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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION INTERROGATION REPORT

No: 29

DATE: 2 Mar 45

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CONTENTS

Portion of PW's report dealing with possibilities of Allied fifth-column work in KOREA, withheld from general circulation, submitted to distribution as listed hereunder.

Examiner - 195

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SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,
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Co-ordinator.

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION INTERROGATION REPORT NO 29
(Subject to correction, addition or deletion)

1. PW FUJINO, Masaru; AUST PW No 100249; US No 51J-1033; Sup Pvt of 41 Mt Arty Regt, captured NEW GUINEA 19 Aug '44, has given the following information.
2. All information in this report has been extracted from this PW source only. Its value should be assessed and its distribution restricted accordingly.
3. Further report to complete PW's record will follow.

-1-

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC SUBJECT INDEX
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION INTERROGATION
REPORT NO. 29

6,000 Block applies to Army
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<u>I.G. No.</u>		<u>Pages</u>
1170 ✓	<u>Coasts and Adjacent Islands</u> Jan '45. Brief hydrographic information - KOREAN coast.	3-4
3020 ✓	<u>Stability of Govt - Revolutionary Movements</u> Communists - and anti-Jap bodies KOREA details - include KOREA Indep movement. ETA Class or BYAKUCHONS. Mountain People (KADEMIN). KOREAN Priests.	2-4
6900	<u>MILITARY OPERATIONS - General</u>	
6900.15 ✓	<u>KOREA - Possible landing places.</u>	3
7810 ✓	<u>Coast Defense System</u> Jan '45. Well guarded naval fortifications, South KOREAN coast.	4
9714 ✓	<u>Air Crews, General</u> Possibility of organizations in KOREA to aid Allied crashed airmen.	2-3
9815 ✓	<u>Antiaircraft Gun and Searchlight Defense System</u> Data on location of airfields in KOREA.	4
9905 ✓	<u>Movements and Distributions</u> Unidentified Flying Regt situated at KAINETI (KOREA).	4

CMG/BC/15

BRIEF OF
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION INTERROGATION
REPORT NO. 29

PW FUJINO, Masaru, Sup Pvt, gunner, of 41 Mt Arty Regt; captured in NEW GUINEA 19 Aug '44.

No part of KOREA was entirely free from JAP control, but Central and Northern areas were less pro-JAP than was Southern. Possible organizations in KOREA to aid Allied Airmen. Suggested locations and method of entry for Allied landing parties.

2-4

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1. PREAMBLE

PW asserted he was a member of the Communist movement in the JAP Army, and thought this was the reason he had not been promoted above Sup. Pvt. He was suspected, and under observation. PW was also a sympathizer of the Independent KOREA movement, and through this organization had received news of Allied from RUSSIAN Bulletins. At one time (in '40) PW was to have made contact with the mountain people (KADENMIN) of KOREA, (See Sec 20) as a sympathizer of the CHINA Communist Party, but the plan did not materialize.

20. SPECIAL INTELLIGENCEKOREAN Attitude toward JAPS

General No part of KOREA was entirely free from JAP control. There were no inter-tribal hostilities, and PW knew of no head-hunters or bandits.

Country people, especially those in the farming areas of the South, were well established under JAP rule and were very pro-JAP. These farmers were much praised and helped by the JAPS in order to win their confidence, and JAPAN had spent a good deal of money in improving and developing production.

City people were exposed to the influences of the "get rich quick" type of JAP, especially those in business who tried to make a fortune in a short time and return to JAPAN and live in ease. Also, there were AMERICAN, ENGLISH, and other foreign influences in missions, schools and organizations like the YMCA. Thus, these people had a more democratic outlook.

Anti-JAP KOREANS were divided into two groups. The AMERICAN-ENGLISH democratic group, consisting mainly of educated KOREANS, and the RUSSIAN Communistic sympathizers, mainly farmers, laborers, and the mountain people (KADENMIN).

Southern Area (South of 37° North). There were many JAP settlers in this area, which was closer to JAPAN. It was fertile farming country and people were definitely pro-JAP.

Central Area (37° to 39° North). There were fewer JAPS there, and the people were less pro-JAP. The JAPS had not settled in the mountains in the upper Central area.

Northern Area (North of 39° North). This area, which was influenced by MANCHURIA, RUSSIA and CHINA, was the least pro-JAP. There were very few JAPS outside the large cities or away from the lines of communication between them, and they had not settled in the isolated mountains. In early '42 some anti-war propaganda was circulated in KONAN by a KOREAN. He was soon apprehended and imprisoned but the propaganda created a good deal of anti-war sentiment.

Possibility of Organizations in KOREA to aid Allied Airmen

General PW thought that a system for the protection and concealment of ALLIED Airmen in KOREA could be arranged, but it would require time and patience to determine who were the reliable people. Suggested that such people might be found in the large cities, especially by taking time to locate anti-JAP people in factories. Thought best contacts, however, would be made through mission school students and the mountain people (KADENMIN). There were several anti-JAP movements, but he warned that these were underground and difficult to contact.

Groups which might cooperate included:

KOREA Independence Movement (CHOSEN DOKURITSU UNDO) This group had an underground system of communication, with members working in most organizations, including CHIANG KAI-SHEK's Hq. Considered this the most likely place to make contacts. There were other communistic organizations, possibly with a RUSSIAN influence.

ETA Class, or BYAKUCHONS These people were decidedly communistic in their beliefs. Like the ETAs of JAPAN, they had some underground method of making contacts throughout KOREA. PW did not think this group would be reliable, as it was generally believed that they aided both the JAPS and CHINESE, receiving money for information given to both sides.

Mountain People (KADENMIN) (*1) It was thought it would be safer for crashed Allied airmen to go into the mountains rather than into the cities. In the mountains were KADENMIN people who made a livelihood by clearing the ground and growing sweet potatoes, wheat (KARASU MUGI), corn, and millet. Their diet was limited to these foods. As a race they originally came from KOREAN tribes, who deserted to evade fighting, or who were outcasts who moved out from the tribal area to live in comparative freedom.

Their knowledge of conditions outside their local vicinity was somewhat limited. They had little contact with civilization, and the only JAP influence was the JAP officials who frequently hunted them in attempts to move them to more settled communities. Because of these facts, and the lack of any orders from the JAPS concerning Allied airmen, the KADENMIN people would be more likely to aid Allied airmen than to turn them over to the JAPS.

PW thought the best way to impress these people would be to offer food, clothing or salt. Jewels and trinkets would be of little value to them. KADENMIN people had very little luxury in the way of food and clothing, and salt was so closely rationed that it was difficult to make pickles, the main part of their diet.

PW thought that a certificate should be given to those who assisted Allies, as a guarantee of good treatment when the Allies landed. These certificates should be written in both KANJI BUN (*2) and in the KOREAN simple language ONBUN (*3). Wording of both should be precise and easy to understand. There were many uneducated KOREANS in the mountains, but ONBUN was understood by the older KOREANS, including those with very little education. PW could write KANJI BUN but was unable to write ONBUN.

KOREAN Priests Had been in KOREA and CHINA for centuries. They resided in temples located on most high mountain tops and were visited only on rare occasions in the spring and autumn.

PW thought the Priests would be likely to help Allied airmen. These Priests maintained old KOREAN ideals and methods, and strongly disapproved of JAP methods and treatment. The majority supported the Independent KOREA Movement. He suggested that propaganda leaflets should be dropped, or contacts made with the KOREAN Priests, assuring them of protection and freedom for KOREA, but that this would require their help.

Possibility of Allies Landing Parties Any such party should be composed of either JAPS, KOREANS or CHINESE who had a good knowledge of the people, their language and the localities. PW expressed willingness to cooperate, and considered he would be of great value as he was reared in KEOJI and had travelled in North KOREA.

PW thought it unwise to attempt a landing as long as most KOREANS thought that JAPAN would win the war. After Allied landings in FORMOSA and CHINA, people would see the hopelessness of the JAP cause and consider helping the Allies.

Suggested Locations Considered the most suitable place to effect a landing was on the coast between KOJO and KOKUSANDO, there being only small fishing ports in this area, and the people were not very observant. PW stated that in all other parts of KOREA there were military units and factories, and the areas were closely settled and well guarded.

(*1) etc. -

火田民

(2) 漢字文

(3) 諺文

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The West coast had a great tidal rise and fall and at low tide the water was a long way from the shore. Large craft could not approach, and it was impossible to wade in because of mud.

There were well guarded naval fortifications on the South coast. CHINKAI Bay was also well fortified and it was said that Admiral TOGO had had his fleet there during the RUSSIAN-JAP war.

There was an airfield at URUSAN, so that area was presumably well guarded. PW had also heard of airfields at SHINGSHI, HEIJO, KEIJO, KANKO and KAINEI. Other than the one at KAINEI all were civil airfields.

An u/i flying regt and an u/i AA unit were located at KAINEI. Many factories and military units were located between GENZAN and the RUSSIAN border. This area was closely guarded because of illegal entries from MANCHURIA, RUSSIA and CHINA.

Suggested Method of Entry PW considered it advisable to land in a small boat and destroy it after effecting the landing, or to use a small unpainted rowing boat bearing JAP characters, to give the impression that it had drifted ashore from some fishing boat. Group should then go to a RR station, and proceed to a large city where there would be less chance of being suspected than in a small community where a stranger would immediately be noticed and questioned by authorities.

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