



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

SECRET

IN REPLY, REFER TO

AO2A-WSP-bfh
3800

14 AUG 1973

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Director, Naval Investigative Service

Subj: Continuing Intelligence Activities

Ref: (a) Your ltr NIS-09Y/kac 3800 Ser: U-2280 of 9 Aug 1973
(b) SECNAVINST 5500.28
(c) SECNAVINST 5430.13B
(d) MCO 3850.1C
(e) MCO 005511.11A
(f) MCO 07040.4E

Encl: (1) Copy of reference (d)
(2) Copy of reference (e)
(3) Copy of reference (f)

1. In accordance with the request contained in reference (a), the following information is provided for use in responding to Senator Sam J. Ervin's letter of 30 July 1973.

a. Response to Question I.E

Marine Corps counterintelligence activities are governed by references (b) through (f). Reference (b) designated the Director of Naval Intelligence as the Department of the Navy focal point for insuring the coordination and integration of all Naval counterintelligence, investigative and security policy and program matters (less combat related counterintelligence responsibilities of the Marine Corps) and for relationships with non-Naval agencies on such matters. Reference (c) specifies Naval intelligence and investigative jurisdiction and responsibilities. Based on these two documents, reference (d) sets forth the policy and guidance for counterintelligence activities and authorizes Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel to assist the Naval Investigative Service investigations and operations. Reference (e) provides information on technical surveillance countermeasures, and reference (f) outlines the policies and procedures governing the expenditure of collection and classification of information funds. All three of the Marine Corps directives are current and in effect. Reference (e) is the only current regulation issued since 1 March 1971. All directives pertain to tactical counterintelligence operations and maintenance of security aboard Marine Corps bases and installations. Reference (d) authorizes Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel to

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assist in investigations being conducted by the Naval Investigative Service in accordance with references (b) and (c) and with respect to espionage, sabotage and subversion including disaffection.

b. Response to Question II

(1) The Marine Corps has maintained representatives on only one interagency intelligence organization since 1 March 1971, the United States Intelligence Board. Currently, the Marine Corps provides an alternate member for the Department of the Navy on the United States Intelligence Board Security Committee. Membership is also active on the Audio Countermeasures Subcommittee, Research and Development Subcommittee of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, United States Intelligence Board.

(2) The individuals, members of the Counterintelligence and Security Branch, G-2 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, who participated in these committee meetings were:

(a) Security Committee, United States Intelligence Board.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATES</u>
LtCol Phillip J. Ryan	1 Mar 1971 - 30 Aug 1971
LtCol Raymon B. Steel	31 Aug 1971 - 30 Mar 1972
LtCol Walter S. Pullar, Jr.	17 May 1972 - Present

(b) Audio Countermeasures Subcommittee, Research and Development Subcommittee of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, United States Intelligence Board.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DATES</u>
Maj Denver D. Scott	1 Mar 1971 - April 1972
Maj Donald L. Davis	May 1972 - Present

(3) Information relative to the committees and subcommittees of the United States Intelligence Board can be obtained from the Director of that organization.

(4) Participation is continuing.

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2. Enclosures (1) through (3) are provided for your use. In view of the likelihood of further questions and the need for the Department to speak with one voice, it is requested that the Department of the Navy's reply to Senator Sam J. Ervin's letter of 30 July 1973 be coordinated with this Headquarters (Code AO2, LtCol Walter S. Pullar, Jr., OX4-2219/2058).



L. V. TOPE
By direction

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Auth: ED 12858

Date: 21 SEP 1977

Encl:

- 1. In accordance with the following:
 - a. Response

Marine by references (b) Director of Naval focal point for intelligence matters (1) Naval agencies of the Marine intelligence and investigation Based on these two documents and guidance for counterintelligence and information Marine Corps for counterintelligence and information (e) provides reference governing the expenditure of funds. All the information and reference are current since 1 Marine Corps security aboard Marine Corps (d) authorizes Marine Corps

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MARINE CORPS ORDER 3850.1C

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: Policy and Guidance for Counterintelligence (CI)
Activities

- Ref:
- (a) FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action
 - (b) FMFM 2-1, Intelligence
 - (c) SECNAVINST 5430.13B, Naval Intelligence Investi-
gative Jurisdiction and Responsibilities
 - (d) OPNAVINST 03850.1A (NOTAL)
 - (e) MCO 07040.4E (NOTAL)
 - (f) MCO 005511.11 (NOTAL)

- Encl:
- (1) Listing of Counterintelligence-related references
and source documents
 - (2) Instructions for Counterintelligence Credentials
 - (3) Format for Monthly Report of Team Activities

Report Required: Report of CI Team Activities (Report
Symbol MC-3850-01) par. 4j(2)

1. Purpose. To provide guidance and direction for commanders
in the accomplishment of their counterintelligence responsi-
bility/mission and employment of counterintelligence personnel.
2. Cancellation. MCO 3850.1B, MCO 3850.2, and MCO 5512.3B.
3. Background

a. Basic doctrine and guidance for the Marine Corps
combat-related counterintelligence activities are contained
in references (a) and (b). Further guidance on specific topics
is provided by references (c) through (f) and by those
publications listed in enclosure (1).

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c. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS), under the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, maintains, commands, and operates a worldwide organization to fulfill the investigative and counterintelligence responsibilities of the Department of the Navy (less those combat-related counterintelligence matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps). In accordance with references (c) and (d), NIS will conduct appropriate investigations of actual, potential or suspected espionage, actual, potential or suspected sabotage, and actual, potential or suspected subversive activities, including disaffection, and will collect, report, and disseminate counterintelligence information.

d. The commander, at any level, is responsible for formulation and implementation of adequate counterintelligence measures designed to ensure the security of his command and to deny to the enemy information which might be used to increase the effectiveness of hostile operations against friendly forces.

e. Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel are assigned to major Fleet Marine Force commands and supporting establishments to advise and assist in the counterintelligence effort.

f. In support of the NIS mission, Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel are authorized to assist in NIS investigations and operations. Generally, such assistance is highly encouraged by this Headquarters, subject to limitations imposed by requirements of the local command and provided the following is accomplished:

(1) Adequate counterintelligence support is being provided to the command to which the Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel are assigned.

(2) Adequate and appropriate counterintelligence training in support of the Marine Corps combat counterintelligence mission is being provided.

(3) In the case of support provided by counterintelligence teams, the team commander shall maintain operational

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g. Selected Marine Corps counterintelligence personnel are assigned authorized billets within the NIS organization to assist in conducting counterintelligence investigations, operations, and technical security services. Personnel will normally be assigned in areas of high Marine Corps interest.

4. Policy

a. Personnel

(1) Marine Corps personnel are especially selected and trained for counterintelligence duties. Personnel will not be assigned counterintelligence duties until a satisfactory background investigation has been conducted and they have satisfactorily completed a formal course of instruction approved by this Headquarters. Exceptions may be made upon request to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A). Each request must contain full justification.

(2) Personnel possessing a primary counterintelligence MOS may not be assigned primary duties outside of the intelligence occupational field unless authorized by this Headquarters.

b. Initial Selection and Training. All applicants for assignment to a formal counterintelligence course of instruction shall be screened by locally assigned counterintelligence personnel prior to being nominated for training. Commanding officers shall screen applicants in the absence of locally assigned counterintelligence personnel. Applicants must meet the following prerequisites:

(1) Be a corporal, sergeant, or staff sergeant, any MOS.

(2) Have a minimum GT score of 110.

(3) Be a high school graduate or have attained the equivalent GED.

(4) Have two years' obligated service upon completion of the course of instruction.

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(7) Personnel selected for counterintelligence training will be assigned the appropriate military occupational specialty (MOS) by this Headquarters upon satisfactory completion of the course of instruction.

c. Credentials. Upon command request, counterintelligence credentials are issued by this Headquarters to personnel assigned authorized counterintelligence billets. The purpose of these credentials is to identify those personnel accredited and authorized to conduct counterintelligence activities within the Marine Corps. Instructions for the use, preparation, and handling of credentials are contained in enclosure (2).

d. Civilian Clothing. An initial civilian clothing allowance may be granted to enlisted counterintelligence personnel when assigned duties where concealment of their military identity is required or desirable. Requests for civilian clothing allowances will be forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A02A) with sufficient information to justify the special expenditure. Normally, active participation in investigations conducted by NIS representatives, extensive liaison with other intelligence or investigative agencies, or counterintelligence assignments outside the continental limits of the United States will be considered as appropriate justification.

e. Funds. Instructions for the use of funds in garrison counterintelligence operations and investigations are contained in reference (e). Funds for operations in a combat situation will be available in accordance with instructions published by the appropriate theater or operational commander.

f. Specialized Training. Quotas to specialized technical training courses, language training, and area intelligence courses are scheduled by this Headquarters on a continuing basis to meet planned and anticipated requirements. In view of the unique and sensitive nature of this training and the billets for which trained, this Headquarters will control the selection and assignment of personnel to such training.

g. Security Standards. The sensitivity of counterintelligence assignments requires high standards of personal and professional conduct, attitudes, and performance.

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h. Liaison. Effective performance in the field of counterintelligence requires extensive liaison. Counterintelligence personnel are encouraged to maintain close and continuous liaison with NIS representatives and other intelligence and law enforcement agencies, military and civilian, as appropriate. Specific guidance with respect to matters which may be of investigative interest to other Federal agencies is provided in paragraph 10 of reference (c).

i. Identity of Personnel. Information concerning the numbers and names of personnel assigned to counterintelligence duties and their methods of operation will not be released to the public except when authorized by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Counterintelligence activities will be safeguarded in accordance with current security regulations for the security of classified matter.

j. Standardization of Reports

(1) Where possible, counterintelligence investigations, surveys, inspections, and inquiries will be reported on NAVMC 10481 (Rev 6-68) (Counterintelligence Report) and NAVMC 10482 (Rev 8-60) (Local Records Check). Operational intelligence reporting will be in accordance with directives published by the appropriate force commander.

(2) Counterintelligence team activity reports will be forwarded by the 10th of each month for the previous month's activities utilizing Report Symbol MC-3850-01 and the format in enclosure (3).

5. Counterintelligence Responsibilities. Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to major commands to assist and advise the commander in the accomplishment of his counterintelligence and security responsibilities. Assigned counterintelligence personnel should provide, as a minimum, the counterintelligence and security support listed below.

a. Staff Counterintelligence Section

(1) Through liaison with appropriate agencies, analysis of available information, and oral briefings or written estimates, keep the commander informed of persons, groups, or activities.

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espionage, actual, potential or suspected sabotage, and actual, potential or suspected subversive activities, including disaffection, ensuring that information about these matters is promptly referred to the nearest NIS representative.

(3) Conduct counterintelligence planning and training in support of command contingency missions. Planning actions may range from combat counterintelligence planning for operational deployments to security and counterintelligence planning for domestic/civil disturbances. The basis for planning should be counterintelligence estimates of the situation.

(4) Constitute the commander's primary source of advice and assistance on security matters. In fulfilling this responsibility, the following activities will normally be accomplished by assigned counterintelligence personnel:

(a) A basic security survey of the command/installation to determine the sensitivity, criticality, and vulnerability to threats.

(b) A continuous program of security inspections, evaluations, limited surveys, or related activities to ensure maintenance of an effective security posture.

(c) Limited technical security inspections of critical offices, conference rooms, communications spaces, and similar sensitive areas. Appropriate guidance is contained in reference (f).

(d) Assist in command security education and training programs designed to keep individuals informed on security regulations and to maintain a high degree of security consciousness.

(e) Supervision of the personnel security program to include establishing procedures for the initiation of security investigations and the granting, denial, or termination of personnel security clearances.

NOTE: Although counterintelligence specialists should not be employed in the clerical functions associated with the administrative preparation and processing of

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(f) In coordination with the communications officer and other staff officers, maintenance of the physical security aspects of communications security, including the investigation and reporting of violations thereof.

(g) Preparation of orders, instructions, and SOP's on security matters.

(h) Establishment of procedures for the security control of visitors, military and civilian.

(5) Conduct planning for the intelligence and counter-intelligence processing of friendly prisoners of war who have been returned to friendly control.

b. Counterintelligence Teams. The counterintelligence team, under the staff cognizance of the assistant chief of staff, G-2, will normally accomplish the following:

(1) Coordinate with the staff counterintelligence officer in accomplishing functions listed in paragraph 5a above. Emphasis will be placed on planning and preparation for contingency missions.

(2) Participate to the maximum extent possible in field training exercises involving battalion or larger elements. Such participation should include assignment of counterintelligence personnel to the exercise planning staff to ensure an adequate intelligence/counterintelligence play in the exercise.

(3) Ensure team training is adequate to maintain required proficiency in MOS skills.

(4) Assume responsibility for the conduct of security surveys, evaluations, afterhours security inspections, and technical security inspections. (NOTE: The staff counterintelligence element should normally be responsible for the security and counterintelligence portion of the command IG and A&M inspections.)

(5) In those instances of actual, potential or suspected espionage, sabotage, or subversive activity where the isolated location of the command may preclude timely response,

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6. Counterintelligence Activities in Support of the Fleet Marine Forces. Basic policy guidance and operational doctrine for the employment of CI teams are contained in reference (b). This guidance and operational doctrine will be revised periodically to reflect experience and lessons learned in operational deployments. The following supplementary guidance is based on recent policy decisions and lessons learned in Southeast Asia:

a. Counterintelligence teams will normally be attached to Fleet Marine Force Headquarters, MEF Headquarters, divisions, and air wings. Current planning provides three CI teams per MEF; i.e., one CI team each with the MEF Headquarters, division and air wing. When operational requirements so dictate, additional teams may be attached.

b. Coordination of CI teams through the MEF counterintelligence officer is considered essential to ensure an economical, flexible, and coordinated response to the counterintelligence threat within the MEF area of responsibility. Except where geographical or operational circumstances dictate otherwise, counterintelligence teams and subteams will not normally be placed under the operational control of commands of less than MEB size.

c. Counterintelligence activities must be characterized by the imaginative exploitation of all available resources. The counterintelligence effort must be oriented on the hostile intelligence/collection threat, but must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the geographical environment, attitudes of the indigenous population, mission of the supported command, and changing emphasis by hostile intelligence organizations.

d. In addition to normal counterintelligence activities, both active and passive, counterintelligence teams possess the capability of collecting both counterintelligence and "positive" (i.e., combat) intelligence through special operations and the use of human resources. Further information on this capability will be published separately to major FMF commanders.

e. In order to ensure that comprehensive, "all source" counterintelligence estimates and views are available to the supported commander, the staff counterintelligence officer at

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f. Experience has proven that counterintelligence activities do not achieve maximum effectiveness when conducted separately from other intelligence activities. The capabilities of the counterintelligence teams should be integrated into the overall collection plan. Their activities must be closely coordinated with those of other intelligence specialist teams as well as with civil affairs, psychological operations, and similar organizations in contact with the indigenous population. Extensive liaison with other intelligence agencies in the operating area, military and civilian, is essential to provide the supported commander the comprehensive support required.

g. Counterintelligence participation and assistance should be included early in the planning phases of tactical operations so that commanders will have the benefit of counterintelligence information in the early formulation of tactical plans.

h. Particular attention in the planning phase should be directed to concealing or masking those observable actions or patterns of activity which necessarily precede the operation and which, if observed and analyzed by the enemy, tend to reveal details or the existence of imminent operations.

7. Action. Commanding officers should effect those counterintelligence measures required and necessary as set forth herein to ensure the security of their command. Maximum use of counterintelligence personnel is recommended. Detailed counterintelligence directives should be promulgated by local commands as required.

8. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

W. J. Van Ryzin
W. J. VAN RYZIN
Chief of Staff

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Listing of Counterintelligence-Related References and Source Documents

<u>Publication</u>	<u>Subject/Description</u>
SECNAVINST 5521.6A	Navy and Marine Corps Military Personnel Security Program
OPNAVINST 3821.3B	Hostile Intelligence Collection of Unclassified Information
OPNAVINST 03822.5	Military Intelligence-Disclosure of Classified Information (U)
OPNAVINST 3850.2A	Reporting of Information on Actual or Attempted Defection
OPNAVINST 5510.1C	U.S. Navy Security Manual for Classified Information
OPNAVINST 5570.1A	Anonymous Correspondence of a Threatening or "Crank" Category; handling of
OPNAVINST 5700.8A	Communist Propaganda; instructions for handling of
MCO P10120.28	Individual Clothing Regulations (Chap. 4, part B, section III--- pertains to guidance on civilian clothing allowance)
NISINST 5520.11*	Assistance of Marine Corps CI personnel in NIS investigations
FM 30-5	Combat Intelligence
FM 30-17(C)	Counterintelligence Operations Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U)
FM 30-18(S)	Intelligence Collection Operations, Intelligence Corps, U.S. Army (U)
ONI 63.1B*	NIS Manual for Investigation
ONI 63-2	Guide for Security Orientation, Education and Training

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ONI 64-2A(S)*

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Counterintelligence Manual for
Naval Intelligence (U)

T/E for CI Team

T/O for CI Team

*Distribution made only to those commands having counter-
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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Instructions for Counterintelligence Credentials

1. General. Counterintelligence credentials are intended for the use of personnel on authorized counterintelligence missions. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A) is designated as the office of record for Marine Corps counterintelligence credentials. Commanders authorized counterintelligence personnel are responsible for the proper use, custody, safeguarding, and recall, when appropriate, of credentials issued to counterintelligence personnel within the command.
2. Requesting Procedure. Credentials will be prepared for issue as follows:
 - a. Commandant of the Marine Corps (AO2A) will:
 - (1) Print the name and affix the photograph of the individual for whom the credential is intended.
 - (2) Have the credential signed by an officer in the name of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and forward to the requesting command.
 - b. The requesting command will:
 - (1) Have the individual for whom the credential is issued sign the credential on the line provided (first name, middle initial, surname) and affix an inked impression of the right index finger in the space provided. (The grade of the individual will not appear on the credential.)
 - (2) Upon completion of all administrative entries on the credentials, both portions will be laminated prior to use.
 - (3) Complete and return the transmittal certification to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A).
3. Accountability
 - a. Credentials will be returned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A) by registered mail when counterintelligence personnel are transferred, assigned other duties, discharged (providing not immediately reenlisted), released from active duty, or under other circumstances which may cause the commander concerned to consider that retention of the credentials is no longer appropriate or required.

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b. Once issued, this Headquarters will retain credentials for counterintelligence personnel not currently occupying authorized billets and will reissue credentials when requested.

c. Commanders will initiate an immediate and thorough investigation of loss or theft of a credential, making an immediate report to Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A) that the loss or theft has occurred. In addition, local U.S. Government investigative agencies will be notified. Upon completion of the investigation, a full report will be forwarded to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A).

4. Restrictions

a. Except under unusual circumstances, as determined by this Headquarters, credentials will not be issued to personnel who have not completed a formal course of instruction in counterintelligence which qualified the individual for the MOS of 0210/0211.

b. Credentials are not transferable and will not be reproduced nor altered in any way except as authorized in paragraph 5 below.

5. Foreign Language Counterintelligence Credentials

a. Commanding Generals, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, are authorized to reproduce credentials in foreign languages for areas of possible use.

b. Issue and control of foreign language credentials is the responsibility of each Fleet Marine Force Headquarters.

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MCO 3850.1C
8 Jul 1968
Report Symbol
MC-3850-01

From: Team Commander
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force _____
Via: Commanding General, (Major Command) _____

Subj: Report of Counterintelligence Team Activities

Ref: (a) MCO 3850.1C

Encl: (1) Team Personnel Roster

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report of team activities for the period _____ is submitted:

a. Operations

- (1) Combat Operations
- (2) Special Operations
- (3) Investigations

b. Significant Counterintelligence Support Activities

- (1) Security services (surveys, evaluations, inspections, training, etc.)
- (2) Technical support (DAME/TSCM/Photo)

c. Training Highlights

d. Equipment Shortages

e. Miscellaneous (Liaison, TAD, and visiting personnel, etc.)

2. Team Commander's Comments. (Comments are solicited on combat operations, training exercises, and lessons learned which would be of use and general information to other teams/personnel.)

Distribution List:
CMC (Code AO2A)
CI Teams (Lant/Pac)

ENCLOSURE (3)

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Team Personnel Roster

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>SerNo</u>	<u>Duty</u> <u>Assignment</u>	<u>Spec</u> <u>Qualifications</u>	<u>RTD/</u> <u>OSCD</u>	<u>EAS</u>
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Special Qualification Legend

D--DAME
P--Photo
T--DASE/TSCM
A--Area Int
VL--Viet Lang
SL--Span Lang
FL--French Lang
RL--Russian Lang
TL--Thai Lang

ENCLOSURE (1) to
Report of CI
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

MCO 005511.11A
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MARINE CORPS ORDER 005511.11A

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (U)

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5510.1C
(b) OPNAVINST 5510.45B
(c) SECNAVINST 5430.13B
(d) KAG-1D/TSEC
(e) OPNAVINST 005500.46A

Encl: (1) Locator Sheet

1. (C) Purpose. To reiterate the necessity for protection of classified information against technical penetration, provide information regarding technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) for inclusion within the command security programs, and furnish information as to the availability of TSCM support to Marine Corps commands.

2. (U) Cancellation. MCO 005511.11.

3. (S) Background. Technological advances and the application of new techniques and concepts have increased the threat of technical penetration by hostile intelligence elements. During the past 5 years hostile penetrations utilizing clandestine listening devices have been mainly directed at political targets. The discovery of these penetrations, however, has revealed a continued extensive hostile capability which can also be directed at U. S. military installations. Furthermore, the availability of electronic components and subassemblies on the commercial market has increased the threat of low-level technical penetration. The threat to military installations is considered less than that to certain other Government installations; however, the extensive hostile capability dictates that positive technical surveillance countermeasures are applied for the protection of highly classified sensitive information.

4. (S) Information. The sophistication of technical penetration techniques may range from simple wired microphones to direct transmission optical links utilizing light rays which are beyond the wave length visible to the human eye. The

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most common techniques which have been employed to date include the use of wire microphones, radio frequency transmitters, and exploitation of existing telephones or intercommunications systems. The single most effective countermeasure against technical penetration is a continuous and vigorous physical security program including strict access control. The following specific countermeasures concepts are utilized in maintaining a proper security posture against the threat of technical penetration and surveillance.

a. (S) Isolation. Isolation is accomplished by ensuring that highly classified or sensitive information is discussed only in areas which are afforded complete perimeter and access control. In addition to proper physical security measures, acoustic control (soundproofing) and electromagnetic control (RF shielding) may also be necessary depending on the area. Intercommunication systems and telephones should be removed from sensitive spaces such as conference and briefing rooms wherever practical. When removal of telephones is impractical, they should be equipped with a secondary disconnect device, such as a jack and plug, in order to physically disconnect the instrument from the line when not in use. Access to these areas must be stringently controlled. Uncleared personnel and foreign nationals must be excluded or escorted and closely supervised at all times. Escorts must be appropriately cleared U. S. personnel aware of the threat of technical penetration. It must be impressed on personnel concerned with the security of sensitive areas, that an RF transmitter can be installed in as little as 15 seconds once access is gained to an area. Additional guidance and information concerning command responsibility for physical security are contained in references (a) and (b).

b. (S) Nullification. Nullification is a method of masking or jamming classified conversation by the use of various sound sources which will render the intercepted information unintelligible. Appropriate sound sources include radio and television broadcasts or prerecorded multiple conversation. Nullification is not effective over a long period of time and should only be used as an expedient when circumstances preclude establishing appropriate isolation.

c. (S) Detection

(1) (S) To augment isolation and nullification a program of detection directed toward locating and neutralizing clandestine listening devices must be instituted. Advances in

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technology and new techniques normally require highly skilled personnel using specialized countermeasures equipment and techniques to locate clandestine listening devices. Techniques now exist, for example, wherein a telephone may be used as a listening device without modification to the instrument and without the telephone being in use.

(2) (C) The advancement in technical penetration capabilities has necessitated corresponding advancement in countermeasures equipment and techniques which in turn has dictated consolidation of TSCM assets due to rising costs and greater training requirements.

5. (C) Responsibility

a. (C) Reference (c) established the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) responsibility for providing specialized TSCM support within the Department of the Navy. TSCM support to CONUS and the Western Hemisphere is provided from NIS Headquarters, Alexandria, Virginia. NIS Office Europe, London, England, provides support for Europe and Africa; and NIS Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii, provides support to the Pacific area.

b. (C) Selected Marine counterintelligence teams also maintain a limited tactical TSCM support capability. While these teams may be utilized for advice to all commanders concerning their TSCM programs, this detection support capability should be limited, except for unusual circumstances, to tactical units of the Fleet Marine Forces.

6. (C) Inspections and Surveys

a. (C) TSCM support is provided by TSCM inspections and surveys which differ only in the degree of support provided. Discussions concerning such support should not take place in the area which is to be inspected or surveyed. In addition, all requests and reports concerning TSCM support should be classified at least confidential.

b. (C) Sensitive areas requiring TSCM inspections or surveys are normally limited to fixed secure communication facilities as required by reference (d), those areas where highly classified information is discussed on a continuous basis, and those areas where special intelligence or extremely sensitive programs are normally discussed. Areas which are determined to require TSCM inspections or surveys must also

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contain appropriate physical security and access control systems to preclude unauthorized access. Sensitive areas should be inspected no less than annually and when circumstances indicate that a possibility of technical penetration exists, such as new construction, renovation, repairs, or unauthorized access.

c. (C) Whenever possible, conferences and meetings concerning highly classified or sensitive matters should be held in secure areas which have previously received TSCM inspections or surveys.

7. (S) Action

a. (C) Commanders will ensure that appropriate technical surveillance countermeasures are included in their overall security programs. Those commands maintaining sensitive areas and requiring NIS TSCM support should submit requests to the appropriate NIS headquarters contained in paragraph 5a, above. Further instructions for requesting TSCM support are contained in reference (e).

b. (S) In the event a technical penetration is discovered, classified conversation in the area should be sanitized to a minimum level and terminated as soon as feasible. Normal routine should be maintained in the area to the extent possible and no verbal reference should be made concerning the discovery. The Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code A02), Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, Director, Naval Investigative Service, and appropriate commanders will be immediately notified of the discovery. Detailed action to be taken in the event of a technical penetration discovery is contained in reference (e). Information concerning discoveries will be classified secret.

8. (U) Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

J. R. Chaisson
J. R. CHAISSON
Chief of Staff

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Enclosure (1)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

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21 March 1968

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MARINE CORPS ORDER 07040.4E

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: Funds for the Collection and Classification of Information (C)

Encl: (1) Excerpt from NAVINTCOMINST 07000.2
(2) Locator Sheet

1. (C) Purpose. To establish and describe policies and procedures governing the expenditure of funds available for the collection and classification of information (C&CI) funds.

2. (U) Cancellation. MCO 07040.4D.

3. (C) Information

a. In view of the limited Marine Corps requirement for C&CI funds, it has been determined that a separate HQMC fund will be terminated.

b. C&CI funds will continue to be available for Marine Corps use through procedures jointly established by this Headquarters and the Naval Intelligence Command.

4. (C) Policy

a. The Marine Corps will not maintain a separate C&CI fund nor will funds be suballocated to subordinate Marine Corps commands.

b. This Headquarters will review and validate all expenditures of C&CI funds by Marine Corps commands prior to forwarding to the Naval Intelligence Command.

c. Expenditure of C&CI funds will be in strict accordance with enclosure (1).

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d. C&CI funds required by Fleet Marine Force commanders for combat or contingency operations in overseas areas will be requested through the appropriate operational commander. Such requirements do not fall under the purview of this directive.

5. (C) Action

a. Activities expending funds for the collection and classification of information will submit appropriate documentation to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A) for approval and payment.

b. Vouchers covering expenditures shall be prepared in triplicate on a Claim for Reimbursement (OPNAV Form 7000-3). The original and one copy of all executed vouchers, together with the original and certified facsimiles of all receipts, invoices, and supporting papers shall be forwarded by air mail to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A).

c. In the preparation of vouchers, the spaces titled "Approved for Payment" and "Voucher No." shall be left blank. Prior to submission, each voucher shall bear the following certification by the commanding officer or his designated representative: "Above claim certified as expenditures made in accordance with provisions of Naval Intelligence Command Instruction 07000.2"

d. Particular attention is invited to those portions of enclosure (1) concerning mileage allowances and the requirement for proper case identification. Vouchers not containing proper case identification will not be approved.

6. (C) Fiscal Instructions. The instructions contained herein apply exclusively to collection and classification of information funds and in no way pertain to any other public funds.

7. (U) Forms. OPNAV Form 7000-3, not in the Marine Corps supply system, is available upon request to Commandant of the Marine Corps (Code AO2A).

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8. (U) Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserves.

H. W. Buse Jr.
H. W. BUSE Jr.
Chief of Staff

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EXCERPTS FROM NAVINTCOMINST 07000.2

"4. (C) Policy.

"a. To insure that the intent of Congress is not violated in the administration of "Contingencies of the Navy" funds, it is the stated and enforced policy of the Secretary of the Navy not to approve expenses for items of a personal nature, expenditures which tend to circumvent or supplement other specific provisions of law, or expenses for self-entertainment of officials of the Department of Defense. The Commander, Naval Intelligence Command is held accountable to the Secretary of the Navy for these funds, and improper expenditures will be disallowed when financial returns are post-audited at the Washington level. The use of "Contingencies of the Navy" funds for any purpose other than Collection and Classification of Information is strictly prohibited. Among expenditures, normally authorized are:

"(1) payment of cash to informants

"(2) cost of inducements provided informants or prospective informants, including entertainment where applicable

"(3) incidental expenses incurred while engaged in undercover activities

"(4) salaries, allowances, and expenses of contract agents ...

"(5) certain miscellaneous items subject to conditions directed or approved by the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command.

"b. While common sense and good judgment should be used in determining whether an expenditure of C&CI funds is proper, two questions should also be considered:

"First, is the expenditure to be made in connection with the Collection and Classification of Information for Naval Intelligence purposes?

"Second, can the cost incident to the service or material be vouchered and charged to another appropriation or allotment without defeating or jeopardizing the purpose for which C&CI funds are provided?

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"The expenditure is authorized only if the answer to the first question is 'Yes' and the answer to the second question is 'No.' If either of the questions cannot be answered accurately as indicated, then the expenditure should not be authorized. When doubt exists concerning the propriety of a specific expenditure, guidance should be requested from the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command.

"c. Unless expressly authorized in advance by the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, the following items will NOT be allowed as charges against C&CI funds:

"(1) Payment to any U.S. public official including military, for services within his official capacity.

"(2) Payment or advance payment for any type of travel or accommodation expense when the claimant is traveling under orders for which the expenses are properly chargeable to other than C&CI funds. When the use of C&CI funds is mandatory, reimbursement for travel performed by military and civilian personnel will be in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volumes 1 and 2, respectively.

"(3) Payments to indigenous employees of the U.S. Government, except those payments directly relating to the Collection and Classification of Information.

"(4) Gifts for birthday presents, Christmas presents, Christmas parties, office parties, coffee messes and such other expenditures involving U.S. employees are NOT authorized, regardless of 'local custom.'

"(5) Expenditures for embossed stationery, including invitations and place cards are not authorized. NAVPUBINST 5604.2 (series) contains a ready reference guide for ordering approved stationery.

"(6) Expenditures for calling cards or any form of greeting cards are considered to be personal rather than official, and are not authorized.

Normal housekeeping expenses of the Command; such materials and services must be procured through normal supply channels.

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"(8) Entertainment, except as a necessary reward to an informant or as inducement to a potential informant. Too frequent entertaining of the same person might indicate that C&CI funds are being used to fulfill social obligations of a personal nature, or that the repeated entertaining and other payments are not accomplishing the purpose for which these funds are allotted."

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