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KOREA

Soviet Position in Northern Korea. The USSR's fundamental strategic concern with Korea is positional. Northern Korea has a short common border with Soviet territory, flanks sea and land communication lines between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, and shares a long, common frontier with Manchuria. Control of northern Korea provides the USSR with an advance fringe of secondary air and naval bases beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Far East. In addition, northern Korea provides a base for eventual extension of Soviet control over southern Korea, which, if accomplished, would give the Soviet Union a further strategic advantage in its positional relationship with Japan and consequently enhance the position of the USSR vis-a-vis the U.S. in the Far East. Of increasing importance at the present time is the area's economic potential, which, although limited, can make valuable contributions to the economy of the Soviet Far East.

To assure continued control and to protect and advance strategic and economic interests in northern Korea, the Soviet Union since 1945 has concentrated on the following objectives: (1) the establishment of a strong, effective, and obedient Communist government and society; (2) the exploitation of economic and human resources, with simultaneous development of a self-supporting, expanding economy within northern Korea; and (3) the exploitation of northern Korea as a base for the penetration and subversion of southern Korea.

Since the establishment of the "Democratic People's Republic" (September 1948) and the withdrawal of Soviet troops (December 1948), the Soviet Union has maintained the fiction of northern Korean independence and has exercised its control through the medium of the Communist-dominated Korean Government and associated political organizations. The Soviet Embassy at the "capital city" of Pyongyang is headquarters of the four- to five-thousand-man Soviet mission in northern Korea. The Soviet mission, infiltrated as advisers throughout the government, economy, and political organizations, serves as a guarantee of northern Korean subservience and a source of technical assistance.

Status of North Korean Regime. The "Democratic People's Republic" of northern Korea is a firmly controlled Soviet Satellite that exercises no independent initiative and depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence. At the present time there is no serious internal threat to the regime's stability, and, barring an outbreak of general hostilities, the Communists will continue to make progress toward their ultimate domestic goals. The Communist regime in northern Korea suffers from a shortage of skilled administrative personnel and from weaknesses in its economy and its official Party organizations. There is widespread, although passive, popular discontent with the Communist government. Despite these weaknesses, however, the regime has, with Soviet assistance, clearly demonstrated an ability to continue its control and development of northern Korea along predetermined political, economic, and social lines.

Northern Korea's capability for long-term military operations is dependent upon increased logistical support from the USSR. If the foreign supporters of each faction were called upon for increased assistance, there is no reason to believe that Soviet support would be withheld and considerations of proximity and availability of such assistance would greatly favor the northern Korean regime. Soviet assistance to northern Korea, however, probably would not be in the form of direct participation of regular Soviet or Chinese Communist military units except as a last resort.

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KOREA (cont'd)

The "Democratic People's Republic" is under the immediate control of a small group of Korean Communist leaders whose primary qualification for high office is loyalty to the USSR and willingness to accept a subordinate role within the pattern of Soviet control. Thus, Koreans with a Soviet background appear to have been given positions superior to those held by either native-trained Communists or Koreans who received Communist indoctrination in Yenan and Manchuria, and this Soviet-trained leadership appears to be well knit. The intensity of Soviet control, the leaders' lack of strong personal followings among the Korean people, and the composition of the present southern Korean Government which makes it unpalatable to possible northern "nationalist deviationists" as an alternative prevents either significant deviations or disruptive factionalism.

Except for their loyalty and subservience to the USSR, northern Korea's leaders possess few qualifications for the responsibility of high government and party office. They have gained no popular support and despite four years in office they still lack requisite administrative and technical skills. Although these weaknesses lower the regime's efficiency and decrease its popular appeal, they do not materially affect the stability of the "People's Republic," since, experienced Soviet advisers adequately maintain government efficiency at the top level and the police effectively control the populace.

Current Military Situation. Northern Korea's military forces are still being expanded. So far as the ground forces are concerned, this process involves the integration into the "People's Army" of local recruits and of Korean troops that have seen service under the Chinese Communists in Manchuria, as well as the equipping of this force with small arms, artillery, vehicles, aircraft, and armor from the USSR.

The northern Korean armed forces depend almost wholly on the USSR for logistic support. Recent reports have indicated, however, that limited quantities of Soviet-type small arms, munitions, and uniforms are being locally manufactured.

A large segment of the domestic economy is as yet uncommitted to the logistic support of the armed forces and could provide further manpower for expansion of the military machine. However, the Communist regime's military machine already constitutes a drain on the undermanned northern Korean economy.

The northern Korean military forces are entirely the product of Soviet planning, and depend heavily on the large Soviet military mission for training at higher command levels and for tactical advice down to the battalion level. The PA's state of training is comparable to that of the southern Korean Army. Air training is probably still in a basic stage, however, and there is no indication that the Air regiment has attained operational status. The navy has received less Soviet attention.

There is evidence of a continuing program of sending small numbers of ground and air officers to the USSR for advanced training. Soviet advisers to the PA are believed to number at least 2,000; to the PAAF, 70; and to the Navy, 33. An additional 2,000 Soviet naval personnel are reported to be stationed in major northern Korean ports, to service Soviet naval units and to control port facilities.

The morale of the northern Korean military forces generally appears to be good, and, although factions exist, factionalism is not a significant problem. Troops are subject

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KOREA (cont'd)

to continuous indoctrination and surveillance, and their loyalty is further induced by above-average food rations, good wages, and special privileges. At the present time, the northern Korean armed forces are probably psychologically prepared to fight wholeheartedly against southern Korean troops. Their loyalty to the Communist regime and their fighting spirit, however, would vary inversely with the strength of the opposition and the duration of the struggle. In contrast, the ex-Manchurian Koreans, whose loyalty was indicated by the fact of their transfer to the PA, now form a significant percentage of that force. These troops possibly have less feeling of kinship for southern Koreans and therefore may provide a firm backbone for the PA.

Current Developments. The progress of the conflict during the past week has suggested that the order of battle, as presented in Digest 26-50, is approximately correct. Six North Korean divisions have actually been reported engaged, with a possible two brigades not yet employed. In addition, about 90-100 tanks have been reported in the vicinity of the front lines, in the Seoul area.

Seoul was over-run early in the fight, although Inchon managed to hold out until about 5 July. The North Korean forces pushed rapidly to the Han River south of Seoul and here paused while supplies and reinforcements were brought up. Pontoon bridges and barges were constructed to support a crossing of the river. On 3 July the North Koreans evidently probed the South Korean lines in strength; on 4 July an all-out attack on Suwon, south of Seoul, developed and the remnants of 5 South Korean divisions were in danger of being cut off against the sea as the Northern envelopment struck from the East. As of 5 July, the North Korean spearhead seems to be thrusting close to Osan, about 20 miles south of Seoul.

Elsewhere on the front there has been no advance up to 5 July, except along the east coast, where Northern PA elements have moved down to gain possession of Samchok.

South Korean forces have nowhere been able to halt the Northern advance. The best available information gives a remarkable "casualty" rate among SK forces—a decrease in strength which seems out of all proportion to the intensity of combat and may quite probably be attributed to desertion and/or defection. Effective South Korean strength may now be in the neighborhood of 25,000 or less.

Regarding air operations, North Korean aircraft have made desultory raids in small numbers (6-7 planes at a time). In view of the large number of airfields available in the North, it is considered probable that NKAf planes are well dispersed and further protected by a profusion of dummy planes on the ground.

The progress of the war has so far indicated a grave weakness in South Korean forces. Reinforcements from United Nations forces, however, may soon change the present trend. (SECRET)

U.S.S.R.

Delayed Response to Korean War. There are several indications that the U.S. reaction to North Korea's aggression took the Soviets aback. Eventually, about a week after

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U.S.S.R. (cont'd)

the outbreak of hostilities, Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko made a comment to the effect that the U.S. Government was dragging the U.S. into war by its "aggressive" action.

As of 5 July, there was no sign of Soviet intervention in the Korean situation. (SEC)

U.S.S.R.

Military Defense Bonds between Satellites and Russia Tighten. Increased control by the USSR of the satellite armed forces is reflected in the continuing shakeup of top-level defense ministries in the satellites. The replacement on 27 May of Lt. Gen. Georgi Damyanov by Lt. Gen. Petur Panchevski as Minister of People's Defense makes Bulgaria the fourth Eastern European Satellite to shake up the top level of its Defense Ministry in the last six months. The others are Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Poland. It is rumored that a similar shake-up is in the offing for Hungary. (SECRET)

U.S.S.R.

Soviet IL-12 Transports Returned to Service. After having grounded them for modifications, the Soviets have returned Il-12s to service. Apparently the modification consisted of removing (1) the front eight seats and (2) the inside row of seats on the right side, thus reducing the passenger capacity from 32 to 18. Il-12s in service in the USSR and Czechoslovakia have been modified in this manner.

The nature of these modifications to the Il-12 seems to indicate that both control and structural deficiencies exist in the design. It also appears that the Soviets are experiencing an unusual amount of difficulty with their first native-designed transport. (SECRET)



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CHINA

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Convention of Communist Party Secretaries. A report as of 19 June states that a secret convention of general secretaries of communist parties of 23 nations in S.E. Asia is to be held in Peking on 20 July. Representatives to attend include those from North Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Viet Minh and the USSR.

The main purpose of the conference is ostensibly to conduct an overall review of the respective parties. It is not known whether this conference was called before or after the outbreak of the Korean War. (CONFIDENTIAL)

CHINA

Sino-Reds Renew Attack on Wan Shan Islands. On the 27th of June the Chinese Communists initiated their second attempt to gain control of the Pearl River estuary islands. They have succeeded in gaining control of one small island adjacent to Lin Tin Island but the Nationalist Navy still controls the sea area. The earlier appearance of Communist Naval craft to challenge this control resulted in a severe beating by the Nationalists. This struggle for control of this group of islands between Hong Kong and Macau resulted from the Communist determination to deprive the Nationalists of important blockade bases in that area.

Meanwhile, Hong Kong shipping firms are hoping that President Truman's statement will mean a cessation of all Nationalist sea and air activity along the coast and the end of Nationalist enforcement of port closures. There has been, however, some Nationalist action against neutral shipping. The Norwegian SS MUI HENG was shelled off the Wan Shan Islands in early July.

In Amoy, Swatow and Shanghai the Communists have announced that the ports are open but have made no attempt to sweep the mines from the approaches to Swatow and Shanghai.

British Naval vessels continue to maintain a patrol off the Yangtze and Swatow. (SEC)

CHINA

Communist Naval Dispositions. Naval dispositions as of 14 June are reported by Chinese Naval Headquarters as follows:

Chefoo	1 armed merchant ship 1 minelayer 1 minesweeper
Tsingtao	1 Destroyer Escort 810 tons
Shanghai	1 Destroyer 1 Destroyer Escort 3 Gunboats 8 Subchasers 6 Repair Ships 2 Landing Craft, Medium 1 Landing Craft, Infantry
Nanking	1 Subchaser

CHINA (cont'd)

There are also twenty four naval craft of unknown types at undetermined locations. Among them are reported to be some of the Japanese reparation craft given by the Soviets to the Chinese Reds. (SECRET)

CHINA

Troop Dispositions Along Coast. For some time there has been a lack of information about Chinese Communist troop movements on the mainland. A recent unconfirmed report from a usually reliable source has given present Chinese concentrations as follows:

Swatow	15th Army Group Headquarters (advanced)
Canton	41st, 42d and 43d Armies. These have been reported as enroute to Swatow.
Nanking	1 Army Hq 3d Field Army (Chen Yi)
Shanghai	3 Armies
Hangchow	8th Army Group Hq 7th Army 2 Armies. These are reported as south of Hangchow Bay, between Hangshou and Ningpo.
Amoy	4 Armies
Hangchou to Foochow-3 Armies. These are reported as distributed down the coast.	

The total number of units on the China coast is now estimated to be approximately 24 Armies, 2 divisions (each equivalent to an army) and a division, with an aggregate strength of approximately 700,000. (CONFIDENTIAL)

JAPAN

Communists Suffer Setbacks. Recent development in Japan have been highlighted by a series of setbacks suffered by the Japanese Communists.

In the elections of 4 June for the upper house of the Diet, the Liberal Party (Conservatives) of Premier Yoshida made significant gains at the expense of the Communists. The Liberals have gone on record as favoring a separate peace treaty with the West and in general are agreeable to U.S. retention of bases in Japan after a treaty. The Communists, calling for an over-all peace treaty including the USSR and China and opposing U.S. bases in Japan, had hoped to capitalize on these issues in the election.

In an attempt to influence the elections, the Japanese Communists, who have been increasingly dedicated to a program of violence since the Cominform criticism of the party

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JAPAN (cont'd)

last January, called an anti-U.S. general strike for 3 June. The demonstrations were to protest the trial of eight Japanese accused of beating five U.S. soldiers at a Communist rally on 30 May and also the possible retention by the U.S. of bases in Japan after a peace treaty. However, the strike failed to achieve significant proportions and no violence resulted.

Further blows to the Communists came in post-election action taken by the Japanese Government and SCAP. The Government warned that if further incidents of violence occurred, it would take steps to outlaw the Communist Party, a course which SCAP has indicated might be desirable. Then SCAP ordered the purging from public service of all 24 members of the Communist Party's Central Committee, which includes all the important party leaders, and of 17 of the top editors and managers of the party newspaper. SCAP's orders charged these leaders with inciting lawlessness, violence, and confusion.

The Communist Party has publicly indicated a defiant attitude, stating that it will fight this so-called "oppression" with continued propaganda, strikes, sabotage, demonstrations and political activity. What may actually be expected, however, will not be clear until future strategy decided upon by the leadership begins to unfold. To what extent, if any, the Party will attempt to significantly harass current U.S. operations in Japan is also not clear. (CONF)

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
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