

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USBS 202)  
(NAV NO. 50)

Place: Tokyo  
Date: 31 Oct. 1945 - 1 Nov. 1945  
Time: 1330 - 1700      0930-1200

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Subject: Aircraft Availability and Loss Reports.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Commander FUKAMIZU, IJN, is an officer of the Regular Navy with 17 years service. From December 1941 to June 1942 he was a member of the supply staff of the 21st Air Flotilla at Formosa. From June 1942 to January 1943 he was on the supply staff of the Southwest Area Fleet. He was in charge of the 1st section of the 1st department of the Koku Hombu, concerned with aircraft distribution records from January 1943 until the end of the war. He is an engineer and is not a pilot.

Where interrogated: Room 340, Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. R. P. Aikin, USNR.

Interpreter: Mr. Fred C. Woodrough, Jr.

Allied Officers Present: Robert Garred, Lieut. USNR.

SUMMARY

Commander FUKAMIZU had prepared a graph on which were plotted: (1) Annual overall naval aircraft production and wastage totals from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Annual naval aircraft production and wastage totals by plane type, i.e. fighters, bombers, (torpedo and dive), medium bombers, baka, float planes, flying boats, land based recce. planes, trainers and transports.

Commander FUKAMIZU also had prepared a chart breaking down wastage totals by (1) Months from December 1941 to August 1945. (2) Cause, i.e. combat and non-combat losses and (3) Principal campaigns. The monthly totals coincide with those plotted on the graph.

The attached interrogation conducted over a two day period establishes the basis on which the graph and chart were prepared.

TRANSCRIPT

- Q. Did you assemble the reports yourself?  
A. Yes. An assistant helped me prepare the chart on monthly losses, but the production and loss graph I made myself.
- Q. Is the monthly loss chart the official reply to Nav. Memo. No. 18 submitted through the Navy Liaison Office?  
A. No. I understand that is being prepared by officers in the Gunreibu.
- Q. Are you familiar with aircraft production figures as well as losses?  
A. No. I accepted Capt. Terai's (Gunreibu) figures on production. (Note: Aircraft production totals graphed coincide exactly with data furnished FEAF by Gunreibu officers and published in FEAF Intelligence Memorandum No. 22; the production totals also are the same as those furnished FEAF - see Intelligence Memorandum No. 28 - by General Endo, former head of Air Ordnance Bureau of the Ministry of Munitions. The latter figures are the same as those given to Comdr. Paul Johnson.)
- Q. How did you prepare the loss reports?  
A. On the basis of periodic plane availability reports received at least monthly and occasionally more often, from the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands.
- Q. Do you have these reports?  
A. No, they were burned.
- Q. Then, how could you construct the graph and chart of losses?  
A. I know the exact strength by plane types of the Japanese Naval Air Force at the beginning of each fiscal year (April) and also the exact monthly production as well as the approximate losses during each campaign and major action.
- Q. What was the purpose of the Air Fleets and their subordinate commands sending by dispatch and mail plane availability and loss reports to the 1st Section of the 1st Dept. of Koku Hombu?  
A. They were sent to my department for two reasons: (1) To make the figures of losses available to the Minister of the Navy, and (2) in order to carry out my duties. When the Gunreibu directed the General Affairs Department (Somu Bu) of the Koku Hombu to supply tactical and training units with aircraft, it was the function of my department to determine from what source such additional aircraft were to be obtained, i.e. civilian factories and/or naval arsenals, depots or other tactical or training commands. Accordingly, to accomplish its mission, my section was furnished with monthly and other periodic plane availability reports of all tactical and training commands. This was necessary so that we could know from what source aircraft would be available for supply to tactical commands.
- Q. Regarding your loss and production chart, how were the exact loss figures, shown on the graph, obtained?  
A. We know the exact annual production figures throughout the war and the exact strength of the IJNAF at the end of each fiscal year (31 March). By subtracting the total strength at the end of the fiscal year from the sum of the same figure for the start of the preceding year and the total years production, we arrive at an exact annual loss figure.
- Q. Do the production figures represent actual acceptances by the Navy?  
A. I don't know. However, it is my opinion that only planes actually accepted by the Navy are included in the production figures. During

the first part of the war, all planes produced were considered Navy acceptances. This practise was found to be unsatisfactory and was abandoned in 1944 -- August, I believe. From then on, only accepted aircraft are used in the production figures.

Q. Why did you change your system of figuring production totals?

A. There was approximately a 30 - 50 percent discrepancy between the monthly aircraft factory production figures and the actual number of aircraft the Navy accepted.

Q. What were the reasons for the rejections?

A. Aircraft were not accepted when they failed to meet Navy specifications. There were some minor defects, modifications, adjustments, additional equipment to be added (belly tanks for over-water ferrying) etcetera. Some of the aircraft had to be returned to the factory for as long as a month to correct these deficiencies.

Q. How were these rejections listed in your availability reports?

A. Such aircraft were not subsequently included in the following month's factory production figures. However, at the end of the fiscal year in March, rejected aircraft were deducted from that month's aircraft production figure in order to close the yearly records and carried over into the following fiscal year.

Q. Do production figures include both aircraft produced by Navy arsenals and civilian factories?

A. Yes, both are included.

Q. The 1944 production is graphed at 14,178 aircraft, whereas previous information obtained from the Gunreibu and Munitions ministry shows a total of 13,418. Which is correct?

A. The lower figure does not include the OKA. (Baka Bomb)

Q. Were aircraft requirements, established by Gunreibu, generally met?

A. In the majority of cases, the factory orders were not fulfilled in the specified time limit. After U. S. bombings became intensive, this situation worsened. Generally speaking, orders for standard aircraft models (ZEMES, KATES etc.) were more easily met. Orders for the newer types, (FRANCES, MYRT etc.) were often 30 to 50 percent incomplete by the time specified in the contract.

Q. What is your estimate of in-transit losses of aircraft being ferried from depots to tactical units?

A. Approximately 3 to 5 percent throughout the war. In the early part of the war, the great distances to outlying bases was the main factor in ferrying losses. Toward the end of the war the distances to bases were shortened but flight personnel were less experienced. The percentage of losses remained fairly constant.

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HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 202) (Supplement)  
NAV NO. 50

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division

Subject: Aircraft Availability and Loss Reports..

Personnel Interrogated: Commander J. FUKAMIZU, IJN

The attached charts supplement Interrogation No. USSBS 202 (NAV No. 50).

1. Annex A, a graph on which is plotted annual overall naval aircraft production and wastage totals from December 1941 to August 1945, and corresponding figures for plane types is attached.

2. Annex B, a chart breaking down wastage totals by (a) Months from December 1941 to August 1945. (b) Cause, i.e. combat and non-combat and (c) Principal campaigns or actions.

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
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### JAPANESE NAVAL A/C PRODUCTION & WASTAGE DECEMBER 1941 TO AUGUST 1945

ANNEXA TO  
U.S.S.B.S 202 (NAV. NO.50)

PLATE 50-1



# JAPANESE NAVAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES

DEC '41 TO AUG '45

AIRCRAFT EXPENDED IN GREATER EAST ASIA WAR

NOTE

NUMBER OF PL

YEAR MONTH PLANE TYPE	FISCAL 1941					FISCAL 1942											FISCAL 1943											FISCAL 1944								
	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG
FIGHTER	44 32	35 34	31 38	26 60	136 164	36 35	57 47	137 70	103 95	104 61	36 54	120 57	84 66	48 70	47 64	25 73	25 76	822 768	65 95	40 101	73 114	93 132	108 113	134 125	112 184	147 155	124 130	80 183	102 154	90 187	1170 1673	50 123	60 206	370 165	46 86	3
TORPEDO AND DIVE BOMBERS	19 24	11 23	15 26	8 20	53 93	19 10	90 8	189 12	49 11	23 12	13 8	103 12	58 12	10 10	7 9	38 15	32 12	631 131	13 15	23 25	26 41	30 48	30 71	60 82	40 36	70 81	25 77	10 86	22 121	18 81	367 824	20 72	60 190	220 105	20 131	4
MEDIUM BOMBERS	25 18	11 21	40 25	5 37	81 101	11 14	21 16	9 18	42 10	46 16	24 14	25 13	30 17	18 15	23 13	21 16	21 12	291 174	8 27	26 36	28 57	20 51	15 51	30 41	24 78	52 58	20 64	23 81	40 53	20 66	306 663	25 85	25 70	98 44	25 75	1
RECCE															1 0		1 0				1 3	0 2	0 0	1 3	0 2	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	2 10	2 3	5 6	12 8	4 9	4 6	
TRANSPORTS	0 4	0 5	0 5	0 6	0 20	3 2	0 2	2 4	1 3	2 3	1 4	1 4	3 3	1 4	1 3	3 3	2 2	20 37	4 3	1 2	0 3	2 4	3 1	2 4	2 3	4 4	3 3	2 4	2 5	0 3	25 39	4 8	8 8	5 9	4 10	6 7
FLOAT PLANES	2 11	15 9	13 15	13 15	43 50	6 10	38 13	11 14	34 17	32 17	39 14	39 17	26 13	7 12	10 13	13 16	20 14	275 170	15 19	25 21	9 17	15 32	17 24	16 22	12 36	15 32	5 32	8 27	15 32	12 34	164 328	15 16	32 67	70 28	15 32	2
FLYING BOATS	1 5	0 5	0 6	1 4	2 20	1 2	1 1	2 0	0 4	11 2	0 2	0 2	1 2	0 0	0 3	2 4	2 3	20 25	2 3	0 0	1 5	2 5	2 4	3 5	1 4	3 0	1 5	0 5	4 5	0 5	19 49	2 3	7 5	14 5	1 2	2 3
TRAINERS	0 18	0 21	0 27	0 26	0 92	0 24	0 20	0 21	0 22	0 27	0 27	0 30	0 30	0 30	0 36	2 34	2 39	4 340	1 30	3 45	1 50	0 40	0 33	0 60	0 55	0 61	0 67	0 72	0 80	0 97	5 690	0 70	0 80	0 85	0 82	0 10
TOTAL	91 112	72 118	99 142	53 168	315 540	76 97	207 107	350 139	229 162	214 138	113 123	288 135	202 143	84 141	89 141	104 161	104 158	2064 1645	108 192	118 230	138 287	163 315	175 299	245 339	192 459	273 396	178 378	123 458	185 450	140 473	2058 4276	118 380	197 632	789 449	115 427	12 54
NOTE	HAWAII	PHILIPPINES	PHILIPPINES	SINGAPORE	CEYLON SRI LANKA SRI LANKA	PORT DARWIN	DARWIN CORAL SEA	MIDWAY ALEUTIONS	ATTACK ON PORT HERDLAND	GUADALCANAL 1ST & 2ND PHASE SOLOMONS	GUADALCANAL OPERATION	SOUTH PACIFIC NAVAL BATTLE	3RD PHASE SOLOMONS		1ST PHASE RENNELE	OFF ISABELLA 2ND PHASE RENNELE	ATTACK ON ORO BAY	NEW GUINEA ORO BAY FLORIDA ISLANDS		AIR BATTLE OFF LUNGA	KURILE KAGOM BANGOR REN- DOVA	DEFENSE OF HENDR VELLA LAVELLA BATTLES	ATTACKS ON RABUL	ATTACKS ON RABUL	1ST TO 4TH ATTACK ON GILBERTS RABUL AND BONEVILLE AIR BATTLES	ATTACK ON MARSHALLS 6TH AIR BATTLE AT BONHOMME	LANDINGS ON KWAJALEIN AND RUDT ATTACKS ON MARSHALLS					SRIPAN OPERATIONS	ATTACK BY CHINA BASED PLANES TINIAN LANDING			

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# JAPANESE NAVAL AIRCRAFT LOSSES

DEC '41 TO AUG '45

WAR

NOTE

NUMBER OF PLANES EXPENDED =

COMBAT LOSSES

OPERATIONAL LOSSES

ANNEX B TO  
U.S.S.B.S. 202  
(NAV. NO. 50)

TOTAL	FISCAL 1943													FISCAL 1944										FISCAL 1945						GRAND TOTAL			
	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	APR	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG	SEPT	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	TOTAL	APR	MAY	JUNE		JULY	AUG	TOTAL
22	65	40	73	93	108	134	112	147	124	80	102	90	1170	50	60	370	46	34	70	210	295	110	95	85	148	1573	335	175	140	180	160	990	4691
58	95	101	114	132	113	125	184	155	130	183	154	187	1673	123	206	165	86	190	220	275	297	340	230	200	245	2577	260	220	230	320	400	1430	6612
31	13	23	26	30	30	60	40	70	25	10	22	18	367	20	60	220	20	40	30	120	100	50	20	33	80	793	105	35	81	40	50	311	2155
31	15	25	41	48	71	82	36	81	77	86	121	81	824	72	190	105	131	135	104	80	160	115	95	100	70	1357	95	100	110	120	200	625	3030
1	8	26	28	20	15	30	24	52	20	23	40	20	306	25	25	98	25	14	44	91	80	44	26	24	49	545	40	30	45	60	50	225	1448
74	27	36	57	51	51	41	78	58	64	81	53	66	663	85	70	44	75	70	80	60	72	80	90	77	88	891	75	50	90	90	110	415	2244
				1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	12	4	4	6	19	16	8	7	5	9	97	18	13	8	11	15	65	165
				3	2	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	10	3	6	8	9	6	8	9	8	6	8	6	7	84	11	16	14	15	29	85	179
				3	2	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	25	4	8	5	4	6	3	14	10	16	7	8	9	94	12	11	14	7	8	52	191
	4	1	0	2	3	2	2	4	3	2	2	0	39	8	8	9	10	7	8	7	4	6	5	5	7	84	7	6	7	10	10	40	220
	3	2	3	4	1	4	3	4	3	4	5	3	37	15	32	70	15	20	21	35	76	25	28	15	22	374	20	24	35	56	64	199	1055
15	15	25	9	15	17	16	12	15	5	8	15	12	164	16	67	28	32	31	47	59	47	27	32	58	52	496	76	76	80	90	89	411	1455
0	19	21	17	32	24	22	36	32	32	27	32	34	328	2	7	14	1	2	4	8	9	3	1	2	4	57	4	3	4	7	8	26	124
0	2	0	1	2	2	3	1	3	1	0	4	0	17	3	5	5	2	3	8	5	5	3	3	2	4	48	9	8	10	11	10	48	190
5	3	0	5	5	4	5	4	3	5	5	5	5	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	15	10	7	15	50	122	80	60	70	120	80	410	541
	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	15	10	7	15	50	122	80	60	70	120	80	410	541
	30	45	50	40	33	60	55	61	67	72	80	97	670	70	80	85	82	100	100	110	105	87	100	95	124	1138	110	100	110	140	100	560	2820
0	108	118	138	163	175	245	192	293	178	123	185	140	2058	118	197	789	115	120	178	522	601	266	191	187	371	3655	614	351	397	481	435	2278	10370
69	192	230	287	315	299	339	459	396	378	458	450	473	4216	380	632	449	427	542	575	605	690	664	563	543	597	6675	643	576	651	796	948	3614	16750
15																																	

PLATE 50-2

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The erythrocyte sedimentation rate: The normal sedimentation rate is from 1 to 10 m.m. This rate is increased in all cases of malnutrition (in the absence of tuberculosis or other infection). It may increase to 25 to 50 m.m.

Changes in general appearance: Young men have an aged appearance. Skin turgor becomes poor.

Cold Hands and Feet. This is common and is due entirely to a lack of calories. It is very difficult to get these patients warm.

Inability to absorb and utilize food eaten.

Lack of response to environment. Patients become apathetic, and, to varying degrees, insensible to pain.

The Navy supplies Vitamin A and B concentrates to its personnel, as well as tablets containing the vitamin B complex or the vitamin B complex plus vitamin C. Tablets or pills containing vitamin C alone are not supplied.