

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS #08)
Jap Intel No. 2

Place: Tokyo
Date: 2 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Division.

Subject: Japanese Communications Intelligence.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Commander OZAWA, Hideo, a regular officer of the Japanese Navy, was graduated from the Japanese Naval Academy in 1924. In 1940 he came to the Navy General Staff to do code research where he remained until February 1942 when he was sent to Rabaul as executive officer of a Communications unit concerned primarily with DF. In February of 1943 he returned to the Naval General Staff as executive officer of the general affairs division of the Special Section. The Special Section was headed by Rear Admiral Tomokichi NOMURA and was responsible for radio intelligence. Comdr. OZAWA held this post until the end of the war. His duties included the making of policy and plans and dissemination of intelligence obtained through communication.

Where interviewed: The Navy Department.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. Wm. H. Botzer
Lt. Comdr. T. M. Curtis

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary

Allied Officers Present: None, other than interrogator and interpreter.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

SUMMARY

The organization of the Special Section (Radio Intelligence) of the 4th Dept. (Communications) of the Naval General Staff was as follows:

SPECIAL SECTION

REAR ADMIRAL NOMURA, Tomekich,
(ALSO HEAD OF 4TH SECTION)

1st BRANCH		3rd BRANCH
GENERAL AFFAIRS	2nd BRANCH	OWADA COMM. UNIT
CAPT. AMANO (NOW DEAD)	CODE-BREAKING RESEARCH	CAPT. MORIKAWA
COMDR. OZAWA, Hideo	CAPT. ENDO	COMDR.
LT. COMDR.	Lt. Comdr. (Am & Brit)	10 RESERVE OFFICERS
1 RESERVE OFFICER	SATARE	120 COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL
	Lt. Cmr. (China)	
	NAKATANI	
	Lt. Cmr. (Russia)	
	FUNOTO	
	30 typists	
	Student Trainees	
	used upon emergency	

OWADA COMM. UNIT was an independent unit. Capt. MORIKAWA had two duties - C.O. of OWADA COMM. UNIT, and head of 3rd BRANCH of Special Section.

Duties of the Special Section consisted of interception and analysis of Allied radio transmissions, and dissemination, by dispatch, of intelligence received in this manner to the proper activity for action when justified, otherwise by daily and periodic summary to the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff. Information judged to be of interest to the army was relayed to the War Ministry.

The Special Section analyzed ship call signs, volume of communications traffic, routing of traffic, and RDF, and had limited success in predicting Allied operations by this means.

Chief sources of information were air-to-air and air-to-ground transmission by Allied forces which the Japanese were able to break some of the time, and strike reports of the B-29's. The practice of the B-29's adjusting radio frequencies prior to a raid often gave warning of an impending strike. The presence and transmissions of B-29 weather reconnaissance planes provided information by which the Japanese were 50% successful in estimating the target area to be attacked.

The only information useful to the Special Section received from the Germans was the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Movement Ships) basic code. Use of this code permitted the Japanese to break shore-to-ship transmissions to merchant ships, and estimate volume of movement of ship traffic. It did not permit tracking, however, nor did it provide information on the location of ships.

TRANSCRIPT

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.1. What was the organization of the "Special Section"?

A. The organization of the Special Section (radio intelligence) of the 4th department (communications) of the Naval General Staff was broken down into three branches as follows:

1. General Affairs Branch which had the responsibility of planning, policy making, and dissemination of information for the section.
2. Code Breaking Branch.
3. Radio Receiving Branch.

Q.2. How did the Special Section operate?

A. The OWADA Communication Center, which is located a short distance from Tokyo, received transmissions from U.S. and Allied sources. Information gained in this way was forwarded to the General Affairs Branch of the section.

Q.3. To what extent were you able to intercept and use U.S. transmissions for intelligence purposes?

A. Call signs were analyzed, volume of traffic and routing of traffic was studied, and radio direction finding was used. Air-to-air and ~~and~~ air-to-ground coded information was received and we were able to interpret much of it. Strike reports by B-29's were also received and were useful.

There were two ways to tell when aircraft were preparing for a strike. 1. When aircraft prepared to take off there was much adjusting of radio frequencies. 2. Weather reconnaissance planes which preceded large strikes gave an indication of the target area and the importance of the strike by the volume of data sent back to its base. We were 50% successful in making estimates based on analysis of weather reconnaissance flights.

Q.4. Were you successful in locating and following units of the U.S. Fleet through communication intelligence?

A. Our success was negligible. General analysis by volume of communication traffic and occasional DF gave some idea, but did not indicate size of the force.

Q.5. Did the Special Section do intelligence work other than communication?

A. No. We performed same function with regard to China and Russia as with U.S. However, we had some success in interpreting Russian and Chinese transmissions.

Q.6. What use was made of information received?

A. Results from OWADA were sent out immediately by dispatch. B-29 strike reports were made up in duly printed reports and sent to the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff. Information considered of interest to the army was sent to the War Ministry. These chiefly concerned B-29 reports. Periodic summaries were sent to all commands, including the army.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

- Q.7. Did the army have an organization with functions similar to those of the "Special Section"?
- A. Yes. at TANASHI.
- Q.8. What was the coordination between the Army and Navy in this type of activity?
- A. Practically none.
- Q.9. Were attempts made to estimate U.S. strength in various theaters through communication intelligence analysis?
- A. We were rarely successful.
- Q.10. Were you able to make estimates of U.S. Losses?
- A. We could tell a little from strike reports.
- Q.11. Could you identify ships by call signs?
- A. No. Call signs were changed too often.
- Q.12. Did the Japanese have any success in predicting future Allied landings from communication intelligence?
- A. We could predict general areas by aircraft-to-base transmissions and by radio silence areas. We had no success in predicting days on which landings were to be made.
- Q.13. Did you capture any U.S. communications equipment?
- A. Yes. We captured strip codes from either Wake or Guam - I think Wake - and from Kiska and some aircraft codes.
- Q.14. Did you analyze this information, and if so, what use did you make of it?
- A. Nothing that could be used operationally.
- Q.15. What were your duties in censorship and safeguarding of communications security?
- A. These duties are just on paper. Actually, they don't exist.
- Q.16. How were communications with Germany?
- A. The only information of value to the Special Section was the BAMS (Broadcasting Allied Merchant Ships) base code which the Germans supplied us.
- Q.17. What use were you able to make of this?
- A. The basic code remains the same and works on a numerical combination with formulae. We were able to break about 50%. The trouble was that by the time the code was broken, the ship was no longer in the original area. We were not able to track ships.
- Q.18. Did you learn the course and speed of ships?
- A. Yes, sometimes. All transmissions were from shore-to-ship, and we were not able to place the ship's location.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.19. Could you tell departures and arrivals of ships?

A. Locations of ships were not stated.

Q.20. Did you gain useful information from the Germans through communication analysis made by them?

A. The Special Section did not, but I think the 3rd Section (Naval Intelligence Section) did.

Q.21. What intelligence information did you receive from short wave radio operated by Japanese in U.S.

A. That is not the responsibility of this section. Talk to 3rd Section.

Q.22. How were communications with Japanese submarines?

A. This information came to War Ministry and was distributed to all sections.

Q.23. How successful were you in analyzing communications from U.S. submarines?

A. We could pick it up but could not interpret. Could tell in a general way by volume of traffic how much activity there was but they did not broadcast often enough to be of real help.

Q.24. What documents or manuals for instruction and guidance of personnel did you have?

A. None. We did have a basic manual explaining the nature of call signs used by various types of ships. This manual was revised from time to time as necessary.

Q.25. What was your greatest success in predicting future operations?

A. In the Marshalls operation we got word to the garrisons in time to be of some help that they should prepare for an attack. Not much success in other operations. We had no success at all in the Indian Ocean Areas because we could not hear during the day when most traffic occurred.

Q.26. What was the basis for the prediction in the Marshalls campaign?

A. Bombing grew intense. Both ship and aircraft volume of radio transmissions rose to a peak, and we were able to pick up a few plain language broadcasts. I remember one saying General Olds would arrive shortly. I cannot say how long in advance the Marshalls garrisons were alerted, but it was enough to be of help to them. We had some minor success in predicting the two Jima landings.

Q.27. What is your estimate of U.S. communication security?

A. The order of the first four or five words in a dispatch were usually the same in U.S. communications and gave some key to type of dispatch and importance.

The rapidity with which aircraft codes changed caused confusion to us.

As Japanese areas were bypassed, it was impossible to supply garrisons with new code books, so we had to use old ones, and this was very bad for our own security.

Transcript of Interrogation (Commander OZAWA, Hideo)

Q.28. What liaison did you have with Navy Intelligence Headquarters and Army G-3?

A. I was liaison officer and had constant liaison with the 3rd Section (Naval Intelligence) and upon occasion, with the army. I occupied no advisory or planning capacity with the navy or army intelligence.

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