostok coastal area, and one "Naval Frontier Security Section" as well as one "Frontier Cutter Section" for the Black Sea area. No special naval NKVD units are listed among the following NKVD Frontier Guard area headquarters: Lithuania (Shauliai - still being organized); Moldavia (Kishiney - still being organized); White Sea (Archangel) and "Operational Group of the NKVD Frontier Guards, Murmansk". However, German naval files show that at the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities NKVD naval units were operating as security formations in the Eastern Baltic.

NKVD Frontier Guards are assumed to have been of special importance for operations in border and newly occupied areas. German reports state that these units deployed agents across the border. The December 1944 Fremde Heere, Ost report gives a chart of the organization of the NKVD Frontier Guards which shows the NKVD, U.S.S.R., Directorate of the Frontier Guards as directed by Maj. Gen. Stakhanov. Attached to his central office were the "political administration" and the "staff"; subordinate to this central office were the following sections: (1) Personnel Section; (2) Advanced Training Section for Frontier Guards; (3) Communications Section; (4) War Academy of the Frontier Guards; (5) Supply Section; (6) Medical Inspection; (7) Veterinary Inspection; (8) Cipher Section; (9) Watch Dogs.



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The field organization given for the administration of Frontier Guards of the individual Republics and Frontier Guard Districts follows a somewhat similar pattern. Attached to the central office are the Political Deputy with a Political Staff, and the Staff composed of five sections. Section 5 is identified as being composed of two subsections (a) Subsection for surveillance of the population this side of the border, and (b) Subsection for surveillance in districts across the border.

Under this Republics' and district Administration operate a number of "Frontier Guard Sections" for various "Frontier Sectors". The Chief of each section has a Political Deputy, and a staff composed of five sections. In addition, he is in charge of a supply branch, a medical branch, a veterinary branch, a finance branch, and a branch for mobile reserves composed of two to three rifle or cavalry units, and of noncommissioned officers' training schools. The Chief of the sector also is in charge of the "K.P.P.", the designated points for crossing the border.

The "Frontier Kommandantura" are given on the chart as the next lower level. Each of the above Frontier Guard Sections is reported to be composed of three to four of such Kommandanturas. The Chief of the Kommandantura has a Political Deputy and a Staff, composed of a Deputy for Espionage Affairs, a Communications Unit, and a Watch Dog Unit. In addition, a Chief of Supplies, a Reserve Frontier Guard Detachment, and a Medical Unit are attached to the Kommandantura.

Under each Kommandantura operate three to four "Chiefs of the Field Watch", the lowest echelon in the system. Each Chief of the Field Watch has a Deputy for staff duties and a Political Deputy. He is in charge of various border control posts and reconnaissance units. The Chief of the Field Watch commands three to four Rifle Groups, a Supply Group, and three to four Watch Dog Groups.

The manner in which this system for Soviet border control has been transferred to Russian-occupied territories is not covered by any German report. However, methods employed by these NKVD units in operational and reoccupied areas are described in greater detail in Appendix I, Chapter 11.

## 12. NKVD Activities in the Soviet Fleet

Files of the Intelligence Officer of the 11th German Army (Source # 36) contain a report which was prepared by the Rumanian Secret Service (S.S.I.R.) for the German Army Command, South. This report, No. 739, dated 16 July 1942, gives a detailed, though obviously not complete, description of the NKVD organization in the Russian Black Sea Fleet based on interrogation of captured NKVD personnel. As is the case with frontier guards, some functions ascribed to the NKVD may have been transferred meanwhile to the NKGB.

The report states that the "NKVD Special Division for the Black Sea Fleet" was directed by the NKVD Major Ermolaev, his deputy Smirnov, the Politruk Mensikov as secretary, a certain Aparin as adjutant, and Commissar Goldici as commander.

The Special Division was reported to be composed of the following sections:

Section I, "KRO" dealt with counterrevolution and espionage. Section II dealt with the Black Sea Fleet Command, hospitals, and the political administration of the Fleet. Section IIIa dealt with submarine units; this section was said to have op-

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erated independently from December 1941 onwards under the title O.N.K.V.D.-B.P.L. Section IVa dealt with the fleet air arm. Section Va dealt with shore units. Section VIa dealt with naval reserve units. Section VIIa dealt with training establishments.

In addition, the special sections "Operational Control", "Training", and "Personnel", were listed as part of the NKVD Special Division of the Black Sea Fleet.

The function of the NKVD Special Division for the Black Sea Fleet was described as follows:

"The whole NKVD organization of the Soviet Fleet is under the direct command of the NKVD, U.S.S.R., Moscow. The Supreme Command of the Fleet has authority to make independent decisions only in exceptional cases...

"The NKVD interrogates German and Rumanian prisoners. The first interrogation is usually made by a staff officer; the following interrogations are handled by operational agents...

"Every detail of the NKVD work is secret; office employees rarely learn anything unless operational agents talk with each other. Anybody divulging information is liable to disappear without a trace.

"Every fleet unit has an NKVD representative who deploys agents in the unit in question. Arrests are made without previous warning; the superior naval officers are not informed. This situation has a strong effect with regard to the power of NKVD officials.

"Members of the NKVD rarely have contact with the political Commissars or Politruks, unless it is in order to pass on some information. The NKVD officials can make independent decisions are are responsible only to the supreme Chief of the NKVD."

### 13. "People's Commissariat for Security" - NKGB

The Fremde Heere, Ost report (Appendix I) describes the function of the NKGB as follows: "The NKGB is the central agency for all secret operations in espionage and counterespionage in non-military fields. Originally a directorate of the NKVD, it has been established as an independent People's Commissariat. It continues to work in close cooperation with the NKVD."

The establishment of the NKGB as independent Commissariat was first reported early in 1941. When in June of that year Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the NKGB reverted to the NKVD. However, in 1943 it was set up again as an independent Commissariat. (The former NKGB is today the MGB, the Ministry of Security.)

Close coordination with NKVD activities was assured by the choice of the chief of the NKGB, a post for which Merkulov, until 1943 deputy of the Chief of NKVD, Beria, was selected. Organization of NKGB as of December 1944, is shown on a Fremde Heere, Ost chart as follows:\*

\* The organization given on the chart differs somewhat from the picture presented in the study (Appendix I).



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1. Headquarters consist of two different types of office: Directorates, of which eight have been identified, and Operational Sections, of which five have been identified. In addition, three headquarters offices are identified, which may be either Directorates or Operational Sections.

2. The document identifies the following NKGB Directorates:

- (a) 1st Directorate: Protection of members of the Government;
- (b) 2nd Directorate: SPU - Secret State Police;
- (c) 3rd Directorate: KRU - Counterespionage;
- (d) 4th Directorate: Activities in reoccupied and presumably also in newly occupied areas;
- (e) 5th Directorate: INU - Foreign Countries;
- (f) - Directorate: EKV - Economics;
- (g) - Directorate: DTU - Transportation;
- (h) - Directorate: Investigations.


3. The following Operational Sections (SO) are identified:

- (a) SO-1: Secret Files;
- (b) SO-2: Technical Services;
- (c) SO-3: Agents;
- (d) SO-4: Censorship;
- (e) SO-5: Codes.

4. In addition, the following three headquarters offices are identified:

- (a) Section for Anti-Guerrilla Operations;
- (b) Prisoner Section;
- (c) Personnel Section.

According to the German chart, the system in the various Republics and Territories closely follows the organization of the U.S.S.R. headquarters. In the districts, that is, the lowest unit of the regional administration, the organization is reduced to the following offices:





A marginal note on the chart points out that German Army Intelligence assumed that a similar organization prevailed in newly occupied territories.

5. The chart shows further that each district deputy operated under the dual authority of (a) the chief of his district office, and (b) the deputy for his particular field (SPO, KRO, etc.) in the next higher echelon of the organization. Thus, the Counterespionage Chief of the NKGB, USSR, for instance, had direct channels to every deputy for counterespionage in the Republics' and district organizations.

14. "Smersh", GRU, and PURKKA

Russian armed forces organization is assumed to have been incorporated into the political state and party organization to a much greater extent than was ever achieved in Germany. It will be remembered that, contrary to the situation in Germany, the Soviet Government did not adapt the old Czarist military and naval organization to its purposes, but created its own "Red Army" and "Red Fleet".

The manner in which the Navy was politically incorporated into the Soviet System is indicated by a German Naval Intelligence document (8 Sept. 1944) which shows a "Naval War Council" attached to the People's Commissariat for the Navy. This council is reported as exercising "decisive influence upon the command of the Soviet Fleet". The following four persons are given as "identified members of the Naval War Council":

1. The People's Commissar for the Navy, Fleet Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov;
2. The Chief of the Admiralty, Admiral L.M. Galler, identified as former officer of the Czarist Fleet;
3. The Chief of the Political Administration, Lt. Gen. of Coastal Defense I.W. Rogov, identified as former Political Commissar in the Red Army.
4. Lt. Gen. A. A. Zhdanov, identified as "Secretary of the Communist Party for the District of Leningrad". (This same Zhdanov has been reported to be a member of the Polit Bureau of the Communist Party.)

In spite of the apparently close integration of the Army and Navy Command with the over-all direction of Soviet policies, it is assumed that most operations in the field of espionage, sabotage, or conspiracy which are not of a strictly military or naval nature, were directed by other than armed forces agencies.

However, in 1943 the Russian armed forces organization Smersh apparently assumed rather broad activities in the field of counterespionage. How much of this aspect is due to propaganda, cannot be discerned; the name of the organization itself, which is an abbreviation of "Death to the Spies", indicates that public opinion was not overlooked.

Smersh had originally been a less publicized "OO" (Special Counterintelligence Section) of the NKVD. According to the Fremde Heere, Ost study, all armed forces counterintelligence and security was transferred to Smersh by 1943. (Recent reports from the Soviet Union indicate that Smersh, as such, has ceased to exist, and that its function now has been taken over by the NKGB, which, as will be remembered, has a special direc-



torate for counterintelligence, "KRO".)

Nevertheless, it can be assumed that Smersh developed new tactics in the field of counterintelligence carried out by and among armed forces units. Today, most of the administration of Soviet occupied territory is carried out by Red Army units, and it must be assumed that prior to the end of hostilities Smersh organizations had been built up within these Army units. Thus the working methods of Smersh may still be pertinent, even though the organization as such no longer functions.

A Fremde Heere, Ost chart shows that activities of Smersh were divided between the following two main sectors:

A. The headquarters organization, consisting of:


1. The UOKR NKO Smersh central administration, attached to the People's Commissariat for National Defense, and directed by Avakumov;

2. a Smersh agency attached to every theater command;

3. a Smersh agency attached to every Army command; this agency was composed of a guard company of about 100 men, which handled prisoners, and established communications; an "Operational Section" which was in charge of the supervision of all units in the field; a "Second Section", in charge of the deployment of counterespionage agents across the front line; a "Third Section" responsible for security in the rear of the Army, and a "Fourth Section" in charge of all pending investigations.

This headquarters organization from the central Moscow agency on down to the Smersh Army Staff, was responsible for the supervision of all troops, for security, counterespionage, and deception.

B. The Smersh Field Organization was built around the divisional staff. This organization was limited in general to supervision of personnel and maintenance of security. Its system was pictured as follows:



(Six to eight informers assigned to every resident; one informer assigned to every five to six suspected Red Army men)



NKO "Smersh" was the counterespionage division of the Commissariat for National Defense (NKO); a similar Smersh division is reported to have been established in the Commissariat for the Fleet (NKVMF). Both commissariats are reported to have had also divisions for operational intelligence, referred to as "GRU" divisions, at the commissariat level, and as "RO" at the theater, army, and divisional level. No material on the GRU organization is available.

Finally, within the armed forces the PURKKA organization was responsible for operations designed to strengthen Soviet and undermine enemy morale. The Fremde Heere, Ost study describes the function of PURKKA as follows:

"The Political Directorate of the People's Commissariat for National Defense, PURKKA, is in charge of the indoctrination of the Red Army and of propaganda. It assumed these functions following the abolition of the commissar system which was ordered in October 1942 and carried out by spring 1943."\*

The PURKKA organization, that is, the Party organization within the armed forces, was reported as operating through the chiefs of the various political divisions and political sections attached to the Army and Navy staffs, and through "Politruks", that is, members of Red Army companies and battalions who carry out Party work as collateral duty. The Chief of PURKKA, that is, of the "Political Directorate of the People's Commissariat for National Defense", was reported in 1944 to be a Col. Shtsherbakov, who was also identified as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

The following difference in the organization of Smersh, GRU, and PURKKA is pointed out in the Fremde Heere, Ost study on "Russian Security Agencies":

(a) Smersh agencies were merely attached to the Army and Navy staffs; they remained directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Defense and reported via the next higher Smersh office.

(b) The agencies for military (and naval) intelligence, (GRU), formed an integral part of the army (and navy) organization and were, therefore, subordinate to the various staffs.

(c) The political officers of the PURKKA organization attached to army (and navy) formations were subordinate to the respective armed forces commanders, but they received the directives concerning their working methods from the superior political (party) agency, and forwarded their reports directly to the Political Directorate of the Red Army (and Fleet) without passing it through the usual chain of command.

\* In the Russian Navy political supervision and indoctrination was carried out in the same manner by a similar "Political Directorate" attached to the "People's Commissariat for the Fleet"; this directorate was referred to as PURKKF.



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 PART II: E S P I O N A G E  
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The following part presents documents regarding the intelligence situation in the East; its heading has been chosen in view of the fact that espionage apparently was its outstanding feature. Intelligence of a purely operational character, such as activities carried out in the front areas by the German Army or officers, has not been considered in this report.

Section A: GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE

15. Operations prior to the Attack

For at least a decade preceding the invasion of Russia, German armed forces agencies and officers evidently exerted great efforts to gather all possible intelligence on Russia. At times the political situation provided Germany with conditions more favorable than those encountered as a general rule by intelligence agencies dealing with Russia: Following the signature of the Rapallo Pact various German missions and officers went to the Soviet Union for studies and instruction. The Russo-German Non-Agression Pact of 1939 also provided German intelligence with new channels. German records state that the Soviet Union took equal advantage of such periods of "mutual understanding". \*

Apparently, much of the pre-war intelligence aimed at economic and industrial information. The fact that German intelligence lacked a central agency for the gathering and evaluation of economic and industrial data has been pointed out previously. The manner in which German armed forces intelligence agencies endeavored to gain direct access to industrial and economic information is illustrated by the account which the German industrial representative, Dr. Conn, gave of a conference in Berlin with Comdr. Menzel, Naval Intelligence, in June 1939 (Source # 46).

"Comdr. Menzel stressed the point that in view of the progressive closing down of public and easily accessible channels, increasing importance was attached to obtaining information through our business representatives abroad. This method of obtaining intelligence would have to be followed up much more keenly than in the past. The Rheinmetall corporation was handling this matter far more efficiently than was Krupp. This was partly explained by the fact that an ex-employee of Rheinmetall was working in the Intelligence branch and, knowing the executives of that firm, was able to maintain close liaison.

"I fully agreed with him on the importance of this type of intelligence report, but reminded him that in such a large concern as Krupp it obviously took time to organize matters; also that most of our foreign agencies were directed by foreigners on

\* Material dealing with these two periods is contained in German naval files. It has been incorporated in a report on "Russo-German Naval Relations 1921 to 1941" which will be published shortly by this office.



whom one could only make limited demands in this matter, and that finally at all costs we must avoid lending color to the malicious rumors circulated abroad that our agencies indulged in something akin to espionage.

"Menzel's second point was that before going abroad, and again on their return, our executives should report to the Intelligence branch at Berlin, or at all events to the Intelligence sub-branch at Cologne.... My personal opinion is that we ourselves might be able to pick up quite a lot of useful information if we reported to Berlin for instructions.

"His third point was a request to utilize foreign visitors to obtain intelligence. I replied that this was being done already, but that it was necessary to proceed very carefully, to avoid arousing suspicion on the part of the visitors..."

The German Naval intelligence files on Russia, up to 1940, contain a wide variety of source material, such as was submitted by "Ausland/Abwehr", the German Foreign Office, the press syndicate "Ost-Express", and numerous other agencies. However, from the same files it would appear that Naval Staff received much of the reliable information through its own channels, and especially from the German Naval Attache in Moscow. Additional facilities for the gathering of intelligence were acquired by this attache when Germany established a secret naval base on the Murmansk coast in the winter of 1939 with Russian consent. Material concerning this "Base North" and the "Etappe" organization set up in connection with it, is contained in the forthcoming report on Russo-German naval relations.

The moment Germany opened hostilities against Russia, most of these channels closed down. "Base North" and its "Etappe" had been withdrawn earlier; the attaches had left. In the field of espionage, the situation at the outbreak of war is indicated by the following order issued by Ausland/Abwehr on 3 September 1941 (Source # 1):

"1. Prior to the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Abwehr III sent several waves of agents to Russia. The agents were men who had connections with the offices of the Russian Intelligence Service. They were to gain information on changes in the Russian Intelligence Service offices and on the location of files. After completing their task they were to report to the nearest German office within a specified time. With the opening of hostilities all agents were to report to the nearest German military command. Up to the present no reports have been made by Abwehr Field Commands and units on the arrival of such agents. However, the Intelligence Office at Cracow reports the return of one agent who has handed over important material."

#### 16. Frontline Espionage

Prior to the opening of hostilities, deployment of espionage agents on Soviet soil had been a hazardous task in view of the stringent border and internal control. The war apparently reversed the situation to a certain extent. "Unclassified" sources, such as magazines and travel reports almost dried up, while on the other hand it now proved simpler to channel agents into Russia.

In Russian territory occupied by German forces, countless people had lost their homes and means of a livelihood; they were faced



with the threat of labor camps or worse. Under such circumstances it seems to have been no great problem to enlist or press Russian nationals into Abwehr units. An outstanding feature of German and Russian work with such front-line agents was the tactic of "turning back". The "double agent" may be a more or less common character everywhere; he has been characterized as a cunning figure who wishes to play a lone hand. In comparison, the "turned-back" agent was a wretched, often unwilling instrument in the hands of agencies which apparently attached small value to the individual, preferring to trust in numbers. "Turned-back" agents were especially valuable for counterespionage; this practice will therefore be illustrated in the section on counterespionage by the case history of "Lt. Puchov".

An indication of the problems encountered in the deployment of front-line agents is contained in a circular letter from Ausland/Abwehr (Dienststelle Walli), dated 22 July 1943, and headed: "Exploitation of the enemy situation" (Source # 11). The letter states in part:

"It is essential to keep the missions sharply defined. They should not be too complex, or energy will be wasted. It will be well to assign at least two groups to the same target. They are to operate independently without knowing about each other. Details reported by both groups can then be checked against each other. Nevertheless, it will always be difficult to detect whether a Russian 'activist' sticks to his job, or whether he runs with the hare and hunts with the hounds... All gear should be Russian. More Russian blank forms must be provided. In planning, pay more attention to detail; small points often spell the difference between success and failure."

The use of Russian-born women for Abwehr I missions behind the Soviet lines is discussed in a memorandum from the Abwehr III of the officer of "Befehlsstab Walli", dated 25 January 1943 (Source # 11) and given here in excerpt:

"Statement made by the Soviet woman agent G. captured at Vitebsk on 26.12.42.

"She stated that the German offices made the following mistakes when using girls for intelligence duties:

"The girls were usually sent out in pairs. If they were captured, their replies during interrogation did not tally, especially as instructions given were often wrong. Incorrect details of places often caused the capture of women agents. If the German intelligence service wishes to be successful, it must only use agents familiar with the terrain. The Russians often call upon partisans who know the district thoroughly to help in the interrogations."

"It has also been noted that the girls often had tattoo marks that were made before the war when they had been imprisoned for some offense. Furthermore, this particular type of girl is usually unreliable."

"Russian authorities suspected of espionage paid much attention to dialect and pronunciation. Apparently the Germans did not take sufficient care about this."

The available material does not permit the assessment of the number of spies and "turned-back" agents used by Russian and



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German agencies, beyond the broad statement that the figure was apparently large. The number of those who returned was evidently much smaller. Abwehr documents point out that every returnee had to be suspected of having been "turned back" by the Russians.

#### 17. The Espionage Net of Abwehr I, Ost

While the Abwehr Trupps and Kommandos at the front tried to send an ever increasing number of their V-men behind the enemy lines, Abwehr I, Ost headquarters, in charge of armed forces espionage directed against the U.S.S.R., tried to set up a new net of espionage agents.

It is assumed that prior to the war Abwehr made great efforts to enlist the services of foreigners who were by their trade or profession in a position to carry out espionage "from within", and the stress placed on "inside" contacts is demonstrated by German counterespionage methods. German police records indicate that Soviet agencies also tried to work along similar lines. In the absence of detailed accounts of such operations, the Redl case of pre-World War I days may be cited as illustration for the use by Imperial Russian Military Intelligence \* of the method of "espionage from within".

With regard to the success of Abwehr efforts to gain inside contact in the course of the war, the following statement of the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee (Source # 48) may be noted:

"Between the work of Abwehr III and RSHA Amt IV, the Allied intelligence services in the Low Countries were deeply penetrated at the beginning of the war, and throughout the history of the resistance movements in the occupied countries there were many instances of effective German penetration, some of them on a large scale (e.g., in Holland in 1944). It must be remembered, however, that this success was achieved mainly on the agent level ..."

As far as Russia is concerned the material at hand does not permit the conclusion that German espionage or counterespionage agents penetrated the enemy organization to any great extent. The type of agents used by Abwehr against Russia is illustrated by a list in Fremde Heere, Ost files (Source # 34). Dated 14 November 1944 and headed "List of Abwehr I, Ost Agents", the list contains 184 espionage sources. A good many of the listings

\* No official account of the Redl case is available. Unofficial reports and circumstantial evidence suggest the following: On 25 May 1913, Col. Alfred Redl, then Chief of the General Staff of the Prague Division of the Austrian Army, shot himself at a Vienna hotel. Subsequently it was reported that prior to his field assignment in Prague, Redl had been Chief of the Intelligence Service (K.S.) of the Austrian Army, and that from at least 1903 onward he furnished Russian Military Intelligence with secret information. He was said to have acted upon instruction from the Russian military attache in Berlin, and it was claimed that Austrian mobilization plans had been among the military secrets passed on by Redl. The treason was detected by Redl's successor to the office of Chief of Austrian Military Intelligence, Col. V. Urbanski. The Austrian Secret State Police were able to prove that the acts had been committed by Redl; he was given an opportunity to shoot himself, and the case was closed.

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appear to be duplications. After deduction of the most obvious ones, 159 names remain, of which almost half are described as "still doubtful", that is, presumably, new. Some of the sources are listed as operating in the West; it was a known practice of Abwehr agencies to extend their operations into the territory of other regional Abwehr agencies.

The document states that Abwehr has substituted three-figure numbers for the former code-names; the middle figure is to indicate the evaluation of the source. Nine different evaluation groups are given, and an analysis of the 159 sources shows the following totals:

Key 2 (Very valuable):	18	Key 4 (Limited):	15
Key 9 (Very valuable to usable):	2	Key 7 (Limited to very limited):	4
Key 3 (Usable):	21	Key 5 (Very limited):	3
Key 8 (Usable to limited):	17	Key 6 (Agent Radio):	5
Key 0 (Still doubtful):	74		

Among sources listed as "very valuable" (2) are the following, identified by their covername and a brief description provided presumably by Abwehr:

The agent Svenson, with the following sub-sources: "Svenson I" Polish Deuxieme Bureau; "Svenson II" - Information Service of the Guardia Ludova; "Svenson III" - Polish-British liaison officer in the Polish Deuxieme Bureau; "Svenson IV" - New Ukrainain contact man;

QuR (Toni) - Intelligence Officer in the White Russian Army of 1918;

Borodin - Representative of the German "Wolff" Press Agency in the Far East for many years;

CHB - Former Czech Army officer;

Mogul - Boegenkamp, collaborator of the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin;

R 4927 - Operating in Russia for many years, engaged in supervision of internal Russian radio traffic;

Pandur - Main agent, former German officer operating at Stockholm.

Among sources "Still doubtful", i.e., new sources, are the following:

Husar - Contactman of the German Police (RSHA) Attache at Shanghai;

Laos - RAF Officer at Irak; - via Belruth;

No 1552 - U.S.A. Representative in Spain;

--- Son of a former Czarist officer with contacts to Soviet General Staff Officer;

Paul - Agent left behind by the former KO Finland;

Vroni - Viennese-born; married to a Hungarian communist intellectual; he is hostile to communism.



Among other sources contained in this list, the following may be noted:

--- Radio counteragent, former Soviet Lieutenant and PW;

No. 102 - Former German officer; working at the Siberia Institute at Vladivostok;

H 7167 - Agent reporting from England by radio (Afu);

F 3165 - Contact to Soviet Military Attache and Brazilian Legation at Stockholm;

Oakland - Economic group overseas with close contacts to the War Department in Washington;

V 305 - Agent in England, reporting via Spain;

26 - Japanese contact of Pandur, Stockholm.

Judging by this list, the Abwehr I, Ost agent network was far-flung by the end of 1944. However, only in a few instances did the source appear to be operating in Soviet territory. No material has been available which would tell whether or not the agents succeeded in obtaining any information of value on Russia. However, on 22 October 1944 the German Naval Intelligence Division, 3/Skl, published a study on the reliability of agent reports in general (Source # 1). The study claimed that of a total of 192 reports checked, only fifteen had been accurate, and concluded:

"The majority of the reports are either inaccurate or expressed in such general terms...that they cannot serve as basis for an evaluation by 3/Skl. More often than not the reports originate from sources that have been innocent victims of floating rumors or, unwittingly or deliberately, have used material supplied by the enemy. Instead of clarifying the situation when received, the reports caused the greatest possible confusion."

#### 18. Evaluation

The Intelligence Division of Naval Staff was the agency charged with the evaluation of Abwehr reports, and any other intelligence material of value for the Navy. For the Army, the same function was performed by the "Fremde Heere" section of the General Staff. The Air Force had its evaluation unit in the "Forschungsamt". These three agencies provided facilities for the evaluation of such intelligence as was of immediate concern for the three branches independently, but they were neither authorized nor in a position to carry out a top-level strategic evaluation. It is known that Germany exerted unusual efforts to collect information; the apparent absence of proper facilities for the correlation and evaluation of such data on a top-level is thus the more striking.

There is evidence that due to the initiative of the SS General Schellenberg Amt VI of the RSHA set up a system for filing and evaluation of all available intelligence. This system was thorough; however, it should be remembered that Amt VI did not have access to all intelligence gathered by the various agencies. The Amt VI evaluation system was outlined in a directive, issued by Schellenberg on 10 August 1942. It stipulated:

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1. The following files and indexes were to be set up:
  - (a) Personal files of each agent (V-man),
  - (b) card-index of all agents,
  - (c) personality file (case history), arranged alphabetically and by subjects,
  - (d) personality card index, arranged as (c),
  - (e) subject file.

2. The personal file of each individual agent was to contain his code-name, consisting of a "V", the code number of the country against which the agent was deployed, and a number added by the official of the respective country desk. Agent No. 85, operating in England would thus be identified as "V 45/85" - 45 being the code number for England. In addition, the personal file was to contain a short biography, also reports of the double security check to be made prior to enrolling the agent and then annually. The agent file was also to contain information regarding the channels to the V-man, such as cover addresses, courier and radio links, and a separate folder with documents concerning the various assignments given. Finally a short record of all reports received from the agent was to be included with a code as to their value (1: Excellent; 2: Good; 3: Medium; 4: Bad; 5: Completely useless).

3. The agent card-index was to be arranged according to countries, the cards were to serve as a guide to the V-man personal files.

4. Personality files (case histories) were to be started for every person about whom information had been received. These personality files were to be kept with the respective country desks.

5. The personality card index was to be arranged alphabetically; the cards were to serve as a guide to the personality files with the various country desks. A second personality card index was to be made according to subjects.

6. The Subject File was to contain all information not concerning persons. This file was to be arranged according to countries and according to the subject headings given under 8.

7. The division into countries followed a numerical system. One number was given for each country regardless of size or importance. The numbering was done in alphabetical sequence, with Afghanistan as (1). However, one or more numbers were skipped between countries so that "Soviet Russia" had No. 152 and "USA" No. 176, with "Yemen" concluding the list as No. 182.

8. Great emphasis was placed upon a systematic division of subjects. The main divisions were (A) Foreign Policy, (B) Internal Affairs, (C) Economy, (D) Armed Forces, and (E), added later, Colonial Affairs. Each main division was subdivided into groups; Armed Forces (D), for instance, contained (I) General Armed Forces Policy, (II) Personnel, (III) Material, (IV) Operations, (V) Various.

These groups were subdivided again into the actual filing subjects. For instance, under (B) Internal Affairs, the Group IV, Political Influence, was divided into Diplomatic circles (213), Military Circles (215), Aristocratic Circles (216), Officials (220), Labor Leaders (230), Church Groups (235), Jews and Freemasons (240), Ethnological and racial groups (245), Ethnological



Minorities Abroad (255), Parties (260). Group V, "Situation", was divided into: Administration and Police (315), Jurisprudence (320). Postal Service, Radio and Telephone (325), Public Health (345), Organizations and Groups (360), Foreigners (370).

9. With regard to proper filing the Schellenberg directive stated: "The evaluator is to make an estimate of the value of every report. This estimate is to be sent to the agent personal file. The report is to be filed according to its contents in the right personality or subject file. The filing in the right personality file should not cause any difficulties. For filing in a subject file, the following procedure is to be observed: The evaluator carefully considers the whole report and asks himself: 'What new information does it contain?'. He will then arrive at a short heading such as..." Further details on this evaluation process cover two pages of the directive.

Economic Intelligence: German naval files show that Naval Staff as well as the German Air Force General Staff were aware of the importance of economic information, but that insufficient provisions existed within the armed forces for the gathering and evaluation of such intelligence. Economic intelligence reports, provided by the War Economy Section (W-WI) of the OKW proved insufficient for operational requirements. On several occasions Naval Staff requested that economic research be carried out by private organizations such as the "Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung" (Market Research Institute).

## Section B. RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

A detailed German study of the Russian intelligence organization is contained in the Fremde Heere, Ost report "Russian Security Agencies", which appears as Appendix I to this report. In addition, a number of reports on local or regional intelligence and espionage operations conducted by military and political Soviet agencies have been located in various German files, some of which appear on the following pages. Several other espionage and counterespionage operations are described in Appendix II, "Russian Security and Counterespionage Operations".

### 19. Intelligence in the Field

On 18 September 1942 the German Abwehr Officer attached to the staff of the 11th Army transmitted a translation of a Rumanian document to headquarters Abwehr III. The document was headed "Intelligence of the Black Sea Coastal Army". A cover-letter stated that it was a study by the Rumanian Intelligence Unit attached to Abwehr and stationed in the Crimea, and that it was based on captured Russian documents and the interrogation of Russian PW's. (Source # 36).

According to this Rumanian document, most of the intelligence and espionage work of this Army was carried out by the "Second (Intelligence) Division" and by the "Political Division" (PURKKA) of the Red Army staff.

"The Second Division aimed at locating and identifying German units in action in the sector of the Coastal Army... Data were obtained through the following channels:

I. Front-line Reconnaissance. Intelligence units were attached to formations of the Coastal Army as follows: One reconnaissance unit of fifteen to seventeen men in each battalion; one reconnaissance unit of fifty three men in each regiment; one reconnaissance unit of 110 to 120 men in each division. These



reconnaissance units carried out reconnaissance missions against the enemy lines, sent agents through the lines to gather information on movements in the rear and also organized small skirmishes for the purpose of obtaining additional data on the strength of the enemy... All information gathered by the reconnaissance units was relayed to the army staff, where it was evaluated. Units and front-line commands were then informed of the enemy situation; in the Caucasus area this information was transmitted twice daily by cipher telegram.

"II. Espionage. The Agent Section of the army staff suffered from lack of experienced personnel; the intelligence division therefore was not able to gain much information through agents."

Whether the lack of personnel qualified for espionage was incidental in this particular Army, or whether it reflected a more general pattern, is a question suggested by the following paragraph indicating the prominent role which the NKVD (presumably later NKGB) played in front-line espionage:

"Espionage on a large scale was conducted by the representative of the NKVD attached to the Coastal Army, Major of State Security, Smirnov, and his staff. At times, special NKVD representatives of the Coastal Army worked under his command, as well as the staff of the Political Division of the Coastal Army. Major Smirnov maintained a network of agents throughout the Crimea, composed mainly of former local party members..."

The activities of the Political Division are mentioned only briefly. However, it appears that many of the activities of this division were also directed by NKVD officials. Sections for propaganda, prisoner interrogation, espionage, and monitoring are listed in addition to the Special Section 00 (Osoboji Otdel), the later Smersh organization for armed forces counterintelligence.

Thus, it may be noted that the Soviet Army organization apparently tended to incorporate into the Army Staffs the espionage and counterintelligence agencies which on the German side were set up as separate Abwehr agencies. In any event, this Soviet system did not preclude the operation in the front-line of other espionage and counterespionage agencies which were interested primarily in political objectives.

## 20. "Besprisorniki"

Various Abwehr documents mention local incidents and observations which may or may not be typical for Russian front-line espionage methods. In November 1942, for instance, the German Armed Forces High Command issued a directive (Source # 1) entitled "Combat of Agents" and providing among others the following details:

"The type and strength of German armed forces offices is a subject of particular interest to the Soviet intelligence service. It may be concluded that thefts from these offices are planned.

"Soviet espionage agents in the guise of deserters are to induce inmates of prisoner of war and deserter camps to escape. Such escaped prisoners are to carry espionage reports back to the Russian intelligence service.



"Agents try to obtain employment with German military offices, and they have often succeeded due to the prevalent blind trust. A former Soviet Air Force Lieutenant was thus able to obtain a position as telephone and radio technician, while another Russian espionage agent was able to make overland trips as a veterinary surgeon."

A particular type of front-line agent said to have been encountered often in the eastern theater is described in a report by "Combat Group Samara" (Source # 13). The rather dramatized account gives the following details:

"Driving along the endless Russian highways or marching along the rough country roads you always meet individuals tramping along with a bundle on their back. They look anything but trustworthy; they say they are on the way to their native village or to visit their parents. These statements can seldom be verified; there are far too many wanderers. Nobody pays attention to these tramps any more, certainly not to the children in their teens, who also people the roads. These children roam about without any supervision; sometimes they tramp alone, sometimes in hordes. The Russians call them 'Besprisorniki'.

"The Red Army has taken considerable numbers of these Besprisorniki into its ranks. Many have attended an espionage school for about six months. They are then employed as contact-man, courier, or spy...

"The boys rarely write down their orders or what they have observed. Reports are transmitted by means of currency bills of different kinds that are marked in an unobtrusive manner and are put together in definite arrangements representing intelligence that is almost impossible to decipher. French playing cards are used for the same purpose, they are marked and stacked according to a certain system. The Besprisorniki are so deft in these techniques that it might be thought they had done nothing else all their short lives...

"A half-grown boy was caught who had been careless enough to make notes on the street where the German combat group was billeted, on how many men were usually in the house, and other details. He could not be forced to name the person from whom he had received his orders. He merely kept telling clumsy lies. At last a pretense was made of sentencing him to death. He had to look on while seven adult prisoners were shot. Then he had to prepare himself to be shot and walk to the place of execution. Just as the squad was about to fire he was suddenly taken away and told by the interrogator that he would not be shot if he would finally come clean. The youth smiled cheekily and said he knew he would be killed even if he did speak up. When the interrogator assured him again that he could only save his life by naming his employer, the boy replied: 'I know very well that I shall be shot even if I do tell the truth. I'll tell you the truth now: I have lied to you six times and I'll do it a seventh!'"

The fact that German agencies also tried to make use of these "Besprisorniki" is indicated by the following communication, which was sent on 8 November 1943 from Abwehr II headquarters to Abwehr Kommando 203 (Source # 6):

"Abwehr Trupp 208 reported on 27 October that in the vicinity of Borissov gangs have recently used explosives camouflaged as coal (Tarnkohle), causing some damage. Can these acts have been committed by the boys assigned to our operation "Kohlenklaus" and possibly turned back by the Soviets?"



## 21. Soviet Espionage in German and German-occupied

Territories

German police records give a fairly comprehensive account of various Soviet and communist activities for espionage and related purposes, which according to the German source were organized by Moscow on German territory prior to the war and subsequently also in German-occupied areas.

RSHA files contain a report of the Chief of the German SD, Heydrich, on Russian espionage and other secret activities prior to the German invasion of Russia. The report was dated 10 June 1941, and submitted to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler. Himmler made a few minor corrections, and transmitted the report on 20 June 1942, top-secret to the German Government (Source # 40). The following excerpts are taken from the copy bearing the pencilled corrections inserted by Himmler.\*

"Since the signing of the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact, the Russian Espionage Service has been operating here in an almost provocative manner... Some time ago the then Russian Ambassador Schwarzev was recalled from Berlin and replaced by Ambassador Dekanosov. This change was the signal for an intensification of espionage in political, economic and military matters. Dekanosov, an intimate of Stalin, was Chief of the Intelligence Division of the NKVD in Russia...

"When Dekanosov left Moscow he had instructions to set up a network of agents who were to gain access to the offices of the German government. The agents were to concentrate on obtaining information on Germany's military potential and operational plans. Dekanosov was faithfully aided by the GPU member and 'Embassy Councillor' (Botschaftsrat) Kobulov, who was highly active in espionage while exploiting his diplomatic privileges.

"The objectives of Russian espionage agents in the Reich were not limited to obtaining military and political intelligence, they aimed as well at the establishment of facilities for secret radio communication. In many parts of Germany communication relays were to be set up for transmission of reports to Russia by a cunningly worked out code system. Large-scale preparations in the field of espionage have been carried out since 1940 at incalculable expense.

"These activities were directed by the Russian councillor and GPU official Kobulov who also guided the Russian military attache in Berlin, Tupikov. The Yugoslav military attache in Berlin, Col. Vauhnik, who cannot be suspected of pro-German feelings, reported that Col. Korniaikov\*\*, aide to Tupikov, was engaged solely in intelligence work and had unlimited funds at his disposal. Activities directed by Kobulev and carried out by Tupikov and Korniaikov, aimed at establishing a chain of secret radio stations in Berlin and all other important cities of the Greater German Reich.

"Intensified pressure of Russian espionage was especially evident in the German territories in the East - primarily in the Polish 'Gouvernement General' and in the Czech 'Protectorate' - special attention was given by the RSHA to these endangered

\* Additional excerpts from the same report appear in the part "Sabotage" (Chapter 42), and in the part "Conspiracy" (Chapter 58).

\*\* The name of this aide to the Soviet military attache is given in the SD report alternately as "Korniaikov" and "Skornjakow".



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territories. It was established that an official of the Russian Consulate-General in Prague, Leonid Mochov, was head of a GPU espionage ring in the Protectorate. Former members of the Czech Legion, who had fought in the German-Polish war on the Polish side, many of them supporters of the former Czecho-Slovak Communist Party, had been taken prisoners of war by Russia after the collapse of Poland. They had then been pressed into the Russian espionage service and had been trained in the operation of underground radio transmitters. These men were given false papers and sent into the Protectorate, where they were employed under the direction of the Russian Consulate official, Mochov, already mentioned. When the round-up was made, well over sixty members of this Russian espionage network were arrested. A dozen secret radio installations were confiscated. This GPU espionage ring worked completely independently of the political underground set up by the Comintern in the Protectorate."

22. The Pakulat Case

In addition to this account of activities of Russian diplomatic representatives, the SD report contains a number of cases taken from German police files, allegedly illustrating methods of the Russian espionage service in Germany for enlisting and deploying agents. In the absence of corroborative material, it was not possible to check the accuracy of these Gestapo case reports.\*

A series of smaller case reports is introduced with the statement that Russian espionage agencies made special use of those German nationals or ethnological Germans who had lived in Poland and the Baltic States, and who in accordance with a Russo-German agreement were moved to the Reich after these territories had been incorporated into the Soviet Union. "German nationals who wished to return to Germany were called to GPU offices and interrogated for hours... A favorite method was to tell those who wanted to return that reprisals would be taken on members of their family remaining behind, if the person contacted did not carry out his mission satisfactorily."

Among the cases presented by the SD to illustrate this technique, the Pakulat case is of special interest, since it appears that this man was enlisted later by the RSHA counterespionage to track down Soviet espionage activities by what German intelligence and police agencies call a "counter-play". The report states:

"Wietold Pakulat, a baker by trade, from Mariampol in Lithuania, was a member of the League for German Culture in Lithuania and had relatives in the Reich, chiefly in Berlin. One day he was summoned to the GPU office at Kaunas. There, he was threatened with prosecution as a spy... The frightened man was then told he would not be punished if he was willing to move to Berlin in the role of a German refugee from Lithuania and to work there for the Soviet Union according to instructions."

\* RSHA documents not included in this report indicate that Amt IV got its first "break" in this series of cases, after it had rented an apartment opposite the Russian Embassy in Berlin. By use of a tele-lens, suspicious visitors to the Soviet offices were photographed and could thus be identified later.



"Pakulat was sent into the Reich, while his wife and child remained as hostages in the hands of the GPU. He was warned that the arm of the GPU was long enough to get him in Berlin if he turned traitor. Despite this threat and disregarding the fact that he had been forced to leave his family in the power of the GPU this man of German race did his duty and contacted the SD. Thus it was possible in the ensuing counter-play to follow the Russian moves...

"In Berlin Pakulat was provided with current instructions and orders by a GPU contact from the Russian Embassy. He was first directed to rent an apartment in Berlin where the GPU installed a large secret transmitter. Then he had to take over a small hotel with a bar, to have rooms available as pied-a-terre for transient Russian agents and couriers. He also received instructions to approach technicians in the armament industry and induce them to pass on classified information...

"In this one case alone, the GPU spent about 100,000 RM. Through Pakulat the Russian Intelligence Service enlisted a German radio operator from the Siemens company to operate the secret transmitter at Pakulat's apartment. This operator was provided by the SD to initiate a radio counter-play. The Russian Intelligence Service believed that Pakulat had organized a network of sixty German agents, extending as far as Koenigsberg, and ready to carry out seditious activities as well as espionage. However, this whole network had been provided by the SD as part of the counter-play."

### 23. The Baumann Case

German Naval files (Source # 1) contain the report on an espionage organization active up to 1943 in German ports and naval bases along the Baltic coast. The report was sent by Abwehr III on 20 July 1943, to the Operations Division, Naval Staff. Headquarters for the operative are given as "Warsaw"; from the document it cannot be ascertained whether Soviet espionage profited directly or indirectly from these espionage activities\*. The German account states:

"An investigation report on an illegal Polish intelligence organization (Nachrichtenorganisation) dated 23 June 1943 has been received from the Danzig Abwehr office. The following excerpt is transmitted for your information:

"On 14 May 1943, Edmund Baumann, born 27 August 1915 at Pr. Stargard (Pomerania), was arrested unobtrusively while on a railroad trip from Danzig to Dirschau. He made a full confession that he had been furnishing the Polish Intelligence Service with military information on the port of Gdynia since the fall of 1942. He had been instructed to concentrate on submitting regular reports on shipping movements at Gdynia. Baumann reported arrivals and sailings of naval units by means of a post card to his headquarters in Warsaw, that is - to a mail drop which has been identified there. The post cards contained greetings from Gdynia; the exact date of arrivals or sailings was indicated by a special ciphering of the date. The signature gave the name of the ship in cipher. Baumann possessed silhouettes ..

\* For a report on a communist-sponsored secret organization operating in the Baltic harbors and engaged mainly in sabotage, see Chapter #2.

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of the German fleet to enable him to identify the warships observed. Through these daily reports the enemy Intelligence Service obtained a complete picture of the shipping traffic in Gdynia harbor. Edmund Baumann was arrested together with five other agents who acted under his supervision. Two of these agents had been called to Gdynia by Baumann. They were employed at the naval arsenal, and furnished information on the armament and equipment of ships under repair. Two others worked at the Schichau naval yard at Danzig and reported on ships which were under repair in the docks. Baumann was thereby able to give further details to Warsaw on events in the shipyards at Gdynia and Danzig."

#### 24. "NKGB Agents"

The Fremde Heere, Ost study "Russian Security Agencies", issued December 1944, (Source # 32) contains an appendix headed "Operations of NKGB Agents - Excerpts from an intelligence report of an allied Axis power". From the contents of the report it would appear that it originated in Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria. The Fremde Heere, Ost study itself gives the impression of having been prepared with great care; not quite the same can be said about this appendix. The opening paragraphs of the report on NKGB operations provide among others the following "General Information":

"NKGB agents are called 'seksots', that is, secret operatives. They are enlisted from various classes of the people, and only the chiefs of divisions and directorates know all the men under their jurisdiction. Newly hired operatives have to sign an affidavit not to reveal any secret; then they are assigned a code number which is registered with the NKGB. Only the most reliable persons are engaged; their past and most especially all their previous activities are carefully investigated."

"Disclosure of official information is punished with a minimum of ten years imprisonment. Top-secret documents are routed by special NKGB courier. NKGB mail is classified 'A' for secret and 'K' for top-secret. Contents of top secret communications are known only to the chiefs of the directorates. Special messages, inquiries and orders are transmitted by radio or telegraph and in code which is known only to the NKGB. Only one officer within each NKGB agency has the key."

"All public and private institutions of the country are supervised by NKGB agencies. For each suspect a case file is kept which follows him to the proper agency if the man moves. This practice is known as preparing of cases (Vorbildung). Such preparatory reports are kept on 2.2 to 3% of all Soviet citizens; for the Red Army the percentage is considerably higher. Other government authorities know nothing of this practice."

The document gives a more detailed account of the working methods of agents of three NKGB directorates, described as "the most important ones". For the NKGB "First Directorate: Foreign Countries", commonly known under its abbreviation "INU" the report lists "foreign espionage" as the main activity and gives the following details:

"The NKGB carries out espionage in foreign countries through the various Soviet representations abroad, such as the diplomatic representations, trade commissions, and similar offices."

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"The espionage activities are directed by an NKVD representative who may hold office as vice-consul, deputy director of a trade commission, etc. In addition, resident agents are interspersed in the trade commissions whose task it is to establish outside contacts. These resident agents are not members of the NKGB; in most cases they are selected from the ranks of communists previously active in the respective country. They operate under the supervision of the NKGB representatives and are assigned to keep contact with local agents and to make recommendations concerning new agents to be enlisted. The following groups are of special interest:

(1) Emigres of Czarist Russia; regardless of the time when they left Russia and their political beliefs; (2) refugees who left the Soviet Union for reasons of nationalist activity or political affiliations; for example Ukrainians, Darshnaks, members of the Caucasian mountain tribes, etc; (3) political emigres such as Trotskyites, etc.

"Since the dissolution of the Comintern, communist organizations in all countries have continued their activities, working underground. The political delegates, legations and trade commissions of the U.S.S.R. abroad are important links. Experienced Soviet agents as well as the NKGB representatives are employed there, sometimes in only minor positions.

"Soviet agents usually appear in foreign countries in the role of political emigres or deserters. At the beginning they severely criticize the Soviet government and the Bolsheviks and may write anti-Soviet articles for foreign newspapers. Only after some years during which nothing was undertaken in connection with their assignment do they begin their secret activities. Having established their reputation as irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet system, they are trusted everywhere; often they have even become citizens of the country in which they reside... Huge sums of money are spent on foreign espionage. The money is appropriated to the NKGB from the budgets of the various trade commissions which are subordinate to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

"In many instances several intelligence agents or collaborators are assigned to gather information on a specific subject. This procedure is designed to expedite the compilation of data as well as to permit a check on the accuracy. In addition, special NKGB supervisors are active abroad who check on the activities of local espionage agents as well as on the accuracy of information supplied by them.

"Almost all information supplied must be substantiated by evidence. For instance, a report dealing with the arrival of new military units opposite the Soviet border must be documented by written evidence such as an envelope bearing the unit's stamp.

"Most diplomatic couriers of the U.S.S.R. are NKGB members; they act as liaison between the foreign agents."

The following section of the report deals with the "Second Directorate - Secret Political", commonly referred to as "SPU". Its primary function is described as detection of counterrevolutionary movements; and the activities of its agents are described as follows:

"The SPU seksets are charged with the surveillance of suspects. Reports from these agents are added to the 'preparatory file' of the individual case. Once the SPU agent has been enlisted he is prohibited from revisiting the directorate offices, so that his membership in the NKGB will be kept secret. He forwards all his reports via an authorized agent; these reports are usually made in writing and signed with the code number. The authorized agents usually have two or three apartments in various parts of the city; in many instances they also have hotel rooms at their disposal.



"The SPU secret operatives frequently assume the roles of chimney sweeps, electricians, plumbers, etc. to gain easy access to the home of the individual under surveillance. For this purpose they are occasionally furnished with a professional license made out in a fictitious name.

"At times an SPU seksot is recruited from the ranks of reactionary or terrorist groups in order to discover the activities and organization of a counterrevolutionary movement about which no further information is available. After such a person has revealed the desired information he is arrested with the other members of the organization. However, after a while he is set free again and may be transferred to another place to continue his activities. Several terrorist organizations have been broken up in this manner.

"Under the law, the NKGB may arrest persons only by permission of the Procurator (Russian: Sledovatel - judge assigned to investigations), although in urgent cases this permission is requested 'ex post facto'. Should the Procurator fail to authorize the arrest, the individual concerned can nevertheless be taken into custody surreptitiously; the seksot may, for instance, get into a fight with the suspect; both men are arrested and the NKGB operative is released shortly afterwards."

The final part of this report gives an account of the operations of NKGB counterespionage agents of the "Third Directorate" (KRU). Excerpts from this part are given in the next section, Chapter 30.

### Section C: COUNTERESPIONAGE

German and Russian armed forces had their special counterintelligence agencies in Abwehr III and "Smersh" respectively. In the case of Abwehr III it is known, and for Smersh it is assumed, that the agencies did not limit themselves to combatting agents who had penetrated into the ranks of their own armed forces, but that they also carried out active counterespionage operations on enemy territory. Furthermore it is believed that Germany through the RSHA Amt IV and VI, and Russia through the NKGB, carried out political "supervision" of their own agents, units and agencies abroad, in addition to active counterespionage.

The material available on these organizations and on their practices is mainly circumstantial, and thus only few reports on actual counterespionage operations appear on the following pages.

#### 25. Front-line Counterintelligence Report

Early in 1943 the Abwehr III section of "Befehlsstab Walli" issued a counterintelligence report on "Mobile Warfare and Intelligence" (Source # 11). The report was intended to analyze the front-line intelligence situation from the German as well as the Russian point of view, and showed the close interrelation between German and Russian espionage and counterespionage activities:

"The Soviet Intelligence Service profits to a certain extent from the adjustments necessary in our front-line, while our III-F activities carried out by the Abwehr units are hampered by these movements. The following specific information is available concerning the influence of mobile warfare upon the intelligence situation:-



"1. Following a German withdrawal the Soviet Intelligence Service can contact its resident agents left behind when the Russians had retreated earlier. By thorough questioning they can get a much better picture from the observations of these resident agents than they would have gained from transmitted reports.

"2. The Soviet Intelligence Service can contact other agents who had been instructed to await the return of the Red Army to the area into which they had been sent. According to statements made by agents, such instructions have been issued on an even larger scale during the last few months and apply mainly to areas affected by mobile warfare.

"3. The Soviet Intelligence Service gets hold of most of the people who worked in German offices or served the Germans in some other capacity, such as chiefs and members of auxiliary police units, and employees from armed forces offices. All such persons are arrested by the NKVD - as confirmed by numerous agent statements. - They are given an opportunity to 'rehabilitate' themselves by carrying out agent-missions. The longer a Russian has worked in a German office, the more he knows about the personnel and state of affairs, and the more valuable he is to the Soviet Intelligence. His previous experience also makes it easier for him to carry out Intelligence missions more efficiently... Increased assignment of 'rehabilitation-agents' must be anticipated.

"4. Our counterintelligence will be confronted with persons who now feel it advisable to start some work for the Soviets. 'Residents' and other agents have often lived for months behind the German lines without operating and now command extensive intelligence knowledge. They also have connections with the local population, and in many cases with German troops. They will have little trouble in carrying out old or new Intelligence Service assignments.

"5. The civilian population will naturally be more inclined now to support the Soviet Intelligence Service, at least indirectly. The sheltering and feeding of agents, as well as the passing on of information to them will become more common. The same applies to partisan warfare, since the population in areas affected by the partisans vacillates between aiding or passively resisting the German troops...

"By reason of these facts and considerations, the over-all counterintelligence picture in the eastern operational area is at present as follows:-

- (a) The enemy Intelligence Service is becoming more active;
- (b) the enemy Intelligence Service has at its disposal more experienced and more willing workers;
- (c) the enemy Intelligence Service can count on stronger direct and indirect support from the civilian population;
- (d) the German Intelligence units will therefore encounter more serious problems and greater difficulties than previously;
- (e) with the enemy Intelligence in a stronger position, German Intelligence must anticipate a change in the attitude of the civilian population which will be detrimental to our work."



26. "Turning-Back" Tactics - The Puchov Case

A method commonly employed by German as well as Russian counter-intelligence was the "turning-back" of agents. This technique is illustrated by the German file on a Russian Lieutenant, identified as "V-man Leonid Puchov, cover-name Leonid Petrov." The document shows that Puchov was first enlisted by German Abwehr offices at Riga. He was sent to the agent training camp at Friedaine and then assigned to a sabotage mission on Soviet territory. The German files do not clarify whether at that time Puchov was already acting under Russian orders; the case-history covers events only from the time Puchov was dropped by parachute behind the Russian lines. It contains his statement with regard to the manner in which he was interrogated and enlisted by the NKVD which channeled him back into German territory. The file also gives the report of a German woman counterespionage agent assigned to check on this statement by Puchov, and finally presents the conclusions drawn by German counterespionage.

These documents, although very detailed, are often vague and at times confusing. Yet with all their contradictions they picture the atmosphere of German and Russian counterespionage operations and demonstrate the complexities of the "turning-back" technique. If and when Puchov lied, he was nevertheless obliged in these interrogations to back up his lies with concrete facts.

The Puchov case-history (Source # 5) opens with the statements made by Puchov early in October 1943 immediately after he had been detained by counterintelligence Abwehr Trupp 311 in a camp near Pskov. This statement recounts the mishaps which Puchov allegedly encountered when he was flown on a sabotage mission from the German airfield at Pleskau on 21 August 1943 across the Russian lines and dropped in Soviet territory. He claims that he strained his knee, and that the agent Bruchanov, who was dropped with him, broke his leg. After two days both men arrived at Sonki village - Bruchanov had been carried there, - and were billeted by the president of the village council. Puchov then reported (in excerpts):

"That night while we were in bed, a group of people came in, among them the Secretary of the local Party Committee, who demanded to see my papers. As he was looking at the documents he said: 'We know all about this. You will stay here until the morning'.

"Next morning more officials of the NKVD came and asked us for our gear, explosives and thermite. I replied that we had nothing, but was told not to talk rubbish, and that we were parachutists sent by the Germans. I replied 'Yes'. Then I was forced to tell them where the parachutes and my explosives were...

"We were taken away in a car to an NKVD Militia Office. There a militia man with a telegram in his hand asked for our names. I answered that I was 'Petrov', and the other was Bruchanov. He said: 'Correct'. I got the impression that they already knew all about us and had been expecting us.

"We then went on to Ostashkov where the NKVD officials had us sent to a hospital. We were treated there like everyone else, and on 5 September I was released and taken back to Ostashkov. The same evening I was called to be interrogated by an NKVD Lieutenant. First I was asked what training center I came from. My reply: 'Friedaine'. How many had been dropped? My reply: 'Two men'. Next question: 'Where are the others?' I replied I knew of no others...

"Thereupon he brought out the report of the interrogation of Anatoli and read me the names of members of Friedaine groups and I then told him the names I knew.



"He wanted to know the people who work in German Intelligence. I could not answer this, for I really did not know the individual names. Next he wanted to know the exact location of the Intelligence Staff. I said in Riga, but I did not know the street and number. Now my questioner got angry and said what a poor spy I was, flying back home without being able to answer even such elementary questions. I replied that at that time I had not wanted to know anything. I had only wanted to get back home.

"He said: 'Home? Is this your home when you made up your mind to wreck our railroads; this is not your home'... At the end of the interrogation I was charged with having turned traitor to my country and I was taken back to the hut.

"On 6 September I was taken to another house, where a Lt. Colonel, a Major and a Captain were sitting. They opened the conversation with the question why I had broken my soldier's oath and turned traitor. I replied that I had broken my oath but had not betrayed my country. I said it had been the only way to get back home, but I had never intended to do anything... They replied that this was all very fine and that they knew about my parents and had complete records of my case. They merely wanted to know whether I wished to remain a traitor to the bitter end or would help them to defend our native land. I replied that I wished to fight for my country. Then I was asked how I thought I was going to do that. I said that I must of course atone for my guilt by a sacrifice at the Front. I was then asked what I should say if I were to be sent back to Germany. I said that I could not do this at present. They answered that this meant I was to end as a traitor and my family, too...

"During 8 September I was again interrogated by the three officers. I now agreed to cooperate. I was photographed and the requisite data were noted. After a few days I received my orders. My task was to gain access to the staff of the German counterespionage to find out how many persons were working there, their names, and exact location of the offices. Also, I was to get back to the school at Friedaine. There I was to approach those willing to collaborate and to inform them that saboteurs sent from Germany to Soviet Russia were not shot if they reported...

"On 27 September I was called for. We returned to Ostashkov and I was provided with fake papers. When we reached the front I was sent out on the evening of 5 October with a reconnaissance unit from the 46th Brigade. The night was unfavorable, we went through a swamp, made a detour round our own defenses and returned. I was sent out a second time on the evening of 8 October. This time I went with seven specially selected Party members instead of a military reconnaissance unit. I crossed to the German lines on the morning of 9 October."

The Puchov case-file does not give any information on the manner in which he approached the German Abwehr agency or was apprehended after he had crossed the lines. However, the documents show that he was detained almost at once by counterintelligence Abwehr Trupp 311 of Abwehr Kommando 204. Events which followed are described by a presumably Russian-born woman counterespionage agent, described in one document as "Nina Wichrewa, who calls herself 'Lydia' and lives with the Specialist". A statement which "Lydia" dictated on 13 October 1943 to this Specialist Riech in charge of the investigation, reads in part as follows:

"On Sunday, 10 October 1943 the Specialist with whom I was already acquainted, called for me in a car at my home and took me to Loknja, where I was introduced to a certain Lt. Petrov. The Specialist had told me that this Lieutenant had just returned from the Soviet lines where he had been on a mission for Germany. I was to pump Petrov to see whether he had been 'turned back'.

"The Specialist told Petrov in my presence that I had been a Soviet partisan. During the evening I told Petrov that at one



time I had been enlisted in my village by the partisans as a nurse.

"I told him that I had been trained as an agent over there and that counterintelligence had sent me through the front lines on a mission with a partisan division. He was surprised that the Germans had not shot me. I told him that I had always called myself a partisan and that they did not shoot all partisans. He believed me then; the drinks he had, helped. When he wanted to know what my Russian reconnaissance mission was, I told him I was afraid that he might be spying on me. I said I did not know his mission and his cover-name, and that I was not at all curious about them. He then said that he had been assigned by the KRO. Then we went to bed...

"About midday on 12.10 I told him my cover-name was 'Wychrova'. He did not believe this. However, I convinced him and said that my real name was 'Nesterova'. Then he wrote his cover-name on a small piece of paper and gave it to me: 'Puchov, Leonid Las-arevitsh Rishski'. (I have given this to Abwehrkommando 204.) He said that if I succeeded in getting across to the Soviet lines earlier than he, I was to tell them that I had seen Rishski safe and sound in Loknja and that he was on his way to Riga."

On the day when "Lydia" dictated this report to Specialist Riech, Puchov himself wrote down a statement on the same events as covered by Lydia. He stated in part:

"Upon my return I slept alone the first night. Next morning I was taken by the Specialist into a communal room. That evening a girl was brought to me. The Specialist gave us schnaps and we drank. I told the girl that I was a prisoner of war and had been caught only a short time before and was naturally on the Soviet side.

"I do not know whether she believed me or not. We were brought more schnaps next evening. We drank and made friends. Then she confessed that her name was not 'Lida' but Nina Vichreva and that she had been sent across Lake Ilmen by Counterespionage of the 27th Army...

"Lida often referred to a mission, and remarked that she was afraid of the Bolsheviks because she had not carried out this assignment. On account of her relatives she does not want to undertake anything, also she does not wish to leave her child to fend for itself. If I could spend more time with her I should of course find out her full assignment. But time is short; she has not yet told me everything that is worrying her. I believe that Lida is a Bolshevik who has lost her way in the Jewish abyss. - Petrov."

The conclusions drawn by the Abwehr office from comparing these statements by "Lydia" and "Petrov" are recorded in the following report which Specialist Riech sent on 14 October 1943 to Abwehr Kommando 204. The report is headed: "Subject: Lt. Puchov, turned-back V-man." It states:

"Findings of the investigation: Petrov was introduced by Specialist Riech to the V-woman Lydia. He was told that Lydia was a former partisan, who had recently been assigned to housework for the Specialist, but that she could not be trusted.

"Lydia reported on the first day to Specialist Riech that she could see through Petrov's game. To influence Petrov further in her favor, he was then told to be careful with her.

"Petrov told Lydia his cover-name and gave her a message for the Soviet side. If he had thought to get something out of Lydia in this way, he would have mentioned the fact in his report. Instead, he tried to give the impression that he himself is reliably



pro-German, and on the other hand he tried to make Lydia appear fairly harmless.

"It is assumed that Petrov was under orders to learn more about the German intelligence organization, and to transmit this information via the secret transmitter in Riga. (signed) Riech, Specialist."

Since Riga was German occupied at the time of this report and the Germans knew of this transmitter, it may be assumed that the Russian transmitter was operated by III-F as radio "counter-play".

The Puchov case-file does not contain any document indicating what happened after Abwehr Trupp 311 had forwarded the above report.

## 27. Radio Counterespionage

The Puchov report mentions a secret Soviet transmitter apparently known to German agencies. Abwehr III and RSHA, Amt IV, files contain numerous references to such enemy intelligence transmitters which were not only known to but operated by German counterespionage. It may be noted that in many fields of intelligence work Germany obtained better than average results by use of radio facilities.\*

Counterintelligence radio operations aimed at cutting in on the enemy radio circuit. In German espionage parlance these operations became known as "radio counter-play". No transcript of such a German "radio counter-play" has been available for this report. However, problems encountered in these practices are illustrated by the "Report on radio traffic with Operation Dschungel" (Source # 5).

Operation Dschungel was not started as a German counterespionage mission, but as a long-distance sabotage (F/S) and seditious operation.\*\* The mission was composed of twelve Russian nationals, who set out by plane from Kirkenes on 5 June 1943 and were dropped over their assigned area in Arctic Russia, 2,500 km from their base at Riga. To keep in touch, the mission had been equipped with a radio transmitter-receiver with pedal operated generating unit. The radio traffic which subsequently developed gave rise to the suspicion that Soviet agents might have started a "counter-play". Therefore, the traffic was analyzed by Abwehr radio counterespionage experts. Their report, transmitted on 20 October 1943 and signed by a Lt. Col. Rasehorn, presented the following findings, given in excerpt:

"The radio operator of the party had formerly served as operator in the Soviet Army. He was the best of a group of about twenty men trained by Ast Ostland in 1942. During training he showed great interest in radio. Politically he also gave the impression that he would do his utmost during the coming assignment as contribution to the struggle for a new Europe, to use his own words... At the beginning of the operation the operator received and transmitted at speeds of 100 to 120 characters. It was noted that he had a habit of often making too many dits to the figures 4, 5 and 6 without being aware of it.

\* See, for instance "German Operational Intelligence" issued by MID 1946 and the ONI report on "German Naval Intelligence".

\*\* The assignment of operation "Dschungel" is described in greater detail in chapter 49.



"In order to ascertain at any time whether traffic was genuine, it was arranged that during each traffic run a query about the time should be made (QTR?). In normal cases this query was to be answered differently from the usual procedure by making QTR RRR OK. However, if the operator should be working under pressure the query was to be answered in the routine fashion by giving the correct time. The group leader of the party was told of this arrangement.

"Before setting out the group leader asked for a week's time to get settled in the area and guard against surprise attacks. However, the radio station did not report within a week. Although it left Kirkenes on 5 June 1943, it was not heard until 22 June 1943 at 2200 by Radio Station 'Sperber' (Abw. Kdo. III, Pleskau). Real contact was not established until 0600 on 24 June 1943, when a message from 'Dschungel' was received by 'Richard' (Riga). From this first message on, the 'Dschungel' operator did not carry out interrupted traffic as had been ordered and practised during training, but communicated by alternate two-way traffic with long pauses. The tendency of the radio operator to make extra dits in the figures 4, 5, and 6, could still be noted at the start of the two-way traffic to the same extent as during his training.

"After 20 July 1943 an obvious change occurred in the traffic. The two-way traffic carried on contrary to orders now changed to interrupted traffic. Generally speaking, traffic began to be handled by 'Dschungel' with more energy and self-assurance. The peculiarities in making the figures 4, 5, and 6 were exaggerated and appeared more often.

"It had been agreed that initially 'Dschungel' and Ast Ostland were to try to contact each other daily at several definite times on the frequencies fixed. After contact had thus been established, all messages were to be exchanged during one traffic routine, fixed for a different time each day. During the first few days of the actual operation all frequencies could be heard clearly at all times fixed. 'Dschungel' then disregarded the order for handling all traffic in one routine from that time on; instead he transmitted daily at the three different times all through July.

"According to the plan for Operation 'Dschungel', the mission, or at least its radio station, was to move continually in order to reduce to a minimum the danger of the Russians getting a fix on it. In order to ascertain whether the operator was following these instructions, radio station 'Richard' made the following experiment:

"When 'Dschungel' was heard clearly on frequency No. 2 at 1630 on 30.9.1943, 'Richard' said that he could not read the messages on account of interference and told 'Dschungel' to go over to frequency No. 4 on his transmitter. 'Dschungel' replied that he was changing immediately to frequency No. 4. As frequency No. 4 was a night frequency and therefore could not be heard during the day, it was not possible to tell whether the 'Dschungel' operator did actually send on this frequency. But the fact that the 'Dschungel' operator immediately went over to the different frequency requested by 'Richard', i.e., without arranging a waiting period to permit him to erect a new antenna, shows fairly conclusively that 'Dschungel's' operator had permanently erected several, if not all five antennas with which he had been equipped...

"The check question (QTR?) for use in the 'Dschungel' traffic to guard against any Russian radio 'counter-play' has been asked repeatedly by 'Richard'. 'Dschungel' answers all QTR-questions with 'QTR RRR OK'. Of course, it is possible that this check has been revealed by the radio operator or by the group leader, who was also initiated, if there has been treachery. It is also possible that the enemy intercept service noticed that the QTR query



was not answered in the routine manner and if carrying on decoy traffic, has been very carefully copying this...

"The fact that the operator used the slower and clumsier simplex method gives rise to the assumption that during the first few days the 'Dschungel' operator was working under supervision, and that this type of traffic was chosen for reasons of security, since during the breaks instructions could be given, questions asked on the character of the traffic and, not least important, the operator could be supervised more closely on account of the slower procedure. The especially long breaks, which as 'Richard' noticed, at first often lasted a minute, suggest that the operator was either working under supervision or that he was being forced to train another operator under enemy supervision. The observation that after 20 July 1943 the originally two-way traffic changed to interrupted traffic also leads to this assumption...

"All during July 1943 the 'Dschungel' operator reported three times a day at all the provisionally established routines instead of only once a day... It must be remembered that when operating, a V-man will limit traffic to the most essential routines, if only for his own protection and to avoid the danger of having a fix taken on his gear...

"After a thorough and prolonged check of the observations made by 'Richard', it appears that the question whether the radio traffic with Operation 'Dschungel' is enemy radio 'counter-play' must be answered with the statement that the traffic is more likely to be decoy than genuine."

## 28. Manipulation and Identification of Documents

As shown by interrogation reports, German as well as Russian counterintelligence agents paid special attention to the "legend" and to the identification papers of any suspect. The "legend" was the cover-story with which each side provided its men. German and Russian espionage agencies were equally active in inventing and breaking down such "legends"; the evaluation, however, often left room for speculation and doubt. Documents, on the other hand, could serve as more positive proof. Once manipulation of the document was detected, no matter how slight, counterintelligence could be almost certain of its case. It is therefore obvious that both sides paid a great deal of attention to identification papers. Available files contain German as well as an allegedly Russian account of these efforts, providing at least a sidelight on counterintelligence activities.

As may be remembered, the section I G (One G) in Ausland/Abwehr was responsible for the handling of documents, secret inks, and other technical assistance to all Abwehr branches and commands. Within Abwehr I G, section "6" handled passports and other documents. Activities of this section are illustrated by a report which Abwehr I G forwarded to "Kurfuerst" on 1 April 1943. The document (Source # 2) has the pencilled notation "From Dr. Guenther" and states in part:

"The need for Russian identification papers of every kind has constantly increased in the course of the eastern campaign. Military papers are required, such as pay-books, service records, ID-cards, travel orders, and corroborative evidence; also civilian papers such as internal passports, employment cards, party membership books, evacuation forms and similar documents. The following figures give some idea of the scale on which work has been done:



"Since the beginning of the eastern campaign almost 400,000 papers of every possible type have gone out from Abw I G 6, exclusive of the identification papers required by the advance headquarters. Exact instructions were given to the V-men on use of these identification papers and their specific meaning. Thus a considerable percentage of the agents was able to work successfully in different areas of the Soviet Union, obtaining valuable intelligence. Here are a few examples:

"An agent was supplied with the identification papers of a lieutenant of a Soviet Field Unit under orders to attend a course at the Air Force School in a town on the Volga. When the agent reached his destination he reported to the Air Force School and after showing his papers was accepted for the next course without hesitation. The agent succeeded in playing his part successfully for several months. When the Russian counterintelligence detected him, he eluded capture by escaping to the German lines.

"Another agent was equipped with papers identifying him as a member of the Red Army Institute of Scientific Research in Communications. He was supposedly under orders to proceed on official duty to a large town in the hinterland. By means of the papers and travel orders with which he had been provided, he succeeded in making a train journey lasting several days and passed all controls. The agent was able to maintain his military role for several weeks until he considered it advisable to discard his uniform. As he had no civilian papers with him, he sent a request by radio for civilian identification papers. This request was met, the papers being transmitted by another agent. With these new papers the agent succeeded in obtaining an official position. He is still working successfully..."

The same German document contains an "Index of U.S.S.R. blank forms at present available at Abwehr I G". The index lists over 130 forms, among them such papers as:

U.S.S.R. Armed Forces ID-Cards; Unfit-for-military-duty Certificate (grey); Ukrainian Passport with or without number and series; Travel Order; Group Travel Order for Red Army Men; Travel Requisition for the Armed Forces (white); Officer's Identification (grey, burgundy, pink, orange, with water marks); Certificate of Decoration (war issue); Party Membership Book; Certificate for Surrendered Passport (Caucasian area); Transfer Certificate for Communist Party Functionaries; ID-Card for Partisans (silk), etc.

In spite of this collection of genuine Russian documents and of advanced methods, I G does not appear to have been able at all times to evade the scrutiny of Russian counterintelligence agents. Methods by which the Soviets were able to detect manipulation of documents are listed in an alleged Russian memorandum, a photostat of which was contained in German files together with a German translation. (Source # 35). The Russian document is dated July 1943, addressed to the "Operational Officers of the Counterespionage Division 'Smersh' of the 46th Army" and signed Col. Andrianov, Chief of the Counterespionage Division "Smersh" of the 46th Army, countersigned Capt. Gajevski, Chief of the 4th Section of the same organization. It states in part:

"Pay attention to rubber stamp impressions and seals on documents. For the sake of simplicity, the Germans often use the same forged stamp for various documents, merely changing the official number on the stamp. When the stamp is cut, they leave a blank space into which the various numbers can be inserted later. Such manipulations can often be detected by differences in the ink impression or incorrect arrangement. In some instances German agencies provide their agents with papers, on which the number in the stamp or seal is left blank so that the agent himself can later insert the specific number required for accurate papers on his mission. Stamp impressions and seals are often affixed so that the numbers are illegible.



"Watch the staples. The Germans use chromium plated wire for stapling which leaves no trace of rust on the stapled pages.

"Attention should be paid to the way in which the stamp impression shows up. At times the German impressions are very clear; every letter of the stamp and every crease in the page shows up clearly in pale lilac ink, especially on forged Red Army ID-Cards. The letters of the impression stand out sharp and round, some even flattened out sideways instead of having the fainter oval forms of our impressions.

"If anything suspicious is detected in one document, all other available documents must be re-examined immediately. In conjunction with other evidence the following factors give a secondary indication of German forgery: The paper on which the identification photo is printed may differ from the paper on which photos are printed in the U.S.S.R. The new cover of a document may be at variance with the date of issue. There may be signs that the photo of another person has been touched up to make it tally with the new bearer. Also, pages from genuine identification papers may have been inserted in forged documents."

The following section of the document deals with specific forgeries and shows the extent to which minute details were scrutinized by Russian counterintelligence. The paragraphs describing German forgeries of Communist party membership books provide the following details:

"German espionage agencies have issued two editions of forged party membership books. In the first edition the lines forming the upper section of the frame on the pages for entering the membership contribution amounts are heavily underscored. No such underscoring is given in the genuine books. The loop over the letter 'I' in the word 'Chlenski' (membership) is given as two dots... The forgery is most apparent from the disparity between the serial number of the party book and the years shown for contribution payments. In the genuine party books up to number 3,800,000, contribution years are given in print for the period from 1935 to 1943. In cards above No. 3,800,000 an empty space is left for the specific date of the contribution to be inserted in writing. Several party books have been found which show a serial number below 3,800,000, but give an empty space for the contribution year; thus they are obviously forged. In various forged membership books the signature of the holder is in ordinary ink, but it should be signed with the same black ink used for the remaining text. In genuine books the stamp imprints are always black, whereas in forgeries they are sometimes violet.

"The second edition of forged party membership books has been made with much greater care. The forgery, however, can be detected by a hyphen between the months 'June' and 'July' in the line provided for the signature of the party secretary..."

Added to the description of forged documents is a section headed "Faulty equipment of German agents dropped behind our lines in the uniform of Red Army officers of minor or medium grade". Among others, the following details are provided:

"Shoulder tabs are sewn on down to the sleeve; on genuine uniforms they hang down from the collar just touching the sleeve. Collars on service coats can be removed; this cannot be done on genuine coats. Coat buttons have a flat back, whereas ours are usually concave... The shirts have side slits on their tails, and the buttons on shirts and underpants are covered with material. Shirts with side slits, and underwear with buttons of the type described have not been issued to our officers.



29. Soviet Security and Counterintelligence in the Field

The organization of Soviet Counterespionage agencies is described in detail in Appendix II to this report. The manner in which these organizations carried out their activities in the rear of the front is documented by an alleged Soviet top-level directive contained in German translation in Fremde Heere, Ost documents (Source # 33). The directive is dated 23 May 1942, number 214, top-secret, and signed "Beria". No originating office is given, but Beria is assumed at that time to have been the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (NKVD). The directive reads as follows:

"Recently the number of enemy agents has increased. They are assigned singly or in groups and equipped with radio. These agents are selected from Red Army prisoners or the population of occupied areas, and they are dropped in our rear areas for sabotage or espionage missions.

"Some of the enemy agents have reported voluntarily to the NKVD; most of the others have been arrested through the cooperation of the civilian population, and of the Liquidation Units (Vernichtungseinheiten) of the Red Army, in consequence of special measures adopted by the NKVD.

"In order to stimulate popular interest in the fight against enemy agents and to show the population that traitors who do not report voluntarily, and who are arrested with their help, do not go unpunished, I order herewith:

"1. Any parachutist arrested by NKVD agencies is to be interrogated according to NKVD service instructions. The following points are to be ascertained: Details and names of enemy agents already assigned or under training for a mission; instructors of espionage schools responsible for training parachute agents. Efficient assistants from the NKVD Counterintelligence Section KRO are to be sent to the place of interrogation; persons arrested are to be taken to NKVD buildings in exceptional cases only.

"2. Interrogation results are to be checked and reported to the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., together with a request for sanction to shoot the prisoner.

"3. After such permission has been given by a telegram which must be signed by me or my deputy, the prisoner will be shot in the presence of the inhabitants of the place where he was arrested. The inhabitants are to be informed of the reasons for the shooting.

"4. After the execution a certificate is to be made out and forwarded to the First Special Division of the NKVD, U.S.S.R.

"5. Agents who surrender voluntarily are to be kept under arrest until special instructions have been received from the NKVD, U.S.S.R.

"6. Captured parachutists, especially radio operators, are to be used for counter-plays only after special permission has been given by the NKVD, U.S.S.R.

"7. The relatives of captured parachutist agents are to be arrested. In accordance with the decree of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., dated December 10, 1940, No. 001,552, they are to be sentenced by the Special Commission of the NKVD to five years banishment. Therefore the number of relatives must be ascertained during interrogation. Details are to be forwarded to the appropriate NKVD office, so that the arrests can be made. A copy of such reports is to be sent to the First Special Division of the NKVD, U.S.S.R.

"8. The carrying out of this decree will be supervised by



Comrade Merkulov, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs in the U.S.S.R."

Precautions taken by NKVD (and later "Smersh") agents in the field against German agents are documented further by the following alleged order of the Chief, Special Division 00, NKVD of the 19th Army, Col. Korolev, issued 3 August 1941, and contained in translation in Fremde Heere, Ost files (Source # 33). This order was directed "To all chiefs of the 00 Special Division, NKVD, of the Corps and Divisions of the Red Army". It stated in part:

"All Chiefs of the NKVD 00 Special Division of the army corps and divisions are personally responsible that measures are taken immediately for minute checking and cleansing of all army staffs from persons who have returned from German occupied or encircled areas. The same applies to rumor-mongers and to persons who have joined the ranks under doubtful circumstances.

"Any officer, political functionary, or Red Army soldier who returns singly or as member of a group from German captivity or from an encircled area, is to be arrested and carefully scrutinized. Only after the check has been completed may it be decided whether the subject will remain with his corps, division or regiment. Simultaneously, a careful counter-check by our agent service is to be arranged.

"All counterrevolutionary elements are to be placed under observation on the basis of reports already received or which may be received from our agents and from official sources. The 'Placing under Supervision' of any subject starts with the filing of an 'Preparatory Report' which is to include:

- (a) The personal history of the subject;
- (b) a summary of all information available, including excerpts from the interrogation transcript;
- (c) a character evaluation by the agency processing the subject;
- (d) the executive measures proposed by the agency with regard to the subject;
- (e) in the case of any person returning from German encirclement, a description of his experiences while in the encircled area and on his way back;
- (f) in a special paragraph, an account of how the subject has conducted himself in battle.

"Our net of agents and informers is to be checked at once; all ballast and dubious elements have to be eliminated. New agents are to be recruited for the investigation of enemy espionage operations and agencies.

"All members of the Red Army officers corps, as well as all political functionaries and men of the Red Army who had been drafted from the western area of White Russia, or from the Ukraine, Bessarabia or the Baltic provinces are to be screened by our agent service.

"All information concerning members of the Armed Forces who are under surveillance due to a suspicion of espionage must be forwarded by special messenger.

"On or before 10 August the Special Division 00, NKVD, of the Army is to be furnished with Investigation Reports on all persons at present under investigation, to facilitate their central registration in a master file and to permit the issuing of directives concerning the processing of counterrevolutionary elements.



"I invite the attention of all Chiefs to the fact that if the measures are inadequate which are taken in execution of the directives issued by the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs and Commissar General for the Security of the State, General Beria, all persons responsible will be subject to severe disciplinary action."

### 30. Soviet Counterespionage at Home and Abroad

The report on "Operations of NKGB agents" given as appendix to the Fremde Heere, Ost study on "Russian Security Agencies" (Source # 32), which has already been quoted in Chapter 24 deals in its final section with the operations of the NKGB "Third Directorate - Counterintelligence". This directorate, commonly referred to as KRU, is assumed to represent the main Soviet agency for all counterespionage.\*

In its section on KRU the report "Operations of NKGB agents" gives at first an account of counterintelligence activities among foreign representations and missions in the U.S.S.R.; it then describes the training of KRU agents and counterespionage activities of a broader scope on Russian territory as well as abroad. The following details are provided:

"A large network of agents has been established among foreigners who are in any way connected with their diplomatic missions. A network of agents has been established among persons employed by foreign missions. Agents are used who have connections with employees of legations, consulates and commercial agencies. Foreigners or Soviet citizens are employed as special agents, who attempt to make direct contact with foreign missions by using cover-stories; these stories are worked out by the Second Special Section (SO-2) of the NKGB. All foreign legations, consulates and commercial representations are permanently watched; so are the persons visiting foreign offices. This surveillance is carried out by the Third Special Section (SO-3) of the NKGB.

"All persons employed in foreign agencies are screened to determine their connections abroad (likewise carried out by SO-3).

"Monitoring devices are used in the foreign offices, and all telephone conversations are intercepted. (Carried out by SO-2). Censorship of incoming and outgoing mail of foreign agencies and decoding of their cipher messages is carried out by the Fourth Special Section. (SO-4)

"Transport of NKGB agents across the Soviet frontier and their employment abroad is often arranged by devious means with the assistance of foreign missions. The KRU seksots also play an important role in the combat of foreign espionage.

"The various NKGB SO's pay special attention to foreign diplomats, commercial representatives, military attaches, tourists and personnel of special missions. The walls of restaurants and hotels

\* Counterintelligence in the armed forces was originally the function of the NKVD "OO" Section. In the course of the war this Section "OO" was transformed into the Armed Forces Counterintelligence organization "Smersh". Recent reports from Russia claim that Smersh meanwhile has been shifted to the NKGB; thus, it may now form part of KRU.



frequented by foreigners often contain microphones. Military and Naval attaches are placed under particularly close surveillance; if they move to another city within the Soviet Union, the local NKGB agency will assign a new man to cover their movements.

"KRU seksots undergo a training period lasting from three to four years. Half this time they spend in learning a trade in a factory, with the railroad, etc., so that they can work well disguised; the other half is spent in intelligence and counterintelligence training. During this training the seksots may join enemy espionage organizations in order to ascertain their operations and set-up. They may even be permitted to furnish these enemy organizations with important information, or to enlist additional personnel to work for the foreign espionage agency, if it serves the following purposes: Strengthening credibility of the agent's claim to be an active member of the foreign espionage organization; gathering of additional information about the organization; establishing and maintaining contact with the foreign intelligence officers and their agents; complete identification and elimination of the entire organization. In the course of such activities the seksot will furnish the foreign espionage organization only with such information as could be obtained through other sources.

"Once the seksot has compiled sufficient information about such an espionage organization, he is allegedly transferred to another place, while in reality he goes to Moscow to render his report. Subsequently arrests are made in which the seksot does not participate. The court files will indicate only that the foreign espionage organization was uncovered by regular NKGB agents, and will not show the special activities of the counterintelligence division, KRU.

"Once the case has been closed by the judicial authorities, the seksot is reassigned at another place. No documents are in his possession which would in any way indicate his activities; should he be arrested by local authorities he is to state that he wishes to 'report to headquarters, People's Commissariat'. Once he is sent there, the local NKGB authority may never know that this man arrested as a foreign spy was really an agent of the counter-espionage division.

"The agents use only one surname because a change of names could often be detected. They have vast sums of money at their disposal, give drinking parties, pay good wages to agents whom they employ, buy information, etc., and do not have to account for any of these expenditures.

"In some instances the counterintelligence seksot may work several years to uncover fully an enemy organization or a single spy.

"According to the statement of an apprehended NKGB officer the (KRU) seksots within the Soviet Union supposedly number 150 at the most. Any of these agents sent abroad receive special training which is in no way connected with the regular intelligence work. For instance, an international battalion is attached to the cavalry school at Tambov where agents of different nationalities are trained for assignment as agents in various countries. Such agents are also trained at the 'Institute of the European Peoples'. The students of this Institute are mostly Soviet citizens and receive language instruction, courses in the history of the various peoples and states and in intelligence techniques."



### PART III. SABOTAGE

#### 31. Scope and Organization of Sabotage in the Russo-German Theater of Operations.

An official British source gives the following definition of sabotage: "The word sabotage was coined to describe the practice, incidental to the industrial revolution in France, of damaging the machinery of factories by throwing wooden shoes in it. It has since been used to describe almost every form of human activity except that one. In its present context it must be understood to mean the destruction of installations or material by the agent of an enemy intelligence service. This is to be distinguished from the kind, for example, normally carried out by a retreating army."

A more detailed description of the character of sabotage warfare in the Eastern theater was given on 18 October 1942 by Adolf Hitler in an order to shoot all captured saboteurs. This top secret order (Source # 1) stated in part:

"I find myself forced to issue a strict order for the destruction of enemy sabotage groups..."

"To a degree unknown in any former war, a method has developed of disrupting rear communications, of intimidating those civilians who work for Germany, and of destroying war plants in territories occupied by us."

"In the East this type of combat has taken the form of partisan warfare with most serious consequences for our fighting efficiency. It has taken heavy toll of German soldiers, railroad workers, members of the Todt Organization, of the Labor Service etc. It has greatly hampered transportation services needed to maintain the fighting strength of the combat troops, at times causing stoppages for days on end. A serious crisis may arise at some point along the front if this kind of warfare continues successfully or is intensified..."

"It is the mission of the sabotage units: (1) To set up an over-all espionage system with the collaboration of willing natives; (2) to form terrorist groups and supply them with arms and explosives; (3) to carry out acts of sabotage designed not merely to disrupt our communications continuously by destroying transportation installations, but at critical moments to render troop movements impossible by cutting all means of communication. Finally these units are to carry out raids on war plants and to destroy the industrial nerve-centers according to a scientifically arranged program, so as practically to paralyze entire industries..."

"If we are to keep German operations from becoming seriously hampered by such methods, then the enemy must fully realize that every sabotage unit without exception will be cut down to the last man... If it should serve our purpose to keep one or two men alive for a time to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately after the interrogation."

signed: Adolf Hitler"

Documents available indicate that this Hitler directive did not greatly exaggerate the consequences of systematic Russian sabotage efforts. On the other hand, the documents show that Germany herself was extremely active in this field.

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Section A : GERMAN SABOTAGE OPERATIONS

German sabotage was conducted by the "Sabotage Branch" of Ausland/Abwehr, that is, by Abwehr II. Independently of Abwehr II, the RSHA, Amt VI, is reported to have engaged in sabotage.

While Russian sabotage operations often appear to have been carried out as collateral duty by various agencies, the German set-up drew a strict dividing line between sabotage and espionage with the exception of large special missions. However, the term "Sabotage" was used by Abwehr II in its very broadest sense. Abwehr II activities were divided into "S" (Sabotage) and "I" (Insurgierung). "S" activities consisted of Sabotage, (S); Long-Distance Sabotage (F/S); and small-scale combat of the guerrilla type (K); they were primarily directed against material objectives. The target of "I" functions were sub-divided into "Z" (Zersetzung - that is the disintegration of enemy morale), and "I" proper, which dealt in large-scale conspiratorial operations of a Fifth Column nature. In this part only the "S" activities of Abwehr II will be considered. "I" activities, including "Z" propaganda and Fifth Column, will be dealt with in the part on "Conspiracy".

The extent of German sabotage carried out by Abwehr II in the East is documented by detailed German statistics (Source # 5), which, however, must be read with caution. A report by Abwehr Kommando 202, for instance, stated that during a given six-months period, fifty nine sabotage operations had been carried out, of which eleven had been successful. Study of the report showed that in nine out of the eleven cases the reported success was based solely on statements made by the agents who returned.

With these qualifications the following "Yearly Summary of Abwehr II Activities" is presented. It is dated 28 June 1943, and contains figures on all Abwehr II activities conducted in 1942. German documents confirm the observation that Abwehr II operations in this period of the war were conducted primarily at the Eastern front. The summary gives under "I" the composition of Abwehr II personnel for 1942 as follows:

(a) German personnel: Fifty two officers, seventy three non-commissioned officers, 300 men. Total: 425.

(b) V-men personnel (which must be assumed to have been largely of Russian and related origin): V-men trained: 7,027; V-men assigned: 3,262, or 44% of those trained; V-men returning after mission: 2,510, or 77% of those assigned to mission.

Under "II" are listed "Missions carried out". The missions are divided into "K" (guerrilla warfare), "S" (Sabotage) and "Z" (disintegration of enemy morale). The following figures are given:

"K" missions: 269, of which 218, or 81%, were successful;  
 "S" missions: 132, of which 38, or 29%, were successful;  
 "Z" missions: 103, of which 46, or 60%, were successful.

The total of all Abwehr II operations in 1942 is given as 504 missions, of which 302, or 60%, were successful. Of this total, 101 missions were carried out by parachute; twenty three of these parachute missions were reported as having been completed successfully.

Casualties suffered by Abwehr II during these 1942 operations are given as follows: German personnel: Five killed, nine wounded, eighteen missing; total 32, or 7.5% of actual strength. Russian personnel: Total losses: 532, or 16% of strength assigned. This figure obviously does not include at least an additional several hundred V-men who for some reason or other did not return from their mission on Soviet territory.

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32. Sabotage Personnel

The "Brandenburg Division" formed the nucleus of German sabotage personnel. Here, sabotage specialists, instructors, and leaders were trained. The Abwehr II V-men, however, that is the men who actually carried out most of the sabotage operations, were chosen as a rule from Russian prisoners of war and trained in the field.

A report on the selection and training of Russian personnel for German sabotage and related activities is contained in an Abwehr II file (Source # 8). The report, written by an Abwehr II Specialist, Ramdohr, assigned to Abwehr Trupp 202, is dated 13 January 1943, and entitled: "Experiences and suggestions for the formation of 'K', 'S', and 'I' units, and for their assignment in enemy territory". The report makes the following points, given in excerpt:

"(1) Command: - The commander of 'K' units must have general military experience, be acquainted with the handling and effect of our own and of enemy weapons, and should be trained in parachute jumping. A passion for Abwehr II work is essential; and a certain degree of fanaticism is required. The commander of an 'S' unit must have the same qualifications as the 'K' unit commander. In addition he must command a comprehensive knowledge of sabotage techniques. The commander of 'I' units must be the most quickwitted of all unit commanders. He must speak Russian fluently, and instead of being a stolid soldier, he must be a man full of folklore and familiar with the psychology of the enemy people. He must constantly visit prisoner of war camps to gain fresh ideas and information.

"(2) Personnel: - I have had best results with highly Russianized Ukrainians as sergeants, and with Russians from Central and Northern Russia as privates. Practically all these men were factory workers by trade. They are fairly intelligent, have good nerves and can stand a great number of missions. Caucasians are easily enthused and make a good showing once or twice, but they soon get over-cautious and in the long run they lack perseverance. However, if used in their own provinces, they produce good results. In selecting sergeants, it is essential to pick men who have an old score to settle with the Soviet regime. Men who are on the wrong side of the authorities or sons of former kulaks are best.

"Suitable personnel can usually be found in the prisoner of war cages in sufficient numbers. Deserters are often less desirable than prisoners. As a rule they desert merely from war weariness, not because they hold anti-Soviet views.

"It is a good system to put an old member of the Trupp into the cage for a day or two in the guise of a prisoner. He can easily pick out people who fulfill our requirements. At the same time he can usually give the names of a number of trouble makers; the camp guard is always grateful for such information.

"(3) Training: - Prior to being accepted into a Trupp, a man must have satisfied us with regard to the following requirements: Political reliability, physical fitness and mental stability (medical examination is essential), military training, knowledge of the area.

"The men are trained according to the type of assignment they will receive. Men assigned to 'K' units should have only very brief training behind the front line. All commands must be given in Russian. Technical instruction must cover all types of Russian infantry weapons, sabotage training, and first aid. As soon as possible the unit is to be moved to a front sector to get seasoned. Reconnaissance operations, at first carried out in mixed German-Russian groups, will soon show which men are fit for service.

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"Men assigned to 'S' duty are chosen for specific missions and trained accordingly. It is undesirable to form a pool of special sabotage units for future missions. Sabotage agents are far more likely to be taken prisoner than men assigned to a 'K' unit. Furthermore, if a man has to wait for a lengthy period before being assigned to his 'S' mission, the nervous strain is great and the man usually cracks up when on his mission. Selection of men from prisoner of war camps for sabotage missions should be made without the men being aware of it. When a man is required, he should be taken out of the cage, given three or four days specialized training in accordance with the particular mission, and then be assigned immediately. This short training is quite sufficient when the men are selected according to suitability; they learn amazingly quickly."

### 33. Sabotage Blueprint made by Abwehr Group South.

Planning and conduct of tactical sabotage by Abwehr II units are illustrated by a directive issued by Abwehr Kommando II (attached to Army Group South) to the sabotage liaison officers (VO II) attached to the three Intelligence Officers (Ic) with the 11th, 16th, and 17th Armies. The directive was dated 23 April 1942. At that time German plans were well advanced to resume a two-pronged offensive on the Eastern Front. The task of capturing the Caucasian oil fields had been assigned to Army Group South.

The directive was entitled "Conduct of sabotage operations in the rear of the enemy" (Source # 5), and stated in its opening paragraph:

"The enemy anticipates the opening of the German spring offensive as soon as the weather turns warmer. He is making defensive preparations accordingly. Abwehr II is to attempt to disrupt enemy supply lines by sabotage and to put armament factories out of action by the incessant assignment of well trained agents."

Concerning the execution of these missions, the directive stated:

"Objectives located in the enemy hinterland are to be reached by parachutists. Agents of the nationalities listed in the attached orders under (B) and (I) are especially valuable for these operations. It is requested that this office be notified by radio of any of these nationals found in PW cages who appear suitable for sabotage assignment."

Attached to the directive were operational orders which stated in part:

"(A) Disruption of supply lines. Personnel: Railroad workers of all categories for large and small-scale sabotage. - Objectives and operational areas: All important lines and points of traffic concentration as far as the Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Urals. - Agents are especially required for large-scale sabotage of the following junctions:

- (1) Don River bridges near Liski-Slobody, south of Voronezh,
- (2) Donets river bridges near Lisichansk, Luganskaya, Kamensk, Byelaya-Kalitva,
- (3) Railroad junction at Likhaya, southeast of Voroshilovgrad,
- (4) Don bridge southwest of Stalingrad,



(5) Various points on the railroad from Stalingrad - Likhaya - Donetsk Basin, and Stalingrad - Krasnodar - Novorossiysk,

(6) Railroad triangle Tikhoretsk - Kavkaskaya or Kropotkin - Krasnodar.

"(B) Creation of bottle necks in the war economy. Personnel: Railroad and oilfield experts (refinery and pipeline) for large and small-scale sabotage. - Objectives and areas: Gurev railroad and pipeline, mouths of the Ural River, Emba River, and Orsk on the Ural River. Refinery at Orsk. - Deployment: Singly or in groups. - Nationalities required: Russians, Turkmen, Kara-Kalpaks and Kazakhs.

"(C) Prevention of evacuation and withdrawal. - Personnel: Longshoremen and similar men with local knowledge for large and small-scale sabotage. - Objectives and areas: Prevention of removal of machinery (petroleum industry), and of movements of troops and service equipment via the ports of the Caspian Sea. Destruction of means of transportation and of installations in the ports of Makhachkala, Baku, Derbent, Krasnovodsk, Astrakhan, and Gurev. Deployment: Singly and in groups.

"(D) Disruption of shipping on the Volga. - Personnel: Longshoremen, seamen and fishermen for small and large-scale sabotage. Objectives and areas: Transport vessels on the Volga (petroleum etc.); Astrakhan, Stalingrad, Saratov.

"(E) Measures against enemy 'scorched-earth' detachments. - Personnel: Engineers, technicians, sappers, firemen and similar technical personnel trained in systematic investigation of attempts to mine cities and communication points prior to Russian withdrawal...

"(I) Sedition - Personnel: Specialists for undermining enemy morale (propaganda disruption), especially political leaders, typographers, printers, artists, etc. Assignment in enemy territory: Hinterland. - Nationalities required: Russians, Ukrainians, Turkmen, Kasakhs, Kara-Kalpaks, Kalmucks, Caucasians.

"(K) Protection of Economic Targets: - Personnel: Experts and men with local knowledge for protection of objectives that will be specially selected by the Economic Inspector South (Wi. In.Sued)."

#### 34. Sabotage Techniques

Headquarters for sabotage techniques was the Abwehr II Camp at Quenzsee, where a special section "Technik" was at work.

No detailed German report on Abwehr II techniques has been located.\* However, Abwehr II files (Source # 6) contain the Italian original and a German translation of a study on "German Activities in the Field of Sabotage" (Attivita' Germanica nel Campo del Sabotaggio).

\* It is known that Abwehr II used a considerable amount of foreign, especially British, sabotage material. According to RSHA documents, Abwehr II sabotage materials of German and English origin were used by Col. Count Stauffenberg in the plot against Hitler on 20 July 1944, the material having been provided by the Chief of Abwehr II, Baron v. Freytag-Loringhoven.



The Italian document is dated August 1943. According to notations on the document, Abwehr II officers assumed that the Italian officers Lt. Col. Dr. Valente (Military Intelligence Service, Chemical Section), Major Vaciago (Military Intelligence Service, Organization), and Capt. Markert (Mil. Int. Service, Royal Carab.) were the authors. Among others, the study gives the following details:

"The sabotage material is prepared in a secret laboratory. Even small parts are so constructed that the German origin cannot be identified should the material fall into enemy hands.

"Great care and constant research are devoted to camouflaging the sabotage material. The German technical service has succeeded in producing explosive and incendiary material that has identical color, smell, specific gravity, etc., as soap, chocolate, wood, canned food, vulcanized fiber, and so on.

"In the laboratory (presumably at Quenzsee) a collection is kept of articles of foreign origin such as boxes, labels, brushes, walking sticks, clocks, fountain pens, candies, canned foods, etc., so as to have materials always at hand which may be required for a mission in enemy territory.

"The objects with built-in sabotage mechanisms are made in such a manner that they do not appear suspicious even if closely examined. For example, replicas of shoe lasts, loaves of bread and thermos flasks serve as cover.

"A typical example of unrecognizable sabotage material is provided by a trunk that is made of explosive material. The agent can take this trunk abroad and keep it without arousing any suspicion. At the appropriate moment all that is needed is to cut the trunk up into pieces from which explosive charges can be made."

A compilation of techniques for industrial and minor sabotage was made in spring 1945 by Abwehr II officers and included in a manual entitled "Conspiracy and Guerrilla Warfare". German military engineer manuals as well as Communist texts may have been used for this study, which was apparently to serve as guide for a German underground after Allied occupation.

The following acts are listed as being feasible for sabotage carried out by a single operative:

- "(a) Railroad sabotage;
- (b) Demolition of parts of roads, railroads, canals, telegraph wires etc.;
- (c) Setting fire to gasoline tanks, garages and airplane hangars;
- (d) Contamination of foodstuffs by adding acids, microbes and poisons;
- (e) Destruction of mail by fire or acids;
- (f) Rendering gasoline unusable by adding water or sugar (one gram to one liter of gasoline).

Among the numerous different techniques described, the following may be noted:

"Telephone and telegraph wires are to be cut at every opportunity. Attach a weight (such as a stone in a piece of cloth) to

\* Additional excerpts from this source appear in the section "Conspiracy".



a rope and throw it over the wires and pull them down. Wires that are not insulated can be short-circuited by throwing wire mattress springs on them.

"Railroad systems: Switches can be blocked by hammering a wooden peg between the tongue and the rail. Cut the wires - the railroad system is dependent to a very great degree on signals and communications...

"Ammunition dumps, when located in a building, can be ignited by using thermite bombs or rags soaked in oil.

"Cement should have water poured on it, or the sacks should be opened so that rain can penetrate.

"Hay and forage are to be burned or rendered unfit for use through acids or disinfectants.

"In food storages elevators and refrigeration plants: Vermin is to be encouraged or introduced."

For industrial sabotage the following techniques are given among others:

"Overheating wastes a great deal of fuel and in some circumstances causes explosions.

"Open or close taps, valves, etc; plug the safety valves of pressure boilers.

"Cut cables, loosen screws on flanges and joints.

"Break pressure gauges and bend measuring instruments...

"Place bulky objects where they will block the passages.

"Smuggle explosives camouflaged as lumps of coal onto coal dumps.

"Contaminate the water used for manufacture.

"Introduce gas into the ventilators.

"Spoil lubricating oil by adding sand, ashes, etc.

"Spoil alloys by adding harmful substances that have already been extracted such as phosphorus, sulphur, etc..

"Cause short-circuits, especially at night;

"Tip over high-piled trucks in narrow passages.

35. Report on the Abwehr II Operation: "Mammut."

The German file "Top Secret, Operation 'Mammut'" (Source # 14) contains what appears to be an unusually extensive and thoroughly prepared sabotage mission. Operation "Mammut" was planned early in 1943 with the aim of strategic sabotage of the Allied oil supplies in the Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya area in Northern Iran. The operation, though directed primarily against U.S. and British supplies, was organized by the Eastern sections of Ausland/Abwehr in cooperation with Fremde Heere, Ost.

The order setting up Operation "Mammut" was issued by Abwehr II on 14 January 1943. It stated in part:

"(a) Purpose of mission: To carry out sabotage and insurgent



activities in the Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya area.

"(b) Conduct of mission:

1. Establish contact with Sheik Mahmud and other Kurd sheiks;
2. Prepare bases for other missions;
3. Interrupt enemy troop supplies via the railroad from Bagdad to Kirkuk by demolitions and small-scale sabotage;
4. Carry out sabotage in the Kirkuk oil region;
5. Cut and destroy telephone wires;
6. Sabotage stocks of provisions, roads and airfields;
7. Carry out special security measures that may be necessitated by the situation (possibly protection of the oil area if German troops advance from the Caucasus; or other measures called for by Turkey's attitude);
8. Intelligence mission: Investigate enemy activities, roads, crossings, defenses, attitude of other Kurd tribes.

"(c) Abwehr II will direct the mission through a liaison officer. All plans and decisions are to be submitted to OKW/Abw. II. Radio contact with Abwehr II will be maintained through the Abwehr II liaison officer, who will be attached to an Abwehr Kommando of the Caucasus Army. Coding according to special instructions.

"(d) Personnel and technical equipment: The mission will be commanded by a German officer. A German officer, a German guide, and a Kurd agent will be dropped by parachute. After they have established themselves, a group of about five non-commissioned officers and men will be dropped. They will be distributed amongst the various Kurd tribes as instructors and commanders of Kurd sabotage units ("S" Trupps) or they will be assigned in a body as a sabotage unit.

"(e) Funds: Gift for Sheik Mahmud £ 1,000; gift for Sheik Hadchi Agha Bassar £ 500; money for other sheiks, purchases, etc., £ 500; funds for preparatory work 15,000 RM."

This directive was framed as a result of a memorandum which Lt. Gottfried Johannes Mueller had submitted to Abwehr II on 5 December 1942. In this memo he had outlined among others the following reasons for the operation:

"In 1935 and 1936 I made an educational trip through the Near East: Turkey, Rhodes, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Iraq. I then travelled from Bagdad to Kurdistan as protege of the "King of the Kurds", Sheik Mahmud. He gave me his photograph with a friendly greeting on it to serve as a passport. At that time Sheik Mahmud was in exile at Bagdad. I proceeded to Sulaimaniya via Kirkuk and Chemchemal. There I met his son, Sheik Latif, who was administering his father's possessions during his absence... With Sheik Latif's help I succeeded in penetrating into the mountains north of Sulaimaniya without being observed by the police patrols. For a time I was a guest of the head of one of Sheik Mahmud's tribes, Shuah Machid, at Haladin, and we took long hunting trips farther into the interior. For my personal safety I was accompanied by an intimate friend of Sheik Mahmud, Omar ben Hadchi Yussef of Kirkuk... Later I also visited the ruler of the Pichtar Territory, Sheik Hadchi Agha Bassar, at Gabilon...

"Today all Kurdistan, even the Turkish and Persian districts, look eagerly to Sheik Mahmud, for it is realized that he is the



man capable of engineering the great revolt to which they look forward. Sheik Mahmud has been forced to come to terms with the British so as to have some backing against the Turks, Persians and Arabs, all of whom are only too ready to engulf the Kurds and their territory. However these pacts will not prevent him from turning against the British overnight if he thinks he can more easily achieve his aim of creating an independent Kurdistan with the help of a different power...

"To sum up:

1. As a 'friend of the King', I am able to enter Inner Kurdistan.
2. I have well-founded hopes of winning the Kurds over to the German cause.
3. It is possible to organize the Kurd tribes secretly and later move them up close to the objective of any raid.
4. It is possible to make such raids.
5. The objective captured can be held for several weeks."

These suggestions had been approved in general on 14 January 1943. By the end of March 1943, that is, three months after the initial planning, sufficient progress had been made to discuss the project in greater detail with the officers of Fremde Heere, Ost. Lt. Mueller made the following transcript of a conversation, dated 31 March 1943, with Major Kuebart and Specialist Weiss of the Army General Staff, Section Fremde Heere, Ost:

"Special emphasis is to be laid on intelligence activities in Western Iran, Northern Iraq, and Southeast Turkey. At first it is far more important to obtain reliable information on military events in this area than to carry out sabotage of supplies, etc. Of special interest is the type, quantity and destination of material on the western Iran and Iraq supply lines from south to north. Also the types of troops concentrated, their position and numbers. What is happening in the south and southeast of Turkey?

"Later sabotage activity can commence at a favorable moment in the Kirkuk and Mosul oilfields, on supplies, etc."

Later, the general intelligence requests were more specialized; on 20 May 1943 Lt. Mueller received the main assignment from Fremde Heere, Ost. for "Mammut". Similar lists were submitted by economic and other interested offices of the Armed Forces High Command. Thus the scope of the mission increased continually; new personnel was required, new points of view and possibilities had to be considered. However, no indication appears anywhere in the file that Lt. Mueller, or anybody else concerned, was considering the possibility that with the passing of time and the growing circle of cooperation, the possibilities of a "leak" increased as well.

By middle of June, operation "Mammut" finally was ready to start. According to a file note, Group I, composed of Lt. Gottfried Mueller, with Pfc. Hoffmann, Pfc. Konieczny and the Kurd agent Raschid, as well as the Liaison Officer Lt. Dr. Messow with his radio operator Pfc. Johannes Mueller, took off on 15 June for the operational air field at Sarabuz, 20 miles north of Simferopol, Crimea. By this time the plan for operation "Mammut" had grown into a blueprint for a full-fledged revolt in the Kurdistan area. This is shown in a memorandum which Lt. Messow forwarded on 27 June 1943 to Abwehr II headquarters. At that time, Lt. Mueller, together with the Kurd Raschid and the two other agents had already jumped over Northern Iran. Lt. Messow, awaiting radio contact with the group, sent the following additional proposals to Berlin:

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"The Kurd agent Ramsi Nafi Raschid, who jumped with Lt. Mueller, has turned out excellently and promises to be a great help to operation 'Mammut'. In detailed conferences, agent Raschid explained that German specialists would be needed to help in building up an independent Kurd state, and that the Young Kurd Nationalists would welcome such assistance. It would be an excellent opportunity for Germany, as in this manner a strong pro-German influence on the local population would be assured.

"Hence agent Raschid requests that suitable preparations be made now. The following personnel proposed by the chief of the mission should be sent shortly to Kurdistan:

"1. A German doctor. Task: (a) To treat members of operation 'Mammut' and the attached organization, and in special cases, Kurd sheiks and their families. (b) To train young Kurds as orderlies (nurses), thus creating another organization covering the whole operational area to serve our purposes.

"2. On account of high maternal mortality (mother and child), a German woman doctor is needed, since custom permits only women doctors to treat women... She is to train Kurd girls as nurses and midwives, thus creating an organization of women to serve our purposes over the whole operational area...

"3. A German engineer for surface and subterranean constructions...

"4. A German geologist: Merely as camouflage; he will act as assistant to the engineer.

"5. A German political economist..."

Lt. Mueller and the other members of Group I had stayed only one day at Simferopol. Leaving behind Lt. Messow and his radio operator, they took off on 16 June 1943 to carry out the mission, so well prepared in six months of conferences, study and training.

Sergeant Paulus was in charge of the flight. On 12 July 1943 he transmitted to Abwehr II the following "Jumping Report on Operation 'Mammut', Group I":

"1. The group took off from Sarabuz, near Simferopol, on 16 June 1943, at 1843 in a Focke-Wulff 200 of the 2nd Experimental Squadron. The plane crossed the Turkish border at Yalikoy (west of Trabzon) at 2055 in darkness on a course for the southeastern tip of Lake Van. Visibility was good at the coast; the weather report stated that all other Turkish territory was covered with cloud... The group was dropped at 0005 east of a river and slightly north of the village of Dera...

"After the first two containers had been dropped, a member of the mission dropped the third container on my head. This caused a slight delay, which I cannot time exactly due to the shock - after the jumping operation was completed I became unconscious for some time. The dropping of the fourth container and the jumping of the four men followed in rapid succession.

"After landing at Sarabuz it was noticed that the base of one of the chutes had gotten caught on the plane... Nevertheless inspection showed that the chute and its load may well have landed in good condition. However, it is possible that the load was lost. Accidents of this type occur very rarely, but they cannot be completely excluded, and form part of the risk of the para-trooper.

"It is thus possible that part of the radio gear has been lost, which might seriously hamper operations by the group... This accident might have been avoided if the chief of the mission had closely followed the pilot's instructions concerning the jumping operation..."



Weeks passed without any radio message being received by Lt. Messow, who had set up his receiver near Simferopol to keep in touch with operation "Mammut". Since the group had been dropped with two radio sets, even a partial loss should not have delayed radio communication for so extended a period.

The uncertainty concerning the fate of mission "Mammut" was lifted on 23 July 1943, when Abwehr II picked up and decoded a radio message sent by the British Air Attache in Iraq. Contents of the decoded message were incorporated in a message prepared by Capt. Eisenberg of Abwehr II in Berlin and sent to "Ida" for relay to "Poster" and "Lindner", code designations apparently standing for Ausland/Abwehr representatives in the Near East. The message read:

"During night of 16 June 1943, squad of operation 'Mammut' was dropped over Dera, east of Erbil, northern Iraq. Three officers, one Kurd.

"British Air Attache informed Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff that three German officers had been picked up. Flight was said to have started from Crimea. Turkish territory was said to have been violated.

"Message British Air Attache states that three planes took part. Further radio communication from Bagdad indicates that the German parachutists will be treated as spies.

"It has become known that Bagdad intends to invoke Geneva convention. Under no circumstances can this information be used.

"Foreign Office, Berlin, states that it can do nothing. Is there any possibility at your end of taking steps through German Embassy or military attache? There is no reason to assume that Turkish neutrality was violated; the mission may have taken the route via Lake Urmia.

"The names of the officers are: Major Mueller; Lt. Hoffman, Lt. Konieczny.

"Foreign Office suggests that steps be taken through Kestner, military attache at the Embassy. Refer to report Military Attache, German Embassy, 8 July 1943, concerning conference with Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, General Asim Guendue.

By direction: Zwillling-Eisen."

This radiogram is the last document in the file on "Operation 'Mammut'". It is not known whether Abwehr II received any further information regarding the fate of Mueller and his crew.

### Section B. INDUSTRIAL SABOTAGE

From the military point of view Industrial Sabotage is but one specific form of strategic sabotage. Implications of industrial sabotage, however, transgress the sphere of military or naval activities: Industrial sabotage is a constant danger in war and peace; its effects may be felt equally severely on the home front and in the combat zone. For these reasons, German material on industrial sabotage in the East is presented in the following separate section.



Few German operational reports of successful acts of industrial sabotage have been found in the records. However, there is a great amount of material dealing with techniques for industrial sabotage; some of this material has already been presented in the chapter on sabotage techniques. An even greater number of documents is available concerning German anti-sabotage measures. These measures included (1) actions taken inside Germany to protect German industry against sabotage instigated by the U.S.S.R. or other sources, and (2) German measures taken to prevent Russian authorities from sabotaging Russian industries prior to a withdrawal; that is, prevention of "scorched-earth" tactics.

The German view on industrial sabotage is summed up in a study written in October 1942 by Dr. Greiff on possibilities for industrial sabotage in Russia (Source # 5):

"Sabotage acts in factories are of special importance, since the effects of such acts directed against well chosen objectives are much more lasting than the results of sabotage on communications, which as a rule can be repaired in a relatively short time.

"Of greatest interest are key plants, such as power stations, and gas and water works. However, thorough security measures taken by the Russians may prevent decisive acts against these key targets. Plans should therefore be made for acts against industrial targets of lesser importance. Special attention should be given to the following objectives:

Oil refineries, coal mines, iron and copper mines, copper, aluminum and iron smelting works, steel mills of more important types, tank factories, motor vehicle factories, airplane engine factories and factories making other types of engines, railroad and automobile repair shops, armament factories, aircraft factories, chemical concerns, including chemical warfare factories, oxygen plants, carbon dioxide factories, ammunition factories, rubber factories, oil factories (explosives), lubricating oil and grease factories."

### 36. German Methods of Industrial Sabotage.

On 6 September 1942 a group of German technicians set out to visit factories in the captured Donets Basin. They were members of a training and instruction unit set up as "Industrial Training Camp" by Abwehr Kommando II (not further identified). The trip, which lasted until 25 December, was described as having the following purposes:

- (a) To ascertain the most vulnerable spots of a list of selected industrial targets;
- (b) To locate factories suitable for training men in industrial sabotage;
- (c) Investigation of Russian anti-sabotage measures;
- (d) Compilation of lists of Russian workers with anti-Bolshevist ideology who were employed in evacuated armament factories.

To carry out this mission the following factories were visited:

- (a) A large tractor and tank factory at Kharkov;
- (b) The oxygen plant at Kharkov;
- (c) A smelting works at Dnepropetrovsk;
- (d) An iron and steel mill at Dnepropetrovsk (Lenin Factory);

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- (e) The iron mine at Krivoi Rog;
- (f) The blast furnace at Krivoi Rog, largest in the U.S.S.R.;
- (g) The generating station at Krivoi Rog, coal-operated;
- (h) A coal mine at Stalino.

Upon its return, the mission drew up a report entitled "Sabotage Targets in Industrial Centers" (Source # 5), from which the following excerpts have been taken.

"Sabotage possibilities in the factories of the type inspected.

"1. The tractor factory at Kharkov, producing armor plate, is one of the largest of its kind in the Soviet Union. The present technical manager Dr. Hesse demonstrated the thorough demolition of the factory by the Russians. Demolitions on this scale could not be carried out by sabotage units, even of fairly large size, since a great deal of time and explosives are required. Therefore, sabotage on objectives of this type can be carried out successfully only by acts against the generating plant or the water system. A lengthy interruption of production can be achieved by destroying the water plant of the factory, since the connection with the town's water mains cannot be restored for months, and, in view of the general water shortage, may well be almost impossible. In addition, such plants can be vitally affected by destroying smaller factories turning out intermediate products for them. Destruction of ballbearing factories would be especially effective. However, production would probably not be affected immediately, as it is the practice in the Soviet Union to set up large stockpiles of intermediate products.

"2. The oxygen plant at Kharkov is of medium size. 1st Lt. Dr. Roth, now in charge of the Chemical Section of the Economic Staff (Wi-Kdo) at Stalino, and Lt. Asche, who got the plant going again, gave technical advice during the inspection. Oxygen plants are of great importance because all welding requires oxygen. Closing down these plants would have repercussions on all iron works using the welding process - and they almost all do. In this case, it appears especially easy to carry out sabotage. A handful of carbide dropped down the unprotected ventilation pipe which terminates on the roof will cause the so-called column, a large upright cylinder that is extremely delicate, to explode. This will damage the works for months; maybe permanently.

"3. The iron smelting works at Dnepropetrovsk are of medium size and have been thoroughly destroyed by the Russians. The major demolitions carried out there (letting-out the blast furnaces, large-scale demolitions) cannot be effected with light resources. It appears, however, that specially prepared pieces of iron ore containing an explosive charge could be placed in the blast furnace. It is important to destroy all furnaces. This is difficult as they are usually started up at different times. Other vulnerable spots in foundries are the ventilation installations and the furnaces, chambers and generating installations of steel foundries.

"4. The iron works adjoining the smelting works at Dnepropetrovsk have also been demolished by the Russians to a far greater extent than is possible with small means. In iron works as in smelting works, the only effective sabotage possible is to cut the supplies of water or power for an extended period.

"5. The generating plant at Krivoi Rog (coal) is the only fairly large works in the western Donets Basin that is already well restored and running. The plant serves as a good example, since the Russians set up a sabotage group among the workers, which was, however, unable to carry out its mission. It was shown that sabotage is rendered extremely difficult if proper safeguards



are used. In any case, sabotage agents who are to receive assignments in generating plants must have detailed instruction. Opportunities for sabotage in generating plants - such as plugging up the oil pipes, dropping iron filings into the turbines, destroying the switch mechanism or parts of the air system - usually cannot be exploited in view of numerous security measures, unless the sabotage unit at the generating plant cooperates efficiently..."

In addition to these specific observations, the report contained the following general recommendations:

1. "The inspection showed that the situation varies greatly in the several factories; sabotage instructors must always bear this fact in mind.

2. "Many of the details of each factory can be learned in advance from plans of the installations. The Economic Section of the Armed Forces High Command should have such plans of all electric power stations... However, since it will as a rule not be possible to supply the sabotage agent with each and every detail, it must be pointed out to him during briefing that much is left to his own inventiveness and versatility.

3. "If the sabotage agent himself cannot gain access to a factory, he must contact suitable men who work there. This office can contribute a list of suitable contacts. A list of desirable objectives has been compiled for the Stalino district. A similar list is to be provided for the Voroshilovgrad district."

Concerning point three, the contact of Russian workers inside factories by German sabotage agents, the document provided the following additional information:

"Many Russian factories have been evacuated together with their employees from the areas now occupied by German forces. Among the evacuated workers are many with anti-Bolshevist leanings. It is of the greatest importance to have these persons identified so as to use them for industrial sabotage on Soviet territory... Inquiries are now being made among Russian workers who were not evacuated. Lists of workers suitable as contacts will be forwarded to Abwehr Group B for Abwehr Kommando 202."

### 37. Industrial Security, German Measures.

Industrial sabotage, that is, offensive action, was conducted by the Armed Forces, Abwehr II. Of equal importance to the German war effort was the defensive, that is, industrial security. Measures to protect German industry against espionage and sabotage had been organized by the Armed Forces High Command in 1935. By 1938, control of industrial security was transferred from the Armed Forces to the RSHA.

German industrial security depended upon a network of industrial counterintelligence agents (Abwb), who operated under the supervision of the RSHA in the fields of industrial espionage, sabotage, and conspiracy. Of these functions, countersabotage appears to have been of prime importance, presumably due to the fact that industrial espionage cases had been reduced by war conditions, and that seditious activities had their most dangerous form in acts of sabotage. Regulations governing the activity of industrial counterintelligence agents are recorded in this chapter; all material presented was contained in a special RSHA file concerning industrial counterintelligence agents (Source # 41).

Shortly after the outbreak of war, the SS officer Schellenberg, then with Amt IV (Gestapo) of the RSHA issued a directive to all local state police offices by which the German industrial counter-

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Intelligence agents "Abwb" were to be reassigned, since "the war has revolutionized our economy to such an extent that an entirely new grouping must be made among the industrial centers to be protected". The directive divided all German industrial and commercial activities into the following three groups:

I. Centers of war production which are fully protected. About 8,000 factories belonged to this group, divided into the following categories:

(a) Factories primarily concerned with armament production or army contracts even in time of peace;

(b) Factories converted to war production with the outbreak of war;

(c) Factories contributing indirectly to war production, such as mines, water works, and producers of other raw materials.

II. Factories engaged in war production but only partially protected.

To this group belonged between thirty and forty thousand factories which were supervised by the Reich Ministry of Economics with respect to security and economy. The Reich Ministry of Economics carried out such protective measures in consultation with the Armed Forces High Command, and through the offices of the industrial and commercial organization and other economic groups under its jurisdiction. These groups of industry and commerce were reported to maintain private agents to carry out supervision.

III. Unprotected factories. About 15,000 small commercial and artisan enterprises belonged to this group. The Schellenberg directive concluded with the statement:

"Only factories belonging to group I, that is, those engaged directly or indirectly in war production, can be considered at the present time for the appointment of industrial counterintelligence agents of the Security Service (SD). Therefor, assignment of 16,000 industrial counterintelligence agents (agents and deputies) will be required."

Material available indicates that the number of RSHA industrial counterintelligence agents actually assigned probably never exceeded 4,000. RSHA files indicate further that at the latest from 1943 on, the figure of personnel assigned to Abwb duty began to decrease considerably due to the manpower shortage.

Activities of RSHA industrial counterintelligence agents were governed by regulations which had been prepared in 1935 by the Armed Forces High Command, and which were taken over as binding by the RSHA. These regulations provide in part:

1. "The industrial counterintelligence agent (Abwb) is responsible for enforcing the Armed Forces directives concerning maintenance of security and the 'Security regulations for firms engaged in work for the Armed Forces, October 1936 edition'. Even apparently unimportant slackness facilitates treason, espionage or sabotage.

2. "The industrial counterintelligence agent is held responsible, for informing the competent Abwehr office of any unusual happenings or observations connected with Abwehr matters and of any deficiencies that he himself cannot remedy. He must provide detailed information in all Abwehr questions concerning his factory; he cannot be released from this obligation through the imposition of any other duty or directive.

3. "The factory security guard (Werkschutz), including



doorkeepers and watchmen, are the instrument to be used by the factory manager for measures necessary to safeguard security. The factory security guard is to be at the disposition of the industrial counterintelligence agent as circumstances may require or he may be entrusted with the direction of the security guard. Members of the guard are to be given counterintelligence training and called on to assist in the carrying out of Abwehr duties.

4. "Abwehr service in the factory must be organized, conducted and supervised in accordance with a proper plan. The industrial counterintelligence agent is to gather material essential for the formulation of this Counterintelligence Plan for his factory. The plan is to be submitted to the factory manager."

These regulations established by the Armed Forces High Command formed the frame for the work of the industrial counterintelligence agents. When this organization was taken away from the control of the Armed Forces and transferred to the RSHA in 1938, no major changes in the working methods appear to have occurred. In 1939 the Gestapo (Geheimes Staatspolizei Amt), that is, RSHA, Amt IV, issued a small pamphlet of additional "Regulations for the security police function of the industrial counterintelligence agents (Abwb)." This regulation, however, concerned principally the relations between the Abwb and the RSHA, making no additional provision for the work of the Abwb in the factories. Among other points the directive provided for the following:

"Any person opposed to the institutions of the National-Socialist Reich is particularly dangerous when his activities are aimed at the creation of unrest among the employees.

"The main function of counterintelligence is defensive. Early recognition of unsatisfactory or illegal conditions in the factory is of prime importance.

"Special attention must be paid to the conduct of former and present enemies of the state of any and all political views.

"As a rule the Abwb will not carry out investigations independently; in all cases he will notify the Gestapo immediately."

### 38. Russian Methods for Industrial Security.

Material on Russian methods designed for the prevention of industrial sabotage is scarce in the files consulted. The report by the study group which visited the factories in the Donets Basin to investigate possibilities for industrial sabotage (Source # 5) makes the following points:

"It appears that no systematic study has as yet been made of Russian methods to prevent industrial sabotage... The following information, which was gathered in the course of the inspection trip, will require further amplification.

"1. Normally the Russians erect a high wooden observation tower close to the fence or wall surrounding the protected installation. These towers are equipped with searchlights and manned by armed guards.

"2. Armed guards are also maintained inside the factories. At night they are often reinforced; they sometimes work with dogs. In the area visited, the ratio between employees and guards appears to have been 2 : 1 in important plants; the electric power plant at Krivoi Rog, for instance, employed 1,000 workers and 500 guards.

"3. Only persons identified by special pass can enter pro-



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tested industrial areas. Additional passes are required to gain access to important sections of the plant and these passes are valid only for sections specially designated... The German system of showing the department in which a worker is employed by button-hole rosettes does not appear to have been introduced in the Soviet Union.

"4. Secret NKVD shadow-units are reported to be assigned to every factory without the knowledge of the factory personnel."

### 39. German Operations to Prevent "Scorched-Earth"

#### Policy.

The war in the East was to a large extent a struggle for the control of resources and industrial facilities. Due to this fact, industrial sabotage and anti-sabotage acquired special significance.

Offensive sabotage had been answered by defensive industrial security measures. Yet, at the time Russian forces withdrew, they were no longer interested in maintaining their industrial facilities, but started to destroy them by "scorched-earth" tactics. By 1942, if not earlier, German Armed Forces officers became aware of the need to prevent Russia from carrying out her "scorched-earth" policy. Thereby, Abwehr II units in the East developed a dual character: Their prime mission was to carry out sabotage behind the Russian lines. At times, however, they were assigned to missions designed to prevent the Russians from sabotaging their own facilities.

Such German preventive measures are described in detail in a file of the "Economic Inspection, Caucasus", a section of the Economic Branch of the Armed Forces High Command responsible for long-range military planning in the field of economics, and for the exploitation of occupied areas (Source # 5). On 13 October 1942 the "Economic Inspection, Caucasus" sent a memorandum to Abwehr Kommando II of Abwehr Group D, attached to Army Group A, which stated:

"It is assumed that during a future withdrawal Russia will continue the type of demolition encountered heretofore, with the result that only a small percentage of industries will be left intact. However, in many factories some parts of the installation will remain untouched so that production may be resumed later. It is therefore important to prevent the destruction of those parts of machinery and installations which are vital for emergency operation and for which replacements cannot easily be obtained from Germany."

The memorandum then presented a priority list for protection of Russian installations. This list was augmented by a detailed description of techniques designed to keep Russian authorities from carrying out demolitions, or to direct the activities of demolition squads in such a manner that they would do the least damage. The document stated (in excerpt):

"1. Agents behind the enemy lines, anti-Communist cells in factories and the 'Pantoffelpost' ('Slipper-mail', that is, whispering campaign) are to keep hammering it into the workers that in destroying their factories they destroy their means of existence...

"2. It must be made known that any person who renders special services in the preservation of a factory will be given a reward of money or food and a preferential higher position when posts are filled. Exact details of the size of the reward are to be avoided; it suffices to state that the reward will be 'appropriate'.

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"3. As the majority of Russian works are linked by side tracks to the main lines and are usually evacuated via these tracks often only a few days before we enter, valuable machines can be saved by demolishing this side line at the crucial moment. Especially good positions for such demolition are near small bridges and near switches or crane installations in the engine shed. It is suggested that our sabotage units be alerted for these missions. This office can provide names of the factories concerned.

"4. It has been found that Soviet demolition squads did not destroy or remove machinery taken down previously by factory engineers under the pretext that it needed repairing. The demolition squads, which are mainly composed of laymen, considered these parts to be worthless spare parts. In this manner valuable generators, turbines and similar equipment were preserved.

"5. The Russians destroyed some machines by draining off the oil and then running the machines full speed until they were ruined by lack of lubrication. In some of these cases the Russian workers saved the machine by cutting the electric cable or destroying the belt drive, thus preventing the machine from running.

"6. Some machine parts and equipment are so vital that if saved they may determine the fate of an entire factory, as it would take months to make special spare parts in Germany. It is suggested that agents should remove and hide these parts. This can be done best during the general confusion preceding the evacuation or demolition.

"7. Soviet demolition squads rarely consist of trained personnel and it has been possible at times to put them to work at the wrong place. It is merely necessary to insure that something blows up to give the demolition squad the impression of a fine piece of destruction. The power station at Riga was saved when the chief engineer caused the demolition squad to blow up the superstructure of the bridge over the dam and succeeded in convincing the men that the entire power station had thus been put out of commission.

"8. There are large textile works at Klintzy, (west of Bryansk) and the initiative of the mayor of Klintzy should be remembered. At the crucial moment the Mayor invited the local demolition squad to a dinner and treated the men so generously with 90 proof vodka that the squad (Kommando) was still out of action two days later when the German advance troops occupied the town. Klintzy and its factories fell into German hands almost unharmed. This method is worthy of imitation."

#### #0. "R" Sabotage: Operation "Unke/Nikolaus"

A particular form of industrial sabotage developed toward the end of the war: The "R" operation.

The code letter "R" is assumed to stand for the German "Ruecken" (rear); it designates what in English has been termed "stay-behind". German documents show that "R" operations were planned or carried out in a great variety of forms. "R" espionage nets were set up by the RSHA in the West, in Finland, and other areas; however, sufficient documentary evidence is not available to illustrate "R" espionage. The records on hand deal mainly with "R" sabotage.

Most of these "R" sabotage operations were of a tactical nature. Often they were carried out in cooperation with the engineers of the withdrawing army formation. This type of sabotage is so closely linked with military operations that it will not be considered in this report.

Abwehr II files, however, contain a report on an "R" operation which has distinct marks of industrial sabotage. The report is headed



"Operation Unke/Nikolaus". It was drawn up by the FAK (former Abwehr Kommando) 206. It is dated 30 December 1944, and gives the following details:

"Purpose: After Budapest has been occupied by the enemy, when roads, railroads and public utilities have been restored and industry started up again, unrest is to be caused among the enemy and his supplies held up as much as possible by acts of sabotage and disruption. For this purpose the following preliminary arrangements have been made:

"Personnel 'Unke': Men and women have been recruited in Budapest for various tasks. 'Residents' are to form groups of collaborators to carry out acts of sabotage. Individual sabotage agents are to work alone with the sabotage material placed at their disposal. Informers are to keep constant watch on enemy measures and movements. Mail drops are provided which will also give shelter to agents coming from other places. These agents have to establish their identity by password.

"The various persons do not know one another. They have merely been informed of their own task. In addition to the persons who have remained in Budapest, the task will be carried out by agents who will infiltrate through the front line or be dropped by parachute at an appropriate time.

"Material 'Nikolaus': Thirty seven packets of sabotage material have been deposited in nineteen places in different parts of Budapest convenient to objectives to be dealt with. This material will be used by resident groups and individual agents, and it can be picked up by agents coming in from outside. In addition, five incendiary cases have been buried near suitable objectives. No one has been informed of the hiding places of the packets and cases."

Attached to this statement were several tables. Table 1 contained an organization list for operation "Unke", giving the names and addresses of seven residents and the number of packets deposited with each of them; four agents who were to work singly, one of whom was listed as having four packets; five informers, and four mail drops. All persons were listed as living in Budapest or suburbs.

Table 2 listed the contents of the packets ("Nikolaus"). Four separate issues are described as being composed of the following packets:

"Contents of the first issue of packets 'Nikolaus':

"(a) Six packets ILONA each with the following contents: Three vulcanite containers, three large hand grenades, one large adhesive charge with red pencil, two small fiber incendiaries, two B-100 with BZ 39, two 300 gram plastic containers with safety fuse, about 250 'angle nails', one explosive body camouflaged as coal, one box of hurricane matches.

"(b) Five packets ARPAD each with the following contents: Three miniature mines, two small adhesive charges with CA-fuses for one and two hours, two 'double-triangles', about 25 'angle nails', one large hand grenade, three small hand grenades, four 250 gram containers with safety fuse, four small fiber incendiaries, two B-100 with BZ 39, one box of hurricane matches.

"(c) Six packets ERZSEBET each with the following contents: Two explosive bodies camouflaged as coal, one large hand grenade, two small hand grenades, one signal cap with 300 gram plastic container and instantaneous fuse, two pressure caps for rails with plastic container and detonating cord, one adhesive charge, small, with CA-fuse for one or two hours, one B-100 with BZ 39, one small fiber incendiary, one large fiber incendiary,



about twenty five 'angle nails', one box of hurricane matches.

"The sabotage material listed is live and can be used without further preparation."

This table was followed by a list showing the manner in which the above seventeen packets had been distributed among thirteen residents of Budapest. From this list it appears that the persons holding the packets may not have been aware of the contents. Their names do not appear on the list of the agents, resident groups, informers, and mail drops.

In several instances a short personal description of the holders is given in addition to name and address. These descriptions read: "Widow"; "50-year old overseer in timber yard of Messrs. Hofherr-Schirantz"; "Cabinet maker, 70 years old"; "Locksmith, 100% war invalid".

Additional information as to the exact hiding place of the packets is given in three instances:

"Packet is in the cellar under the copper".

"Packets are in the attic of the house he lives in. Key and sketch enclosed".

"If J. is not home, description of hiding place of packet is on the right-hand door in the kitchen."

In addition, the "Unke/Nikolaus" report contained a map of Budapest on which the exact locations of: (1) Residents, (2) Single agents, (3) Informers, (4) Mail drops, (5) Incendiary cases, (6) Packets, (7) Sabotage objectives, and (8) Places where packets were stored, were shown by means of symbols. This map gave the following objectives:

(1) Radio-Electro factory; (2) Gas and Water Works; (3) Shipyard; (4) Railroad Repair Works; (5) West Railroad Station; (6) East Railroad Station; (7) Josef Railroad Station; (8) South Railroad Station; (9) Kelenteldi Railroad Station; (10) Telephone Exchange; (11) Power Station; (12) Manfred Weiss Factory; (13) Hofherr and Schirantz Plant.

### Section C. NAVAL AND SHIPPING SABOTAGE

Technically, naval and shipping sabotage are but a part of tactical, strategic, or industrial sabotage. Nevertheless, as a rule, acts of naval and shipping sabotage require special techniques, hence special crews, training and equipment. For this reason the above subject will be considered separately in the following section.

The very broad field of naval and shipping sabotage is merely touched upon in the German files available for this report. No general studies or overall reports were available.



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"2. It must be made known that any person who renders special services in the preservation of a factory will be given a reward of money or food and a preferential higher position when posts are filled. Exact details of the size of the reward are to be avoided; it suffices to state that the reward will be 'appropriate'.



the ship while at sea in view of the danger to our own merchantmen or to blockade-runners who may sail disguised as enemy merchantmen. The operation must be limited to enemy harbors on the West African Coast... Naval Staff is willing to support the operation within these limitations by all available means."

In spite of the support promised by Naval Staff, operation "Reiseernte" did not materialize.

#### 42. Soviet Shipping Sabotage

Existence of a Russian armed forces organization for shipping sabotage is indicated by a communication which Abwehr III forwarded to Naval Staff on 13 January 1943. Headed "Special Sabotage Division for Lake and River Operations" the report (Source # 1) stated:

"The following sections of the Special Sabotage Division have been assigned to the Sea of Asov: The 14th Section between Sinyarska and Kagalnik (O-in-C: Maj. Kunikov); the 20th Section between Kagalnik and Yeisk (Lt. Col. Gissitsh); the 18th Section between Yeisk and Dolgaya (?) (Capt. Shtcherbakov); the 12th Section at Akhtarsh (Lt. Strelow); the 11th Section at Temryuk (O-in-C unknown).

"Each section has at its disposal ten motor cutters type 'RB' (rescue cutters from the Volga). The cutters of the 18th Section came from the Oka River. Each cutter is manned by an officer in charge, two machine gunners, two engineers and two divers. Each cutter carries one MG, type 'Maxim'; some cutters also carry minelaying equipment. In addition, each section is equipped with ten trucks for shore operations."

No further details are available on Russian Armed Forces naval sabotage organizations. A considerably more detailed report on a Comintern shipping sabotage organization is contained in German police files (Source # 40). The report was transmitted on 10 June 1941 by the SD Chief, Heydrich to the RF-SS, Himmler: (Other excerpts from this report are given in the parts on "Espionage" and "Conspiracy"). The top-secret German police report described the Wollweber Group as "a widely ramified sabotage organization set up by the Comintern for the main purpose of destroying ships belonging to states united in the Anti-Comintern Pact."

The following data are given with regard to the Comintern organization sponsoring that group:

"As early as 1930, the Comintern had begun to call tested Communists of all foreign sections to Russia to instruct them in the techniques of sabotage and demolition at appropriate schools. Thus in 1930 the so-called military - political training courses in Moscow were started again and are still running..."

"A great number of the terrorist and sabotage groups detected by the SD in Reich territory had been established by the Comintern and demonstrate the attitude of the Soviet Union to the Reich..."

"The great effort made by Bolshevism to get a hand in the Reich itself is shown by the fact that subsequent to March 1941 the SD has been able to identify Communist elements in Upper Silesia and in the Polish 'Gouvernement General'. These elements have been installed in increasing number as leaders of Polish sabotage and terrorist organizations. The manner in which the recent acts of violence were organized shows typically Communist methods."

Concerning the shipping sabotage organization, the "Wollweber Group", the SD report states:

"Members of this organization are known to have been active up



to the end of 1940. They attempted to re-enter German territory from Denmark. The leader of this organization was the German refugee, Ernst Wollweber, since 1931 a member of the Reich Directorate of the Red Labor Union Opposition (RGO). He was elected Communist Party Deputy to the Reichstag in November 1932. After fleeing to Copenhagen in 1933, Wollweber took over the direction of the ISH, the Communist-sponsored International Union of Seamen and Longshoremen. This organization has been the instrument for sabotage ordered by the Comintern, especially against German vessels.

"Wollweber has been responsible for the organization and activities of shipping sabotage groups formed on Moscow's order in Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France, and the former Baltic States. He has been largely responsible for supervising supply and transport of explosives and other sabotage material. He controls the funds generously provided by the Comintern for financing the organization and sponsoring of agents.

"After the entry of German troops into Oslo in May 1940, Wollweber fled to Sweden, where he has been held under arrest up to the present. Wollweber has acquired Russian citizenship in the meantime. The Soviet Government has taken steps in Sweden to have Wollweber extradited to Russia.\*

"Acts committed on sixteen German, three Italian and two Japanese ships can be traced to this sabotage organization built up by Wollweber. In two cases, highly valuable ships became a total loss. The perpetrators tried at first to destroy the ships by incendiaries. After finding that this method did not usually lead to total loss, they began of late to make attempts with explosives on ships plying in the Baltic and North Sea. Their main bases are in the harbors of Hamburg, Bremen, Danzig, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Oslo, Reval, and Riga.

"Sabotage branches organized in Holland, Belgium, and France were led by the Dutch Communist, Josef Rimbartus Schaap, who was head of the Interklub in Rotterdam and maintained very close contact with the chief functionaries of the organization in Scandinavia.

"His immediate subordinate was the chief of the former Hamburg Communist Veteran's Organization (RFB), Karl Bargstaedt, who was responsible for the technical execution of sabotage attempts with explosives. The explosives required came from ore mines in Northern Scandinavia and were supplied to the branches in Holland, Belgium, and France by Dutch seamen via the Norwegian iron-ore harbor at Narvik and the Swedish ore harbor at Lulea. The Dutch communist Willem van Vreeswijk, who was one of the most prominent couriers for explosives, has been arrested in Rotterdam.

"The Dutch and the Belgian Group each had its own laboratories where incendiary and high-explosive bombs were manufactured. The acts of sabotage on the Italian steamer BOCCACCIO and on the Japanese steamer KASII MARU can be traced to these groups. A projected act of sabotage against German ships in the harbors of Amsterdam and Rotterdam was detected and prevented. In the course of further investigation, the Security Service (SD) arrested twenty

\* In November 1941, Wollweber was reported to have been sentenced by a court in Kiruna, Sweden, to three years hard labor on a dynamite charge. In July 1944, he was reported to have been released from prison. At that time the Swedish government was said to have the intention of holding Wollweber on a second charge.



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four Communist terrorists, among them the leader of the Dutch sabotage Group, Achille Beguin, and the leader of the Belgian sabotage Group, Alfons Pictels. The leader of the Western European branches, Schaap, was arrested on 1 August 1940 by Danish police in Copenhagen, as he was about to reactivate the shipping sabotage organization that already existed in Denmark.

"The desire of the Comintern to eliminate German shipping in the Baltic by means of sabotage is illustrated by the fact that between February and April 1941 the German Security Service in co-operation with the Danish police succeeded in rounding up a number of leading Danish Communists who were implicated in sabotage groups. Those arrested include Richard Jensen, member of the Executive Committee of the Danish Communist Party and General Secretary of the ISH, Thoege Thoegeisen, editor of the Danish Communist paper "Arbeiterblatt" in Copenhagen, and the half-Jew Otto Melchior, Committee member of the Danish League of Friends of the Soviet Union.

"The sabotage attempt on the German steamer SAAR in Reval harbor, and on the German freighter PHILA in Koenigsberg harbor are attributable to this Danish Communist sabotage group. The latter vessel sprang a heavy leak in her bow at the waterline following a powerful explosion. The chemical time fuse pack had been put on board in Riga harbor. The chemical and mechanical ignition agents and fuses used by the Danish Communist organization came from Sweden. They had been stored at Malmoe, and a special courier who was employed in a haberdashery at Malmoe took them to Copenhagen. Statements made by other Communist sabotage agents in Denmark provided further important clues concerning the activities of the Comintern directed against Germany:

"In this work, the Comintern attached especial importance to winning over Scandinavian seamen as collaborators, since Moscow believed that in a future war the Scandinavian countries alone would remain neutral and that therefore only citizens of these countries would be able to carry out sabotage in German harbors and on German ships. Over and above this, definite instructions were given to the Scandinavian seamen to destroy the cargo of their own vessels by incendiary and explosive packs if such acts would serve the interests of the Soviet Union. Wollweber himself issued instructions to the local sabotage groups in the Baltic States and the German North Sea harbors that at least one reliable agent should be recruited on all ships plying in this area. This agent was to be well trained to carry out directives of the Third International.

"The attempt to establish a sabotage group in Danzig can also be traced back to this Wollweber order. It has been possible to round up prominent ISH functionaries belonging to the Danzig group, among them the Norwegian citizen Arthur Samsing, who was born in Oslo and spent a long time in the Soviet Union. The men arrested have given full details of the sabotage acts conducted on Wollweber's orders against the Reich.

"As directed by the Comintern, Wollweber also set up bases on the Baltic Islands, Dagoe and Oesel. Agents enlisted there were not to take any action unless these islands should be occupied by German troops or be taken over by the German Navy in the course of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. In such a case, sabotage was to be concentrated on submarine bases, airfields, and oil storage tanks."



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 PART IV. PROPAGANDA - SEDITION  
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 CONSPIRACY  
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No one term or phrase appears quite adequate to define the activities which are to be documented in this part. The distinctions between propaganda, sedition, and conspiracy are vague and fluctuant. Terms like "psychological warfare" or "war of nerves" do not cover the whole field.

These activities nevertheless appear to form one distinct field of warfare. It may be described as being composed of various means designed to break down enemy resistance by other than physical force. Since war is predominantly an operation by armed forces, these means will probably be most effective if co-ordinated according to plan with the suggested or actual exercise of physical force.

The origin of these methods must be dated back at least to the time of the "Trojan Horse". As to their value and effectiveness, the opinions of military writers differ. However, the documents presented on the following pages suggest that these weapons may have their greatest and most threatening potentialities during a period of international tension which has not yet assumed the character of an armed clash.

The material quoted on the following pages illuminates certain tactics, and presents certain ideas which are reported to have governed German and Russian activities in this field. Far from complete, it merely skims over the surface of this intricate subject.

#### 43. Organization and Objectives

On the German side, various offices within the Armed Forces and other organizations took part in activities designed to break down Russian morale and resistance. With regard to propaganda, the material available shows the situation as follows:

According to a Fuehrer Directive of 13 June 1938 the Armed Forces High Command was responsible for the coordination of propaganda campaigns with the over-all aims of armed warfare. Subsequent to this directive an Armed Forces Propaganda Branch (W Pr) was established, the function of which has been described as follows (Source # 52):

"Headed by the Chief of the Propaganda Troops (Chef Pr Tr) this branch (W Pr) is responsible for all types of military propaganda except that which is fed to the troops by the National Socialist Guidance Staff (NSFSt) of the various High Commands. It includes sections for the administration of the propaganda troops, propaganda for the home front, military censorship, propaganda for foreign countries, and counterpropaganda."

Sedition and conspiracy were handled on the top level by the highest political state authorities; several Fuehrer Directives are on record dealing with this subject. In the field they were as a rule carried out under the command of Abwehr II. As will



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be remembered, Abwehr II was divided into two main sections "S" handling sabotage acts, and "I" handling operations in the field of covert propaganda and sedition. To make the German code-letter designation system still more confusing, "I" activities were subdivided into "Z" and "I" (proper), as shown in an Abwehr II directive dated 20 April 1943:

In order to clarify the designation of activities in Abwehr work, it is hereby ordered:

"1. The term 'Insurgent activities' is applied to operations designed to create insurgent activities, such as guerrilla groups in the enemy hinterland, and the preparation of revolts. Code name: 'I' activities.

"2. The term 'Zersetzungsarbeit' (Z) (seditious activities) covers the disintegration of the enemy troops that is to be carried out by means of whispering campaigns, and circulation of leaflets which must not reveal their German origin but appear as the work of dissatisfied Russian nationals."

"Z" activities were carried out by Abwehr II units to a much greater extent and in considerably greater variety than may be assumed from the above directive.

The German files available do not contain any direct account of Russian organizations engaged in propaganda, sedition, and conspiracy. However, material strongly indicates that broad organizations, like the Comintern or the partisans, carried out such activities as special assignments.

Russian Armed Forces propaganda was directed by a special branch of "PURKKA", the Political Central Administration of the Armed Forces Directorate of the All-Soviet Communist Party (WKP (b)). German documents give a certain Shcherbakov (German spelling, Schtscherbakow) as Chief of PURKKA. The PURKKA representative among the troops was the "Politruk". Additional information concerning the organization and function of PURKKA is contained in the German report on "Russian Security Agencies" which appears as Appendix I to this report.

#### Section A: PROPAGANDA

The importance which the German Armed Forces High Command attached to propaganda is documented by a directive issued over the signature of General Keitel by the "National Defense" Section of the OKW on 27 February 1939 (Source # 1). This directive appears of particular interest since it mentions the plan of the OKW to circulate counterpropaganda not only abroad but in Germany as well. No documents have been located to ascertain whether this plan with regard to Germany was subsequently carried out. The top-secret directive states in part:

"One of the outstanding aims of enemy propaganda is to circulate reports even in the Reich government central offices. These reports are designed to cause unrest and confusion and are constructed in such a way that they do not correspond to actual facts, or that they tally only partially... Not every recipient of such reports is in a position to check its veracity...

"Henceforth the Armed Forces High Command through its counter-intelligence channels will circulate in Germany and abroad reports which suit our purpose. Until further notice, these re-

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ports are to further the idea that Germany has no additional territorial aims in Europe, and that her armament serves only the national defense..."

In the course of the war, various German government agencies appear to have been concerned with propaganda on the top-level. Besides the German Propaganda Minister (Dr. Goebbels) and the State Press Chief (Dr. Dietrich), the (Rosenberg) Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories was active in this field. Amt VI of the RSHA gave some thought to propaganda activities. No evidence has been located indicating that any one of the three Commanders-in-Chief, Army, Navy, or Air Force, played a major part in formulating propaganda policies. However, Admiral Canaris, the chief of Ausland/Abwehr, complained on occasion about the disregard for psychological and propaganda factors evinced in Armed Forces and RSHA directives and practices.

The material concerning top-level agencies dealing with propaganda indicates that (a) various views were held by the offices concerned; (b) only in specific instances was an effort made to coordinate these views; (c) the character of military and political acts conflicted at times with the aims professed by propaganda. The lack of proper coordination appears to have been an outstanding feature of German propaganda activity in the East.

Documents on the following pages present two different types of German propaganda: Overt propaganda, conducted by the Armed Forces Propaganda Section W Pr, and covert propaganda forming part of the "Z" operations of Abwehr II.

#### 44. W Pr-Operation: "Silberstreif"

"Silberstreif" means silver lining. This name was used by the Propaganda Section of the Armed Forces High Command as code-word for an overt propaganda operation carried out in preparation for the German summer counteroffensive in the Kursk sector and with what appears to be a singular amount of leaflets, loud-speakers and other equipment. Propaganda Companies (Pr K) and Abwehr II units of the three armies under Army Group, Central Sector, participated in the operation.

Abwehr files (Source # 9) contain a report by the Propaganda Officer Capt. Baron v. Knigge, attached to the Intelligence offices of Army Group Command, Central Sector. This report shows that operation "Silberstreif" was conducted during at least five ten-day periods. The report, is dated 29 June 1943 and covers the fifth of these periods, that is, the time from 15 to 25 June 1943.

In these ten days the following means of propaganda were used for "Silberstreif":

##### (1) Leaflets.

(a) printed by the frontline printing platoon "Memel"; 7,240,000 copies;

(b) received from Armed Forces High Command (W Pr); 16,216,000 copies.

These 23,456,000 copies were distributed as follows:



(Source # 9). The study commands interest due to two factors:

1. The unnamed author apparently had a good knowledge of Russian affairs and had access to Soviet, or allegedly Soviet, documents dated as late as 1943.

2. The study was made for the indoctrination of German military personnel assigned to propaganda missions. Therefore, whatever is presented as the latest Russian propaganda trend, is made simultaneously to serve the German propaganda doctrine of the "Red Menace".

In this manner the document acquires a dual character: It discusses Russian propaganda themes, but this discussion is part and parcel of German propaganda; almost every page discloses this purpose.

The period of this document is noteworthy; while the manuscript is not dated, its contents show that it was written about fall 1943. At that time, Russian and communist propaganda appeared to be concentrated on furthering an Allied victory. Since the close of hostilities, the situation has changed, and corresponding changes may have been observed in what is commonly referred to as "the party line".

The author of the document has not been identified. From the contents, one might assume that he belonged to the group of experts who were gathered by the RSHA for the study of Russian problems in the "Wannsee Institute".

Part I of the document, headed "Soviet Statehood", deals with recent Russian nationalist tendencies. The German writer makes, among others, the following statements:

"A. Official 'Sovietism' propaganda for local consumption:

"This propaganda stresses the fact that the citizen of the USSR does not belong to the cradle of Bolshevik World Revolution, nor to Czarist Russia, but to the progressive 'Union' (Russian: Soyuz) of all Soviet Republics. This Soyuz-outlook is strengthened by all personal identification papers, such as passports, rigidly describing the home state as the 'Union' (the Soyuz); by cleverly designed maps of the country, well adapted atlases and effective Soyuz emblems, such as coats of arms, flags and symbols. Soyuz propaganda is also applied to the ethnological description of the Union; its numerous peoples are no longer described as 'population' or 'inhabitants' of the Soviet Union, but are known officially as 'The Soviet People'.

"The mere consciousness of belonging to a Union State is broadened by patriotic propaganda. Films show Soviet Russia's 'largest building in the world', her 'most important dam in the world', her 'largest factories on the Continent'. Postage stamps depict the Red Flag at the North Pole as a symbol of 'Soviet Arctic exploration and ice-breaker technique'. In school and literature the country is praised as 'unique and incomparable', as 'the hope of mankind'.

"This propaganda, which was started from above as a Government measure soon found response among parts of the population. Ambitious or unstable nationalities were given a chance at least on paper for an existence impossible in the old Czarist Empire. Nationalistic or Czarist fathers with 'old-fashioned ideas' could raise their children in the new spirit of Soviet Statehood, thus avoiding still greater moral compromise. Non-Communist youth saw in 'Sovietism' a last chance for social betterment open to them without the obligation to join the 'Komsomol' and thereby the Party.



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lar operations only by acts which cannot be identified as originating from a German source, such as:

(a) "Z" leaflets and "Z" slogans with fictitious signatures of Soviet or ex-Soviet officials, for instance, of a prominent enemy general, a well known partisan chief, or an anti-Soviet Russian minority;

(b) Assistance to local W Pr and NFSt offices by temporary assignment of agents who cannot be used elsewhere, or by exchange of practical information;

(c) If front-line conditions permit, the following coordinated operation is recommended: The appropriate military propaganda squad (W Pr) on a front sector involves the Russian Politruk or other speaker in a loud-speaker discussion. The Abwehr II Trupp then cuts in with an auxiliary propaganda megaphone or similar gear, posing as a voice from another Soviet sector and making sharp comments on the remarks of the Politruk."

#### 45. Propaganda Principles and Experiences gained by Abwehr Trupp 204

The manner in which covert propaganda was carried out by Abwehr Trupps is illustrated by a report which was submitted on 21 September 1942 by Abwehr Group, Central Army Sector to its subordinate commands and to Abwehr II headquarters. The report was written by a Capt. Verbeek, officer in charge of Abwehr Trupp 204; it was entitled "'Z' operations against the Soviet Union". (Source # 7). Section II of this report recorded "Past Experiences" as follows:

"Abwehr Trupp 204 of the 6th Army now has a year's experience.

"Statements of senior Soviet officers after the encirclement at Uman showed that stories carried back by returning Red Army men were more effective than any leaflets. Such stories robbed the Soviet atrocity propaganda of its force and, in particular, gave telling accounts of the technical equipment and cultural level of the German army. Hence it was decided to experiment with properly planned 'Z' propaganda.

"Shortly before the capture of Kiev and then again in front of Kharkov in 1941, units of fifteen to twenty ex-prisoners of war including officers, were filtered through the front lines, after appropriate good treatment and instruction. Their sole task was to report on conditions on the German side and to suggest that resistance be given up. This work was renewed on a larger scale in Spring 1942. This time the indoctrination of the 'Z' agents was especially concerned with:

- (1) The condition of workers and peasants in Germany,
- (2) projected and accomplished reorganization of Russian agriculture,
- (3) significance of the war to the Russian peasant's struggle for freedom, and
- (4) economic reorganization of the country and recompense of the industrious.

"Three units of eighteen to twenty agents each were assigned

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in June, and other units at three different times during the advance and the battles before Stalingrad. It was possible to contact some of the agents again, although the return of the agents had not been anticipated, as they almost all lived in unoccupied Russia. Reports from these agents and constant interrogations of prisoners of war showed that eyewitness reports are given greater credence than leaflet propaganda. In many instances the stories transmitted led to the desertion of large units and officers as well.

"It is no disadvantage if some of the agents are rounded up by the Russian counterespionage. The enemy should be made aware of the fact that these covert operations are being carried out against him. He must be made uneasy and caused to suspect foul play behind every little incident at the Front..."

Russian propaganda operations of an overt as well as a covert nature have been reported as having been at times highly successful. Statements from Russian and other sources speak of the desertion of German front-line units occasioned by Russian propaganda in the latter part of the war. It is known that Russian propaganda made special use of the "General von Paulus" group which was affiliated with the German "Freiheitsbewegung" organized in Moscow and directed by leading German communists. While it can be assumed that in these campaigns specialized propaganda techniques were developed, no material on the subject has been available for this report.

#### 46. The Prisoner of War Propaganda Problem

Documents presented in the two previous chapters show that W Pr overt propaganda as well as Abwehr II covert propaganda aimed particularly at persuading Russian units to surrender. Documents and official communiques indicate that the eastern theater may have held broad possibilities in this respect. However, officers concerned realized that a direct relation existed between conditions prevalent in prisoner of war cages and the willingness or unwillingness of enemy troops to become "guests" in such camps.

In this situation Germany apparently found herself at a disadvantage because of the barbaric treatment meted out to Russian prisoners by SS and SD units and the Nazi concept of the Slavic "Untermensch" (Man below human standards). These difficulties were clearly pointed out in a secret memorandum which the Chief of Ausland/Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, sent on 15 September 1940 to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command. The memorandum was occasioned by an Armed Forces decree concerning the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war.

Point "1" of the memorandum reviewed the regulations of the Geneva Convention regarding the treatment of prisoners. It pointed out that these regulations were not binding in the case of Russia, since the Soviet Union was not a party to the Convention. It stated that, notwithstanding the legal situation, certain principles of International Law have become the common practice of all civilized nations. Admiral Canaris then continued:

"The decrees for the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed as supplement No. 1 are based on a fundamentally dif-

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ferent viewpoint, as is shown in the opening phrases. According to this view military service in the Soviet armed forces is not considered a fulfillment of duty, but in view of the murders committed by the Russians, is regarded as a crime... The instructions are very general. But if one considers their basic principles, the expressly approved measures will result in arbitrary mistreatment and murder, the formal prohibition of arbitrary action notwithstanding... The treatment of prisoners of war is removed to a large extent from the supervision of the Armed Forces; but to the world at large the responsibility will remain ours...

"Enclosure No. 2 is a translation of the Russian decree for prisoners of war. It complies with the principles of International Law and to a very large extent also with the Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of war. This decree will no doubt be disregarded by the Russian troops at the front, but both the Russian as well as the German decrees are mainly for home consumption... There is the danger that the German decrees will be seized upon by enemy propaganda and will be compared with the Russian decrees...

"The reconstruction of the occupied territories, so essential for the German war economy, will be handicapped. After their experiences in the prisoner of war camps it will be impossible to get prisoners of war to work for us after their release... Possible sources of information will be blocked; prisoners of war who could be used for counterintelligence purposes as political opponents of the Bolshevistic regime, especially those belonging to minorities, will lose any willingness they may have had to be enlisted..."

The consequences of this situation for Army units in the field were pointed out in a memorandum (Source # 9) sent on 13 October 1942 by Abwehr Kommando 202, attached to Abwehr Group B, to the Chief Intelligence Officer of Army Group B controlling the German armies in the sector before Stalingrad and Kursk:

"As a result of the atrocity stories spread by all possible means by the Russians, Red Army men are panic-stricken at the thought of becoming German prisoners of war. This propaganda is often the main reason for the desperate resistance of the enemy; he will rather fight to the last than risk being taken prisoner under the conditions pictured by Russian propaganda."

To counteract this situation, Abwehr Kommando 202 had suggested on 1 May 1942 setting up "model prisoner of war camps for deserters only". In addition, Abwehr Kommando 202 suggested (Source # 9): "The most convincing method is to organize a prisoner of war postal service, so that prisoners have an opportunity of writing to their families to say that they are alive, being well treated, etc. These letters would have to be sorted into areas and towns and dropped by planes... Russian civilians believe the atrocity stories propagated by the Russians about German soldiers, especially stories of shooting prisoners of war. Bad conditions in German prisoner of war camps have lent color to this propaganda. As a result, the number of deserters has fallen off to almost nothing and every man fights to the death to avoid what he supposes to be imminent torture and the firing-squad after being taken prisoner by the Germans."

"Hence, it is of utmost importance that the Soviet people should know something of the treatment given to prisoners of war, which has meantime improved, and of the fate of their husbands, brothers and fathers."

"Without being asked, prisoners of war will paint conditions in Germany in a rosier light than they actually are for fear of the censor and in order to curry favor. Prisoners who are work-



ing and look stronger may also send photographs. These letters could be used in two ways:

"1. Abwehr II missions and agents passing through the Soviet lines can be supplied with letters to families in their operational area. When they reach the actual place the agents can use the letters as identification and state that the sender will be treated well only if the agent reaches German territory again, alive. In this way support can be extorted from the family of the prisoner of war in question.

"2. The prisoner of war letters can be dropped ostentatiously by plane in the neighborhood of the towns to which they are addressed. In this case, it is not important that the letters reach the correct address; even if the family does not read them, other people will..."

It can be assumed that such machinations were insufficient to veil the actual situation. All documents available point to the fact that Germany was the loser in the contest to induce the enemy troops to give up a struggle which the propaganda pictured as "hopeless".

#### 47. The Failure of German Political Propaganda in the East.

Propaganda is pre-eminently a political weapon. The front-line propaganda conducted by Armed Forces Propaganda officers and Abwehr II "Z" units depended in the end upon such political propaganda and activities as were carried out by the political offices of the German government. The possibilities for political propaganda, as well as the failure to utilize this weapon properly, were analyzed in a handwritten memorandum drawn up in October 1942 (or 1944) by Dr. Braeutigam, who was a ranking member of the Political Affairs Division of the (Rosenberg) Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories. This division was headed by Dr. Leibbrandt, who prepared the propaganda campaign preceding the German attack. The Braeutigam memorandum (Source # 46) stated:

"If the war were conducted only to smash Bolshevism, it would have been decided long ago in our favor, for, as all experiences of this war have confirmed, Bolshevism is hated to the utmost by the Eastern European peoples, above all by the great mass of peasants.

"The Russian population understood the measures necessitated by war much better than the conquered peoples of the West. However, the workers and peasants soon perceived that Germany did not regard them as partners with equal rights, but merely as the objective of her political and economic aims. This disillusioned them unspeakably, all the more so, since they had placed greatest hopes on Germany...

"As we know, the peoples of the Soviet Union have endured the greatest hardships. Consequently, they are of a simplicity inconceivable to us, even in the political sphere. A form of occupation which was not intent on plundering and exploitation and which did away with Bolshevik methods would have kindled the greatest enthusiasm. It would have secured us the support of millions. Such feelings in occupied territories would have had far-reaching repercussions on the morale of the Red Army.



"Considering the great significance of the agrarian question in the Soviet Union, the Political Affairs Division demanded even prior to the Eastern campaign, that the Kolkhos (collective farms) be dissolved and an individual agrarian economy be introduced again. This proposal was turned down by the Deputy for the Four Year Plan (Goering) with the remark that organic changes were not to be considered during the war... The increasing of farmland, which forms the main criterion of the general economy has still not been achieved to the extent of 10% of the general economy, although it was decreed... in August 1941...

"Religious freedom likewise was to set in motion a great surge of enthusiasm. After months of negotiations it was eventually decided not to proclaim freedom of religion, but to let it come into existence as quietly as possible. Consequently the propaganda effect was lost.\*

"When the Ministry's Political Affairs Division noticed the reluctance to come to a decision on the church question, it searched for a substitute. Another means of propaganda could have been found by restoring the individual's right to property... The first display of this propaganda would have been the immediate renunciation of the expropriation measures in the Baltic states... To the unbounded surprise of the populace, however, the German administration marched forward to play the role of receiver of the goods stolen by the Bolsheviks... Again a true weapon for the disintegration of the enemy front had been twisted from our hand...

"The treatment of prisoners of war should be mentioned as a subject of prime importance. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of prisoners literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps... It is obvious that nothing is so suitable to strengthen the will to resistance of the Red Army as the knowledge that a slow miserable death is to be met in German captivity.

"Under these circumstances the following can be noted:

"1. The morale of the Red Army and the strength of the partisan movement have mounted in the same degree as the population realized our true aims. Just as in 1918, the feats of arms of our noble army have been neutralized by an inadequate policy. Our policy has forced Bolsheviks and Russian nationalists into one common front against us. The Russian fights today with exceptional bravery and self-sacrifice for nothing more nor less than recognition of his human dignity.

"2. Our aspiration to utilize the Ukraine as a political instrument against mighty Russia, Poland and the Balkans, and as a bridge into the Caucasus, has suffered complete shipwreck. The forty million Ukrainians, who joyfully greeted us as liberators, today are indifferent to us, and have already begun to swing into the enemy camp..."

#### 48. Russian Propaganda Themes for Foreign and Home Consumption.

Among Abwehr II documents is a study entitled "The four methods used by Moscow to disguise the drive for World Revolution"

\* Documents (Source # 46) show that any suggestion to proclaim religious freedom in Russia was vetoed by Hitler.



(Source # 9). The study commands interest due to two factors:

1. The unnamed author apparently had a good knowledge of Russian affairs and had access to Soviet, or allegedly Soviet, documents dated as late as 1943.

2. The study was made for the indoctrination of German military personnel assigned to propaganda missions. Therefore, whatever is presented as the latest Russian propaganda trend, is made simultaneously to serve the German propaganda doctrine of the "Red Menace".

In this manner the document acquires a dual character: It discusses Russian propaganda themes, but this discussion is part and parcel of German propaganda; almost every page discloses this purpose.

The period of this document is noteworthy; while the manuscript is not dated, its contents show that it was written about fall 1943. At that time, Russian and communist propaganda appeared to be concentrated on furthering an Allied victory. Since the close of hostilities, the situation has changed, and corresponding changes may have been observed in what is commonly referred to as "the party line".

The author of the document has not been identified. From the contents, one might assume that he belonged to the group of experts who were gathered by the RSHA for the study of Russian problems in the "Wannsee Institute".

Part I of the document, headed "Soviet Statehood", deals with recent Russian nationalist tendencies. The German writer makes, among others, the following statements:

"A. Official 'Sovietism' propaganda for local consumption:

"This propaganda stresses the fact that the citizen of the USSR does not belong to the cradle of Bolshevik World Revolution, nor to Czarist Russia, but to the progressive 'Union' (Russian: Soyuz) of all Soviet Republics. This Soyuz-outlook is strengthened by all personal identification papers, such as passports, rigidly describing the home state as the 'Union' (the Soyuz); by cleverly designed maps of the country, well adapted atlases and effective Soyuz emblems, such as coats of arms, flags and symbols. Soyuz propaganda is also applied to the ethnological description of the Union; its numerous peoples are no longer described as 'population' or 'inhabitants' of the Soviet Union, but are known officially as 'The Soviet People'.

"The mere consciousness of belonging to a Union State is broadened by patriotic propaganda. Films show Soviet Russia's 'largest building in the world', her 'most important dam in the world', her 'largest factories on the Continent'. Postage stamps depict the Red Flag at the North Pole as a symbol of 'Soviet Arctic exploration and ice-breaker technique'. In school and literature the country is praised as 'unique and incomparable', as 'the hope of mankind'.

"This propaganda, which was started from above as a Government measure soon found response among parts of the population. Ambitious or unstable nationalities were given a chance at least on paper for an existence impossible in the old Czarist Empire. Nationalistic or Czarist fathers with 'old-fashioned ideas' could raise their children in the new spirit of Soviet Statehood, thus avoiding still greater moral compromise. Non-Communist youth saw in 'Sovietism' a last chance for social betterment open to them without the obligation to join the 'Komsomol' and thereby the Party.

"B. 'Sovietism' propaganda for foreign consumption:



"Russia's alleged resignation from the Comintern represented the climax of these propaganda maneuvers: The Western Democracies were to be led to believe that they would be met half way by the peace loving Soviet State and not by the motherland of the Bolshevik World Revolution. For this technique cf. Lenin's maxim, still unforgotten in the Soviet Union. (Lenin's works, Russian Edition, Vol. XVIII, pg. 276):

"Organization is this: Millions of human beings inspired by one common will resolve to change the forms of their society and work. Their eyes fixed on the one common aim, they will alter the places and methods of their activity, synchronizing their means and weapons with the shifting phases and conditions of their struggle."

Part II of the document is entitled "Pan-Slavism". The following material is presented:

"Under the cover of 'Sovietism', Russian-Nationalist ideas have been stimulated throughout the Soviet Union. Russian is today the language of the most powerful central state agencies, the Army and Navy, the railways, inland waterways and the Secret Police (GPU). The industrialization sponsored by the Moscow Government brought hundreds of thousands of national Russian workers and engineers into the feverishly expanding cities in the Arctic, to Siberia and the Pacific coast, so that in ten 'colonization years' more Russians migrated to the frontier than during the 300 previous 'years of possession'.

"The development of a renewed Pan-Russianism contained two dangers: It might offend the non-Russian population of the state and it might lead to repercussions in internal politics. The National-Russian spirit was therefore diverted into new channels:

"A. 'The Homeland'.

"In principle the member of the Communist International knows no homeland. Yet the communist may deviate from this principle when the situation demands. Stalin, in his speech in 1938, applied the new doctrine to the party organization, saying: 'In the past we had no motherland, nor was such a thing possible. But now that we have overcome capitalism and given the power to the worker, we have a motherland and will fight for her independence'.

"Simultaneously, a new nationalist interpretation of history is substituted for the former 'materialist concepts'. Homage is again paid to previously defamed Czarist army and navy commanders, as for example the Generals Kutuzov, Suvarov, the Admiral Makarov and even the 'White Guard' General Kornilov. Historical epochs formerly branded are now honored as the embodiment of Russian ideals, for example, in the book 'The Russian Aristocracy in the XVIII Century' (Moscow 1941).

"B. The Soviet doctrine on the Russian heritage.

"As early as the XV century Moscow claimed to be the heir of two historic forbears: The Byzantine Empire and the Slav-Norman Great Empire of Kiev. The Bolshevik Moscow of Lenin discarded these teachings and claimed that it represented the beginning of an entirely new era. The Bolshevik Moscow of Stalin, however, turned its back on Lenin's claims and revived the old teachings of inheritance. In accordance with this Stalin doctrine, the Soviet regime is now the legal, spiritual and historic heir of the glorious Russian past, even the Czarist time...

"Stalin himself formulated the new doctrines of historical inheritance when he addressed members of the Red Army assembled on the Red Square in Moscow on November 7, 1941 to celebrate the October Revolution: 'May the picture of our great forebears go

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before you in this war for the motherland: Alexander Nevsky, Dimitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dimitri Pozarski, Alexander Suvarov, Michael Kutuzov. May the victorious banner of the great Lenin light your path!

"A directive for 'Agitators and Propagandists in the Red Army' (Military Publishers, Moscow 1943, volume 7) proves that this teaching is hammered into the fanaticized troops hour after hour, and day after day.

"C. Pan-Slavism. This doctrine is played down at present as compared to the Sovietism propaganda. Nevertheless, Pan-Slavist propaganda is carried on in the political and military sphere.

"Political Pan-Slavism has an internal and an external aim. The internal aim is to intermingle biologically and in language the three Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union, so that they amalgamate until they form one 'Slav-Soviet People'. For this purpose, differences between Russians and Ukrainians are obliterated as much as possible by political coddling of the Ukrainians, theoretical recognition of their 'cultural rights', numerous awards of decorations and honorary posts. The Slav-Cyrillic letters have been decreed compulsory for the entire Soviet Union. Thus, the Cyrillic, i.e., the Slavic writing is used now even for the new written languages of Usbek, Azerbaijan, Kalmuk and other provinces.

"The outward aim of political Pan-Slavism is the Russian protectorate over all 'Slav brothers who are the serfs of Fascism'. For this purpose the allegedly dissolved Comintern has been replaced by the 'Pan-Slav Congress'. Three annual congresses took place in Moscow in 1941, 1942, and 1943. The permanent executive secretary also resides in Moscow. Prominent among the members are a Polish priest, Slovak deserters and partisans, Bulgarian Communists, Czech legionaries, Croat emigres, etc. The tenor and arguments of the speeches do not differ from those of Pan-Slav Congresses before World War I. The political program clearly aims at the integration of Poles and Czechs, the occupation of the Balkans, and access to the Dardanelles.

"Military Pan-Slavism has developed into diversionary and partisan activity. A Czech and a Polish legion have been formed. Serbian, Croat and Slovene partisan groups exist in the Balkans, but they are bitterly combatted by national groups of their own peoples, even though all parts of the countries are anti-German..."

Part III of the German Document is entitled "The new Russian Church Policy", but does not contain any material not generally known.

The final part is headed "Eurasia Propaganda" and presents the following argument:

"The Eurasia concept is to form the apex to the other three themes of new Communist teaching and propaganda. According to this concept, Europe is merely the western tip of Asia; she belongs to the continent of Asia as a 'little appendage'. This assumption is expressed in the political instructions of the Politruks....

"The Eurasia concept offers added camouflage to Moscow's aspirations. No longer is the drive to the Atlantic to appear as part of a Bolshevik plan for World Revolution - this admission might frighten off some of its hirelings or allies. It now appears as a supposedly natural course of events: 'Eurasia with its center in Moscow has started to carry out the trifling frontier adjustments in the West that had previously been shelved'."



## Section B. SEDITION

Documents presented in the preceding section show that in German organization no clear distinction was made between covert propaganda and sedition. Both formed part of the "Z" activities of the (letter) "I" branch of Abwehr II. While "I" (proper) activities aimed mainly at the establishment and direction of guerrilla organizations in the rear of the enemy, "Z" activities were described in an Abwehr II directive issued on 15 October 1943 (Source # 7) as follows:

"The word 'Zersetzung' connotes the undermining of the enemy's will and capacity to fight by means of Abwehr II methods. All measures and expedients used for this objective must be of such a nature that they give the impression of originating in dissatisfied or war weary sections of the enemy state itself. 'Z' is aimed at disaffecting enemy forces until military chaos and administrative anarchy result."

The memorandum then outlines the three main fields of seditious activities "Z" as follows:

"1. Decomposition: Disintegration of the enemy into smaller units that are more easily attacked... Exploitation of national minorities. Reference to the so-called 'Armies of Liberation', especially the Russian 'Vlassov' Army, the Ukrainian, Caucasian, Cossack, and Turkmen People's Legions. Revival of national committees and underground groups. Reference to the numerous Slavic peoples who fight on the German side, as opposed to the Pan-Slav office in Moscow."

"2. Deception: Diverting the enemy from his original tactical or strategic plans, and misleading him as to German plans. In this connection the assignment of guerrilla ('K') and 'special duty' (z.b.V.) missions has more than merely operational aims; it is designed to increase the uneasiness of the enemy, to make him mistrust his own uniform and units. Inevitably he will over-evaluate any tactical success of such Abwehr II mission, no matter how slight it appeared on the surface."

"3. Provocation: Prominent Soviet officers, officials, or important Russian groups are to be exposed and played off one against the other. Forged papers of a compromising character are to be left behind during withdrawals, such as German reports on Soviet officers or incriminating prisoner of war interrogation material. Compromising radio transmissions, including such in Russian code..."

From this description it is evident that "Z" operations, while they included the use of covert propaganda, went far beyond this. In the following chapters, German documents are given which illustrate various tactics used in pursuit of decomposition, deception, and provocation.

## 49. Decomposition

Probably the historic example of decomposition is the manner in which the German government made use of the Bolshevist leader Lenin during World War I. Exiled from Russia, Lenin conducted anti-Czarist and defeatist propaganda from Switzerland. It was reported that the German government permitted him to spread his defeatist propaganda among Russian prisoners of war during 1915



and 1916. In 1917 the German General Erich von Ludendorff is said to have arranged for the secret transport of Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks Zinovyev, Kamenev, Radeck, Lunarcharsky and others from Switzerland into Russia. The men were reported to have been transported through Germany in a sealed freight car. On 16 April 1917 Lenin arrived in Petrograd, later renamed Leningrad, to start his mission of "decomposition" which culminated in the November Revolution, 1917.

Nothing equally spectacular has been found in German files of World War II. As a rule, decomposition operations appear to have been carried out on a small scale by freeing inmates of isolated Russian prison-labor camps, or by supplying anti-Russian guerrillas with arms.

What appears to have been a fairly typical "run of the mill" decomposition operation is described in instructions transmitted by the "Mil. Amt", that is Ausland/Abwehr after its incorporation into the RSHA, to the "Training Regiment Kurfuerst". The instructions were based on action reports received from the East. The document (Source # 9) states:

"Operation 'B' is based on the statements of refugees, prisoners and agents, all of which agree on the fact that Russian anti-Soviet guerrillas are in the woods east of... It is suggested to contact these guerrillas through agents in order to provide them with weapons, ammunition and provisions in return for definite sabotage activities and interruption of the enemy supply lines."

Such combination of sabotage and decomposition, of "S" and "Z" operations, appear to have been a rather common practice of Abwehr II Kommandos in the East. The plan for Operation "Dschungel" appears typical of such combined operations. It had been devised by Abwehr Office Ostland, and was carried out by Abwehr Kommando 204. The plan provided as follows:

"1. Strength of unit: V-man Nikolayev and eleven Russian agents, including two radio operators, plus two German airplane pilots.

"2. Equipment: Russian NKVD uniforms, weapons according to special requirements, sabotage material according to special requirements, provisions for twenty days. Total weight about 1,600 kg. Money: 5,000 rubles per man, total 60,000 rubles.

"3. Mission: a. To sabotage with lasting effect the railroad Vorkuta-Kotlas at different places between Ust Koshva and Ust Ukhta. b. Wrecking of four small bridges (20 to 40 m long) over tributaries of the Pechora by fire or explosive. Clearing and reconstruction are to be delayed by installing mines with tension release igniter. c. Release of the political prisoners in the labor camps. They are to be armed and will be used for insurrection. They are to start a resistance movement. V-man Nikolayev anticipates that the released prisoners will help in the execution of the sabotage assignments. He will equip them with weapons and material. It must be left to V-man Nikolayev to decide when he will free the prisoners; it is planned to do this after the first sabotage act when his group has proved itself... d. After completing his mission, V-man Nikolayev intends to return bringing with him any volunteers. He will provide the others with papers so that they can make their own way back, or he will release them in their home district."

The operation was started according to plan. Its success could not be ascertained by Abwehr II authorities.\*

\* For the radio traffic between the "Dschungel" mission and Abwehr II see chapter 27.



## 50. Deception

German armed forces deceptive measures were based on a General Directive issued by the Armed Forces High Command on 2 February 1940, and stating in part:

## "Methods of Deception:

(a) Navy, Army, and Air Force: Operational measures calculated to confuse the enemy should, on principle, be so worked out that they can stand checking by the enemy intelligence service and corroborate fake messages sent out by our own counter-intelligence. It is a prerequisite of every major deceptive operation that our troops, and to a considerable extent the authorities in charge, including the lesser commands, should believe in the genuineness of the measures, - that is, they must not be aware of any intent to deceive.

(b) Ausland/Abwehr: Counterespionage; spreading of news by persons travelling abroad, such as economists; supplying carefully calculated information to neutral military and naval attaches; systematic use of our own military and naval attaches and of 'drawing-room espionage'; exchange of intelligence material with neutral states, etc."

The most extensive deceptive operation conducted by the German Armed Forces High Command was part of "Barbarossa", that is, the attack on Russia. Plans for this attack provided that its initial phases were not to be conducted under "Barbarossa", but under "Haifisch" and "Harpune". "Haifisch" and "Harpune" were operational plans for an invasion of England, the first with jumping-off places along the Channel coast, the second in Norway. These plans were worked out in great detail, and by the late spring of 1941 orders went out to German commands to start moving for "Haifisch" and "Harpune". These orders closely resembled those issued in the summer and fall of 1940 under "Seeloewe", that is, the original plan for the invasion of the British Isles. "Haifisch/Harpune" orders were accompanied by a sealed envelope, to be opened only on orders from the Armed Forces High Command. This envelope contained the information that "Haifisch" and "Harpune" were deceptive movements and that the invasion was not directed against England but against the U.S.S.R. Several documents from the files of Naval Staff (Source # 1) illustrate the tactics employed. On 17 March 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following top-secret memorandum (given in excerpt) to the Commanding Admirals of Naval Group North and West, and to the Commanding Admirals, France, and Norway:

"Subject: 'Barbarossa.' The following information is intended only for the information of the Commanding Admirals and their Chiefs of Staff:

"I. During the first period of preparation, the purpose of the operations outlined in the following is to increase the uncertainty of the enemy and to camouflage those movements which are to take place.

a. Army: Large-scale east-west movements, up to twenty one divisions. Transport of seven divisions into the Channel area to give the impression that preparations are under way for the invasion of England. This impression will be increased by landing exercises, transport of special equipment into the coastal area, issuing of directives and guidebooks for Southern England, and assignment of English speaking interpreters to the staffs. Foreign officers are 'accidentally' to gain a glimpse of these preparations.

b. Air Force. Air units are scheduled to remain in the west. Special exercises in the 'Seeloewe' area are to strengthen the impression that an invasion is imminent.



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c. Navy. Naval forces will remain assigned against England. The fact that small naval units will be absent from the combat area for a prolonged period will be explained by our agents abroad as further indication of the preparations for an invasion of England.

d. The Armed Forces High Command will issue traffic and communications regulations as well as guide books on England; it will set up propaganda teams with English interpreters; economic experts in German private industry will be informed that their induction into the armed forces is imminent.

"II. Commencing 12 April, the second period of preparations will begin during which certain movements can no longer be camouflaged. However, in the West the Army will prepare a new operation against England similar to 'Seeloewe', but under a different code word. In Norway, landing preparations will be started in the same way... Those movements in the East which can no longer be concealed, will be explained as measures to protect our rear."

On 26 April 1941, with the "second phase of preparations" well under way, the Chief of Naval Operations informed the Commanding Admirals as follows (in excerpt):

"Subject: 'Barbarossa' (Deception).

"I. The Armed Forces High Command has issued the following directives to Commander in Chief, Army; Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands, and Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway:

1. Activities in the coastal areas of Belgium and Northern France are to be intensified by: (a) tightening of controls on those foreigners and stateless persons who have not yet been expelled; (b) issuing of orders by which all persons must at all times carry official identification with photo and such special permits as may be required; (c) issuing of orders to all apartment and hotel owners to check every entry in the guest book against the personal identification of the guest...

2. Border control at the demarcation line is to be increased. All violations of border regulations are to be punished.

"These regulations to become effective early in May.

"II. The Commanding Admirals of the Groups and the Commanding Admirals, France, and Norway are informed of these measures to enable them to answer inquiries from subordinate commands in an appropriate manner. The aim and purpose of the above measures is to give enemy intelligence the impression that they are being carried out to cover up larger military preparations for an invasion.

"III. The Army High Command has ordered the Army Command, Norway to carry out a deceptive maneuver against England. Code word 'Harpune'. German occupation troops stationed in Denmark will take part. The fact that this operation is a camouflage maneuver will be made known by the Army High Command only to the Army Command, Norway, and to the Commanding General of the German troops in Denmark."

It is impossible at this time to check the extent to which this deceptive operation was successful. In any event Naval files show that it was carried out with most methodical thoroughness, and with disregard for any stress and strain on military personnel, equipment, or civilians. However, in the light of various notes in the War Diary of the German Naval Attache at Moscow for the months April and May 1941, it appears doubtful that the German attack came as a surprise to the Soviet Union. Under the date of 7 May 1941, for instance, he recorded:



"Two Russian officers stated in a conversation with Lt. Neumann (aide to the attache), ... that war with Germany would start within two months. This is the first time during the past three months that such a remark has been made from Soviet quarters to one of my assistants."

No second deceptive operation amounting to anything like the "Barbarossa" maneuver is shown in German files. On the other hand, these files indicate that deceptive acts on a much smaller scale were a common practice of Abwehr II units in the East. "Z" operations of a deceptive character are illustrated by the following report taken from the instructional memorandum quoted previously (Source #7):

"NKVD radio messages intercepted recently show that the mere discovery of parachutes has led to extensive countermeasures and searches. Hence it is proposed to drop several empty chutes in the areas where NKVD units are under observation by our radio counterintelligence. The chutes will be unserviceable ones; there will be one or two supply chutes with explosives and fuzes, and a complete agent radio set with operating instructions. The aim of this operation is:

(a) To strengthen the deceptive impression of an operation already started;

(b) to lead the NKVD to believe that a large group has been dropped;

(c) to cause the Russians to start radio counter-play with the gear picked up. During this decoy traffic, fake messages and orders will be sent to the German mission supposedly dropped in these areas.

"It is anticipated that the course of this operation can be checked by continuous interception of the NKVD Service radio counter-play."

The close link between deception and counterintelligence demonstrated in this document is assumed to have been fairly characteristic for Abwehr practices.

#### 51. Provocation

The Abwehr II directive of 15 October 1943, described provocative "Z" operations as aimed at the "exposure" and the compromising of prominent Soviet officers and officials.

On 29 July 1944 RSHA, Mil. Amt forwarded to Training Regiment "Kurfuerst" a report on operation "Judas" (Source # 9). The mission was described as follows: "A ranking Red Army officer is to be compromised. The operation is to lead to his arrest by the NKVD. He will be held on the charge of high treason in view of the fact that incriminating letters and bribes have been transmitted to him by an agent."

The report itself differs from previous Ausland/Abwehr reports by the fact that all names of persons and places not essential to the story are omitted. Omissions in the following text are those of the RSHA.

The instrument for this operation was to be the Russian Lt. N.,



described in the RSHA report as follows:

"In view of his improbable statements which are often contradictory and of his strange conduct at the transit camp 'ooo', N. is suspected of being a Russian agent who has wormed his way into the camp. His desire to prove his reliability by front line duty with the (Vlassov) Army of Liberation is particularly suspicious. In view of his ambitious character he appears a suitable object for the operation planned... The operation can be started immediately."

The manner in which N. was to be used for operation "Judas" is shown by the following order signed by him:

"In the guise of a Red Army Officer who is on his way to a hospital, I am to go to the staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Front (Army Group) at K. There I am to go straight to Major K. and to report with the code: 'I am to bring you greetings from Major Petrov.' Upon the answer 'Which Major Petrov do you mean?' I am to hand Major K. a letter and 50,000 rubles."

This letter was written in code, which, however, could easily be broken, and the amount of 50,000 rubles was handed to Lt. N. According to the RSHA document, operation "Judas" was to proceed as follows:

"The Russian Lt. N. will apparently be inducted for service with the German Abwehr. He will be told that Red Army officers who have been captured or are deserters and have proven their reliability to German authorities, may enlist in the Vlassov Army with their present or next higher rank. To give N. the opportunity to prove his reliability, he will be asked to cross into Red Army territory as our agent."

"Before Lt. N. is assigned to this task, he will be given an opportunity to eavesdrop on conversations which will cause him to suspect that the German Army is in touch with a group of Red Army officers, and that these Red Army officers aim at the overthrow of the Stalin regime."

"During a briefing conference, he will receive the German order to deliver an important message and a large sum of money to Major K. with the staff of the 3rd Ukrainian Red Army Front. N. must be under the impression when he receives this order that no other agent is available. At the same time he will be informed vaguely of the 'conspiracy' in the Russian ranks."

"N. will be channeled through the front in an appropriate sector ostensibly as a wounded Soviet officer on his way to the field hospital; he will be furnished with papers corroborating this story..."

"It can be assumed that once N. has been filtered through the front he will either not carry out his mission, or he will be arrested by an NKVD patrol. In any event, in view of the routine NKVD procedure, it can be assumed that besides arresting Major 'K' they will take his father (implicated by the letter) who is a Major General and Chief of Staff at the 'xxx' Front. The closest fellow officers of these two men will also be involved. All these men will be eliminated at least for a considerable period if they are not actually shot."

"Other agents to be sent into Soviet territory will be furnished with a legend by which the existence of an anti-bolshevist conspiracy in the ranks of higher Red Army officers is also implied."

According to the RSHA, Mil. Amt document, Lt. N. was channeled through the front line southeast of "T" on 8 July 1944 at 0230.



He carried the "Z" letter and 50,000 rubles. He wore the uniform of a Red Army 2nd lieutenant. The German corporal "W", in charge of this mission, took him to the front and watched him cross into Russian territory.

No report on success or failure of operation "Judas" has been found in German files.

## 52. Russian Seditious Operations

The Abwehr II files available do not contain any direct accounts of Russian seditious activities of a pattern similar to German "Z" operations. Acts of decomposition, deception, and provocation, however, are assumed to have been conducted by both sides in the Russo-German war. This assumption can be based, (1) on the thorough use made of diversionary tactics by the Russian General Staff in World War I, (2) on Russian accounts concerning activities of the "Paulus" and similar groups formed of German prisoners and sent to the front line as part of the Red Army "Agitprop" campaign, and (3) on the observation that in the field of sedition, as in the field of sabotage, German and Russian activities were apparently of a competitive nature.

Some evidence of Russian "Z" operations is contained in German naval files (Source # 1). A document transmitted by the "Intelligence Service East" (Ic-Dienst Ost) of the Army High Command to Naval Staff, headed "Sly and Cunning Russian Tactics", and dated December 1944, stated:

"In April 1942 an order was issued according to which units of up to twenty men are formed from especially reliable members of the Red Army. These men, equipped with adequate weapons, are sent over to the German lines. They are to show a white flag to indicate their wish to surrender, but as soon as they reach the German front lines, they are to use their weapons.

"In this manner the Soviet leaders hope to stir up hatred against the Soviet Army among our troops so that they will fire on any Red Army soldier who approaches a German position, especially when he makes out that he is a deserter.

"For propagandistic purposes incidents of this kind are represented by the Russians as evidence that German troops shoot every man instead of taking prisoners. According to a statement made by a Russian officer who was taken prisoner, it is thus hoped to reduce the number of deserters."

Further material on Russian seditious operations is contained in a German report on "Russian Counterespionage Activities designed to mislead the Enemy", which appears as Section G of Appendix II.

## Section C: PARTISANS AND GUERRILLAS

As used in the following pages the terms "partisan" and "guerrilla" denote the same activity. To facilitate distinction, the term "partisan" is used for Russian-sponsored groups, while similar activities carried out under German auspices are referred to as "guerrilla warfare".



Like other operations covered in preceding pages, partisan and guerrilla operations have many aspects and thus preclude a clear line of demarcation. Partisan warfare may be nothing but tactical support of ground force operations. At other times, partisan warfare may assume the character of a highly organized conspiracy charged with espionage, sabotage and combat. In a very broad sense, partisan and guerrilla groups may be viewed as the military counterpart of "fifth columns" and "communist undergrounds". It is for this reason that documents relating to partisan and guerrilla warfare have been included in this part. However, material dealing primarily with the military aspects of partisan and guerrilla activities has been omitted.

### 53. Operation "Tamara"

On the German side, conduct of guerrilla warfare was the primary concern of Section (letter) "I" of Abwehr II.

Abwehr II activities in the field of guerrilla warfare are illustrated by the Ausland/Abwehr directive of 15 October 1943 outlining functions of Abwehr Kommandos in the East, (Source # 7). With regard to "Insurgierung" this directive states the following:

"The word 'Insurgierung' denotes the kindling of insurrection in the enemy hinterland by setting up guerrilla groups, and by conducting guerrilla operations in the enemy supply areas with these groups. The aim is to consolidate the various groups into large assault groups which are to operate against the enemy's war effort."

The document gives the following rules for the conduct of such "I" operations:

- "1. Setting up of various national guerrilla divisions
  - (a) in the enemy's hinterland to attack Red Army units, reinforcements and supply lines;
  - (b) in occupied areas as jumping-off bases for guerrillas, as counterforces against partisans, for breaking down local native resistance and for deceptive missions.
- "2. Sponsoring of independence movements of national minorities in enemy labor camps, concentration camps and prisoner of war camps; exploitation of strike tendencies or unrest among workers in the enemy hinterland."

The manner in which Abwehr II initiated such guerrilla groups behind Russian lines is illustrated by the following order, issued by the Chief of Abwehr II, Col. Lahousen, on 20 June 1941, two days prior to the German attack on Russia (Source # 1):

"1. In order to carry out directives received from the Armed Forces Operational Staff (WFSt I op) for the exploitation of signs of disunity in Soviet Russia in the vicinity of the Caucasian oilfields, Abwehr office, Rumania is to carry out operation 'Tamara'. The objective of this operation is to prepare and encourage a revolt in the Georgian Republic.

"2. Lt. Dr. Kramer (Abw. II) will be in charge of this operation: Second in charge Sgt. Dr. Haufe (Abw. II).



"3. The operation falls into two parts:

(a) Tamara I: This group consists of sixteen Georgians trained for sabotage; they are to act as a nucleus unit. Sgt. Herrmann (Lehrregiment 'Brandenburg' z.b.V. 800, 5th Comp.) in charge.

(b) Tamara II: This group consists of eighty Georgians trained to act as a nucleus unit. Lt. Dr. Kramer in charge.

"4. Both groups Tamara I and Tamara II are at the disposal of the IC of the 11th Army for the operation ordered by the Armed Forces High Command Operational Staff.

"5. Base of group Tamara I to be chosen in the district around Jassy; base for group Tamara II in triangle Braila - Calarasi - Bucharest.

"6. Operation Tamara will be equipped by Abw. II."

#### 54. Oath of Russian Partisans

The material available for this report does not contain any over-all study of Russian partisan organization or operations.\* The character of Russian partisan tactics, however, is illustrated by a German translation of a Russian document alleged to be the blank form for the oath to be subscribed and sworn to by NKVD agents enlisted in the partisan movement in the Crimea. (Source # 36).

This oath is divided into a general pledge for all partisans and a special additional pledge for NKVD members. The document has the following text:

"I,.....citizen of the Soviet Union, agent of the NKVD of the ASSR of the Crimea, domiciled at..., pledge myself in view of the German-Fascist danger that threatens my native land in the event of the withdrawal of some units of the Red Army from that part of the Soviet Union where I live, to fight the German-Fascist army and all its accomplices present in the area until the enemy is destroyed and Soviet rule is again established over this territory.

"I pledge myself to oppose the enemy in the manner ordered by the president of the National Defense Committee of the U.S.S.R. Comrade Stalin, in his radio address on 8 July 1941 to all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have remained behind in areas now occupied by the enemy. That is:

"They must take an active part in forming groups of partisans, must belong to them themselves, must support the groups of partisans in every way by providing weapons, ammunition, food and intelligence.

"They must form sabotage troops or even personally inflict harm on the enemy by blowing up bridges and roads; damaging telegraph and telephone equipment; setting fire to magazines, baggage, barracks; and poisoning enemy troops and officers.

"They must carry on a terrorist fight against the enemy army

\* Some information on this subject is contained in the German study on "Russian Security and Counterespionage Operations" which appears as Appendix II to this report.



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and its collaborators, and they are to dog the enemy's footsteps and destroy enemy equipment whenever possible, to damage the enemy organization and create an untenable situation for the enemy in the occupied territories.

"They are to circulate rumors calculated to cause panic or provocation.

"They are to collect intelligence with regard to the enemy troops and their station, and to pass it by any channel to the NKVD, the Red Army and the groups of partisans.

"Besides this, I, in my capacity of NKVD agent, have to keep constant watch on the type of personnel and weapons the enemy leaves behind to continue the struggle when he retires; I have to watch persons on whom the enemy relied in the occupied area. It will be my duty to eliminate all traitors before the Red Army returns.

"Immediately after the return of the Red Army to the town of ... I swear to report to the NKVD immediately without being specially summoned, and to make a statement on my activities in the enemy rear territory. I will also report on the result of my observations as agent of the NKVD.

"I pledge myself never under any circumstances, even under threat of death, to betray any person that I know already or with whom I may become acquainted in the future who belongs to the Soviet Intelligence Service, nor any other persons who are being pursued by the enemy.

"I suggest the following double password...for secret communication with me.

"I have been informed of liability incurred if I do not fulfill the tasks set me in accordance with this declaration of loyalty."

The Fremde Heere Ost study on "Russian Security Agencies (Appendix I) states that the NKVD Fire Fighter Units formed the nucleus of the Partisan organization.

55. German Preventive Measures carried out by the SD, SS, and German Police in the rear of the Front.

A distinction should be made between anti-partisan operations carried out by the Armed Forces, especially by Abwehr II Kommandos, and consisting of combat with partisan groups in the field, and those "preventive measures" which were executed by German police and SD forces in the rear of the area.

In principle the division was such that in the front area Abwehr II and Field Security Police (GFP) units operated under army command, while in the rear, Security Police and SD units were deployed in the form of special "Action Groups". Front-line anti-partisan operations were closely linked to army ground operations, and are therefore not considered in this report.

At the time of the invasion of Russia, the SS General Heydrich as Commander, Security Police and SD was in over-all charge of the "purging" operations in the rear of the German front. From the files (Source # 46) it appears that at the outbreak of hostilities, two action groups "A" and "B" were sent to the front. Detailed notes on the operations were made by the officer in charge of Action Group "A", SS Brigade Commander and Maj. Gen. of the Police, Dr. Stahlecker. The Stahlecker report gives the composition of Action Group "A" as follows: -



"Waffen-SS .....	340
Motor Cyclists.....	172
Administration.....	18
Security Service (SD).....	35
Criminal Police (Kripo).....	41
State Police (Gestapo).....	89
Auxiliary Police.....	87
Regular Police.....	133
Female Employees.....	13
Interpreters.....	51
Teletype Operators.....	3
Radio Operators.....	8
Total: .....	990"

The manner in which Action Group "A" conducted its operations behind the advancing German lines, was described by Stahlecker in a "Comprehensive Report up to 15 October 1941". This report stated in part: "Considering that the peoples of the Baltic countries suffered greatly under the rule of Bolshevism and Jewry while they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R., it was to be expected that after being liberated from the foreign government, they themselves would deal with most of the enemies left behind after the retreat of the Red Army. It was the duty of the Security Police to start these self-purging movements and to direct them into the correct channels in order to accomplish the purpose of the purging operations as quickly as possible. For the record, it was no less important to establish definite proof of the fact that the liberated population themselves took the most severe measures against the Bolshevist and Jewish enemy of their own volition, so that the direction by German authorities could not be detected..."

"During the first pogrom on the night of 25 June the Lithuanian partisans did away with more than 1,500 Jews, set fire to several synagogues or destroyed them by other means and burned down a Jewish residential district consisting of about sixty houses. During the following nights about 2,300 Jews were eliminated in a similar manner... In both Kovno and Riga, movie reels and photos were made wherever possible to provide evidence that the first executions of Jews and Communists were carried out spontaneously by Lithuanians and Latvians..."

"Aside from these purging activities, a systematic search was made for Communist functionaries, Red-Army soldiers, and any persons left behind who were seriously suspected on account of their pro-communist activities..."

"At the start the following procedure was followed:

"In areas where partisans had not yet been observed, the population was treated in a friendly manner. The general shortage of bread made it simple to find one or more villagers who were willing to act as informers... The information ring thus built up yielded much intelligence for the Action Group, enabling them to tighten the net round the partisans.

"Much information was given about villagers who had sheltered



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partisans. On the basis of these reports a great many villages were combed out. After a village had been surrounded, all the inhabitants were driven into one square. Persons already under suspicion and the other villagers were interrogated, so that in most cases it was possible to detect persons who helped the partisans. These were either shot at once or, if further interrogation promised useful information, taken to headquarters. After the interrogation they were shot."

A further illustration of the activities of Action Group "A" is given in tabulation, attached to the comprehensive account. It shows that up to 15 October 1941, more than 135,000 people in the East were liquidated without due process by this group. The tabulation presents the following totals:

Area	Jews	Communists	Total
"Lithuania .....	80,311	860	81,171
Latvia.....	30,025	1,843	31,868
Esthonia.....	474	684	1,158
White-Ruthenia..	7,620	....	7,620
	118,430	3,387	121,817

"To be added to these figures:

Jews annihilated by pogroms in Lithuania and Latvia.....5,500

Jews, Communists and partisans executed in Russia proper.....2,000

Lunatics executed..... 748

130,065

"Communists and Jews liquidated by State

Police and SD Tilsit during searches.....5,502

135,567"

No detailed account is available from German sources on Russian methods used in combatting German-sponsored guerrilla groups. The material available, however, shows that responsibility for anti-partisan and saboteur activities in the rear of the Red Army rested with the NKVD Internal Guard. Organization and function of this paramilitary police troop is described in greater detail in the part dealing with "Organization" (Chapter 10.)



## Section D: CONSPIRACY

Espionage, sabotage, propaganda, seditious and guerrilla tactics may be employed independently of each other and merely in support of local or otherwise limited objectives, as has been shown. Documents on the following pages illustrate the manner in which these various techniques may be combined into one over-all plan for conspiracy.

Presumably, a distinction should be made in theory between conspiracies 'springing up' from within, and those instigated from without. The German officers' plot of July, 1944, may have been in the first category, and thus does not fall within the frame of this report on Russo-German affairs. With regard to the second category, all available documents indicate that instigators working from abroad tried to base their efforts on local sources of unrest already in existence, thus making extremely difficult any distinction between what was 'genuine' and what was 'sponsored'.

In any event, the available documents as well as historical records indicate that a sponsoring government must meet certain requirements if it is to be successful in directing a conspiracy abroad. When in World War I the German Government shipped Lenin from Switzerland to Russia, it apparently acted on the sole assumption that Lenin's defeatist propaganda would hasten cessation of hostilities. The link was not strong enough to permit the German Government to have any direct influence upon the future character and action of the Bolshevik conspiracy.

From the following documents, it would appear that the German and Russian agencies dealing in conspiracy prior to and during World War II tried to avoid such mistakes by making arrangements whereby at least some of the true or professed aims of the sponsoring government coincided with those of the conspirators abroad. On the German side, measures designed to create or further conspiracies appear to have been based primarily upon ethnological, racial, or other national-socialist ideologies; viz. the conspiracies by which the ground was prepared for the invasions of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Norway. German efforts to sponsor conspiracies in the Ukraine and other Russian territories relied primarily on ethnological differences.

A similar attitude is evident in documents dealing with Russian efforts to sponsor conspiracies in Germany or German-occupied territories. As a general rule these efforts appear to have been based upon Marxist and communist doctrines with wide use of nationalist slogans, and upon the appeal "to turn the imperialist war into a civil war to throw off the Fascist yoke".

Since the character of any genuine conspiracy is in the main political and ideological rather than military, allowance must be made for the limitations of the material available in German Armed Forces and RSHA files. In the case of Germany, it is presumed that National Socialist Party agencies, such as the "Gau Ausland", and the "Auslandsinstitut" were important instruments in establishing and furthering what have commonly been referred to as "fifth columns".

With regard to Russia, the available German documents do not fully clarify the role played by various Communist Party or Soviet Government agencies in furthering conspiracies abroad. Moreover, RSHA police documents, while detailed, apparently lack thorough knowledge and understanding of Russian organization and subversive tactics. It appears that the RSHA outlook was strongly influenced by experiences with the "proletarian" or "intellectual" type of German communist, while the presumably more efficient type of Moscow operative often remained a riddle to German official mentality. Thus, Russian communist organizers appear to have been able at times to elude the attention of RSHA



officials. Some, who nevertheless were caught reportedly managed to make a get-away, viz. the "Rote Kapelle" records.

#### 56. German Underground Manual

Abwehr II files contain a folder (Source # 16) which has neither cover-title nor index. The folder holds various documents with regard to underground warfare and conspiracy as conducted by Russian or German (Abwehr II) units. By far the most voluminous document in this file is a typewritten 143-page manuscript entitled "Conspiracy and Guerrilla Warfare in the Rear of the Enemy". The manuscript has several annotations in pencil and some sections added in type. One of these marginal notes indicates that the manuscript was concluded in the early spring of 1945. The purpose of the manual is clearly established by its concluding paragraph:

"The underground fighter is the hope of his homeland, his oppressed and enslaved fatherland. He carries the full responsibility; upon him depends the future of his countrymen and home... Never give up, march on, and victory will be certain. And now: Turn to!"

Thus, this manual on "Conspiracy and Guerrilla Warfare in the Rear of the Enemy" may well be presumed to have been written as a guide for a future German Underground. Since it originated with Abwehr, it can further be assumed that many experiences gained with guerrilla and partisan groups in the East have been incorporated.

Parts of this manual dealing with sabotage have been presented previously (Chapter 34). In the sections dealing with conspiracy the manual shows a tendency to put down every detail in a most systematic manner. Thus, the following excerpts may well serve to illustrate certain features and weaknesses of German activities in the field of conspiracy:

The opening chapter of the manual describes the steps which are to lead from simple mouth-to-mouth propaganda to an open revolt:

"The art of underground warfare lies in hitting the enemy where he least expects an attack. Detection of the enemy's weak and unprotected points is the basis of all underground work... An underground organization can function successfully only when any direct clash with the enemy is avoided... According to the situation in any particular case, we differentiate between the following steps of underground warfare:

1. Spreading false rumors to further our activities;
2. systematic whispering campaigns and incitement of the population;
3. organization of passive resistance and strikes;
4. minor sabotage, or any form of sabotage where an opportunity offers itself;
5. formation of underground organizations and distribution of underground literature;
6. major sabotage, carried out systematically by groups of activists;



7. engagement of enemy armed forces by large groups;

8. preparation and execution of a general revolt to drive out the enemy.

"Each of these steps must be based on the previous ones. The prevailing situation will tell which step is to be used. In every case the highest possible step must be achieved."

The following "immediate aims" are outlined:

"1. Wherever the population comes in contact with the underground organization it must be pointed out that the organization has only one aim; to throw off the enemy yoke. Every one who lends his support shall be treated as a national hero, every enemy as a traitor to his country..."

"2. The fact that armed insurgents and underground activists are present everywhere, will cause the enemy to fritter away his forces to a large degree, and this may go so far that major operations become impossible for him."

The Chapter headed "Conspiracy" lays down the following rules (given in excerpt):

"1. Internal organization: - Any underground organization must be built up on a system of cells. Each cell holds five members at most, three or four are better. Only the cell leader must be known to the members of the cell, who must not know one another."

"2. Appearance: - When beginning work in towns where there is as yet no cell, two persons are sent, a 'resident' and a radio operator. Preferably one should be a man and one a woman, so as to give the impression of a married couple. In dangerous districts a third person can be sent along as scout, observer and guard... The conspirator should always play the role of a person pursuing a normal occupation at the place in question to avoid awakening suspicion. In the country the disguise of shepherd or woodsman permits the observation of certain points; in towns the role of postman, porter, craftsman (carry a bag of tools!), worker or salesman is suitable. The best disguises are those that put the individual into a group which is not tied down to definite times and places."

"When meeting dubious persons do not arrange a rendezvous. Instead arrange to meet while walking along a certain route."

"When meeting strange agents arrange to meet in places where there are a number of people, for example, a station, postoffice, or movie theater before or after the performance."

The chapter dealing with "Types of persons suitable for collaboration" states in part:

"Individual characteristics:

(a) In general, women are less reliable than men, but their enthusiasm is greater and they require less training."

(b) To form a broader group, persons can be induced to sign papers with which they are later blackmailed."

(c) Look for malcontents in the enemy army, also deserters from any units, especially punishment units, and for men whose pay has been stopped; drunkards are often good casual collaborators."

(d) The services of very poor people are easily bought."



(e) Children and adolescents are easily recruited with money, cigarettes and other little things, as casual saboteurs. They are also very useful as carriers of intelligence.

(f) If persons pass remarks in conversations criticizing the government, and continue after they have been threatened with denouncement, they are usually provocateurs. 'Genuine' people usually say no more after being threatened.

(g) Any persons in the immediate neighborhood of the resident must be chosen particularly carefully. This includes the information carrier. The best persons for this task are steady, elderly persons without any great weaknesses of character - no drunkards! - Boys and girls from ten to sixteen years of age are suitable go-betweens in towns; also girls that are older, ugly, and have few boy friends. In villages, boys with a countrified air are useful, but girls of this type are usually too stupid. Elderly people and cripples are also efficient, if necessary they can make their way in the guise of beggars."

One may note with surprise the simplicity of the "secret underground" methods outlined above. Certainly, by 1945 it was well known that underground activities of this type usually constituted an almost hopeless effort when confronted by an efficient police organization. SD documents on the following pages show that communist conspiracies had developed new, and presumably more efficient, tactics based on operations "from within".

German police records indicate that on occasion conspiracies were set up which consisted of a combination of "secret underground" and "inside conspiracy". However, in such a combination the underground was to represent the lever to be pulled at the right moment by the forces working from within, or by those agencies which directed all activities from abroad. Yet, it is doubtful whether the authors of the German manual aimed at the establishment of such a combination; their guide does not contain any provision whereby the secret underground was to work in cooperation with an inside group or with a directing agency abroad. On the contrary, all indications are that this underground was to work as a closed and self-sufficient conspiracy in Germany under Allied occupation.

#### 57. German Armed Forces Counterintelligence Report on the Comintern

From general accounts it can be assumed that the National Socialist state was initially successful in its efforts to combat the Communist conspiracy. Through undercover agents, activities of the German Communist Party had been ascertained beforehand, so that its leading functionaries could be tracked down without great effort. A thorough border-control aimed at preventing the re-entry of any prominent communist who had temporarily taken refuge abroad.

However, as the RSHA records show, communist and Comintern activities were gradually resumed in Germany after the initial breakdown. As the German police records point out, they reappeared under a new form: The old communist political organization composed of cells in the residential districts was shifted to offices and factories. There conspiratorial activities became at times an almost integral part of the official daily work and routine.



The existence of a secret Comintern organization in the Axis countries, composed of such factory cells, is shown in a document which originated from the eastern branch of the counterintelligence section of the old "Abwehr" office of the Reich War Ministry (WA III-d Ost). The document is dated 25 February 1937. It was forwarded, top-secret, to the Commander in Chief, Navy. As is the case with most German material dealing with Russian activities, there is no possibility of checking the veracity of this report. The document (Source # 1) states in part:

"Early in December, 1936, a conference of delegates of the Comintern took place in the presence of several refugees.

"The purpose of the meeting was to develop and to prepare in time of peace communistic actions which are to be carried out in the event of war with Germany, Italy, Austria and Hungary. The communistic actions were characterized as a countermeasure against the present plans of the German General Staff. The actions form part of the plans of the Russian Army Command.

"Enclosed is a report of the meeting.

"In view of the importance of the source, which is believed to be reliable, it is requested that this document shall not be circulated."

Attached to this cover-letter was the report which carries the file number 303-37 WA III-d-Ost gKdos. The report consisted of ten paragraphs. Of these the first four dealt with propaganda matters. Paragraph 5 read as follows:

"The German, Italian, Hungarian, and Austrian Sections of the Communist Party are to send delegates to the Russian General Staff School for Revolutionary Movements. These delegates must be men who are able to direct a conspiracy and who can be assigned to the theoretical and actual command of the future revolutionary battles."

Paragraph 7 called for the organization of militant pacifists (Kriegsfeindliche Avantgarden) and read as follows: "Each communist section of the aforementioned four states is to organize small 'Anti-war vanguards'. These groups shall be composed of from four to five men who are tested revolutionaries and whose personality is not known to the authorities. Since we must reckon with the arrest of these people, only persons unknown to the police can be included in this work. During time of peace the 'vanguard' remains passive, and interests itself only in self-development. When the hour comes, the 'vanguard' will receive its orders directly and exclusively from the Political Secretary of the Comintern. A secret radio transmitting and receiving station is to be constructed for this purpose since all orders will be given by radio."

Paragraph 8 called for the organization of an additional net of contactmen in war factories (Vertrauensleute): "These men are not permitted to engage in any communist activity. They will not belong to any worker's party, even if those parties are not illegal. Under no circumstances will they take part in wage conflicts. They will receive their orders from the Political Secretary (of the Comintern) by radio in the same manner in which orders will be transmitted to the 'vanguards' as outlined in paragraph 7.

"The contact-men of several factories producing armaments and materials will be combined into groups. These groups are to maintain contact with one representative of the (national communist) Central Committee. The contact-men are not permitted to engage in military or industrial espionage. Other communists are to be selected for such duties by the (national communist) Sections.



"The delegates of the (national communist) Central Committee have to keep in touch with the contact-men in the war factories. They have to instruct them in revolutionary spirit and training; they will put cash at their disposal; and they must constantly encourage the contact-men to lead a very quiet and isolated life. Under no circumstances are these contact-men to be called together for conferences."

Paragraph 9 outlined some of the duties with which the communist members in general and the contact-men and members of the "van-guard" in particular will be charged at the outbreak of war:

"The contact-men have to engage in pacifist propaganda up to the beginning of war. When war starts, or when the outbreak of hostilities appears imminent, the Communist Sections of all four above-named Fascist States have to engage in strong party activities. They have to organize wage conflicts, demonstrations, and other actions of revolutionary nature by which declaration of war will be made difficult for the government. Public opinion must be kept in a constant state of excitement."

The report ended with the following statement:

"This directive has been issued by the Political Secretary of the Comintern to the Communist Party Sections of Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Austria, in view of the report from these four countries that at present they do not have sufficient strength to be able to delay mobilization or to interfere with it seriously. The Comintern expects that the Communist Sections in the Fascist States will be guided strictly by this directive. In doing so they will render important assistance to the operations of the Red Army."

If this German report of unidentified source is correct, the organization as set up in this Comintern order subsequently underwent further changes in the light of police actions and political events. The extent to which formal dissolution of the "Comintern" affected the secret international organizations sponsored by Moscow cannot be ascertained from available documents. However, German documents show that compared with this 1936 directive, later secret communist organizations assumed a much less ideological but considerably more practical character, and the technique of working "from within" became more refined.

Evidence that Russian-sponsored conspiratorial activities were well developed by the time Germany attacked the Soviet Union is contained in a directive issued by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command, General Keitel, from Fuehrer's Field Headquarters on 16 September 1941. This directive (Source # 46) stated in part:

"1. Since the start of the campaign against Soviet Russia there have been communist insurrections everywhere in the territories occupied by Germany. The actions range from propaganda and assaults against single members of the armed forces to open revolt and guerrilla warfare. It should be noted that this is a mass movement which is centrally directed from Moscow; to which local and seemingly trifling incidents in areas which have so far been quiet are also to be ascribed.

"2. Previous measures to counteract this general communist insurrection have proved inadequate. The Fuehrer has now ordered that the most drastic means are to be employed everywhere in order to stifle the movement within the shortest possible time."

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58. RSHA Report on "Seditious Activities of the USSR  
directed against Germany"

A full report of the activities of communist conspirators in Germany and German-occupied territories prior to the German attack on Russia was submitted by the German Minister of the Interior and Chief of Police, Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, to the Government on 20 June 1941. (Source # 40).

The character of the top-secret report makes it fairly clear that it was based to a large extent on the police files of the RSHA, Section "IV A-1", the Gestapo branch responsible for "Communism, Marxism and associated organizations".

The extent to which RSHA, IV A-1, and its executive organ, the regional SD, had been active in combatting communism, and the broad legal and extra-legal privileges it had enjoyed in this work are a matter of record. It may be noted that the German report shows nevertheless the existence of a well-developed and far-reaching communist underground operating in Germany and neighboring countries. The account which this report gives of the "Wollweber Group", has been presented in the part dealing with "Sabotage" (Chapter 42); an account of communist espionage taken from the same report, has been given in chapter 21.

The introduction of the report points out that the Russo-German Pact of August 1939 did not affect the scope of Russian subversive activities in German territory. "On the contrary, communist sedition, sabotage and terroristic attempts remained the aim of the Soviet leaders, coupled with the greatest possible exploitation of all available sources for military, economic, and political espionage. Only the methods were affected. German counterintelligence was constantly confronted with new issues due to the ever-changing character and cunning camouflage of Russian activities."

The first section of the report is entitled: "Organization and Objectives of the Comintern." The following material is presented:

"The Communist International (Comintern) has its headquarters at Moscow. According to Section 1 of the statute, this Soviet organization is entrusted with the task 'to coordinate Communist Parties of all lands into one world-wide party, to fight for the welfare of the working class, for the principles of Communism, and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.'

"Stalin, in his role as First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is even today a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern; so are Molotov, the German refugee Pieck, who represents the German section of the Comintern, the French Communist leader Thorez, and the Bulgarian terrorist Dimitroff.

"The official state agencies of the Soviet Union regard the Comintern as the unofficial, 'untainted' office, which can carry out subversive acts on an international level since it is not directly identified with the Soviet government. The Comintern is also active in foreign countries in the field of intelligence and espionage. Due to the fact that it operates here side by side with other specialized Russian intelligence agencies, it is often difficult to identify the Russian agency responsible for the activity uncovered."

Part II of the report is headed "The new Underground Tactics". The first section of this part deals with the communist under-



ground encountered by the RSHA in Reich territory. It states that the uncompromising attitude taken by the national-socialist Reich since 1933 in combatting and liquidating the Communist Party was successful in countering the efforts of the Comintern up to the time the Russo-German Pact was concluded: "The remnants of the German Communist Party ('KPD') with its section for military affairs ('AM') and for industrial espionage ('BB') were not able to achieve anything of importance; in any case their work was under surveillance." While claiming that the RSHA thus was able to counter all illegal communist activities up to the time of the conclusion of the Pact, the report nevertheless concedes:

"The Comintern countered the increased pressure of the German police with methodical directives by which refined underground tactics were developed. These directives strove for the development of 'Trojan Horse' tactics. Following the example set in Spain, seditious activities should start inside the body of state politics. The conclusion of the Pact of 23 August 1939 deprived these tactics of their propaganda basis. The Executive Committee started therefore to rebuild its 'AM' and 'BB' apparatus."

This reorganization of a secret communist underground is described as follows:

"Prolonged surveillance showed that the Comintern relay points in the various European countries were considerably enlarged for the sole task of strengthening the espionage and seditious channels into Germany.

"The main relay point is attached to the Swedish Communist Party at Stockholm. The Stockholm office is one of the most active and dangerous command posts of the Comintern. Methods of this center can be illustrated from records available as follows:

"Former German communist top functionaries with years of training in Moscow and other European cities are preferred for work against the Reich. They were filtered into the Reich for the first time in 1939. One of the wildest succeeded in picking up connections on a large scale with old comrades in Berlin. By systematic efforts he succeeded in reviving the Communist industrial espionage apparatus (BB) in large Berlin plants where important war-work was being carried out. His mission had the combined objectives of disaffecting the employees, inciting them to sabotage, and of conducting industrial espionage. Information, orders and funds were obtained from the Comintern instructors in Stockholm and Copenhagen via cleverly organized courier routes.

"The Swedish Deputy Linderöth, representing the European Bureau of the Comintern in Stockholm, played a major role in directing this organization which gradually expanded to a dangerous extent. Linderöth handled special assignments for various countries given him by the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Working from Stockholm, he assigned and financed agents, who operated in Copenhagen under direct orders from the Comintern, against the Reich.

"Top functionaries, such as Arthur Emmerlich, born at Niederwies 20.9.07, Willy Gall, born at Falkenstein/Vogtland 3.10.1908, Rudolf Hallmeyer, born at Plauen 3.2.08, and Heinrich Schmeer, born 20.3.1906, were instructed in the latest police and search methods to protect them against the threat of seizure by the SD.

"This instruction was carried out by a deputy of Linderöth, Dimitri Fedoseyevich Krylov. This man is well known here as a GPU Commissar....



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"The organization set up by the above-named functionaries worked through a permanent courier relay point established at Hamburg. From there the route ran via Copenhagen and Stockholm to Moscow. The main function of this route was to channel information on the construction and production of new weapons in Germany, and to transmit funds and instructions.

"The above-mentioned organization was responsible also for production of seditious leaflets. The last Comintern order from Moscow reached Emmerlich at the end of May 1941. This order showed that it was planned to dispatch a surprisingly large number of additional instructors to the individual 'Gaue' of the Reich during the next two months.

"Owing to the scope of the organization, constant observation could no longer suffice to prevent actual damage. Therefore, all participants were rounded up and arrested at the end of May 1941."

It will be noted that this police report on Moscow-sponsored activities in Germany lacks detailed observation and identification of operations conducted in Germany by other than German nationals. The next section of this report, which deals with Comintern activities in German-occupied countries, shows the link which existed between Soviet diplomatic representation and local communist activities. Thus, some "legal residents" are identified, but the report does not contain many details with regard to Soviet "illegal residents". Since war was a foregone conclusion and with it the closing of legal channels, the identification of "illegal residents" should have been of major importance.

The RSHA report on Comintern activities in German-occupied territory during the time of the Russo-German pact presents the following material:

Comintern tactics in occupied territory were said to follow the pattern revealed in Germany. It was reported that the Communist Party had been very active in Czechoslovakia even prior to its occupation. The report states that this organization became still more efficient when it went underground following the establishment of the German "Protectorate":

"In the past, functionaries from this district had been called year after year to the Lenin School at Moscow to receive military-political training in the theory and tactics of civil war and guerrilla warfare. These highly qualified functionaries went into action after the Protectorate had been proclaimed. They immediately started to set up an underground communist organization. The contact with Comintern headquarters as well as the supervision of all party work was carried out by the U.S.S.R. Consulate General at Prague. The Tass correspondent and press attache of the Consulate, Kurt Beer, acted as liaison ("Legal Resident") with the Russian Consulate General. In this capacity Beer received Russian newspapers and propaganda material from the Consulate which he distributed in accordance with directives to top functionaries of the Communist Party. He also received very large sums of money for the support of the Party work.

"In addition to this link through the 'Legal Resident', direct secret radio communication with Moscow existed in the Protectorate. The agents in charge of this secret radio station at Prague had been given a special course at the School for Radio-Telegraphy in Moscow. This school is supervised by the Comintern and is run by the Red Army. Training is conducted on the broadest basis. The courses are referred to as 'Oms' (Organizatsiya mezhdunarodnaya soyedineniya), that is, 'Organization of International Communications'. The Prague radio station which was in operation until a few days ago consisted of a large receiving and transmitting set. Transcripts of messages sent by both sides have been secured."

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Concerning the communist organization in occupied France the report stated:

"In view of the present disintegration and inner weakness of France, the Comintern is expecting special success. Here again the fact has been established that French Communists have received funds and propaganda material from the diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Union...

"We confiscated a document concerning the French daily 'L'Ordre' from the files of the French 'Surete Nationale'. As is evident from this French police document, this newspaper was refinanced in November 1939 by the chief of the Press service of the Yugoslav Legation, Vutzevitch, by a certain Jaques (Jaques?) Ebstein, lover of Lady (deleted), a sister of Lord (deleted), and by the Czech Jew, Otto Katz, who worked for the Soviet Union.

"In November 1939, together with the former Red-Spanish Minister Negrin, the Soviet Ambassador to Paris, Surits, visited the editor in chief of the newspaper 'Bure' at his villa at Saint Cloud. Surits repeated this visit in January/February 1940, accompanied by the Secretary of the Embassy, Biriukoff. At this conference it was agreed that a certain Etevenont was to be installed in the administration of 'L'Ordre' as official representative of the Soviet Russian Embassy. In exchange, financial support was granted which was increased by the end of March to Frs. 800,000 monthly."

With regard to other German-occupied countries, the RSHA report claims that the center of Comintern Propaganda in Norway was to be found at the Soviet Legation at Oslo, adding that it had been possible to intercept members of the legation while engaged in such activities. Similar observations are reported from Holland, Belgium and Yugoslavia, but no further details are given.

59. German SD Report 1942 on the "CPN"

The above report dealt with Comintern activities during the period of Russo-German "friendship" and up to the German attack on Russia. There is ample evidence to indicate that the war itself by no means led to an interruption of Russian-sponsored underground activities in German-occupied countries and in Germany itself. It is known that by 1942, section IV-A of the RSHA established a special unit ("Sonderkommando") to infiltrate by counterespionage methods into this communist conspiracy and break it up. This special unit, which in view of its radio counter-intelligence methods was referred to as "Rote Kapelle", is shown by German documents to have been a small unit of twenty or less operatives and technical assistants. Presumably, it operated at times in close contact with regional Abwehr III or SD agencies.

No "Rote Kapelle" files have been available for this report. Among RSHA files, however, is the "Annual Report 1942 of Activities of the Field Office (Aussenstelle) of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD for the occupied Netherlands" or, in less official language, of the "SD Netherlands". The field of activities of this SD branch in 1942 may have covered territory on which "Rote Kapelle" was also active.

Part I of the SD report gives an "Enemy Situation" summary. It states that illegal operations were carried out especially by organizations of the extreme right and the extreme left, that is, the "Oranje Movement" and the "CPN" (Communist Party of the

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Netherlands). The report deals primarily with the CPN.

This organization was said to have been able "to increase its influence considerably during the past few years, since the general public could not relieve the economic shortages by black-market buying; furthermore, on 21 June 1941, the Bolsheviks gained a certain social standing in the democratic camp." The report then states:

"Today the underground CPN provides the active shock troops of the Communist Party in the Netherlands. It must be rated as the most powerful fighting unit of the enemy organizations in the Netherlands. As a result of its predominantly proletarian composition it represents an especially close-knit and thus all the more dangerous instrument.

"The CPN had been banned by the Dutch authorities before the German occupation and was then finally broken up by the German authorities. However, the communists had made arrangements far in advance to go underground. Organization and methods of the underground CPN show that the experience of German communists who emigrated to Holland was fully utilized. The members were divided into three categories: Group I consisted of particularly trustworthy members who had deliberately avoided any publicity in the past. They remained in the background as the main reserve.

"Only Group II was active. Group III consisted of reliable communists who were too well known to be active without endangering the organization and themselves. The headquarters of this organization was in Amsterdam.

"Field office Amsterdam eliminated Group II through surprise raids earlier than the enemy camp had anticipated. Therefore, Group I came into the picture at the beginning of 1942. The blow forced the leaders to issue to the top functionaries a secret directive, containing ten rules of conduct to be followed in underground work, especially in case of arrest or in any other contingency. This directive stated in part (the excerpts are those of the SD):

'1. You can only trust your comrades in the unit. You must not confide Party matters even to your closest personal friend. If you do, the enemy will get hold of valuable information...

'2. Don't forget that many persons who belonged to the movement have left us. If you meet an acquaintance, don't mention anything. You don't know him and don't know what he is doing.

'3. Instructions are given solely by the leader of the unit (Gruppenhaupt) and by no one else.

'4. ...

'5. No member of the Party may enter into communication with refugees, or German deserters.

'6. ...

'7. Make wide use of the underground newspaper. Keep a solid front. Carry out sabotage instructions.

'8. If you are arrested, try to escape by way of balconies, rooftops and gardens. Don't let yourself be taken without a struggle. Never open the door at night if the bell rings.

'9. Refuse to tell the enemy anything. If you don't talk, nothing will happen."

According to the SD report, CPN activities in the Netherlands ap-



pear to have been limited to Amsterdam at that time. The report states that the CPN was originally divided into nine Amsterdam sections, but that all activities were transferred to two working-class districts in the west and east of the city. These two districts were described as headquarters of an extensive organization with communist cells in many plants, especially in the Amsterdam armament factories and in public utilities.

This account of the CPN organization is followed by a chapter on "CPN Propaganda and its Effects", which, however, does not present any material not already known. The SD report then covers sabotage activities of the CPN, stating that the CPN chose sabotage as a weapon to step up the offensive started with propaganda campaigns. For the conduct of sabotage the CPN was reorganized and formed into 5-men cells. Each cell received its orders by liaison-couriers who were continually changed. In addition, special "protective cells" (Schutzgruppen) were set up to safeguard distribution of seditious material (and presumably the execution of acts of sabotage).

"Explosives, incendiaries and other materials were used in preparing the acts of sabotage which were actually carried out or those prevented by us. Primary objectives were armed forces supplies, railroads, public buildings and offices of the Mussert group... It must be noted that apart from the large fire in the Amsterdam market hall in August 1942 and the fires at the Fokker Works in 1941, the incendiary attempts traced to the CPN were either unsuccessful or were prevented by removing the sabotage material in time."

The following section of the report deals with SD countermeasures against the CPN. It states that the Field Office Amsterdam had not been surprised by the increase of CPN activities, as the agency was currently informed by an efficient agent (V-man) network which had been further increased during the period of the report. However, this statement is limited by the remark that "it has become almost impossible to plant agents in the most cunningly contrived CPN apparatus. The fact that in the meanwhile an agent network has been established in all important Amsterdam factories is an illustration of the necessity to coordinate police tactics with the tactics of the enemy. A similar net of agents and informers is presently being organized among the Netherlands railroad personnel for preventive purposes".

The report then states that a special unit (Sonderkommando) of the Field Office Amsterdam was assigned to break up the CPN. Whether this special unit is identical with or related to the special unit "Rote Kapelle" cannot be determined from the report. The report claims that the well timed and usually sudden actions of the "Special Unit" of the Amsterdam Field Office made it possible to liquidate the CPN groups during 1942 and to forestall or frustrate all their actions.

"However it must not be overlooked that the CPN functionaries have meanwhile overcome the effect of the shock caused by our police actions. Thought and attention should be given to the new communist directives already mentioned, which deal with the attitude to be assumed when under arrest. It is evident that the Communists no longer lose their nerve when police appear; even at the very last moment they try to hide evidence in window frames, fire places, toilets, or coal bins."

The SD report on the CPN concludes with the following statement:

"Through the energetic action of the police, and the effect of the severe penalties imposed by the courts, the CPN today has been reduced to a small group of fanatical members. This group no longer seems to exercise influence of any importance upon the workers with its propaganda. However, the struggle against the sabotage cells continues."



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ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE - CONSPIRACY  
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APPENDIX I:  
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RUSSIAN SECURITY AGENCIES  
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NKVD - NKGB - UOKR "SMERSH" - PURKHA  
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AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1944  
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Russian Security Agencies ("Die Ueberwachungsorgane im sowjetischen Staat") is the title of a study which was issued by the German Army General Staff, Intelligence Division, East (Gen 3rd Lt. Fd. Feere Ost (IIG)) for the secret instruction of German Army and "Ausland/Abwehr" intelligence officers at the Russian Front. The date of the study is 1 December, 1944; markings show that it was distributed early in 1945. The cover letter accompanying the document was signed by Brig. Gen. Genlen, Chief of the Army General Staff, Intelligence Division, East.

The study deals in detail with those Russian security, espionage and counterespionage agencies which operated at the Russo-German front. These agencies are viewed and their activities described from the point of view of an Army intelligence officer; special emphasis is given to problems which arise in front-line intelligence operation. However, in a broad sense the study contains information applicable to any area in which Russian armed forces are present.

By comparison with other German sources, the study appears to have been made on a high level and in a competent manner. Almost everything the Germans knew on the subject at that time appears to have been incorporated. A great amount of minute detail is presented, and these details are as a rule well arranged and classified. For the most part, not much analytical thought seems to have been given to the material; the reader himself must discern between what appears to be of local and transitory importance only, and what may be characteristic of the Russian security and intelligence system.

This system is known to be in an almost constant process of reorganization. The German study, while dated December 1944, appears to give in general a report of the situation as of 1943. The far-reaching changes of April/May 1943, by which the NKVD became the "People's Commissariat", are noted; the consequences of this change are not followed up in every instance. As the cover letter pointed out, the study shows gaps at several points, due to the lack of information. However, proper evaluation of the material is facilitated by the fact that the study as a rule distinguishes clearly between facts "known" and situation or organizations "assumed". At all major points the study appears to agree with other reports dealing with the same subject, or to enlarge on these.

In the following translation only minor, repetitious passages have been omitted. Russian documents quoted had to be retranslated from the German without the possibility of checking the accuracy of the German translations. Similar difficulties were encountered with those titles and names for which the study used only a German term without giving the Russian equivalent. Finally, it must be pointed out that in the course of intelligence and sabotage operations at the Russo-German front certain specific methods and techniques developed. These techniques and the organizations charged with their operation are described in terms for which an exact German equivalent is rarely available, and still less a correct English term. Such terms as "sabotage", "prohibited area", "labor camps", "propaganda" etc., should therefore not be understood in their specific American meaning, but they should be read in the widest possible sense and interpreted in connection with the factual information provided. For a general interpretation of Russian and German terms, the glossary (Appendix IV) should be consulted. Footnotes do not form part of the original text.

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The original German documents consist of three sections: (a) the text; (b) 16 charts; and (c) 10 captured documents. On the following pages, only the text itself has been translated. Contents of the charts and of some of the documents have been incorporated into the report on German Intelligence at the Russian Front in the chapter dealing with the organization of Russian espionage, sabotage, and security agencies.

The organization shown in these charts as well as in other German documents does not at all fully correspond to the description given in the following report; this holds true especially for the numbers given to the various NKVD and NKGB Directorates. In view of the apparent constant flux of Soviet organization in the field of security and secret warfare, all technical information given thus should be viewed as indicative for the general situation, but not as positive and fixed details.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Government, as soon as it came to power, established various agencies designed to eliminate all foreign influence and to prevent the formation of any internal opposition by strict supervision of public and private life.

In December 1917 the Cheka ("All-Russian Extraordinary Commission") was founded. This security organization subsequently underwent several changes. Following the government reorganization of 1924, its name was changed into GPU ("State Political Directorate"). In 1934 the GPU was incorporated into the newly created NKVD, the "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs".

In 1943, after several reshuffles, the NKVD came into being, the "People's Commissariat for State Security". This organization had operated formerly as one of the principal directorates within NKVD; now it was made a parallel commissariat. However, even today NKVD and NKGB are working closely together. (\*)

The main task of these organizations is the supervision of every aspect of civilian life. With the outbreak of war it was natural that more attention should be paid to corresponding activities within the armed forces. Here, too, various reorganizations occurred. Today the principal secret police organization within the armed forces is the counterespionage agency UOMR "Smersh", ("Death to the Spies"). Until April/May 1943 this organization had been the "CC" Division (Csaoljki Otdel) of NKVD. Since then it has been operating under the "People's Commissariat for Defense". (\*\*)

Information received early in 1947 and as yet (\*\*\*), unconfirmed, alleges that a body of Secret Military Police has been created. The existence of such an organization appears doubtful.

A further agency for the supervision of the armed forces are the Political Directorates attached to the Army staffs. They operate under the Central Political Directorate of the Red Army. (\*\*\*\*)

(\*) In January 1946, following the reorganization of the government departments from "People's Commissariats" into Ministries, a corresponding change was made in the names of NKVD and NKGB, which today are called MVD and MGB.

(\*\*) The "People's Commissariat for Defense" and the "People's Commissariat for the Fleet" have been united into a "People's Commissariat for the Armed Forces".

(\*\*\*) 1 December 1944.

(\*\*\*\*) Written by a German Army intelligence officer, this study commonly uses the terms "Army" and "military" with the meaning of "Armed Forces". Fleet intelligence and security organization runs parallel to the Army and military organization as a rule; the following pages should be interpreted accordingly.



All these agencies have at their disposal a well trained corps of agents with years of field experience. These agents are constantly supervised.

Operation of secret agents has been a subject of great interest to the Soviet Government from the very outset, especially operation in foreign countries. These operations were guided by two aims: To further world revolution and to protect the Soviet regime. At present all external security and counterespionage is concentrated in two administrative agencies:

- (a) The Red Army is responsible for the military field;
- (b) NKGB is responsible for all nonmilitary sectors.

## II. THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS - "NKVD"-

General Remarks - The NKVD in its present form is predominantly an administrative department, charged with internal Russian affairs. In general usage the term NKVD is used as synonym for agent operation and shadowing. While such activities were carried out by NKVD in the past, they are today the task of NKGB.

Like all People's Commissariats, the NKVD is subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars, of which Stalin has been the head since 1940. However, the Chief, NKVD, Beria, is also Secretary of the Party's Central Committee and a member of the Polit-Buro; thus the Communist Party is the real controlling power behind the NKVD which is furthermore supervised by the "Secret Party Control" (TPK).

When NKGB was established as a People's Commissariat, the NKVD ceded to it the function of security supervision and its corps of agents.

NKVD is divided into approximately twenty directorates. The most important ones are:

Directorate of	Frontier Guards
"	" Guards for Red Army Zone of Operations
"	" Internal Guards
"	" Militia (Police)
"	" Supply (Administration)
"	" Firefighter Units
"	" Corrective Labor Camps
"	" Prisoner of War Camps

Offices of the NKVD and NKGB are at Moscow in the notorious building "No. 2 Lubyanka."

### A. The Directorate of NKVD Frontier Guards - "GUPV"

#### 1. Peacetime Assignments -

Border Patrol is the principal task of the NKVD Frontier Guards. In case of war, a limited number of NKVD Frontier Guards is assigned to military duty, acting as a border security and reconnaissance patrol for the Red Army.

#### 2. Development during the War -

After the outbreak of war the NKVD Frontier Guards were relieved of their routine duties in areas which became operational zones. As the war progressed they were made responsible for "safeguarding the Red Army zone of operations". Thus the NKVD Frontier Guards were divided into two branches:



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- a) Guards remaining on border patrol (Asiatic frontiers); (\*)
- b) guards which are deployed to safeguard the Red Army zone of operations.

These two branches can be distinguished easily in the field. The largest unit of the guard is assigned to border patrol is the Frontier Guard Detachment; the largest unit assigned to safeguard the zone of operations is the Frontier Guard Regiment.

However, all NKVD Frontier Guards have retained their previous designations, with the exception that NKVD Frontier Guard Detachments deployed to safeguard the zone of operations, were organized into NKVD Frontier Guard Regiments.

At the beginning of this change, all NKVD Frontier Guard units remained subordinate to the Directorate of NKVD Frontier Guards... However, a new NKVD Directorate was reported in the course of 1943 for the first time. In June 1944 its designation was determined as "Directorate of NKVD Security Guards in the Red Army Zone of Operations"...

3. Recruiting; Length of Service; Uniform -

NKVD Frontier Guards are recruited on the same basis as Red Army soldiers. When a class is called up for compulsory military service, a representative from the NKVD Frontier Guards selects suitable men. No man who has relatives or friends abroad can be enlisted. Party and Komsomol members are preferred. During the war the standards for replacements have been lowered.

In peacetime, regular service with the NKVD Frontier Guards lasted three years.

The uniform of NKVD Frontier Guards is similar to that of the Red Army. Their collar patches and the upper part of their uniform caps are of light blue cloth.

4. The NKVD Frontier Guard Detachments -

In carrying out their border patrol duties, the NKVD Frontier Guards cooperate closely with the vast network of NKGB agents. The NKGB regional office is in charge of all border espionage and counterespionage; suspected persons are turned over to this office.

The NKVD Frontier Guard Detachments do not conduct espionage in enemy territory, but limit themselves as a rule to countering activities of foreign agents on Russian soil. This work is carried out as follows:

The Field Watch, usually in strength of a company, patrols the territory up to 6 to 7 kilometers behind the border;

the Stations (Komsomol), usually in strength of a battalion, patrol a strip of 15 to 20 kilometers;

the Frontier Guard Detachments survey a sector up to 50 kilometers in depth, extending their activities in special cases still farther into the interior.

(\*) No German records are available concerning changes which may have occurred following Russian participation in the war against Japan in 1945.



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In some cases the staffs of NKVD Frontier Guard Detachments (however not those of the Stations or Outposts) conduct espionage on the soil of the adjacent foreign state in cooperation with the NKGB. Any activity of this kind is limited to the vicinity of the frontier, and is directed mainly against enemy frontier guards and enemy operational intelligence.

In cooperation with authorities of the Red Army Intelligence Directorate forays are carried out occasionally to secure information regarding such targets as border fortifications, barracks, military constructions, and troop deployment. On the basis of information thus secured, frontier defense measures are adopted which also consider the particular terrain and forces available.

The Staffs of NKVD Frontier Guard Detachments are organized in keeping with this reconnaissance activity, and consist of the following sections:

1st Section - Operations and Reconnaissance Division. - Duties: Investigations, searches, arrests, espionage, deployment of agents in cooperation with the NKGB district office.

2nd Section - Headquarters Division. - Duties: Training, preparation and command of all frontier guard activities.

3rd Section - Communications Division - The communications system is coordinated with that of the local NKGB offices.

4th Section - Personnel Division. -

5. The NKVD Air Brigade -

In peacetime this brigade was the Air Police Unit of the NKVD. It was assigned to various missions, such as liaison between widely separated frontier guard posts, reconnaissance, and breaking up of local uprisings, and it operated accordingly as courier, reconnaissance, fighter or bomber unit. It was used especially in areas which by their vastness were unsuitable for the committing of ground units, such as the Caucasus and Inner Asia. With the outbreak of war, the duties were extended to include military border air patrol.

The NKVD Air Brigade's place in the chain of command has not been fully ascertained. Its assignments fall mostly into the category of those directed by the Directorate of the NKVD Frontier Guards or the Directorate of the Internal Guards. It is therefore probable that the NKVD Air Brigade is directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).

In view of the vast distances the Brigade is not commanded by one central authority as a rule. In many instances its units are independently assigned to the territorial administration of the NKVD Frontier Guards or the NKGB.

The average NKVD Air Regiment or independent Air Squadron consists of 250 men flying and ground personnel; as many as 25% to 30% of these are officers. The number of planes is from 9 to 15 per regiment. No data are available on training and ground organization. At the Air Training Station at Borisoglebsk a "Special Section NKVD" is attached which may be in charge of the training of NKVD pilots.

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B. The Directorate of the NKVD Security Guards  
in the Red Army Zone of Operations

All NKVD guards employed to safeguard the Red Army zone of operations are subordinate to this directorate.

It has not been ascertained whether Internal Guards also operate under this directorate when assigned to reinforce Frontier Guards.

A "Chief of the Security Guards in the Red Army Zone of Operations" is attached to each front line command. He is responsible for security in the operational zone, and in charge of a number of NKVD Frontier Guard Regiments, which usually amount to one or two divisions.

The duties of these regiments may be compared with those of the German Military Police and Secret Field Police, although they are adapted to Russian conditions. They cover the following fields:

- (a) Prevention of the infiltration of enemy agents...
- (b) Liquidation of enemy paratroopers, agents, sabotage teams and partisans.
- (c) Prevention of a disorderly retreat by Russian troops, and apprehension of individual deserters.

This protection of the operational zone is carried out approximately as far as the rear demarcation line of the front area. NKVD Frontier Guard Regiments on this duty are organized similarly to detachments on border patrol duty... Lower echelons of NKVD Guard Regiments are attached to respective Red Army authorities in the chain of command.

The "Chief of Security Guards in the Zone of Operations" has at his disposal an emergency reserve of additional NKVD units whenever conditions warrant. These are composed mainly of Internal Guards (Operational Guards) and less frequently of Convoy units or Militia. They are assigned principally to the mopping up of partisan-infested areas in the zone of operations and to the rounding up of scattered enemy forces. In rare instances only are they assigned to reinforce NKVD Frontier Guards on their regular security missions.

Areas behind the operational zone are controlled by the Internal Guards which are deployed in a similar manner as security patrols.

It has become common military usage to refer to NKVD Frontier Guards as well as to Internal Guards on security patrol as Security Units (Speritruppen). However, these Security Units are not a special unit nor do they have an organization of their own.

The operational area proper is for the most part controlled by the respective Army units. Approximately at the level of the Regimental Command Posts begins the control by NKVD Frontier Guard Regiments. The "Security Belt" created by the NKVD Frontier Guard Regiments runs back to the rear demarcation line of the front areas. This "Security Belt" is divided into several "Security Sectors" which are coordinated with the military front sectors... Each sector is usually guarded by one NKVD regiment.

In the Security Belt all soldiers and civilians are shadowed or examined by:



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- (a) Control posts at important traffic centers,
- (b) patrols on roads, in towns and villages and along railroads,
- (c) patrols at points that appear especially favorable for making a detour around the control posts,
- (d) road blocks where soldiers with insufficient identification are turned over to "Smersh", and civilians to the Counterespionage Section of NKGB.

Control posts and patrols are usually made up of three men. Forged or obsolete identification papers are easily detected due to constant changes in regulations affecting personal identification. All movements of civilians remaining in the zone of operations are governed by stringent regulations.

C. The Directorate of the NKVD Internal Guards - "GUVV"

The Internal Guards serve political purposes. They are the agency by which the state renders harmless its internal enemies and protects its institutions from any kind of attack. The Internal Guards are divided into Operational Guards, Convoy Guards, and Railroad and Industrial Guards.

The duties of the NKVD Operational Guards are:

- (a) Protection of industrial plants, government buildings, railroads, bridges etc.
- (b) quelling of any armed revolts, combat of resistance movements, and occasionally
- (c) guarding of corrective labor camps, transport of prisoners and exiled persons.

The duties of the Convoy Guards and of the Railroad and Industrial Guards are similar to those of the Operational Guards, but apply to their special fields only. All assignments are performed in close cooperation with the NKGB.

The war expanded somewhat the duties of the NKVD Internal Guards. Operational Guard units were assigned like the NKVD Frontier Guards to safeguard the rear area of the zone of operations.

The duties of the Operational Guards do not call for their deployment at the front, but in critical situations, Internal Guards have been assigned to combat duty. For each such assignment, an order from Stalin appears necessary.

D. The Directorate of the NKVD Militia - "GUM"

The duties of the Militia can be compared to those of the German uniformed police (Ordnungspolizei). In its organization it follows the general pattern of NKVD administration. In carrying out criminal police duties, the Militia cooperates closely with the NKGB.

The largest single unit of the Militia is the regiment. Regiments are subordinate to the administrations of the separate Soviet Republics. They are in most instances larger than the Red Army's regiments; a Militia platoon, for instance, may be as large as a Red Army company. The size of the cavalry units is unknown. No further data are available on the organization of the Militia forces.

Service in the Militia was on a voluntary basis during peacetime, the term of enlistment lasting for two years. Discharged Red Army soldiers accounted for the largest number of militia men. However, volunteers as

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young as 18 years were accepted, and allowed to remain in the Militia if they proved competent, thereby being exempt from compulsory military service. During the war more and more women were used for service in the Militia.

No special military importance is to be attached to the Militia.

E. The NKVD Directorate of Supply  
and Administration - "GUVS"

Its organization has not been ascertained as yet. Presumably, this directorate is responsible for all supplies and administration of the entire NKVD, and may be called the "NKVD Quartermaster Division".

F. The NKVD Directorate of Fire Fighters

The Fire Fighter Units are important in so far as they constituted the nucleus of the partisan movement in peacetime. Even prior to this war, many local fire chiefs were sworn in to organize partisan warfare should the country be occupied by enemy forces. They were instructed to gather all physically fit and politically reliable members of the fire department into partisan units. Therefore, at the beginning of the war many dynamite units of the liquidation commandos were composed of former fire fighters.

Nothing is known of the importance of the remaining fire fighter units. It may be assumed that their present assignment is confined to the fire protection of important buildings, plants and other objectives, and it seems that they are no longer charged with other tasks.

G. The NKVD Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps

All camps to which Soviet citizens are transferred for punitive purposes are controlled by this directorate, except the camps in Central Asia and the Far East, which are administered separately.

Each camp is an economic unit assigned to constructions, gold prospecting, timber production, coal mining, agriculture, etc.

The guard units are organized into companies. In peacetime they were partly made up of discharged soldiers. The size of the guard units is approximately 3 to 5 % of the number of prisoners in each camp. An "Auxiliary Guard" is formed from the ranks of the prisoners (criminals) who are even equipped with weapons.

Usually the camps consist of several places which may be 50 km apart.

All camps are under "Operational Security": In towns and villages within a radius of 30 to 50 km of each camp, and at railroad junctions up to 500 km away, guard posts are stationed and the trains are screened.

H. The NKVD Directorate of Prisoner of War Camps

Details are lacking. It is assumed that organization and conditions of these camps correspond to those of the civilian prisoner camps.



# I. The NKVD Directorate of Highways and Roads

Details are lacking as to the organization of this Directorate. It carries out construction projects on a large scale in cooperation with the Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps. The White Sea Canal and the Moscow-Volga Canal as well as roads in Kazakhstan, Central Asia and the Far East have been built almost exclusively by prisoners.

## J. Auxiliary NKVD Organizations

The Liquidation Units and the Territorial Groups are civilian organizations of the NKVD.

### 1. Liquidation Units - Their main tasks are:

- a) Combatting enemy elements deployed behind the Soviet front;
- b) tracing and combatting anti-Soviet groups;
- c) air raid protection and anti-aircraft defense.

They cooperate with the offices of the NKGB to which they also turn over their prisoners. The Liquidation Units are directed to form or join partisan forces should their area be occupied by the enemy.

Liquidation Units are organized by local regional NKVD offices from the zone of operations to far into the interior. These groups exist in every district, large industrial plant, farm cooperative, etc. They are composed of persons not subject to military service and those found unfit for military duty. Special consideration is given to their political reliability.

Each Liquidation Unit is composed of approximately 75 to 200 men, and divided into platoons of approximately 25 men. The platoons are subdivided into squads of 8 men.

2. Territorial Groups: They are an auxiliary NKVD institution in frontier areas, where parts of the civilian population are occasionally drafted to assist the frontier guards in counterespionage, border patrol and similar activities.

A group consists of 8 to 10 men. Its members are watchmen, foresters, railroad section hands, shepherds and other persons who in the course of their daily work have good opportunities to watch over roads and other objectives. These groups are said to be so numerous that any point at which an enemy agent might possibly appear is under constant supervision. Some NKVD agents are former members of the auxiliary groups who have shown their reliability.



## III. THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

## FOR STATE SECURITY - "NKGB" -

The NKGB is the central agency for all secret agent operations in espionage and counterespionage in nonmilitary fields. Originally a directorate of NKVD, it has been established as an independent People's Commissariat (\*). It continues to work in close cooperation with the NKVD.

Combat intelligence (\*\*) is directed by the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army General Staff (2nd Section), and by the corresponding army intelligence offices at the various command levels.

Counterintelligence in the field and supervision of troop morale is carried out by the UOKR NKO "Smersh" (3rd Section), operating under the People's Commissariat for Defense.

NKGB is charged with the following missions:

(1) Secret supervision of all political, economic, and industrial activities in Russia; combat of underground activities in the country;

(2) counterespionage and security operations to detect and if possible eliminate counter-revolutionary activities and espionage, sabotage and fifth-column activities originating abroad. Supervision of all own agents;

(3) intelligence operations abroad to keep abreast of developments especially of a political or economic nature, including security operations at and across the borders;

(4) in time of war, continuation of the above-named activities in enemy occupied territories through underground offices and in cooperation with secret party cells; organization of partisans; offensive sabotage and espionage operations.

NKGB is composed of the following main directorates:

## A. First Directorate: Foreign Countries - INU -

Chief: Commissar Titus

This directorate sets up and operates agencies in foreign countries. Aside from permanent "residents", INU controls a network of occasional collaborators. These are planted in offices which represent the Soviet Union officially, such as legations and consulates, or semi-officially, such as foreign newspapers, travel agencies and unions.

Originally INU was set up to propagate the "World Revolution" and to maintain close ties with all Communist Parties. Today, it is cooperating closely with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The First Directorate contains special sections for Western Europe, the Balkans, the Far East, the Near East etc.

(\*) Now: "Ministry of State Security", abbreviated "MGB".

(\*\*) The report does not refer to strategic intelligence and other army and navy long-range intelligence projects.



B. Second Directorate: Secret Political Affairs - SPU

Chief: Commissar Gorevskij (2)

This directorate uncovers and combats anti-Soviet activities and organizations within the USSR.

C. Third Directorate: Counterespionage - KRU

Chief: Commissar Blinov

This directorate is in charge of the supervision of all foreign missions and all foreigners in the USSR; persons of foreign origin who live in the Soviet Union and are Soviet citizens; persons who might establish connections with foreign countries in view of their nationality or origin.

The Third Directorate has Counterespionage Divisions for European Countries, the Balkan States, the Far East, the Near East etc. with subdivisions for the individual states.

D. Fourth Directorate: Occupied Areas

Chief: Ssudeplatov

This directorate is responsible for supervision of the civilian population in areas occupied by the enemy. It is assumed that this directorate has been reorganized for duties in recaptured or newly occupied areas.

The Fourth Directorate was created in 1942 to cover German occupied areas as well as areas which were threatened with occupation. It planted resident agents, built a network of secret agencies and cooperated with the partisan activities in those areas. This directorate is not charged with military duties; its character is purely civilian. It is departmentalized as follows:

- a) Division for the Western Areas, with subdivisions for Poland, Latvia and Estonia,
- b) Division for the Ukraine and White Ruthenia,
- c) Division for the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Kuban with a series of subdivisions.

The numbers carried by the following directorates are not known.

E. Economic Directorate - "EKO"

This directorate has separate divisions for;

- a) Heavy industry,
- b) other industries,
- c) agriculture,
- d) commerce.

The directorate is responsible for antisabotage and for anti-industrial espionage measures. "Agents for plant espionage" (industrial espionage) are trained in ten month courses.

F. Transportation Directorate - "DTU"

The divisions of this directorate are not known.



G. Investigation and Legal Preparations Office - "SB" - (\*)

This office is charged with the investigation of persons under arrest. In addition it makes arrests warranted by the findings of other NKGB directorates. Nothing is known of the organization of this office.

H. Special Sections - "SO" -

In addition to the directorates, NKGB has a number of special sections (spets. otdyeli - SO). These SO operate directly under the Chief, NKGB, V.M. Merkulov.

The special sections are the executive organ for all NKGB directorates.

The first five special sections are numbered.

1. SO - 1: Special Section for Records and Statistics is the "Operational List-Keeping" office. It has, among others, the following subsections:

- a) Central file for all matters pending with the directorates
- b) Card index for Soviet agents (within the Soviet Union)
- c) Card index for enemy agents
- d) " " " unreliable persons
- e) " " " persons under arrest or sentence.

2. SO - 2: Special Section for Technical Services - This section is in charge of all NKGB technical equipment and is organized as follows:

- a) Branch for Telephone Communications
- b) " " Radio Communications
- c) " " Monitoring Devices
- d) " " Telegraphy
- etc.

3. SO - 3: Special Section for Shadowing and Legwork - This section is responsible for: Locating persons reported as suspicious, searches, continuous observations, shadowing NKGB members under suspicion, execution of arrests on orders from the Investigation Office.

4. SO - 4: Special Section for Censorship - This section is responsible for mail censorship, intercepting telephone conversations, monitoring secret broadcasting stations, manufacturing invisible inks and their developers, etc.

5. SO - 5: Special Section for Cryptography - Responsible for the arrangement of all Russian code systems and for breaking intercepted code messages.

The numbers carried by the following divisions are unknown.

6. SO - (?): Special Section for Combat of Anti-Russian Partisans - Responsible for combat of all anti-Soviet organizations on Russian soil.

(\*) From the present and other German documents it appears that this office, while not called a directorate is operating nevertheless on the directorate level.



7. SO - (2): Special Section for the Prison System. - Responsible for the administration of the notorious investigation prisons for political prisoners.

8. SO - Personnel Section. - It handles all personnel problems of permanent NKGB employees, dealing with advancement, leaves, etc. The Chief of the Personnel Section is at the same time the Deputy People's Commissar for State Security, in charge of personnel affairs.

Each special section contains a section chief with deputy and staff and several branch chiefs with deputies and staffs. All special sections work in close contact with the directorates and exchange all information required for their work.

#### I. "Secretariat" and "First Division"

In addition to the directorates and special sections a "First Division" with Kremlin Guard, and a "Secretariat" operate directly under the Chief, NKGB.

1. The Secretariat NKGB is charged with the administrative duties of a "Staff". (\*)

2. The 1st Division NKGB is responsible for: Supervision and guarding of members of the "Polit-Buro" of the Communist Party, Secretaries of the Party Central Committee, and the Secret Party Control, members of the Supreme Presidium, and of the Council of Nationalities, People's Commissars, the Supreme Judiciary, political functionaries, poets, authors and artists.

The 1st Division personnel is divided into uniformed members who come into immediate contact with the persons whom they guard, and into secret agents. The "wards" know nothing of the latter. If Stalin, or any other fairly important political person, appears at a public affair, he is escorted by 15 to 20 uniformed guards, but there is also a secret guard present whom "one does not see".

In the individual Soviet Republics the NKGB operates along the same principles. However, within these republics there exist no directorates but solely special sections and sub-sections.

#### J. Extraordinary Commission - Cheka

This term reappeared about October 1943 in connection with secret police activities.

The Cheka ceased to be an independent body in 1924. Its task was taken over by the GPU and subsequently the NKVD and NKGB. Therefore, the present-day Cheka is probably no more than the name implies; an "Extraordinary Commission" which is formed as the need arises and furnished with special powers whenever political conditions in certain districts are unfavorable or if the local secret police is unable to carry out its tasks unaided.

"Operational Cheka Groups" have appeared from October 1943 up to now only in cooperation with NKVD troops engaged in security operations in reoccupied territories. It may

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(\*) German documents show this Secretariat as a top-level agency probably with policy-making functions. Details are lacking.



therefore, be assumed that they are called upon to reinforce the NKVD and NKGB agencies for special security operations and for the liquidation of unreliable elements in order to reinstate Soviet authority. The "Operational Cheka Groups" apparently concern themselves solely with the civilian population which remained behind in reoccupied territories. According to available data, the sentences of the Cheka are as in earlier days pronounced by a "troika", i.e. a threehead court-martial under exclusion of the public and in absence of the accused.

It seems that the new Cheka groups are set up by a central NKGB authority or one of its subordinate offices, attached to NKVD Guard Staffs. It is said that subsequent to completion of their mission, members of the Cheka groups are often established as local NKGB chiefs.

While detailed data on the new Cheka organization are lacking, it appears that an "Operational Cheka Group" has been attached to each NKVD Frontier Guard Regiment.

Statements from prisoners of war lead to the assumption that "Operational Cheka Groups" are withdrawn and deactivated as soon as the reoccupied areas are pacified. It may therefore be assumed that a regular Cheka organization does not exist.

#### IV. THE COUNTERESPIONAGE DIRECTORATE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE, "DEATH TO THE SPIES" -

##### UOKR NKO "SMERSH"

The organization "Smersh" is responsible for the supervision of the Red Army (and Navy) personnel, for security, and for counterespionage in the field. With the reorganization of the NKVD OO (Special) Divisions into an armed forces counterintelligence agency, all military reconnaissance, security and counterespionage was transferred from NKVD OO Division to NKO "Smersh" Organization. It has not yet been ascertained whether the "OO" sections of the partisan staffs have likewise been incorporated into "Smersh".

The organization "Smersh" is responsible for:

1. Combat of the "internal enemy". - This activity includes carrying out preventive security measures and handling all cases of suspected or identified (enemy military or naval) agents.
2. Combat of the "external enemy" by:
  - a) Counterespionage activities in newly occupied areas, supervision of the civilian population, safeguarding important objects, carrying out control actions, searches, etc.
  - b) Instruction of military personnel regarding the dangers of enemy agent activity.
  - c) Counterespionage operations, which as a rule are organized by the OKR only from the Army level upward.



d) Misleading the enemy by turning back his agents, sending fake messages by agents' secret transmitters, etc.

Each OKR "Smersh" (\*) is responsible for the supervision of troops as well as for counterespionage measures within its area, and all pertinent inquiries are to be addressed to it. In turn any "Smersh" office is under continuous supervision by the next higher "Smersh" office.

Beyond its defensive operations, "Smersh" also deploys its own agents on enemy territory. However, these agents conduct only such operations as are necessary within the given military framework. The deployment of agents for gaining operational intelligence is exclusively the task of the Combat Intelligence Units (RO) of the Army Intelligence Staffs.

The fact is of prime importance that OKR NKO "Smersh" offices are merely attached to the lower Army (and Navy) staffs and remain directly subordinate to the People's Commissariat for Defense. The agency for military intelligence (RO) is an integral part of the Army organization and therefore subordinate to the Army staffs. OKR NKO "Smersh" offices on the other hand which are detailed to the various fronts, armies, and divisions, are not subordinate to the troop staffs but to the next higher "Smersh" office; the channels of communication run correspondingly. The armed forces authorities must report all cases concerning enemy agents to the OKR "Smersh", which in turn informs the troop commander when enemy agents have been apprehended. Subsistence for "Smersh" personnel is provided by the armed forces.

The reorganization of the OO NKVD into UOKR NKO "Smersh" took place only a relatively short time ago. Therefore data concerning the internal structure of "Smersh" are still comparatively incomplete. In matters of personnel and organization the general NKVD pattern appears to have remained unchanged. However, corresponding military ranks were substituted for the NKVD ranks.

No further reliable data are available on UOKR, the Directorate for Counterintelligence of the People's Commissariat for Defense. The Chief of the Directorate is Avakumov, the former chief of the OO NKVD. As a directorate, UOKR "Smersh" is directly subordinate to Stalin, the People's Commissar for Defense.

The units of "Smersh" in the Red Army are subdivided according to arms branches.

#### V. POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

##### FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE - PURKKA

The Political Directorate of the People's Commissariat for National Defense (\*\*) is in charge of the Red Army's political and propagandist indoctrination. It assumed this

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(\*) UOKR "Smersh" is the name of the Directorate in the Commissariat for Defense. Smersh agencies attached to Army or Navy command are referred to as OKR.

(\*\*) Now: Ministry for the Armed Forces.

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role following the abolition of the commissar system which was ordered in October 1942 and carried out by spring 1943.

The PURKKA organization is coordinated with the military chain of command as follows: Down to divisional staff level there are "Chiefs of Political Divisions"; the regiments and battalions have "Political Deputies"; the companies have one "Organizer" for the Communist Party and one for the Komsomol.\*

These political officers are subordinate to the respective military commanders. However, they receive the directives concerning their working methods from the superior political office. Each party functionary is obliged to inform his commanding officer of the nature and scope of his activity. However, the functionary forwards his reports directly to the Political Directorate of the Red Army without recourse to military channels. In contrast to the former commissars, the party functionaries are now deprived of the possibility of taking reprisals against the military commanders. The duplication of command over the political functionaries naturally leads to complication. Generally, however, the scale has been tipped decidedly in favor of the military commanders.

As the political top-level organization of the Russian Armed Forces, the "Political Directorate" is for all practical purposes an armed forces subdivision of the Communist Party and subordinate to the "People's Commissariat for Defense".

The Chief of the Political Directorate is Colonel Shtsherbakov. He is also Secretary of the "Central Committee" of the Communist Party.

The principal task of the "Political Directorate" is the direction and supervision of all political education in the Red Army. At the present the emphasis is on party interests: Recruiting of members, supervision of party members, etc.

The Political Directorate constitutes an efficient propaganda machine. 40 or 50 % of the entire party organization is devoted to various propaganda activities designed for dissemination among the enemy, morale building among Soviet troops etc. The political divisions from the divisional staff level upwards have special sections dealing with communist propaganda among the enemy military and naval personnel. They are also charged with the task of keeping up the morale of the civilian population in the area in which the military unit is stationed.

Political officers from the battalion level upward are full-time officials and therefore exempt from any other duty, while the organizers at company level perform their political functions on a part-time basis.

The number of political functionaries in a company is practically unlimited. Each Party or Komsomol member may, according to his talents, be called upon for propaganda duty. The platoon leader is both the military and political leader.

\* These organizers were commonly referred to as "Politruk".



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ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE - CONSPIRACY  
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APPENDIX II :  
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RUSSIAN SECURITY AND COUNTER -  
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ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS AT THE  
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GERMAN FRONT  
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AS OF SUMMER 1943  
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"Russian Security and Counterespionage Operations at the German Front" (Die sowjetische Agentenabwehr und Gegenespionage im Operationsgebiet der Ostfront) is the title of a German secret report on Russian security and counterespionage. The report, now the property of the U.S. Army, was located in the files of German Army Intelligence, East (Fremde Heere Ost). It is marked with the file number 10 763/43, but carries no other identification as to author, issuing agency, and date of issue.

Whatever the exact origin of this document, it is evident from its contents that it was compiled by a top-level agency with access to most of the material related to the subject available by summer 1943 to the German Army High Command. The material gives the impression that "Fremde Heere Ost" compiled the study; however, the terminology in some instances more closely resembles that used by the Armed Forces "Ausland/Abwehr" agency. This fact may be explained by the close cooperation between these two offices at the Eastern Front.

The time of publication was presumably the latter half of 1943. Among other indications, this is shown by the fact that the study records the existence of the "Smersh" organization, which was formed in May 1943. On the other hand, the reorganization of the GBKB directorate into the People's Commissariat NKGB, which took place at the same date, is merely reported in a footnote as "unconfirmed".

The document consists of three parts. Part I deals with the organization of the Russian Security and Counterespionage Agencies at the Eastern Front. This part has been omitted since it contains material similar to that in the German study on "Russian Security Agencies", which is given in translation as Appendix I to this report.

Part II, "Counterintelligence on Russian Territory" and Part III, "Counterespionage on Enemy Territory" are given in translation in the following pages. Minor parts of a repetitious or a distinctly local character have been deleted. Attached to the document was a translation of ten captured Russian documents which have been omitted since they contain no information not already presented in this report. Footnotes given do not form part of the original text.

The German document is characterized by a great amount of detailed and specific information. Where an effort is made to get away from these details to general observations and to a broad analysis, the report often becomes vague. In addition, the following characteristics can be noted throughout the pages:

1. The material presented deals almost exclusively with operations in the front area. No broad knowledge of Russian principles guiding such operations enters into the description. The absence of proper appreciation of the factors common to Russian espionage and counterespionage remains a surprising feature of this report even if it is assumed that the study did not intend to evaluate Russian operations.
2. The otherwise factual report shows marked traits of German propaganda influence where it deals with principles guiding Russian operations. There is a tendency to overdramatize Russian activities, to give even routine matters a sinister twist and, most of all, to picture Russian operations as being limited to a rather low strata. Hence,



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operations may have been overlooked which were conducted by Russian agencies on a higher level, such as the possible infiltration of German Communists into the Nazi party officers' corps, or links established with the offices of Russian "liberation" groups in Germany.

3. The report gives the impression that in dealing with Russia, German counterintelligence tried to copy Russian methods, but lagged behind. This factor should be kept in mind in evaluating the German report.
4. Information contained in the document deals almost exclusively with activities in the zone of military operations. Such material, apart from its historical interest, illustrates the functioning of a large security and espionage organization. Actual operations change continually according to the situation, locale, and particular circumstances, but it may be assumed that the ruling principles are of an enduring character.

Translation had to be made without reference to the Russian documents which served as material for the German study. The phraseology therefore follows the German terms. The German text shows an inclination to adapt Russian operational and organizational terms to German standards. This is especially noticeable in fields such as security measures and psychological warfare which do not lend themselves to clear-cut definitions. In the course of their operations German agencies developed standard designations for specific functions, such as "Abw III" (Counterespionage), "S" (Sabotage), and "Z" (subversive propaganda). It is difficult to give exact English equivalents for these expressions. The matter becomes further complicated when the document uses the German standard terminology to describe Russian activities which were actually based on different methods and organizations. In translating these terms it has been necessary to give the broadest possible rendering, and allowances should be made for this when reading. For an exact definition the reader must rely upon the text, which explains the activities covered by the term.

Designation of Russian agencies in this study varies at times from those used for apparently the same agency in other German documents.

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# I. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ON RUSSIAN TERRITORY

The activities of the German secret service and of German sabotage units behind the Soviet line are encountering unusually strong opposition. Numerous full or part-time Russian organizations and activities render any deployment of our agents most difficult. Russian counterintelligence activities cover the following fields:

- a. far-reaching protective measures for internal security, and counterintelligence;
- b. a well-organized system for the apprehension of enemy agents;
- c. proven methods for dealing with apprehended agents...

In the course of the war new measures and methods have constantly been developed by the Russians. The organization was reorganized and improved and all persons available for direct or indirect support were mobilized. Today, counterintelligence is publicized as a meritorious contribution to the nation's struggle. Something akin to a contest has been developed; an order issued by Moscow reads: "All command staffs are to be notified that their activities will be judged in the light of their success in counterespionage."...

This attitude is partially explained by the fact that in Russia one can never distinguish quite clearly between police spying for the protection of the regime, and combat of foreign activities. In wartime especially every Soviet citizen is encouraged to be on constant guard against both these sources of danger. Security and counterintelligence work hand in hand, and a great amount of energy is devoted to both activities.

The agencies operating in this field are inspired by a constant fear of spies, saboteurs, and enemies of the Soviet system. Especially in the zone of operations they utilize the experience gained in a lifetime spent under the Soviet system. This experience and these fears form the background against which one must judge the data which are presented on the following pages:...

## 1. Security and Counterintelligence in the

### Armed Forces

A special security agency was incorporated into the Soviet Army for the purpose of detecting and countering all seditious attempts. This control agency was simultaneously charged with preventing infiltration of enemy agents or propaganda.

Originally, organization and control of this security agency was assigned to the Special Section (OO) in the NKVD. It has now been transferred to the UOKR NKD "Smersh". The agents of this organization secretly supervise practically every member of the Red Army from the top commander down to the last private. Agents of Smersh are alerted as soon as the effects of enemy agent activity are noted.

## 2. Supervision of Military Personnel

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### 3. Supervision of the Civilian Population in the Zone of Operations

As is common knowledge, civilians were evacuated from the Soviet zone of operations to a large extent. The remaining part of the population has been subjected to severe security regulations. For instance, an order issued by the Staff of the Voronezh Front on 31 May 1943 contains the following regulation:

"A prohibited area is to be established parallel to the front line to a depth of 50 km. Its boundary will be the eastern bank of the Oskol River. Civilians will be allowed to enter this zone only in cases of extreme urgency and by permission of the NKVD authorities."

Numerous similar orders contain minute regulations concerning registration and residence in these areas close to the front...

### 4. Prohibited Areas

Numerous measures guard the Russian front line against infiltration by enemy agents and saboteurs. The troops themselves are governed by security regulations of the severest nature. They are separated from the rear areas by a "Prohibited Area" (Sperrlinie) to prevent the infiltration of enemy agents from the rear.

The following system appears typical: The combat area proper is controlled by the line troops themselves. Only in rare instances is this task performed by security units. (\*) The second prohibited area commences approximately 5 to 7 km behind the combat area. To the rear of it lies the third prohibited area. The latter two areas are under the supervision of the security units.

The prohibited areas are in turn divided into security sectors, each one approximately 120 km. long. Usually one regiment of security troops is deployed in such a sector.

All civilians as well as all military personnel are under secret supervision in these areas. Usually all civilians have been evacuated from the battle zone proper and from the adjacent second prohibited area. In the third prohibited area only those civilians remain whose activities are essential to military operations. In this area all movements of soldiers are equally strictly supervised to prevent desertion and to detect enemy agents disguised in Russian uniform...

Posts and patrols on duty in the prohibited area are usually three men strong. They are authorized to check identification papers and pay books. A constant change of regulations governing the identification system renders the use of forged or obsolete identification papers extremely difficult. The following examples are typical of procedure in this field:

- a. In the sector between the divisional headquarters and the combat line all persons must have a special pass issued by the respective divisional staff.

(\*) These security units (Sperrtruppen), while not further identified in this report, appear to be identical with the NKVD Frontier Guards, and/or the NKVD Security Guards in the Red Army zone of operations.



- b. At intervals new passes are introduced, or old passes are supplemented by an added page or a new rubber stamping.
- c. Inconspicuous little markings, blanks and similar methods are used to identify the periods at which identifications were issued.

Strict regulations govern the movements of civilians who remain in the zone of operations:

- a. Unless given permission by the local military commandor, strangers are prohibited from taking up residence in all towns and villages occupied by military personnel. "Street elders" must report cases of unauthorized residence.
- b. Civilians are not allowed to move between individual towns and villages unless they possess the proper passes.
- c. Civilians are not allowed in the streets at night unless they possess a special permit from the local military commander.
- d. Irrespective of general evacuation regulations, all civilians are evacuated from towns and villages housing military staffs.

In summing up it may be said that the security measures which the Soviets have taken in the zone of operations render any attempt of espionage or sabotage exceedingly difficult. Such missions promise success only if current local security measures, identification regulations, etc., are ascertained beforehand in the greatest possible detail.

#### 5. Investigation of Suspected Persons

Russian security agencies are especially alert to enemy agent activity within certain groups of the population, such as:

- a. Prisoners of war escaped from German captivity;
- b. Members of the Red Army who have broken out of a German encirclement and lost contact with their units;
- c. All Red Army members whose homes are in German occupied territory, especially those who still have dependents there....
- d. The population within areas reoccupied by the Soviets. These persons are at first considered unreliable en bloc. All persons who were in German employ or displayed pro-German sentiments are especially mistrusted. The duty plan of an "OO" Commissar of an Army Staff reads:

"In cooperation with the divisional "OO", the counter-intelligence service is to be especially active among the population which has lived under temporary enemy occupation. Agent networks and residents are to be set up especially in those towns and villages in which suspicious elements have appeared in larger numbers."

- e. Female auxiliary military personnel. - A relevant order stated:



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"All units are to investigate women who may have gotten into the Red Army's ranks. Anyone arousing suspicion is to be arrested immediately. In the future, women may be employed as auxiliaries only with the permission of the "OO". Where women are employed, agencies for screening them are to be set up to unmask German agents among them. Women who have affairs with command personnel are to be watched especially."

- f. Vagrant children and adolescents. - These are deemed highly suspicious because the German intelligence service is reputed to employ a large number of children.
- g. All persons who have been found in possession of enemy propaganda material or who carry on whispering campaigns. - These are to be arrested at once.
- h. All Soviet secret agents who return from missions in enemy territory. They are to be turned over to the OKR NKRO "Smersh" at once, where they will be investigated to see whether the enemy has influenced them ideologically or turned them back. Serious suspicion is aroused when an agent does not return at the appointed date; in such a case all adjacent "Smersh" offices are notified.

6. Supervision of Threatened Objects

In the zone of operations all buildings and installations in the immediate vicinity of command posts, staff headquarters and security agencies, are considered particularly endangered by enemy agents. They are surrounded by a closely knit security net, including agents provocateurs. The following directive issued by the counter-intelligence section of an Army Staff illustrates this method:

"Initiative is essential to develop the methods most effective to unmask German espionage and sabotage agents in Red Army rear echelon headquarters and to uncover persons who are likely to commit treason. A new plan to perfect operations of our agent service is to be set up based on the experience gained. This plan must assign the most trustworthy agents in the guise of German agents to places particularly endangered or suspicious."

7. Interrogations

OKR "Smersh" conducts the questioning of enemy agents and suspected persons through its own investigating specialists. In some cases military experts, mostly from the combat intelligence divisions, are consulted. Special investigating subdivisions are likewise established within the counterespionage divisions (KRO) of the NKVD.\*

Voluminous "Directives for the Interrogation of Apprehended Enemy Agents, Pro-German Elements, for Investigation of Returned Soviet Agents, etc." give the subjects to be covered in interrogations down to the last detail. The main interest centers on the plans and activities of the German agent operating services. Considerable importance is also attached to the general enemy situation. In the following are given some of the principal points from such

(\*) KRO is reported to have been transferred to NKGB.



directives for the conduct of interrogations, as issued by the Soviet counterespionage service:

a. Personal Data on the Subject under Investigation. - In many instances the first question concerns the cover-name of the person in question in order to determine whether other data about him has already been gathered from statements made by other apprehended agents, or gained through Soviet counterespionage agents. Further questions concern the subject's career and personal affairs, circumstances surrounding his joining the German intelligence or sabotage service, the training given him preparatory to his assignment, the mission proper, places and cover addresses he was ordered to contact.

b. German Intelligence and Sabotage Agencies. - Next an attempt is made to establish which German office employed the agent. Questions are asked concerning the location, organization, equipment, personnel and methods of this office. Much attention is paid to the training which agents are given, to their equipment, their officers and instructors, and to the security measures taken at the German office, the methods used on the German side for evaluating reports from agents, etc.. Special efforts are made to obtain personal data on all persons whom the Germans had previously used as agents or who are to be deployed at some future time.

c. German Security and Counterespionage. - All information which persons coming from the German side can supply on German security measures and installations is of vital interest to the Soviets, since this knowledge is applied for briefing their own agents. Stress is laid on inquiries about German counterintelligence organizations, their working methods, special protective measures, control installations, German procedure for investigating suspects, or for dealing with persons proven guilty of agent activity.

d. Situation in German Occupied Territory....

e. The Military Situation....

To clarify important questions, the suspect is interrogated several times and experts are consulted whenever necessary. -

Scepticism toward statements made by the interrogated person is the guiding principle; a service regulation states: "Whenever an enemy agent makes a statement it should be kept in mind that he is under orders from the German secret service to give misleading information. Therefore the information is to be checked carefully, for instance through cell mates, etc.."

Russian interrogations of enemy agents and suspects are most exhaustive and thorough; and it is most difficult to mislead the expert investigators.

#### 8. Evaluation of Data Obtained During Interrogations

Data gathered during interrogations are evaluated for three purposes:

a. Improvement of Russian Security and counterespionage measures (material for searches; information on German methods, offices and contacts).

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b. Facilitation of the task of Russian agents (information concerning conditions and security measures in German occupied territory; suggestions to agents on how to conduct themselves; information concerning locations well suited for agent activities).

c. Intelligence concerning the enemy situation.

All information concerning the relatives of the suspects is listed for reprisals. These data are forwarded to the appropriate NKVD office, which sends a copy to the 1st Special Division of the NKVD, Central Office, for inclusion in the card index. (\*)

#### 9. Methods for Dealing with Apprehended Agents

An order issued by the NKVD Chief, Beria, on 23 May 1942 regulates the treatment of enemy agents after the close of the investigation. It contains the full procedure applied in such cases, from the arrest to the execution by a firing squad. (\*\*)

Enemy agents whose guilt has been established and who cannot be used to further advantage are usually shot. In rare instances they are exiled or imprisoned. - However, the Russian agencies attempt to use persons whom they deem suitable for their own espionage or counterespionage services by promising them rehabilitation.

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(\*) These activities reportedly have been transferred to NKGB.

(\*\*) Translation of this order has been presented in the part dealing with "Espionage", chapter 29.



## II. COUNTERESPIONAGE ON ENEMY TERRITORY

## A. OBJECTIVES

The aim of Russian counterespionage in the German zone of operations is to identify and disrupt the German agencies which employ agents on Russian soil or which work against undercover Soviet activities in German occupied territory. Primary targets are:

- a. agencies, training facilities, camps and auxiliary installations of the German intelligence service, personnel and working methods, etc.;
- b. agencies of the auxiliary organizations of the German intelligence service;
- c. agencies of the security service, the police, the militia, etc.;
- d. persons and groups who work in German agencies as officers, agents and assistants;
- e. camps for prisoners of war, deserters, and prison labor from which persons are enlisted for German service.

Soviet counterespionage directives, which have been analyzed, show a highly flexible system. Points of operation change continually. New dangers and possibilities are recognized quickly. Russian counterespionage always endeavors to identify the German agencies involved, but its main interest is directed toward the persons who have been or who are about to be deployed against Russia. The primary objective is always to establish the identity of these persons and to render them as harmless as possible. All other counterintelligence is carried out with this end in view.

The following Russian counterespionage agencies have so far been identified as operating in the German zone of operations.

- a. In approximately 80% of all cases: The counterespionage agency Smersh (formerly OO NKVD) which operates as a rule from the army level on up.
- b. In approximately 10% of all cases: The non-military counterespionage agency "KRO" of the Security Commissariat (NKGB), and in rare instances the "4th Division of the NKVD".\*
- c. Combat intelligence units of the military staffs. These units often give their agents alternate targets dealing with counterespionage information, to be pursued in case of arrest.
- d. The partisan staffs which at times carry out counterespionage operations not only for their own security but also as contribution to the general Russian counterespionage effort.

It is assumed that all valuable material gathered by these and any other agency is forwarded for evaluation to

\* This refers presumably to what was later identified by German sources as the "4th Directorate NKGB" in charge of Security in reoccupied and newly occupied areas.



the NKGO and the NKVD.\*

The nature of Russian counterespionage is apparent if one remembers its principal aim, the main objectives and the facilities provided for this work. Operations of Russian counterintelligence agencies are designed to accomplish the following aims:

- a. Gather information concerning German agencies and operations these agencies have planned or already executed in Soviet territory. And subsequently:
- b. Demoralize German agents prior to, and during, their operations.
- c. Evaluate all information gathered, to be used for searches in Soviet territory by counterintelligence agents.
- d. Mislead the German agencies by turning back German agents, by "deserters", by sending decoy messages over agent radio, and by similar methods...

## B. THE PREPARATION OF RUSSIAN COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

### 1. Principal Methods

Captured documents of the 19th Soviet Army Counterespionage "Special Division" OO NKVD point out the links between counterespionage and security. They state:

"German resident agents are to be identified through a combination of investigation and (counterintelligence) agent activities. All persons suspected of having contact with the German intelligence service are to be arrested...."

The first Russian aim is to identify the objectives of German espionage and other undercover operations. Interrogations as well as investigations are to identify these objectives. Information thus compiled is evaluated for general use in operational and security measures. Then an attempt is made to determine specific enemy activities.

Much attention is given to the identification of German agents so as to be able to eliminate them as far as possible. By an "Investigation File" card index all personal data are systematically processed and followed up. The Smersh offices attached to army staffs maintain records on all identified German agencies, their personnel and agents, their methods of recruiting, training, and dealing with enemy agents. Formerly the OO NKVD and the KRO offices had to forward all such information to the "1st Special Section" of the NKVD central office in Moscow. At present OIR "Smersh" probably performs this function.\*\* Among the records of the "1st Special Section" are a register of all

\* According to later German information: NKGO, NKVMF, and NKGB, but no longer NKVD.

\*\* Later German records indicate that the "1st Special Section" (SO - 1) and its functions were transferred to NKGB.



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enemy agents, a card index of persons under secret supervision or investigation, and files containing the final evaluation of all information gathered by Soviet agents.

In many instances evidence compiled by the above methods and supplemented by research of the central evaluation offices is subsequently used as basis for the assignment of counterespionage agents to cover known or assumed German intelligence agencies, their officers or agents.

2. Selection of Soviet Counterespionage Agents

As far as German intelligence agencies have been able to determine up to now, Russian personnel assigned to counterespionage missions on German soil is not of an appreciably different type from the other Soviet agents. The principle which seems to guide the Soviet counterespionage agencies in the selection of its agents is their aptitude to gather information, to spread propaganda and to mislead the enemy without arousing suspicion. As a rule it is considered more important that the person concerned can be expected to remain loyal than that he should be exceptionally intelligent.

As far as has been determined up to the present, the following types of persons seem to be preferred for counterespionage work:

- a. Persons previously in German employ, particularly those who had been actively engaged in gathering information for Germany; those who worked as German agents, interpreters, auxiliaries, etc.
- b. Persons well acquainted with conditions prevailing around the office to be reconnoitered.
- c. Persons presumed to appear more trustworthy than others to the German authorities concerned (alleged or real opponents of the Soviet regime, members of national minority groups within the Soviet Union, "Volksdeutsche", and persons of inconspicuous appearance).
- d. Persons whose profession or skill is particularly in demand within German occupied territory, due to a shortage and who consequently are able to obtain jobs under conditions especially well suited for their activities as Soviet agents.
- e. Espionage and propaganda agents of proven ability.
- f. Politically active people who are reliable.

As a rule the selection will depend on the particular requirements of the operation planned; all data compiled during the preliminary investigation are taken into consideration.

3. Training

The principal subjects of instruction and indoctrination for Russian counterespionage agents are:

- a. Instruction about conditions within enemy territory, particularly within the immediate vicinity of the objective of the mission.

\* Persons of German origin but of foreign citizenship.



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- b. Acquainting the agent with previously compiled data so far as is necessary for carrying out the mission.
- c. Advising the agent about conduct most appropriate in German territory or during contact with German offices and secret police organizations.
- d. Familiarizing the agent with the cover-story selected for his mission.
- e. Briefing.

The instruction is more or less exhaustive, depending on the importance of the mission and the agent's qualifications.

According to evidence so far secured, training given to Soviet counterespionage agents is in most cases brief. However, the persons involved have not infrequently gained valuable experience in the course of previous activities. Only 20% of the agents apprehended last year during counterespionage missions had received counterespionage training lasting more than ten days. Most of the others had merely been informed about their mission and cover-story. Up to now, nothing is known about special counterespionage training centers in the Russian zone of operations. However, counterespionage forms part of the curriculum of the general agent training courses of Smersh. According to several statements, a "School for Counterespionage" exists in Moscow, although so far none of the counterespionage agents apprehended in the zone of operations has graduated from there.

In each well organized Soviet intelligence school, security and counterespionage are treated in particular detail and with utmost secrecy; this is especially true of the NKVD schools, since the NKVD was responsible for security and, up to April 1943, also for counterespionage. The courses cover not only Soviet agencies in this field, but also instruct the members in the working methods of the German security in occupied territory and the German counterespionage service, as well as the dangers to be overcome when dealing with these organizations.

C. THE DEPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN COUNTERESPIONAGE AGENTS

The Soviet counterespionage agent is to concentrate his efforts on reaching his target quickly and under favorable conditions. Since most missions entail infiltration into enemy offices, appropriate forms must be chosen for his crossing the frontier and his behaviour in enemy territory. It is obvious that these forms, adapted to prevailing conditions, are constantly changing. However, Russian tactics are based on certain patterns:

- a. The role of the "deserter" is probably the most common front of the Soviet counterespionage agent. Through his own intelligence service and statements made by apprehended German agents the Russians have learned that "the German intelligence service prefers to enlist deserters". Often they even know the camps for enemy deserters from which agents are recruited by German agencies. The Soviets try to have their agents in the guise of deserters cross into German territory at places where it is probable that they will be taken to those camps.

Often the mission of the agent begins immediately

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after he has been committed to one of those camps. At first he is mainly intent on gaining German confidence. Nevertheless, working for his employer all the time, he gathers important data concerning the camp's inmates, the guard complement and those prisoners who are presumed to have been recruited as German agents. Once the disguised Soviet agent is approached with the offer to become a German agent he will, in accordance with orders, accept only hesitatingly at first so as not to arouse suspicion. Finally he will consent to take the job in order to be able to carry out his main task.

The following excerpt from the working plan of the 28th Soviet Army counterespionage OO NKVD of May 1942 is typical of such methods: "...Agent X is to be sent through the front lines in the disguise of a voluntarily deserting, armed field grade officer. Our outposts are to fire at him as a deserter. He is charged with the following mission: To gain the confidence of the German intelligence service and to get into its school at Poltava..."

Civilian "deserters" are also employed. A Russian deserter for instance, instead of being sentenced to death, was given the assignment to desert to the German side in civilian clothing "because of bad food conditions". He was to accept service as a German anti-Soviet agent but actually to work for the Soviet counterespionage.

- b. In many instances Soviet agents who "surrender voluntarily" also work in fact for counterespionage agencies. Usually they are under orders to surrender to German authorities immediately after crossing the front lines or after landing, and to reveal their missions for such alleged reasons as "fundamental opposition to the Soviet regime". In this way they are to gain German confidence. Hereafter they are to attempt to be "turned back" against the Soviets by a German office after having graduated from an appropriate training course.

Example: After her parachute jump near Ordzhonikidze the woman student Tsh. was to surrender voluntarily as a Soviet agent in order to be brought to the previously determined German intelligence office at O... There she was to attempt to gather information and then to accept a job as German agent and be sent to the Soviet side.

- c. Agents who allegedly have worked for German interests in earlier days are to offer their services as anti-Soviet agents. For this purpose they are supplied with a cover-story which is supposed to hint at a more detailed knowledge about the German intelligence service, the Secret Field Police or similar authorities. In this manner it is hoped to confirm the impression that the person concerned had previously proved his or her reliability. One of these agents for instance stated that he had previously worked for the Hungarian border intelligence. Others state that although they had not worked for the intelligence service they had been actively engaged in pro-German activities in the capacity of auxiliary police, anti-partisan fighters, or as office employees; usually they show documents to support their statements. Other agents attempt to gain German confidence by professing sympathy for the



German cause. An operations plan of the Counterespionage Section of the 28th Red Army contains the following paragraph:

"The woman agent Vera H. is to be sent through the front lines with the cover-story that she has fled from persecution by the Soviets who wanted to arrest her because of her affairs with German officers. Her mission: To locate the German intelligence office in village X and to gain access to it...She is to install a communication relay point at Kharkov under the pretext of visiting a niece..."

- d. At times Russian counterespionage agents approach German authorities in the guise of representatives of anti-Soviet organizations. Their true intentions are to be recruited by and to gain access to German agencies.

Example: Agent A reported to the German military authorities claiming to be a courier from an anti-Soviet group within the Red Army by the name of "Troika". He professed that this group ordered him to establish contact with the German Army and to return with a German assignment within 24 hours so as not to arouse suspicion on the Soviet side.

In similar cases the Soviet counterespionage service develops cover-stories with an eye to presumed German sympathies for Russian national minority groups. An agent may be under orders to state that he is sent by a Georgian or North Caucasian secret organization which desires to establish contact with a German agency.

- e. Other Soviet agents state that they are contact men sent by German agents working in Russian territory. Often statements made by apprehended German agents were used for these cover-stories. For instance, the German agent F, whom the Soviets had apprehended, confessed to be working for a German captain X in N and described the latter's office. Thereupon the Soviet counterespionage service sent its agent J to this captain. He was to pass himself off as contact man sent by F and to ask captain X to send another agent and aid to F. Then he was supposed to let himself be recruited as a German agent, investigate the office as far as possible and transmit the information to his Russian officer by way of another agent who was to be recruited by him.
- f. At times Soviet counterespionage agents are ordered to behave deliberately in a suspicious way, so as to provoke German authorities to arrest them, but without actually making themselves liable to punishment. In this way the Soviets hope to locate German agencies. - A woman agent was to get herself arrested in order to locate the German security office in charge of a certain district. On the basis of her cover-story it was hoped that she would soon be released due to insufficient evidence.
- g. Sometimes agents are left behind in an area from which Soviet troops have been withdrawn. They receive their orders prior to the withdrawal or at a later date. An order of the OO NKVD attached

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to a front staff stated in part:

"When our troops are withdrawn, agents are to be left behind in larger villages. They are to obtain employment in enemy intelligence and administrative offices..."

- h. Some agents are ordered to attract the attention of German secret service authorities by making conspicuous statements. The Soviets hope that consequently these authorities will devote much attention to the person concerned who thus will have the opportunity to compile important information for Russian counterintelligence. For instance, an NKVD office ordered Soviet agent Kr. to "desert" to the German side, represent himself as a former NKVD official and member of Stalin's bodyguard, and state that he could supply the German intelligence service with important information. He was to gain the confidence of the German authorities by giving a mixture of true but worthless and interesting but false information. Later on he was to accept employment as an anti-Soviet agent and let himself be sent back into Soviet territory....

D. OPERATIONS OF RUSSIAN COUNTERESPIONAGE AGENTS

IN THE GERMAN ZONE OF OPERATIONS

All known intelligence operations of Russian counter-espionage agencies have the following two objectives:

- a. To inform the Russian security service of German agents who have been or are about to be deployed within Soviet territory or in partisan-held areas.
- b. To protect Soviet espionage, sabotage and propaganda agents deployed within the German zone of operations by uncovering the German security and similar agencies.

Therefore, the espionage activity of the Russian counterintelligence service is not limited to determining the scope of German counterintelligence agencies; it covers all German intelligence agencies as well as the "Gestapo" and every other office the Soviets connect with it...

In order to obtain a broad view of all German intelligence activities directed against Russia, the Soviets use agents who are directed to find out if and where in a certain place or area an agency of this nature is located and how it is organized. Excerpts from captured orders state:

"...German agent training centers and names of German agents in the Yelnya area are to be determined..."

"...They are to identify German agencies which interrogate enemy agents..."

"...They are to locate the agency which sends agents into our territory. After establishing its location, they are to accept employment as German agents and gather information concerning personal records, training and equipment of German agents. At the first opportunity they are to let themselves be sent back as agents with a German mission..."

The above orders deal with operations designed to gain basic information. Different circumstances prevail when an

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agent is assigned to a mission against a specific German agency... The following captured Russian orders illustrate operations of such a nature:

"Investigate the agent training center, Derzhinski Street, Smolensk. Establish contact with members of this school. Determine the names of trainees, the missions for which they are intended and the subjects of instruction. Try to gain admission to the school and to be sent back on a German mission..."

"Investigate the German intelligence staff at Dno and gather data about all pertinent details..."

Frequently intelligence divisions of the partisan staffs are assigned to such operations. Sometimes individual Russian counterespionage agents are attached to partisan intelligence sections...

In all operations, the Russian counterespionage service is interested in the following specific data:

- a. Where are the respective German agencies located; how are they organized and protected?
- b. Who is in charge of the agency and who is employed there as officer, lecturer, etc? Accurate detailed information is desired, including description of personnel and, if possible, photographs.
- c. Where do the aforementioned persons live?
- d. With which other office is this agency connected?
- e. Do the agents receive training for missions? - Subjects of instruction; training curricula and methods?
- f. How are the agents treated; is there any dissatisfaction which could be used for psychological work?
- g. What missions and rules for personal conduct are given to German agents?
- h. How are the agents equipped - cover-stories; documents; weapons; technical equipment?
- i. At which point and by what method are agents sent from the German side into the area behind the Russian battle line or into the partisan area?
- j. Is there any possibility of kidnapping an officer or any other member of such an agency and getting him through the front line for questioning? How can such an enterprise be executed?

Intelligence operations of this nature are more or less comprehensive depending on the importance of the case and the qualifications of the agent involved. Frequently the intelligence mission is followed up by propaganda or decoy activity, or an attempt to deceive the enemy may precede the operation proper.



E. SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA\*1. Propaganda Activities of the Soviet Counteres-pionage Service

....Efforts to foment sedition among German agents\*\* prior to their deployment are a particularly valuable contribution to the Russian security system. Thereby the Soviet counterespionage service attempts to prevent the activities of German agents from the very start, or persuades them to pretend to accept the German mission but in reality to work for the Russian side.

For the most part propaganda activities center on places where German authorities try to enlist persons for undercover work, such as in recruiting stations of German intelligence agencies, camps for enemy deserters, and in areas surrounding the agencies which train and deploy agents..

2. Propaganda Activities in German Agencieswhich Employ Agents

The following are some of the arguments used to persuade German agents to enter the Soviet service:

- a. The agent is threatened with retaliatory measures against his relatives.
- b. The person scheduled to go on a mission is told that the Soviets are informed of his treasonable activity and will give him an appropriate welcome.
- c. The agent is promised not only rehabilitation but also decorations, amnesty, and various other personal advantages if he will consent to work for the Soviets.

Once the efforts to enlist a German agent to work for the Soviets have met with success, he is given more detailed instructions concerning his conduct. Usually he is told to behave as follows:

- a. Accept the German mission as a pretense.
- b. Surrender immediately after reaching Soviet territory, usually by using a certain password.
- c. Reveal all he knows about the German agency in question and the persons with whom he became acquainted there.
- d. If necessary, declare himself willing to continue

\* The term propaganda is simply used hereinafter in translation for the German "Z" (Zersetzung). It implies the methods of psychological warfare by which enemy troops or agents are made to surrender or change sides. In the German organization "Z" activities were part of the sabotage agency (Abwehr II). In Russia they appear largely to have been handled in connection with counterintelligence.

\*\* The term "German agent" on this and the following pages refers apparently to Russian nationals in German pay.



his pretended pro-German activities so as to mislead the German office...

3. Propaganda in Areas Surrounding German Agencies

Soviet counterespionage agents direct their psychological efforts not only against the various German agencies and the agents, but also against all persons who are in direct or indirect contact with the respective office. Among persons whose cooperation is particularly sought after are those who are employed at German agencies (from the charwoman to the interpreter) or who reside in the area and vicinity. Such persons are used most of all as constant observers and communication relays.

Typical of these methods is an order issued by the NKVD at Rostov: "In German occupied territory apartment owners in whose homes intelligence agencies are billeted, are to be enlisted in the Soviet service following investigation..."

Any attempt to enlist such persons is preceded by investigations, which in most cases are very far-reaching and thorough. Russian orders for operations of this nature time and again contain directives that all family affairs of those persons whose aid is sought for such services are to be ascertained. Information of this nature is used to apply pressure. If there is danger that the person concerned might notify the German agency of the Russian activity, he is threatened with an attempt on his life. In other instances an effort is made to compromise the person with the Germans so that they dispense with his services of their own accord.

4. Terror Acts against German Agencies

At times the psychological activities of Russian counterespionage agents in German agencies reach their climax in terror acts which are aimed at the liquidation of the office, its officers and employees. The Soviets try to carry out such operations with the support of partisan or special sabotage groups. The two following cases are typical examples:

- a. Soviet agents were supposed to locate a German agent training camp near Valka, and to identify its chief, its instructors and trainees. Once some of the camp's inmates had been enlisted for Soviet services, the entire camp was to be destroyed, perhaps with the aid of prisoners of war who were working on surrounding farms.
- b. Two counterespionage agents were to accept employment at the "German Espionage Staff" at D., to collect there all important information, and upon leaving the camp to murder its chief and his Russian collaborators.

In conclusion one may state that any German office and person who in the line of duty must employ native help to carry out operations against Russia is constantly in serious danger.

F. COMMUNICATION CHANNELS OF RUSSIAN COUNTER-  
ESPIONAGE AGENTS

Information collected by Soviet counterespionage agents is transmitted to their agencies through the following channels:

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1. By the agent on his return after completion of his mission.
2. By the agent on his return in the role of a "German agent".
3. Through a third person acting as communication link.
4. By radio.

If the purpose of the mission was merely the preliminary locating of a certain German agency without establishing close contacts, the agent is often instructed to return and make his report in person. He usually arranges for a sub-agent to continue the investigation....

However, in most cases the German agency itself is to be used as the medium by which intelligence is communicated. Soviet agents are instructed to see to it that they are hired by the German agency and sent into Soviet territory as German agents, thereby gaining an opportunity to report to their agency. The Soviet agent charged with such operations may make a personal report in the role of a German agent, or he may employ a German agent whom he has enlisted for Russian services.

Even Russian propaganda cells in German occupied territory use this method of passing intelligence to the Soviet side and of keeping in touch with their headquarters. For instance, in Poltava a secret Soviet organization installed agents within a German agent training camp. These agents were to organize a system whereby communications would be transmitted through members of the camp.

Counterespionage messages are furthermore transmitted by partisan couriers, messengers assigned especially to a particular agent, or by a regular counterespionage communications network.

Sometimes counterespionage agents are equipped with radio or are in touch with secret agent radio stations which transmit their messages. In some cases they have been instructed to contact their agency by use of the facilities of the radio stations at the German agent training camps. Agent M, for instance, was to infiltrate into a German school for radio agents and there to take a course as a radio operator. When unobserved he was to transmit information to the Russian agency which had sent him on this mission.

#### G. RUSSIAN COUNTERESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

##### DESIGNED TO MISLEAD THE ENEMY

The Soviet counterespionage service goes to great lengths in order to deceive its opponent. These operations are carried out through Russian agents or through apprehended German agents who are persuaded to work against their former employer. The deception is designed to accomplish the following:

- a. Supply German authorities with misleading information about Soviet espionage agencies, their personnel and plans;
- b. supply misleading information about the progress of German missions within Soviet territory;
- c. supply misleading information about Soviet security measures; and last but not least

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d. deceive German authorities as to the Soviet's strategic and tactical plans, as well as to the general situation on the Soviet side...

In this field the enemy has always concentrated his efforts on persuading apprehended agents to work against their German employers. Former German agents are also employed to transmit decoy intelligence messages by radio to the German intelligence agency...

In enlisting former enemy agents for assignment in German territory, the principal consideration of the Soviet counterespionage service is the loyalty which may be expected. An agent surrendering voluntarily after reaching Russian territory is viewed with suspicion, especially if he appears anxious to be assigned to a mission against his former German employer; it will be assumed that he is acting on German orders. The Russians view a person more trustworthy who is apprehended while carrying out his assignment. In dealing with such a subject the Russian agencies rely upon the effects of the threat of death as penalty for the acts committed, and of promises of honorable rehabilitation if the subject proves himself faithful to the Soviet Union...

Once the Soviets have decided to use a former German agent against his erstwhile employer the indoctrination begins. As a rule the agent is kept incommunicado during this period because he might reveal to the Germans whatever information he is able to collect. Next he must sign his instructions which are similar to those of all other Soviet agents. Captured instructions for an agent formerly in German service read as follows:

"I, K.D. Jakovevich, born on 19 September 1903, pledge myself to guide German intelligence agents to the Soviet side by using the password "Ukraina", and not to reveal anything about this task to the German officers even under threat of death."

As a rule, any agent enlisted in this manner for a countermission is next photographed and fingerprinted; a detailed index card is made out which contains data about his person and his relatives. Should he fail to return at the appointed time, the security service uses this information to start a search, because it will be assumed that the Germans have won him over once again.

A fitting cover-story for double agents is obviously not as simple to construct as cover-stories for regular agents. All cover-stories are designed to convince the German agency of the reliable work which the agent did while on Russian territory. Two types of cover-story are common:

- a. The agent returns with "information" which shall give the impression that he has actually carried out his assignment. The following case is typical:

Agent L, who was deployed by a German agency, surrendered to a Russian counterintelligence officer. He gave away his password ("43") and reported that he had been ordered to carry out espionage activities in various Russian villages. When he was reassigned by the Russian counterintelligence agency, he was fitted out with unimportant material concerning these villages. He was then instructed to return to the German lines, to use his pass word there and to take up work behind the German lines for the Russian agency.

- b. The agent returns with a plausible explanation why



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he has been unable to carry out his German assignment. A German counterespionage agent who became a double agent reported to his German agency as follows:

"While parachuting down on Russian territory, I tore a ligament in my left leg. Since I was unable to find my group and needed medical aid, I went to a hospital where I was admitted on the basis of a self-invented cover-story. When I was well again, I was transferred to a replacement station which assigned me to a front line unit. From this unit I deserted to the German lines."

Cover-stories of the latter type are favored today. The handling of fake information is a difficult proposition and double agents often have become entangled in cover-stories of such a kind. However, also the second type of cover-story is at times wrongly constructed and can be identified as such by close scrutiny:

Upon his return to the German side an agent who had been contacted by the Soviets in the meantime reported as follows: "While crossing the battle line we were wounded, taken prisoner and sent to a hospital after having been interrogated. When I was well again, I was sent to the camp at Ch. and from there the army area command sent me to the front. I fell ill en route and was admitted to the hospital at Valdai. There I happened to meet the German agent O., who is in bad condition but works reliably. Once I reached the front again I took the first opportunity to desert to the German side."

This cover-story sounded improbable because the agent alleged to have been taken into the Red Army without the usual extremely thorough preliminary investigation. In addition it was obviously designed to testify to the loyalty of a former German agent who had likewise entered into Soviet employ in the meantime.

Generally speaking however, particular care is taken that the cover-stories supplied to German agents turned against their former employer can be presented without causing suspicion. In most cases only locations are mentioned with which the agent is really familiar and only circumstances are described which appear plausible.

The assignments of double agents are generally similar to regular counterespionage assignments. They are however, often more thorough and more closely defined since it is taken for granted that the agent concerned will be well acquainted with conditions at a particular German agency...

The following assignment which was recently given an agent by the espionage section of a Russian Army group command appears typical:

"Contact with the German agency is to be re-established. The agent will then apply for one month's rehabilitation leave by reason of the successful completion of his task. As proof he will produce the documents furnished him. He is to spend his leave in camp if at all possible. There he is to gather information about the other agents in the camp, their names and cover-names, their tasks and the objectives assigned to them. Particular attention is to be devoted to identifying the groups of people whom the Germans prefer as agents. Furthermore, he is to gather information about the



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camp's guard detachment and their living quarters. - The names of German personnel, their habits, weaknesses, special characteristics and the rest periods of the persons concerned are to be ascertained. - According to our information, the Germans plan to send another group of agents into Soviet territory approximately two to three months from now. At that time it should be attempted to kidnap the commanding officer of the German post, a Lieutenant Colonel E., who usually accompanies the agents to the point where they cross the frontier. He is to be brought to Russian territory."

In this particular case the Russian agent was instructed to gain special confidence by reporting that the German agent W who belonged to the camp was actually working for the Soviet espionage service.

Sometimes the Russians assign double agents to learn from German agents returned from missions in Soviet territory how they succeeded in carrying out their task without being apprehended by the Soviet security service. Hereby the Soviets intend to obtain suggestions for improving their security system...

On the basis of several statements by apprehended agents the Soviet counterespionage service also attempts to mislead the German intelligence offices by persuading radio agents to work for them. Further details concerning this activity are not available, since it is difficult to determine just when and how radio messages cease to be authentic.

H. SUCCESSES OF RUSSIAN COUNTERESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES

It is obvious that Russian counterespionage operations have made valuable contributions to the cause of the Red Army and Red Fleet. To get an accurate account of these achievements is relatively difficult for the German side. However, it is fairly evident that Russian counterintelligence has been successful with regard to the following objectives:

- a. Russian counterespionage and security agencies have collected detailed data about the organization and personnel of the German espionage, sabotage, and security agencies.
- b. The Russian counterespionage service has been able to secure in numerous instances advance notice of operations which German agencies were planning or carrying out. The Russian security system was thereby furnished with valuable information for search activities, enabling it to counter such missions. We have captured a few search lists issued by the NKVD District Administration at Rostov between September 1941 and May 1942. This limited material contains the names and in some cases the personal descriptions of 681 German agents. Much of this information had been secured by Russian counterespionage agents.
- c. German intelligence operations have been seriously impaired by interception or liquidation of our agents.
- d. The number of successful cases of subversive propaganda also deserve mention. Attempts to foment sedition have been uncovered at nearly every German agency which worked in the zone of operations over an extended period, against which the Soviet counterespionage service had been active. At many



of these agencies it was possible to identify agents working covertly for the enemy. It was ascertained that hostile elements were able to work for Russian interests in the disguise of German agents for a long time without being detected. Soviet agents have corrupted many reliable men, and clever enemy agents have succeeded in winning a considerable number of German agents to their side and then assigning them to lead Russian operations in German territory. Russian counterespionage has also been the cause of large-scale desertions from agent training camps.

The most important consideration is that these successes of the Russian counterespionage service combined with intensive security measures have created conditions which make any German intelligence operation in Soviet territory an increasingly difficult and dangerous task....



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ESPIONAGE - SABOTAGE - CONSPIRACY

APPENDIX III :

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G L O S S A R Y

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A. GERMAN TERMS . . . .	1
B. RUSSIAN TERMS . . . .	10



## GLOSSARY OF GERMAN TERMS

Literal translations are based on Cassel's "New German Dictionary" New York, 1939. However, German armed forces and police formations were inclined to give words a special connotation. Where possible, a translation has been given which comes closest to the meaning of the term in the present context.

Codes and abbreviations used as code were common as designation of offices, commands, and also some functions. In the following glossary, the code is given first, followed by the full term when code and full term were used interchangeably. In cases where only the code was used, the original or assumed German word is given in parenthesis. Numerical designations are listed at the end of this section.

-----oOo-----

Abt. - Abteilung

See: Amt.

Abwehr

Literally: Defense. The term was generally applied to activities in the field of espionage and counterespionage. In particular:

Up to 1938: Intelligence Section of Reich Ministry for Defense.

1938 - 1944: Armed Forces Intelligence, Sabotage, and Counterintelligence Agency; full title "Amt Ausland/Abwehr". Its main divisions were:

Abt. Abwehr I  
I(M)  
I(H)  
I(L)

Espionage Division, with  
Naval Desk  
Army Desk  
Air Force Desk.

Abwehr I I

Abwehr Communications Section.

Abwehr I G

Research and Technical Services Section.

Abt. Abwehr II  
II/S  
II/I

Sabotage and Infiltration Division, with  
Sabotage Section  
Infiltration Section.

Abt. Abwehr III  
III/F  
III/N

Counterespionage Division.  
Active Counterespionage Section  
Censorship.

Amtsgruppe Ausland

Foreign Liaison Division.

Abt. Z.

Administrative Division.

Abwb (Abwehr-  
beauftragter)

Industrial counterespionage agent of the  
RSHA.

Abwehr-Gruppe

Abwehr front-line staff, attached to Army  
Group Command.

Abwehr-Kommando

Abwehr front-line unit, usually one Kom-  
mando each for Abwehr I, II, and III  
activities with each Abwehr-Gruppe.

Abwehr Trupp

Abwehr unit, usually several with each  
Abwehr Kommando.

Afu (Agentenfunk)

Agent radio (report).

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Aktivist

Literally: An active person. Originally used by Communists and Nazis to identify a specially active member. Used in Abwehr work as term for Russians willing to enlist in "the common cause of the struggle against Bolshevism".

Alst

Regional Intelligence Control.

AM

German communist secret cells, esp. inside the armed and police forces, largely devoted to military espionage.

Amt

Directorate or Department, such as the Amt Ausland/Abwehr. At times several of these Departments were combined into a

Hauptamt

Main Directorate, such as the RSHA,

Amtsgruppe

Division of "Amt", such as the "Amtsgruppe Ausland" of Abwehr.

Abt.- Abteilung

Division of "Amt", such as Abteilung I, II, III of Abwehr. Also: A military detachment.

(There is a standard system for the German Amt, Amtsgruppe and Abteilung organization, each one of these offices appearing on various levels.)

Amt Ausland/Abwehr

See: Abwehr.

Amtsgruppe Ausland

See: Abwehr.

Anst (Abwehr-  
nebenstelle)

Branch Office, operating under Ast.

Ast (Abwehrstelle)

Abwehr Field Office on German or German-occupied territory; approximately 20 Asts have been identified.

Armee

Army. The army itself was usually referred to as "Heer" (H). Its field units, however, were referred to as

AOK / Armeeober-  
kommando

Command of a single army; several AOKs were combined into

(Heeres-) Gruppen-  
kommando

Army Group Command

(Ic

Army Intelligence Officer, attached to Group Commands, Army Commands, Corps and Divisions.)

Ausland

See: Abwehr.

Ausland/Abwehr

See: Abwehr.



B.d.S. See: S. - Sicherheit.

BE (Berichterstatter) Agent, esp. harbor agent, of the "Etappe" organization.

Betriebs-Zellen Communist factory cells, reported by the RSHA.

Brandenburg Division Armed Forces unit for special assignment also referred to by Abwehr II.  
as: "Brandenburg Regiment", "Regiment 800 z.b.V."

Chef der Sicherheits-polizei und des SD "Chief of the Security Police and the SD", Commander of the German Police and Nazi Party Security Forces.

Chefsache See: gKdos.

Chi (Chiffrier) Coding and decoding.

Chi-Nachrichten Foreign Press and Radio Digest, issued by "Ausland".

CPN Communist Party, Netherlands.

Einsatz-Gruppe Mobile police formation, esp. attached to the field army, comprising several Einsatz-Kommandos.

E.K. - Einsatz-Kommando Field unit of mixed Security Police and SD forces.

Etappe Secret German naval organization, operating abroad.

F (Fremd; Feind) Literally: Foreign, hostile; used as code for counterintelligence activities as well as for material of foreign origin.

FA (Forschungsamt) Literally; research office; actually, Intelligence Agency of the Reich Minister for Air.

FAK (Frontaufklarungskommando) Designation of former Abwehr-Kommandos after the 1944 reorganization.

FAT (Frontaufklarungstrupp) Designation of former Abwehr-Trupps after the 1944 reorganization.

Fremde Heere See: QU IV

Forscher "Spotter"; designation of agents who selected in prisoner of war cages subjects to be enlisted for Abwehr work.

Fu - Funk Radio.

Funkabwehr Common term for WNV/Fu. III, the Armed Forces radio security service.

Gegenspiel See: Spiel.

Geheim Secret.

Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) Secret State Police, Amt IV of the RSHA.

GFP (Geheime Feld-polizei) Army Secret Field Police.

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gKdos (Geheime Kommandosache)	Secret classification for armed forces material. Civilian government agencies used the term "Geheime Reichssache" for secret. GKdos material of a top-secret nature was marked in addition "Chefsache, Nur durch Offizier" (Matter for the Chief; by officer only); special officers were designated in each command to deal with Chefsache matters.
Grenzpolizei	Border Police; subordinate to the Chief RSHA, Amt IV.
GV (Gegenverbindung)	Counterconnection; term used in counterespionage.
GV-Spiel	See: Spiel.
H - Heer - Heeresgruppe	See: Armee.
Haifisch Harpune	Code designations for deceptive maneuvers whereby preparations for the invasion of Russia were camouflaged as being designed for an invasion of the British Isles.
H.SS.Pf. - Hoeherer SS und Polizeifuehrer	Himmler's deputy in a German Wehrkreis or an occupied country, in charge of all SS and Police Forces, and supervising the activities of I.d.S. and B.d.S.
Huest - Hafenueberwachungsstelle	Harbor Control Office.
I - Insurgierung	Infiltration.
II/I	Abwehr II branch in charge of all armed forces "I" activities.
I.d.S.	See: S. - Sicherheit.
Institut fuer Konjunkturforschung	Institut for Market Research, sponsored by the German association of manufacturers, occasionally providing economic intelligence for the armed forces.
K (Kampf; Kleinkampf)	Guerrilla operations and antipartisan activities of Abwehr II units.
Kampfgruppe	Irregular army unit of temporary nature.
KdM	See: KMG.
Kdo. - Kommando	"Command", the term being used alternatively to designate staffs or operating units.
KMG (Kommando der Meldegebiete)	Regional Intelligence Control; designation given to former Ast's and KO's after the 1944 reorganization of Abwehr; also referred to as KdM. See also: Melde.
KO (Kriegsorganisation)	Abwehr agency in neutral or German-allied countries.
KPD	Communist Party, Germany.
Kripo (Kriminalpolizei)	Criminal Investigation Police.

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Kurfuerst. Lehr- regiment -	Training Regiment "Kurfuerst"; 5th Regiment of the Brandenburg Division, with Abwehr school and sabotage personnel pool.
L - Luftwaffe	Air Force.
Legende	Literally: Legend; term used for cover-stories provided by German and Russian agencies for their espionage and counterespionage agents.
M - Marine	Navy.
FM	"Foreign Navies", German naval intelligence reports.
Ob.d.M.	Commander in Chief, Navy.
Melde	Literally: Inform. The term was used in German military parlance to identify espionage activities. From 1919 to 1944, the term "Abwehr" was substituted. By order of Himmler, the term "Melde" was reintroduced in Spring 1944.
Melde-Dienst	Intelligence Service.
Geheimer Melde-Dienst	Secret Intelligence Service - a plan to establish a "Geheimer Melde-Dienst" as central German intelligence agency was announced in 1944, but never fully carried out.
Melde-Gebiet	Operating area of FAT or FAK units; after 1944 several "Melde-Gebiete" acting under a KMG.
M.E.A. - Marineein-satzabteilung	Naval unit for coastal reconnaissance and small-scale Commando raids, operating mainly under Abwehr.
M.E.K. - Marineein-satzkommando	Detachment of M.E.A.
Musik	In RSHA and Abwehr parlance: Radio operation.
Nachrichten	Literally: Information. The term was applied in German military and naval usage with a dual meaning (a) communications, (b) intelligence. This may be partially explained by the organization: Up to 1938 the German Naval Staff "Nachrichten" Division was responsible for communications as well as intelligence; it was then broken up into the "3rd Division" (Nachrichtenauswertung - i.e., intelligence evaluation) and the "4th Division" (Marine Nachrichtendienst - i.e., Naval Communications).
Nachrichten-auswertung	Evaluation.
Nest - Nebenstelle.	See: Abwehr Anst.
NS	National-Socialist

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NSFSt "National-Socialist Guidance Staff in the Propaganda Division of the Armed Forces High Command."

Nur fuer den Dienstgebrauch Restricted.

OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) Armed Forces High Command; see also: W.

Orpo - Ordnungspolizei Regular Police.

Pantoffelpost "Slipper-mail"; Abwehr expression for whispering campaigns.

Pr Propaganda

W Pr Propaganda Division of the Armed Forces High Command.

Pr Tr Propaganda Units, including press and photo reporters.

Pr K Propaganda Companies, attached to front-line units.

Pz - Panzer Armored - also designation for Abwehr Troops attached to Armored Armies.

QU IV (Oberquartiermeister IV). Assistant Chief of Staff for the Evaluation of Intelligence for the Army General Staff with:

3. Abt; Fremde Heere, Ost Russian Section.

12. Abt; Fremde Heere, West Western Section.

R (Ruecken) "Rear": Code for stay-behind operations.

Resident In German terminology: A stay-behind agent; in Russian terminology: A main agent abroad. The term was apparently assumed gradually from the Russian by Abwehr and RSHA staffs; its use shows variations.

RFB - Roter Frontkaempferbund German Communist Veterans Organization.

RF-SS - Reichsfuehrer SS Official party rank of Heinrich Himmler.

RG0 - Rote Gewerkschaftsopposition German Communist-sponsored opposition in the unions.

Rote Kapelle "Red Orchestra"; RSHA Special Investigation Unit, assigned to infiltrate into Moscow-sponsored underground organizations by radio counterespionage and other means.

RSHA - Reichssicherheitshauptamt Central Security Agency, divided into various Departments (see "Amt"), among them the following:

RSHA/IV, Amt IV Secret State Police, Gestapo Amt,



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IVa	Communist and related activities.
RSHA/VI, Amt VI	Foreign Countries Division.
VI/C	Eastern and Far Eastern Desks.
VI/S	Sabotage Branch.
VI/Z	Counterespionage Branch, successor to Abwehr III-F.
S - Sabotage	Sabotage.
II/S	Sabotage Branch of Abwehr II.
S - Sicherheit	Security.
SD - Sicherheitsdienst	Security Service of the Nazi Party, formed from members of the SS.
Sipo - (Sicherheitspolizei)	Security Police.
Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD	Chief of the Security Police and the SD, in charge of all German police and party security formations, and directing activities of:
I.d.S. - Inspekteur der Sicherheit	Inspector-General of Security Districts in German territories.
B.d.S. - Befehlshaber der Sicherheit	Commander Security, for Districts in German-occupied territories.
Skl - Seekriegsleitung	Naval Staff, with:
1/Skl., Operationsabteilung	Operations Division, Naval Staff.
3/Skl., Nachrichten- auswertungsabteilung	Intelligence Evaluation Division, Naval Staff.
4/Skl., Marinenachrichtendienst	Communications Division, Naval Staff.
Sonderfuehrer	Specialist; special rank for Abwehr leaders who had not received officer-training, but exercised command authority of varying degree.
Sonderkommando	Special Unit: esp. Investigation Unit of the RSHA.
Spiel	Literally: Play, game; espionage operation carried out by the use of manipulated information.
Spielmaterial	Faked material (information).
GV-Spiel; Gegen- spiel	Counterespionage operation, frequently conducted by radio.
SS - Schutzstaffel	Protective squadron, i.e., the Nazi Party Elite Guard.
Waffen-SS.	Militarized branch of the SS.
Stapolste - Staatspolizeileitstelle	Regional office of the Gestapo.
Staposte - Staatspolizeistelle	District office, subordinate to Stapolste.
Unternehmen	Literally: Undertaking; usual term for an Abwehr operation.



V. (Verbindung) Connection; term used in German espionage parlance.

V-Mann Agent; in the East esp. any Russian national enlisted by Abwehr.

VM Liaison man of the Etappe organization.

GV-Mann Counterespionage agent.

VO (Verbindungs-offizier) Liaison Officer, esp: Abwehr liaison officer attached to the Ic of army staffs.

VO, Italien Abwehr organization in Italy, similar to KO in other countries.

Vlassov Russian general, headed Russian national military units fighting on the German side. These units were referred to at times as "Vlassov Army", or "Army of Liberation".

W - Wehrmacht Armed Forces. The designation "W" in front of an office or command usually indicates that it is under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW).

WFSt (Wehrmachts-fuehrungsstab) Operational Staff of the Armed Forces High Command.

WFSt op Operations Section of the Operational Staff, attached to Fuehrer's Field Headquarters.

WFSt op (M) Naval Officer with Operations Staff.

WNV (Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindung) Armed Forces Communications Division.

WNV/Fu. III Radio Security Service.

W Pr Armed Forces Propaganda Division.

W Wi (Wehrwirtschaftsstab) Armed Forces Economic Division.

Waffen SS See: SS

Walli Abwehr Agency, attached to Ast Ostland, Riga, for the coordination of Abwehr activities at the Russian front.

Wannsee Institut Research Institute, sponsored by the RSHA.

Werkschutz Factory Security Guards, privately employed but supervised by government agencies.

Z (Zentralabteilung) Administrative Section of Ausland/Abwehr.

ZA Personnel

ZF Finance

ZK Central Index

ZKV Central Agents Index.

Z - Zersetzung Disintegration and decomposition, carried out by Abwehr II.

z.b.V. (zur besonderen For special assignment.  
Verwendung, Verfuegung)



Numerical Designations...

Ia	Operations Section, Operations Officer.
Ic	(Army) Intelligence Officer.
I G	(Abwehr) Research and Technical Services Section.
I (H)	Army Desk at Abwehr I.
I I	(Abwehr) Communications Section.
I (M)	Navy Desk at Abwehr I.
1/Skl	Naval Staff, Operations Division.
I (L)	Air Force Desk at Abwehr I.
II	General designation for Abwehr II sabotage and seditious activities.
II/I	(Abwehr) Infiltration units, activities.
II/S	(Abwehr) Sabotage units, activities..
III-F	Active Counterespionage.
III-F Methoden	Active counterespionage techniques; also: Third-degree interrogation methods.
3/Skl	Naval Intelligence, Evaluation Division of Naval Staff.
III (W)	Armed Forces Desk at Abwehr III.
IV (Amt IV)	Gestapo, Secret State Police Division of the RSHA.
VI (Amt VI)	Foreign Countries Division of the RSHA.

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B. GLOSSARY OF RUSSIAN TERMS.

This glossary gives Russian terms as they appeared in German documents. Therefore, responsibility for the accuracy of the term as well as for its interpretation rests with the German source.

In general, the spelling of Russian words and names has been changed from the German to standard English usage.

In some instances, various designations have been applied in German documents to what appears to be one and the same Russian agency; also varying accounts have been given of the activity of apparently one agency. In such cases, the glossary gives the alternative designations and functions in parenthesis.

A; Ag	Agent.
Agentura	Agency; esp. that section of an intelligence organization responsible for recruiting and directing agents.
Agitprop	Propaganda branch of the Communist Party.
A/S (antisovjetski)	Anti-bolshevist.
A.S.S.R.	Autonomous Soviet Republic (of the U.S.S.R.).
BO	Coast Guard.
Cheka (Extraordinary Commission)	Security Agency 1917 - 1922.
Diversiya	"Diversión", including sabotage, sedition and deception.
Diversant	Sabotage or seditious agent.
DTU	Transportation Directorate, NKGB, in charge of security of all internal transportation and communications in the USSR.
DTO	Regional or local branch of DTU.
EKU	Economic Directorate, NKGB, in charge of security of industrial and commercial undertakings in the USSR.
EKO	Regional or local branch of EKU.
F	Sabotage agent.
Front	Front; i.e., Army Group.
GB	"... of State Security", added to the military rank of NKGB officers.
(O) GPU	(Central) State Political Directorate, constituted as successor to the Cheka, reorganized 1934 into the NKVD. Since 1943 most of the former GPU functions have been transferred to NKGB.
(G) RU	See: RU
(G) UGB	(Central) Directorate of State Security, NKVD. The functions of this directorate have been transferred to NKGB.



(G.) UKR See: Smersh.

GULAG Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps, NKVD.

GUM Directorate of the Militia (Police), NKVD.

GUPV Directorate of Frontier Guards, NKVD.

GUVS Directorate of Supplies (Administration), NKVD.

GUVV Directorate of Internal Guards, NKVD.

H NKGB operating group in charge of foreigners or foreign missions on Soviet soil.

INF "Information Section", NKGB.

INU Foreign Directorate, NKGB. This directorate, variously reported as "1st" and "5th" Directorate is in charge of NKGB activities abroad. Reportedly, it was initially established in 1921 as a section of the Cheka.

INO Regional or local office of INU.

Kolkhoz Collective Farm.

Komendatura Headquarters; esp: field command of NKVD Guards.

Komsomol Communist Party Youth Organization.

K.P.P. Designated points for border-transit; supervised by NKVD Frontier Guards.

KR (Kontrrasvedka) Counterintelligence.

KRU Counterespionage Directorate (3rd Directorate), NKGB.

KRO Regional or local office of KRU.

(K) TPK or KPK Central Control (Commission) of the Communist Party Central Committee for supervision of ranking members.

Kulak Farmer who employs labor.

MGB Ministry of State Security; see also NKGB.

MTS Motor Tractor Station; state-operated farming equipment agency.

MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs; see also NKVD.

NKGB (Narodni Kommissariat Gosudarstvenoy Besopastnosti) People's Commissariat for State Security; since 1943 in charge of espionage and other covert operations formerly carried out by NKVD. Present name: Ministry of State Security (MGB).

NKO People's Commissariat for Defense (Army and Army Air); changed into Ministry of Armed Forces.

NKVD (Narodni Kommissariat Vnutrenikh Del) People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; established in 1934 as successor to the OGPU; present name: Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).



NKVMF People's Commissariat for the Fleet; incorporated into the new Ministry of Armed Forces.

NKVMF RU  
UKR NKVMF Naval Intelligence (2nd Division NKVMF).  
Naval Counterintelligence (3rd Division NKVMF).

OGPU See: GPU

OKR See: Smersh.

OKRUG NKVD border or coastal district.

Oms, (Organizatsiya  
mezhdunarodnaya  
soyedineniya) "Organization of International Communica-  
tions"; Comintern Communications  
Training Center, supervised by the Red  
Army, according to RSHA.

OO, (Osoboji Otdjel,  
Osoboiy Otdyel) Special Section, esp:

OO, NKVD NKVD Counterespionage Section, the  
functions of which were transferred  
to "Smersh" in 1943.

OPO; Opergruppa Operational "strong arm" section of NKGB  
units.

Org Bureau; Orgburo Organizations bureau of the Communist  
Party.

ORSU Fleet Command.

OSO Special Secret Section, esp: Special  
Secret Section of Naval Intelligence,  
cooperating with "Smersh".

Osh NKVD General NKVD School.

Otdjel, (Otdyel) Section.

Partisan OO NKGB Counterespionage section of the Partisans,  
under NKGB control (not under "Smersh").

Partisan RO Partisan Intelligence; 2nd Section of the  
Partisan command.

Partorg (Communist) party organization.

PO (also: SQ-4,  
NKGB) Censorship section.

Polit Bureau; Politburo Controlling body (steering committee) of  
the Russian Communist Party and of for-  
eign communist propaganda; ten members.

Politrak Political Guide, i.e., member of the armed  
forces who acts as party representative  
on the squadron and company level.

PU or PO Political Section; esp. of Army and Navy  
staffs.

PURKKA Political Directorate of the People's Com-  
missariat for National Defense.

PURKKE Political Directorate of the Red Fleet,  
organized similarly to PURKKA.

(Politicheskoye  
Upravleniye  
Rabochey-  
Krestyanskovo  
Krasnoye Flota)



RU or RO	Intelligence; esp. intelligence sections of the army and navy staffs, (2nd Section).
(G)RU	Intelligence Division (2nd Division), (a) with the General Staff of the army (RU NKO), (b) with the Naval Staff (RU NKVMF), (c) with the Frontier Guards, NKVD.
RO	Field agencies of the above Divisions.
SB	Section for investigation and legal preparation, NKGB.
Shp (Shpion)	Spy.
Second (Division, Section, etc.)	Common designation for intelligence branch.
Seksot; SS	Secret operative; esp. of NKGB.
Sledovatel	Public prosecutor - Federal Attorney General.
(UOKR) "Smersh"	Literally: Directorate for Counterespionage "Death to the Spies". Counterintelligence organization of the Armed Forces; developed in 1943 from the NKVD "00" (Special Division for Counterintelligence). With conclusion of hostilities "Smersh" functions reportedly were transferred to NKGB.
OKR NKO "Smersh"	"Smersh" agency attached to army staffs.
SNK	See: Sovnarkom.
SO	Special Operational Section; esp. those of NKGB.
Soyuz	Literally: Union; Soviet-Unionism.
Sovnarkom	Council of People's Commissars, i.e., Soviet state government; name now changed into "Council of Ministers".
Sovkhoz	State farm.
SPU	Secret Political Directorate (Second Directorate), NKGB.
SPO	Regional or local office of SPU.
SS	See: Seksot.
Third (Division, Section, etc.)	Common designation for counterintelligence branch.
TPK	See: (K) TPK.
UGB	See: (G) UGB.
(G)UKR NKVMF	Division of Naval Counterintelligence.
UOKR	See: Smersh.
UOO	Directorate of the "Special Section", NKVD, (Counterespionage Section); see also: 00.

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UPV	NKVD Frontier Guards.
VKR	Internal Counterintelligence; esp.: supervision of NKVD and NKGB members.
VR	Army operational intelligence; reconnaissance.
Vsh (Vyshiy Shkola), NKVD	NKVD College.
Vyshiy Kurs Rabotnikov NKVD	NKVD Academy.
ZAGS	Vital Statistics Directorate.
ZK VKP(b)	Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).



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