



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
HOFFMAN BUILDING
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ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

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IN REPLY REFER TO
NIS-42/vlb

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Ser C 4270
12 JUL 1971

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From: Director, Naval Investigative Service
To: Distribution List

Subj: Defense Investigative Program Matters

Ref: (a) DIRNIS ltr Ser U3505 of 3 June 1971

Encl: (1) DIRC Study Report No. 7
(2) Examples of unsuitable items for production
(3) Examples of suitable items for production

1. Reference (a) provided copies of, and comments concerning, DIRC Studies No. 1, No. 2, and No. 9 for guidance and compliance, and indicated that policy guidance would continue to be promulgated as other DIRC studies, which were still underway, are completed.

2. Enclosure (1) sets forth the approved DIRC concept concerning Counterintelligence Publications. The following comments are provided for information, or emphasis, as appropriate:

a. The DIRC has defined finished publications as those for which data has been evaluated, analyzed or correlated to produce a substantive report which is circulated to commanders or other agencies. This would include such things as NIS Briefs, studies, estimates, analyses, summaries of information, and characterizations.

b. Information contained in all future NIS publications must now meet at least one of the three requirements set forth in paragraph II.A of enclosure (1). Namely, they must fulfill a need to:

(1) Advise commanders of activities of a subversive nature being directed at the officers and men under their command. (The DIRC definition of subversion embraces actions designed to undermine the loyalty, morale, or discipline of DoD military and civilian personnel.)

(2) Provide information to commanders on organizations threatening the physical security of their installations. (This encompasses the protection of DoD functions and property and includes such threats as thefts of arms and ammunition, destruction or sabotage of facilities, direct threats to DoD military

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or civilian personnel in connection with their official duties, or any other act jeopardizing the security of DoD elements or operations).

(3) Produce finished publications containing information of value in making judgements concerning personnel security matters. (This primarily embraces information needed to adjudicate NAC's, PSI's and internal security investigations. It could also include the production of finished intelligence for commanders on non-DoD affiliated persons and organizations who have requested access to DoD installations or participation in some DoD function.) Such information cannot, however, be given broad dissemination for educational purposes through such mediums as the NIS Brief. It must be provided in response to a specific request.

c. The information must have a direct relationship and applicability to a threat against the Department of the Navy or some other element of DoD. In the case of the monthly or quarterly Brief this relationship must be clearly stated within each article. In the case of other publications (e.g., studies, analyses and estimates) dealing with one general subject or problem it shall be set forth in a "threat assessment" at the outset. The assessment should identify the commands targeted and should specify the nature of the threat in a clear and concise manner. It is no longer permissible to include in finished publications information relating to general trends (e.g., general activities on the part of such groups as the Communist Party, USA or the Students for a Democratic Society, which do not directly exhibit a threat to DoD. Examples of such trends which are no longer acceptable are contained in enclosure (2). Conversely, examples of items that are acceptable are set forth in enclosure (3).

d. Each publication must contain, either on the inside of the cover sheet or in the letter of promulgation, the following certification:

"The information set forth herein has been collected in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5200.27 and SECNAVINST 3820.2."

e. As will be noted in Section III.E. of enclosure (1) the DIRC has emphasized that the failure to identify non-DoD

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sources conveys the erroneous implication that the information was collected by elements of DoD. Therefore, DIRC is requiring that all DoD publications broadly identify, to the maximum extent possible, the source of any non-DoD developed information contained therein. In the case of the NIS Brief this can be handled by an annotation at the end of each article, as appropriate. Examples might be: (Source: FBI-NY) or (Source: Maryland State Police) or (Source: A non-DoD local San Francisco law enforcement agency) or (Source: A non-DoD government agency that conducts security investigations). In studies and analyses where it might not be appropriate to annotate sources at the end of each paragraph, it will suffice to include the following statement in the letter of promulgation, (or some other prominent place where no letter of promulgation is required): "The information contained herein which relates to non-DoD organizations or personnel was obtained by liaison with appropriate federal, state, and local investigative agencies."

f. Paragraph IV.E. of enclosure (1) emphasizes that each Military Department should review current dissemination procedures and limit the publication of information on U. S. organizations and individuals to those commands and agencies having a valid requirement for the information. Accordingly, distribution on all NIS publications that contain information on U. S. citizens and organizations not affiliated with DoD shall be limited to the following:

(1) Navy/Marine Corps officials who might have a policy interest in the matter reported upon.

(2) Navy/Marine Corps components that might be directly affected.

(3) Subscribers to the Delimitations Agreement.

(4) Other federal government agencies or components that have demonstrably valid requirements for the information.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

1 June 1971

ADMINISTRATION

DIRC Study Report No. 7

SUBJECT: A Review of Counterintelligence Publications

I. BACKGROUND

A. The DIRC has directed that this study analyze the requirements for, the content of, and the dissemination procedures for counterintelligence publications that contain information about civilian organizations or individuals not affiliated with the Department of Defense.

B. A review has been conducted of the publications produced periodically by the military departments and the unified and specified commanders. This review concentrated on finished publications which are defined as those for which data has been evaluated, analyzed or correlated to produce a substantive report which is circulated to commanders or other agencies.

C. A majority of the publications reviewed contained information outside the scope of this study effort. These publications were primarily directed at foreign intelligence information or foreign intelligence services. No analysis of these has been undertaken.

D. Attached at TAB "A" is a listing of all publications which have been reviewed, and which contain information on non-affiliated

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organizations and individuals. This study report provides conclusions and recommendations for future publication of this type of information.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Requirements

The first requirement upon which the current publications are based is to advise military commanders about activities of a subversive nature being directed at the officers and men under their command. A second requirement is to provide to the military commander information related to organizations threatening the physical security of the installation for which he is responsible. Finally, there is a requirement to produce finished publications containing information of value in making judgments concerning personnel security matters.

These requirements are implicit in the publications examined, but no publication contained a statement of specific relationship to a requirement. Rather, most contained a general statement indicating that the purpose of the publication was to provide a summary of counterintelligence information.

B. Content

The publications examined contained a broad range of information. In certain cases, a single publication contained articles about U.S. individuals and organizations as well as articles about foreign intelligence services or in some cases foreign intelligence. Additionally, certain publications examine in detail a single dissident U.S. organization.

The majority of the publications examined were produced prior to the publication of DoD Directive 5200.27. As a result, the content in many cases, would not meet the criteria established by that Directive, and would therefore not be publishable. It was noted that publications prepared subsequent to the Directive reflect a reduction in the scope and quantity of information on U.S. organizations and individuals. This trend is expected to continue as the amount of information collected and retained is sharply reduced.

As presently written, the publications might be construed as being based solely upon the results of DoD collection and analysis. This impression is heightened by a lack of prefatory statements either acknowledging compliance with existing information acquisition directives or broadly identifying the source of the data. It might thus be concluded erroneously that the Department of Defense continues to collect and publish much material with little direct relationship either to an individual service or to the Department's mission.

Finally, in some publications the origin of the information was not identified. It was, therefore, not possible to determine if the contents were produced at the local level or simply repetitious.

C. Dissemination

All of the publications examined indicated dissemination. In general, headquarters publications received wide external dissemination including CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and in some cases, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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Since the basic requirement for the publications has been to advise military commanders of matters of security significance, the publications have received broad dissemination within each of the military departments. This dissemination was not limited to investigative activities, but generally include all appropriate commands. Additionally, each of the service headquarters publications' was exchanged with other service investigative headquarters on a broad basis. These procedures have resulted in an impression of a great proliferation of information on U.S. civilians and organizations not associated with DoD.

III. CONCLUSIONS

A. Valid requirements for publications of the type examined continue to exist.

B. The restricted collection/retention criteria established pursuant to DoD Directive 5200.27 will have the effect of limiting the domestic material available for publication.

C. The publications entitled "Counterintelligence" contain information which goes beyond the DIRC definition of "Counterintelligence".

D. Some publications have not yet been changed to fully reflect policies contained in DoD Directive 5200.27 pending the results of this study; however, an improvement has been noted since publication of the Directive.

E. In some cases, the failure to identify non-DoD sources conveys the erroneous implication that much of the information was acquired by DoD investigators.

F. The failure of some articles to establish a direct relationship with a threat to the military mistakenly suggests that DoD publishes indiscriminately.

G. Dissemination practices, particularly external, require re-evaluation.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

A. Publications indicate the direct relationship and applicability of the articles published to a threat against the individual service or other DoD activities.

B. Publications not misuse the term "Counterintelligence" as defined by the DIRC.

C. Publications contain a certificate of compliance with DoD Directive 5200.27 or implementing Military Department Regulations.

D. Publications broadly identify non-DoD sources of information to the extent practicable.

E. Each military department review current dissemination procedures and limit the publication of information on U.S. organizations and individuals to those commands and agencies having a valid requirement for the information.

F. The publication of analyses, memoranda, or articles be carefully screened to determine that the information published is limited to essential information and does not contain excessive background material.

	<u>PUBLICATIONS</u>			
	<u>ARMY</u>	<u>NAVY</u>	<u>AF</u>	<u>U&S COMMANDS</u>
<u>Departmental Publications</u>	Counterintelligence Digest (monthly) Counterintelligence Estimates (as required)	Counterintelligence Brief (monthly) NIS Study (as required) NIS Analysis (as required)	OSI Information Brief (bi-weekly) OSI Special Reports and Memoranda (as required)	
<u>Joint Commands</u>	CONUS Armies' Monthly Intelli- gence Summary (each Army publishes one)	NISO Counterintelli- gence Brief (monthly) NISO Port Studies (annually) NISO Estimates (as required) NISO Analysis (as required)	None	CINCLANT Counter- intelligence Brief (quarterly)

TAB "A"

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BLACK PANTHER PARTY SPONSORED REVOLUTIONARY CONVENTION ENDS
IN FAILURE (U)

(U) Delegates to the Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC) left Washington, D. C., after Thanksgiving week-end without the constitution they had promised and with little to show for their efforts. Many reports suggest that the cause of radical left-wing factions and the prestige of the Black Panther Party may have suffered a significant setback due to the failure.

(U) A major source of difficulty for the convention was the failure to secure a building capable of handling the needs of the three to five thousand delegates who turned out. A request to use the District of Columbia Armory had been denied in October and this denial was upheld by the U. S. District Court and the U. S. Court of Appeals. This latter decision, handed down on 2 November 1970, forced a postponement of the convention, initially scheduled for the first week-end in November.

(C) The Student Association at Howard University, Washington, D. C., offered use of the university's facilities for approximately \$10,000. However, this offer was later withdrawn when the Black Panther Party failed to make payment of even a portion of the fee by the 24 November deadline date.

(C) Approximately six inner city churches had offered the convention the use of their buildings for some of the smaller workshops, and they became the only facilities available. Among the many groups represented were: women's liberation groups; college students' the homosexual Gay Liberation Front; the Black Panther Party; the Puerto Rican Young Lords; radical splinter groups; and young white "street people," many of high school age.

COMMENT:

(C) The significance of the failure of the convention to accomplish its aims, both in terms of the Black Panthers and the revolutionary movement as a whole, is difficult to assess. Unlike the plenary session which met in Philadelphia over Labor Day week-end, this event was marked by disorganization, friction and, to a certain extent, disenchantment. To a large number of young radicals and a wide range of organizations, the Black Panther Party made a singularly bad showing. One of the most notable schisms is that which developed between the Panthers on the one hand, and the administration and students of Howard University, on the other.

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ANTI-MILITARY PROTEST

Overview

(FOUO) The past six months have been comparatively quiet, so far as student dissidents have been concerned, and this quiet has evoked editorial comment from major news journals attempting to analyze the situation on the nation's campuses. The current Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia and Laos failed to arouse the dissidents as did the events of May 1970; however, spokesmen claiming knowledge of the student movements attribute the lack of response to sullen indifference, futility and hopelessness.

(FOUO) Radicals who espouse revolutionary activity have attempted to restore the feverish pitch to anti-war activities with little obvious response. Rennie DAVIS, convicted at the Chicago Conspiracy Seven Trial, has been working with the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST WAR, RACISM and REPRESSION in a program designed to bring protesters to Washington, D. C. again this Spring, and has appeared at several campuses that offered some potential for the response of bygone days.

(FOUO) In Chicago after Christmas, the Maoist oriented WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE/STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY held a national gathering to plan activities for the Spring. All things considered, it has been a quiet period, but the usual period of Spring planning has taken place and the peace of Winter will be challenged in the Spring. The extent and success of the projected Spring actions will be a real test for radical leaders who wish to restore the former intensity and excitement to dissident activity.

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RICHMOND INFORMATION CENTER (U)

Richmond, Virginia

(C) Recently, this office reported the founding of the RICHMOND INFORMATION CENTER (RIC). Although the relationship between the RIC and the BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) was never specified, it was understood by both groups that the RIC was to serve as an organizing chapter of the BPP. Reports have now been received that the RIC has decided to drop its connection with the PANTHERS. Leaders of the Richmond group were dissatisfied with the organizational support extended by the BPP and claimed that the national headquarters had failed to provide enough guidance for the group. The organization is also considering changing its name from the RICHMOND INFORMATION CENTER to UNITED FRONT or BLACK UNITED FRONT.

COMMENT:

(C) Last reports indicate that the RIC has not abandoned BLACK PANTHER PARTY goals and methods. However, it can be expected that the strength and influence of the RIC will decline. A large share of the Richmond group's financial support came from the national headquarters of the BPP and from the sale of BLACK PANTHER newspapers. Without this financial backing, the viability of RIC will suffer.

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PROPOSAL TO UNIFY DISSIDENT MILITARY PERSONNEL (U)

A leader of the WHITE PANTHER PARTY (WPP), a group of Caucasian revolutionaries who support the BLACK PANTHER PARTY, has proposed a massive organizational effort to consolidate the dissident activity of military personnel on active duty into an organization that might be taken into the WPP or at least mount a united front campaign with the WPP. As envisioned, the organization would have a number of purposes, but mainly it would provide information to servicemen and provide counseling services for draftees and discharged servicemen. Personnel would not be encouraged to avoid military service but would be urged to organize within the service, utilizing newspapers, word-of-mouth communication, radio and rock bands. A studied effort would be made to reduce the antipathy between service personnel and "freaks." On the premise that the military man of today is the teacher of the revolutionary army of tomorrow, an important part of the proposal is the establishment of a newspaper to be disseminated to military personnel of all services. Regional headquarters would be at Berkeley, California, for the West Coast, Chicago for the Midwest, and Washington, D. C., for the East Coast. Representatives at bases within designated sub-regions would gather information from military reporters and photographers and send it to the regional headquarters for transmittal to the Headquarters in Ann Arbor, Michigan. The Headquarters would be responsible for editing and publishing the material for distribution. Overseas areas in Europe, Central and Latin America and Asia have not been overlooked; however, each area poses peculiar problems of representation for collection of exploitable information. Radio communications would be exploited to advertise the military underground movement and provide announcements of interest to dissident military personnel. Radio would also be used to unify the "freaks" of the movement with military personnel.

COMMENT: The foregoing is in the proposal stage and if the project does get off the ground there will be a great deal of reliance on such established groups as the MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC MILITARY (MDM), which has an active chapter in the environs of Naval Base Great Lakes, Illinois.

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PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY PROGRAM FOR SUBVERSION WITHIN THE
ARMED FORCES (U)

(U) A recently published special issue of Challenge-DeSafio, the official publication of the PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP), enumerates a 16-point "PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY Program for Smashing the Bosses' Armed Forces from Within." The demands read as follows:

- (1) Get out of Vietnam and all of Southeast Asia now!
- (2) No use of troops in ghettos - abolish "riot" training.
- (3) No use of troops against workers' strikes.
- (4) No use of troops on campus.
- (5) Smash the stockades - free the prisoners.
- (6) Absolutely no bad discharges.
- (7) Abolish OCS - no scabs from our ranks.
- (8) Abolish COP recruiting.
- (9) No recruiting for re-upping - no lifers from our ranks.
- (10) Fight for guaranteed jobs for GIs and wives upon discharge - jobs for all GI wives now - absolutely no unemployment.
- (11) Support base workers fighting for higher pay, better job conditions, and against "layoffs."
- (12) Develop support of all workers on strike.
- (13) Smash basic training - fight their intimidation and oppose their male supremacy and racist propaganda.
- (14) Fight all harassment and punishments.
- (15) Support fight of all disabled and hospitalized vets for better conditions, and guaranteed jobs with equal pay.
- (16) Fight for shorter hours, more leaves - the less work we do in their armies the better!

(C) COMMENT: The PLP has become increasingly active in

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its attempts to influence servicemen to disrupt the military in furtherance of PLP revolutionary goals. The PLP has stated that it has sent its members into the services to accomplish these goals. The list of demands is the most comprehensive statement yet made by the PLP in approaching the military. PLP philosophy follows that of the Chinese Communists, calling for a strict class struggle in which the enlisted man fights the officer as a worker fights his boss.

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BPP "EDUCATION" OF SERVICEMEN (U)

(C) Reputedly founded for "black protection and control of the black community," the BLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) has become known for its criminal activities, violence, and avowed intent to see the overthrow and destruction of the United States Government. The Party has not overlooked the military man in its plans to undermine the "establishment."

(C) There is a "servicemen's" subcommittee within each NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO COMBAT FASCISM (NCCF). The NCCF's were designed to serve as the "organizing arms" of the BPP. Organizationally, "servicemen's" subcommittees are staffed primarily with members and former members of the Armed Forces. They are charged with the task of "informing" American servicemen, particularly Negroes, of the "need to oppose the war in Vietnam." They are also directed to encourage and "Mobilize" servicemen to support and work for BPP objectives, and to tell servicemen they are being used as fascists by the military services.

(C) COMMENT: It is likely that the "educational" responsibilities of the "servicemen's" subcommittees would include the indoctrination of men in uniform with statements made by BPP leaders regarding the military services. "Panther Field Marshal" Don COX aimed a diatribe directly at men in the military in the 30 January 1971 issue of the BPP organ, Black Panther--Black Community News Service.

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MILITANT STUDENTS AT PRAIRIE VIEW A&M GO ON RAMPAGE

(U) On 26 February 1971 militant students at Prairie View A&M College (about 40 miles from Houston, Texas) set fire to a building which houses, among other departments, the military science and NROTC. Three floors of the brick building were seriously damaged by the blaze. This was the second straight night of campus violence at the predominantly black, state-supported school. On 25 February, about 1000 students went on rampage burning down the campus security police building, wrecking the campus store exchange, breaking windows out of two dormitories and the Memorial Center, and overturning and burning a security police car. The students were angry over the expulsion of four militant students, prices in the school cafeteria and campus exchange store, and dormitory conditions. Some students demanded an end to compulsory ROTC training. As a result of this student unrest, the college was shut down. Forms were mailed to the students, and they were not to be readmitted if they did not sign an agreement to support the goals and rules of the college; and pledged not to participate in any violence. On 8 March the school resumed classes. Sixty-two (62) students and two (2) faculty members were suspended.

(U) COMMENT: Prairie View A&M has a student enrollment of about 4000. This recent student unrest was the second time in less than two years that students have gone on rampage. Three buildings were burned 29 March 1969 following the fatal knifing of a football player in a student fight. Prairie View A&M is one of the colleges in the 8ND which has a NROTC on campus.

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