


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206	CO VP 871	262	CO USS HELENA (CA75)	359	CG 8292nd AU
207	CO VP 874	263	CO USS ROCHESTER (CA124)	360	CG 8301st AU
208	CO VP 884	264	CO USS TOLEDO (CA133)	361	CG 8302nd AU
209	CO VA 702	265	CO USS MANCHESTER (CL83)	362	CG 8309th AU
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COMMUNIST CHINACurrent Summary of Communist Chinese Air Strength

The following summary presents the current situation as derived from all available sources and appears to be reasonably correct.

CCAF aircraft, by type, are estimated to be as follows:

Bombers		Fighters		Transport	
TU-2	92	LA-5	20	C-46	22
IL-2	20	LA-7	20	C-47	5
B-24	1	LA-9	80		
FB-26	3	P-51	12		
		Oscar	30		
		Tojo	18		
Total	116	Total	180	Total	27
Grand Total 323					

Of these aircraft the obsolescent Japanese types are supposedly used for training. However, they could be put to limited combat use in case of necessity.

Personnel strength is estimated at approximately 30,000 officers and men of whom there are approximately 550 pilots, 700 aircrew members, and the balance composed of ground crew personnel. The figure of 30,000 total may seem unreasonably high, but it possibly includes laborers involved in airfield construction, in which case the total is not excessive. A more accurate personnel figure cannot be presented with the information now available.

Aside from the CCAF, it is necessary to include the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force elements in China. These planes, while not an integral part of the CCAF, must be considered a potential likely to be involved in any overt action of the CCP. They must be piloted by Soviets or, more likely, may be turned over to the CCAF in much the same way that Soviet aircraft were given to the North Koreans in their conflict. Their aircraft, by type, are as follows:

Bombers		Fighters		Transport	
TU-2	44	YAK-21	32	LI-2	38
		YAK-15	8		
		LA-9	90		
Total	44	Total	130	Total	38
Grand Total 212					

It is estimated that the Soviet aircraft are manned and maintained by approximately 8,000 personnel.

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COMMUNIST CHINA (cont'd)

It is to be noted that no Jet aircraft are believed to be a part of the CCAF.

The Chinese Communist Air Force (CCAF) is organized along lines similar to the Soviet Air Force. There is a Commander in Chief, Liu Ya Lou, who is directly responsible to the People's Revolution Military Committee. Under the CinC, and included in his HQ's at Peiping, there are five departments as follows:

1. Garrison Dept, in charge of medicine, guarding, and anti-air raid.
2. Supply Dept, in charge of supply and repair.
3. Ground Service (or Maintenance) Dept, in charge of recreation, communication, transportation and base.
4. Operation (or Pilot) Dept, in charge of operations and training.
5. Planning Dept, in charge of intelligence and personnel.

The air districts within the air command are very similar to, if not an exact duplicate of, the CCP military districts. These are tentatively identified as follows: the North China, comprising Shansi and Hopeh Provinces and northward; the North-West China, comprising Shensi and Kansu Provinces and northwestward; the Central South China, comprising Honan, Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung Provinces; the East China, comprising Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang, and Fukien Provinces; and perhaps, the South West China District, comprising the remaining provinces to the southwest.

It is estimated that four air groups, under the Aviation HQ's at Peiping, are assigned one to each of the North-West, North, East, and Central-South China Districts. The HQ's of these districts are tentatively located at Sian, Peiping, Nanking or Shanghai, and Canton respectively. Only one of the air groups has been identified, the 4th, located in the Central-South China District.

The air groups appear to be of a composite type, but the actual composition is not yet known. It is believed that the bulk of the air units are still in the process of being formed. There are, however, some indications that there might be separate fighter units attached to the air defense elements within the districts, much in the same manner as Soviet fighter units are attached to their PVO (Air Defense Organization). To date this is unconfirmed.

The Air Defense Wing is considered to comprise searchlight, barrage balloon, signal, fire, ambulance, courier and AAA groups. The exact command relationship of the Air Defense Wing is not known, but there are indications that at least some of the units are directly attached to the HQ's of the People's Army in Peking.

The CCAF is, at the present time, estimated to be deployed with approximately 50% of its strength in Peiping and the remainder scattered primarily in Nanking, Shanghai, Hankow, Hsuehou, and Canton.

The Soviet Far East Air Force elements are located primarily in Shanghai, Peiping, Mukden, Harbin, and Chi Chi Har. Small elements (6-9 aircraft of VF type) are probably located in Canton and Hainan Island.

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COMMUNIST CHINA (cont'd)

It is believed that the CCAF will occupy positions in the east and south upon the completion of their training in the Peiping area. The emphasis will probably be placed on the Sino-French Indochina border area and the two main areas around Canton and Shanghai.

The CCAF is currently operating under a large scale training and airfield construction program. Both phases of this program are being carried out under the direct supervision of the Soviets.

Most of the training is centered in the Manchuria region. The airfield construction program covers all of the border areas of China, beginning just south of Shanghai, all along the southeast coast line and over to the Sino-French Indochina border.

The CCAF is almost entirely dependent on the Soviets for all supply of aircraft and aircraft parts. They are gradually changing their entire complement of aircraft to those of Soviet manufacture, becoming even more reliant on the Russians for logistic support. Under an agreement of February 1950, the Soviets are to supply a total of 800 aircraft to the Chinese Communists. It is these planes that the CCAF is in the process of receiving.

In their own right, the CCAF possesses a number of obsolescent Japanese aircraft and a few captured Nationalist China aircraft. In order to maintain the Japanese planes, it has been necessary to cannibalize the large majority in order to maintain a few. It is believed that these measures are not entirely satisfactory and certainly would be insufficient in time of war.

A small supply of transport parts have been purchased on the open market in Hong Kong for C-46 and C-47 aircraft. The exact amount is not known.

The main supply routes are as follows:

Gasoline: (1) from Hong Kong and Macao inland by railroad to supply centers.
(2) from Manchuria south via Peiping thence distributed by railroad and/or truck to supply centers.
(3) from East Russian ports (presumably Vladivostok) by ship to Chinese ports.

Aircraft: (1) from Manchuria by railroad, in crate form, to assembly points (Peiping, Shanghai and Canton).
(2) flown intact from Manchuria, presumably along the Tsitsihar-Mukden-Harbin route to Peiping.

Aircraft
Parts: (1) same as the aircraft.

In order to offset their difficult logistic problem, they have, under direction of the Soviets, established supply centers in strategic areas. It is considered that the three main areas are Peiping, Shanghai and Canton.

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COMMUNIST CHINA (cont'd)

There are indications that the CCP is contemplating a rather wide railroad and road construction program in the south and southwestern areas. If this is true, it will aid materially in the solution of the CCAF logistic problems in that area. Specific information is not at present available.

The reinforcement problem of the CCAF is largely one of equipment, and, since they are primarily dependent on the Soviets for their aircraft, the situation resolves itself into one dictated by the USSR. There are some indications that a few spare parts factories are in China, but locations are not known.

The CCAF is now estimated to possess approximately 550 pilots with the training centers graduating approximately 250-350 pilots per three to six-month period. It is believed that the present capacity of training centers will be increased as more aircraft become available for training purposes, and that pilot availability will not present any difficulties in the maintenance of a 600-700-plane air force.

The time and space factors involved resolve themselves into a logistic problem. Inasmuch as the airfield construction program is both broad in scope and well underway, it is considered that by the end of 1950 the only limitations placed on aircraft operations will be those imposed by the petroleum and spare parts disposition. The air units themselves may be deployed to any locality within China or to Hainan Island in a matter of two days.

The CCAF training program has been well underway since the early part of 1950. Previous to that time it is believed that some pilots were trained by the Soviets in Russian territory.

The training centers are located in Manchuria, and consist of radar, air crew, pilot, ground personnel, and paratrooper schools. The training of all categories has remained in the Manchurian area with the exception of pilot training. This has followed a southerly trend. While the bulk of the training has remained in the north, one school has opened and has been active at Hang Chou in Chekiang Province. Also, there are indications that another pilot training center is to be located at Canton. However, these schools are smaller in size than those in Manchuria and may be designated for "operational training."

In training, as in the other activities of the CCAF, the Soviets have had direct control. They have established the centers, set forth the curriculum, and supplied the instructors. As qualified CCAF personnel become available, it is believed that they in turn take on the role of instructors. The overall Soviet jurisdiction, however, has been maintained.

There have been some reports that the Soviets have had some difficulties with the CCAF personnel in connection with training due to the Chinese low educational level and mechanical ineptitude. However, there is no information available at present by which judgment of the caliber of the graduates can be made.

The training centers are geared to a mass production schedule. In the second quarter of 1950 an estimated 250-300 pilots and 6,000 paratroopers were graduated as well as 2,000 ground and an unknown number of aircrew personnel. During the same period it is estimated that an additional large number of paratroopers (probably in the vicinity of 6,000), 250 pilots, and an unknown number of ground and aircrew personnel were under training.

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COMMUNIST CHINA (cont'd)

It is believed that the CCAF will be afflicted with the same ills that the Soviets had during World War II. This will particularly be true in relation to their maintenance problem. Given sufficient time, it is believed that a fairly high percentage of aircraft availability will be acquired, but, under the stress of continued combat, this percentage will rapidly fall off to a point far below that acceptable by U.S. standards.

The Oriental philosophy of life will tend to make the pilots bold and aggressive. It is presumed that their flying ability will be at a level equal to, or just below, that of the Soviets.

To date there have been no indications of a large scale maneuvers being held by the CCAF.

Since the few obsolescent Japanese aircraft possessed by the CCAF are considered of little or no value except as training aircraft, the only planes worthy of consideration are of Soviet manufacture. The main types found in the CCAF are TU-2, IL-2, LA-5, 7, 9, Yak-9? and a limited number of U.S. P-51.

The general characteristics of the Soviet aircraft are ruggedness of construction and lack of refinement in auxiliary equipment. For detailed characteristics of the planes, see "Characteristics and Performance Handbook, USSR Aircraft" promulgated by DI/USAF and DNI.

The AA regiments are believed well equipped with modern Soviet equipment including radar, guns, detection equipment (sound), and searchlights.

Guerrilla Activity. The Peking regime has admitted publicly recently, in effect, that significant guerrilla resistance still continues in various areas on the mainland. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Communist Government, stated on 1 October that there were 200,000 anti-Communist guerrillas on the mainland. The actual number is probably somewhat larger. In addition, the East China regional administrative body on 13 October announced new regulations for a more effective enforcement of its relatively new land reform program. Widespread evasion of the program was admitted and a connection with serious guerrilla activities was implied. Severe penalties for such evasions and such activities were announced.

In point of fact it appears that guerrilla activity in Kwangtung has increased and that the provincial government there has intensified its own anti-guerrilla activities. With respect to the land reform program, neither the government nor the public reportedly is adequately prepared for it, so that a large measure of further opposition may still occur despite increased counter-measures.

None of this guerrilla or other illegal activity is considered sufficiently well-organized at present to constitute a serious threat to the Peking regime. There is a lack of unified direction and leadership of the guerrillas. In this connection, however, it may be significant with respect to the future that large number of guerrilla leaders have been reported appearing in Hong Kong in search of support.

COMMUNIST CHINA (cont'd)

However, despite the obvious value of a coordinated, unified command structure for anti-Communist guerrilla operations on the mainland, there is no evidence as yet that Nationalist military leaders plan to attempt to develop a coordinated effort to exploit the usefulness of the guerrillas. Separate commanders for each guerrilla area are believed by Nationalist leaders to be better. Some guerrilla leaders themselves believe that their principal need is not money and supplies but a moral and spiritual support, now lacking, such as the USSR gave the Chinese Communists for years before extending significant material assistance.

A chemical warfare school and research laboratory appears to have been established by the Chinese Communists at Changchun, Manchuria. The Soviets have supplied large quantities of the training materials. Most of the school and laboratory staff, an estimated 1,200 officers and men, reportedly were trained in chemical warfare in the USSR during 1948-49. Although the Chinese have been interested in the past in the employment of flame weapons, screening smokes, and toxic chemicals, they have been unable hitherto to engage in offensive CW except on a very small scale because of a lack of arsenals and chemical industry. The current establishment with Soviet aid of the new school and laboratory, therefore, is important.

TAIWAN

The U.N. and the Nationalist government. The chief subject of political discussion in government circles and among the people continues to be the Truman-MacArthur conference and its possible effect on Taiwan's future. Gratification was expressed that American policy seems to be that the island shall not be allowed to fall to the Reds, and also that a final solution will not be rushed.

The increased prestige of the United Nations is causing many government officials, especially on the middle and lower levels, to look with more favor on the Taiwan problem being placed firmly in the hands of the UN — especially since a return to the Chinese mainland in the near future is now generally accepted as unlikely. Meanwhile they see no harm in a period of propaganda and preparation for an eventual return in "two to five years."


Almost all non-government elements have long favored a UN investigation. Many Formosan leaders who a year ago favored revolt against the government are now so heartened by the conviction that trusteeship will come that they are inclined to compromise with and partly support the government. They remain critical of the Kuomintang, but feel that the UN will correct the major evils.

United Nations Day was celebrated by a meeting at the Taipei city auditorium attended by a capacity audience, mostly youthful, who listened to speeches by representatives of various civil and military groups. Press and radio publicity indicates a lively UN consciousness, and a spreading of knowledge about the United Nations previously lacking among the illiterate section of the population. The Korean conflict, the question of Chinese Communist delegation to the UN, and possible UN investigation in Taiwan have made the international body a topic of vital interest.

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TIBET

For the past two months, various unconfirmed press reports have mentioned an "invasion" of Tibet by Chinese Communist troops, and conflicting estimates have appeared regarding the identity and strength of these troops. In the past week a Peiping radio broadcast quoted a dispatch from Chunking, China, which gave more definite details. The dispatch said: "A political mobilization directive to People's (Communist) Army units, which have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free 3,000,000 Tibetans from imperialist oppression and to consolidate the national defenses of the western borders of China, has been issued jointly by the Southwest China Bureau of the Communist Party in China, the Southwest military area and the headquarters of the Second Field Army."

In Moscow, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda repeated the news of "the liberation of this last region of the continental part of the Republic of China which is still under the yoke of foreign imperialism."

On 27 October India asked its ambassador in Peiping, K.M. Pannikar, to convey the government's "surprise and regret" at the invasion directive. In Rangoon, the Burmese press reflected stern disapproval of the invasion, looking upon it as a threat to the independence of other Asian countries. At Karachi, informed quarters were inclined to shrug off the news, saying that Pakistan has always considered Tibet under Chinese sovereignty.

By 30 October it was reported in New Delhi that the 15-year old Dalai Lama of Tibet had appealed to India for diplomatic help and was expected to seek shelter in the Indian border province of Sikkim.

It is difficult to determine whether Chinese troops have actually invaded Tibet proper or not, since the Sino-Tibetan border has been in dispute for many years. Press reports on 30 October stated that Tibetan defenders had fallen back on Pemba-Go, which is 200 air miles east of Lhasa on "a main caravan route to Chamdo, an important East Tibetan defense center." However, both Pemba-Go and Chamdo are well within an area which has been claimed by China since 1939.

In a previous issue of the Weekly Intelligence Digest (35-50) it was pointed out that Tibet is divided into two regions: Outer Tibet, west of approximately the 93-degree meridian and including the capital Lhasa; and Inner Tibet, comprising the eastern areas bordering on China proper. The Chinese Nationalist government in 1939 formally created two new provinces, Sikang and Tsinghai, from parts of Inner Tibet and has attempted to consolidate its control in these areas. (See Map). Sino-Tibetan relations have been beclouded since the forming of the Chinese Republic in 1911. The Chinese, although unable to secure defacto control, claim that Tibet is an integral part of the Republic of China, a claim which the Tibetans deny.

Comment. A Tibetan delegation headed by Tsepon Shakabpa has been conducting preliminary discussions in New Delhi with Red China's ambassador Yuan Chung Hsien with a view of settling peaceably the issues between the two countries. The Chinese have insisted that final negotiations take place in Peiping, and the Tibetan government has reportedly ordered its delegation to proceed to the Chinese capital. The seven-man delegation is expected to reach Peiping in mid-November. It is possible that the Chinese troop movements were designed as pressure tactics, something in the nature of a fait accompli.

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TIBET (cont'd)

If a Chinese invasion of Tibet proper is actually under way, it is nothing new in Tibetan history. It occurred in 1750, in 1792 (in the arctic cold of winter), in 1910 and in 1917. The Indian government, now so perturbed at Chinese aggression, itself sent troops into Tibet in 1903-04 out of fear of Russian penetration. In 1907 an Anglo-Russian Convention recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, although the Russian Revolution of 1917 probably cancelled that treaty. In other words, Tibet traditionally has been a pawn in a three-cornered Chinese, Russian, Anglo-Indian struggle.

The latest Chinese action may have an interesting effect on Prime Minister Nehru and the Indian government. Nehru's policy of trying to do business with Communism may suffer a severe jolt as a militant China appears on the Indian border. There is some speculation that India's objections may take the form of a withdrawal of sponsorship of Communist China as a United Nations member.

HONG KONG

CAT-CNAC Aircraft. Apparently reliable reports reaching Formosa indicate that the Chinese Communists intend to abandon an almost one-year long attempt to obtain control of 71 CAT-CNAC Aircraft still at Kaitak Airfield, Hong Kong. These have been subject to a long drawn-out dispute between Chinese Communist-controlled firms and General Channault's interests. The Peking Government reportedly has ordered the transfer of CAT-CNAC Hong Kong employees to Canton, Peking and Tientsin with only a very small number remaining at Hong Kong for office maintenance and plane security at Kaitak. If true, apparently no further maintenance will be attempted on the aircraft. This new move reportedly is due not only to inability to secure an early favorable decision from the British, but also, allegedly, to the expected receipt of Soviet supplies and equipment for expansion of Chinese Communist civil air routes.

Airfields in Hong Kong to be Renovated. After several years of discussion, a decision has been reached in Hong Kong to change the direction of the landing runway at Sokkong Airfield, New Territories, in order to allow a better approach path; to provide an asphalt surface which will replace the present steel mat; and to lengthen the runway to 2,000 yards. The work on the improvements will begin within a month. Runway 13/31 at Kaitak Airfield, Kowloon, Hong Kong, also will be lengthened from 1,500 to 1,800 yards, by cutting across a highway and removing houses in the northwest end. This construction will commence soon. Despite this new construction, there evidently are no plans underway which will give Hong Kong all-weather landing facilities, as no additional radio aids, landing systems, or adequate nightlighting systems are contemplated.

JAPAN

Two recent developments will probably cause a further diminution of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) potential in Japan. First, the government began on 19 October its long-pending ouster of Red elements from the civil service. Two Communist employees of the Agriculture and Forestry Ministry were dismissed on the basis of Clause 3, Article 78, of the National Public Service Law, which provides that public employees found lacking in qualifications may be demoted or dismissed against their will.

Secondly, the Cabinet on 13 October announced the reinstatement of 10,090 former purgees, of 32,089 who had appealed their cases. The Purge Appeals Commission was dissolved and a large number of prominent political figures again became qualified for public office. The purge release is expected to have widespread effects on the domestic political situation. Most of the reinstated political figures are of rightist inclination.

BURMA

The Burmese Navy, which was organized under British tutelage in 1942, is the most efficient of Burma's three services. It is headed by the Naval Staff which is a department of the War Office. Hence, this places the navy under the control of the army. Furthermore, it is reported that General Ne Win, anti-British Army Chief of Staff, has a group of favorites (who are more loyal to Ne Win than their own service) in key navy positions. These officers supposedly report directly to him and ignore the Chief of Naval Staff. Thus, the top command is torn by conflict and divergent political views and many junior officers are frustrated and dissatisfied. It is believed that in the future Ne Win may remove many qualified and experienced naval officers who are British-trained and who cannot agree with Win regarding naval matters. It is said that while Win remains in power, the navy will never reach maximum efficiency.

However, the personnel of the Burmese Navy in general is considered well-trained and efficient and should remain so if competent officers are not replaced by political appointees.

The Burmese Navy is handicapped by a shortage of officers (especially engineering officers) and lack of trained technicians. Although an increase of personnel of the naval service was planned, the proposed expansion has not become seriously evident. Lack of training officers, barracks, and other facilities make expansion difficult.

The total annual budget is \$3,000,000. It is pointed out that due to the revolution, a large proportion of the budget money must be spent for costs of naval operations. Burma gives little economic support to its navy. It is almost completely dependent on assistance from the United Kingdom and India. Its few vessels reflect the river and harbor character of operations. The Burmese Navy can be considered in its infancy. It needs technical advice and guidance.

Bo Ne Win. As head of the Armed Forces, General Bo Ne Win is a figure of some importance in present-day Burmese politics. Born in 1910, Bo Ne Win joined the late Aung San's nationalist movement in 1938 and received his only military training in Japan in 1941. He belonged to the Burma National Army which fought first against the Allies in World War II and later (1945) against the Japanese.

He is considered a political soldier of strong anti-British, anti-foreign, anti-Karen sentiments, is called the government's strong man, and has served as Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Home Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. As Home Minister he created a separate militia which is considered variously as a private Socialist Army and a personal force of Bo Ne Win.

Recently (30 July 1950) his attitude of cooperation with the United States has changed. He has been highly critical of the MDAP Mission in southeast Asia, and has agitated for a UN Security Council investigation of the Chinese Nationalists lodged in eastern Burma, although he is aware that such action would be embarrassing to the U.S. Other actions of minor nature also indicate an anti-U.S. attitude. This change may be attributed to (1) a bid for internal political support from the extreme left element of the Socialist Party, (2) the reaction of his anti-British feelings to the close coordination of the U.S. and British programs for military aid to Burma, or (3) the result of diplomatic pressure from Peking, since it followed closely on the heels of the arrival in Peking of the first Burmese Ambassador to Communist China.

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KOREA

Despite a greater resistance on the part of North Korean elements, the UN forces continued to advance during the week. On the west coast, the 24th U.S. Division moved on Sonchon and, farther inland, was reported slightly beyond Kusong by 31 October. On the east coast, the ROK Capital Division pushed beyond Songjin to enter the town of Kilchu.

On both coasts the resistance was light. In the inland hills, however, where defenses can be thrown up with a greater effectiveness, the enemy units were making a more determined stand. This was greatest in the Onjong area, where local counterattacks raised some havoc with over-extended ROK units.


Elements of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division were landed in the vicinity of Iwon on the east coast north of Wonsan. This was an administrative landing like that at Wonsan, and no opposition was encountered. No enemy mines were reported as the landing progressed smoothly. The landing was originally scheduled for Wonsan, but the choice of Iwon, farther north, will speed up the drive of the 7th Division and save wear and tear on equipment.

Sweeping of minefields continued on both coasts.

Below Wonsan, the large North Korean guerrilla band in the mountains is continuing to occupy much of the attention of the X Corps.

The overall situation as of this date indicates that residual enemy resistance throughout Korea will pose a serious, but not a critical, problem to occupation troops for some time. The nature of the terrain will facilitate a prolonged guerrilla campaign.

As UN forces press closer to the Manchurian border they are watching closely for signs of Chinese Communist reaction. A handful of Chinese troops have been captured south of the border and it is possible that Chinese units are seeking to delay the UN advance toward the Yalu River power system. The power plants are on the Korean side of the river and supply factories in Manchuria. It would be advantageous for the Chinese to dismantle as much power equipment as possible and transport it across the river before the UN drive to the border is completed. There is no evidence as yet, however, that the Chinese intend a full scale intervention in Korea.



ABOVE THE PARALLEL—

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INDONESIA

Fighting on Ambon Island. The Indonesian government of Prime Minister Natsir, by winning a vote of confidence on 25 October in Parliament by a vote of 113 to 34, has received a new lease on life to tackle the increasing internal security and economic problems. The latter involve principally the obtaining of necessary foreign capital.

Internal security is threatened by continued fighting on Ambon Island, plus guerrilla activity (by non-Communist groups) all over Java and the South Celebes. In addition, Communist strength in Indonesia is being consolidated.

The Ambon rebels reportedly are running short of food and ammunition and have begun leaving by night for nearby Ceram Island where they may go underground as guerrillas. Anti-guerrilla operations in the South Celebes are reported to be progressing satisfactorily. A guerrilla strong point in the vicinity of Malino reportedly has been destroyed.

Attacks on estates in all areas of Java, particularly in the Tjandjoer-Bogor-Sukabumi District, have been reported, but the Army has been unable to take effective action, partly because of its concentration upon the Ambon and South Celebes operations. Bali also is experiencing serious disorders which have not yet been effectively countered.

A favorable development has been a delay in the scheduled departure of the last Dutch troops in Indonesia until February 1951 due to scarcity of water transportation. Retention of Dutch troops will help control Ambonese troops in Java which have not yet been demobilized. (SECRET)

MALAYA

Renewed Guerrilla Raids. Initial successes in the British all-out, state-by-state campaign against Communist-led guerrillas appear to have been checked by an upsurge of effective guerrilla activity. In this connection a particularly significant development with respect to future guerrilla capabilities is the reported successful use by guerrillas of electrically-detonated mines. 152 attacks reportedly took place during the 7-day period, 13 to 20 October, of which 128 caused casualties or damage. Twenty-three Federation police were killed and 19 wounded. Guerrilla casualties were only 7 killed, 3 captured and 4 surrendered. On 18 October guerrillas blew up a passenger train only 7 miles from Johore Bahru, with severe disruption of rail service resulting.

Evidence is accumulating that the guerrillas are not only using South Thailand for rest and hospitalization, but also as a base for sorties into Malaya. The British have countered this with new emergency regulations closing the border completely during the hours of darkness and establishing only six legal entry points and routes during daylight. New home guard regulations are being applied for the first time at the town of Padang Besar, which is along the railway near the Thai border in the State of Perlis. These regulations are for conscription of villagers for home guard duties and compulsory cooperation by all householders. The extent to which they prove successful will have an important effect on British capabilities for achieving a quicker decision over the guerrillas.

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PAKISTAN

Raid by Afghan Tribesmen. An undetermined number of Afghan tribesmen penetrated Pakistan territory in late September in the Dobandi border area northwest of Quetta. Pakistan troops engaged the invaders and as of 6 October were in control of the situation, though it was not yet fully settled then.

A Pakistan communique had said that the Afghans had occupied the strategic Bogra Pass on the border. Pakistan also claimed that regular Afghan troops also were involved in the incident and that the Afghan force was under the leadership of Brigadier Chaffor Khan, former commander of Afghan troops in the area opposite Chaman. There has been no official confirmation of these Pakistan claims. The invaders' supplies, however, appeared as of 6 October to be coming by camel from Kandahar in Afghanistan.

This border incident is thus the latest episode in the "little cold war" in which Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged for the past two years over "Pushtunistan," a long stretch of barren hills extending from the Pamirs to Baluchistan and claimed by both countries. The Afghan government has been supporting a movement for the establishment of "Pushtunistan" in the above area as an independent nation of the Pathan or Pushtu-speaking tribes of both sides of the frontier. The British kept a No Man's Land between the frontier and the Durand line, drawn in 1893, and there had been relative peace in the thirty years before they left. The British kept garrison troops in the area and paid subsidies to the tribal leaders. Pakistan in great part abandoned this policy because of the need for its troops along the Kashmir and Indian borders and has relied mainly on the hope that the Pathans, Afridis, and Mohmands, being Moslems, would be friendly to a Moslem state. This has not worked out very satisfactorily. The resulting tension in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations has created a troublesome situation of potential strategic advantage to the USSR. (SECRET)

New Army Chief. The first Pakistani officer to become the Army's Commander-in-Chief is Major General Mohammed Ayub Khan. He will succeed General Sir Douglas D. Gracey when the latter retires in a few months.

Gen. Ayub is 43 years old, a native of the Northwest Frontier Province, and well regarded in military circles. He speaks very good English and is said to be pro-American, and has much admiration of the U.S. Army.

Rift in Muslim League. Prime Minister Liaquat arrived at Lahore 24 October on the first leg of a two-week tour of the Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province, ostensibly to inspect flooded areas. His main objective, however, is to attempt to close the widening breach in the Punjab Muslim League, one faction of which has been attacking the prime minister's Korea policy and "blunders in handling the Kashmir dispute."

Soviet Propaganda. Maulvi Abdul Huq, one of six Pakistanis who were invited to visit Moscow this month, has turned down the invitation, stating that Soviet authorities refused him permission to make an inspection tour of the Soviet Muslim republics. A burst of outspoken condemnation of this Soviet attitude in the local press seems to indicate that the Soviet propaganda line boomeranged.

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FRENCH INDOCHINA

River Operations in Indochina. The numerous navigable streams, particularly in the delta areas, provide some of the better routes of communication in Indochina, and are utilized to advantage by both the French and the Viet Minh. The French have found it necessary to patrol the rivers in order to restrict Viet Minh arms traffic and troop movements. They have also found that in many cases they can realize a greater measure of success in operations against Viet Minh installations by approaching their objectives over these natural water routes. Likewise the Viet Minh forces, expert in the conduct of guerrilla type operations, have devised various means to reduce the efficiency of French river operations in the restricted waterways where, because of the dense jungle growth reaching down to the river banks, observation favors the forces ashore.

Operations on the rivers as conducted by the French are in effect small scale joint operations in which elements of the French Navy, Army, and Air Force function as a team in a coordinated effort aimed at the accomplishment of a specific mission. The Naval element, known as a Naval Assault Unit or "Dinassaux," provides the transport and the preponderance of fire power. It consists of various types and numbers of landing type vessels grouped so as to provide for the requirements of a particular operation. The Army normally provides the landing force by furnishing one or more "Commando" units, a force of approximately 150 infantry troops each. Special Naval "Commando" units may be employed in conjunction with or in lieu of Army "Commandos." The Air Force provides necessary aerial reconnaissance and limited logistic support for river operations and flies combat missions in support of both the Naval Attack unit and the Landing Force.

From long and bitter experience the French have found that amphibious formations on the Indochina rivers are extremely vulnerable to the guerrilla-type tactics employed by the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh keeps well informed on the movements of French Naval formations and will not normally prepare an ambush or launch a serious attack until it appears that the French are following a routine pattern. Ambushes are generally well planned and frequently employ obstacles designed to obstruct passage through the river. Viet Minh forces wait until the French advance is blocked by an obstacle such as a steel cable stretched across the river, a sunken concrete loaded junk, concrete pilings, or a steel rail barricade, all of which may or may not be mined, and then open up with a heavy cross-fire from both banks, at the same time detonating electrically or mechanically controlled mines previously placed at strategic points in the river bed.

Against this type of action the French have found that land forces constitute the only effective form of protection for amphibious formations, and that such formations must advance either under the protection of landed troops or with troops embarked in small craft such as LCM's, ready to land at a moment's notice.

While the composition of the Naval element will normally vary depending on the nature of the mission assigned, a typical Naval Assault Unit might, for example, be composed of 2 LCA, 1 LCI, 1 LCT, 2 LCM, and 1 "Commando." The LCA's are used to scout and reconnoiter the channel, feel out the enemy, and then withdraw when contact is established. LCI's, in addition to transporting the Landing Force, are employed as gunboats to provide the bulk of the fire power. Since the normal 40mm and 20mm armament of LCI's proved ineffective against shore defenses, the French have added one 75mm gun and 81mm mortars to the armament of this type craft without, however, removing the normal armament. LCT's are used to transport troops and material in the conventional manner. LCM's, proceeding under the cover of the larger vessels, carry elements of the Commando charged with aiding and freeing any assault units that may be in a difficult position.

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FRENCH INDOCHINA (cont'd)

Military Operations in Past Week. While the Viet Minh has continued to exert pressure on the French in northern Tonkin during the past week, they have shown less aggressiveness during this period than at any time since they launched their attack on Dong Khe in mid September. This however, is no reflection on the capabilities of the Viet Minh forces in the area, but is probably explained by a need for regrouping of forces prior to a continuation of the attack on a major scale. The Viet Minh still maintains a decided superiority of numbers in the area, and has demonstrated its ability in the conduct of coordinated operations, particularly against more or less isolated French outposts.


Since the French have been forced to abandon most of the isolated outposts which they formerly held, and have established a defense perimeter along the edges of the Red River delta, reinforcing the defended area with troops extricated from Sino-border posts as well as with additional troops moved in from areas to the south, it may be expected that Viet Minh successes will be made more difficult in the future. There is little doubt, however, that the Viet Minh has the capability of maintaining the initiative in Tonkin unless the French find the wherewithal to make additional reinforcements available in the area.

The garrison at Lao Kay, 220 miles NW of Hanoi, has been under the greatest pressure during the past week, but the French have been successful in beating off the attacking forces. According to press reports, the French have reopened the airfield at Lao Kay which was closed for several days as a result of Viet Minh action in the area. This action underscored the precarious position of the Lao Kay outpost, and press reports, as yet unconfirmed, indicate that Lao Kay will be evacuated by air in the near future. Earlier reports had indicated a French intention to hold Lao Kay in an effort to block Viet Minh traffic through the Red River valley and into the delta area. In view of the present situation, the evacuation of Lao Kay by either air or ground is hazardous.

However, an attempt to maintain the garrison at Lao Kay is also hazardous since the strength which the Viet Minh is capable of assembling in the area could overwhelm the garrison.

An air evacuation, as suggested by the press, would be difficult since the French have insufficient air lift to execute a one-lift operation. A piecemeal air evacuation would progressively weaken the garrison until eventually the remaining forces could easily be overcome by Viet Minh forces now in the area.

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