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VICE ADMIRAL BENEDICT J. SEMMES, Jr., USN The Chief of Naval Personnel REAR ADMIRAL BERNARD M. STREAN, USN The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel CAPTAIN JOHN W. HIGGINS, Jr., USN Assistant Chief for Morale Services

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John A. Oudine, Editor

Associate Editors G. Vern Blasdell, News Jerry Wolff, Research Don Addor, Layout & Art French Crawford Smith, Reserve


 FRONT COVER: POWER COMBO—Artist's conception portrays the combination of air/sea power as represented in the mobile carrier and its potent air arm in today's Navy. Drawing by Robert Grabowski, DM3, USN, former staff artist on All Hands Magazine now serving aboard USS Ranger (CVA 61).

• AT LEFT: COMBAT PRACTICE—Navyman sights target for three-inch, 50-caliber mount during Fleet exercise. Photo by J. O. Sagester, PH2, USN.

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Naval Intelligence is a subject that the average Navyman knows very little about, and it is also one that he finds most interesting. ALL HANDS readers are fortunate, therefore, to have an opportunity to get a firsthand report which combines a brief historical sketch of naval intelligence down through the years with a rundown on how it functions in today's Navy. This account, specially written for ALL HANDS, is the work of an expert who has spent many years in this field, Captain W. H. Packard, USN (Ret).

EVER SINCE NOAH sent the dove out to reconnoiter the situation and look for land, seafaring men have been



involved in, and have had a need for, Intelligence.

And, like Noah, they have not thought of themselves as conducting intelligence operations when they sought to acquire knowledge needed for safe and profitable voyages between various ports.

The Phoenicians were among the first extensive intelligence collectors. Back about 1100 BC, they acquired their strength and wealth from their knowledge and use of the sea.

Through their reconnaissance of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Atlantic coasts of Southern Europe, the British Isles, and most of the east and west coasts of Africa, they became the best informed people, up to that time, on the geography of the world.

As they explored and operated in this relatively vast area in their shallow draft ships, they gathered information on natural harbors, prevailing winds and weather, the availability of fresh water, food, natural resources and local products.

EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, they gathered knowledge from the people of these areas, which they carried not only back to their homeland, but also to many other areas where they traded. E. B. Potter in his book, *Sea Power*, noted that the early seafarers "brought home in their



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heads an invisible cargo of ideas and information, a form of wealth oftentimes more precious than the trade goods they carried in their ships' holds."

Here again, this was not looked upon as intelligence, but rather the process of using one's normal senses to acquire information and to become educated in subjects pertinent to one's livelihood.

Similar to good intelligence practices of today, the Phoenicians kept the information secret on the trade routes used by their wealth-laden ships in order to help protect them against piracy. They also apparently kept to themselves their accumulated knowledge of the rudiments of celestial navigation, to prevent others from using that knowledge, which was so important to their monopoly in the trading business.

Their security must have been exceptionally good, because it was not until 2000 years later that the Portuguese learned what the Phoenicians had known—that Africa could be circumnavigated. Perhaps this intelligence was picked up during the Crusades and the Portuguese were the first to check it out.

The age of exploration was another era of extensive intelligence-gathering efforts by seafaring men.

Initially their reconnaissance brought back valuable


negative information, debunking the fabled existence of sea monsters, ocean currents of boiling water, and giant whirlpools that allegedly could take control of and sink their ships.

On the positive side, each voyage brought back new information on the lands that were discovered, their geographic location, configuration, vegetation, climate, inhabitants and, sometimes, evidence of their wealth.

The information thus collected and reported served as the basis for various national claims to the newly discovered lands. And sometimes the reports were intentionally misleading, either to cover up a lack of success in exploration, or to achieve greater security from competition in future exploitation of discoveries.

S ⁰, INTELLIGENCE is not new for those who live on the sea, and that includes those in the U. S. Navy. However, like Noah and the Phoenicians and the early European explorers, the Navy in the early years of its history did not categorize any of its activities as intelligence. But, the naval actions and activities of those days were nonetheless influenced by information obtained (or missed) about the enemy.

In reviewing examples of early intelligence efforts



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and usage in the Navy, one can see how intelligence requirements and techniques changed as the country grew in international and technical stature.

In the American Revolution, individual ships sailing in foreign waters fulfilled their intelligence needs by calls at neutral or friendly ports or by hailing passing ships. Thus Wickes, Conyngham and Jones obtained at French ports reasonably up-to-date information on British port activities and on shipping in the waters adjacent to the British Isles.

Conyngham learned enough about British capabilities and procedures to be able, on two occasions, to disguise his identity and use British ports for replenishment. This permitted him to save transit time away from his operating area, and also simplified gathering the intelligence he needed in his operations against British shipping.

Intelligence support for naval action in foreign waters in the war with Tripoli and the War of 1812 was similarly obtained.

THE CRUISE in the southeast Pacific in the latter conflict, by uss *Essex*, a 32-gun frigate under the command of Captain David Porter, is a fine example of operational use of intelligence.

Porter's first stop after rounding the Horn was at Valparaiso on 13 Mar 1813. There he picked up information from an American whaler that there were many British whalers operating near the Galapagos Islands. As *Essex* proceeded toward the Galapagos, she captured a Peruvian privateer which had been preying on American whalers.


From the skipper of the privateer, Porter obtained a list and description of all the British whalers reportedly operating in those waters.

By the end of September 1813, he had captured almost all the English merchant ships in the area. Some of the prizes he converted to supply ships, some he used to carry prisoners and others, to escort prizes back to the South American coast. One of them, of 20 light guns, he renamed *Essex Junior*, and he used her as an escort and picket ship. *Essex Junior*, in one of her visits to Valparaiso, learned that the 36-gun British frigate, *Phoebe*, and two sloops were coming around the Horn. Upon receipt of this intelligence, Captain Porter, who was anxious to climax his Pacific cruise with the capture of an English man-of-war of near equal strength, set sail for the Marquesas Islands, to refit his ship and put her in top material condition preliminary to serious combat.

On 12 December the overhaul of *Essex* was completed and, accompanied by *Essex Junior*, Porter headed for Valparaiso. He arrived there on 3 Feb 1814, five days ahead of *Phoebe* and her accompanying sloops. (The story of Porter's operations in the Pacific is told, in part, in the ALL HANDS Special Supplement of August 1955.) Finally, in a battle on 28 Mar 1814, *Essex*, which had been disabled in a storm, was captured by the British, but Porter went on to gain fame for himself and the American Navy.

Throughout his operations in the Pacific, Captain Porter had made effective use of intelligence information to inflict serious damage on British commerce in that area. He received the information about the superior *Phoebe* force as a challenge, rather than a timely warning, and he fought a courageous battle, as was his custom-demonstrated later in his cleaning up of piracy in the West Indies.

OVER THE YEARS, orientation operations by ships of the Fleet to various ports have given evidence of friendly intentions and support to the countries visited, and they have also helped Navy personnel to understand better the people and conditions in those countries.



, thew Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 is an example , t a get-acquainted operation performed by the Navy. It was not then considered an intelligence collection operation, nor would it now be so considered. However, Perry did conduct extensive research to learn as much as he could about Japan before he arrived there.

Working through London and New York book collectors, he gathered all the authoritative literature then existing on Japan's history, customs and traditions. He also purchased, from Holland, charts of Japanese waters. He studied this material exhaustively and, as a consequence, was well prepared to conduct himself in a manner that would assure him success in his negotiations with the Japanese.

UNTIL AFTER the U. S. Civil War, the Navy's intelligence efforts and requirements were essentially those within the capacity of a ship's commanding officer to conduct and use. Then technical developments, stimulated not only by the Civil War in the United States but also by the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian War in Europe, resulted in improved metals and powder which, in turn, led to the progressive development of larger caliber, built-up, rifled ordnance firing elongated missiles.


The German development of the sliding wedge breech block made muzzle-loading obsolete and permitted fixed gun mounts and more accurate aiming. Armor progressed from wood to iron to steel.

Recognizing the need for keeping in touch with such progress in foreign navies, the Secretary of the Navy, on 23 Mar 1882, signed General Order 292, establishing the "Office of Intelligence" in the Bureau of Navigation "to collect and record such naval information as may be useful to the Department in wartime as well as in peace."

The Navy Department Library was combined with the Office of Intelligence. Naval Attache posts were set up in London in 1882, in Paris in 1885 and in Rome in 1888. The attache in Paris was also accredited to Berlin and St. Petersburg (later Petrograd, then Leningrad) and the attache at Rome included Austria in his area of accreditation.

These naval attache posts were established to facilitate the exchange of information on the progress of naval science.

In February 1897, when war between Spain and the




United States appeared possible, the attache in Paris, Lieutenant William S. Sims, USN, was additionally accredited to Madrid to keep track of Spanish naval forces. After USS *Maine* was blown up in Havana Harbor on 15 Feb 1898, the naval attaches in Europe were assigned the responsibility of handling the Navy Department's negotiations for the purchase of ships and munitions.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN War was the first test of the relatively new Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and it effectively served the Naval War Board, providing it with the essential information it needed to give the Secretary of the Navy policy and strategic guidance in the conduct of the war.


Most of this information had been gathered before the outbreak of the war, making the wartime effort mainly the presentation of what was wanted when it was wanted.

The big operational question early in the war was "Where is Admiral Cervera and his squadron, and will he attack the East Coast of the United States or proceed directly to Cuba?" Three ships were sent to scout the waters of Puerto Rico, Martinique and Guadeloupe, and one of these, uss *Harvard*, learned that one of Cervera's ships had briefly called at Martinique.

This piece of intelligence, confirming that the Span-



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ish were not heading for the East Coast, led to the moving of Commodore Schley and his squadron from Newport News, Va., to Key West, and then to Cuban waters where he joined forces with Rear Admiral W. T. Sampson, USN.

The outcome of the war between Spain and the United States, more than the war itself, had a strong influence on the intelligence needs of the Navy. By the Treaty of Paris the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Islands and guaranteed Cuban independence.

The war and its aftermath ushered the U. S. into the status of a world naval power, thus broadening its international interests and responsibilities manyfold, particularly in the western Pacific. The Russo-Japanese War, which was concluded by a peace treaty signed in 1905 in the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, N. H., and the round-the-world cruise of the U. S. Fleet in 1907 continued this trend.

THE DEVELOPMENT of radio communications had a tremendous influence on the timeliness of intelligence reporting and of intelligence support to operating forces when at sea.

The development of the submarine and the airplane for military purposes not only changed the Navy's intelligence requirements, but also introduced new techniques of collecting information.

In the period before World War I, the United States started falling behind the European powers in technical development and ship design. The German development of the diesel engine and its subsequent adaptation to submarine propulsion by both Germany and England in the years 1907 to 1912 found the United States sitting in the grandstand watching, and not participating in, this naval construction race.

During the period between the start of the war in 1914 and the U. S. entry into it, the stimulant for improvements, military technical developments and counterdevelopments in Europe gave intelligence observers a full-time job. Furthermore, as it became more and more obvious that the U. S. would become involved, it became more and more important to keep constantly informed on the status of all world naval forces.

By the time the U. S. entered World War I, most of the naval operational intelligence requirements were being fulfilled by the British Navy in a highly satisfactory manner—and this support became available to the U. S. Navy not only for its ships joining British forces in the eastern Atlantic, but also for those ships and commands responsible for U. S. convoy protection.

U. S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE kept the Navy Department and the U. S. operational commanders informed on the intelligence obtained from the British pertinent to U. S. naval operations, particularly for support of convoy operations.

Convoys were controlled from various centers, one of the most important of which was at Brest, France, under the command of Vice Admiral Henry B. Wilson, USN. A joint operations/intelligence plot was maintained there.

Every eastbound convoy crossing the Atlantic was shown on a huge chart along with the information on every submarine reported. The latter were represented by danger circles of varying sizes, depending on how long it had been since the submarine had been sighted. By radioing course changes to escorts of convoys, the danger circles of recently reported submarines were avoided.

The success of this and other operational/intelligence team efforts at the various convoy control centers is attested by the fact that not a single troopship was torpedoed en route from the United States to the war zone in Europe.

THE NEED FOR an investigative and counterintelligence service within the Navy was recognized before the U. S. became an active participant in World War I. The duties envisioned for such a service included:


• Investigations of possible acts of sabotage aboard naval ships, in Navy yards, and in plants having naval contracts.

• Investigation of suspicious characters, stowaways, impostors, enemy sympathizers and troublemakers aboard ships and in Navy yards.

• Inspection of merchant ships, their crews and passengers for security purposes (in collaboration with Immigration, Customs and Justice).

Upon the U. S. entering World War I, the Office of Naval Intelligence, to carry out the above duties, estab-

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lished an "Aide for Information" at each of the 15 naval districts, plus nine branch offices at the major ports of entry in the U. S.

THIS WAS THE START of the present District Intelligence Office system. The correctness of establishing this counterintelligence service as part of Naval Intelligence was repeatedly demonstrated, as the information which the districts collected incident to their security work supplemented the work of the attaches, and the information collected by the attaches helped the districts in their counterintelligence work, particularly in their checking of suspicious travelers in merchant ships.

So, upon taking on the counterintelligence reponsibilities in the Navy, Naval Intelligence acquired the broad functions which have guided its activities from that time up to the present. Very generally and simply, these functions can be stated as follows:

In the field of *positive intelligence*:

• Collect information through Navy resources and through liaison with other intelligence agencies.

• Produce intelligence studies and estimates to fulfill the requirements of Navy users of intelligence and produce naval intelligence studies and estimates to meet the needs of other intelligence agencies.

• Disseminate the products of naval collection and production to those having a need for same.

In the field of *counterintelligence*:

• Provide investigative service, as required, to protect the Navy against acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

• Provide the Navy with guidance for reducing its vulnerability to espionage, sabotage and subversion.

• Coordinate with other United States government investigative agencies in matters of mutual concern.

T^{HE} EXTENT to which the above functions have been carried out has varied according to the Navy's understanding of its intelligence requirements, which in turn have fluctuated to the degree to which the United States has been involved in international affairs.

Thus, during the period between World Wars I and II, the Navy's intelligence activities both in the positive and counterintelligence areas were reduced almost to insignificance, and the Navy's understanding of intelligence was similarly reduced. The early phases of World War II revived the Navy's interest the hard way-by grimly contrasting the costs of battles in which intelligence was properly and improperly used.

In terms of today's requirements, these functions should be of interest to all in the Navy because of the support that Naval Intelligence can give to almost everything else the Navy does and also because each person in the Navy can contribute to, and participate in, this intelligence effort.

It is beyond the scope of this report to itemize all the areas of mutual concern to the Navy's intelligence service and to the Navy's personnel and leadership; however, it has been suggested that everyone in a position of leadership should strive to review the intelligence that is available to him, determine its deficiencies as it relates to his job and then make every effort to correct those deficiencies by requests to ONI via the chain of command.

Additionally, each person, as a result of his training and experiences, has unique qualities as an observer. His observations, if he will report them, can help educate those who follow, and perhaps save them from errors caused by changes or by gaps in intelligence. Only by repeated observations can one determine what is a normal situation and in turn be alert to identify what's new and how it has been changed.

THE ADVENT of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reduced the requirement for the Navy to produce reference type intelligence.

The Navy takes the broad-based products of the DIA and selects information from them as basic ingredients in the production of intelligence studies and estimates which more nearly meet the specific requirements of the Navy. The Office of Naval Intelligence serves as "the cook" in this effort to satisfy the tastes and specific intelligence requirements of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the technical bureaus of the Navy, and the staffs assigned to them. The intelligence elements of major staffs perform similar services for their commands.

In the counterintelligence field, ONI is constantly striving to protect the Navy's information, material and personnel against espionage, sabotage and subversion. Consequently, whenever a command has a problem concerning: `(1) The apparent compromise of classified information; (2) damage to or loss of government. property; or (3) unknown disturbing influences on discipline and morale, it correctly calls for assistance from ONI. But not until a command requests such help does ONI enter the case and, after it enters, it will normally pull out if initial investigation indicates that there is no counterintelligence (i.e., espionage, sabotage, subversive) aspect and that the problem can be resolved administratively by the command.

While ONI's investigative effort is concerned with the identification and apprehension of persons in the Navy and on Navy property involved in unlawful activities, it is equally concerned with protecting Navy personnel against false accusations, entrapment and influences inimical to their better judgment.

• NI HAS HAD MANY cases in which Navymen or their dependents have innocently become involved in unlawful acts of a criminal nature simply because they didn't want to say no to a request for a favor. Then, when they found out the illegal connotation of their kind deed, they were afraid to renege or preferred to try to get away with it.

This is another area where everyone in the Navy is in a position to help himself and the Navy. Usually the initial approach leading up to one of these situations is made at a foreign port. A shopkeeper from whom several purchases have been made invites you and some of your shipmates to a restaurant for dinner or a drink, the night before your ship sails for the U. S. or a port in some other country. Before the evening is over, he asks you to carry a package for him to a friend at your next port of call.

Of course, you won't know what's in the package, but when you are caught bringing it ashore, you find it contains narcotics or stolen jewelry or other valuables which your "friend" hoped to have you unwittingly smuggle through Customs for him.

There are many variations of this game. Not the least possible is intentional entrapment where, shortly after your friend passes you the package, he has a colleague inform the police that you stole whatever is in it and, of course, he can identify the contents exactly.


This is usually a good way to initiate an anti-U. S. scene down near the docks, and the anti-U. S. press will be tipped off and have photographers present.

The only semi-sure defense against this trickery is to have an uncompromising rule that you will not carry anything through Customs anywhere for anyone else, not even for your grandmother. If, in spite of this rule, you do get yourself tricked or coerced into such a situation, let your commanding officer know as soon as possible, and ask him to notify the nearest representative of Naval Intelligence. He is part of the Navy too, is proud of it, and he wants to stay that way.

In summary, the Navy and the intelligence which supports it are interdependent one upon the other. Every job in the Navy can be done better with intelligence support; some jobs can't be done effectively without it; and intelligence support to the Navy will not be fully satisfactory until it becomes an all hands effort.

For those who find themselves in a full-time intelligence billet, trying to supply the Navy with the intelligence it needs, it is a serious, thankless job; for those who have had the benefit of experience in intelligence work, the seriousness of all other Navy effort is better understood; and they have, therefore, a more mature understanding of their professional duties and are of greater value to the Navy because of it.

- W. H. Packard, CAPT, USN (Ret.)



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