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7 AUG 1947

From: The Chief of Naval Operations (Chief of Naval Intelligence)
 To : The President, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

Subject: Career Summaries of Lecturers and Outlines of Lectures
 to be delivered at Naval War College during the period
 18 - 20 August, 1947, Forwarding of

Reference: (a) NWO Ltr NC3/PLL-3(NI) Serial 3412 dated 2 June, 1947.
 (b) CNO(ONI) Ltr Op-32 03 PLL-3/NC3, Serial 6145P32
 dated 25 June, 1947.

Enclosure: (A) Summary of Career of Rear Admiral Thos. B. Inglis, U.S.Navy,
 and Outline of Lecture on "Organization and Mission of
 Naval Intelligence".
 (B) Summary of Career of Captain Carl F. Espe, U.S.Navy,
 and Outline of Lecture on "Strategic and Operational
 Intelligence".
 (C) Summary of Career of Captain P. Henry, U.S.Navy, and
 Outline of Lecture on "Naval Air Intelligence".
 (D) Summary of Career of Lieut. Col. T. L. Ridge, U.S.M.C.,
 and Outline of Lecture on "Amphibious Intelligence".
 (E) Summary of Career of Comdr. W. Abbott, U.S.N.R. (Inactive),
 and Outline of Lecture on "Counter-Intelligence, Subversion,
 and Psychological Warfare".

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1. Enclosures (A) to (E) inclusive are forwarded herewith
 in accordance with the request contained in paragraph 5 of reference (a).

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2. Transmission of this document by Registered Guard Mail
 or U.S. Registered Mail is necessary and is authorized in accordance
 with Article 76(15), E, F, U.S. Navy Regulations.

Thos. B. Inglis
 By Direction,

Dict. 4 Aug. 1947
 Dict. by Capt. L.J. Jones, USN
 Typed by C. Hansen

7 AUG 1947

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REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS BROWNING INGLIS, U. S. NAVY

Rear Admiral Inglis, born in Petoskey, Michigan, November 19, 1897, was appointed to the U. S. Naval Academy from the Tenth District of his native state in 1914. While a Midshipman he was manager of the lacrosse team. Graduated and commissioned Ensign in June 1917, with the Class of 1918, he progressed in grade until his promotion to Captain, June 30, 1942; Commodore (Temporary) April 3, 1945; and Rear Admiral, November 2, 1945, to rank from September 23, 1943.

After graduation in 1917, Rear Admiral Inglis joined the U.S.S. KEARSARGE in which he served while she operated with the Atlantic Fleet during the World War. In January 1919 he joined the U.S.S. ALABAMA for duty as division radio officer on the staff of Rear Admiral Earle B. Brittain, U.S.N., Commander, Division 1, Battleship Force 1, Atlantic Fleet, later redesignated Division "A". In July 1919 he was transferred to the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY with duty as squadron radio officer on the staff of Vice Admiral Clarence S. Williams, U.S.N., Commander, Squadron 1, Division 1, Pacific Fleet, continuing to serve in that capacity when in June 1920 Vice Admiral Williams hoisted his flag in the U.S.S. NEW YORK as Commander, Battleship Squadron 4, Pacific Fleet, and in February 1921 as Commander, Battle Force, Pacific.

Detached from that assignment in July 1921, Rear Admiral Inglis served until May 1922 in the U.S.S. PHILIP. He then was under instruction in radio engineering at the Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland, and Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, where he received the degree of Master of Science in June 1924. From July of that year until October 1925 he served in the battleship CALIFORNIA, being assigned additional duty in February 1925 as a member of a board, headed by Captain (now Admiral, Retired) Arthur J. Hepburn, U.S.N., to study Army communication methods. In October 1925 he was transferred to duty as aide and division radio officer on the staff of Admiral (then Vice Admiral) Richard H. Jackson, U.S.N., Commander, Battleship Divisions, Battleship Divisions, Battle Fleet, of which the U.S.S. WEST VIRGINIA was flagship, continuing duty as aide and fleet radio officer on the staff of Admiral Jackson when in September 1926 he transferred his flag to the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA as Commander in Chief, Battle Fleet.

Following detachment from that assignment in September 1927, Rear Admiral Inglis had duty in the Radio Division, Bureau of Engineering, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., until August 1929 when he returned to sea as executive officer of the U.S.S. PRUITT. In July 1930 he was transferred to duty as aide and squadrons radio officer on the staff of the Commander, Destroyer Squadrons, Battle Fleet, serving consecutively under Rear Admirals Thomas J. Senn, U.S.N., William H. Standley, U.S.N., and Edward G. Kalbfus, U.S.N. From September 1932 until May 1934 he was District Communication Officer, Eleventh Naval District, San Diego, California, with additional duty in command of Naval Radio Stations within that district. Returning to sea, he commanded the U.S.S. HATFIELD from June 1934 until April 1935, and the following year was communication officer on the staff of

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Admiral Harris Loring, U.S.N., Commander, Battle Force, of which the U.S.S. CALIFORNIA was flagship. In April 1936 he joined the U.S.S. HOUSTON, serving as navigator of that cruiser until June 1937.

Following a tour of duty in the Communication Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., from July 1937 until May 1940, Rear Admiral Inglis served as executive officer of the battleship TEXAS for a year. He next had charge of the conversion of the merchant vessel MORMAGWREN to the U.S.S. ALGORAB and commanded that cargo ship from her commissioning June 15, 1941, until March 18, 1942, when he returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, where he remained on duty until August 1943, as Deputy Director of Naval Communications.

On August 11, 1943, Rear Admiral Inglis assumed command of the U.S.S. BIRMINGHAM. During his command, that light cruiser participated in September 1943 in the carrier raid on Tarawa, and the following month bombarded Wake and Peale Islands. She next supported landings in the Solomons and while patrolling off the American beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay, Bougainville, on the night of November 8-9, 1943, she suffered two torpedo hits and a bomb hit from Japanese planes. Forced to return to the United States for repairs, she was ready for action again early in 1944 and returned to the Pacific where she bombarded enemy positions in the Shortlands, Northern Solomons, and in June 1944 took part in the invasion of the Marianas. In September 1944 the BIRMINGHAM was a unit of a carrier task force supporting the landings on Peleliu. In October 1944 she assisted in operations in support of the Philippine landings of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, including air raids on the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. On October 24 while attempting to save the U.S.S. PRINCETON, his ship was severely damaged when that aircraft carrier exploded. The BIRMINGHAM suffered heavy casualties and her skipper was wounded. For his services in command of that cruiser Rear Admiral Inglis was awarded the Bronze Star Medal, the Silver Star Medal, and the Navy Cross, with the following citations:

BRONZE STAR MEDAL

"For heroic achievement as Commanding Officer of a Close-in Fire Support Ship in action against enemy Japanese forces at Saipan Island on June 14-15, 1944. Operating under difficult navigational conditions and in the face of repeated heavy enemy gunfire, Captain Inglis skillfully maneuvered his ship through dangerous waters and effectively directed accurate, concentrated fire against hostile shore batteries, contributing essentially to the success of our forces in the accomplishment of a vital mission. An expert seaman and brilliant leader, Captain Inglis was a constant inspiration to the men under his command and his gallant fighting spirit throughout the fierce action was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

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SILVER STAR MEDAL

"For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity as Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BIRMINGHAM assigned to a Task Unit covering the withdrawal of the U.S.S. CANBERRA and the U.S.S. HOUSTON from Japanese waters after those two vessels had been torpedoed by enemy shore-based aircraft on October 13 and 14, 1944. A splendid leader and seaman, Captain Inglis fought his ship gallantly against hostile planes which attacked repeatedly on October 15-16 and, by his aggressiveness and courage under fire, contributed essentially to the destruction of the attacking aircraft and to the successful withdrawal of two valuable combatant vessels to safety. Captain Inglis' unwavering devotion to the fulfillment of an important and hazardous mission was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

NAVY CROSS

"For distinguishing himself by extraordinary heroism in operations against the enemy as Commanding Officer of a cruiser while participating in the salvage and rescue operations of an aircraft carrier in the face of enemy air attack on 24 October 1944, in the North Philippine Sea. In spite of heavy fire and smoke, and in the face of imminent danger of explosion, he skillfully placed his vessel alongside the aircraft carrier, and afforded such aid to the ship in fighting her fires that they would have been brought under control had not the cruiser been forced to leave the aircraft carrier's side to repel attacks. During the second determined attempt to furnish aid to the carrier heavy casualties were inflicted upon personnel of the cruiser by a tremendous explosion in the carrier. By his courageous and determined bearing and his calm and efficient handling of a most difficult situation he inspired his officers and men to heroic and tireless efforts to save the carrier in the face of the gravest possible dangers. His courage and skill were at all times in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

Returned to the United States for hospitalization after injuries sustained aboard the BIRMINGHAM, Rear Admiral Inglis subsequently reported May 26, 1945, for duty as Deputy Director, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Washington, D.C., serving in that assignment in the temporary rank of Commodore. On September 7, 1945, he became Chief of Naval Intelligence, and shortly thereafter was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral.

In addition to the Navy Cross, the Silver Star Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon, and the Purple Heart Medal, Rear Admiral Inglis has the Victory Medal, Atlantic Fleet Clasp (U.S.S. KEARSARGE), and is entitled to the American Defense Service Medal with Bronze "A" (for service in the U.S.S. ALGORAB which operated in actual or potential belligerent contact with Axis Forces in the Atlantic Ocean prior to December 7, 1941), the Asiatic-Pacific Area Campaign Medal, the American Area Campaign Medal, and the World War II Victory Medal, the Philippine Liberation Campaign Ribbon, and several other foreign decorations.

His official address is Houghton Lake, Michigan. He and his wife, the former Kathryn Harper of Washington, D.C., are currently living at 4321 Drumm Avenue, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

21 July 1947

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I. Introductory remarks.

- A. Purpose of this series of lectures: create understanding of intelligence and appreciation of its capabilities at staff and command level.
- B. Ground to be covered by this and following lectures.
 - 1. By this lecture: general aspects of intelligence, its chief problems today, and the organization of the NIS.
 - 2. By following officers: Captain Espe - General Operational Intelligence; Lt. Col. Ridge - Operational Intelligence applied to Amphibious operations; Captain Henry - Air Intelligence and an example of Intelligence production; Comdr. Abbott - Counter Intelligence and security.

II. Intelligence generally; what it is.

- A. Intelligence in broad sense (National Intelligence) needed by governments for policy and planning. Naval Intelligence: that category of intelligence needed to determine Naval policy and plan and execute Naval operations.
- B. Instances of operations in recent war:
 - 1. Mariannes (Saipan, Guam, Tinian)- Landing of Leyte Island.
- C. What had they in common?
 - 1. Successful gathering of info.,-- proper analysis of info. -- timely application to a concrete situation.
- D. These factors in large measure define intelligence: The timely application to a given situation of adequate and sound information correctly interpreted. It ranges from elementary reconnaissance

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to world-wide political analysis. It embraces three basic steps: collection, processing, dissemination. It requires trained minds and an effective organization.

III. Lessons and developments.

- A. The war was greatest intelligence experience in history, and set intelligence two immediate problems at close of hostilities.
 1. Study of weaknesses shown by selves and others in order to guard against them in future.
 2. Permanently establishing the successful developments in wartime intelligence.
- B. The weaknesses.
 1. We saw our enemies' intelligence fail for reasons chiefly: lack of centralization and adequate coordination; lack of good top-level understanding of intelligence; the decay in reporting and impartial analysis due to political intrusion, especially in case of Germany.
 2. We found weaknesses of our own at Pearl Harbor; failure to link intelligence and planning; failure in dissemination; failure in correct interpretation.
- C. The gains.
 1. Growth of concept of intelligence as integral part of planning and operations-- development of operational intelligence-- development during war of large body of trained intelligence men.

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2. Steps taken to consolidate these gains and avoid failings:
 - a. Defined status and responsibility for dissemination
(Art. 425)-- integration of intelligence into command
 - (Art.'s 687-a, 786)-- integration of intelligence with plans and operations (transfer to Op-03)-- broad training program to maintain and increase trained men both inside and outside Regular Service.

IV. Mission and problems.

- A. Statement of Mission of NIS.
- B. In carrying out this mission, NIS is faced with one primary target - USSR.
- C. The nature of strategic situation of U.S. and USSR, and nature of any future war, shapes the nature of the intelligence problems.
- D. Strategic situation.
 1. Russia: continental power with great army, but small fleet responsible for 4 sea frontiers without adequate communications between; but also C.P.'s throughout world and thus great subversive potential.
 2. U.S.: outstanding industrial machine; great Navy capable of carrying war to Russia and maintaining full control of world oceans; but weak in defense against subversive attack.
- E. Intelligence situation for NIS is thus:
 1. Capabilities and intention of USSR (Peacetime), in order to make possible sound planning and eventual operations in war.
 2. Defense of Naval Establishment and Nation against Soviet subversion --i.e., security in broadest sense (Peace and War).

V. The Organization and Method.

A. NIS composed of 4 elements.

1. Operational intelligence - primarily wartime, to be covered in detail by following lecturer.
2. DIO's -- as intelligence officers of commanders -- fundamentally concerned with security -- also a source of valuable foreign intelligence.
3. Attaches and observers - principal Naval source of foreign intelligence - extent of coverage - covert and overt - difficulties due increased security policies of all countries - Japanese chicken-wire compared to Soviet iron curtain.
4. ONI - headquarters laboratory for processing and disseminating intelligence from all sources - principal branches.
5. Cardinal elements are: broadest collection of information possible - own sources -- close relations with other agencies.
 - a. particularly close link with G-2 and A-2 what effect of National Security Act '47 will be.
 - b. reference to forthcoming lecture by Adm. Hillenkoetter on ONI; Navy's attitude toward ONI.
6. Principles in the handling of material.
 - a. protection of source (Gezenko and Krivitsky).
 - b. open mind --- German High Command refused flatly to consider possibility of North African landings in November '42 even when reports flowed in from Gibraltar outposts, insisting Allied vessels bound for Malta and Egypt.

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VI. CONCLUSION.

- A. Can assure you NIS aware of gravity of its tasks and, together with other agencies determined to do its job.
- B. But we are in great part dependent upon Command for full application of intelligence - Our job to furnish you with an essential instrument of command - You can make that instrument more effective through support and demand for high performance.

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SUMMARY OF NAVAL CAREER
of
CAPTAIN CARL F. ESPE, USN

Graduated from U.S. Naval Academy in 1922.

Served in USS PENNSYLVANIA for two years as Assistant Radio Officer.

Served in USS CHASE (DD-323) as Torpedo and Gunnery Officer, 1924-1927.

Served in USS MISSISSIPPI for two years as Anti-Aircraft Officer, 1927-1929.

U. S. Naval Academy, 1929-1931.

Served in USS DETROIT in Gunnery Department, 1931-1933.

Commanded USS BOBOLINK for one year, 1933-34.

Duty at U.S. Naval Academy, 1934-1935.

Served as Flag Secretary to Commander Aircraft Base Force, 1935, 1936.

Executive Officer, USS PERKINS, 1936-1938.

Attended Army Industrial College, 1938-1939.

Commanding Officer, USS O'BRIEN for two years, 1940-1941.

Navigator, USS RANGER, 1942.

Aide to VADM, 1942, 1943.

Commander Destroyer Squadron 46, 1943-1944.

Participated in Gilbert Islands operations, first strike on Truk, Marshall Islands operations, strikes on Kavieng, Hollandia operations, Marianas operations, first strikes on Iwo and Chichi Jima, first strikes on Okinawa and Formosa, and Leyte operations.

Decorations:

Silver Star

3 Legions of Merit

Bronze Star

Campaign Ribbons

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ENCL. B

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- (a) Purpose of Naval Intelligence course at the Naval War College is to create an understanding of Intelligence and an appreciation of its capabilities on the staff and command levels.

Intelligence in the broad sense, or let us say, national intelligence is needed by governments in order to determine national policy and planning. Naval Intelligence is that category of Intelligence, regardless of source, which is needed for the determination of Naval Policy and for planning and execution of naval operations.

(b) Fields of Intelligence - Navy

1. Positive Intelligence

- a. Strategic Intelligence - needed by Naval Commanders charged with the determination of policy and planning.

- b. Operational Intelligence - needed by Naval Commanders in planning and executing operations, including battle.

2. Counter-Intelligence

- a. Counter-Espionage

- b. Counter-Subversion

- c. Security.

II. Strategic Intelligence

- (a) Grand Strategy - The master plan of a nation in both peace and war is called its "grand strategy." It includes not only the nation's military plans but its domestic and foreign policies as well. The role of strategic intelligence in peacetime is to aid the chiefs of state in formulating grand strategy, and to enable military leaders in lower echelons to plan in such a way as to support the chiefs of state.

(b) Types

1. Political

2. Economic

3. Geographic

4. Naval Power

5. Sociological

6. Technical and Scientific

7. Personalities

8. Counter-Intelligence - that phase of Counter-Espionage covering preparation of monographs on foreign intelligence organizations.

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(c) Sources

1. Domestic

- a. Liaison and Research in Washington
- b. Contact Register
- c. Counter-Intelligence

2. Foreign

- a. Naval Attachés and Observers
- b. Special Operations

3. Fleet

- a. Reconnaissance by agents or forces over enemy territory or waters.
- b. Photographs and strategic area studies from same.
- c. Interrogation of Prisoners of War.
- d. Captured documents and material.

(d) General - Strategic intelligence on the national planning level aims at disclosing the capabilities of other nations to wage war, and their intentions insofar as may be determined. Naval strategic intelligence on the planning level is more specialized but is an integral part of national strategic intelligence. Its importance in any nation depends to the extent that such nation has cultivated its sea power.

III. Operational Intelligence

(a) Utilization - Operational Intelligence supports a nation's grand strategy in war. As previously stated there is no fine line of demarcation between Strategic and Operational Intelligence. When Strategic Intelligence is employed in conducting operations against the enemy it becomes Operational Intelligence.

- 1. Planning and Support of Operations
- 2. Combat.

(b) Sources

- 1. Intelligence files
- 2. Communication Intelligence
- 3. Reconnaissance
- 4. Interrogation of Prisoners of War, ex-inhabitants, etc.
- 5. Captured Documents and Material

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- (c) General - Operational Intelligence is of primary importance to the conduct of grand strategy in wartime - Strategic Intelligence is of primary importance to the conduct of grand strategy in time of ostensible peace. The dividing lines between war and peace, tactics and strategy, and between operational and strategic intelligence are not so sharp as they were formerly. Phases of grand strategy are conducted in peacetime by means of specific tactics. Example of bow and arrow.

IV. Practical Application of Intelligence at the Staff and Command levels.

1. Contribution to Estimate of the Situation
2. Intelligence Estimate
3. Intelligence Plan
4. Intelligence Annex
5. Assist in maintaining Running Estimate by means of Intelligence Journal, Work Sheets, Situation Plots and Intelligence Reports.

V. Importance of Intelligence Under Present World Conditions and Need for Support.

- (a) Russia on strategic offensive - U.S. strategic defensive. Russia possesses strategic initiative in satellite countries.
- (b) Naval Commanders must maintain a clear conception of the vital part played by good intelligence in the successful planning and conduct of operations and lend support.
- (c) Intelligence cannot be laid on shelf to be dusted off when needed.

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SUMMARY OF NAVAL CAREER

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of

CAPTAIN PATRICK HENRY, USN

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Graduated from Naval Academy 1927.

1927 - 29	USS COLORADO	Varied duties.
1929 - 30	NAS Pensacola	Flight Training.
1930 - 33	USS SARATOGA	Fighter Squadron.
1933 - 35	NAS Pensacola	Fighter Instructor
1935 - 38	USS AUGUSTA	Aviation duties
1938 - 40	Norfolk	Experimental duties
1940 - 41	VP Squadron	Flight Exec. Officer
1941 - 42	TAB Iceland	Executive
1942	VP Squadron	Commanding Officer
1942 - 43	FAW 11	Group Commander
1943 - 44	FAW 11	Exec. Off. & Group Cdr.
1944 - 45	Alameda	Executive Officer
1945 - 46	CVB-38, Pacific	Commanding Officer
1946 - present	- CNO, Navy Dept.	Asst. Chief, Air Branch, O.N.I.

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ENCL. C

NAVAL AIR INTELLIGENCE**Secret**

- I. Introduction**
 - A. Definition of naval air intelligence
 - B. Users of air intelligence during (1) peace (2) war.
 - C. What air intelligence is required.

- II. Past Concept of Air Intelligence Prior and During World War II**
 - A. Failure to realize import of a country's capability to wage air warfare.
 - B. Information neither collected nor studied in well-planned or methodical manner by qualified personnel.
 - C. Wartime experiences of AOI officers.

- III. Present Concept of Air Intelligence.**
 - A. Stems from war experiences - joint committees, etc.
 - B. Permanent organization
 - C. Continuous world-wide coverage of alien offensive and defensive air capabilities together with strategic vulnerability and air facilities.
 - D. Strategic vulnerability.

- IV. Production and Dissemination of Air Intelligence**
 - A. Flow of material to Air Intelligence Division for evaluation.
 - B. Types of Air Intelligence reports prepared.
 - C. Dissemination of Air Intelligence studies.

- V. The Use of Air Intelligence during Peacetime.**
 - A. Requirements of knowledge of offensive and defensive air capabilities of all foreign powers for use in planning probable naval operations.
 - B. Based on intimate knowledge of an airforce.
 - C. Intelligent naval planning not possible until this knowledge is available.
 - D. Example of development of air capabilities of a country:
 - 1. Preface
 - a. Information concerning Russians meager, etc,
 - b. Soviet Air Force as a whole will be considered - Naval Air Force to follow naturally in its proper place.
 - c. Development of Soviet Air Force since 1929.
 - d. Present organization, disposition, offensive capabilities, defensive capabilities, airfields and facilities, logistic support, trends and developments and overall conclusions.
 - e. Chart showing production since 1929 together with 1937 flight to L.A. compared with our 1946 flights.

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- f. 1941 Air Force, strength, planes and personnel.
- g. August 1945 same - 18000 new planes.
- h. Good part of land lease consisting of - fighters and - bombers.
Also B-29's.
- i. Present strength planes and personnel.
- 2. Organization.
 - a. Chart #2 showing organization.
 - b. Key personalities.
 - c. Degree of political control.
- 3. Disposition.
 - a. Chart #3 showing present disposition and strength.
- 4. Offensive Capabilities.
 - a. Largest Air Force in being.
 - b. Tied to Army and primarily a ground support force.
 - c. Bombers medium range.
 - d. Fighters good but somewhat below US-UK standards.
 - e. Long range force in developmental status - possibly capable of one-way flight 3,000 miles, 4,000 lbs. - against ships ineffective high altitude bombing.
 - f. Naval Air Force primarily coastal defense and patrol.
 - g. Limited experience at sea - capable of coordinated attacks - light bombing, torpedo, mines, and rockets but overall tactical development much inferior to ours. No carrier. Uses Army planes. Generally superior to Army Air.
 - h. Civil Air Fleet provides tremendous air lift capabilities - 38,000 troops to max. 1200 miles.
 - i. Pilots generally deficient night flying, bad weather and navigation - considerable cold weather flying experience. General education low. Overall efficiency not too good. One German equal to three Russians.
 - j. Weak in all electronic material. During war 30% US-UK lend lease.
 - k. Western Europe, Middle East, North Africa, North Atlantic, North East, North America.
- 5. Defensive Capabilities.
 - a. PVO main reliance.
 - b. Radar weakness.
 - c. AA below German, above Japanese - no proximity fuses present.
 - d. Passive defense organization camouflaged good.
 - e. Lacking World War II experience versus strategic bombing.
 - f. Due above together with vast area to be defended, defense will be weak and mainly limited to area of objective.

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- 6. Logistic Support.**
- a. One of world's strongest economies. Capable of high degree of concentration on objectives.
 - b. Large aviation industry - max, 4500 planes December 1944.
 - c. Although petroleum industry vulnerable, sufficient in gasoline, lubricants, kerosene and diesel.
 - d. Munitions O.K.
 - e. Possible shortage of aluminum.
- 7. Airfields and Facilities.**
- a. Russians adept at operating from hastily improvised fields.
 - b. Planes designed for makeshift fields.
 - c. Scarcity of large fields - only 112 of 4500 ft. or more of total 4500 fields. Not one suitable for B-36's.
- 8. Trends and Developments.**
- a. Jet fighter - German help, UK help. Realize their deficiencies - high priority. 100 of two types in May Day Parade - U.S. total jet that time 50.
 - b. Electronics same. Lend Lease help, also post-war U.K. help. Feb 1946 complete tactical and technical info airport control, blind landing equipment, etc.
 - c. Long range force. Little info other than German being stressed - development concurrently with A-bomb. Training to overcome deficiencies. No reason to believe that they will not have effective long range force. Capable sizes and research personnel. However, link to production is weak.
 - d. Likewise no reason to believe they will not have effective defense force of jets, efficiently directed by electronic means within next several years.
 - e. Example German World War II jet effectiveness.
- 9. Conclusions.**
- a. World's largest airforce in being.
 - b. Present capabilities somewhat limited by overall deficiencies and concept, but rapidly being improved.
 - c. Due to strength of her economy, her self-sufficiency in all that goes into an air force, her inherent ability to concentrate on an objective - the future capabilities of the USSR in the air are almost unlimited.
 - d. When considered in conjunction with similar studies of the air force of other countries a sound structure for intelligent planning exists.
- VI. The Use of Air Intelligence in Wartime.**
- A. Continued use of strategic studies for broad overall planning.
 - B. Use of air studies as a basis for operational intelligence.
 - C. Operational Intelligence desired and sources.
- VII. Summary and Conclusion.**

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CAREER SUMMARY OF

LTC. COL. T. L. RIDGE, U.S.M.C.

Entered the U. S. Marine Corps in 1938.

July 1938 - May 1939: Student, U.S. Marine Corps Basic School, Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pa.

June 1939 - Sept. 1940: Sea Duty, primarily on board the USS QUINCY.

Sept. 1940 - June, 1941: Duty, MB, NY, Boston, Mass.

July, 1941 - Nov. 1941: Duty, MB, NAS, Jacksonville, Fla.

Dec. 1941 - July, 1944: Asst. Naval Attache, American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

Aug. 1944 - Nov. 1944: Student, Command & Staff School, Quantico, Va.

Nov. 1944 - Mar. 1945: Exec. Off., A.O. of S. G-2 Section, FMF, Pac.

Mar. 1945 - May 1945: FMF Pac., G-2, Observer on the OKINAWA Operation.

May 1945 - Nov. 1945: A.O. of S. G-2, 3rd Marine Division.

Nov. 1945 - March 1946: Member, Japanese Defense Study Group.

April, 1946 to present: Amphibious member, Intelligence Staff, O.M.I.

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OUTLINE OF LECTURE ON

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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION

1. The nature of an operation determines, in part, the type and extent of intelligence that is required:
 - (a) Definition of an Amphibious Operation.
 - (b) Types of an Amphibious Operation.
 - (c) The forces involved in an Amphibious Operation usually include naval, ground and air components.
2. The intelligence process, i.e., the determination of requirements, collection, processing and distribution. (General brief discussion of the process as a whole; the individual steps, from the amphibious viewpoint, will be discussed below.)
3. Amphibious intelligence requirements.
 - (a) The requirements may emphasize various types of intelligence and depend upon:
 - (1) the type and mission of the amphibious operation, and
 - (2) the characteristics of the target area. Example:
 - (b) List of general requirements.
4. Procurement of amphibious intelligence.
 - (a) Departmental intelligence.
 - (1) List of types.
 - (b) Theater intelligence,
 - (1) List of types.
 - (c) Examples.
5. Comparative value of various sources of information.
 - (a) Departmental intelligence for background material.
 - (b) Photography.
 - (c) Reconnaissance.
 - (d) Captured documents.
 - (e) POW interrogations.

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6. Processing of amphibious intelligence.
 - (a) General statement.
 - (b) Difficulties of processing new information while ship-borne en route to target.
7. Dissemination of amphibious intelligence. (General discussion, with examples, regarding the volume of material that must be delivered to diverse units, which may be scattered over a large area, in time to be of value. Example.)
8. Comments on amphibious intelligence requirements in the event of war with the U.S.S.R.
9. Conclusions.

Note: A world map or chart adjacent to the speakers' rostrum is desired.

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CAREER SUMMARY OFWILLIAM ABBOTT, Comdr., USNR, S(I) (Inactive)

Commissioned as Lieut(jg), Class I-V(S) in 1940.
 Reported for active duty in May 1941.

Officer-in-Charge Japanese Desk, Counter-Intelligence Branch (Op-16-S-7-J)
 and Officer-in-Charge General Counter-Intelligence Desk (Op-16-S-7-A)
 until January 1943.

Counter-Intelligence Officer, Naval Section of the Joint Intelligence
 Collection Agency, Algiers, Algeria - February 1943 until August 1943.

Assistant for counter-intelligence matters to Officer-in-Charge,
 Naval Intelligence Unit, Commander 8th Fleet, Algiers, Algeria and Naples,
 Italy - August 1943 until August 1944.

Officer-in-Charge, Inter-Service, Inter-Allied Japanese Intelligence
 Section, G-2 Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force,
 London, Paris, Frankfurt and Berlin - August 1944 until August 1945.

Assistant Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander Naval Forces, Europe,
 and Assistant to Naval Attaché, London, England - August 1945 until September,
 1945.

Released to inactive duty, 10 April 1946.

Decorations and Awards

- A. Bronze Star (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe)
- B. Letter of Commendation (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces,
 North African Waters)
- C. Legion d'Honneur, French Government
- D. Croix de Guerre avec Palme, Belgian Government.

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ENCL E

Secret**COUNTER INTELLIGENCE****I. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND SCOPE**

A. Naval Counter Intelligence is a defensive weapon whose objective is to forecast the actions of an enemy or potential enemy directed against the security of the Naval Establishment before rather than after the fact in order that appropriate counter measures may be instituted to neutralize activities inimical to the Navy.

1. Counter Intelligence function has three phases:

- (a) Collection
- (b) Processing
- (c) Dissemination

(1) Examples to illustrate the three phases--
the DIO system, the Atache system, N-2
Division of Fleet Commands, Joint and
Combined operations.

B. Scope - Naval Counter Intelligence is concerned primarily with the activity of individuals acting singly or in groups, and deals with subversive, espionage and sabotage activities as well as with military operations.

1. This analysis involves consideration of economic, political, industrial and military problems.

II. NAVAL INTEREST

A. As the most important navy in the world, the U.S. Navy is the objective and potential target for subversive, sabotage and espionage activities as well as military operations carried on by many other countries of the world.

1. As one of the instruments by which the world wide interests of the U. S. are protected and advanced, the Naval Establishment has become world wide and is subject to attack from many quarters.
2. Subversives, saboteurs and espionage agents are not limited by geographic boundaries and do not wear labels indicating that their objective is the U. S. Navy.
3. Since attacks on the Naval Establishment are frequently indirect effective counter-intelligence requires a broad understanding of tactics, and techniques utilized by foreign powers to carry out subversion, sabotage and espionage against the Naval Establishment

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(a) Particular fields of interest to the Navy in this connection are:

- (1) Problems involving shipping and merchant marine
- (2) Port problems
- (3) Travel control problems
- (4) Activities of Naval personnel
- (5) Problems involving Naval research and development
- (6) Industrial, commercial and political activities affecting Naval production and operations.

III. EXAMPLES OF COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR II

A. In the U.S.

1. Counter Intelligence analysis of Japanese activities.
 - (a) Library function - accumulation of information according to 1500 known categories of Japanese subversive activities.
 - (b) Correlation of information and coordination with other Federal agencies (case of Shio SAKAMOTO)

2. Landing of German Saboteurs.

B. In Mediterranean Theater

1. Inter-Service and Combined Counter Intelligence organization.
2. French political problems affecting U.S. Naval operations.
3. German and Italian Agents
4. Intelligence from occupied and enemy areas
5. Counter Intelligence in support of amphibious operations.
 - (a) Pre-invasion planning
 - (b) Assault activities of counter intelligence value.
6. Prisoner-of-War interrogation
 - (a) Document analysis.

C. In European Theater of Operations.

1. Illustration of Inter-Service and Inter-Allied counter intelligence coordination.
 - (a) Planning stage
 - (b) Operational stage
 - (c) Post-operational activities.

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D. Propaganda Efforts of the enemy.

1. General statement

2. Examples

- (a) French Army to Fight against Russians (1942)
- (b) Americans are Drunks (1943--No. Africa)
- (c) Americans plan to Colonize North Africa (1944)
- (d) U.S. plans to make Italy another State (1944)
- (e) U.S. plans to Annex Canada (1944-45)
- (f) Allies not really fighting in Normandy; Russian visits to Beachhead (1944)
- (g) Allies to join Germans in fight against Russia (1945)
- (h) Americans using Russian Jeeps under Lend Lease (1945)
- (i) Germans would return to Paris by New Year (Battle of Bulge)
- (j) Occupied Germany - Circulation of rumors re behavior of occupying forces.

IV. SUBVERSION

A. Statement by Rear Admiral Thos. B. Ingalls, Chief of Naval Intelligence, concerning the relationship of ONI to the subject of Subversion.

B. Definition of Subversion

- 1. Domestic Sources
- 2. Foreign Sources

C. The U.S.S.R.

- 1. Communism in Russia
- 2. Dialectical Materialism
- 3. Communism Versus Capitalism
- 4. Russia Versus the Communist Party
- 5. Communist Party Organization
- 6. Methods used within a Communist State
- 7. Methods used outside the USSR

D. Within the U.S.

- 1. Suspicion
- 2. U.S. Communist Party
- 3. Subversive Methods
- 4. Communist Appeal
- 5. U.S. Merchant Marine
- 6. Panama Canal
- 7. U.S. Marines in China
- 8. Institute of Ethnic Affairs
- 9. Scientists
- 10. Defeatism
- 11. Scientific Research.

E. Communists in the U.S. Navy

F. Counter Measures

1. Susceptible Groups.

V. ESPIONAGE

SECRET

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