

NAVY DEPARTMENT

41958

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

(SC) A8-6/Q51

Op-16-F-7

SECRET

Serial No. 02001616

AUG 14 1942

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.  
To: Director, Central Division.  
Subject: Th. van der Laan, Attorney General, Curacao,  
Netherlands West Indies.  
References: (a) Central Division letter serial 040513 of  
May 23, 1942, to Admiral Ranneft,  
Netherlands Legation, Washington, D. C.  
(b) Extract of N. I. L. O. Curacao, Serial  
No. 7A-42 of July 4.  
Enclosure: (A) Reference (b).  
1. Enclosure is forwarded as a matter under  
cognizance of Central Division.  
2. This report, in addition to the information  
contained in reference (a), may indicate that the sympathies  
of Dutch Government representatives in the Caribbean are not  
100% pro-Ally.  
3. It is recommended that Admiral Ranneft,  
Netherlands Legation, be informed of this matter.

*see train*

*Finished-Struble-File*

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**SECRET**

*Discussed with  
Capt. Train  
file  
and*

SECRET

Extract from N. I. L. O. Curacao, Serial No. 7A-42 of July 4:

1. Much administrative power lies vested in the Attorney General, Th. van der Laan. His treatment of that power is looked upon with daily increasing distrust by many in Curacao, including some highly-placed officials. This distrust, upon analysis, appears to be based on the following factors: (a.) The official's secrecy of method. He has many channels through which to acquire information; but that which he acquires is by no means disseminated to all departments concerned therewith. (b.) His seeming obstructionism. The slowness with which measures are taken for increased security. (c.) His past leniency to certain aliens known to be pro-Axis. (d.) His frequent visits to the island of Bonaire, where the Internment Camp is located. (e.) His monopolizing of the functions of the Netherlands West Indies Intelligence Department.

2. Of the above, the Naval Liaison Officer has had reliable information concerning all counts, and personal knowledge only of (e.). It is realized that the statements are broad and general, and unsubstantiated by specific proof. However, no report on the current situation in this area would be complete unless it referred to these widespread and increasing suspicions. As best proof of the seriousness of the situation, the following is submitted: On July 1st a highly-placed and respected Dutch official confidentially told the writer: 'We will all need close co-operation. I am unhappy about things which are going on here. I mean, inside.' On July 4th the same official said to the writer: 'You must warn your Staff (i.e. Cafac Headquarters) not to give any important information to the Attorney General. The man is a big question mark.'

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Enclosure (A)

SECRET



NETHERLANDS EMBASSY  
~~ROYAL NETHERLAND LEGATION~~  
BUREAU OF NAVAL ATTACHE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

33961

S.

July 8, 1942.

My dear Captain Schuirmann:

Referring to your letter of May 23, 1942, Serial No. 040513, I am herewith enclosing a Memorandum, in which the comment is given by the Governor of Surinam regarding the report of the U. S. Naval Observer, Paramaribo, Surinam.

I may suggest that the U.S. Observer would discuss his complaints with the Governments Officials before sending them to his own Government and that he would take more into account the local circumstances.

Sincerely Yours,

RECEIVED SC FILES

Room 2055

JUL 18 1942

ROUTE TO: From op 13

Op File No. (SC) 178-6/Q51

Doc. No. ....

Copy No. .... of .....

RN. ....

J. E. Meijer Ranneft  
Rear Admiral, R.N.N.  
Naval Attache.

Ranneft

Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U.S.N.  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

13B

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Authority NND 803073

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9 7.7  
178-6/Q51

M E M O R A N D U M .

With reference to your letter dated May 23, 1942, Serial No. 040513 (S.C.) A8-6/QS1 and the report of the U. S. Naval Observer, Paramaribo, Surinam, to the Chief of Naval Operations of May 1, 1942, dealing with the security of shipping information.

1.) Consignees of incoming cargo receive per airmail before the ship arrives their bills of lading, in which name of ship, cargo and destination are mentioned, so that the name of the ship is known to these people.


However time of arrival of the ship remains always a secret even to authorities and ship's agents till the moment that a pilot is asked for, but then the ship is very close to the lightvessel where she is out of danger on account of the shallow water and the presence of patrolplanes.

2.) The guarding of the wharves and sheds takes place by police and detectives. This is considered more effective than a guard of military men because the police knows everybody in this small community and can refuse entrance to the docks to undesirables better than sentries.

It is unavoidable that shippers of cargo have access to the sheds and offices for information. This is also the case with longshoremen for the handling of the cargo.

It is in the nature of things that information is given to shippers whence they can send their cargo, but the route of the ships remains nevertheless a secret. Hence it is not surprising that the

- observer -



Finished-GARY-File

Another improvement would be to send the bills of lading of outgoing ships a couple of days after the ships have left.

In order to make the guarding of docks more perfect, the Governor will also put the military police in this service, and furthermore he will make it obligatory for harbor and shipping personnel to be provided with identification cards with finger-prints.

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Authority NND 803073



Director

If you wish to right  
the report referred to, I will  
get it.

(M)

Capt Schumann brought  
this up - Please return to op 13.

W. showed a copy of the letter  
to Ramseft who requested a copy  
as he said he had received  
reports that things were in a mess  
in the Dutch Administration there  
and wanted the letter to support  
a change in the Administration.  
Upon his request we gave him  
practically a verbatim copy, but  
apparently something went wrong.  
I consider Ramseft second

16-F-11.....	Strategic Information.....	
16-F-12.....	Protocol and Reception.....	
16-F-20.....	Identification and Characteristics.....	
16-J.....	JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMM.....	
16-X.....	PLANNING BRANCH.....	
16-COI-OSS..	OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES..	

PLAIN

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SECRET

JUL 9 1942

Comment

For info. &  
for any action  
you think  
appropriate.  
Return ultimately  
to op-13. ←  
TW

Advise N.O. to  
try to correct locally  
if feasible. Return  
(2)

N.O. advised 7/14/42  
and

file and

Finished-GARY-File  
SECRET

60 A86/RSI



Memo for D.N.I.

As you will recall the Navobs  
Paramaribo Surinam made a report  
on lack of security of shipping  
information in Dutch Guiana, and  
O.N.I. asked OP-13 to take it up.

We showed a copy of the letter  
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N.O. advised 7/14/42

file and

60 A86/251



## MEMORANDUM

JUL 9 1942

From: The Director of Naval Intelligence, Op-16.

Symbol	Branch or Section	To	Comment
16.....	AIDE TO DIRECTOR .....		
16-1.....	ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.....		
16-A.....	HEAD OF ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH.		
16-A-d.....	CENSORSHIP.....		
16-A-1.....	Secretarial.....		
16-A-2.....	Personnel.....		
16-A-3.....	Mail and Dispatch .....		
16-A-4.....	Services.....		
16-A-5.....	Legal.....		
16-A-6.....	Reserve.....		
16-B.....	HEAD OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.....		
16-B-1.....	Executive Assistant.....		
16-B-2.....	Reports and Files.....		
16-B-3.....	Investigating.....		
16-B-4.....	Security.....		
16-B-5.....	Commerce and Travel.....		
16-B-7.....	Counter Intelligence.....		
16-B-8.....	Coastal Information.....		
16-B-9.....	Training School.....		
16-B-10.....	Personnel Security.....		
16-C.....	HEAD OF FLEET INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.....		
16-C-1.....	Intelligence Center.....		
16-C-2.....	Information Center.....		
16-E.....	HEAD OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY.....		
16-F.....	HEAD OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.....		
16-F-x.....	British Agencies Liaison.....		
16-F-1.....	British Empire.....		
16-F-2.....	Far East.....		
16-F-3.....	Western European.....		
16-F-4.....	Central European.....		
16-F-5.....	Eastern European.....		
16-F-6.....	Balkans and Near East.....		
16-F-7.....	American Republics.....		
16-F-8.....	Foreign Trade.....		
16-F-9.....	Special Intelligence.....		
16-F-10.....	Statistical.....		
16-F-11.....	Strategic Information.....		
16-F-12.....	Protocol and Reception.....		
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60 186/251