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ADVANCED INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
NORTH PACIFIC AREA  
#230 Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

SECRET

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From: Officer-in-Charge.  
To : Commander North Pacific Force.

Subject: Memorandum by Lt.Comdr. B. L. Lawrence, A-V(S), USNR, on  
Use of Intelligence Officers in the Kiska Operation.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of subject memorandum.

1. Subject memorandum was prepared by the former Officer-in-Charge of the Advanced Intelligence Center.

2. It is believed that the experience of Naval Intelligence Officers in this area operating with Army personnel in amphibious operations should be of value in similar operations in other areas.

3. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.

*V. Van Keuren*  
V. VAN KEUREN

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S E C R E T

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San Francisco, California

8 September 1943

MEMORANDUM ON: The Use of Intelligence Officers in the KISKA Operation.

1. The following officers of A.I.C. accompanied landing forces in the KISKA landing operations:

Two A.C.I. officers with G-2.

Two Photographic Interpretation officers with Photographic Section of G-2.

Four language officers attached to Regimental and Battalion Headquarters of the landing force.

Two language officers to be primarily with Radio Interception Unit and secondarily with Force Headquarters.

One language officer for beach compound for captured documents and prisoners.

One Crash Intelligence officer to collect information from crashed planes.

2. It being necessary in amphibious operations to coordinate activities of Army and Navy Intelligence Officers as closely as possible and also being probable that Naval material and documents would be found, these officers were attached to the landing force. Approximately seventy-five language and intelligence officers of G-2 were assigned similar duties.

3. The plan for collecting and examining of captured documents was briefly that language officers with Battalion & Regimental Headquarters would collect and have collected documents, translating only such as seemed to have immediate tactical value and forwarding the balance to Force Headquarters or beach pools for further classification and necessary translation. Thereafter all documents were to be forwarded to ADAK for final translation made in this area and distribution. All documents at ADAK are collected in one place where translation, processing, and distribution of the documents takes place, the work being done by Army officers and enlisted personnel, assisted by Naval Officers and enlisted personnel of A.I.C. This latter arrangement has proved mutually beneficial, saving time and duplication. When requested, photographic copies of originals have been made for Army or Navy.



S E C R E T

Memorandum on the Use of Intelligence Officers in the Kiska Operation (Cont'd).

4. Conditions prevailing at KISKA prevented putting into effect the plan outlined. Personnel that were originally detailed the duty of collecting and guarding enemy material were in many instances used for other purposes, and intelligence officers have reported that, in many instances, they themselves had to be on the spot immediately after or with the first line of advancing troops in order to obtain material. If the collecting and guarding of this material is necessary as well as translating, a very much larger number of intelligence officers and personnel would be required.

5. The operational plan called for the turning in of every document and also the collecting of any material at least until Commanding Officers or qualified intelligence officers could examine such material and decide whether of any possible operational or intelligence value.

6. The following are some of the criticisms and recommendations selected from the experience of intelligence personnel involved in the KISKA operation.

(a) Collection of souvenirs is still a serious problem. It is believed that this can be rectified only by more thorough indoctrination and education as to the importance of enemy documents and a very detailed statement of methods of collection to be employed. Unless cooperation of all can be enlisted, very large numbers of intelligence personnel would have to be employed to attempt even partial collection. Certain units of land forces should be employed for collecting and guarding of the material. Education in this general matter can be supplemented well by clear advance notice of disciplinary measures to be taken in the event of violations, particularly as applied to the sale of captured material or documents. It is further suggested that discipline cannot be of much avail unless officers of the Army and Navy refrain from the collection or retention of souvenirs without strict observance of regulations established.

(b) Boat crews and crews of transports should be forbidden access to the beaches except under orders and with definite instructions as to the regulations in existence as regard to enemy documents and material. A Naval patrol of occupied beaches would be beneficial.

(c) Language officers should not be employed for actual collection of documents and material. Adequate provision should be made that material is brought to them at various Headquarters.

(d) Material should be tagged and guarded until disposition can be made. When the guard cannot be maintained, tagging of the material should be sufficient security by specific direction.



S E C R E T

Memorandum on the Use of Intelligence Officers in the Kiska Operation (Cont'd)

(c) Intelligence officers (including language officers) should be given some instruction and training in:

Use of small arms,  
Landing boat operations,  
Bocby traps and land mines.

It is probable that closest cooperation with Engineer Units should be established.

(f) It has been suggested that for similar operations complete Army equipment be adopted and obtained by Naval personnel.

(g) It has been further suggested that certain classes of captured material which have no intelligence value, should be made available for souvenirs. It is believed that this will avoid congestion in established dumps and will encourage the turning in of material which has value. However in order to clarify this matter, it is suggested that officers responsible be provided with tickets indicating that any material which is retained has been examined.

(h) Variations in the effectiveness of procedure and enforcement of discipline were apparent. It is, however, to be noted that, unless equally enforced throughout, resentment will occur in those units where regulations have been adhered to, and a breakdown of procedure and discipline will spread rapidly.

/s/

B. L. LAWRENCE  
Lt. Comdr., USNR.