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
Subj: Communist Plans to Sabotage IDAP Shipments to Western Europe

Ref: (a) Chief of Naval Operations Secret Summary of Information,
same subject, dated 28 April 1950

Encl: (1) Summary of Information, dated 30 June 1950; same subject

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith as information which supplements data in reference (a).

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Op-321E/rmm
30 June 1950

Summary of Information

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PLANS TO SABOTAGE MDAP SHIPMENTS TO WESTERN EUROPE

1. Leaders of the French and Italian Communist Parties have met to discuss plans to insure a more effective anti-MDAP program.
2. On 22 February 1950, a meeting of the Central Committee of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) was held in Rome to determine the Party's attitude when MDAP arms reached Italy.
3. Palmiro TOGLIATTI, top Italian Communist leader stated that the PCI, as a subordinate organization of the Cominform, adapts itself to the situation of the Italian workers in the Party, or sympathetic to it. While recognizing the orders and requirements of the Cominform, TOGLIATTI explained it is necessary to avoid any action which could offer to the "forces of reaction", any pretext to strike the Party with new measures or to accuse the Party on a propaganda level of abandoning the working classes and working excessively as an instrument of a foreign power.
4. TOGLIATTI stated further that no one intends to underestimate the importance of manifestations against the dispatch of U.S. arms since the Italian working class would reportedly be the first to feel the disastrous effect of a new war. In this connection at a Cominform meeting held before the PCI meeting of February, 1950, it was reportedly at TOGLIATTI's suggestion that each party secretary estimate and carry out its own agitation program after consulting with his Central Directorate, framing it in the spirit of the "Paris Central Peace Committee".
5. In the anti-MDAP program, the error of the French Communist Party, according to TOGLIATTI, is that of relying too heavily on the activity of French Communist workers and party organizers rather than relying on the effective propaganda campaign designed to organizing the masses, including the Communists, against preparations. In France, the few acts of sabotage carried out against armed shipments are of no importance from a political point of view, if not actively "counter-productive" since the French Government appears to be able to control the situation and subsequently raise its prestige with the Americans. TOGLIATTI stated further that the work of the Party must be that of gathering around itself the vast strata of workers, employees and soldiers and to give every act of protest the character of a mass manifestation. Acts of force which would project harm rather than gain should be avoided.

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6. Pietro SECCHIA, another Italian Communist leader praised the French Communist spirit of sacrifice and organization and maintained that the organization of the French Communist Party better conforms to Cominform objectives. He reportedly maintained that the existence of European Communist Parties who give evidence of being militarily as well as politically organized preoccupied U. S. staffs much more than a hostile manifestation of a mass character. According to SECCHIA, the sabotage of American armed shipments should be prepared with the greatest care. He felt that propaganda should be oriented not so much toward the middle class which has never responded satisfactorily, but toward the Armed Forces where the ground is much more favorable.

7. Following the above statements of TOGLIATTI and SECCHIA, Edoardo d'ONFORIO invited the Party to step up the organization of people's committees, intensify propaganda among civilians and the military, and increase preparations on a para-military level in the event the Cominform should consider it necessary to take "open action" against the MDAP shipments.

8. According to a report of 24 May 1950, Palmiro TOGLIATTI, Secretary-General of the PCI and Maurice THOREZ, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party agree that the Partisans of Peace Movement lacks sufficient strength in the port areas of France and Italy to carry out prolonged sabotage on a large scale against shipment of arms from the United States. However, TOGLIATTI reportedly believes it imperative that mass demonstrations be staged in Italy this summer against the "war effort" of the U. S. He expects the French Communist Party to promote similar demonstrations. Jacques DUCLOS and Etienne FAJON, members of the French Communist Political Bureau reportedly favor postponing such action until fall.

9. Palamede BORSARI, a Brazilian engineer and member of the Communist Party in Sao Paulo, and described as a member of the "Bureau of the Partisans of World Peace" reportedly often acts as a liaison agent between TOGLIATTI and THOREZ. BORSARI was active in the promotion of the World Congress for Peace held in Mexico City in September, 1949 and attended it as one of the Brazilian delegates. BORSARI was in Mexico from 7 June until 31 October 1949. Although primarily concerned with the promotion of the Congress for Peace, he also contributed his advice as to labor policy in Latin America.

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