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INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MEMORANDUM  
No. 31

THE JAPANESE CHARACTER IN WAR.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE  
ALLIED AIR FORCES  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA  
8th OCTOBER 1943.

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GENERAL.

1. The enemy's character has always been regarded as an important factor in war. Its intangible quality, however, opens up vast fields in which amateur psychologists can find support for almost any conclusion agreeable to their own temperamental predispositions.

2. This makes the collation of the available evidence an extremely difficult task. Morale in the field, when in face of the enemy, has a reasonably self-evident meaning. This, however, is not true of those aspects of character whose roots lie far deeper in the racial qualities of the particular enemy concerned.

3. It is the purpose of this memorandum to bring together under appropriate headings all relevant data from enemy sources available at this Headquarters. Unfortunately, only a comparatively few Japanese prisoners have anywhere been captured. Most of the available information, therefore, comes from captured diaries and letters.

4. The extracts are, for the most part, from documents and from reports of the interrogation of POW captured in the South West and South Pacific theatres. Those documents and interrogation reports from India, available at this Headquarters, have, however, also been consulted. The translations of documents and the interrogations of prisoners captured in the South West Pacific which are quoted or referred to have been issued by A.T.I.S. Those coming from other theatres have been translated in those theatres.

5. An attempt has been made throughout to give sufficient particulars of the source of the information to enable its weight to be assessed. No references to original documents have been given. These are, however, in nearly every case, available at the J.A.P.I.S. Section of this Headquarters, if required.

6. The ranks of the persons quoted from diaries and interrogation reports have <sup>always</sup> not been given, partly because they were in many cases not known and partly because, for the purpose of this memorandum, they are in most cases of little significance. The vast majority, however, were non-commissioned. Although not more than 500 POW interrogation reports have been consulted it is nevertheless felt, having regard to the many documents quoted, that the extracts here set out and the conclusions indicated fairly represent a cross section of the Japanese character in war as it has revealed itself up to the present.

7. No comments and opinions of outside observers on the Japanese character have been quoted, except those of Joseph C. Grew, the United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932 to 1941, published in his "Report from TOKYO". This exception has been made because Mr. Grew's observations often throw a good deal of light on the subject under discussion, and help to relate the data from captured sources, which primarily reflect the attitudes and reactions of Service personnel engaged in fighting the war, to those of Japan and the Japanese people as a whole.

"I know Japan", writes Mr. Grew. "I lived there for ten years. I know the Japanese intimately. The Japanese will not crack. They will not crack morally or psychologically or economically, even when eventual defeat stares them in the face. They will pull in their belts another notch, reduce their rations from a bowl to a half bowl of rice, and fight to the bitter end. Only by utter physical destruction or utter exhaustion of their men and materials can they be defeated. That is the difference between the Germans and the Japanese. That is what we are up against in fighting Japan".

.....  
"We would be deluding ourselves if we believed that any personal sacrifices which the Japanese people might be called upon to make would lead to any cracking of their morale".

.....  
"Too long have we nurtured the illusion that the Japanese is an insignificant person whose achievements are poor imitations of our own achievements. He is a clever and dangerous enemy - one who will compel



us to use all the intelligence and all the strength of which we are capable in order to bring about his defeat".

.....  
"But above all, according to both the Japanese themselves and outside observers, the most important factors contributing to Japanese victories is the spirit which permeates all the armed forces of the Empire. This spirit, recognised by competent military men as the most vital intangible factor in achieving victory, has been nourished and perpetuated since the foundation of the modern Japanese Army. But the Japanese have been careful to develop a tremendous fighting spirit, in their armed services and people alike. Indeed, the Japanese armed services and the Japanese nation have become so closely identified that it is difficult to tell where one stops and the other begins".

8. Captured documents and Prisoners of War have given some indication of the nature and quality of this spirit.

#### PATRIOTISM.

##### ATTITUDE TOWARDS EMPEROR:

9. Mr. Grew writes: "The people of Japan are wholly united in their support of their armed forces and of this war, simply because it is declared to be the will of the Emperor. To oppose the will of the Throne, the will of the Son of Heaven, is unthinkable in Japan. Disloyalty to the Emperor, too, would shame their own ancestors - and ancestor worship, the patriotic faith called Shintoism, is the fundamental faith of the entire country".

.....  
"They are united. Theirs is a unity of solidarity. Foolish or wise though their war government may be, they support it. They believe in the divinity of their Emperor and, through him, in the rightness of their war leaders".

10. This general attitude towards the Emperor is reflected both by PsOW and in captured documents. One POW, a superior private captured off the TROBRIANDS on 9th March 1943, immediately rose and stood to attention when a reference was made, during questioning, to the Emperor; another, a Bomber Pilot of the rank of Lieutenant, captured in the SOLOMONS on 11th September 1942, when asked for his opinion as to the Emperor's attitude towards the war replied that to the Japanese people he was God; and a third, a petty officer, captured near BUNA on 3rd January 1943, stated that he himself did not believe in war, but had nothing to say about the Emperor's part in the war, since that touched a matter that was not discussed by Japanese.

11. A captured letter from a mother to her soldier son illustrates the spiritual subordination to the Emperor which inspires, at all events, some Japanese. She writes on 4th April -- "You are my son - and yet you are not my son. You are the son of the Emperor. Your body is not yours - it belongs to the Emperor. Therefore you must take good care of yourself. Day and night I am praying for your safety. God and I, your mother, will always be with you".

12. Perhaps a little more introspectively self-conscious, but not for that reason any the less significant, is the following extract from a diary:

"Just at a moment when the protracted war is at its height, we are lying in CANTON Army Hospital in China. How disloyal we are to His Imperial Majesty! What a regret! However, a time will come when we shall be able to repay His Imperial kindness by performing our duty".

13. It is to be observed how physical incapacity to fight becomes endowed with the moral quality of disloyalty to the Emperor. How those who truly serve him must commit themselves irrevocably is shown by the following stanza from a pamphlet issued to Japanese soldiers:



"Across the sea,  
Corpses in the water,  
Across the mountain,  
Corpses piling up on the field,  
I die only for the sake of the Emperor,  
Will never look back.

14. The same spirit is apparent in some lines written by a Japanese airman on the back of a map. The airman had been shot down into the sea off the NEW GUINEA coast, had drifted about in the water for several days, and tried to make his way back to his compatriots by improvised rafts. He was alone in the sea with no real hope of rescue.

"My honourable and able machine is buried in the depths of the sea and has been prepared for knighthood.  
Why should I be afraid of an enemy 10,000 million strong. Now that the Emperor's favour has not been repaid, I'd like to live and go into another battle. If I die, I'll be at ease, but I'll only die for my Emperor and Country.

Again the setting sun finds me on a lonely island in the South Seas. I see enemy planes overhead every day. As a disappointed devil I came to realise my position only at death's door. Up to now my loyalty has been insufficient.

What face have I to return to my former squadron".

15. The attitude that the Emperor is a sacred being who cannot be discussed is no doubt a useful instrument of military discipline and is for that reason likely to be more marked among Service personnel in their military submissiveness to him than it is among civilians in their more political subordination. This is indicated by the fact that even soldiers, when they think of the Emperor in relation to their political leaders and civil government, seem less unreasoning in their attitude than when they think of him in relation to the Army. The available material on this aspect is collated in the section dealing with Politics, below.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS RACE AND COUNTRY:

16. Mr. Grew writes:

"Because they are taught that they descend from the gods, the Japanese are not allowed to know the scientific and historical truth of their racial origin. They are led to believe - and many do believe it - that they are different from the rest of the world. Just the other day a broadcast from Japan, intended for Japanese ears, announced: "Japan is a nation made by gods. Japan is a mother nation, and those who are born in Japan are born of God. We are the greatest people in the world".

17. After pointing out that the Japanese militarists saw that they could not lead their people into war for economic reasons for the sake of booty, on religious grounds, for the old shibboleths of power, politics or for dated national ambitions, Mr. Grew points out that:

"They turned to racialism. Race sounded scientific. They had an attentive and docile audience. The Japanese language is peculiar. Few of Japan's neighbours show clear evidence of blood kinship with Japan. The ancient myths of Japan's Divine Empire were at hand, ready to be recast into the pseudo scientific terms of Metropolitan men. The Japanese Race was singled out as the Master People of the entire world. The ancient sagas of Japan were twisted into this modern propaganda".

.....  
"At this moment, the Japanese feel themselves, man for man, superior to you and to me and to any of our peoples. They admire our technology, they may have a lurking dread of our ultimate superiority of resources, but all too many of them have contempt for us as human beings".

18. This sense of national and racial superiority is reflected in a captured diary:



"I am glad to participate in this great mission as a Japanese. I will slave unto death for the Imperial favour. I am certain that the dawn of the Greater Asiatic Empire is near. Morale is high and my belief in ultimate victory is firm. I shall never give in until the enemy is destroyed. Our country is God's country and I am the Son of God, hence I shall fear no one. I shall smilingly undertake this great mission. Long live the Emperor".

19. The same spirit is reflected in the attitude of some PsOW who find themselves quite unable to see how Japan could lose this war. One POW, an oiler 3rd class, explaining this attitude, added that the Japanese did not consider that TOJO was Japan's main strength. Japan had reached her present position in world affairs because of the inherent strength of the Japanese people. Another, a probationary officer, by way possibly of pointing a contrast to his captors, stressed the fact that the Japanese were prepared to make any sacrifice to attain their aim; and a third, a Sgt., said that the Japanese would fight to the end, however long the war lasted. Needless to say, every Japanese POW who was asked about the matter emphatically rejected the German theories of racial superiority; the mere suggestion of any such theory being regarded as too fantastic to be taken seriously.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICS IN GENERAL:

20. Of some 25 PsOW who were asked about their political opinions, seven said that they were too young to have taken any interest in politics; one that politics were beyond his understanding; and two that being soldiers, politics were not for their concern; while two said they were not interested in politics. The others expressed varying political opinions of no marked significance. Of these, six were in varying degree averse to communism. One thought that Karl Marx's theories were an excellent ideal, but far too Utopian ever to be practicable in Japan. This POW, a Naval Paymaster Lieut., already quoted in previous sections, had studied economics at TOKYO University. Another, a labourer, thought communism had some good points if not carried to extremes, and "appealed to the lower classes in metropolitan areas".

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICAL LEADERS:

21. Some 56 PsOW were questioned on their attitude towards TOJO and his responsibility for the war. 38 thought that TOJO was responsible for the war and five did not think that he was responsible. The rest felt that they could not express any views about the matter. Of those who thought that TOJO was responsible, seven thought that he was not carrying out the Emperor's wishes in the matter.

22. It is not to be assumed, however, that those who did not share this view thought that the Emperor was responsible for the war, or that those who did think that he was, thought that the Emperor desired the war. On the contrary, all those who expressed any views on this point said that the Emperor was a peace-loving man, but had the war forced on him or was fighting it for the sake of establishing peace.

23. Two of those who thought that TOJO was not carrying out the Emperor's wishes thought that TOJO was merely consulting his own ambitions.

24. All the others thought that he was working for the interests of Japan and the Japanese people. Five thought that TOJO had little to do with the outbreak of the war, which they thought was forced on Japan as the result of world affairs. Two said that they could not understand the motivations or feelings of such superior beings as the Emperor or TOJO, and could, therefore, not express any views about a matter that was entirely beyond them. Three thought that TOJO was merely carrying out the wishes of the Army and Navy, by whom they thought he was largely controlled.

25. One POW said that if the war should go against Japan, TOJO would have to accept responsibility as he was Prime Minister at its commencement. Military meddling in politics, however, was necessary in order to bring people to a proper realisation of where politicians were leading the country.



26. Another POW said that TOJO was not alone to blame for the war, since he was only the representative of those who supported the militarist party. He thought that the militarists and politicians had conceived the idea of conquering the world.

27. Another POW likened TOJO to HITLER and said that TOJO regarded this war as an opportunity for Japan not to be missed. Yet another POW, however, said that TOJO's position could not be compared with that of HITLER or MUSSOLINI. TOJO was not irreplaceable. The war was undoubtedly traceable to the domination of the Cabinet by a military clique and was not to the Emperor's liking.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE U.S.A:

28. There is little evidence from captured documents at this Headquarters, giving any indication of the attitude of Japanese Service personnel towards the British and American peoples. Except for one reference in a diary to Gen. MacArthur and two references to the characteristics of Allied soldiers, the only evidence from captured sources comes from PsOW and since the prisoners were captured either by British or American troops and held on British territory, it is hardly to be expected that they would give open expression to any ill feeling towards them.

29. The reference to Gen. MacArthur is as follows:

"This person who is called MacArthur must be great. We must admit that our foe is fighting valiantly. How I wish to repulse this good enemy".

The man who wrote this was a Sergeant.

30. One of the other references, also from a diary written in 1942, is as follows:

"27th November - Strength of Australian soldier is superior to that of Nippon soldier".

31. The third, from an instruction, reads as follows:

#### "Ways and Methods of the Enemy:

1. The enemy are materialists and place all their reliance in this. Either in attack or defence they rely chiefly upon their fire-power. Against such an enemy our spirit is of the highest significance. In the event of a surprise attack or a frontal attack we must systematically neutralize the fire power of the enemy.
2. It is characteristic of the enemy that he is strong towards the weak, and weak when faced by the strong. For this reason against us he will take advantage of our small physique more and more. This must be impressed upon every single soldier in each BUTAI. After overwhelming the morale of the enemy by the very daring of our attack, it is vital to cause him to wither and collapse completely.
3. The enemy belongs to a nation deeply influenced by a single death, and when their officers die it is clear that they have a tendency to collapse. For this reason we must take every opportunity to throw into confusion and destroy the organization of their command.

32. More generally, PsOW have made the following observations:

33. One POW, a stoker, thought that Australians were the same as English, who were characterised by being gentlemen. Another, a superior private, recollected that his teacher used to say that England was a country of real gentlemen. Another, a 2nd Lieut., thought that the Emperor entertained friendly feelings towards Britain. Another said that prior to the war the Japanese people were well-disposed towards the British and Americans but now they could only be classed as enemies, and the Japanese dislike of them was on a par with that for the Chinese. Three PsOW thought that individually the Japanese did not dislike the British, even though they were at war, and that the war was purely a matter between their respective governments.



34. Twenty-three PsOW who were asked about the anti-British movement in Japan expressed varying views. Three said it was necessary because of Britain's attitude towards China. 15 said either that they knew nothing about it or could give no reason for it, while two said it had been stirred up by the Government to prepare the people for the present conflict. Two thought it was due to German propaganda.

35. Only one POW referred specifically to the United States. He said that the main resentment was towards America. In the absence of any record, it may be assumed that this remark was not made to an American.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS CHINA:

36. Thirty-two PsOW who were questioned about the Japanese attitude towards China gave varying views.

37. One POW said that the dislike between the Japanese and Chinese was mutual. They were perennial enemies. He did not know the cause but thought it was because China wanted to be Japan's equal, which was contrary to Japanese ideas. Three thought that this mutual dislike dated from the Sino-Japanese war of 1894. Another thought that the antipathy was due to their geographic proximity. One POW said that the Japanese regarded the Chinese as fools. Nineteen denied that there was any mutual dislike between the Chinese and Japanese. The others had no very defined views on the subject.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS GERMANY:

38. There is no evidence from captured documents at this Headquarters which throws any light on the attitude of the Japanese towards Germany.

39. Fifty-four PsOW who were questioned about it expressed a number of different views.

40. Ten had never heard of the Germans' racial superiority theory. Those that had were unanimous in their rejection of it. Some thought it so fantastic as to be amused by it.

41. All those to whom the matter was mentioned could see nothing comparable in the positions occupied by HITLER and the Japanese Emperor - to worship the former being quite absurd; though some few were prepared to concede, if the Germans wanted to do so, that was their affair.

42. None of the PsOW thought that Japan was receiving any assistance from Germany, or owed anything to Germany, or that Germany was in any way concerned with Japan's war. The alliance between them was purely for mutual protection against Russia.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS NATIVES:

43. There is a good deal of evidence from captured documents and PsOW about the general attitude of the Japanese towards the natives in the NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS area. The whole of this evidence has been collected and published in a separate memorandum, to which reference should be had. It is sufficient for the purpose of this memorandum to say that the treatment of the natives in these areas by the Japanese appears, on the whole, to be reasonable, both in theory and in practice, and that the Japanese attitude towards them appears to be dictated partly by the realization that the natives can be of great use to them in the jungles of these islands, if properly treated, and a serious danger if antagonized; and partly because they are regarded in some undefined way as potential allies, if not equals, in the Japanese Great East Asia co-prosperity policy against the white races from whom the Japanese regard it as part of their mission to "liberate" the natives.



MILITARISM.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS WAR:

44. Mr. Grew asks the question: "Why did they (the Japanese) make war upon us?" and answers it as follows:

"The Japanese attitude towards the English-speaking peoples is based on a concept of Japanese superiority and strength and of our inferiority and weakness. Part of this is the product of their mythology - the only neolithic mythology in the world which still plays a part in the affairs of a government. A part of it is a product of national vanity. A part of it is - in the Japanese view - logical matter of fact and well-founded".

45. Mr. Grew adds these significant observations:

"It is a paradox of Japanese thinking that, despite their faith in their own innate superiority, they believe that the man who thinks he is superior is ipso facto handicapped. The Japanese have known what we thought of them - that they were little fellows physically, that they were imitative, that they were not really very important in the world of men and nations . . . . .

The Japanese have made comparisons not favourable to us. They have pointed to their own thrift, and compared it with our wastefulness. They have looked at their own national unity and national reverence and have contrasted it with our partisanship and our readiness to laugh at ourselves. They have seen the comforts with which we have surrounded ourselves, and they envy these, even while they despise us for our possession and enjoyment of them".

\*\*\*\*\*  
"The leaders of Japan are not suicidally minded incompetents. History will show that they have made a miscalculation, but they have miscalculated less than most of us suppose. In this they find their strength".

46. A captured diary contains the following:

"The inspiring dream of the coming war between JAPAN and AMERICA during my boyhood days is now a reality".

47. Japanese PsOW have expressed a variety of views about the war. Of 73 PsOW questioned on the subject, 54 stated quite frankly that they did not "believe in" war, "disliked" war, "hated" war, were "against" war, or "abhorred" war. One thought this was self-evident as "nobody really wished to die". None thought war as such was a good thing, though one suggested that an attack by Japan on Russia would be good strategy.

48. In considering these views and the proportion of PsOW who expressed them, it must, of course, be borne in mind that they are the views of prisoners and are for that reason probably not at all representative, having regard to the Japanese attitude towards being taken prisoner and the fact that so few prisoners have been taken. Moreover, a distaste for war as such is by no means inconsistent with other qualities of character and mental attitudes that make those who dislike war nevertheless formidable enemies. It is necessary, therefore, to carry the examination a little further:

49. Of those who did not like war, 5 expressed the view that international differences could better be settled by other means, and that it might have been better for Japan to keep out of the war; 22 thought the present war was inevitable or was a necessary evil. The reasons they gave for this view varied. Some said that it was due to Japan's over population and lack of living space; some said Japan had no option but to fight because England and America had squeezed her economically to the point of bankruptcy; some attributed the war to a conflict of ideals and principles; some thought the war was necessary because Japan had to defeat the nations helping China; some that Japan would derive ultimate advantages from the war which she would not otherwise be able to get; some that war was a matter of circumstance; while others felt that the matter was beyond their understanding.



50. Of those who accepted war as inevitable, 8 felt that it was a matter of duty for them to take their part in it as soldiers without further question. One prisoner confessed that up to the time of his capture he had thought that the war was a matter of duty but that since he had become indifferent to the question; another that he did not care whether Japan won or not as he did not wish to return there; a third, that even if the Allies won he would not object if it meant a speedy conclusion of hostilities; while a fourth, who agreed that war was not a good thing and that he personally did not like it, added that he was out of touch with the general feeling in Japan on this matter. Two others, who were totally opposed to war, said that most of their companions felt the same way, but as everyone was regimented and placed under orders, they had no say in the matter. They, however, did not want Japan to lose the war now that she was in it.

51. A captured civilian military employee, who, admitting that he did not like war, quite frankly said that he volunteered for service to make more money than he was earning at home. In contrast to this economic cynicism, a second-class private thought that there would never be an end to war unless people could be educated to forget their own selfish interests and take a broader view of things. Unfortunately, all countries only looked to their own interests.

52. A naval Paymaster Lieut., after discussing the general economic position of Japan in relation to other nations as a contributing cause of the present war, went on as follows:

"China gave great provocation by boycotts and incidents such as the HOKKAI massacre. England, it was thought, instigated the Washington Naval Conference. These events naturally estranged relations but they did not seriously deteriorate until the Manchukuo Incident, which, in PW's opinion was the beginning of the present trouble. Japan should have accepted the Lytton Report but the Militarists were responsible for delegate MATSUOKA's walking out of the League of Geneva. They too undoubtedly created the China Incident of 1937 by failing to cooperate with the then Premier who wished to halt operations after North China was occupied.

PW had never thought the China War would end quickly. As it progressed Japan's relations with foreign powers rapidly deteriorated. America refused to supply oil and steel or purchase silk, and Netherlands East Indies refused to sell oil, although Japan actually despatched an Ambassador to Java to conduct negotiations. PW fully admitted that friendly relations could have been re-established promptly had Japan agreed to "call off" the China War.

He did not believe in war. He was not a soldier in spirit and did not voice traditional military thoughts. While studying, he had many bitter arguments with officers attached to Civilian Schools, and was often rebuked. He claimed that since his boyhood days he had been an idealist and still retained these youthful ideals, but being one amongst many, he could not accomplish much".

53. Confirming the opinion that the Paymaster Lieut. did not express the general view, a Sergeant who himself did not believe in war was confident that Japan would fight on until half the population of the country had been killed and would carry on in the face of heavy bombing attacks; while a Warrant Officer who felt that it would undoubtedly have been better for Japan to have stayed out of the present war nevertheless thought that Japan would be victorious, in spite of the superior material strength of England and the U.S.A., because of Japan's "superior power and overwhelming spirit". Similarly, a Medical 2nd Lt. said that, notwithstanding the strength of Britain and America, the Japanese people would fight to the end, however long the war might last, "as that is in accord with their character". So also a 2nd class private and a L/Cpl. said that the war was a matter of "do or die" and that even those who would like to see it end quickly were resolved to see it through to the end and would accept any sacrifice and hardship to win it.



54. There are, however, a few indications of war weariness. One POW was outspoken against the war and indicated he would do any work to shorten the war, even to the extent of expressing his willingness to fight against the Japanese.

55. Another said:

"What optimistic thoughts we used to have; such as the taking of PORT MORESBY, then NEW ZEALAND and back to JAPAN. Just like that - so easy! What fantastic ideas!" (Laughter)

56. There is also some evidence of war weariness in diaries:

"17th February 1943 - Now that I have been on active service for so long a time, nobody except my parents is of much importance to me".

57. Another contains this:

"26th November 1942 - Under any circumstance, I want to go back to my home as soon as possible".

.....

"20th January 1943 - Walking through a jungle. My only plan is to return to my country.

58. Two other diaries contain similar entries.

59. The fact that so few Japanese soldiers have been captured, while many have fought on in incredible conditions of hardship without hope of victory or escape, is perhaps the strongest evidence that war weariness is not general - at all events among those who are at present in the Services - and that any evidence from prisoners to the contrary must be considered as an indication that the attitude is not universal rather than that it is general. It is noteworthy that only one POW, a cadet, gave expression to the view that the war would carry on for another couple of years or so, and that by then all nations would have tired of war and come to some agreement.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARMY:

60. Mr. Grew writes:

"Certainly there are plenty of Japanese who dislike the Army's methods; there is plenty of restiveness at the wholesale impressment of young men to fight in China; at the death and crippling of many; and all the restrictions and handicaps in everyday life entailed by the expenses of the China campaign. But that the Army can be discredited in the eyes of the people to a degree where its power and prestige will become so effectively undermined as to deprive it of control, or at least of its preponderant influence in shaping national policy, is an hypothesis which I believe no one conversant with Japan and the Japanese would for a moment entertain".

61. It is apparent from the previous section that even prisoners who have their own ideas about the war are not always able to carry these same ideas over into their attitude towards the Army and that their attitudes towards the war and the Army are consequently sometimes in conflict. Only very few, even among those who are not in agreement with the war, are prepared to question the Army; their attitude towards the Army being a matter of "duty", which they find themselves unable to question, even if they are in disagreement with the war. This is no doubt due to the conception of the Army as an Imperial institution and an expression of the Emperor's majesty, which is clearly suggested by such instructions to officers and men as that dated 29th December 1942, which was recently captured. This stated:

"The Imperial Army is an immortal army and we are immortal soldiers. From time immemorial, the history of our Imperial Force has shown that the grace and blessing of Heaven has been with us".

Few, it appears, even among prisoners, have so far been prepared to regard the blessing as a doubtful one, or if they do so regard it, to give expression to their doubts.

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62. One man, however, on his deathbed, seems to have wondered whether the Deity had deserted the Army. A diary written in 1942 contains this:

"21st December - Isn't God protecting the Imperial Army? Ah, how tragic is this battlefield! Fellow-comrades, are you going to let us die? Even the spirits of invincible Jap. soldiers are despondent now. Please God . . . . The night fell again. Our end is approaching. Three men came to reinforce our No. 2 Section. Our strength now is 9 men without any L.M.G."

ATTITUDE BETWEEN OFFICERS AND MEN:

63. Fifteen PsOW, none above the rank of Corporal, have, during the course of interrogation, given some indication of the attitude of Japanese soldiers towards their officers in battle areas. Except where they felt that their officers had deserted them, or taken advantage of their authority, this attitude generally indicates a spirit of discipline, based perhaps not so much on the superior rank of the officer as on his position as the custodian of the Emperor's authority and the embodiment of the Army's spirit.

64. One POW said that from childhood he had been trained to obey orders handed down from the Emperor. He, therefore, obeyed the orders given by his officers without question, whether they were right or wrong. Strict discipline was maintained, even by NCOs. In the absence of supervision, confusion arose.

65. This last comment suggests that Japanese discipline is mainly the product of training and drill. It is, however, probably also associated with a sense of racial and spiritual superiority, the results of which one would expect to be much more evident in soldiers when individually face to face in battle with an alien enemy, than when among themselves in numbers and without supervision, when confusion might arise. The almost fanatical refusal of individual soldiers, when alone or in small groups, to admit defeat certainly seems to suggest this.

66. The following extracts from the statements of PsOW, whose sense of discipline may be presumed to be less than that of the majority, are indicative:

67. One POW said that the treatment of men by superiors was severe. The Japanese Army was modelled on Spartan lines and discipline was maintained at high pitch. Instant obedience was demanded and in no case could a command or order be questioned. YAMATO DAMASHI (the Spirit of Japan) was only obtained by this rigid training.

68. Another said that treatment of men by superiors in barracks in Japan was bad, but in forward areas men were treated with more consideration. Discipline was maintained by talks from superior officers.

69. Another POW said that discipline in the Army was very strict. Little physical punishment was inflicted, but men were frequently admonished in loud tones for the slightest reason. Another said that the handling of men by superior officers varied, but was generally strict. Recruits were trained by older soldiers and there were isolated cases of rough treatment.

70. Another, who did not care for Army life, said that officers were very hard on men, but that since the outbreak of war, harmony between officers and soldiers had been stressed. Discipline was maintained at a high level.

71. Two others, who were satisfied with their Army jobs, said that soldiers were not ill-treated by officers, but that discipline was extremely strict.

72. Yet another said that recruits went through a rough time for the first year, but were not necessarily knocked about by their superiors. Officers never interfered with Sergeants and Corporals in training or in punishment of men. Special instructions were issued in 1942, dealing with the treatment to be accorded to recruits. This put a stop to indiscriminate bullying such as he had undergone a year previously. Discipline was strict.



73. Another confirmed this, when he said that the treatment by superiors was now reasonable, but when he was first called up, the men were sometimes beaten and cuffed. Discipline also was not as strict as formerly, owing, he thought, to men of all ages being mixed together.

74. A Naval man said that, during his first year, he experienced rough treatment from 1st class seamen, from whom he received many cuffings. While this was not officially sanctioned, it was widely done, but care was taken not to injure or disfigure. He knew of instances when senior men had received reprimands from P.Os. for these acts. P.Os. and officers never struck men themselves. Discipline in the Navy was strict and well-maintained.

75. Another POW was agreeably surprised, when captured, to observe the good feeling that apparently existed between men and officers of the Australian forces. There is no such comradeship in the Japanese Army, where discipline is rigid. Japanese officers, particularly those of junior rank, and NCOs., treat their men very badly. In consequence, it is not an uncommon occurrence in the field for an officer to be shot from behind by his own men. Harsher treatment is dealt out by the officers in the Artillery than in the Infantry, as there are fewer opportunities of reprisals by the men.

76. The diary entries of a seaman contain a good deal of evidence of cuffing:

"20th February 1941 - In loading the gun I dropped the shell because of clumsy handling on deck and was censured severely. It wasn't once but twice. .... At gunnery drill we had amn supplying drill. Salvo firing interval is 18 seconds. Nobody can do it in time by himself, but the senior NCO unconcernedly reprimanded me for being slow. That thoughtless, noisy fellow!"

.....  
"20th March 1941 - Had clothing inspection in the afternoon. Assembly on deck. Was slapped twice. We had a squad afterwards and I got drunk. Got slapped by the Section Leader".

.....  
"22nd March 1941. - Was reprimanded by the squad leader because I had powder on my hat. That misunderstanding fool! Spent the entire day with ill feeling".

.....  
"2nd May 1941 - Received a blow on head from Petty Officer NABETA".

.....  
"11th May 1941 - After an investigation, received punishment. This is quite frequent nowadays. Think nothing of it".

.....  
"17th May 1941 - At muster up on deck, received warning on attitude from 1st Class Seaman MORIKAWA. Struck by 1st class seaman UYEHARA. Today's blow was specially felt. This is the 8th one today. It is not a good feeling".

.....  
"24th May 1941 - At sea duty, did not fall in and was struck 4 times by that imbecile, ISHIZUKA. That big blockhead boy who doesn't know himself".

.....  
"28th May 1941 - In the morning struck 10 times by senior NCO. Felt unpleasant all day. That big fool".

.....  
"9th June 1941 - Hope there will be war because it will be much more exciting than getting a scolding every day".

.....  
"15th July 1941 - At muster, struck 4 times by FUKASE and TAKANO 1st class seaman. It was painful".

.....  
"16th July 1941 - At 0500, reprimanded by Chief Navigator for being asleep".

.....  
"24th July 1941 - While smoking in latrine, discovered by an officer of the watch and struck".

.....  
"27th July 1941 - Yesterday, struck by KAWASAKI, TAKANO and HATAKEYAMA. Injured my tooth and it was painful. I am tired. I never felt so bad as now, since I joined Navy. Look at my face, my swollen cheek".  
.....

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"24th August 1941 -- At night was struck 3 times".

.....  
 "22nd September 1941 -- Was slapped 5 times while standing in formation. It hurt".

.....  
 "29th September 1941 -- At night the crazy fool, NARO, Minosuke, tried to find fault with me".

.....  
 "15th October 1941. -- Due to a slight negligence on my part during watch, I received punishment".

.....  
 "14th November 1941 -- What a nasty day! I endeavoured to hold back my temper but ended the day by hitting someone".

77. Another private said that in the front line discipline was maintained by promises of replacements, which, in his experience, did not arrive; and while another POW said that he had no reason to question the integrity of officers, there is evidence that this faith has not been universal.

78. One POW stated that Maj.Gen. YAMAGATA came in for some adverse comment among the troops when he fled from GIRUWA in NEW GUINEA by M.L.C. and ordered the attempt which was being made to evacuate some stretcher cases to be stopped, so that the M.L.C. could push off. He also stated that Gen. HORII was criticised by officers and men alike for what was considered by them to be an unnecessary waste of lives during the Stanley Campaign, resulting from his "roughly refusing to listen to the advice of his staff and of other high-ranking officers to retreat to the coast earlier and await reinforcements".

79. A captured labourer also commented that when the Japanese soldiers were beginning to suffer a reverse in New Guinea, there was much discussion about the poor tactical judgment of their officers.

80. Another POW, a Corporal, expressed strong resentment over the abandonment of front line elements by their officers. He stated that he and many others lost respect for their higher officers who "preached the spirit of the Samurai to the men but in turn deserted them when the going got too hot". He added that many had vowed to kill the Bn. Commander and the Regimental Commander if they ever had the opportunity.

81. The above are the statements of POW and should be treated accordingly. Confirmation from captured documents indicating ill-feeling towards superior officers is, however, not lacking.

82. A diary captured in NEW GEORGIA contains this entry:

"The Japanese Army is still depending on the hand to hand fighting of the MEIJI era while the enemy is using highly developed scientific weapons. Thinking it over, however, this poorly armored force of ours has still not been overcome and is still guarding this island, so it is something worthy of comment. But this is no time for praise. More than likely they have something in the rear. If the Air and Navy Forces don't move, this island will soon be taken. If we as well as the enemy were to fight to the end with all the available weapons that each possesses, then I would be willing to give up whether we win, lose, be injured, or killed. But in a war like this, where we are like a baby's neck in the hands of an adult, even if I die it will be a spiteful death. How regretful! My most regretful thought is my grudge towards the forces in the rear and my increasing hatred towards the operational staff".

83. Another diary from MUNDA records the following, in 1943:

"April 9th -- Fatigued from long hardships, I finally collapsed. At this time I saw the loathsome face of my superior. Thinking that sickness is only mental -- my health is depending upon spirit. I never can forgive the works supervisor! While on watch I have often thought of striking him with the rifle. When will my conscience become clear? Before we knew it, we left MUNDA and advanced to the front line".

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84. Another diary contains the following entries, which are presumed to refer to 1942:

"11th January - Staff members always preached that they would sacrifice their flesh and bone in securing the well-being of their men, but upon facing actual difficulties they turn their head around neglecting their duties ....."

"18th January - Senior personnel are always loafing and never think of the difficulties of the men".

85. Another diary, captured in NEW GUINEA, contains this:

"I can't help but feel that the Regt Comdr thinks about himself".

.....

"In the morning 2nd Lieut. TAMBA came. I am angry at 2nd Lieut. SUGATANI. Got tired of hearing his morbid suspicions. TAMBA said that, according to SUGATANI, he probably became sick just to avoid going to battle. From the men, TAMBA's story is that bullets do not always come from the front. This made them curious".

86. The diary of a company officer contains the following:

"Hearing the conditions in each company from the NCO., it seems that supplies are not coming. Characteristics are revealed which are not known under ordinary circumstances, such as the true nature of human beings. In a certain company the messmen ate 2 or 3 times as much as the others and the officers and NCOs. ate three times as much as the men. A certain Battalion Commander received 100 cigarettes to divide among his men, but he only gave one or two to his Company Commanders, and he lost almost all of his usual prestige. Thanks to my qualities of an ordinary soldier, the men of the company thanked me".

87. Another diary contains this:

"Enemy artillery is shelling us as usual. I went out of the fox-hole for some fresh air, and heard an argument about food going on in the leading squad. I was surprised to find out that there were such NCOs. Morale among them should be better. At ten o'clock Sgt. INOUE came to apologise".

88. Yet another diary has this entry. The year is 1942:

"26th December - There may be some misunderstanding when I mention the value of comrades, but it is certainly a lamentable situation when everyone runs off and not a single person remains to take care of things. Can these men be called soldiers of Japan?"

.....  
"28th December - At the present time, all officers, even though there is such a scarcity of food, eat relatively sufficiently. The condition is one in which the majority are starving. (The higher officials are not starving). This is indeed a deplorable state of affairs for the Imperial Army".

89. The diary of one officer records the following:

"Many commanders like to take into battle with them as many of their men as possible, but, in contrast to this, I myself (a lieutenant) am inclined to leave behind many of those who are not really fit (due to injuries and sickness). Can it be that I am not sufficiently ruthless? It is a matter regarding which some self-examination is necessary. I am worried because I cannot unconcernedly overlook another's troubles, and the feeling grows on me that as a commander I am lacking in sincerity. I feel that I am becoming detached from my comrades through insufficient mental discipline.

"Diligent people talk of their hopes."

"Lazy people bemoan their misfortunes".

"I will rectify my lack of mental discipline by diligence and industry".

I (a lieutenant) don't know whether it is better to be a 1st Lt. or a 2nd Lt.

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has had so many casualties, but all ranks of commanders seem to have lost some of their offensive spirit".

90. A farewell reprimand delivered by a Bn. Commander on the eve of his own departure from NASSAU BAY on 2nd July 1943 is of particular interest. This contained what appear to be crocodile tears in the following terms:

"As with our lives in our hands, we live and die together, high rank and low rank, the lack of high loyalty and trueness of heart really fills me with an irrepressible heartrending anguish. From the time that my present duty was specially drawn up, I have gone with you beyond the bounds of life and death; we have battled for two years in the front lines of the war of Greater East Asia, and with you, have long awaited the opportunity to deal the enemy one final, decisive blow. But now, through my own unworthiness, it is my greatest dread that you may be unable to extricate yourselves from the conditions which I have just described.

Now, in obedience to my orders, I am about to take leave of NASSAU BAY, dear to my heart, and of you, officers and men, beloved soldiers. And as I withdraw from the scene of the battle, to go across the waves at the equator, dyed with the blood of my long-to-be mourned brave and loyal followers, it is my earnest, importunate hope that you will not bring trouble or misfortune to the new TAI commander, nor vex your superiors; that you will manifest the deepest loyalty, will not hesitate to offer candid, even if unpleasant advice, will search your own hearts and rouse yourselves to action.

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER SERVICES:

91. The attitude of men in one Service or branch of a Service towards other Services is indicated by the following evidence:

92. An Army private said that he liked the Army better than the Navy because he did not like ships. He thought that opinions as to which branch of the services was better depended on prejudices. Undoubtedly, the Army was better in some things and the Navy in others. The Navy traditionally treated its personnel better than the Army insofar as pay, promotion, food and medical attention was concerned. He could not answer as regards the Air Force.

93. The view that the Navy enjoyed better pay and conditions was shared by two other PsOW, one of whom attributed the difference to the fact that sailors were volunteers.

94. Another thought that the Army and Navy worked together very well. Three others said that the relationship between the Army and the Navy had improved in recent years and was "passive" at present.

95. Only one POW said that a certain amount of jealousy existed between the Army and the Navy; the latter, he said, was very boastful of its fighting qualities.

96. An entry in one diary, belonging to a man from an Army bomber, states somewhat cryptically:

"2nd April 1943 - At 0800 the planes of the ZUIHO took off. Fighters and bombers, 80 altogether, sped away in perfect formation. Though enmity existed between the two, a parting was sad. We waved our hats in farewell. "Good luck to the fighting men of the sea".

97.

This is the only evidence sighted at this Headquarters which touches upon the relationship between the Army and Navy Air Services. It is known that they generally operate separately, from separate bases, but this is by no means always true, and is quite explicable on purely administrative grounds.

98. Another diary contains the following outburst:



"18th March - What's the matter with the Navy? They give the enemy every chance. Air raid warning after enemy planes have come over our head! 4th Fleet is useless".

SELF-SACRIFICE.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS SELF-SACRIFICE:

99. Mr. Grew writes:

"The Japanese soldier is the result of calculated, continuous indoctrination in the glories of the militarist state. His willingness to sacrifice himself on the battlefield is not a result of intellectual commitment to a cause. It is the result of a far more dangerous training of his emotions from childhood to respond to the appeal of sacrifice for the State. All the forces which have produced him - the family, the school, compulsory military service, State religion, and the compulsory power of the group over the individual - have shaped him to this end. Unquestioning obedience and self-sacrifice are his creed - obedience and sacrifice to the militaristic state."

100. This almost massocistic attitude towards self-sacrifice is evidenced in captured documents which contain more than one admission of our superior material strength, and use that to emphasise the superiority of the Japanese fighting spirit and the necessity for self-sacrifice.

101. One Japanese order issued in the SOLOMONS reads as follows:

"Strictly Confidential.

We are certain to be victorious in this war.

1. Now is the time to offer your life for His Majesty the Emperor.
2. The flower of Japan's infantry will make a bayonet charge. This will be most frightful to the enemy.
3. The enemy's strength is superior in fire power, but we will meet this by utilizing night fighting in the jungle.
4. When the general attack begins, we will quickly break through the enemy front line, seize the airport over which we feel great resentment, and without fail destroy the enemy by dawn, kicking, scattering, stabbing and killing them.
5. Thus it will surely be a great victory for the Imperial Army".

102. Another similar order issued in GUADALCANAL reads as follows:

"Military Secret, Instructions:

For the information of all officers and men participating in the GUADALCANAL offensive.

1. It lies in this one battle to ensure peace for Japan and to place her in an invincible position.
2. Every officer and man must lay down his life in return for the Emperor's favors.
3. As far as possible, the casualties from enemy air attack must be made to decrease and the fighting spirit must increase greatly.
4. You must remain firmly resolved not to be led astray by wild rumors.
5. Through the utmost efforts of every officer we will quickly be led to victory in the battle and the reputation of the division will be enhanced.

The above is an instruction.

October 13, 1942.

ITO Unit Commander

Major General ITO."

103. As exhortations the above quotations would be less remarkable than as orders which for the most part do not seem to be regarded by those to whom they are addressed as demanding anything unusual.

104. One diary, for instance, records the following:

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"2nd February 1943 - Prepared to move in accordance with yesterday's order. Kept body and soul together by eating raw potatoes and dreamed of tomorrow's victory under enemy planes, under enemy bombardment, and under constant enemy assaults. Who would have such thoughts under these circumstances but Japanese soldiers? No one can stop us in our efforts to surmount difficulties. No doubt this is the way we Japanese always think".

105. Another soldier writes:

"Whenever and wherever I die, I will not regret it because I have already given my soul and body to my country and I have said farewell to my parents, wife, brother and sister".

106. Another writes:

"Whatever happens that may come to our country, to sacrifice one's life for his country is a soldier's realisation of his long-cherished desire. When I received my mobilization orders, I had already sacrificed my life for my country. You must not expect me to return home".

107. This has, up to the present, been the attitude of most Japanese soldiers. Some few, however, who have allowed themselves to become prisoners of war, guiltily regard life as being something precious. But they, up to the present, are unquestionably the rare exception. Nor are there many instances of lack of courage disclosed in captured documents. The only three which have come to the notice of this Headquarters are the following diary entries:

"22nd December - According to Sgt. OGAWA, platoon leader's messenger, WAKAMATSU, Kazuhiko, is such a coward that when he is on the guard duty he becomes frightened and hides in another unit's bomb shelter, trembling with fear. As a soldier, he is a disgrace".

108. The second states:

"1st December 1942 - Last night when enemy advanced in the vicinity of the wireless post, a certain number of soldiers retreated without permission. Such action will be hereafter subject to court martial".

109. The third says:

"9th February 1943 - Went to look for deserters in the afternoon".

"11th March 1943 - We were frightened at the sight of enemy planes".

110. On the other hand, a diary of a 2nd Lieutenant contained this entry, written in 1942:

"3rd December - We were ordered to retreat, but disobeyed".

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEATH:

111. Self-inflicted death as a means of atonement or escape from the humiliation of disgrace or shame is traditional among the Japanese, and the inclination of POW towards suicide is only one manifestation of this tradition. It is not the only one. A notebook of a commander captured at GUADALCANAL refers to an instance of another. This reads as follows:

"The Division Commander was in hospital, wounded, and because he blamed himself for the death of so many of the men under his command, he committed suicide with a pistol".

112. Specific instructions for the provision that is to be made to deal with the dead are contained in some official and other Japanese documents that have been captured.

113. A pamphlet issued to soldiers contains this:



"In this war, there will be much activity on the sea, and often after landing a small detachment may have to march deep into the enemy country. Be prepared to abandon your dead".

114. Another instruction states:

"Before leaving for the fighting line, or at the latest on board the ship, make the necessary will, and have your hair and nails cut, and be ready to die at any time and any place. It is best for all the soldiers of the unit to make a joint arrangement for leaving these things behind, so that each one may be personally prepared".

115. The above instruction to have the hair and nails cut in readiness for death is intended to provide some remains that can be burnt in the event of the body itself not being recoverable for burning, so that some human ashes can be sent back to Japan for enshrinement. POW have also stated that sometimes a limb or other part of a dead soldier is burnt instead of the whole body, so as to facilitate the task of collecting ashes and sending the ashes to Japan.

116. One POW said that he, together with some other men, had returned to Japan to deliver to relatives the ashes of some 1500 troops killed in the Philippines; he himself being responsible for the ashes of 121 soldiers. The ashes were contained in individual boxes, each marked with the name of the deceased and the place of death.

117. Deceased warriors are enshrined at the YASUKUNI Shrine. Some so enshrined appear to have caused some embarrassment by later reappearing alive. This is dealt with in an instruction which refers to the so-called dead in the China Campaign, who appeared on the register for enshrinement submitted by each TAI, but later returned alive: "Even though not one point was left in doubt or any margin for error left" . . . "these persons", continues the instruction, "have been enshrined. Later on to find them living will bring about a retraction which will be absolutely impossible and lead to fearful results". Reports are, therefore, to be under the following classifications:

- (a) Conclusive deaths,
- (b) Confirmed deaths with tangible proof even though the corpse is not brought in,
- (c) Missing persons.

And, for the purpose of honours and awards, the instruction provides that even suicide cases are to be reported where meritorious services have been rendered.

118. A loose leaf from a notebook contains this:

"To the enemy officer:  
I am sorry to trouble you, but I beg you to bury my body, placing the head towards the north-west.  
I fought bravely till the last. The situation was unfavourable to us.  
My end has come".

#### ATTITUDE TOWARDS CAPTURE:

##### Official Attitude:

119. Mr. Grew gives the official attitude towards capture in an incident which he narrates:

"Last year, when our Country and Japan were still at peace, I received from the Chinese Government the name of a Japanese who had been taken prisoner in China and who wished his family at home in Japan to know that he was alive and well. I communicated the information to the Government in Tokyo and received, in due course, the official reply. It was brief and to the point. The Japanese Government was not interested in receiving such information. So far as they, the Government, were concerned, and also so far as his own family was concerned, that man was



officially dead. Were he to be recognised as a prisoner of war, shame would be brought upon not only his own family, but also his Government and his nation. "Victory or Death" is no mere slogan for these soldiers. It is a plain, matter of fact description of the military policy that controls their forces, from the highest generals to the newest recruit. The man who allows himself to be captured has disgraced himself and his country."

120. The following sentence from a volume issued in December 1941, by the Japanese Inspector General of Military Aviation under the title "Rule of Conduct for Aircrews", confirms this attitude:

"When flight becomes impossible over enemy territory and you are unable to return to our own lines, action must be taken to prevent documents, etc. from falling into the enemy's hands, and you must courageously link your fate with that of your aircraft. Under no circumstances should you cling to life by accepting defeat, nor should you forget the dignity of our Imperial forces to the extent of enduring the disgrace of being taken prisoner".

121. Captured documents contain similar statements. A naval document states specifically as follows:

"It is necessary that training be given in the doctrine of committing suicide without hesitation in circumstances such as when, after the ship has been sunk and one is adrift, he is unfortunately sighted and about to be taken prisoner by enemy craft".

122. Another document contained this:

"The Commander's Orders were as follows:

"I order the three of you to be messengers unto death. Under the leadership of 1st Class Stoker MAKIYA, you must all unite in accomplishing your mission. If, upon arrival at BUNA, the Detachment is not there, go to the Commander of the Roadstead and you will receive his help. Should you encounter the enemy on the way, fight to a finish, burn these papers, and each one of you use your final bullet to take your own life rather than become prisoners".

123. There is also abundant evidence that, generally speaking, Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen act in accordance with these doctrines. Reports of nearly every engagement contain vivid and well-authenticated accounts of Japanese soldiers fighting to the death of the last man long after it must have been quite evident to them that their position was utterly hopeless and that there was neither chance of relief or evacuation. Many corpses have also been found, giving unmistakable evidence of self-destruction by hand grenades held to the chest and exploded, while eye-witnesses have repeatedly reported how, when cornered, Japanese soldiers have shot themselves through the mouth. Negative evidence pointing towards the same thing is to be found in the fact that Japanese fighter pilots do not as a rule carry parachutes on operational flights and that up to the present, as far as is known, fewer than 500 Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen have been captured in all theatres since the war against Japan began. A number of Army labourers (mostly Koreans) have been captured, but they are not regular service personnel.

124. If escape or evacuation had always been possible, the small numbers of prisoners might not be significant. The most serious reverses which the Japanese have suffered, however, have been on islands and in NEW GUINEA, where neither was possible without leaving considerable numbers of men behind, mostly in small groups, which, for that very reason, might have been expected to give themselves up, if their spirit had been different.

125. Captured documents contribute their evidence to the same thing. From ATTU, for instance, comes this diary entry:

"29th May 1943 - Today at 2000 o'clock we assembled in front of Headquarters. The field hospital took part, too. The last assault is to be carried out. All the patients in the hospital were made to admit to



ide. Only 33 years of living - and I am to die here, I have no regrets. I am grateful that I have kept the peace in my soul which ..... (TH: Jesus Christ?) bestowed upon me. At 1800 took care of all the patients with hand grenades. Goodbye TAEKO, my beloved wife who loved me to the last. Until we meet again, greet you God-speed. MISAKA, who just became 4 years old, will grow up unhindered. I feel sorry for you, TOKIKO, born February of this year and gone without seeing your father. Well, be good, MATSUE (brother), DOCHAN, SUKECHAN, MASACHAN, MITTICHAN, Goodbye. The number participating in this attack is a little over 1000; to take enemy artillery position. It seems that the enemy is expecting an all-out attack tomorrow".

126. A POW explained this order to commit suicide on the ground that the patients would be treated unmercifully by the U.S. Forces, if captured".

127. Another document captured in the South West Pacific contains the following:

"However, I regret that I lost my sword and that if a certain occasion arises I cannot commit harakiri".

128. Similarly a POW said that he overheard an officer, who had been engaged in operations at GUADALCANAL, tell the POW's Company that the Japanese had shot and killed all wounded Japanese troops that could not be evacuated.

129. Another POW who had never himself seen wounded soldiers, who could not be evacuated, being killed to prevent them being captured, said that such things must happen, in view of the regulations on the subject; while another described how an observer shot himself with his own pistol rather than be captured.

130. Security may be one reason why Japanese soldiers are not permitted to allow themselves to be taken prisoner. It is more than doubt, however, that this is the main or indeed anything more than a minor contributory reason, since the demands of security are largely met by the ignorance of anything outside their own particular work, in which Japanese service personnel seem as a matter of policy to be kept throughout their service. Nor would mere reasons of security have the emotional quality necessary to make such drastic doctrines prevail over the instinct of self-preservation, which there is no reason to assume is any weaker in the Japanese than in other people. There seems every reason to assume, therefore, that the motives and emotional sanctions involved are far more deeply rooted.

#### GENERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CAPTURE:

131. Of 79 PsOW questioned about the matter, all except two were either aware of the official attitude, or else regarded it as being so generally accepted by the Japanese people that it was part of their moral, if not legal, code.

132. A Corporal, captured on Unknown Island, who appears to have given the matter some thought, stated that from time immemorial Japanese people had had it ingrained into them that capture by the enemy was a disgrace and that a Japanese soldier should do away with himself rather than be taken prisoner. This feeling still possessed people and there had been no change, in spite of greatly altered conditions of warfare. Those classified as missing are considered dead after a lapse of three years. Should they then return for any reason whatever, special legislation must be enacted to deal with their status. This POW thought that regulations would be introduced to deal with such cases in the present conflict, but whether these would ameliorate penalties or increase them was a moot point. PsOW after return to Japan faced 20 years imprisonment under an Article of the Military Law. He had discussed this with another POW, who thought that a less drastic attitude would be adopted.

133. Another POW, a 2nd Lieut., said that he had been taught from a Manual of Military Law that Japanese soldiers taken prisoner would be shot on returning to Japan. In cases of extenuating circumstances, however, the sentence might be commuted to a maximum of 30 years imprisonment.

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134. Another POW said that while O.Rs. might be pardoned if taken prisoner, officers would not be.

135. Another POW thought that a distinction was drawn in Japan between genuine PsOW and deserters or traitors, specific punishment being provided for desertion but not for bona fide PsOW, who, he thought, could return to Japan after the war without let or hindrance so far as the Government were concerned. Whilst, however, there was no official or military stigma attached to capture, it was looked upon by one's family as a lasting disgrace, and this would in many cases prove the barrier to a POW's return. He thought that PsOW would be regarded as "missing" for three years and would then be presumed dead. When notified as "missing", their dependents would receive a solatium and further periodical allowances. If it should subsequently become known that a "missing" soldier was a POW, this would not affect the position. The Government would spare a soldier the disgrace of having his relatives know that he was a prisoner.

136. Another POW, a superior private, who knew what the general attitude towards capture was and was aware that Japanese soldiers were told that they must fight to the end, said that he himself thought this was unreasonable, as times had changed and war was not waged in the same manner as in former years. Life, he said, was precious, and when there was no object to be gained by further resistance his view was that he should surrender. He added that he was not alone in this opinion.

137. All the evidence, however, indicates that there cannot as yet be many who either share his view or are prepared to act on it if they do, though the fact that there are some, however few, indicates that the possibility of independent thought is not entirely extinct even among the Japanese rank and file.

138. Their ideas as to what would happen if it should become known in Japan that they were prisoners also varied considerably. Some thought that relatives would be punished or ostracised. A 2nd Lieut., captured in NEW GUINEA, was quite specific and said that his family would be disgraced and that his father, who was Chief of the Education Bureau at MAGOYA, would be forced to retire from office. All agreed that their capture brought dishonour on their country, disgrace on their name, and shame on their family.

139. One POW, a private, protested that although it had been no fault of his that he had been captured, since he was half dead at the time, people in Japan would nevertheless not understand why he had permitted himself to be taken. Another POW - a superior private - commented that though he personally felt no shame, the people in Japan, through age-old custom, regarded capture as shameful, and it was not to be expected that the opinion of a few PsOW could alter things.

140. Not unnaturally, those who thought that their capture would bring disgrace and possibly punishment to their families if the fact should become known, had no desire to write or to communicate in any way with them. One POW, who at first gave a name which was not his, later explained that he had done this because he was afraid lest his name might be dropped over RABOUL or other Japanese occupied areas, and feared the consequences to his relations which would follow.

141. Only three PsOW expressed a wish to write to their people. They apparently did not think that any harm would come to them as a result of their doing so. One of them, the superior private already quoted, who, though aware of the official view, regarded it as unreasonable, said that after having given the matter some thought, he could see no reason for hiding his capture from his own people, as they were given no orders to resist to the last, but were told that they would be evacuated, and since they were not evacuated, about which he was very bitter, he saw no reason why he should not let himself be captured.

#### ATTITUDE OF PsOW TOWARDS THEIR OWN FUTURE

142. The views of PsOW towards their own future, now that they had been captured, varied. Two PsOW expected to be executed by their captors, and were



surprised that they were not. This, however, is obviously no indication that the majority of Japanese Service personnel do not expect to be killed. The two PsOW, who thought they would be, were wounded when they were captured. One POW mentioned a fellow-prisoner in hospital at MORESBY, who was in terror of being shot, and stated that he had reasoned with him on the lines that prisoners in Japan had not been shot and that there was, therefore, no reason to expect that they would be.

143. Seven PsOW thought that they would be shot, either with or without court martial, if they should ever return to Japan. Three or four others thought they would be court-martialled, but were not sure what the sentence would be. Two commented pessimistically that "the Japanese are somewhat vindictive in such matters"; while one - a 2nd Lieutenant - explained more fully that, if a POW should return to Japan, he would be tried immediately by court martial, it being ingrained in Japanese officers that they should in no circumstances be taken prisoner. The Japanese as a race, he said, somewhat ruefully, were not well-educated and it would be beyond the mentality of a military court to judge a case of capture on its individual merits. It would blindly follow the custom of centuries and the inevitable verdict would be hanging.

144. One POW, whose statements contain clear evidence of the conflict within him between traditionalism and instincts of self-preservation, said that "nobody had given him instruction about self-destruction; it was his own belief that it was the best thing to do if captured. It was generally accepted by the Japanese people that if a soldier had a weapon it was better to shoot himself rather than become a prisoner. He did not wish to write to his family, for, to become a prisoner brought shame on one's family and Country. This attitude would probably not change after the war, even though there be a large number of Japanese prisoners. He considered himself still a soldier and if his Government ordered him to return after the war, he would do so; otherwise he would stay in Australia. He had given up hope of ever seeing his family again. When told that the Allied attitude was different, and that we hoped that our PsOW would return, he stated that there was no reason why they should kill themselves, as they were enjoying their stay in Japan. He wanted to return to Japan, although the circumstances of his return would not be very pleasant. Therefore, when the time arrived he would put up with whatever was destined.

145. One POW, already quoted, who thought his surrender was justified as no orders had been given not to do so, but on the contrary it had been stated that he would be evacuated, was very bitter over the fact that most of the officers evacuated first and left the rank and file to be evacuated later, with the result that when no ships came he and others with him were left to die or surrender. His attitude was that if on his return any question were raised as to the reason for his surrender, he would demand that the desertion of the soldiers by their commanding officers should first be investigated.

146. Another POW - a Corporal - expected to be court-martialled, but thought that unless it could be proved that he had divulged matters of military importance he would either be set free or serve a short sentence. Officers, on the other hand, might be executed.

147. Four or five PsOW said that, even if they were not punished, they could not return to their homes and families. One, a Cadet, explained that he could in no circumstances expect to return to his native place and that the best he could hope for was to be sent under some colonization scheme to some conquered territory. He based this on the fact that returned soldiers from the MANCHURIA Incident had been treated in this manner.

148. Another, who did not think that there was any law against his return to Japan, or which would punish him on his return, said that in all probability his parents and family would not agree to his return, as, whatever the law, they would regard his return as an everlasting disgrace. Yet another POW felt sure that, even if he could go back, it would be impossible for him to obtain employment in Japan.

149. Only one POW thought that there would be nothing against his returning home and resuming his pre-war vocation. One POW - A Sergeant - who was



wounded when captured, thought that, in view of the large numbers of killed and missing in this War, the Government would do something about the matter, and that a more enlightened view would be taken of the matter at the conclusion of the war.

150. Five PsOW preferred to take no chances and expressed a desire to stay in Australia. One of these, while nostalgically recalling his family life, thought it was better, having regard to the Japanese views about capture, to stay in Australia, where his experiences since capture had been "like a dream". He was a Corporal,

151. Another POW expected to be taken to HAWAII and shot. Instead of this he was placed in a hospital and treated with consideration and kindness. He said he would have died if he had been left unattended and would never forget kind treatment received. Once peace was declared, he would do everything possible to return in some manner all kindnesses shown to him. He was undecided as to what he would do after the war. Whether he could return to Japan or not would depend on attitude of Japanese Government. Had heard that death penalty or 20 years in jail was given to PsOW but was not sure. He would like to communicate with his family but did not wish to advise them of his present status.

152. A number of PsOW have expressed a desire, during the course of their interrogation, that they should either be killed or be allowed to commit suicide. It is a little doubtful how sincere some of these requests are; or, if sincere, how far they would be persisted in. Among wounded prisoners who had no opportunity of committing suicide, it is probable that a larger proportion would be prepared to press the matter to its conclusion than among those who could have committed suicide before capture but did not do so. There have been instances when prisoners made genuine attempts at suicide and at least one successful attempt has been reported. On the other hand, there have been a number of prisoners, who, though sincere in their attitude, were ready to accept circumstances which prevented them from carrying out their avowed desire, as the intervention of a fate they could not gainsay; while others would have ended their lives if the matter had been made an issue, but were content with a dutiful declaration which they were happy not to be compelled to carry into execution in order to save face.

153. One POW said that he had expected to be shot when captured. If that had been done he would have died as a warrior should. When he was not shot, he asked to be killed, and though that request was not granted and he had since been well-treated he adhered to his decision. He, however, took no steps to commit suicide.

154. Another POW said that he would have committed suicide rather than be captured, but for the fact that his pistol had become rusted through immersion in salt water. It was customary to commit suicide and he would take his life on his return to Japan, if he should be exchanged. He did not think he would be shot by the Military authorities, but he would shoot himself through the mouth, as Harakiri was too painful.

155. Yet another, who said that the men had been given orders to commit suicide rather than be taken prisoner, explained that he was ill and did not have the strength to kill himself with the hand grenade in his possession.

156. A fourth POW felt that, as it would be useless to return to Japan only to be ignominiously shot and as he was content in his own mind that no disgrace attached to his capture, he would regard it as a favour if the sentence could now be executed.

157. Two others expressed similar feelings; a seventh was content to commit suicide upon his release after the war; while an eighth philosophically reflected that, as he was alive, it was his duty to make the best of a bad situation.

158. From the above, it is clear that a sense of moral guilt is associated with capture and that this sense is for most PsOW more disturbing than any reasoned views about their future. The conflict between the emotional appeal of a hero's death and the preciousness of life is well shown by a verse written by a POW:



"My comrades are crossing the seas  
To the shrine of KUDAN (1),  
But I, like a caged bird,  
Cannot join them.

My comrades have been scattered by the winds,  
But they will bloom again as flowers of KUDAN<sup>(2)</sup>,  
My name was scattered too, (3)  
But alas! I shall not come to fruition.

For my Sovereign and my Country,  
My name was lost on the battlefield,  
But I cannot lose this five-foot body of mine.

The comrades I talked with yesterday  
Have become protective Gods of the Nation;  
I, alas, am not yet dead,  
And my carcass in enemy land still unburied".

- (1) KUDAN - YASUKUNI Shrine is on KUDAN Hill, TOKYO, where all dead warriors are enshrined.
- (2) Cherry blossoms symbolising the warrior.
- (3) Being presumed dead.

159. The whole concept of self-destruction upon capture, or disgrace, is, according to one POW, "Beyond explanation and incomprehensible to occidentals as is the whole spirit of BUSHIDO".

#### BEHAVIOR UNDER STRESS.

##### EFFECT OF BOMBING:

160. Some indication of the effect of bombing on Japanese troops in the NEW GUINEA area is given by some PsOW, who volunteered the following observations:

161. One POW, a Sgt., was very definite that the bombing which the Japanese had received at WAU had not lowered the morale of the troops. They simply laid flat on the ground and escaped injury. Another said that bombing did not disturb him but he did not like Allied 3" mortar fire, which was most accurate and effective.

162. These two, however, are the only statements recorded at this Headquarters suggesting a negative moral effect of bombing.

163. One POW said that a near panic ensued when the OIGAWA MARU, on which he was, was bombed on 3rd March 1943. As it was practically his baptism of fire under conditions which precluded counter-measures, his reactions were not pleasant.

164. A diary, recording the feelings of another soldier when he experienced his first bombing, is more restrained:

"..... dreadful bombings ....."

"Bombs exploded near us while we were hiding in the dense forest. How many times I have been prepared to die! This is the first time we have had such an experience. However, we are quite steady and our desire to overcome the enemy at all costs increases".

165. One diary, which probably belonged to a sailor, records the following:

"7th August 1942 - ... another air attack alarm caused frantic confusion".

166. A notebook of a probationary officer contains this entry:

"6th September 1942 - Enemy air attacks have struck terror into our hearts. The morale of ground troops is low".



167. Another diary says:

"27th December 1942 - RABAU.  
Every day we have air raids. During the day there are none, but always at night. It is becoming unbearable".

168. Another diary contains this:

"It is true that even the soldiers have in mind to flee as they watch enemy planes. The higher officers would flee before anybody else".

169. Yet another diary contains this:

"16th January ? - Bombed several times, but thanks to a miracle no damage was inflicted. However, mental shock was very great". (RABAU)

170. A further diary, captured in the SOLOMONS, has this entry:

"14th October ? - I could not sleep well last night because of the roaring of the guns. We dug a trench at the observation post and I wrote the diary in the trench. At 10.30 the friendly plane bombed an enemy position twice. In the afternoon I went up the hill and observed the enemy situation. The front line of the enemy is unknown. MITUYOSHI SUZUKI had diarrhoea. The soldiers are becoming ill from under-nourishment. It seems that the morale of the soldiers here is getting poor because of the continuous bombing. I slept at the observation post".

171. Another diary contains this:

"31st October ? - Before we were up, the enemy field mortars came and fired. The noise from the mortars and airplane motors makes bad hearing. I am feeling terribly. The soldiers are comparatively calm. Once we are bombarded intensively it makes one jittery. This may not be true of the soldiers as they are not cowards, but it is best not to overdo yourself when injured badly. However, there are many who do not care and they pitch in the battle with full spirit".

172. Another diary, written in 1942, records as follows:

"20th December - At dawn, enemy bombed the hell out of us. Observe only the sky, with bitter regrettable tears rolling down. Sup. Pvt. MIYA killed by mortar fire. Fierce enemy firing coming! AOSHIMA BUNTAI is in danger. Our No. 2 BUNTAI preparation finished for charge with Pl leader. Filled my stomach with dried bread and waited for my end to come. Oh! Remaining comrades, I shall depend on you for my revenge. Enemy firing ceased. Unable to carry out the charge.  
21st December - News of reinforcements coming on 20th is unfounded. Bombing of enemy near.  
Killed Sup. Pvt. TSUTSUI, wounded Opl. HATTORI, HASEGAWA, TAJI. Oh! friendly troops, are you going to let us die like rats in a hole? Sgt. OGAWA reported that reinforcements are coming. Under these circumstances, one cannot accept such reports except as a temporary relief to one's feelings, or as yet another false rumour. Enemy bombing fiercely and our end is coming nearer and nearer. To avoid enemy artillery, built trenches. Three men transferred to No. 2 BUNTAI.  
22nd December - Enemy firing, silent in the morning. No thought of returning home alive. Want to die like a soldier and go to YASUKUNI Shrine. Enemy firing became fierce. Writing in this diary word-by-word, not knowing when a shell may strike and I will be killed. Thirty-five days since we started to fight.  
1730 hrs. Artillery firing again; shells dropping all around the trenches. Full moon shining through the trees in the jungle, hearing the cries of the birds and insects, the breeze blowing gently and peacefully. We lack fuel for cooking. Gathered twigs and built a fire in the trenches to avoid detection by the enemy.  
Good news - friendly troops are near in the rear and friendly planes will fly tomorrow. How far is this true and how far an unfounded rumour? Whatever it is, it is happy news".



173. Finally, one diarist writes:

"14th December 1942 -- With each bomb dropped, I thought it was the last. Even if it is said that death should not be feared, at this moment, being human, I was very much afraid".

EFFECT OF OTHER WEAPONS:

174. There is very little evidence of the moral effect of shelling. The only POW who is known at this Headquarters to have referred to this said that he was afraid for the first few days but got over it. His worst experience was the bursting of shells above him. He did not mind rifle fire.

175. Other than the above, there is no recorded evidence at this Headquarters of the indirect effects of rifle fire on Japanese soldiers. Nor has any evidence been noted from captured documents or POW interrogation reports to suggest that the Japanese are exceptionally affected by the noise of explosions or battle. Some have complained of being kept awake at night by the unusual sounds of the wild life of the NEW GUINEA jungle, but that is an experience which is not peculiar to them, and from which any isolated parties not accustomed to life in a tropical jungle might suffer.

EFFECT OF HARDSHIPS:

176. There is some evidence from enemy sources of the hardships and hunger from which the Japanese have suffered, both in the NEW GUINEA and SOLOMONS campaigns.

177. One POW -- a leading private captured in NEW GUINEA in January 1943 -- said:

"Conditions towards end of campaign in NEW GUINEA were indescribable. There was seldom a let up day or night in bombing, which caused numerous casualties. Food was seldom seen and wounded were obliged to suffer as there were no means either to attend to or evacuate them. To add to confusion existing at time of retreat, it rained incessantly, making conditions almost unbearable. There were constant rumours of reliefs and supplies but none ever came. He did not know where these rumours started but believed that they were intended to bolster morale. He heard of SOLOMONS campaign and troops were definitely told that as soon as operations there were over, all Japanese planes and troops would be sent to NEW GUINEA to relieve them. In PW's opinion, Japanese troops had never been in such dire straits as those in NEW GUINEA. Operations at HONGKONG and PHILIPPINE Islands bore no comparison with hardships of NEW GUINEA. The hardships endured in transporting supplies were indescribable. Although a member of ASC, PW was made to shoulder a rifle for about 10 days, passing it over to another man when he became too weak to carry it".

178. There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of this account. On the contrary, all the evidence from Allied sources confirms these conditions and the state in which some prisoners were captured bears ample testimony to the hardships and hunger they had to endure.

179. One diary contains this:

"27th November 1942 -- The condition of South Sea Detachment is beyond description. It is worse than you think. In GIRUWA area there are Engineer Unit, line of communication, hospital, but there is no fighting power. Patients in hospital have no food to eat. Condition is so bad that I have no words to describe it".



180. Another diary contained this:

"5th February 1943 - It has been about a month since I landed at NEW GUINEA and lived in the jungle. The noise of aeroplanes is frightful. Eleven months of life in the field has been more distressing than I ever dreamt of.

9th February 1943 - WO TAZAKI of No. 11 Coy arrived, and we heard astonishing news about the fighting conditions at MUBO. I got disgusted with army life".

181. Another diary, belonging to an acting Company Commander, contains the following:

"8th October 1942 - Spent all day gathering Australian rice. I was amazed at the various ways one is able to prepare tainted rice. Perhaps neither the Army nor the regiment knows of our condition here. Two-thirds of the men are suffering from beriberi. Their visual powers and physical strength are weakened. Food is scarce, vegetables unprocurable. Our life here is worse than a beggar's. Wish the people back home could see our condition".

182. A Japanese broadcast in English from BATAVIA on 4th March 1943 suggests that these conditions have been made known in Japan. In view of the purpose which it was intended to achieve, this broadcast doubtless did not minimise the matter. It is nevertheless probably substantially true, though perhaps a little coloured. The broadcast said:

"An article in the Nippon Times gives a true picture of the determination of Nippon. It quotes a letter written by an officer in NEW GUINEA. He writes: "It rains every day. It is difficult to advance. Bullets rain down at the rate of 300 a minute. We are suffering from hunger. Some of the men carry ..... trees with them, so that they can eat bamboo shoots. Enemy fire is so relentless that even trees offer no shelter. Enemy planes fly so low that they seem to hang from the tree tops. Each day our numbers grow less. But we will never give in". This story shows Australia what must be expected when the Nippon offensive comes".

183. If the article in fact did appear in the Nippon Times, this account is not only of interest for the spirit of the writer of the letter which it shows, but is also remarkable for the fact that the Japanese press must have regarded it as a stimulant to Japanese morale, rather than as an anodyne.

184. A notebook captured at GUADALCANAL confirms the hardships there:

"11th November 1942 - At GUADALCANAL 5000 men have been killed or wounded or have died from starvation".

185. There is little evidence as yet that these hardships have anywhere lowered morale to any appreciable extent. One POW, however, gave the following reason for his capture: He was wounded and asked one of the NCOs. if he could go back for medical aid but was flatly refused and advised to go forward. The same order was given by the officer in charge. He finally left without orders in search of medical aid and finally fell into our hands. He felt so strongly about these things that he stated that he never wanted to return to Japan again. He claimed that the Army was no good and expressed the hope that the United States would soon win the war.

#### EFFECT OF HUNGER:

186. One diary records the following:

"31st December 1942 - Received 1 GO and 5 SHAKU of rice. I am tired of NEW GUINEA. I think only of home. I wish I could eat a belly-ful. I have hardly eaten for 50 days. I am bony and skinny. I walk with faltering steps. I want to see my children.  
1st January 1943 - Greeted the New Year, 1943.  
This New Year is sad and pitiful. Received 2 GO of rice. Enemy bombing and trench mortars are giving our troops a punishment.



3rd January 1943 - Staggeringly, I went to GIRUWA for ration. Dead bodies of our troops were lying around the hospital, so I could not even set my foot down".

187. A message book records:

"10th April 1943 - The day's ration of rice is less than 4 GO; we are just moaning from empty stomachs, but I have to continue to state that the ration should be sufficient. Our morale is very low".

188. On the other hand, the following extract from a letter written in hospital shows little effect of hunger. The letter is dated 5th December 1942:

"I have not eaten properly since the 24th of November; many days I have had nothing to eat at all. From tonight on indefinitely, again without expecting to return alive, I am going out resolutely to the front line. Even though I am holding my rifle with a right arm that doesn't move easily, etc., now is the time for me to dominate a military contest. I must serve as long as I can move at all".

189. A staff diary belonging to a 2nd Lieut, records in 1942 as follows:

"27th November - Our morale is better after being supplied with food".

190. The shortage of food has led the Japanese to strange repasts, including cannibalism, rather than giving in.

191. One interrogation report says that the POW confirmed reports that troops without food have at times subsisted on human flesh, ant nests, lizards, snakes, etc. He added, however, that cannibalistic tendencies were always hidden from the officers and that the officers only knew of such things from reports.

192. Another POW admitted that he had spoken with participants in cannibalism among Japanese troops in NEW GUINEA. He stated that these individuals admitted having eaten flesh from Japanese as well as Australian corpses. PW claimed that, although he himself had eaten horse flesh, he had never participated in, nor actually witnessed, cannibalism. He further stated that those who admitted to him that they participated in cannibalism exhibited extreme and pitiful revulsion of feeling when they realised the full significance of their act.

193. He stated that Japanese troops had been under such conditions that they were not normal human beings at the time when the cannibalism took place. These conditions were described by POW as continuous standing in swamp water up to the armpits, suffering from malaria with 40 degrees centigrade of fever, and such lack of food - particularly Vitamin B - as to cause TORI ME (Nyctalopia or Night Blindness). He stated that in this condition troops were unable to see the plainest objects except in broad daylight. They were also deaf and reduced to such a state of delirium that their only reaction was to discharge their rifles in the general direction of any sound they might hear.

194. PW requested that this matter might be kept confidential on the ground that if such a report ever reached the Japanese people it would be received with horror. PW exhibited genuine distress during the discussion.

195. Another POW said that he had heard at RABAU that a Company Commander in NEW GUINEA had drawn his sword, cut up a dead body, and cooked the meat and ate it. He added that he himself had been so thirsty and hungry that if one of his companions had died he would have cooked and eaten him.

196. Another POW said that he had eaten human flesh once, and that he knew of a man who had been reduced to such starvation that he had killed a sick friend and eaten him.

197. There is also evidence from captured documents. One diary, belonging to an acting Company Commander, stated:



"19th October, Monday.

Because of food shortage, some companies have begun eating human flesh. (Australian soldiers.) The taste is said to be good. We are looking for anything edible and are now eating grass, leaves and the pith of the Tako tree. These don't agree with us but that cannot be helped.

.....

"4th November - When we ran short of rations we devoured our own kind to stave off starvation".

198. Another diary contained this:

"10th January 1943 - Ate human meat for the first time. It tastes comparatively good".

EFFECT OF REVERSES AND BAD NEWS:

199. There is not much evidence from POW interrogation reports or captured documents of the effect of reverses and bad news on Japanese morale. What there is, however, all suggests a depressing effect.

200. One diary contained this:

"29th October 1942 - Heard that our forces were completely wiped out in the SOLOMONS. Maybe this war is not so easy after all".

201. Another diary has this entry:

"2nd January 1943. Tried to contact for four days in vain. We are all in low spirits. Messages are all tragic ones. Heard of the annihilation of our troops at BUNA".

202. A third diary contained this entry:

"15th January 1943 - Day after day is spent in idleness. The tension caused by news from GUADALCANAL ISLAND is paralysing. Received a call from Lieut. of No. 3 SeP this evening. Think only of the war. I am spending my day in complete bewilderment. Our victory depends on sacrifice" (TN: sentence illegible)

203. A POW said that prior to leaving RABAU the troops had heard of defeats sustained by the Japanese in NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS, and as a result they were not too pleased at being sent to the NEW GUINEA area. He thought the morale of the troops was not high as they all realised the difficult situation.

204. Another POW said that pilots and crews had become afraid of being sent to GUADALCANAL because of the losses sustained.

205. Two diary entries are much more laconic; one written by a private says:

"It is regrettable that in NEW GUINEA and GUADALCANAL the American Air Force has definite superiority over us".

206. The other, referring to NEW GUINEA and GUADALCANAL, says:

"Heard 1500 died in the campaign. The reason for this defeat is that we did not hold the air superiority. Our damage is great in today's enemy air raid".

207. The above is the only direct evidence from enemy sources, at this Headquarters, of the effect of reverses and bad news. There is, however, some indirect evidence in diary entries and the statements of POWs. Some of these indicate that bad news is suppressed, thereby suggesting that those who suppressed it, at all events, did not think that it would be stimulating to morale.

208. One diary entry, written in 1942, said:



"27th November . . . Heard that Detachment Commander and Staff had been drowned in KUMUSI River. Because of the possible effect on the Army this is to be kept a strict secret".

209. Another diary, written in 1942, contained this entry:

"1st July - Surprised to see 2nd class cruiser MOGAMI with her front half cut off. This is kept secret from our home people".

210. A POW said that there was one battle in which Japan was supposed to have caused heavy damage to Allied aircraft carriers and warships, but unfortunately very few of Japan's ships returned safely. The crews that came back were kept from the public in such a way that the public was not aware of what happened. Even other sailors were ignorant of the outcome of the battle. That, he commented, was how military matters were kept secret.

211. Another said that he had heard TOKYO and SINGAPORE news broadcasts in other theatres before he came to NEW GUINEA, and was of the opinion that they were inaccurate in that they did not reveal the whole story. He did not think the disastrous results of the NEW GUINEA campaign would be released to the public.

212. Another said that he did not know whether or not Japanese losses in NEW GUINEA had been announced by TOKYO radio. It was possible that bad news was held back, but the time would come when it would have to be released. The civilian population would not be pleased when they found that news had been withheld.

213. Six other PsOW thought that bad news was generally withheld, but one thought that news of heavy casualties would always be made public, but not until three to six months later.

214. Eight PsOW went further, and thought that Japanese war news was mostly "propaganda" or "differed considerably from the real thing", and that much unreliable information and propaganda was published. One said that the press and radio in Japan gave out little news as regards losses and he did not believe the figures which had been given out, which he thought too small. Losses in planes were particularly low, and the majority had been termed "self-destruction". PW thought that radio accounts of war differed very greatly from actual conditions. The news in Japan claimed success after success, whereas he himself knew that the NEW GUINEA campaign, if not others, had been a miserable failure. He agreed that the Japanese people were misled by broadcasts.

215. On the other hand, four thought that the Japanese news contained facts only, and was for the most part accurate.

216. Another drew a distinction between news received by the troops from Headquarters and news received over the radio; the former, he thought, was reliable but not the latter, for the reason that they were too close to the realities of the war to make any serious departures from accuracy credible.

217. The only evidence that bad news might be a stimulant to morale refers to the effects of the raid on TOKYO on 18th April 1942. One POW referred to this and thought that it would give an extra stimulus to the war effort. He had been in Japan in June following the raid and understood that there had been little other than temporary excitement and apprehension.

#### EFFECT OF ALLIED PROPAGANDA:

218. Allied propaganda has taken three forms: General propaganda over the radio, direct loudspeaker appeals to surrender addressed to the troops, and propaganda leaflets and invitations to surrender dropped behind enemy lines. There is some evidence from PsOW and captured documents of the effects of each of these on the Japanese.

#### Broadcasts:

219. One superior private said that officers and all ranks at RABAU were

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permitted to listen in to the Japanese broadcasts from Australia and U.S.A., and that it was by a fluke that they found out that Australia was broadcasting in Japanese. The Japanese troops referred to the broadcasts as "demagogism" but nevertheless listened to them.

220. Another interrogation report from India states that the POW had occasionally listened to the Japanese programme while at TOUNGOO, but that later orders were issued forbidding listening in to these particular broadcasts.

221. These are the only two references from captured sources to Allied broadcasts noted at this Headquarters.

#### Loud Speaker Appeals:

222. Twelve PsOW said that they had heard the loud-speaker appeals to surrender and four others said that, although they had not themselves heard them, they had heard of them.

223. There is little doubt that the twelve who heard them, if not the other four, were influenced in their decision to surrender by the loud-speakers. Seven frankly admitted this, while one POW captured at CADALCANAL said that the loud-speakers had a very noticeable effect on the morale of his unit. Several men killed themselves, while others went out of their minds. Although the rest of the men did not outwardly show that they were effected he said that it was clear that they all knew that their position was hopeless.

224. A diary contained this entry:

"16th January 1943 - I heard one of the enemy talking busily in Japanese over a loud-speaker. He was probably telling us to come out. What fools the enemy are. The Japanese Army will stick it out to the end. This position must be defended with our lives. There was no artillery shelling because of the broadcast. The enemy is broadcasting something vigorously at a distance. It will probably have no effect at all.

"17th January 1943 - According to the enemy broadcast, today they are going to attack our positions. However, we have no fear. I went to the Bn. HQ. in the morning and saw enemy propaganda sheets which were found in 1st Lt. KASAHARA's area. The writing was very poor".

#### Leaflets:

225. Some 17 PsOW admitted that they had seen and read Allied propaganda leaflets dropped behind their lines, while one said he had heard of them but had not himself read them. In addition, there are seven references to the leaflets in captured documents.

226. Of the 17 PsOW, seven suggested that they had no effect; eight agreed that they had been influenced by them, and 2 expressed no opinion as to their effect either on themselves or on others. Having regard, however, to the very small number of PsOW captured, the fact that as many as 17, representing possibly 5% of the total number of prisoners captured should admit that they had read the leaflets, in itself suggests that the Japanese are not impervious to their effect.

227. Of those who said the effect of the leaflets was negative, one said that there were no restrictions on their reading them and that the comments of his shipmates on them were jocular. He, however, thought that they would produce some effect later, when a number of his countrymen would be in the Services who, he knew, would not be there of their own choice. Another said that his platoon leader read out one of the leaflets to the men on parade and that no comment or discussion about them took place. They were not forbidden to read them and they were not told that the contents were untrue. Yet another thought the leaflets would achieve nothing unless the troops were being overcome with hunger or sickness, when a number might surrender as a result.



228. Of those PsOW who admitted that they had been influenced by the leaflets, one said that due to the futility of the situation, and lack of leadership displayed by his superior officers, he decided to take the promise of good treatment contained in the leaflets, and gave himself up.

229. Another said that he had kept a leaflet by him for some time, thinking it might be useful. Yet another said that the leaflets were the subject of jokes; one man proposing that they make an excursion one day and all surrender together; but that such joking was discouraged and that it was then determined that they should fight to a finish. Nevertheless, feeling that the situation was hopeless, he surrendered. Yet another said that possession and discussion of the leaflets was forbidden; while another added that the military police were on the lookout and destroyed the leaflets whenever they found them. Yet another said that as they were constantly being bombed and had had no food for days, the offer of security and food contained in the leaflets was very tempting, but he criticised the leaflets for not stating where he should come over!

230. Five of the seven references to the leaflets in captured documents are purely objective statements of fact, noting that the leaflets were dropped, and in some cases briefly indicating what they contained without any comment. Two, however, are less objective. One said as follows:

"15th December 1942 - .... At 1200 hours, planes with white and blue circles again observed our positions and dropped leaflets. I do not know what they have to say. Such impertinence! If and when our infantry arrives we will annihilate the enemy".

231. And the other contained this:

"23rd March 1943 - Enemy planes attacked KOKOPO aerodrome, damaged 8 planes and destroyed 2. They also dropped pictorial propaganda leaflets saying, it doesn't matter what our navy does, it won't do any good. It was rather something to be concerned about".

#### ATROCITIES.

##### IN THEORY:

232. A document entitled "Message to the Warriors in the South Seas", issued by Major General HORII on the 15th November 1941 - i.e. before the commencement of the war - explains "the purpose of the forthcoming campaign", and lays down a number of principles, including the following:

"1. Do not wantonly kill or injure the civilian population.

In battle, we must overwhelm and destroy the enemy with courage and determination. However, to kill or wound in the excitement of the moment, those who have thrown down their arms and surrendered is not in accordance with the spirit of our BUSHIDO. In particular, the natives are those whom we must lead in the future, in order to rebuild East Asia. Wantonly to kill or injure unresisting natives is to mar the honour of the Imperial Forces, and is moreover an unworthy act, contrary to our mission. However, needless to say, you must not be deceived by the enemy through misplaced compassion. There should not be one single man among our warriors in the South Seas to stray from the path of loyalty.

2. On no account are looting and outrages upon women permitted.

Although such occurrences have been rare, it is deplorable that, having regard to the honour of the Imperial Forces, men in the flush of victory should wantonly break into houses, and destroy or loot property. In extreme cases, there have even been vicious men who have outraged women. Whether the victims be whites or natives, and whatever may be the cause, this is something which will on no account be permitted in the South Seas Detached Force. Our Detached Force shall go forward, strictly



maintaining military discipline and respecting public morals in every way, and bearing in mind the Emperor's desire that the Imperial favour be proclaimed far and wide, every soldier, tempering sternness with mercy, shall strive to make it manifest. Even the sullen population - the women - all must be inspired with the courtesy of our South Seas warriors."

233. These instructions, coming from a lofty level, are reasonable enough. They, however, do not stand alone, but before examining the less lofty language used by lesser lights and the evidence of Japanese behavior, it is necessary to refer to the statements of an airman POW who said that during the course of their training as pilots they were taught to respect all Red Cross establishments. Of course, there had been cases where Red Cross ships and Hospitals had been attacked, but this was not deliberate. It may have been done because they suspected the presence of Military targets close to such Red Cross Hospitals or Ships; in such cases they would not go out for the hospitals or ships, but if they were hit during the course of their attack it could not be helped. They usually tried to avoid damaging such establishments, but sometimes this was unavoidable; or even due to enemy interception, bombs had been dropped in the target area but had gone wide of their mark and caused damage to Red Cross establishments. Deliberate bombing of Red Cross establishments was never encouraged in the Japanese Air Force. If the use of the Red Cross is abused, or even suspected of being abused, such incidents may occur. In such cases pilots use their own judgment, and are never commanded to bomb hospitals or hospital ships.

234. Sterner language was used in a news commentary in an English broadcast from TOKYO on 8th April 1943, which concluded as follows:

"In conclusion, a warning to U.S. pilots who still want to attack Japan. Do you know that when your plane is burning and you bail out, just when your parachute opens, you come into range of Japanese guns .... Remember that a decree was issued that enemy pilots raiding Japanese territory, who commit cruel actions against the population, will be sentenced to death in accordance with martial law".

235. The instruction to "destroy the enemy by dawn, kicking, scattering, stabbing and killing them" has already been quoted in the previous section.

236. The same general attitude is shown in a field instruction as to the manner in which Japanese guards should treat prisoners of war:

"Methods of directing the work of prisoners of war must be made still more strict. It is necessary that subordinates be trained so that in the future they will be capable of dominating white men and putting them to work. At every turn we see men displaying an attitude of diffidence in directing prisoners, as though the latter were on an equal footing with themselves - these men do not know themselves.

You must have sufficient self-respect to place yourselves on a higher level and use them like CANTON coolies. In giving orders, use bugles, whistles, or Japanese words of command, and make them move smartly. Those who do not comply must be dealt with rigorously and such measures taken to make them do exactly as the Japanese Army wishes.

There are some BUTAI, which, out of a feeling of compassion for the prisoners, give them too much rest, or start late for the place of work. Why should we waste compassion on a crafty enemy? Such cases are a manifestation of the mistaken ideas of those who direct and supervise prisoners and a weakness of will which shirks trouble. These men should be made to realise the feelings of their dead comrades and reflect seriously on themselves".

#### IN PRACTICE:

237. There can now be little doubt of the measures that the Japanese are prepared to take in order to make prisoners of war do exactly as the Japanese Army wishes. The evidence of atrocities from HONGKONG, NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMONS is conclusive.

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238. The Foreign Secretary (Mr. EDEN) said the following in the House of Commons on 10th March 1942:

"His Majesty's Government have been unwilling to publish any accounts of Japanese atrocities at HONGKONG until these had been confirmed beyond any possibility of doubt. Unfortunately, there is no longer room for doubt. His Majesty's Government are now in possession of statements by reliable eye-witnesses who succeeded in escaping from HONGKONG. Their testimony establishes the fact that the Japanese army at HONGKONG perpetrated against their helpless military prisoners and the civil population without distinction of race or colour, the same kind of barbarities which aroused the horror of the civilised world at the time of the NANKING massacre of 1937.

It is known that 50 officers and men of the British Army were bound hand and foot and then bayoneted to death. It is known that 10 days after the capitulation, wounded were still being collected from the hills and the Japanese were refusing permission to bury the dead. It is known that women, both Asiatic and European, were raped and murdered and that one entire Chinese district was declared a brothel, regardless of the status of the inhabitants. All the survivors of the garrison, including Indians, Chinese and Portuguese, have been herded into a camp consisting of wrecked huts without doors, windows, light or sanitation. By the end of January, 150 cases of dysentery had occurred in the camp, but no drugs or medical facilities were supplied. The dead had to be buried in a corner of the camp. The Japanese guards are utterly callous and the repeated requests of General MAIBY, the General Officer Commanding, for an interview with the Japanese commander have been curtly refused. This presumably means that the Japanese high command have connived at the conduct of their forces".

239. That was at HONGKONG.

240. In NEW GUINEA, two Australian soldiers were found dead on the 4th October 1942 - one decapitated and the other tied to a tree and bayoneted to death.

241. The above evidence is from Allied sources. The evidence from Japanese sources available at this Headquarters is no less conclusive, and is as follows:

242. The official Japanese attitude is indicated by the following:

243. A Japanese intelligence report, issued by the Western Garrison HQ in MALAYA on 8th March 1942 and captured at GIRUWA in NEW GUINEA on 23rd January 1943 contains a table entitled "No. 1 chart showing results of general round-up in the State of SELANGOR, 6th March". This table shows by categories the numbers of persons rounded up by various patrol detachments and the numbers of each category executed. It is here reproduced in condensed form, in order to show by the categories the reasons for the executions.



	Total	Persons Executed
Persons opposing Japanese troops	14	14
Suspected spies and owners of weapons and subversive literature	53	22
Plotting to escape	465	30
Possessors of stolen goods	8	3
Communist Party members and raiders	157	12
Possessors of Chinese flags, anti-Japanese photos, pro-British	416	46
Hotel boarders and dependents	83	25
Teachers	5	5
Confirmed enemy sympathizers in peace restoration societies	3	3
Possessors of enemy cash and securities	38	3
Other suspects	567	84 (including gangsters)
Total	1813	237

244. The evidence from PsOW and captured documents of actual commissions of atrocities and of the attitude of those who witnessed them, is as follows:

245. One POW, captured in GUADALCANAL, stated with reference to the operations in TIMOR that the Japanese did not take many prisoners there. This, he thought, was due to the fact that some of the earlier prisoners who were captured had been struck with bayonets in order to obtain information from them. Some of these, he thought, had escaped and had described what had happened to other Australian troops.

246. The evidence from captured documents, chronologically arranged, is as follows:

247. On 26th July 1942, a NEW GUINEA native was executed. This is referred to in a notebook captured at MILNE BAY:



"Sunday 26th July 1942.

This morning at 7.00 o'clock a black prisoner who resisted the Imperial Army by acting as a spy, was killed by bayonetting. After gathering all the blacks in the neighbourhood and informing them of the death sentence, in a manner which they could understand, they were told that such incidents must not recur. I went along to have a look, with the Acting Company Commander and the Commander of No. 5 Platoon. (Impressions: The natives are no good, even on the point of death - squirm and cry and are an unpleasant sight. On similar occasions, the Chinese are quite tranquil, since they believe that they will be reborn immediately)".

248. The same occurrence is referred to in another notebook, as follows:

"July 26th.

Today is the day of execution of a KANAKA captive, who had insulted our dead soldiers.

Left at 7.00 a.m. as the member of the detail to the Eastern seashore. Numerous natives were gathered. Sentence was passed and he was to be stabbed to death. Unlike Japanese, however, he was crying. He assisted in the wireless and showed a certain amount of intelligence, but in his final moment was hopeless".

249. On the 13th or 14th August 1942, an atrocity occurred near BUNA, NEW GUINEA, of which there is a good deal of evidence from captured documents.

250. A diary belonging to a 1st class seaman contained the following reference:

"13th August 1942 - Natives brought in British prisoners - five men, three women and one child. They were lodged in one room".

"14th August 1942 - Beginning at about 8 o'clock some of the nine prisoners were beheaded and the others shot to death".

251. Another diary, belonging to a Petty Officer, records:

"12th August 1942 - Natives brought in nine Britishers (men and women).

"13th August 1942 - Yesterday's 9 Britishers were shot today".

252. Another diary refers to this in the following terms:

"13th August 1942 - 6 white men, 3 Australians (5 men, 3 women and 1 child) taken prisoners.

"14th August 1942 - Disposal of prisoners at 0830".

253. Yet another diary contains this reference:

"14th August 1942 - Arrived BUNA by MLC. I heard that three American men, 3 women, and 1 child had been shot to death - in the morning".

254. A fifth reference also in a diary is as follows:

"20th August 1942 - The other day, nine enemy prisoners (four men, four women and one child) because . . . (part of page torn and missing) malignant enemies were summarily shot to death".

255. A more detailed account is contained in a notebook, as follows:

"I heard that when BUNA was occupied, the TSUKIOKA BUTAI captured six or seven Australian men and women who had escaped into the jungle, made them kneel on the beach and beheaded them one by one. In the case of one of them - a girl of 16 - they bungled the cutting and held her down, screaming and crying out, while they cut off her head. The soldier who told me this said the sight was more than he could stand. I am told that they threw the heads and bodies into the sea".

256. A POW, captured in NEW GUINEA, who had not himself witnessed the executions but had heard details of them a couple of days later, said that there were four men, four women and a child of about 7 - he thought a boy. The



mother of the child was about 25. He did not think the men were soldiers. Two of them were about 30. He had heard that the party had been kept overnight in what used to be a garage and were executed the next morning. No order was given that the Japanese soldiers at BUNA should witness the execution. Attendance was voluntary. Some attended, others remained in their billets. Spectators were fallen in to witness the execution. The captives were made to kneel down by the grave and were killed one by one, not all together. The mother and child were the last to be killed. The mother was holding the child, who was crying, in her arms, when she was shot. The child was then also shot. The other captives were stabbed with bayonets.

257. This POW said he and his friends were ashamed of the incident. He thought such treatment very brutal and improper. The child, in particular, was pitiful. He thought it "a little cruel" on the part of the Bn Cdr.

258. It is almost certain that the people who were executed were the Missionary's household at BUNA, who had refused to leave when the Japanese approached.

259. On 28th August 1942, an Australian officer was captured in the BUNA area. He also was executed. There are two references to this in captured documents:

260. One diary contains this entry:

"28th August 1942 (BUNA) 1804 hours - Captured one Australian officer and killed him".

261. Another diary states:

"28th August - Captured one Australian officer. Decapitated him".

262. On the 20th September 1942, another incident seems to have occurred. A captured diary refers to this in the following terms. The incident referred to appears to have taken place at GIRUWA in NEW GUINEA.

"20th September 1942 - The death sentence was passed by the TAI Comdr on a KOREAN labourer, but an apology for him was made by the group-leader, ZENNAN. However, the TAI commander then ordered that this KOREAN be beaten by other KOREANS. He was beaten until half dead. I will never experience such a thrill again in all my life".

263. Yet another particularly cold-blooded incident is reported in a diary captured in the SOLOMONS, as having taken place on 26th September 1942 at GUADALCANAL. This entry reads as follows:

"September 26th (pres. 1942) - Discovered and captured the two prisoners who escaped last night in the jungle, and let the Guard Co. guard them. To prevent their escaping a second time, pistols were fired at their feet, but it was difficult to hit them. The two prisoners were dissected while still alive by Medical Officer YAMAJI, and their livers were taken out, and for the first time I saw the internal organs of a human being. It was very informative. Close by the furious sound of cannon and rifle firing could be heard, while the guns of naval vessels also shelled us. Tonight made preparation so that we would be able to start action at any time, and went to sleep".

264. Another ominous reference to a medical officer's activities is contained in a diary captured in NEW GUINEA, which refers to an incident at BASA in NEW GUINEA:

"19th November 1942 - Our patrol encountered enemy patrol near the plantation and after firing two shots we captured two prisoners. These prisoners were executed by Medical Captain KATO of 14th Pioneer Unit".

265. Later, an Allied Air Force officer, who had crashed near SALAMAU, was murdered. This is described by a Japanese eye-witness, in a diary, as follows. The heading is his. The date, given in the original, has been omitted:



"BLOOD CARNIVAL"

..... 1943. All four of us (Technician KUROKAWA, NISHIGUCHI, YAWATA and myself) assembled in front of the HQ at 1500 hrs. One of the two members of the crew of the Douglas which was shot down by A/A on the 18th, and who had been under cross-examination by the 7th Base Force for some days, had been returned to the SALAMAUA Garrison, and it had been decided to kill him. TAI Commander KOMAI, when he came to the observation station today, told us personally that, in accordance with the compassionate sentiments of Japanese BUSHIDO, he was going to kill the prisoner himself with his favourite sword. So we gathered to observe this. After we had waited a little more than ten minutes, the truck came along.

The prisoner, who is at the side of the guard house, is given his last drink of water, etc. The Chief Medical Officer, TAI Commander KOMAI and the HQ Platoon Commander came out of the officers' mess, wearing their military swords. The time has come, so the prisoner, with his arms bound and his long hair now cropped very close, totters forward. He probably suspects what is afoot; but he is more composed than I thought he would be. Without more ado, he is put on the truck and we set out for our destination.

I have a seat next to the Chief Medical Officer; about ten guards ride with us. To the pleasant rumble of the engine, we run swiftly along the road in the growing twilight. The glowing sun has set behind the western hills, gigantic clouds rise before us, and the dusk is falling all around. It will not be long now. As I picture the scene we are about to witness, my heart beats faster.

I glance at the prisoner; he has probably resigned himself to his fate. As though saying farewell to the world, as he sits in the truck he looks about, at the hills, at the sea, and seems deep in thought. I feel a surge of pity and turn my eyes away.

As we passed by the place where last year our lamented HAN leader was cremated, Technician HISHIGUCHI must have been thinking about him too, for he remarked, "It's a long time since we were here last". It certainly is a long time. We could see the place every day from the observation post, but never got a chance to come. It is nearly a year since the HAN leader was cremated. I was moved in spite of myself, and as I passed the place I closed my eyes and prayed for the repose of SHIMIZU's soul.

The truck runs along the seashore. We have left the Navy guard sector behind us and now come into the Army guard sector. Here and there we see sentries in the grassy fields, and I thank them in my heart for their toil as we drive on. They must have got it in the bombing the night before last - there are great holes by the side of the road, full of water from the rain. In a little over twenty minutes, we arrive at our destination, and all get off.

TAI Commander KOMAI stands up and says to the prisoner, "We are now going to kill you". When he tells the prisoner that in accordance with Japanese BUSHIDO he would be killed with a Japanese sword, and that he would have two or three minutes' grace, he listens with bowed head. "TAI" - i.e. the prisoner - says a few words in a low voice. Apparently he wants to be killed with one stroke of the sword. I hear him say the word "One" (T.N. in English). The TAI Commander becomes tense and his face stiffens as he replies "Yes" (T.N. in English).

Now the time has come, and the prisoner is made to kneel on the bank of a bomb crater filled with water. He is apparently resigned; the precaution is taken of surrounding him with guards with fixed bayonets, but he remains calm. He even stretches out his neck, and is very brave. When I put myself in the prisoner's place, and think that in one more minute it will be goodbye to this world, although the daily bombings have filled me with hate, ordinary human feelings make me pity him.

The TAI Commander has drawn his favourite sword. It is the famous OSAMUNE sword which he showed us at the observation post. It glitters in the light and sends a cold shiver down my spine. He taps the prisoner's neck lightly with the back of the blade, then raises it above his head with both arms,



and brings it down with a sweep.

I had been standing with my muscles tensed, but in that moment I closed my eyes.

SSH ! ..... It must be the sound of blood spurting from the arteries. With a sound as though something watery had been cut, the body falls forward. It is amazing - he had killed him with one stroke. The onlookers crowd forward. The head, detached from the trunk, rolls in front of it. SSH ! SSH ! .... The dark blood gushes out.

All is over. The head is dead white, like a doll. The savageness which I felt only a little while ago is gone, and now I feel nothing but the true compassion of Japanese BUSHIDO. A senior corporal laughs loudly, "Well, he will enter Nirvana now!" Then, a superior seaman of the medical unit takes the Chief Medical Officer's Japanese sword, and, intent on paying off old scores, turns the headless body over on its back, and cuts the abdomen open with one clean stroke. They are thick-skinned, these KETO (T.N. "Hairy foreigner" - common term of opprobrium for a white man) - even the skin of their bellies is thick. Not a drop of blood comes out of the body. It is pushed over into the crater at once and buried.

Now the wind blows mournfully and I see the scene again in my mind's eye. We get on to the truck again and start back. It is dark now. We get off in front of the HQ. I say goodbye to TAI Commander KOMAI, and climb up the hill with Technician KUROKAWA. This will be something to remember all my life. If ever I get back alive it will make a good story to tell, so I have written it down.

At SALAMAUA Observation Post, ..... 1943, 0110 hrs, to the sound of the midnight waves.

NOTE: The prisoner killed today was an Air Force TAI from MORESBY. He was a young man, said to have been an instructor to the A.T.C. at MORESBY."

266. The atrocity of this murder is rivalled only by its narration and requires no comment. What is to be noted is that Major General HORII's lofty phrases have not prevented the above seven specific instances from being perpetrated with apparent authority, in cold blood, and that the atmosphere of a barbaric ritual which is unmistakable in the accounts of both the BUNA and SALAMAUA murders only assumes the disguise of a scientific demonstration in the doctor's operation.

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8th October, 1943.

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