

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE



PREPARED BY
 U. S. NAVY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL
 FOR
 THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
 NAVY DEPARTMENT

1948

UNITED STATES
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
 WASHINGTON : 1948

PREFACE

One of the outstanding lessons of World War II was that effective Naval Intelligence is a necessity to successful planning and operations of the Navy in war. Intelligence is indispensable to the function of Command.

In times of peace, good intelligence enables the Navy to support national policy and to serve as the Nation's first line of defense with the maximum economy of force and effort.

Special training is required to develop good intelligence officers. They must be, first, naval officers who understand the Navy and its needs; second, they must be skilled in the specialized techniques of this intricate and fascinating professional specialty.

The purpose of this textbook is to describe the capabilities and limitations of Naval Intelligence, the methods of gathering and processing information into intelligence, the internal organization of Naval Intelligence and its relationship to other organizations, in and out of the Navy.

This book is not an exhaustive treatise. It is not a book of rules and regulations. The Naval Intelligence Manual and Naval Intelligence Directives issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence cover that field. It is a textbook, issued by the Standards and Curriculum Division of the Training Activity of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, to introduce student officers to Naval Intelligence.

This is the first revision of the original text, NavPers 16047, published in February 1946. This revision was prepared by the United States Naval School (Naval Intelligence), Washington, D. C., and reviewed by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The subject is fluid and the book must be kept up to date by frequent revision. Suggestions, comments, and criticisms are invited.

THOS. B. INGLIS,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Chief of Naval Intelligence.

PREFACE

The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive introduction to the field of Naval Intelligence. It is not a book of rules and regulations, but rather a guide to the principles and practices of the profession. The book is divided into three main parts: Part One, Introduction; Part Two, Strategic Intelligence; and Part Three, Primary Functions in Support of Mission. Each part contains chapters that cover the various aspects of the field, from the history and mission of Naval Intelligence to the specific techniques and procedures used in the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence. The book is intended for use by students and professionals alike, and is a valuable resource for anyone interested in the field of Naval Intelligence.

CONTENTS

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION		PART TWO: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE	
Chapter	Page	Chapter	Page
I. INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE AND WAR...	1	IV. INTELLIGENCE AND GRAND STRATEGY...	27
A. <i>The Enhanced Scope and Speed of War</i>	1	A. <i>Definitions</i>	28
B. <i>The Importance of Intelligence in Peacetime</i>	2	1. Grand strategy.....	28
C. <i>Flexibility of Mind</i>	5	2. Strategic offensive.....	28
II. THE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.....	7	3. Strategic defensive.....	28
A. <i>National Foreign Policies</i>	7	4. Strategic initiative.....	28
B. <i>The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff</i>	8	B. <i>Grand Strategy Between World War I and World War II</i>	29
C. <i>The Naval Establishment and Its Administration</i>	8	C. <i>Grand Strategy During World War II</i>	31
D. <i>The Chief of Naval Intelligence</i>	9	D. <i>Grand Strategy After World War II</i>	38
E. <i>Five Main Subdivisions of Naval Intelligence</i>	10	V. NAVAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.....	41
1. <i>The Office of Naval Intelligence</i>	11	A. <i>Definition and Description</i>	41
2. <i>Intelligence foreign posts (attachés, observers, and liaison officers)</i>	12	1. Definition.....	41
3. <i>Naval District and River Command Intelligence organizations</i>	12	2. Description.....	41
4. <i>Intelligence sections and units of the operating forces, including advance bases</i>	13	3. <i>Eight general categories</i>	41-42
5. <i>Naval sections of intelligence activities sponsored jointly by Army and Navy</i>	14	B. <i>Domestic Sources (F and D Branches of ONI; the Naval Districts and River Commands)</i> ..	42
III. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF MISSION.....	15	C. <i>Foreign Sources (the Naval Attaché System)</i>	45
A. <i>Collection of Information</i>	15	D. <i>Fleet Sources (Operational Intelligence Officers)</i>	48
1. <i>Methods of collection</i>	16	VI. POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE.....	51
2. <i>Principal sources</i>	18	A. <i>Political Intelligence</i>	51
B. <i>Processing of Information Into Intelligence</i>	18	1. <i>Definitions</i>	51
C. <i>Dissemination of Intelligence</i>	21	2. <i>Need for coordination of political and military strategy</i>	58
1. <i>Written dissemination</i>	22	3. <i>Psychological warfare</i>	53
2. <i>Graphic dissemination</i>	22	B. <i>Economic Intelligence</i>	59
3. <i>Oral dissemination</i>	23	1. <i>Definitions</i>	59
		2. <i>Economic intelligence and the European war</i>	60
		3. <i>Economic intelligence and the Pacific war</i>	62
		C. <i>Geographic Intelligence</i>	65
		1. <i>Definitions</i>	65
		2. <i>Geographic intelligence in World War II</i>	66
		3. <i>New horizons of geographic intelligence</i>	68

PART TWO: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE—Con.

Chapter	Page
VII. TECHNICAL AND SCIENTIFIC, AND NAVAL POWER INTELLIGENCE	71
A. Technical and Scientific Intelligence	71
1. Definitions	72
2. The time element in research and development	72
3. The technical intelligence center and missions	74
B. Naval Power Intelligence	76
1. Definition and description	77
2. The relation of naval power to grand strategy	78
3. New concepts of naval power	81
VIII. WHO'S WHO, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE	85
A. Who's Who Intelligence	85
1. Definitions	85
2. Axis employment of Who's Who intelligence	85
B. Sociological Intelligence	87
1. Definitions	88
2. Political, ideological, and ethnic forces	88
C. Counter-Intelligence	93

PART THREE: OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Chapter	Page
IX. FLEET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES	97
A. Definitions	97
B. Intelligence and the Operational Functions of Command	98
C. Types of Operational Intelligence Officers	100
D. Information of the Enemy and the Character of the Theater of Action	103
E. The Flow of Information—Direction and Means	104
F. Operational Intelligence Officers at the Sources of Information	105
G. Operational Intelligence Officers at the Intelligence Center	107
H. Operational Intelligence Officers with Tactical Commands	108

PART THREE: OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE—Continued

Chapter	Page
X. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DUTIES	
ASHORE AND AFLOAT	111
A. Intelligence Centers	111
B. Duties at Advanced Bases	115
C. Staff Operational Intelligence Duties	116
1. The preaction phase	117
2. At sea—execution and battle phase	118
3. Post action phase	119
D. Duties on Battleships and Cruisers	119
E. Duties with Submarines	121
F. Duties with Torpedo Boats	123
G. Sea Frontiers and Districts	125
XI. AIR INTELLIGENCE	127
A. The Air Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence	127
B. Functions of the Air Combat Intelligence Officer in World War II	127
1. The ACIO at intelligence centers	128
2. The ACIO on air staffs	131
3. The ACIO on amphibious staffs	133
4. The ACIO attached to ships	135
5. The Air Group ACIO	137
6. The Air Squadron ACIO	139
XII. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE	143
A. Development of Photographic Intelligence	143
1. Capabilities of photographic intelligence	144
2. Limitations of photographic intelligence	146
B. Photographic Intelligence in World War II	147
1. Procedures and techniques employed by photographic interpretation officers	150
2. Billets for photographic interpretation officers	150
3. Planning reconnaissance missions	151

PART THREE: OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE—Continued

Chapter	Page
XII. PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE—Continued	
B. Photographic Intelligence in World War II—Continued	
4. Interpretation	151
5. Damage assessment	152
6. Special skills	152
7. Special assignments	154
XIII. AMPHIBIOUS INTELLIGENCE	155
A. Development of Amphibious Intelligence	155
1. Intelligence in the organization of amphibious forces	156
2. The operational phase of amphibious intelligence	160
3. Training in amphibious intelligence	164
4. Value of intelligence to amphibious forces	165
XIV. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION—THE OKINAWA OPERATION	167
A. Intelligence During the Planning Phase	167
B. Intelligence En Route to Okinawa	172
C. Intelligence at Okinawa	173
D. Intelligence in Supporting Commands	176

PART FOUR: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Chapter	Page
XV. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE	183
A. Description of Counter-Intelligence	184
B. Counter-Intelligence Activities of the Domestic Branch	184
1. Investigations	185
2. Security	187
3. The contact register	196
4. Sabotage, espionage, counter-subversion	196
PART FIVE: CONCLUSION	
XVI. LIAISON AND JOINT ACTIVITIES OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE	201
A. Liaison and Joint Activities during World War II	201
1. The value of liaison	201
2. Types of liaison	203
3. Joint activities	210
B. Postwar Liaison and Joint Activities	
1. Postwar intelligence agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	212
2. The national intelligence authority and the central intelligence group	213
3. The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253)	214
XVII. SUMMARY	219
APPENDIX A. SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY	221

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

INTELLIGENCE IN PEACE AND WAR

There are two major subdivisions in the field of intelligence, namely, counter-intelligence and positive intelligence. Positive intelligence is divided into strategic and operational intelligence. Strategic intelligence is primarily needed by our policy-makers in time of peace to enable us to be prepared for war. Operational intelligence is primarily needed by the commanders of our operating forces once war has begun.

Formerly there was a sharp division between war and peace, and a correspondingly clear-cut division between the two kinds of intelligence. Now, in the light of the experience of World War II, these twin distinctions are in process of being revised, because of mutual encroachments existing between war and peace, and between operational and strategic intelligence.

In similar fashion the distinction between tactics and strategy dwindled during World War II, when the engagements of aircraft carriers at distances of hundreds of miles forced a change in these traditionally held concepts.

The Enhanced Scope and Speed of War

In the last world conflict, both the scope and speed of war have been tremendously enhanced. No real comparison is possible between World War II and any previous war. History tells us that improvements in weapons and methods from war to war are permanent, progressive, and cumulative. There is no retrogression toward the more primitive except in isolated communities. The human animal is not static; he and all his institutions are governed by dynamic change in the direction of greater complexity.

Therefore it is logical to assume that any future war will be more complex than World War II, and will be waged with greater speed, and will involve a larger proportion of the population of the earth.

If this assumption is correct, it follows that the lessons to be learned from World War II are of far greater importance than lessons to be learned from any previous war. These lessons should be studied most carefully and minutely, but they should not be allowed to bulk so large in our field of vision as to obscure current and future developments.

Concurrently with the enhancement of the scope and speed of war which took place progressively from the fall of France to the Japanese surrender, there took place an enhancement of the scope and speed of intelligence. During the black months following Pearl Harbor, America had to resort to improvisation in the face of direct necessity. Shortages hampered our war effort. There was a crying need for more battleships and aircraft carriers, for more guns of all types, for more ammunition, and for trained personnel, particularly trained intelligence officers.

Classic examples of improvisation were provided by the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, and at the time of the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor, when lumbering PBY's were employed as dive bombers against enemy ships, and Army planes took off with torpedoes strapped to their bellies. Improvisation, however, was not confined to the combat forces. Air combat intelligence officers, recruited from civil life, were hastily trained at Quonset Point and rushed out to the fleet and to advanced bases, where there were never enough maps, or enough maps of the right kind, or enough facilities for reproduction and distribution, or enough photographic supplies. American ingenuity was constantly being brought into play to counteract these deficiencies. Ultimately intelligence centers were set up at advanced bases and provided excellent service over wide areas.

Our incomparable production effort brought unprecedented problems of plant protection and internal security on the home front. Soldiers and civilians were mutually interdependent as never before. Civilian fighting forces were built around cadres of professional military men. Annapolis and West Point graduates provided the leadership and set the pattern. Reservists composed as much as 90 percent of the crews of most of our large fighting ships. Reservists filled the overwhelming majority of Naval Intelligence billets.

Thus Naval Intelligence grew step by step with the expanding might of the fleet. In wartime, operational intelligence techniques were evolved simultaneously with new weapons and tactics. Similar growths took place in the Army and Army Air Forces, and tremendous steps forward in joint and liaison activities, in accordance with the directives of and the pattern set by the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The master plan of the two major Axis partners was to encircle the globe, meeting in conquered America, and fighting toward a junction somewhere in India. The tide of Japanese aggression was stopped in the Battle of Midway; the Nazi threat to the Near East was turned back when Rommel was defeated in Africa. Thereafter the geographical scope of the war dwindled, but its technical scope, and the speed and magnitude with which it was waged, increased. There was a decline in the amount of intelligence shared by the Germans and the Japanese, corresponding to the shrinkage of mutual confidence and esteem. There was a steady increase in the amount of intelligence shared by the Allies, corresponding to an increase in joint and combined activities and operations.

Except for sporadic fighting, the shooting phase of World War II ended with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the Japanese surrender. While the war lasted, the emphasis was decidedly on operational intelligence. Now, in peacetime, the emphasis must be placed on acquiring strategic intelligence of the capabilities and intentions of all nations, and on training, including the specialized training of our intelligence personnel. Gen. H. H. Arnold, in his third report to the Secretary of War, dated 12 November 1945, stressed the fact that present intelligence needs

are far different from those of the pre-World War II period:

Our past concept of intelligence needs was insufficient to cover the requirements of modern war.

Detailed and moment-by-moment knowledge of all aspects of civilian and military activity within the territory of an enemy or potential enemy is essential to sound planning in times of peace or war. Continuous knowledge of potential enemies, covering their entire political, social, industrial, scientific and military life, is also necessary to provide warning of impending danger.

Strategic air warfare can be neither soundly planned nor efficiently executed without a continuous flow of detailed information of this kind. In the future it will be suicidally dangerous to depend upon reports of military attachés and routine or casual sources of information regarding foreign states.

There is a great need for a permanent national organization which not only deals with broad questions of policy but also collects, evaluates, and disseminates a continuous stream of intelligence data. In addition, we must have a competent and active air intelligence organization within the Air Force working with such a national organization in times of peace and war.

The National Intelligence Authority and its subordinate body, the Central Intelligence Group, were set up to fulfill the need highlighted by General Arnold in 1945. They will be described more fully in a later chapter, together with the Central Intelligence Agency, which has succeeded them.

The words "war" and "peace" are not absolute, but at best relative terms. It is obvious to all that certain underlying tensions, if not hostilities, have developed between Allied powers since VJ-day. Realists will admit that the peace is a precarious one. Nations vie with each other in maneuvering for economic and political advantage, and the development of new weapons goes on apace.

The Importance of Intelligence in Peacetime

Although the shooting phase of World War II is ended, various kinds of specialized warfare are being carried on in this present time of ostensible peace, just as they were carried on by the Nazis in that false period of calm before World War II. In a recent book entitled *"The Future of American Secret Intelligence,"* George S. Pettee has ably summed up the Nazi contribution to the changed concept of strategic intelligence:

The changes in the scale and character of strategic intelligence were shaped by many factors but the moti-

vation was given by the early Nazi successes. It became apparent, first to close observers, and eventually to everyone, that the Nazis were waging war by economic, political, and psychological means; that they had specific government agencies engaged in these tasks, and that they had developed an awe-inspiring mastery of tactics and strategy in these fields. One effect of the broadened character of the war was the blurring of the line between war and peace. Everything that men do in peace was put at the service of war, and the date when military war began or ended became an arbitrary point in a combined process of broader and longer dimensions.

The outstanding examples of Nazi success in the waging of war by nonmilitary means occurred in the 5 years up to the fall of France in 1940:

Reoccupation of the Rhineland, 7 March 1936. The Spanish Civil War, July 1936-April 1939. Annexation of Austria, 11 March 1938. The occupation of Czechoslovakia, 14 March 1939. The neutrality of Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium. The diplomatic isolation of the Balkan countries. The fall of France, June 1940.

The successes demonstrated two things. First, the Nazis were able to a degree to predict and influence the process of events on the general economic-political-psychological level, whereas we, at the time, were only surprised and dismayed by both the process of events and the apparent Nazi ability to understand and control it. The Nazis boasted, and we recognized the truth of the boast, that they were using a new "combined strategy," in which purely military means were only one element, supporting the effects of economic and psychological weapons to gain political ends. This was an indication as such that the Nazis were utilizing elements of modern knowledge at least equally available to us, but which we had not yet put at the service of policy.

Not so comprehensively and systematically, but with similar ruthlessness and cunning, the Japanese were also preparing for large-scale war in a time of nominal peace. While Churchill warned that, due to the rise of Nazi air power, England's frontier was no longer on the Channel but on the Rhine, Roosevelt urged the civilized world to "quarantine the aggressors." Very few individuals in either the United States or England were as farsighted as Roosevelt and Churchill.

The importance of counterintelligence in peacetime is indicated by the Gouzenko incident. That the average citizen in a democracy in peacetime is inclined to be unrealistic is all too evident, when we consider that in September 1945, Igor Gouzenko, the cipher clerk on the staff of the

Soviet Embassy at Ottawa, having extracted some very interesting documents from the safe which was under his supervision, went to the offices of one of the daily newspapers published in the city, and requested publication of his decision to leave the Soviet service, and the reasons for reaching that decision. The result was negative, as the *Report of the Royal Commission* (Ottawa, June 27, 1946) later pointed out:

Whoever he interviewed at the newspaper office did not act in accordance with his desire. On leaving the newspaper office he proceeded to the apartment where he resided, and the next morning, September 6, he, his wife, and child, left the apartment to remain away until between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening.

He made a number of calls during the day to various official offices and called again upon the newspaper. He was unable that day to have anyone accept him seriously.

Late that night, Gouzenko finally obtained protection from the municipal police. Eventually his story and the documents he provided were substantiated and led to the uncovering of an extensive Soviet spy ring, which was believed to be only one of several such rings in Canada. That this particular ring constituted a real threat to our own security as well as that of Canada and Great Britain, is emphasized in the following quotation, also from the *Report of the Royal Commission*:

In conclusion, therefore, we can say that much vital technical information, which should still be secret to the authorities of Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, has been made known to the Russians by reason of the espionage activities reported on herein. The full extent of the information handed over is impossible to say; as we have already pointed out, these operations have been going on for some time. We should emphasize that the bulk of the technical information sought by the espionage leaders related to research developments which would play an important part in the postwar defences of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The realistic intelligence officer will remember that after World War I an unsuccessful effort was made through the agency of the League of Nations to achieve world order and lasting peace. He will cultivate a sustained interest in and knowledge of a similar effort now being made on a far larger scale through the agency of the United Nations, with the full cooperation and leadership of the United States. But he will be fully aware of the vital necessity for maintaining adequate

national defenses until such time as world order and lasting peace may be proved to be accomplished facts.

Our policy-makers, including both legislators and top military figures, have spoken forcefully on this subject. Momentous decisions on the high levels of statecraft rest with them. It is the function of intelligence officers on lower echelons to provide these policy-makers, through the chain of command, with all intelligence they may require to arrive at their decisions. In time of nominal peace no less than in time of war our national intelligence is our first line of defense.

What we call national intelligence is acquired from thousands of sources at home and abroad which provide raw information to the various Government departments. A vast and complicated process of winnowing and processing takes place, whereby the raw information is converted into finished intelligence, at the peaks of many small triangles. National intelligence may be pictured as one large triangle, at the apex of which are collected the quintessential facts which influence national policy.

There is a descending as well as an upward flow within this large triangle, as specific requests for information are passed from the top to lower levels. There is movement horizontally between agencies or offices on the same level. The speed with which information and intelligence flow depends in the last analysis upon the efficiency of the various components of the national intelligence organization.

Thus any individual, no matter how humbly employed, in any one of the innumerable small triangles, may have a part in large affairs of state. He should accordingly at all times seek to live up to his responsibilities and try continuously to improve his efficiency within the organization of which he is a part. The parallel which exists between peacetime intelligence duty and wartime duty is obvious, particularly in view of the statement made above that wars are continued even in times of nominal peace.

The time element has heretofore been of the utmost importance in war, and of lesser importance in peace. Development of weapons took place by leaps and bounds when nations were confronted with danger of extinction, and progressed more

slowly between armed conflicts. Improvement of old weapons, and development of new ones, took place at a far faster pace in the second than in the First World War, and far higher velocities in weapons and far higher speeds of ships, planes, and tanks called for greater speed in tactical employments.

Science has always been applied to the perfecting and utilizing of weapons of war. It might be said that stone-age man used scientific methods in shaping flint axes and arrowheads. Scientific development was slow at first. Centuries were required for the transition from primitive to refined weapons, from stone to steel, from fire to gunpowder. Later development required not centuries but decades. In World War I it was measured not in terms of decades but of years. In World War II it was measured not in terms of years but of months. Never before did the fates of nations hang so precariously in the balance or depend so completely on the efforts of scientists racing against time.

A few examples may be selected from many: The Stuka helped the Nazis to terrorize and conquer the peoples of Poland and France; the Spitfire helped the English to ward off Nazi aerial onslaughts; giant tanks enabled Rommel to race through northern Africa; improved tanks of the Allies stopped him; Bofors and Oerlikon guns protected our ships from dive-bombers; radar warned of enemy attack, and made possible our massed bomber sweeps over enemy territory. Nazi achievements in guided missiles almost brought England to her knees, and came within an ace of threatening the great population centers of the United States.

The atomic bomb is central to any discussion of new weapons, but it is not the only World War II weapon, by any means, upon which further scientific research is being conducted today. The important point is that the present period of nominal peace is far less a period of actual peace than was the period following World War I. The time element with respect to weapon development is still as important as it was during the war just ended. The time element with respect to statecraft, and with respect to intelligence, upon which statecraft is based, is correspondingly vital. We lost no time in conducting the atomic bomb ex-

periments at Bikini, in assembling the technical intelligence derived therefrom, and in adapting the designs of vessels planned or under construction accordingly.

Flexibility of Mind

A quality useful to all military men, and especially to be desired in the intelligence officer, is flexibility of mind, which may be defined as the ability effectively to meet new situations as they arise, and to predict the course events may take. One who possesses flexibility of mind is capable of bold and original thought; he does not hesitate to break with tradition if in his judgment the circumstances require such a break.

Nevertheless there is a place for the time-tested weapons and tactics, and for conservative thinking. The atomic bomb has not made navies obsolete, for armies must be transported overseas and supplied, and the most effective means of transport at present known is shipping, and shipping must be protected on the high seas. Some aspects of some weapons, such as speed, can be advanced beyond the capacity of other aspects to keep pace with them. It may well be that the trend is in the direction of guided missiles, with the human factor eliminated from actual combat and moved farther back to the ground controls, and beyond that to the factories and research laboratories. But the human factor can never be eliminated from the many ramified fields of intelligence. We have developed machines with uncanny powers of gathering and sorting information, but we have not thus far developed a machine with the power to think, and, by thinking, to convert information into intelligence.

Valuable as tradition may be as a basis on which to build new developments, it is undeniably true that imagination and foresight also have their value, particularly to intelligence officers. Never were these qualities so desperately needed as in the war against Nazi U-boats, when new weapons and tactics were developed and countered with dizzying rapidity.

Imagination in the planning and conduct of operations, and in the development of weapons and tactics, in wartime, is akin to genius. An idea comes in a flash to the mind of the planner, or commander, and is instantly translated into action.

Decisions must be made quickly, and as a result, in spite of brilliant results achieved, mistakes are made. It may be said to our credit that, by and large, mistakes made early in the war were not repeated in later operations. The genius of our planners and commanders was to some extent responsible for this, but it is also true that as the war progressed there was a rapid growth in our intelligence organizations, and a growing understanding and appreciation of the function of the intelligence officer.

That imagination and foresight are not cultivated solely in wartime by our operating forces, our research scientists, and our intelligence agencies, is evidenced by the fact that certain peacetime training exercises, such as Operation Musk-Ox, have been conducted for the purpose of testing Arctic equipment. The last great unexplored areas on the surface of the globe are the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The Navy sent submarines north under the pack-ice in the Bering Sea, and conducted aircraft carrier exercises off the coast of Greenland. The Pacusan Dreamboat demonstrated the feasibility of transpolar flight.

Recently the Navy was engaged in aerial photo mapping of Antarctica, using Martin Mariners, ski-equipped Douglas transports, and other types of planes and ships not hitherto employed in that part of the world. As in wartime, there was a premium on ingenuity and improvisation.

Several other nations have sent, or are sending expeditions to Antarctica, to support claims made to slices of territory. During World War II we brought aerial photography and hydrographic and meteorological observation to a high pitch of effectiveness in the service of intelligence. Methods evolved during the war, and subsequent refinements of those methods, are being used now.

The enslavement of military thought by the false conception of the world in terms of the Mercator Projection is a thing of the past. Military thought is now oriented to global strategy, and both the Arctic and the Antarctic take on new significance. What is known as the Arctic basin will be of particular importance to future planners in this age of rapidly developing aircraft and guided missiles, for the shortest air-line distances to the population centers of Europe and Asia cross

this area. Moscow is only 4,800 miles distant from New York by the great circle route.

Our peacetime national intelligence must keep pace with expanding geographic and scientific horizons. The need for more knowledge, and more accurate and up-to-date knowledge, about more people, more countries, and more continents, is obvious, particularly in view of the implications of nuclear fission.

Training of Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps intelligence personnel is now being carried on at an accelerated pace and on a scale never before attempted, and with greater cooperation than has previously existed between the branches of the armed services and the various Government departments. An attempt has been made in this chapter to explain how the scope and speed of war have increased in recent years, resulting in a need for more comprehensive and more accurate information, collected and processed into intelligence more quickly than ever before. An attempt has also been made to illustrate the trend toward less definite lines of demarcation between strategic and operational intelligence, and between war and peace. We have also demonstrated the value of a realistic attitude, and of such qualities as imagination, foresight, and flexibility of mind, on na-

tional planning levels and in all echelons of our intelligence organizations. The future security of the United States depends in large measure on the effectiveness of our national and departmental intelligence agencies, both of which depend on the capabilities of intelligence personnel now being trained.

As in other kinds of training, the main incentive must come from within the student himself. He will be given full encouragement in this important field of specialization, but without the determination on his part not to become just an intelligence officer, but the best possible intelligence officer, outside assistance will be of little avail. He should remind himself that the field in which he is specializing is as broad as the planet and its surrounding layer of atmosphere which is even now being penetrated, and as comprehensive as all human experience, and that such knowledge as he may acquire may be cumulative, but never complete.

Ideas but lightly touched upon above will be more fully expanded in succeeding chapters, in which the subject of Naval Intelligence is presented within the broader framework of national intelligence, from the viewpoint of the year 1947 but with special reference to developments which occurred during and after World War II.

CHAPTER II

THE MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

The subject of this chapter is the mission and organization of Naval Intelligence. In order to approach this subject properly, it is necessary to consider the following, and to trace the line of authority from the President, who is both Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, down to the Chief of Naval Intelligence:

1. National foreign policies.
2. The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. The Naval Establishment and its administration.

When we have thus oriented the reader we will proceed to state the mission of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and to describe the organization of Naval Intelligence in the Naval Establishment at home and abroad.

National Foreign Policies

The major foreign policies of the United States might be somewhat differently phrased by various high Government officials, depending upon the point of view of the official in question, but central to them and inherent in them is maintenance of national security. On 27 February 1947, in an address entitled "The Navy and National Security," Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King expressed our major national foreign policies, from which our national military policies derive, as follows:

1. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and security of the continental United States, its overseas territories, possessions, leased areas, and trustee territories.
2. Maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of other American States, and regional collaboration with them in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Western Hemisphere.
3. Maintenance of the territorial integrity, security—and the political independence—of the Philippine Islands.
4. Participation in, and full support of, the United Nations.

5. Enforcement, in collaboration with our Allies, of terms imposed upon the defeated enemy states.
6. Maintenance of the United States in the best possible relative position with respect to potential enemy powers, ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States.

Admiral King went on to make what he called reasonable assumptions concerning tasks which our Navy—in conjunction with the Army—will be called upon to discharge, as a result of the above-listed major national foreign policies. These tasks are three:

1. The first is, of course, the security of the continental United States and its overseas possessions.
2. The second, derived from the Act of Chapultepec and coupled with the Monroe Doctrine, is the security of the Western Hemisphere.
3. The third—which is the least well-defined—relates to the commitments of the United States to preserve the peace of the world.

It will be apparent to the thoughtful reader that security in the specialized military sense as well as in the general political sense is involved in several of the policies and tasks stated above by Admiral King, and that intelligence regarding potential enemy states is required for the implementation of the national foreign policy.

The conduct of our national foreign policies is the responsibility of the Secretary of State. The head of the National Military Establishment is the Secretary of Defense, who is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. In this capacity he formulates general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment, which consists of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and all other agencies created by the National Security Act of 1947. The armed forces of the Nation, under the respective Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air, must be maintained in sufficient strength and readiness to back up our foreign policies.

The President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Chief Executive of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the armed forces, is the President, who derives his authority from the Constitution, which was established by the people. The President, advised by his Cabinet, heads the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States in war and peace.

When the National Security Act of 1947 became law, the Secretary of Defense was given Cabinet status; the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air do not have direct access to the President. The Secretary of Defense functions as a coordinator not only of the three military departments, but of the other agencies within the National Military Establishment.

One of the outstanding features of World War II was the successful implementation of the principle of unity of command, as exemplified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a military planning body which was constituted by Presidential Executive order. The Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II operated on a committee system; its authority stemmed from the several responsibilities of the individual members within their own separate spheres of influence. The over-all objective of the body was to assure the coordinated integrating a global war. It was from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations obtained the tasks which were assigned to him, and the command policies which it was his duty to promulgate throughout the Naval Establishment.

The postwar duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be discussed in Chapter XVI, Liaison and Joint Activities of Naval Intelligence, in which the National Military Establishment will be more fully described. In orienting the reader with regard to the place of Naval Intelligence in the Navy, let us now turn to a definition of the Naval Establishment.

The Naval Establishment and its Administration

To define and describe the Naval Establishment and its administration, and the duties of the Secretary of the Navy, we quote below a portion of Navy Department General Order No. 247, signed by the Secretary of the Navy on 10 February 1947; and entitled "Policies and Principles Governing the

Distribution of Authority and Responsibility for the Administration of the Naval Establishment." The quoted portion follows:

1. This general order supersedes and cancels General Order 230.

A. DEFINITIONS

2. The Naval Establishment consists of three principal parts:
 - a. *The Operating Forces* are the several fleets, sea-going forces, sea frontier forces, district forces, and such of the shore establishment of the Navy and other forces and activities as may be assigned to the operating forces by the President or Secretary of the Navy.
 - b. *The Navy Department*, the executive part of the Naval Establishment located at the seat of the Government, which comprises the bureaus, boards and offices of the Navy Department; the Headquarters of the Marine Corps; and the Headquarters of the Coast Guard (when assigned to the Navy).
 - c. *The Shore Establishment*, which comprises all other activities of the Naval Establishment including all shore activities not assigned to the Operating Forces.
3. It is fundamental naval policy to—"maintain the Navy as a thoroughly integrated entity in sufficient strength on the sea and in the air to uphold, in conjunction with our other armed forces, our national policies and interests, to support our commerce and our international obligations, and to guard the United States including its overseas possessions and dependencies." The effectuation of this policy imposes upon the administration of the Naval Establishment four principal tasks:
 - a. First, to interpret, apply and uphold the national policies and interests in the development and use of the Naval Establishment. This task may be described as the "policy control" of the Naval Establishment.
 - b. Second, to command the Operating Forces, and to maintain them in a state of readiness to conduct war; and to promulgate to the Naval Establishment directives embracing matters of operations, security, intelligence, discipline, naval communications, and similar matters of naval administration. This task may be described as the "naval command" of the Naval Establishment.
 - c. Third, to coordinate and direct the effort of the Navy Department and the Shore Establishment in order to assure the development, procurement, production and distribution of material, facilities and personnel to the Operating Forces. This task may be described as the "logistics administration and control" of the Naval Establishment.
 - d. Fourth, to develop and maintain efficiency and economy in the operation of the Naval Establish-

ment with particular regard to matters of organization, staffing, administrative procedures, the utilization of personnel, materials, and facilities, and the budgeting and expenditure of funds. This task may be described as the "business administration" of the Naval Establishment.

4. The executive administration of the Naval Establishment as prescribed by law, executive order or directive, consists of:

- a. *The Secretary of the Navy*, who is responsible directly to the President for the Supervision of all naval matters.¹
- b. *The Civilian Executive Assistants* to the Secretary (the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, the Assistant Secretary for Air and the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary) who perform such duties as prescribed by the Secretary or as required by law.
- c. *The Naval Professional Assistants* to the Secretary, who comprise:
 - (1) *The Naval Command Assistant* (the Chief of Naval Operations) who is responsible under the Secretary of the Navy (a) for the command and administration of the Operating Forces; (b) for the preparation, readiness and logistic support of the operating forces, and (c) for the coordination and direction of effort to this end of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.
 - (2) *The Naval Technical Assistants* (the Chiefs of Bureaus; the Chief of Naval Research; the Chief of the Material Division; the Judge Advocate General; the Commandant, Marine Corps; and the Commandant, Coast Guard (when assigned to the Navy), who are directly responsible for the discharge of all the duties assigned to their respective organizations, and are the technical advisers and assistants, in their special fields, to the Sec-

¹ Passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which, in the spring of that year, became Public Law 253, did not materially affect the internal organization and administration of the Navy Department, but it did change high-echelon administrative and command relationships. The Secretary of the Navy is no longer responsible directly to the President for the supervision of all naval matters. Public Law 253 provided for the setting up of a National Military Establishment, headed by a Secretary of Defense, who is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the national security. The duties of the Secretary of Defense include the establishment of general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein, and the exercising of general direction, authority, and control over such departments and agencies. Hence the Secretary of the Navy is immediately responsible to the Secretary of Defense, but he may report directly to the President or to the Director of the Budget, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Navy in addition to being head of his department is also a member of the National Security Council, within the National Defence Establishment; and the Chief of Naval Operations is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For further discussion of the provisions of Public Law 253, see chapter XVI.

retary, the Civilian Executive Assistants, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

The four principal tasks of the executive administration of the Naval Establishment (defined in par. 3 above) are divided, in the remainder of General Order No. 247, among the Secretary, his Civilian Executive Assistants and his Naval Professional Assistants. Since we are here concerned with the place occupied by Naval Intelligence in the administration of the Naval Establishment, we turn now to section D of the General Order, which deals with the duties of the Naval Professional Assistants. We quote only that part of section D which is pertinent to this discussion:

D. DUTIES OF THE NAVAL PROFESSIONAL ASSISTANTS

8. It will be the policy of the Secretary to assign the following duties, in accordance with law and executive orders, to the Chief of Naval Operations:
 - a. Responsibility for the "naval command" of the Naval Establishment which responsibility embraces:
 - (1) Command of the Operating Forces.
 - (2) The functions of principal naval adviser to the President and the Secretary on the conduct of war, and the function of principal naval adviser and naval executive to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the activities of the Naval Establishment.
 - (3) The promulgation to the bureaus, boards and offices of the Navy Department and to the Shore Establishment of such directives as he deems necessary with respect to matters of operations, security, intelligence, communications, naval personnel discipline and similar matters affecting the naval maintenance and protection of the Naval Establishment.

The location of Naval Intelligence in the Naval Establishment is fixed by paragraph 3 above in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, because cognizance over security and intelligence directives is assigned to CNO.

The Chief of Naval Intelligence

The word *intelligence* in the sense in which it has been used thus far in this text has a long history in English speech. In the sixteenth century, beside its primary meaning, "the faculty or product of the intellect," intelligence also began to be used to mean "information acquired or communicated." This secondary meaning usually carried the connotation of secret information, col-

lected for, and communicated to, a ruler or governmental authorities by spies. Such agents were called *intelligencers*, a word now obsolete, and the organization in which they operated as the *intelligence* of the directing authority. In modern usage, the word in this secondary sense has come to mean:

1. Information collected for the use of Government authorities, usually about foreign states or potential dangers.
2. Any organized system of collecting, evaluating, and transmitting such information.

In either of these meanings, the word is usually accompanied by an adjective to denote the purpose for which the information is gathered, as, for instance, "diplomatic (or political) intelligence," "commercial intelligence," or "military intelligence."

This text is concerned with *naval intelligence*, that branch of military intelligence which is of predominant naval interest, and with *Naval Intelligence*, the organization headed by the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and located in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, who is the Naval Command Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. The distinction between the two phrases must be thoroughly understood and kept clearly in mind. The phrase *Naval Intelligence Service* is obsolete; it has been replaced by *Naval Intelligence*. The phrase *Naval Intelligence Division*, formerly used to signify the intelligence organization of the Chief of Naval Operations, is also obsolete; it has been replaced by *Office of Naval Intelligence*.

As used in the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force intelligence is taken to mean information which has been systematically collected for a definite purpose and from a definite point of view, and which has been subjected to critical analysis, evaluation and collation so that it is no longer a mere mass of facts but a coordinated and organized body of pertinent information suitable for the needs of services concerned and for the guidance of their commanders.

The phrase *naval intelligence* when used as an abstract noun to indicate material collected, processed, and disseminated for the use of naval authority, may be defined as:

The product of the subjection of information of naval interest to evaluation, analysis, and synthesis for the purpose of revealing its meaning and significance.

The mission of naval or military intelligence is to provide the commander with both a shield and a weapon; a shield by protecting him against surprise and safeguarding the secrecy of his plans, preparations, and movements; a weapon by providing him with information which will enable him in time of peace to be ready for any emergency, and which will in time of war assist him to plan and execute successful operations. Toward successful operation, the supreme task of the naval or military commander, intelligence must contribute the information necessary for an accurate estimate of enemy strength as affected by the contemplated theater of operations, and every available clue which may assist the commander to penetrate the intentions of the enemy and anticipate his movements.

The mission of United States Naval Intelligence is, in general terms, to provide this shield and weapon. It has been variously phrased in more specific fashion in the directives of the General Board, in Basic War Plans, and in other authoritative sources, but its basic principles, like those of warfare, do not change. The mission of the Chief of Naval Intelligence is set forth in chapter III of the *Naval Intelligence Manual—1947*, as follows:

To administer, operate, and maintain Naval Intelligence in order to provide intelligence necessary for operations and war plans and in order to keep responsible naval authorities informed of the war capabilities and intentions of foreign nations; and of situations or trends threatening the security of the Naval Establishment.

Five Main Subdivisions of Naval Intelligence

Naval Intelligence consists of:

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence.
2. Intelligence Foreign Posts (attachés, observers, and liaison officers).
3. Naval District and River Command Intelligence organizations.
4. Intelligence sections and units of the Operating Forces, including advance bases.
5. Naval sections of intelligence activities sponsored jointly by Army and Navy.

We will discuss each of these five main subdivisions in turn, beginning with the organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is the intelligence section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. On the organization chart of CNO, the Office of Naval Intelligence is under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations.

The organization of United States Naval Intelligence has come into line with accepted general staff doctrines. In the United States Army, for instance, the General Staff Intelligence Officer (G-2) performs staff functions on the same echelon as the staff officers charged with responsibility for operations, personnel, and supply; and intelligence officers are assigned to lower echelons, down to battalions, companies, and air squadrons, to perform the appropriate staff function for their immediate commanders. In the Navy it will clarify our point of view to think of all intelligence officers as serving on the intelligence section of some commander's staff, the degree of elaborateness with which the section is organized depending on the needs of the command served. On lower echelons, the intelligence section may consist of a single officer who also performs other staff duties, such as that of assistant operations officer, and the commander served—the captain of a ship or the commander of an air squadron—may not be normally thought of as having an organized staff at all; on higher echelons intelligence duties may be divided among many officers. The higher the echelon of command, as a rule, the more elaborate the staff organization, and the larger and more complex the intelligence section.

The highest echelon of United States Naval Command is that of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The intelligence officer for the Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and the intelligence section of CNO is the Office of Naval Intelligence.

When the Office of Naval Intelligence was first established in 1882, the General Order creating it described its purpose as "collecting and recording such naval information as may be useful to the Department in time of war as well as peace." Its first duty was the supervision of the new system of naval attachés, and for the first 35 years of its existence the Office of Naval Intelligence was largely occupied with the collection of foreign

information through the attaché system. Its organization during this period was relatively simple, and the number of officers on duty in it at the Navy Department was small. The events of World War I, particularly the activities of German spies and saboteurs directed against our shipping and our naval establishments, led to an increased emphasis on the security functions of Naval Intelligence, and a consequent enlargement of the personnel employed, and of the objectives envisaged. The further history of this development is referred to at greater length in the appropriate following chapters. The more complex intelligence problems of World War II, particularly the enormous demand for all kinds of geographical information incident to joint and combined operations in many parts of the world, and the special techniques and demands of air intelligence, led to a further considerable expansion.

The Office of Naval Intelligence

Under the Chief of Naval Intelligence and his Deputy, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is divided into seven branches headed by Assistant Chiefs of Naval Intelligence, and one branch (the Liaison Branch) whose head is not an Assistant Chief. These eight branch heads are charged with the various objectives necessary for the accomplishment of the mission of the Chief of Naval Intelligence and with the services contributing thereto. Each of these branches is designated by a capital letter following the number of the intelligence subdivision of CNO, and subdivided into sections and subsections designated by numbers following the branch letter. Thus the Office of Naval Intelligence is Op 32; the Administrative Branch is Op 32C; the Services Section of Op 32C is Op 32C2; and the Subsection of the Services Section which is charged with mail and files is known as Op 32C24. The work of certain of the branches of ONI will be discussed in more detail in later chapters. Here a general description will be sufficient for sketching the outline of the organization as a whole. All branches, sections, and subsections of ONI are shown on the organization chart facing this page.

Two branches, the Domestic Branch and the Foreign Branch, have principal cognizance of the

two main activities of Naval Intelligence in time of peace. The Domestic Branch (the D branch) is charged with security matters, especially with the security of naval information and naval personnel, and with all the investigative, control, and censorship duties connected with this responsibility. The Foreign Branch (the F Branch) is charged with the collection and processing of all foreign information of naval interest. It is staffed with area and technical specialists, and has general cognizance of the activities and reports of United States naval attachés and photographic intelligence.

Of the other branches, two are concerned with the special techniques and procedures of intelligence more particularly in time of war. The Air Branch (V) services and coordinates fleet intelligence for fleet aviation activities and is responsible for the preparation of estimates (1) of alien capabilities to employ offensively, and to defend against, air weapons; (2) of foreign and domestic strategic vulnerability to air attack; and (3) of facilities affecting the employment of air power. The Operational Intelligence Branch (Y) supports and coordinates Fleet Intelligence.

The remaining four branches of ONI are charged respectively with Planning (X), with Protocol and Liaison (L), Security Classification Control (K) and with Administration (C). This last, in addition to the routine services of administration and personnel, has the important duty of handling ONI mail and despatches and the custody of ONI records and files. Beside the eight branches of ONI, Joint Army-Navy intelligence activities are also within the immediate cognizance of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

All branches, sections, and subsections of ONI have missions and objectives specifically set forth; these are not quoted here because a more general discussion is intended.

Intelligence Foreign Posts (Attaches, Observers, and Liaison Officers)

Paragraph 1 of article 425, section 9, *Navy Regulations* states that Naval Intelligence, under the Chief of Naval Operations, is the organization charged with the intelligence and the counter-intelligence mission of the Naval Establishment, and that the head of Naval Intelligence is the Chief of

Naval Intelligence. We have stated above that in time of peace two branches of ONI have principal cognizance of the two main activities of Naval Intelligence—the Domestic Branch (D Branch) being charged with security of naval information and naval personnel, and the Foreign Branch (F Branch) being charged with the foreign collection, processing, and distribution of all foreign information of naval interest.

The F Branch has general cognizance of naval attachés, naval observers, and liaison officers, and all other Naval Intelligence officers stationed abroad. Naval attachés and their staffs are maintained by the Office of Naval Intelligence and are officially a part of Naval Intelligence even though they reside outside the country. They are under the control of the Chief of Naval Intelligence and report directly to him. At the same time, naval attachés are ordered to report for duty to the ambassador or minister who is Chief of the Diplomatic Mission to which they are attached. The size of the Office of the Naval Attaché varies, depending on the importance accorded by the Navy Department to the area controlled by the foreign government to which he is accredited.

The principal function of Naval Intelligence officers stationed abroad is to acquire foreign intelligence of naval interest, and to submit it, after preliminary evaluation, to the F Branch in ONI.

Naval District and River Command Intelligence Organizations

The Shore Establishment of the United States Navy is organized throughout the continental area and major territorial possessions of the United States into naval districts, river commands, and sea frontiers. In each district and river command, a district intelligence officer (DIO) serves on the staff of the Commandant, much as the Chief of Naval Intelligence serves on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. The district intelligence office under the DIO is the intelligence section of the staff of the Commandant, as ONI is the intelligence section of the staff of CNO. Thus, the Commandant of each naval district and river command directs and is responsible for the maintenance and operation of naval intelligence within his command, as CNO directs and is responsible for all of naval intelligence. Naval intelligence

is organized in each district and river command in accordance with instructions issued by ONI. The district intelligence office organization is under the military command of the Commandant. The District intelligence officer, in certain designated districts, has additional duty on the staff of the Sea Frontier Command.

In each district and river command, the district intelligence office is organized along lines similar to those of ONI; it is divided into branches charged with such general missions as the collection of foreign intelligence from domestic sources, or the safeguarding of naval security, and further subdivided into sections with more specific missions, such as investigations. The intelligence organization consists of the headquarters office, district or river command, and such branch or zone offices as may be required, and such intelligence units at naval stations and other naval activities as may be ordered by the Commandant. These field units are a part of naval intelligence. The branch and zone offices are directly under the district intelligence officer. The intelligence officers assigned to the naval stations and other naval activities are members of the staff of the Command of the activity in question and under his command.

Just as it is part of the mission of the F Branch of ONI to support naval attachés and others on foreign duty, so it is part of the mission of the Domestic Branch (D Branch) of ONI to support district intelligence officers and their organizations. The dual responsibility of the DIO to his Commandant and to CNI is comparable to that of the naval attaché to his Chief of Mission and to CNI.

Effective 1 July 1946, the Naval District and Operational Intelligence Personnel Section of ONI was disestablished, and the Reserve Section was reestablished in the Administrative Branch, with the mission of administering and maintaining the Reserve Component of Naval Intelligence for mobilization purposes.

The Commandants of all naval districts and river commands are now conducting, under the supervision of the district intelligence officers, specialized intelligence training programs for members of the Organized and Volunteer Intelligence Components. All intelligence officers of the

Naval Reserve are being assigned mobilization billets, and efforts are being made to recruit additional qualified personnel.

Intelligence Sections and Units of the Operating Forces, Including Advance Bases

In the fleet, as in the districts and river commands, the basic pattern of the intelligence organization is that of the fleet staff section. On the staff of each area, fleet, type, and task force commander, and on the staffs of all flag officers exercising command, there is an intelligence section headed by a flag intelligence officer. The responsibility for organizing, maintaining, and operating the intelligence service for each command falls upon the appropriate commander, acting under whatever directives may be issued by his superior in the chain command.

When it was directed in June 1946 that section 9, article 425, be inserted in *Navy Regulations*, the following additions were also incorporated:

687-A

The commander in chief, or commander of any force or unit of the operating forces not operating under the commander in chief, shall maintain an efficient intelligence organization within his command.

786, (2) (c)

The organization of the staff shall include an intelligence section headed by a line officer designated as flag intelligence officer.

Wartime practice was not so consistent. Partly because of the widely differing needs of the several commands, partly because of the necessarily more independent responsibility of commands afloat, the various fleet intelligence organizations developed early in World War II along varying lines. Later the advantages of greater uniformity and coordination were perceived, and considerable progress was made toward such coordination. Nevertheless, the exigencies of any future war are likely to require specific intelligence organizations widely different from those of peacetime, since upon each commander rests the responsibility for organizing his intelligence section to meet his particular needs. But no future development is likely to alter the responsibility incumbent upon intelligence officers with the fleet, as upon all members of Naval Intelligence, to see that all information collected flows upward to the higher echelons

where it can be properly evaluated and disseminated and so, ultimately, reach the Office of Naval Intelligence, the section of the highest command which the whole system is expected to serve.

The organization of fleet intelligence during the last war need be outlined only briefly here. In general, the area commanders were served by large intelligence centers, which later set up offices in forward sectors for more efficient dissemination. An intelligence officer was assigned to each flag afloat, including fleet air wings, sometimes with one or more assistants. Intelligence officers were also assigned to battleships, cruisers, destroyer and motor torpedo boat squadrons, to all major amphibious units, and to all carriers, air groups, and air squadrons.

Throughout the fleet, intelligence officers have a dual responsibility: to their immediate commander, and, through the intelligence sections of the superior commands, to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Naval Sections of Intelligence Activities Sponsored Jointly by Army and Navy

During World War II the global nature of the fighting, involving as it did the development by the United Nations of many different types of troops, of many nations, in various war theaters, required joint and combined activity, and hence joint and combined intelligence, to a far greater degree than had ever been the case before. United

States Naval Intelligence officers served as observers with the British Fleet, and British personnel were attached to American armed forces. Amphibious operations in both the Pacific and European theaters were planned and executed jointly by sea, ground, and air specialists.

Naval Intelligence participated in joint intelligence activities on all echelons during World War II, from the joint intelligence committee, the intelligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, down to small field units engaged in such tasks as the exploitation of captured documents and the interrogation of prisoners of war. Less than a dozen of these joint intelligence activities continue to function in peacetime.

Several trends initiated in wartime have become even more marked in the postwar period—namely, the trends toward joint scientific research and development, joint intelligence, and joint staff training.

Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 has brought about far-reaching changes in our defense structure, not the least of which is the legal sanction given two temporary wartime agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Group. The former operates on the committee system; the latter, now known as the Central Intelligence Agency, is a national intelligence agency. Naval intelligence officers are at present on duty in the Intelligence Group committees now operating under the joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the Central Intelligence Agency.

CHAPTER III

PRIMARY FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF MISSION

Wherever an intelligence officer may be stationed, he is obliged to exercise certain general skills. The specific duties and problems of the chief types of intelligence assignment will be described in later chapters, but the primary functions in support of the mission of Naval Intelligence will be presented here.

The primary functions, which might also be called the main steps, are three in number:

1. Collection of information.
2. Processing of information into intelligence.
3. Dissemination of intelligence.

Collection of Information

An intelligence officer is first of all a collector of information. Therefore he needs to be full of natural curiosity, avid for new facts. He must have, or cultivate in himself, what is known in journalistic circles as a "nose for news."

He must be continually alert for every hint of something interesting that he does not already know. Along with this constant watchfulness for "leads" and the ability to recognize them instantly and by half a word, he must be willing to spend endless time and energy running down every "lead" he gets. He must be patient and resourceful, and often very inconspicuous in research and inquiry, but he must not be disappointed if the trail turns out to be a false one. After all, even the certainty that a given lead was false adds another fact to the collection.

Moreover, to be of value to Naval Intelligence, the intelligence officer must be a discriminating collector. He will usually have some guidance from authority as to specific developments in which he is called upon to interest himself, but in most situations he will be expected to do a great deal more than merely follow directions. He needs to be able to recognize and seize among the details coming to his attention every item, however fragmentary, of possible interest to the Navy or to the other agencies with which he is in liaison. And if

he is not to waste that vital element, time, he needs, like any discriminating collector, to know thoroughly the contents of the existing collection. Otherwise he will squander his energies running after worthless duplications of items already in the files, and fill his reports with data available in common books of reference.

Fortunately, both curiosity and discrimination are traits that can be developed. They are most easily developed together. The more one knows of any subject, the more intelligently and discriminatingly curious one is apt to be. Therefore, the intelligence officer who wants to become an efficient collector of information will begin by making himself a master of subjects he will be expected to pursue.

The Naval Intelligence officer is a specialist within a larger field of specialization, that of intelligence in general. He will keep abreast of all military matters—technical developments, tactical doctrine, strategic theory, with special reference to navies, of course, but without neglecting land and air forces.

In the second place, he will learn all he can of foreign countries, particularly of the major naval and military powers. He will make himself an expert on at least one of them, acquiring its language, saturating himself in its history and literature, and studying its political and economic and social problems, its customs and its ideologies.

Finally, he must, immediately upon assignment, begin to acquire a complete familiarity with the whole field of his particular duties, from the point of view of the needs which he is expected to supply. An intelligence officer cannot have too much background information.

The vistas of background information spread out in two dimensions—in space and in time. Spatially, or geographically, our knowledge of the world in which we live is increasing rapidly, as distances shrink. Our knowledge of the world and of people existing in past times is likewise

increasing, as scholars delve into history and publish the results of their researches.

Past experience as well as present knowledge is a good teacher. It has been said that there is nothing new under the sun. There are only new combinations and permutations. In the field of intelligence, the coast-watchers of the Pacific in World War II had their counterpart in the train-watchers in France during World War I. The principle of the rocket was taken from the shelf of the remote past, dusted off, and adapted to modern needs, with spectacular results.

The able intelligence officer will be primarily concerned with the present in his acquisition of information, but he will not neglect the past, nor will he be reluctant to project his mind forward to anticipate future developments. We are a nation of visionaries; our greatness resides not so much in our past, which is brief compared with that of other nations, as in our ability to predict, and to some extent to shape the future.

Techniques of collection should be as systematic as circumstances permit. Information comes to us quickly, through the senses, throughout each day. It may be converted into intelligence by instantaneous processes of thought, and may or may not be acted upon. In crossing a crowded street there is neither time nor need for recording of written information. But in almost any more complicated situation some sort of check-list of information already acquired may be filled in, so as to arrive at as complete a picture as possible within the limits of the intelligence objective.

Topically organized files and annotated maps and charts are not only necessary to preserve and keep accessible the information collected, but are themselves one of the best guides of systematic collection. No such mechanical aids, however, should be permitted to limit the quest for all new facts within the designated field of interest.

Methods of Collection

Both information and intelligence are collected by overt and covert means, and by various methods. "Overt" is synonymous with "open," and "above-board." "Covert" is synonymous with "secret," and "clandestine." A request for, or an

exchange of, information is an overt means; a surreptitious entry and search is a covert means.

The most common methods used are as follows: Official exchange with foreign governments, arranged by and carried out under the supervision of the Office of Naval Intelligence; direct or indirect access to the source; investigations, and interviews with persons having information of value; observation, inspection, reconnaissance, and photography; research; cooperation with other Federal Government agencies. Each of these methods is in itself a field of specialization. Obviously the fields overlap to some extent, as in the case of investigation and interviews.

Furthermore, each of these methods has both a long-range strategic and a short-range operational aspect. Information acquired by Prisoner of War Interrogation (another form of interview) may be processed into operational intelligence immediately after one battle and prior to another.

The Axis powers, particularly Germany and Japan, were assiduous collectors of information prior to and during World War II. When Hitler rose to power in 1933 he set in motion, under Admiral Canaris, a world-wide network of espionage agents, ranging from the professional spy to the amateur informer, whose sole mission was the collection of many different kinds of information. This network, backed by unlimited funds, funnelled vast quantities of facts to headquarters in the Nazi homeland, where systematic winnowing took place. The Japanese conducted their espionage less scientifically and on a smaller scale but with an equal amount of zealotry. One of their specialties was photography; another was the planting of naval personnel aboard ostensibly harmless fishing vessels and at other points from which observation could be conducted.

The methods of collection listed above have specific naval as well as general military connotations. From the point of view of Naval Intelligence, the authorized exchange of information with foreign governments is usually conducted in accordance with established policy, either by naval attachés, abroad, or by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in Washington.

The individual intelligence officer, stationed at home or abroad, should establish and maintain

either direct or indirect contact with sources of information of naval interest. Obviously direct contact is preferable.

Investigation is resorted to when routine naval procedure will not produce the results required. Covert means are usually employed in this method of collecting information, in order not to alarm the subject or subjects.

Skillfully conducted interviews may produce good results, particularly if the interviewer possesses adroitness and a superior knowledge of the main topic under discussion. Hearsay evidence, as well as eyewitness testimony, is valuable in intelligence work.

Information obtained by direct observation depends on the training and background of the observer. One significant detail may reveal a wealth of information to one observer, and mean nothing to another.

Inspection results from a more leisurely examination, as in the case of a weapon unveiled for the first time before military experts or publicly invited officials. Inspection implies permission to be seen.

Reconnaissance for the purpose of obtaining information or intelligence may be conducted by force sufficient to overcome anticipated resistance, or deception. Carlson's Raiders conducted a celebrated reconnaissance in force when they landed on Makin Island in World War II. Ordinary reconnaissance was employed in clandestine fashion by submarines and aircraft prior to amphibious landings on Japanese-held territory. Both types of reconnaissance have as their objective specific items of information or intelligence.

The airplane was tentatively used for photographic reconnaissance during World War I. The amount and quality of information thus obtained increased tremendously in World War II, as a result of new techniques and equipment. In addition to photographs taken for specific operational purposes, illustrations in foreign publications may be revealing sources of information.

Research based on Naval Intelligence files, or carried out in public repositories such as archives and libraries, may be extremely productive, not only of strategic intelligence, but of information vital to the conduct of actual operations.

Cooperation with other Federal Government agencies was effected early in the war, and has been smoothly and successfully maintained beyond VJ-day. The principal agencies with which Naval Intelligence has cooperated are to be found among those listed below as sources of information.

Basic guides to collection of information and intelligence may be found in the official statements of the missions and objectives of the seven branches of ONI, in the *Naval Intelligence Manual—1947*, the short title of which is *ONI 19 (A)*; and in *Navy Regulations*.

Additional instructions are issued from time to time by the Chief of Naval Intelligence to units outside ONI as to specific information and intelligence especially desired. Branch heads in ONI are responsible for keeping their want lists up to date, and for guiding and assisting the various intelligence officers, who are themselves responsible for collecting information and intelligence of naval interest.

It is easier to collect foreign information and intelligence in peacetime than in time of war, because of the general relaxation of security controls, and because of the relatively freer movement of travellers, merchant vessels, and professional and businessmen. German and Japanese "tourists" had almost unlimited freedom of movement in the democratic countries before World War II. On the other hand, it became increasingly difficult to obtain information and intelligence from Germany and Japan following the ascendancy of Hitler and the forging of the Axis grand strategy. The twilight deepened into complete darkness. The most stringent security controls were imposed in Germany. The penalty for espionage and disclosure of military information was death even in time of peace. The headsman and his axe were well publicized. Counter-espionage was developed to a high degree. The result was that Germany became an almost impregnable fortress, insofar as information and intelligence was concerned, before the Nazi mechanized columns rolled into France.

It is mandatory that all sources of foreign information be exploited to the maximum consistent with security in time of peace, because after diplomatic relations have severed, or after the war has broken out, collection may be carried out in the

enemy country and in satellite countries only by covert methods and at great risk.

Principal Sources

Information of naval interest, and naval intelligence, are collected from many sources, which may be grouped into naval sources, Government sources, and business and professional sources, at home and abroad.

Naval sources include the Office of Naval Intelligence; the five main subdivisions of Naval Intelligence officers described in chapter II; the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department; other naval commands, ships, and staffs.

Government sources include State Department and Army intelligence units; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Treasury and Coast Guard; the Customs and Immigration and Naturalization Services; the Central Intelligence Agency.

Business and professional sources include business, industrial, and engineering firms; professional and scientific organizations; and the proceedings and journals thereof; trade journals and magazines; business, professional, and scientific exhibits and demonstrations.

Other sources which do not fall in the above-named categories include municipal, county, and State records and officers; libraries and archives; confidential informants.

In time of war, prisoners, captured documents, and items of enemy equipment are sources of intelligence; after cessation of hostilities the entire industrial and technological potential of the enemy is examined by teams of experts.

Just as we may deduce certain facts from a knowledge of what particular secrets are being sought by foreign agents in this country, so foreign agents may obtain intelligence from learning what information we are eager to procure. The intelligence officer must use great care not to compromise our own plans by revealing the type of information being sought and the degree of interest in that information. In brief, skill is required in the collection of information as well as in the later stages of the intelligence process.

It is axiomatic that some sources will be reluctant to disclose information unless their identity is concealed. Business or professional careers or life itself may be at stake. If sources are assured that

they will not be compromised, a continuing flow of information is far more likely to result.

We have said that the intelligence officer must be an eager and inquisitive collector of information. At the same time he should be highly skeptical, unwilling to accept any item he acquires until he has subjected it to the most rigorous critical tests, and strictly limiting his acceptance to the degree to which the item in question has satisfied such tests. Such critical testing comes under the second of the three primary functions, processing of information into intelligence.

Processing of Information Into Intelligence

This function, like the earlier function, collection, and the later function, dissemination, is carried on by all components of Naval Intelligence, and is interrelated with the other two functions.

Processing consists of five principal steps, listed below and thereafter discussed in greater detail:

1. Evaluation.
2. Analysis.
3. Research.
4. Synthesis.
5. Meaning of the information.

It is important to conceive of information as being not static but continually in motion. It is gathered and processed by the collector, who disseminates it upward to higher echelons, laterally to the other echelons on the same level, or downward to lower echelons, where it may again and again be subjected to processing by different hands and from different viewpoints. All information is affected by persons having cognizance over it, who process it and pass it on. After he has collected it and passed it on, the one who first gathered it becomes a source, or transmitting agent. All recipients must at all times carefully scrutinize the source from which information has been obtained, and must themselves be on guard against human and mechanical errors in transmission which may occur while the information is in their custody.

Even when information, after having been processed into intelligence, has come temporarily to rest in filing cabinets in one or more offices, it is only in suspended animation. It may have set a chain of events in motion, or it may be drawn from the file, in whole or in part, at any time for use jointly or in conjunction with later information or

intelligence to activate further events. Like a high velocity shell it has force in motion, supplemented by momentum. And like any intricate mechanism it may become valueless if not used in time, and may deteriorate if not used at all.

The fifth of the above-listed steps in processing, the determination of meaning, must be carried out before information may be disseminated, as intelligence, to those who need to know. The only exception to this rule is the receipt of information indicating immediate danger to all or a part of the Naval Establishment, in which case determination is temporarily dispensed with, and the information is disseminated directly to the command concerned.

We will now take up each of the five steps in the processing of information into intelligence.

To evaluate means to ascertain the value of; to appraise carefully. The housewife evaluates produce when she goes shopping. The man of the house evaluates a new brand of pipe tobacco. In the vernacular, to evaluate means to "size up" a person, thing, or situation.

In intelligence work, evaluation is the basic element in processing information. It is the first step, and it is repeated in each of the succeeding steps.

This first step consists of three separate evaluations, as follows:

1. Reliability of the source.
2. Accuracy of the information.
3. Meaning of the information.

In testing the source for reliability, the question of authenticity arises first. Is the source from which the report ostensibly comes the true source?

Double agents have in the past planted false papers for purposes of deliberate deception. A classic example of this, as related by Hector C. Bywater in *Their Secret Purposes: Dramas and Mysteries of the Naval War*, took place during World War I, when a German warrant officer discovered charts of Russian mine fields and coast defenses in a brief-case which a beautiful woman, Anna of Libau claimed had been left behind by a former lover. The warrant officer, much excited by his discovery, obtained an audience with higher German naval authorities. Minesweepers went in at night and found that the indicated clear channel

was actually free of mines. Gun flashes were observed at the shore defense positions marked on the map, and gunfire problems were worked out accordingly. The next day a strong force of German ships moved in, not to victory, but to disaster. The Russians had sown mines in the clear channel later that night. The gun positions were dummies, located far from the site of the actual coast defense batteries.

The German warrant officer was a reliable transmitter, but the papers found were false, and the woman was subsequently identified as a well-known Russian agent. In this case, incorrect evaluation of the reliability of the source of information cost the German Navy heavily in ships and men.

World War II provides an example of the double agent in William Sebold, who was considered by the Nazis to be one of their most reliable spies. Sebold set up a short-wave radio transmitter on Long Island, as directed by Nazi spy-masters, but actually broadcast false information to Germany, with the full knowledge and support of the American Government. The second question which arises in testing the source for reliability is that of trustworthiness, which is broken down into loyalty, motive, and objectivity.

Trustworthiness is a factor which may change with the passage of time. A person may have divided and conflicting loyalties. The evaluator should not only try to assess the present loyalty of the source, but should anticipate circumstances under which it might be weakened or turned to active hostility in the future. The Nazis failed properly to evaluate the conflicting loyalties of William Sebold. They assumed that his loyalty to Germany predominated over his loyalty to the United States; the reverse was the case. The treachery of many Japanese-Americans before World War II was counterbalanced by the proved bravery and loyalty of Nisei troops.

Loyalty of a source, and hence its trustworthiness, may be determined to some extent by past performance. The loyalty of the German warrant officer mentioned above was unquestioned, but he in turn misjudged the trustworthiness of Anna of Libau, from whom he obtained the false papers. An officer or enlisted man in the United States armed forces is given a higher loyalty

rating, as a source, than a suspicious citizen of a neutral power, or a prisoner of war.

The motive of Anna of Libau in turning over the false papers to the German warrant officer was presumed by him to have been desire to avenge herself for having been deserted by her former lover. Actually it was an entirely different motive. It is true that strong emotions such as jealousy, revenge, patriotism, fanaticism, frequently lead to disclosure of information by a source. The motive may be revealed by the manner in which the information is made available, or by study of the background and personality of the informant.

The third subdivision of trustworthiness, the question of objectivity, is even more difficult to determine than loyalty and motive. All persons possess certain prejudices by virtue of their environment and background. No man is a completely objective witness. What he sees and reports may be colored by idiosyncrasies of which not even he may be aware, let alone the person to whom the information is transmitted. Nevertheless, the objectivity of the source must be determined insofar as is possible, and allowances must be made for such lack of objectivity as may be discovered.

The third test for reliability of the source is that for competency. In this test the training of the observer and his opportunity to observe the incident come into question. Here again, the record of the source must be examined. If in the past he has been a close and competent observer, whether or not he is aware of the full implications of what he reports, the chances are that his information has value. An informant who is known to be an expert in a given field may usually be presumed to be competent in related fields.

It goes without saying that United States naval attachés and assistant attachés are, by virtue of their specialized training, the most competent sources of naval intelligence obtained from abroad.

Following evaluation of the source, the second of the three types of evaluation is that of the accuracy of the information. A reported item is tested by three criteria, here given in the order of their importance: confirmation, coherence, and compatibility.

The item may be confirmed, or not be confirmed, or contradicted when tested against information already available. Two reports containing similar data, but originating from different sources, must be closely compared down to the smallest details if the information contained therein is to be confirmed. Minute differences however, generally do not destroy the value of those portions of the two reports which can be reconciled.

The second of the three criteria by which the accuracy of information is judged is the coherence of the item with the situation as it is known to exist. When, for example, enemy fleet units are reported to be in an area to which they are capable of having proceeded from their last reported positions; and, furthermore, when the new disposition is in agreement with the over-all operational picture, the information may be said to be coherent, and therefore the accuracy factor is enhanced.

The third criterion is compatibility of the item with the entire extant body of intelligence. An unconfirmed report may be consistent with intelligence on hand regarding the capabilities of the enemy; such a report should be given some credence. Another report, which has received confirmation, may nevertheless be at variance with intelligence at hand; such a report should be regarded with suspicion. In brief, the accuracy of an item cannot be established by satisfying only one of the three tests. Confirmation, coherence, and compatibility are interrelated; and an item may be judged accurate in proportion as it satisfies all three.

After the questions of reliability and accuracy have been decided the evaluator must ask of each item of information, "What does it mean?" Sometimes the significance of a report is obvious; sometimes the report will leave several alternates equally probable. For example, a detected flight of bombers might indicate only one target, or the movement of enemy barges the reenforcement of a particular position. Where the significance is obvious the dissemination of the information should be immediate; however, in cases where the significance is not positive further processing covering analysis, research, and synthesis is necessary in order to arrive at a final determination of the meaning of the information.

It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Officer of each Command to know the intelligence needs and requirements of that Command, and to meet them.

Failure of higher authority to act, and to act in time, on the intelligence collected, processed and disseminated by an intelligence agency is well illustrated by the following quotation concerning British naval performance in World War I:

The massive armor and extensive under-water protection of the German dreadnaughts were well known to the British Admiralty, which had received particulars and diagrams of practically every ship that Admiral Scheer commanded at Jutland. These had been secured by our agents years beforehand, and it was not their fault if the Admiralty had neglected to produce armour-piercing shells capable of piercing the sides and decks of the German ships and detonating with full force inside.

An accurate description of the shell which the Germans used with deadly effect at Jutland was in the hands of the Admiralty as far back as 1911, together with an account of its performance against armoured targets on the Krupp proving-ground at Meppen and specially constructed target ships at sea.

At or about the same date drawings and details were furnished of the latest torpedoes in production at the Government factory at Friedrichsort, near Kiel, these being the weapons by which the U-boats were destined to sink millions of tons of shipping.

All essential particulars of the German naval mine, which, although simple, was extraordinarily reliable and effective, were contained in our prewar I. D. files, yet in spite of this information we ourselves clung to an obsolete and inefficient type of mine for nearly 2 years after the outbreak of war.

—Bywater and Ferraby, *Strange Intelligence: Memoirs of the Naval Secret Service.*

Ironically enough, much-improved shells, torpedoes, and mines were later produced for and used by the British Navy, but not in time.

The time element is essential not only in strategic planning but in the intelligence aspect of the conduct of operations as well. The determining factor in the selection of the means of transmitting intelligence should be the immediate urgency of the item sent. If the item is extremely urgent, the most secure means of transmission consonant with the desired speed will be selected. There will be emergencies when a plain language despatch is to be preferred, for the sake of speed, to one in code. There will even be emergencies—in some combat situations they are very common—when

We turn now to the second step in processing, the analysis step. This consists of breaking a report down into all its component parts. Each separate part is then studied for whatever significance it may contain in itself. Incomplete parts may then be filled out, and missing parts may be supplied, from collateral information.

It is the function of the third step, research, to fill in these incomplete parts, and to supply such parts as may be missing from the report.

Synthesis, the fourth step in processing, follows evaluation, analysis, and research. It consists of the putting together again of the separate parts into a coherent whole consisting of the information in question together with all other pertinent information and intelligence.

The fifth and last step in processing, the final determination of the meaning of the information, now takes place. It will be remembered that a preliminary determination of meaning took place in the first, or evaluation, step.

Final determination of meaning is necessary to support the basic mission of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, who is charged with the execution of the intelligence and counter intelligence mission of the Naval Establishment. This last step, the final determination of meaning, concludes the processing of information into intelligence. The intelligence thus derived is now ready to be prepared for dissemination to the naval commanders who need it for fulfillment of their missions and objectives, or to be filed in such a manner as to be readily and immediately accessible.

Dissemination of Intelligence

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that Naval Intelligence is not an action agency. Its mission is to forewarn those whose responsibility it is to act. The third primary function in support of its mission is the dissemination of intelligence to appropriate naval authorities and commanders according to their need.

This function must be performed in time to allow countermeasures if required to be taken. Upon the commander concerned falls the responsibility for acting in support of naval policy and the mission and objective of his command, including security.

intelligence must be disseminated by voice radio.

The scope and speed of both operations and channels of communication increased tremendously in World War II. We cite the following as an example of an extremely urgent item of intelligence, transmitted to the appropriate action agency without delay. During the North African campaign, one of the spotting planes from the flagship off Casablanca encountered "bandits" and signalled:

Am coming in on starboard bow with couple hostile aircraft on my tail. Pick 'em off—I am the one in front!—Morison, *Operations in North African Waters*.

Action—the only suitable action possible—was taken at once; the big ships opened fire with 5-inch batteries, shooting down one hostile plane and driving off the other.

Intelligence is disseminated not only within commands and combat units, but between commands and other parts of the Naval Establishment, and between the Navy Department and other Government agencies. This subject will be discussed more fully in subsequent chapters.

We have indicated that intelligence is of little value unless it is used, or disseminated in usable form. Actual usefulness depends to a large extent upon clear, convincing, and attractive presentation. These in turn depend upon the same disciplines and the same principles that make an effective short story or an effective advertisement. Intelligence is presented in three forms; these are:

1. Written dissemination.
2. Graphic dissemination.
3. Oral dissemination.

Written Dissemination

Intelligence is disseminated in words, both orally and in writing. The purpose is to insure that the intelligence presented gets across to its consumers as fully, clearly, and interestingly as possible, so that it may receive the attention it deserves and be used to the full extent of its potential usefulness. In words, effective presentation is achieved by aiming at clarity, force, and attractiveness. The principles by which these aims may be accomplished in words are set forth in a whole library of textbooks on the arts of speaking and writing, and are illustrated by the practice

of all effective public speakers and by the whole body of respectable English prose. Officers can most easily improve their ability to speak and write well by attending to these models.

It is one of the requisites of the job of an intelligence officer to be able to write clear, straightforward, readable, English prose. The desirability of this accomplishment for all naval officers has been emphasized again and again by high authority. The main directives on the writing of naval communications or orders, with their insistence on unity of subject matter and clarity and brevity of statement, are admirable guides as far as they go. But they are not intended to be complete guides. The rules for writing good naval English are essentially the same as the rules for writing good English in general.

The more common means of written dissemination used in the Navy generally and in Naval Intelligence specifically are the following:

1. Orders.
2. Forms.
3. Reports.
4. Memoranda.
5. Dispatches.
6. Letters.
7. Studies.
8. Booklets.
9. Leaflets.

If it is mandatory that good English, including acceptable punctuation, be used in these means of dissemination of information and intelligence; it is also mandatory that the material be presented with due regard to legibility and arrangement on the printed page.

Graphic Dissemination

Graphic presentation will be clear in proportion as it is unified in purpose, consistent and unmistakable in its use of symbols, and legible in details. Its force and attractiveness will depend, like its clarity, on adherence to fundamental principles of effective design.

Nothing contributes more to the clarity of any graphic presentation than unity of purpose. Intelligence charts should be prepared for a specific purpose; every item of information useful for

this purpose should appear, and all other items should be suppressed. A chart that shows harbor installations should not be unnecessarily cluttered with notations of irrelevant buildings and topographic details; a target folder designed for use by bombing squadrons is not usually improved by including elaborate hydrographic data.

In military graphic presentation, symbols are of the utmost importance. The intelligence officer spends a good deal of time working with plots and maps and charts; he should be thoroughly familiar with the ordinary grammar and vocabulary of this kind of graphic expression, and should be careful always to employ the accepted military and naval symbols so that any trained person can read his plot or overlay at a glance. Every chart for dissemination should have a key to the symbols employed, readily legible in the margin.

Graphic presentation, like any other form of dissemination, should be convincing and attractive as well as clear. Emphasis in graphic presentation is achieved by bold lettering, by strong, solid outlines, and by the use of simple and strongly contrasted colors for the different items of information plotted. Attractiveness is increased by graceful and pleasantly proportioned lettering and by the choice of harmonious colors. The principal means of graphic dissemination of intelligence are as follows:

- | | |
|---------------------|-------------|
| 1. Plots. | 4. Maps. |
| 2. Photographs. | 5. Charts. |
| 3. Motion pictures. | 6. Posters. |

If one or more of the above is to be projected on a screen as a "slide," the principles of graphic dissemination must be adhered to in the preparation of the slide, with the added factors of legibility at a distance and equipment available to be considered. The intelligence officer will not usually have control over conditions under which motion pictures are made, but he will control the conditions under which they are shown, and should see that these conditions are as favorable as possible.

Oral Dissemination

Intelligence is disseminated orally by the following means:

- | | |
|--------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Lectures. | 3. Conference. |
| 2. Briefing. | 4. Telephone and radio. |

Lectures may be delivered, with or without audiovisual aids, before audiences of students in naval schools on various levels of instruction. Briefing, a specialized form of lecture, may be conducted for the benefit of a squadron of fliers about to take off on a mission. A conference of staff members may be held, in which the admiral requires an up-to-the-minute oral statement of the current situation. Under actual combat conditions, or in maneuvers and training, communication by voice, radio, or telephone will be used.

Whatever form oral dissemination takes, it is essentially a more or less prepared speech delivered to an audience, and it is subject to the general rules for effective public speaking.

The briefing officer is under the same obligation to organize his material logically, present it coherently and fluently, and emphasize his main points unmistakably, as the preacher, the politician, the professor, or the salesman. If he wants to be understood, it is just as necessary for him to keep his head up and speak loudly and distinctly as it would be in any other walk of life. And if he wants to avoid distracting his hearers by awkward and irritating mannerisms, and thus risk losing either their attention or their sympathy, he will do well to cultivate an easy, simple, straightforward, and unembarrassed habit of speech. Practice is the best aid to effective speaking, and there are public speaking courses in which corrective measures can be supplied to those who need them. Every naval officer ought to be able to speak effectively in public. This ability is even more necessary to the intelligence officer.

All intelligence officers assigned to any kind of intelligence duty collect, process, and disseminate information. Naval Intelligence as a whole exists to perform these three primary functions. First, the information needed by the Navy for the accomplishment of its general mission must be collected. Next, it must be converted into intelligence by careful processing. And finally, before it can be used, it must be adequately and effectively disseminated. Throughout all stages of these three primary functions the intelligence officer must exercise both caution and judgment in the preservation of security. Whatever special skills he may require, he will need the basic skills necessary for these basic tasks.

Lectures may be delivered, with or without audio-visual aids, before audiences of students in naval schools on various levels of instruction. Briefing a specialized form of lecture may be conducted for the benefit of a squadron of officers about to take on a mission. A conference of staff members may be held in which the technical features of an up-to-the-minute oral statement of the current situation. Under actual combat conditions, or in maneuvers and training, communication by voice, radio, or telephone will be used.

Whether in form oral dissemination takes it is essentially a more or less prepared speech delivered to an audience, and it is subject to the general rules for effective public speaking.

The briefing officer is under the same obligation to organize his material logically, present it coherently and fluently, and emphasize his points unmistakably, as the speaker, the public speaker, the professor, or the command. If he wants to be understood, it is just as necessary for him to keep his head up and speak loudly and distinctly as it would be in any other walk of life. And if he wants to avoid distracting his hearers by awkward and irritating mannerisms, and thus risk losing either their attention or their sympathy, he will do well to cultivate an easy, simple, straightforward, and unembarrassed habit of speech. This is the best aid to effective speaking, and there are public speaking courses in which corrective measures can be applied to those who need them. Every naval officer ought to be able to speak effectively in public. This ability is even more necessary to the intelligence officer.

All intelligence officers are trained to any kind of intelligence duty collect, process, and disseminate information. Naval intelligence is a whole enterprise to perform these three primary functions. First, the information needed by the Navy for the accomplishment of its general mission must be collected. Next, it must be converted into intelligence by careful processing. And finally, before it can be used, it must be adequately and accurately disseminated. Throughout all stages of these three primary functions the intelligence officer must exercise both vision and judgment in the proper use of security. Whatever security skills he may require, he will need the basic skills necessary for these basic tasks.

This purpose should appear, and all other items should be suppressed. A chart that shows harbor installations should not be unnecessarily cluttered with notations of irrelevant buildings and topographic details; a larger label designed for use by briefing speakers is not a really improved by including elaborate hydrographic data.

In military graphic presentation, symbols are of the utmost importance. The intelligence officer spends a good deal of time working with plans and maps and charts; he should be thoroughly familiar with the ordinary grammar and vocabulary of this kind of graphic expression, and should be careful always to employ the accepted notation and naval symbols so that any trained person can read his plot or report at a glance. Every chart for dissemination should have a key to the symbols employed, readily legible in the margin.

Graphic presentation, like any other form of dissemination, should be interesting and attractive as well as clear. Emphasis in graphic presentation is achieved by bold lettering, by strong, solid outlines, and by the use of simple and strongly contrasted colors. The different items of information plotted. Attractiveness is increased by careful and pleasantly proportioned lettering, by the use of harmonious colors. The principles of graphic dissemination of intelligence are as follows:

1. Maps
2. Charts
3. Plans
4. Diagrams
5. Tables
6. Lists
7. Reports
8. Summaries

If one of the above is to be projected on a screen, the principles of graphic dissemination must be adhered to in the preparation of the chart, with the added factors of legibility at a distance and equipment available to be projected. The intelligence officer will not usually have a screen and projector under which to project his charts, and he will control the position of the screen and projector and should consider the position of the screen and projector as favorable as possible.

Charts should be projected only by the following methods:

1. Projector
2. Screen
3. Table
4. List
5. Report
6. Summary
7. Chart
8. Map

PART TWO: STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER IV

INTELLIGENCE AND GRAND STRATEGY

Strategic intelligence in general may be divided into the following categories:

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Political. | 5. Military, naval, and air power. |
| 2. Economic. | 6. Personalities. |
| 3. Geographic. | 7. Sociological. |
| 4. Technical and scientific. | 8. Counter-intelligence. |

The field of strategic intelligence of naval interest is similarly divided. Naval Intelligence is the subject of this text. Strategic intelligence of naval interest is an important part, but only a part, of Naval Intelligence. As officially defined for naval purposes, strategic intelligence is "intelligence needed by naval commanders charged with determination of naval policy and planning."

Just as specific strategic intelligence of naval interest is needed by these commanders, so is strategic intelligence in general needed by governments in order to determine national policy and planning. The master plan of a nation in both war and peace is called its "grand strategy," a term which includes not only military planning but domestic and foreign policy as well. A notable feature of the interim period of ostensible peace between World Wars I and II, and of World War II itself, was the fact that grand strategies were formulated and conducted by single nations and groups of nations on a scale not previously thought possible. Notable features of the present postwar period are the facts the tensions resulting from World War II have not yet been resolved, that new tensions have arisen, and that grand strategies are conducted by the principal powers in times of peace as well as in war.

Strategic intelligence is of primary importance to the formulation of grand strategy in times of war and peace; operational intelligence is of primary importance to those charged with the tactical phases of implementing grand strategy in wartime. Yet it must be emphasized again that

the dividing lines between war and peace, between tactics and strategy, and between operational and strategic intelligence are not so sharp as they were formerly. For example, phases of a grand strategy may be conducted in peacetime as propaganda operations by means of specific tactics. Such terms may be used, however, for the sake of convenience, if it is clearly understood that overlapping exists, and that change occurs.

In chapter I the statement was made that Nazi successes in waging war by nonmilitary means, up to and including the fall of France in 1940, constituted the motivation for changes in the scale and character of strategic intelligence. It was pointed out that further changes took place during World War II, when the Allies were forced to cope with the new Nazi "combined strategy" which included not only military means but economic-political-psychological means, and to keep pace with the rapid development of weapons and tactics.

Since strategic intelligence has changed in the last decade, it follows that the strategic intelligence aspect of Naval Intelligence has also changed. A broad method of approach to the strategic intelligence aspect of Naval Intelligence will be adopted, beginning with a discussion, in this chapter, of the grand strategies of the principal powers before, during, and after World War II, from the general strategic intelligence viewpoint, in the light of recent events and recently published books and documents. The remaining chapters in Part Two will amplify the subject thus introduced, present more specific historical examples, and outline the scope of strategic intelligence from the Naval Intelligence viewpoint.

Because Naval Intelligence itself is but a part of national intelligence, and national intelligence itself is but a part of the grand strategy of the United States, it can best be approached and understood with reference to the broader picture.

As this is written, events are taking place on the world stage which have their roots in the

past decade, and which will make their influence felt for decades to come. Indeed it may not be an exaggeration to say that the fate of the world, or of civilization as we know it, continues to hang in the balance, even after the termination of World War II.

The student of military affairs, particularly the intelligence officer, should not allow his preoccupation with the lessons learned in the Second World War to blind him to issues currently at stake between nations on the economic-political-psychological level, nor should he devote his attention exclusively to the drama now unfolding. The essential continuity of history makes the compartmentation of the human chronicle into self-contained and disparate units unwise. Cause and effect, action and counter-action, form an unending pattern. Grand strategies may be initiated and terminated within war, or they may be conducted, with or without change, continuously between wars.

This chapter is not to be construed as an exhaustive or even nearly complete study of the relation of strategic intelligence to grand strategy in recent years. Its purpose will have been served if it causes the reader to recapitulate the main sequence of events prior to, during, and after World War II, and if it causes him to think in terms of national aspirations and achievements and international issues. Ideally it should stimulate in him the desire to pursue his own researches into specialized aspects of the field, and to keep abreast of current developments.

Definitions

Specialized definitions of the words "tactics" and "strategy" were presented among other definitions in chapter II. It will be remembered that, according to *Manual of the Operational Functions of Command, Including Sound Military Decision*, it is the province of strategy to determine and assign objectives the accomplishment of which will assist in winning the war, and to allocate and to produce at the required time and place an adequate and suitable force to attain each assigned objective against anticipated enemy resistance. A clear understanding not only of the meaning of this word, but of the meaning of the following terms, is necessary to a discussion of strategic intelligence:

1. Grand strategy.
2. Strategic offensive.
3. Strategic defensive.
4. Strategic initiative.

Grand strategy is defined by B. H. Liddell Hart in the article entitled "Strategy" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (14th edition) as follows:

Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and manpower of the nation in order to sustain the fighting services. So also with the moral resources—for to foster and fortify the will to win, and to endure, is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. And it should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Nor is that all, for fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy. It should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and, not least, ethical pressure to weaken the opponent's will. A good cause is a sword and a buckler. Furthermore, while the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peacefulness, secure and prosperous.

If we substitute for the word "force" the word "nation" in the following quotation from *Operational Functions of Command*, we arrive at usable definitions of the terms *strategic offensive*, *strategic defensive*, and *strategic initiative*, as applied in the realm of grand strategy:

A force that acts with a view to changing the character of the current situation to one more favorable is operating on the *Strategic Offensive*. A force whose aim is to maintain that character, that is, to prevent it from becoming more unfavorable, is operating on the *Strategic Defensive*.

In most cases one of the forces possesses choice as to time, route and destination in overseas movements. That force is said to possess the *Strategic Initiative*. In most cases it will be held by the force operating on the strategic offensive. A force which can accomplish its mission, if the enemy does not interpose, always possesses the strategic initiative.

In the purely naval sense, a "force operating" connotes the actual maneuvering of combat units into battle in wartime; in the broader sense of grand strategy, a nation may operate on the economic-political psychological level in times of ostensible peace, to gain diplomatic or trade advantages, or to produce psychological effects, by propaganda and by threat of force, favorable to an ultimate over-all plan of conquest. Nations, as well as combat units, can and do take the strategic initiative.

The role of strategic intelligence in peacetime is to aid the chiefs of state in formulating grand strategy, and to enable military leaders in lower echelons to plan in such a way as to support the decisions of the chiefs of state.

Grand Strategy Between World War I and World War II

The grand strategies of the Axis powers were formulated separately in the 1920's, and began to be implemented and combined in the 1930's. Mussolini marched on Rome and established the first dictatorship. The Japanese fortified their newly acquired Mandated Islands. Hitler dramatized himself and his mad scheme for world conquest in *Mein Kampf*.

Japan took the strategic initiative in China on September 18, 1931, when she arranged the Mukden Incident as a pretext for the rape of Manchuria.

The rise of nazism as a political and military force began when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933. Clandestine preparation for war began at that time, but Germany did not take the strategic offensive in the international arena until March 7, 1936, when she reoccupied the Rhineland.

With much pomp and ceremony, Italy took the strategic offensive against helpless Ethiopia early in 1935.

Each of these aggressions, and each of the large-scale plunderings soon to follow, was in defiance of existing treaties and international law. The western democracies stood helplessly by; they were on the strategic defensive. By 1936 Hitler had created the "Rome-Berlin Axis," and, in conjunction with Mussolini, had intervened on a large scale in the Spanish Civil War for the purpose of testing new weapons and tactics. And by 1936 he had also evolved and put into action the new Nazi "combined strategy," in which purely military means were supplemented by economic-political-psychological means. Because he held the strategic initiative, he was able to a large extent to predict and determine the course of events.

By this time he had set up a world-wide system for gathering strategic information, and scientific facilities for sifting, classifying, and cataloging it, and for converting it into intelligence. In the period 1936-40 it became increasingly clear that

the grand strategy of the Nazi regime was territorial aggrandizement by means short of war, and the forging of armed might against the day when conflict with major powers could no longer be avoided.

During the same period, Mussolini played second fiddle to Hitler. His ambition was not so grandiose, nor were his resources comparable. Meanwhile Japan grew ever more deeply embroiled in her land war in China.

The following statement by Hansjürgen Koehler, in his book *Inside the Gestapo*, describes an actual device used by the Nazis to acquire strategic intelligence in Spain just prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, and testifies, from first-hand knowledge, to the thoroughness of the Gestapo. By special arrangement with Berlin, the Hagenbeck Circus was sent to Spain, and roamed the country for months.

Such a circus had hundreds of employees and the agents of the Gestapo could easily be placed among them. Before the circus arrived in some garrison, its pioneer workers and publicity men could be sent ahead; they could gain access to almost any place. On the lorries of the circus they could drive across districts which were important from a military point of view and could take measurements and photos.

The propaganda which the circus made must not be overlooked. They took tons of pamphlets with them and distributed them chiefly in the south into which part the other German organizations had some difficulty in penetrating * * *.

About the end of 1936 the Gestapo had cleared Spain almost completely of dangerous or harmful German elements. The party controlled all the German subjects through the Secret State Police; they were willing to fulfill any command. The counter-espionage departments of the Gestapo had acquired through their agents and the German associations all the important data on Spanish economic and industrial units and were able to influence them accordingly. The main details of the navy, army, aviation, railways, high roads, and shipping were all in our hands. The Gestapo not only watched closely its own Nazi members, but had its men planted in every important place of both friendly and inimical Spanish parties who reported every movement.

It is interesting to note that in addition to gathering long-range strategic intelligence, the Gestapo also employed current information operationally, as in the control of German nationals and the influencing of Spaniards, and the dissemination of propaganda.

Hitler and his gang were not taken seriously by influential persons in the western democracies, certainly not by Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin. As early as 1934, however, Winston Churchill began to issue solemn warnings regarding the new peril beginning to take shape beyond the Rhine, and for this he was regarded as a political firebrand. England remained on the strategic defensive while these men, and the later exponent of appeasement, Neville Chamberlain, were in power. The western democracies were then, and would continue to be for some time to come, on the strategic defensive.

England and France were getting very little intelligence out of Germany, because it was part of the Nazi grand strategy to infest the homeland with armies of counter-spies, and to punish betrayal of military or industrial secrets by well-publicized beheading, and to employ torture and execution to stamp out disaffection whenever and wherever detected. Lethargy in the British Government, and corruption in high places in the government of France, prevented the right kind of action from being taken in response to such intelligence as was received regarding German rearmament.

Meanwhile Hitler was leading the Nazi state to triumph after triumph. The annexation of Austria took place on March 11, 1938; Czechoslovakia was occupied on March 14, 1939; the neutrality of Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and the diplomatic isolation of the Balkan countries were achieved; France fell in June 1940. These successes were to a large extent due to the Nazi "combined strategy," a form of grand strategy adapted to the purposes of a ruthless dictatorship in which total mobilization could be enforced immediately for the waging of total war.

How was the traditional concept of intelligence broadened by the Nazis to serve their new grand strategy and to implement their revolutionary methods of warfare? To *blitzkrieg*, or "lightning war," were added fifth-column activities, and the "war of nerves," also known as "psychological warfare."

The fifth column has been well described in a pamphlet entitled *Fifth Column Lessons for America*, by Col. William Donovan and Edgar

Mowrer, published in 1941 prior to our declaration of war on the Axis powers:

When all allowance has been made for Hitler's superior armies, for his resourcefulness, for his daring and for the vital assistance rendered by the fancitized Germans living within the victim countries, his amazing successes can only be explained by another factor. This is nothing less than the presence among his enemies of what has, since the Spanish Civil War, been known as the "fifth column." The fifth column has been defined by one of the Britishers engaged in combatting it, as a body of people who, through political disaffection, self-interest, or frank corruption, most easily respond (a) to enemy propaganda, and (b) to the normal activities of the enemy espionage service. But despotic or totalitarian countries ruthlessly suppress it at home while exploiting it elsewhere. It is in a democracy that the fifth column can function most freely and effectively. It remained for Adolph Hitler's genius to raise the creation, strengthening, organization and activity of the fifth column in the countries that opposed him to a decisive weapon.

The establishment of a fifth column as it existed in France and other European countries involves the expenditure of vast sums of money not only for espionage but for the systematic subornation and corruption of high public figures who are in a position through governmental or press power to paralyze the national will to resist. Since they had thrown overboard the traditional concepts of economics which hampered the defense of the democracies during the interim between World Wars, the Nazis could spend astronomical figures on aircraft and other weapons. In their planned economy a proportionately large sum of money was allocated to intelligence work, including the creation of fifth columns and the conduct of propaganda. Donovan and Mowrer, in the pamphlet cited above, state the amount spent, and remark on the scope and aim of the Nazi intelligence organization abroad at that time:

Since we must ascribe a huge share in Adolph Hitler's incomparable successes to his use of Germans and fifth columnists in victim countries, the question arises: how was such a success possible? How are Germans abroad brought to such self-sacrificing enthusiasm for the Nazi regime? How above all can foreigners living under relatively mild and civilized governments be induced voluntarily to betray their own countries for Hitler's Germany? It seems mysterious.

The answer is \$200,000,000 spent annually on organization and propaganda abroad. The immensity of this sum is the secret. Nazi Germany is not a govern-

ment—not even a "folkdom" of the sort Nazi orators talk about. Nazi Germany is a conspiracy. Its scope is universal and its aim world domination. The center is the NSDAP or Nazi Party. The tool is the *Auslandsorganisation* (or Organization Abroad) of this party. Today this organization of Germans abroad has nearly 4 million members, all of whom are conscious agents.

While the sum mentioned is far greater than that ever spent by any of the western democracies, singly or together, for intelligence and propaganda, it is not fantastic when you compare it to the cost of the Maginot Line. A British journalist, S. Theodore Felstead, in 1941 published a book entitled *"Intelligence: An Indictment of a Colossal Failure,"* in which he wrote:

The Maginot Line lulled France—and Britain—to sleep. The disturbing, continual agitation against Holland all the winter, the flooding of the dykes, the serious revelations of treason and espionage paid for with Nazi money, told the French experts nothing.

So Gamelin, and his Government, it seems, held the opinion that all was well with their impressive Maginot Line. They were content that its weakest part should be held with their weakest troops. A greater sin was never committed against any nation, short of selling it outright to the highest bidder. Two hundred million pounds' worth of fortification held exactly 5 days. With it went 350 million pounds in arms and equipment. The French, and other people equally interested, were probably blissfully unaware that Hitler liked the easy way around anything.

Intelligence, which, according to Felstead, enabled Germany to probe the secrets of construction and fortification of the Maginot Line as early as 1932, and a skillful "war of nerves" conducted in the winter of 1939-40, followed by the ultimate blitzkrieg, enabled 200,000 men, at the most, to defeat a nation with 5,000,000 men under arms and to overrun the lowlands and carry the war to the Channel coast itself. From the Nazi point of view, the \$200,000,000 spent annually for intelligence and propaganda was money well spent, except in England and the United States. When England declared war on Germany, and when the United States went to war with the Axis, all known enemy agents were rounded up, and threatened campaigns of terrorism and sabotage never materialized.

That the Nazi grand strategy was truly global in scale, and was directed, among other objectives, at gaining a foothold in Latin America, was recognized by Hugo Fernandez Artucio, who wrote

in *The Nazi Underground in South America*, published in 1942:

An undeclared war is being waged in Latin America today against the democratic institutions and the independence of the New World Republics. The war is being conducted with fearful efficiency by the soldiers of the Third German Empire, who have been distributed by thousands throughout the political underground of this continent. They are the agents of Adolph Hitler, whose mission it is to put into practice here, as in Holland and Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Norway, Austria and France, the principles of totalitarian warfare. In this concept of war, actual armed invasion becomes merely the final link in a long chain of underground preparation * * *

A political scheme of international implications has been set afoot on the American Continent * * *. Its object is to set up a government as nearly like the totalitarian regime as possible, and the method employed is "the war of nerves." Its creators know, with Machiavellian cunning, the political function of fear.

The advantage of strategic initiative, and hence the advantage of surprise, lies with the totalitarian state, dedicated to world conquest, because innumerable covert aggressions are carried out in times of ostensible peace by a horde of fanatic agents. Powerful nations are lulled by skillful propaganda into a false sense of security. Others, less powerful, are threatened, coerced, and attacked. The Axis powers sought to change the existing world situation to one more favorable to themselves. Each succeeded remarkably well up to a certain point, beyond which there set in gradual decline leading to eventual destruction.

Grand Strategy During World War II

The veil of secrecy which shrouded many of the important decisions made during wartime on the grand strategy level tends to be broken down after the cessation of hostilities, when war histories and the memoirs of key politico-military figures are published, and the texts of hitherto top secret international agreements are released to the press.

Similarly the publication of "post mortems" obtained from high-ranking German and Japanese officers by prisoner-of-war-interrogation sheds partial light on different facets of the Axis conduct of the war. The human element must be taken into account in these testaments—a German admiral may blame the loss of the war on political intrigue, an air force officer may criticize air

strategy, an Army officer may state that a different deployment of land forces might have brought about a more favorable result. The jealousies and conflicts which existed in the camp of the enemy in wartime are not forgotten in time of peace. When the human element, and the naturally biased points of view of the various witnesses, are taken into account, there remains an extraordinarily interesting and ever-growing body of knowledge.

We are primarily interested in the intelligence aspects of grand strategy, that is, we desire to learn what failures of strategic intelligence may lie behind failures on the field of battle and on the diplomatic front.

The period up to and including the fall of France, as commented on above in this chapter, was characterized by brilliant Nazi successes; thereafter, when Hitler was forced into war with both England and the United States while still embroiled on the continent of Europe, Nazi blunders were the order of the day.

There is evidence that no war with England or the United States was contemplated by the German High Command during the period of initial Nazi successes. An essay by Admirals Schniewind and Schuster includes the following statement:

A war on such a tremendous scale—or even with England—was in 1939 quite beyond the range of the preparations and intentions of the Government. But the policy of the Government and its political negotiations did not make any provision for this idea, as subsequent developments showed. They completely failed to realize the determination on the part of those who were later to become her enemies to declare war in the event that Germany carried out any further activities similar to the occupation of Austria, Sudetenland, or Czechoslovakia. Germany, her armed forces and especially the navy, were thereafter taken unawares and had to enter the war inadequately equipped.

This statement is further borne out and developed from a navy point of view in the following quotation from an article entitled "From Panzerschiffe to E-Boats," by Vice Admiral Hellmuth Heye:

Foreign politics were of particular importance from the naval point of view. The release of Germany from the Versailles Treaty by means of the Treaty of London was a step which promised a hopeful development. Admiral Raeder, in common with all the best naval opinion, held the view that the war of 1914-18 was lost as a result of Anglo-American sea power. The land decision was only a result of Anglo-American superiority at sea. The Navy therefore held the view that the waging of modern

warfare is only possible, especially in the air age, when there is no determining enemy superiority at sea. Naturally all the necessary conditions appertaining to the use of the sea in an essentially continental country like Germany were difficult to achieve. From the top downward all important offices in the Ministry of War and in the air arm were occupied by persons who were essentially land-trained. The Navy found it impossible to introduce qualified officers into either the Air Ministry or the War Ministry.

Naturally this state of affairs could not but have an influence on the decision taken on all questions connected with the sea and sea warfare. Nevertheless, every effort was made on the highest level to avoid under all circumstances hostilities with England. This hope, as I see it, remained up to the very day of the declaration of war by England. There is no better evidence of this than the fact that until close up to the outbreak of war, I believe 1938, the Navy was expressly forbidden to study or consider the problems presented by a war with England.

If the admirals quoted above are to be believed, the Nazi High Command, which had hitherto held the strategic initiative, was, when Britain entered the war, placed on the strategic defensive insofar as sea power was concerned, but managed to retain the strategic offensive with respect to air power.

Nazi strategic intelligence failed to predict in advance the psychological factors which would make England a belligerent; Nazi diplomatic effort might have gained and preserved an attitude of neutrality in England even if the English character had been correctly estimated. General Wolff, under P. O. W. interrogation, stated that the personal shortcomings of Hitler himself were reflected in his foreign policy:

Since the introduction of this type of government (dictatorship) everything stood or fell with the personality of the Fuehrer. With all regard to his positive qualities and accomplishments, one has to acknowledge the following shortcomings and, in some instances, mistakes on his part: Lack of inborn gentility, lack of education, character, and personal knowledge of foreign countries. This lack of personal knowledge of foreign countries did not enable him to realize the consequences of his ungentlemanly conduct (his sensational breaking of the Munich agreement, 1938; his surrounding himself with followers some of whom were definitely inferior; nor the true strength, ability to resist, and success of the German Ambassador to London (giving the Nazi salute before H. M. King of England) and later as Foreign Secretary had disastrous consequences.

—Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces, January 1946.

The failure to invade England in 1940 was not a failure of operational intelligence; detailed plans for Operation Sealion had been drawn up and were ready to be put into effect. It was rather attributable to a failure of Nazi grand strategy, which had neglected to foresee and prepare for this opportunity. Quite simply, Germany lacked the necessary landing craft and other naval units to carry out the invasion. Air power and land armies had been favored by the Nazi High Command, to the detriment of sea power. The High Command had little freedom in reaching strategic military decisions; these were made by Hitler himself on a basis of "intuition." Testimony in this connection is provided by many captured officers, among whom Vice Admiral Heye, quoted above, may be again quoted:

During the preparations for the operations in Norway I was only once present at a conference with Adolph Hitler. In the course of this he emphasized the importance of the occupation of Norway for the whole conduct of the war and said he was the only man who could assume responsibility for such an operation. In the course of the war, as is well known, he on many occasions acted against the advice of his military chiefs and sometimes he met with successes. This fact may have caused him and many officers to regard him not only as a statesman but also as a superior general in the field. His intervention in military operations grew at all events noticeably more pronounced.

In this connection the following brief dialogue which took place after the Battle of Stalingrad may be quoted from *The Pocket History of the Second World War*:

Edgar Snow asked General Chuikov what important tactical errors the Germans had made, but he said he had observed none.

"The only great error they made was strategic."

"What was that?"

"They gave Adolph Hitler supreme command."

If the grand strategy of Hitler was at fault in permitting war with England to involve him in a land war and a sea war simultaneously, and in failing to prepare for and carry through an invasion of the British Isles in time, it was more at fault in the decision to conduct an all-out offensive against the U. S. S. R. in the winter of 1941-42. From the first, Hitler had underestimated Russian strength and miscalculated Russian intentions.

The major errors of German grand strategy as seen by Colonel Gottschling, Chief of Staff of Ger-

man Air Staff in Italy, and reported by him under P. O. W. interrogation, are as follows:

Hitler's "idée fixe" was to wage war against Russia. The failure to invade Great Britain, the ever-increasing amount of aircraft Britain was receiving from the United States and Germany's ever-increasing number of aircraft losses served to spur Hitler on and in his obsession drove him to attack Russia.

Luftwaffe fighter and bomber units needed in western Europe were dispatched to Bulgaria, Roumania, etc. Hitler overruled every objection of the General Staff with his gift of persuasion.

I have seen the most brilliant and determined men of my acquaintance go before Hitler, determined not to acquiesce to his whims. These brainy and critical men returned fascinated and for weeks remained under the spell of Hitler's charms or hypnosis. Thus, Hitler exercised his influence on his General Staff.

I would summarize Germany's war mistakes as follows:

- Overestimation of England's ability to resist invasion.
- Underestimation of Russia.
- Overestimation of Germany's allies, such as Italy.
- Our failure to treat France as an equal and obtain full use of the wealth and resources of the French colonial empire. This could have been a stepping stone for the invasion of Great Britain.
- Declaring war on America. The High Command should and must have known that America's entry into the war meant Germany's defeat.

—Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces, January 1946.

All of the major mistakes listed above, and their disastrous effects, might have been avoided if Hitler had been prevented from exercising complete control over the German grand strategy, and if the German High Command had been provided with more comprehensive and more accurate strategic intelligence. Fortunately for the Allies, the great volume of raw information collected by the Nazis from world-wide espionage sources was frequently not reliable, and was not adequately processed, and the resulting intelligence was not disseminated to those who needed to know, or, if disseminated, was not acted upon. Grand strategy, if formulated by one individual as a result not of fact but of intuition, cannot fail to reflect not only the brilliance but the faults of that individual. Furthermore, if it is based on faulty intelligence, it will compound and magnify error.

To the German blunders in grand strategy cited thus far in this chapter must be added the failure to bring Spain into the Axis. This will be discussed in some detail, as an example, in a sub-

quent chapter dealing with political intelligence.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was built on surprise, the range of carrier task forces, and the power of aircraft to sink surface vessels. Not only did it surprise the United States, but, like the entry of Italy into the war, it caught the Nazis off guard. Italy had been valuable to Germany as a neutral; her armed forces were rightly considered to be more of a liability than an asset. Now it appeared that Japan was determined to fight her own war independently, without recourse to more than perfunctory liaison with the Nazi leaders. The same lack of coordination in matters of grand strategy existed within the Axis as existed within the Nazi High Command itself.

The final decision of Japan to enter the war was arrived at with the full concurrence and active consent of all important Japanese Army and Navy leaders and of almost all her important civilian leaders, and was based upon the following evaluation, as stated in the *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, an excellent and authoritative document published by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

- a. The threat of Russia on the Manchurian flank had been neutralized by the decisive victories of Germany in Europe which might eventually lead to the complete collapse of the Soviet Union.
- b. Great Britain was in such an irretrievably defensive position that, even if she survived, her entire war-making potential would be spent in a desperate attempt to protect her home islands.
- c. The forces which the United States and her Allies could immediately deploy in the Pacific, particularly in the air, were insufficient to prevent the fully trained and mobilized forces of Japan from occupying within 3 or 4 months the entire area enclosed within a perimeter consisting of Burma, Sumatra, Java, northern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, Wake, and from there north to the Kuriles.
- d. China, with the Burma Road severed, would be isolated and forced to negotiate.
- e. The United States, committed to aiding Great Britain, and weakened by the attack on Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize sufficient strength to go on the offensive for 18 months to 2 years. During this time, the perimeter could be fortified and the required forward air fields and bases established. So strengthened, this perimeter would be backed by a mobile carrier striking force based on Truk.
- f. While the stubborn defense of the captured perimeter was undermining American determination to support the war, the Japanese would speedily extract bauxite, oil, rubber, and metals from Malaya, Burma, the

Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and ship these materials to Japan for processing, to sustain and strengthen her industrial and military machine.

g. The weakness of the United States as a democracy would make it impossible for her to continue all-out offensive action in the face of the losses which would be imposed by fanatically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and the elimination of its Allies. The United States in consequence would compromise and allow Japan to retain a substantial portion of her initial territorial gains.

Most of the evaluations quoted above were incorrect, because they were based on faulty strategic intelligence. Like Hitler and his puppets on the German High Command, the Japanese war lords underestimated the power of the British Empire and of the U. S. S. R. to resist. They went a step further: While Hitler had, at least initially, a healthy respect for the latent military and industrial might of the United States, and tried not to draw us into the war, the Japanese underestimated our war-making potential, and deliberately provoked a conflict.

Neither the Nazi nor the Japanese mind could predict or comprehend certain psychological and morale factors which bolstered the Allied cause in the time of its greatest trials and misfortunes. The grand strategy of the Axis powers was based on ruthless tyranny, the complete subjugation of the individual to the totalitarian state. The grand strategy of the Allies was based on obtaining the last ounce of effort from the individual voluntarily whether on the field of battle or on the production front. Col. Evans F. Carlson of the Marine Raiders put a name to it—"Gung Ho," meaning "Work Together." Both Roosevelt and Churchill were effectively vocal champions not only of the cause of freedom generally but of the sacred rights of the individual.

In the definition of grand strategy by B. H. Liddell Hart, quoted earlier in this chapter, it was stated that "to foster and fortify the will to win, and to endure, is as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power," and that "a good cause is a sword and a buckler." The good cause of the Allies was summed up in the ideology of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter, and was effectively placed in opposition to the evil cause of the Axis—world domination.

Because grand strategy includes "the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry," it is concerned not only with inter-service morale, but with the morale of the civilian worker on the war-production front. Axis grand strategy paid little attention to this important factor, relying instead on slave labor. On the other hand, Allied grand strategy achieved miracles in war production through a minimum of curtailment of individual liberties, and through appeals for the support of a noble cause clearly delineated. The initial weakness of a democracy in war lies in the fact that it does not fight until attacked, that is, it must wait for the potential enemy to take the strategic offensive. This initial weakness is replaced by cumulative power as the full resources of the democratic nation are thrown into high gear. At least one captured German officer was aware of the decisive role played by the industrial might of the Allies; on July 20, 1945, General der Panzertruppe von Senger stated:

The General Staff failed to understand the modern idea of warfare. It still thought in terms of Nineteenth century land battles, whereas we should have had a combined staff like Italy. Our General Staff was primarily occupied with army strategy rather than coordination with the navy and air force * * *. The tragedy of the General Staff is historical rather than military. It saw its enemy in the Allied field soldier—whereas the real enemy was Allied industrial capacity far beyond the front, out of the reach of bombs or the range of artillery.

—Defeat, Headquarters Army Air Forces.

The turning of the tide in the European war has been stated to have occurred in the fall of 1942 when the Allies landed in North Africa and went on to defeat Rommel and to invade Italy. We had to our advantage the most important element of surprise, not only tactically speaking but also in many new types of landing craft and weapons. The way lay open to "the soft underbelly of Europe," and thence to Germany itself. Initial gains in arms led to a major political triumph, the fall of Mussolini, but thereafter Allied strategic initiative in the Mediterranean theater, except for long-range bombing of the Rumanian air fields, dwindled in the fact of stubborn German resistance and difficult terrain.

The war on two fronts which Hitler embraced

and which was so feared by the members of his General Staff, and which Stalin so eagerly sought, opened with heavy aerial bombardment of the Nazi homeland from English bases, and was continued with mounting fury until Germany was knocked out of the war. To the strategic initiative possessed by the Russian land armies after Stalingrad was added the strategic initiative of British and American air forces. Meanwhile, in the Atlantic, the Nazi strategic offensive by U-boats had been defeated by Allied countermeasures. This combination of development should have convinced Hitler that final victory was beyond his grasp.

The landing in Normandy, the triumphal sweep through France, and the junction with Russian forces in Berlin were but the final stages of successful Allied grand strategy, with respect to the war in Europe.

The magnitude of early successes at Pearl Harbor, in Malaya and in the Philippines, and at Wake, Guam, and Rabaul, encouraged the Japanese war lords to commit the one outstanding error in their grand strategy—expansion beyond the perimeter originally planned. The following quotation from *Summary Report (Pacific War)* describes the new plan and states its inherent weakness:

Accordingly a new plan was approved, providing for (a) an advance into the Solomons and Port Moresby, to be followed, if successful, by a further advance into New Caledonia, Samoa, and the Fiji Islands; (b) the capture of Midway; and (c) the temporary occupation of the Aleutians. Accomplishment of such a program would cut the line of communication between Australia and the United States, reduce the threat from Alaska, and deny the United States all major staging areas more advanced than Pearl Harbor.

By stretching and overextending her line of advance, Japan was committed to an expensive and exacting supply problem. She delayed the fortification of the perimeter originally decided upon, jeopardized her economic program for exploiting the resources of the area already captured, and laid herself open to early counter-attack in far advanced and, as yet, weak positions.

That the new plan was partially successful is indicated by the following analysis by Gilbert Cant, in *America's Navy in World War II* (revised edition), of the strategic gains accruing to Japan as a result of her temporary occupation of islands in the western Aleutians at the time of the Battle of Midway:

By occupying Kiska, they made it impossible for our Navy to proceed with its plans to develop the fine harbor there as an advance base for operations in the north-west Pacific and the Bering Sea. They made it impossible for us to develop airfields there from which reconnaissance could be maintained over the northernmost Japanese Islands (southern Sakhalin and the Kurile group). They made it impossible for us to develop bases from which Tokyo could be brought under direct bombing attack, which might have been feasible if we had been willing to make the effort to blast runways out of the forbiddingly rocky terrain of Kiska. They made it impossible for us to guarantee the security of ships moving to ports on the eastern coast of Siberia, such as Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka, and extremely difficult for us to move securely in the Bering Sea, toward more northerly Siberian ports. They imperilled our fur sealing and salmon fishing in the Bering Sea. They imperilled the mainland of northwestern Alaska. Most important of all, they put us on the defensive in an area from which we had expected to be able to take the offensive toward Japan, eventually if not immediately.

That strategic intelligence influenced the decision to land in the Aleutians is evident in the following quotation indicating early Japanese knowledge of our plans for a very heavy bombing plane; thus is the grand strategy of a nation affected by strategic intelligence of scientific research and development:

In Commander Hashimoto's opinion the Japanese move into the Aleutians was conceived as a flanking operation to the occupation of Midway. Once Kiska and Attu were occupied it was decided to hold them for the purpose of blocking a United States amphibious advance toward the Empire via the Aleutian Chain, and also to deny the use of the western Aleutians as bases from which long-range bombers might operate. He said that the Japanese were aware in the latter part of 1942 that the United States had plans for a high altitude, long-range bomber, and, in about February 1943, had information concerning the B-29. This information was later confirmed in a radio broadcast by an American general. He went on to say that the B-29 appeared in operation 8 months later than the Japanese had estimated it might appear. When Attu was re-taken by the United States, the Japanese expected long-range bomber operations from Massacre Bay.

—*Interrogations of Japanese Officials* (vol. I), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific).

Although we had been placed on the strategic defensive in the North Pacific by the Japanese landings in the western Aleutians, we dealt a heavy blow to the Imperial fleet at the Battle of Midway. Here is the statement of Captain Tsuda, when

asked about the effect of the Battle of Midway on future Japanese plans:

The Battle of Midway was the beginning of the Japanese failure in the war. I do not mean that this was the decisive battle of the war, but the loss of our carriers and some of our best pilots and officers affected us throughout the war. It called for the reorganization of the carrier divisions and the Naval Air Force in general. Due to the loss of ships we were unable to meet the Americans in force in the Solomons.

—*Interrogation of Japanese Officials* (vol. I), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific).

Meanwhile, by the end of 1942, we had consolidated and reinforced our precarious footholds in the southwest Pacific, upsetting the enemy strategic plan, and the strategic initiative in that area passed to the United States. Thenceforth, after ousting the Japanese from Attu and Kiska, our north Pacific units were to be employed as a holding and diversionary force, while our main attacks were to be launched by carrier task force raids, amphibious operations, and strategic long-range bombing elsewhere in the Pacific.

Why did the Japanese make the fatal error of extending the original perimeter, and why was the Midway operation launched? Granted that optimism was generated by early successes, granted that intelligence of the United States B-29 program led to fear of attack from the north, and granted that the Aleutians phase of the Midway operation was conceived in order to forestall such attack, there still remains for our consideration the fundamental motive behind the adoption of a new and greatly enlarged perimeter covering vast areas of the Pacific.

Pending access to even more authoritative statements which may possibly be obtained through P. O. W. interrogation, the explanation given by Admiral Toyada, successively Supreme Military Counsellor, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, Chief of Naval General Staff, and Chief, Combined Naval Forces, may profitably be quoted as representative of top echelon Japanese naval thought in the matter:

I think the decision to expand the area of operations so widely might be attributed to a feeling on the part of the Japanese authorities at the time that the state of mind under which you fought the war and the state of mind under which we fought the war were very different, in that to us this was the war for our very national existence, whereas in your case it was merely a case of

national honor or perhaps protection of your economic interests in the Far East; and, because to you the war under such conditions would be of relatively slight significance compared with ours, there might have been a feeling on the part of our leaders that, should the war continue a little longer, you would lose your will to fight, and with that idea we might have continued spreading the battle line.

—*Interrogations of Japanese Officials* (vol. II), U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific).

If this statement be accepted, it leads to the conclusion that the outstanding error in the Japanese grand strategy was attributable to faulty strategic intelligence, specifically an incorrect evaluation of the psychology of the American people.

While Axis grand strategy during World War II was sharply divided, the war effort of two of the major Allied powers, Great Britain and the United States, was most closely coordinated. Varying degrees of coordination were achieved also from time to time with the U. S. S. R., and with lesser members of the United Nations coalition.

At the beginning of this chapter it was stated that grand strategy is conducted in time of ostensible peace as well as in wartime. We were at war with Germany before she declared war on us. Certain early arrangements with Great Britain, such as the destroyers-for-bases deal, convoying of merchant shipping, and lend-lease, led first to fuller cooperation and eventually after Pearl Harbor to complete coordination in matters of grand strategy and military planning. Cooperation and coordination will be more fully discussed in a later chapter; at this point it will suffice to stress the fact that perhaps the outstanding feature of Allied grand strategy was the early conception and implementation of the principle of combined British and United States conduct of the war. Gen. George C. Marshall, in his *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941*, described the inception of this principle:

On December 23, 1941, Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, arrived in Washington to confer with the President and the American Chiefs of Staff. Out of the series of discussions which then followed resulted an agreement, not only regarding the immediate strategy of our combined conduct of the war, but also for the organization of a method for the strategical command

and control of British and American military resources. Probably no other Allied action, in the field or otherwise, has exerted as powerful an effect on the conduct of the war as the prompt establishment of a prescribed procedure for achieving unity of effort through the medium of the Combined Chiefs of Staff acting under the direction of the leaders of their respective Governments.

In a later report to the Secretary of War, covering the period of July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, General Marshall described the composition, functions, and responsibilities of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and the further development of the principle of unity of command:

Under the direction of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the United States Army and Navy, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, are responsible for coordination between the Army and Navy, and in operations for which the United States has sole or primary responsibility, they are charged with the strategic conduct of the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, composed of the above United States members and four representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff insure complete coordination of the war effort of Great Britain and the United States. A development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations is the unity of command principle which places the responsibility and authority for a contemplated operation under one commander directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combined Chiefs of Staff. When a joint or combined force commander has been designated and the units composing his forces are assigned, his command responsibilities are the same as if the forces involved were all of one service or one nation.

If British and American combined operations were an outstanding feature of World War II as conducted in the Atlantic and in the European theater, United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps joint operations were an outstanding feature of the war in the Pacific; joint and combined intelligence and planning played a major part in Allied success around the globe.

The final vindication of the Allied cause, attainment of Allied military objectives, and fulfillment of the war phase of the Allied grand strategy, was proclaimed by the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay. The presence of representatives of the different Allied countries at that ceremony symbolized the wartime cooperation and coordination which had brought about the downfall of the

Axis. But grand strategy, as defined above, "looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace."

Grand Strategy After World War II

The nations so lately ranged side by side in war, within the Allied framework, have formed into other combinations in peacetime and are engaged in striving toward changed and conflicting objectives. New grand strategies are being implemented on the economic-political-psychological level, and pressures are being applied in support of these strategies. In view of these developments, and in view of new weapons the chief of which is the atomic bomb, strategic intelligence is now more compellingly important than ever.

When the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the world was made aware that the adaptation of the principle of nuclear fission to military purposes was an accomplished fact. The employment of this revolutionary weapon was a major compromise of the security which had been so carefully and successfully maintained during the period of its development. Planners of the Allied grand strategy had calculated that the advantages of using the bomb to bring about a quick termination of the war outweighed the disadvantages inherent in disclosure of the fact that it existed.

The full story of security measures taken to safeguard the secret of the atomic bomb, first, as to the knowledge that it was being evolved, and second, as to the process by which it was produced, will perhaps never be revealed. It is axiomatic that the counter-intelligence aspect of intelligence has been broadened and has acquired new emphases as a result of this discovery. Our intelligence services must be more alert than ever in order to prevent knowledge of our scientific achievements from reaching potential enemies, and to collect all possible data regarding such progress in atomic research as may be detected beyond our borders.

The strategic initiative with respect to development of an atomic bomb was first held by Germany. It was knowledge that the Nazis were carrying on intensified atomic research that prompted us to undertake our own program and to carry it through to a successful conclusion. The United States expended nearly \$2,000,000,000 in order to gain the strategic initiative with respect to atomic power.

We won the race for the atomic bomb not only because of our vast resources in money, scientific skill, engineering know-how, and raw materials, but because our grand strategy was based not on tyranny, like that of the dictator states, but on voluntary cooperation. Secretary Stimson described the development of the atomic bomb as "the greatest achievement of the combined efforts of science, industry, labor, and the military in all history." The triumph of the Manhattan District, like the triumph of Allied arms in World War II, was the triumph of the democratic idea.

This is not the place for detailed analysis of postwar world politics. It is sufficient to say that only two nations emerged from World War II with the full stature of major powers—the United States and the U. S. S. R. The United States continues to uphold the cause of democracy and to work for a just and lasting peace. These aims, in conjunction with the maintenance of our national security, might be said to constitute our postwar grand strategy. Russia, on the other hand, has sought to extend her sphere of influence even beyond the territorial gains agreed upon at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The realistic observer must conclude that Russia is motivated not only by the desire to preserve her national security, but by the urge to achieve world domination. That would appear to be her postwar grand strategy.

Because it is the province of strategic intelligence to acquire knowledge concerning the capabilities and intentions of all foreign nations, particularly of those whose interests conflict, or may at some future time conflict, with our own, the remarks of an American army officer who lived in the U. S. S. R. during the war years, and who was in a particularly advantageous position to observe Russian capabilities and intentions, may profitably be quoted. John R. Deane, formerly a Brigadier General in charge of the United States Military Mission to the U. S. S. R., wrote in his recent book, *The Strange Alliance*:

In my opinion there can no longer be any doubt that the Soviet leadership has always been motivated by the belief that communism and capitalism cannot coexist. Nor is there any doubt in my mind that present-day Soviet leaders have determined upon a program pointed toward imposing communism on those countries under their control, and, elsewhere, creating conditions favor-

able to the triumph of communism in the war against capitalism which they consider to be inevitable * * *. If the record up until the end of the war was not sufficient to clarify Soviet intentions, certainly all doubt should have been dispelled on February 9, 1946, when Stalin reaffirmed the doctrine of Marx and Lenin and exhorted his people to extraordinary efforts in preparation for the inevitable wars which must be expected so long as the capitalist system exists * * *.

The program of the Soviet leaders is being carried out with equal aggressiveness in two ways: First, by the introduction and compulsory acceptance of communism in those countries which the Soviet Union controls either by force or by the threat of force; and second, by the infiltration of Communist ideology into those countries which, for the moment, are beyond the orbit of Soviet control. In between are some nations that are subject both to Soviet threat of force and ideological infiltration. Among these are Greece, Turkey, Iraq, and to some extent China. It is safe to predict that these countries will be subjected to a war of nerves which they will be able to resist only by the firm support of the western democracies * * *. The program of infiltration is world-wide. It is evident throughout Latin America, Canada, the British Empire, Asia, and not least—the United States.

The fact that the United States alone possesses the atomic bomb gives us a great if temporary advantage. The time factor is of the utmost importance in such international discussions as may take place within and outside of the framework of the United Nations.

The United States is striving to bring about world agreement and adherence to international law in the shortest possible time; only when effective and workable controls exist will she entrust her atomic secrets to other nations. To date the U. S. S. R. has employed obstructionist and delaying tactics. It is obviously to her advantage to postpone the final peace settlement as long as possible, while fomenting disorder in such nations as may be induced to become satellites. While she thus plays for time on the political level, she is racing against time on the military level. According to reliable reports, Russia is frantically expediting atomic research and the expansion of the Soviet Navy.

A "war of nerves" has been conducted by the U. S. S. R., negatively in the meetings of the United Nations Security Council, and in the Paris and Moscow conferences, where the delaying tactics are carried out, and positively in such countries as Greece by means of propaganda and in-

filtration. Russian grand strategy at the present time includes the widespread employment of radio broadcasts, to disseminate inside and outside of Russia the point of view of the U. S. S. R., and to vilify those governments which hold different viewpoints. American grand strategy includes State Department Russian-language broadcasts beamed into the U. S. S. R. for the purpose of giving the Russian people a true picture of what is going on in the world.

Assistant Secretary of State William Benton announced on March 29, 1947, that the relay transmitters at Munich, which beam the daily short-wave "Voice of America" program to Russia, had been sabotaged by the reversal of an antenna, and that the broadcasts had been diverted to South America instead. However, after the condition had been discovered and corrected, the initially weak signals picked up in Russia were reported by an American correspondent to be coming in strongly and clearly. In his announcement, Mr. Benton did not indicate whether there was a suspicion that the sabotage was carried out by Russian agents or other persons. The incident is referred to here as an example of how the field of strategic intelligence, including counter-espionage, has been widened in recent years. Words are the weapons in the war of ideas, and a spoke thrust in the wheels of the propaganda machine can nullify the effect of careful long-range planning and the expenditure of much effort and money.

The Russians borrowed from Hitler not only the "war of nerves" but the fifth column as well. Americans were shocked at the revelations contained in the *Report of the Royal Commission* in the Canadian spy case, referred to in Chapter I. In that report it was demonstrated that the U. S. S. R., a supposedly friendly power, recently a military ally, had through its diplomatic representatives systematically subverted Canadian nationals for the purpose of extracting military information vital to the defense of Canada and the United States. Not the least alarming aspect of this case was the indication of the existence of a widespread network of Soviet agents in this country.

On March 22, 1947, President Truman signed an Executive order "prescribing procedures for the

administration of an employee loyalty program in the executive branch of the Government." The preamble to this order stated that each employee of the Government of the United States is endowed with a measure of trusteeship over the democratic processes which are the heart and sinew of the United States. This order was but one of several signs of a growing tendency to recognize the danger of a Communist fifth column in the event of war between this country and the U. S. S. R. A basic fact was beginning to be more widely recognized—that each Communist and Communist sympathizer is in effect the agent of a foreign power.

If the grand strategy of Russia includes the intensified use of the "war of nerves" and the establishment of spy networks and fifth columns in time of ostensible peace, our own grand strategy is becoming increasingly well adapted to counteract these threats and to wage war in the event of hostilities. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz stated on March 26, 1947, in testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that "a comprehensive, integrated and logical series of policies and plans" for national defense have been formulated, including an "Interim United States Military Policy," and an "Interim Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces."

Overt war is a confession of the failure of the diplomatic process. While discussions continue between representatives of the United States and Russia, there is hope that war may be averted. Yet armed might lies behind every diplomatic move, and strategic considerations play the dominant part in shaping political maneuvers. Behind our decision to provide financial assistance to Greece and Turkey lie very real strategic considerations, which were lucidly summed up on March 29, 1947, by Walter Lippmann in his column:

The reason for intervening in Greece and Turkey is that of all places in the world they are the best suited strategically for the employment of American military power to check the expansion of Soviet military power. The power of the Soviet Union is in its inexhaustible reserves of infantry capable of pressing upon its wide land frontiers in Europe and Asia. There is no other power or group of powers capable of mobilizing the troops to hold, much less push back, the masses of the Red Army on land. The power of the United States is on the sea and in the air: This kind of power can be exerted to check the Red Army only if it can be brought

within striking distance of the vital centers of the Soviet Union.

The obvious and the unique strategic approach, as all history proves and the Russians are most keenly aware, is across the Black Sea to the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The entrance to the Black Sea is in the eastern Mediterranean through the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles, that is to say between Greece and Turkey * * *.

Insofar as we are able to exert American sea and air power in the Black Sea, we have the means of checking the advance of the Red Army westward into Europe. We are on its flank and in its rear, and we are able to maintain a balance of power, without which serious diplomatic negotiation is impossible.

Conversely, if first Greece and then Turkey were allowed to succumb to Soviet expansionist policy, the way would be open for Russian conquest of the strategic oil-rich lands of the eastern Mediterranean, on which our Navy depends for a large proportion of its fuel supply. American naval power, which is composed primarily of naval vessels and naval aviation, is, along with the atomic bomb, our principal means at present of lending weight to our discussions with the U. S. S. R. Naval Intelligence therefore has a real interest in the diplomatic aspect of the grand strategy of the United States; through naval attachés, and others on foreign duty it keeps in close touch with developments from day to day. When a country takes the strategic initiative, as we have done in Greece and Turkey, international tension grows, and the likelihood of war become correspondingly greater. No realist denies the possibility of war with Russia. Even now we are drawing upon the sum total of our intelligence about the intentions of that nation. If war comes, the sum total of our intelligence about Russian capabilities will be put to the test. Just as the Navy would be called upon to assume a large share of fighting in such a war, so Naval Intelligence would be called on to furnish a large share of the facts necessary for operational plans.

In this chapter the grand strategies of the principal powers before, during, and after World War II have been discussed in connection with strategic intelligence in general. We have seen that the grand strategy of a nation is the sum total of its national power, and that it operates in peace as well as in war, and that to be successful it depends to a large extent on timely, reliable, and complete strategic intelligence.

CHAPTER V

NAVAL STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

Definition and Description

Naval strategic intelligence is officially described, and its scope delineated, as follows:

Strategic intelligence: Intelligence on the intentions and capabilities of possible or actual enemies within the field of naval warfare.

It is needed by naval commanders charged with:

1. Formulation of naval policy supporting national policy and interests;
2. Preparing plans to put the Navy into an effective state of readiness;
3. Planning projected naval operations to complete the mission of the Navy;
4. Planning and directing the necessary logistic activities which will insure adequate naval operation; and
5. Safeguarding the security of the Naval Establishment and of naval information.

It is divided into the following general categories:

1. *Political:* Disclosing intentions of foreign powers which may collide with United States interests in pursuit of their own interests.
2. *Economic:* Disclosing the war potential or capabilities, strength and weaknesses of a foreign power including finance, industry, commerce, agriculture, and transportation.
3. *Geographic:* Disclosing topographic, hydrographic, and meteorological data.
4. *Technical and Scientific:* Disclosing the development of new materials, techniques and munitions of war.
5. *Naval Power:* Disclosing the organization, strength, disposition, readiness, doctrines, command, policy, strategy, tactics, weapons, ship and aircraft characteristics, procurement of personnel, supplies and material, training and bases of the navy of a foreign power; the capability of that power's merchant marine to support or aid the navy, the other armed forces and the national economy, and the capabilities of the armed forces, including the air force, to support or assist the Navy or interfere with United States Naval Operations.
6. *Personalia (Who's Who):* Disclosing data on the personalities in a position to direct the foreign policy or the war making facilities of a foreign power, and those who could be influenced to our advantage.
7. *Sociological:* Disclosing political, ideological and ethnic forces within a foreign country, psychological

We have seen in chapter IV that national strategic intelligence is needed for national planning, and that naval strategic intelligence is needed for naval planning in support of the grand strategy of a nation. Strategic intelligence on the national planning level aims at disclosing the capabilities of other nations to wage war, and their intentions insofar as may be determined. Strategic intelligence on the naval planning level is more specialized; it is an integral part of national strategic intelligence, and its importance in a given nation depends on the extent to which that nation has cultivated sea power.

Strategic intelligence for naval planning purposes differs only in emphasis from that required for air force and ground force planning purposes. It is logical for naval planners to be primarily concerned with ships and harbors, for air force planners to concentrate on aircraft and air bases, and for ground force planners to specialize in the movement of troops and material over terrain.

But joint planning and joint operations were developed to such a degree during World War II that it is no longer possible to give credit for results achieved to any one branch of the armed forces, nor can it be denied that certain nonmilitary agencies of the Government also contributed their share. Coordination and cooperation in war and peace will be discussed in Part Five of this text.

In this chapter we will present a brief description of naval strategic intelligence and of its eight general categories, which, aside from the matter of emphasis, are common to military strategic intelligence and to national strategic intelligence as well. The principal sources of naval strategic intelligence within and outside the United States, and the functions of the Foreign and Domestic Branches of the Office of Naval Intelligence, will be described.

characteristics, castes, education, propaganda and so forth.

8. *Counter-Intelligence*: Disclosing the plans, procedures, and personalities engaged in espionage, sabotage, and subversion directed against the Navy.

From the naval viewpoint, strategy includes all activities and operations of the naval organization and of the naval forces through the phases of policy making, planning in accordance with policy, activities implementing the policy and executing plans, and the operations required to dispose effectively naval forces up to the contact precipitating battle. Tactics comes into play in those operations following contact with the enemy forces, and controls the movement of our forces on land, sea, and in the air against the enemy in the development of the battle and through the actual contest of arms.

Modern warfare has so extended the area of contest both in time and space as to create additional difficulty in determining when strategic operations actually become tactical operations. Use of submarines and air patrols makes possible contact with the enemy a matter of days and hundreds of miles, instead of hours and a few thousand yards, before the actual collision of forces in pitched battle. But when the decision for forcing battle has been made, subsequent operations designed to develop the battle unquestionably fall into the field of tactics.

The Battle of Midway and the Battle of Leyte Gulf are outstanding examples of the transference of operations from the field of strategy to that of tactics days before the shooting phase of the battle. During these long periods, operation of our fleet units involved was essentially tactical. At the same time other United States naval forces in the Pacific were engaged in strategic operations, which were directed in support of those units which were actually developing the impending battle.

Strategic intelligence does not differ from operational (combat) intelligence except in scope and point of view. In Naval Intelligence there is not, and can never be, any clear line of demarcation between strategic and operational intelligence. One flows into the other; distinction is possible only in terms of need and purpose. In what phase of a given operation is a particular item of intelligence needed? For what purpose is it needed? The viewpoint and the needs of the commander

about to engage the enemy will of necessity differ from those of the top strategic planner, yet a particular item of intelligence may be of value to both for different reasons, and may be used by each for a different purpose. Therefore the intelligence is operational when used by the commander immediately before or during battle, and strategic when used by the top strategic planner.

Since naval strategic intelligence is put to a wide variety of uses at various levels within and outside the Navy, it will be feasible to approach it first in terms of the main sources from which it is derived; the word "source" is here used in its general rather than its specific sense. The main sources may be divided as follows:

1. Domestic sources (F and D branches of ONI; the naval districts and river commands).
2. Foreign sources (the naval attaché system).
3. Fleet sources (operational intelligence officers).

Each of these main sources will be discussed in turn, the first two with reference both to wartime and peacetime activity, and the third with reference to development during World War II.

Domestic Sources (F and D Branches of ONI; the Naval Districts and River Commands)

There were three main domestic sources of naval strategic intelligence during World War II, which continue to be exploited in peacetime under changed emphases and after a somewhat altered assignment of responsibilities, as explained below. These are:

1. ONI files and other intelligence agencies.
2. Liaison with other Government departments.
3. The contact register.

Specific examples of liaison and joint activities will be presented in a later chapter; it will be sufficient at this point to underline the fact that during World War II extremely close and effective liaison was maintained between the Allied nations and their chiefs of state, between the United States armed forces and the various Government departments, and between activities in the Naval Establishment. The attention of the student is here invited to liaison as a source of naval strategic intelligence.

Obviously no single department of the Federal Government could collect, or would be interested in, all the components that make up the sum total

of national strategic intelligence. There are vast differences in the requirements of the several departments. The Department of State is concerned chiefly with the political and diplomatic situation; the Department of Commerce with economic and commercial development; the War Department with developments in the military field; the Navy Department with affairs affecting the Navy. Each department employs special techniques and trained personnel to supply it with, and to process, the information which it requires. The representatives of one department cannot adequately fill the needs of the others.

Through the medium of close liaison and mutual cooperation in the exchange of information, however, a body of strategic intelligence is available, both in peace and war, for use by those who will have the responsibility for planning and directing the policy of our Government in matters political, economic, military, and naval.

The student must realize that the armed forces have no monopoly on strategy, and that a strategic diplomatic or commercial move may be as effective in attaining a national objective as a dozen victories in battle. Very often the use, or threat, of armed forces is simply a means of achieving a political or economic objective planned and required by nonmilitary components of the Government.

The significant thing to remember is that all strategy, whether political, economic, military, or naval, must be directed toward, and integrated with, the achievement of the result required to attain the national objective, and that the courses of action adopted by the several departments must be correlated and complementary if that goal is to be gained in an orderly and efficient way. Therefore, the free interchange of strategic information and intelligence between the departments must continue and expand, and each department must be kept fully informed of the aims and problems of the others.

It is from ONI that vital liaison with the other Government departments in Washington stems, and through it exchanges of strategic intelligence are arranged. Furthermore, to the various desks in the Foreign Branch flows the information obtained from the Naval Attaches and from other sources abroad. This information has received a

preliminary evaluation by the officers who transmit it, but the final determination of accuracy and significance rests with the experts in the Foreign Branch.

Finished strategic intelligence received from Government departments through liaison demands no further processing by the Foreign Branch, except insofar as it may be used as part of a larger picture. However, the Foreign Branch itself is a major producer of finished strategic intelligence of purely naval interest, derived from raw and partially processed information originating in many different parts of the Naval Establishment. Research by experts, and the consultation of extensive files, play important roles in processing as conducted by the Foreign Branch.

The organization of the Office of Naval Intelligence was described in chapter II. We are here concerned with two branches of ONI, the Foreign Branch and the Domestic Branch, both of which are engaged in the collection and processing of strategic intelligence.

Attention is called to the fact that it is part of the mission of the Foreign Branch to support the naval attachés and other Naval Intelligence personnel on foreign posts, and to the fact that it is part of the mission of the Domestic Branch to support the naval district intelligence officers and personnel. The functions of these two large components of Naval Intelligence, the naval attachés and the district intelligence officers, who may be termed "field representatives," cannot well be discussed without reference to the respective branches of ONI to which they report.

Naval attachés owe a dual allegiance to the Chief of Naval Intelligence (Foreign Branch, ONI), and to the chief of the Diplomatic Mission to which they are attached. The naval attaché system will be described in considerable detail in this chapter, because through it foreign strategic intelligence of naval interest is obtained.

District intelligence officers owe a dual allegiance to the Chief of Naval Intelligence (Domestic Branch, ONI), and to the district commandant on whose staff they serve. The basic mission of the district intelligence officer is to maintain a district intelligence organization, which is divided into headquarters and outlying activities. The headquarters functions are accomplished by

branches C, D, and Y. The objectives of the district or river command over which these branches have cognizance are, briefly, as follows:

- C Service functions.
- D To supply required counter-intelligence.
- Y To supply operational intelligence.

The contact register, principal domestic source of naval strategic intelligence concerning foreign nations, will now be discussed historically as maintained during World War II by the F Branch of ONI.

The officer-in-charge of the FN section was responsible for organizing and directing a system designed to uncover and develop all sources of strategic intelligence within the naval district. Emphasis was naturally placed upon sources within the United States early in the war because, in 1941, there were no Pacific bases from which photographic reconnaissance could be conducted, and because Japanese counter-intelligence was efficient and ruthless. However, intelligence officers in the naval districts, by interviewing American engineers who had planned and constructed hydro-generation plants, iron foundries, railroads, and other industrial units in Manchuria, were able to provide the strategic evaluators with information which made possible accurate and significant conclusions regarding the industrial war potential of Japan. In time of war these engineers, together with their photographs and blueprints, were found within the United States, where they were used as sources of indispensable information.

Most of the naval districts embrace a considerable area and a huge civilian population. To tap this vast reservoir of information required an elaborate and integrated organization and a studied development of highly specialized techniques. Initially all potential sources of foreign information were carefully surveyed. Manufacturing and trade associations dealing in the foreign market were combed; scientific and research organizations with foreign interests were consulted; and institutions and groups such as colleges and universities, public and private libraries, travel bureaus and import-export firms, missionary societies, newspapers, banks, and insurance companies, plus a host of private persons, including returned internees with known foreign connections and ex-

perience, were carefully investigated. In one naval district alone this survey produced the names of 20,000 individuals, firms, and organizations—all useful sources of information concerning enemy or enemy-held areas.

These names were then catalogued, filed, and cross-indexed geographically. In such a file it was possible to determine at a glance the present location within the naval district of every local chemical engineer who had lived in or visited Kobe, Japan. When ONI requested information on a chemical plant in that area it was possible for the district FN section to arrange immediate interviews with individuals or organizations able to provide that information.

These sources within the United States, which are to be found in the contact register, are among the most useful and reliable during wartime for producing a comprehensive analysis of enemy shipping and foreign trade, for studies of vital raw materials such as iron, steel, aluminum, petroleum, and for extensive surveys such as those published by JANIS (Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study). By having an encyclopedic documentation on each of the basic heavy industries, any internal change, expansion, or destruction by our own forces will be noted with relation to information already available and may be used for further strategic planning.

Similarly, research could be directed and controlled through this filing system. When, for example, ONI priority directives requested emphasis on Samar and Leyte, the district office could identify precisely persons and firms familiar with the islands, and library collections and research groups which had made the islands a subject for special study.

The effectiveness of the system is indicated by the fact that a request from ONI for specific information on the Japan Physical and Chemical Research Institute was honored by one of the naval districts in 3 days with an exhaustive and well-illustrated report on electronic experimental facilities in the Tokyo area. The report represented the results of interviews by 30 officers, all of whom made their contacts through the filing system previously mentioned.

Supplementing the sources already listed, liaison on the district level was always an important and

valuable adjunct to collection. Within the naval district, the Military Intelligence Service, the Board of Economic Warfare (later the Foreign Economic Administration), the Office of War Information, the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the Army Map Service, and other Government agencies were all working on problems directly or indirectly related to matters of strategic naval interest. To insure against needless duplication of effort and to guarantee complete coverage of all related fields of endeavor, close liaison was established and maintained between the FN section and these agencies, in addition to the liaison maintained by the F Branch of ONI in Washington.

Strategic intelligence within the naval district was essentially a research task. Wartime demands far exceeded personnel resources, and a high degree of efficiency, particularly with respect to the collection of information, was required in order to avoid an unprofitable expenditure of manpower and to insure that only fruitful sources of information were investigated, and only pertinent information processed.

Research in the intelligence field is precisely the same as in any line of scholarly endeavor. It requires painstaking investigation by competent persons of all the available publications, photographs, and records on a given subject, coupled with the ability to transform the results of that study into precise, accurate, and readable reports. Expert evaluation is required, both of the source itself and the information it contains.

In the naval districts the final processing and correlation of strategic information, the ultimate production of intelligence, was done by officers who, by reason of background or special study, were qualified to analyze and evaluate. The evaluator had to be completely familiar with the latest monographs and strategic area studies, or with the current developments in the technical field in which he specialized. To insure that specialization was complete and adequate, with ample time for research on the latest information, geographic areas were often divided into such subcategories as "ports" and "communications centers," and technical subjects were divided into subcategories as well. The finished strategic intelligence was then forwarded from the district offices to ONI, and to

various authorized and interested commands both at home and in operational areas by means of written reports, conferences, dispatches, and bulletins. Information which had received only a preliminary evaluation in the district offices was forwarded to ONI for final processing, after which it was disseminated upward to top strategic planners, outwardly to other interested Government agencies by liaison, and downward as required.

It was to the F Branch of ONI that the commands charged with strategic naval planning turned for information and intelligence. Much of that intelligence was already available in the F Branch, the result of careful evaluation of the reports of naval attachés, observers, and liaison officers abroad, the investigations of intelligence naval districts, and the observations of intelligence officers assigned to the operating forces. If the needed intelligence was not already available in ONI, steps were taken to obtain it.

Having described in rather general fashion the main domestic sources of naval strategic intelligence, which are ONI files and other intelligence agencies, liaison with other Government departments, and the contact register, we will turn now to the subject of foreign sources.

Foreign Sources (the Naval Attaché System)

Naval officers on duty in foreign posts provide a large part of the strategic intelligence needed by the Navy for planning purposes in war and peace. Therefore it is desirable at this point in our discussion of naval strategic intelligence to deal in some detail with the organization and function of the naval attaché system, and with the related activities of naval liaison officers and naval observers.

The paramount duty of these officers is that of naval intelligence, in the performance of which they are an integral part of Naval Intelligence and are under the direct supervision and control of the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The planning, coordination, supervision and inspection of their activities are the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence in charge of the Foreign Branch of ONI.

The Naval Intelligence Manual—1944 (ONI-19 (R)) states that—

The mission of naval attachés, naval liaison officers, and naval observers is to represent the United States

in a thorough and creditable manner, and to procure and report all information and intelligence obtainable and of value to the United States. They are to report particularly on matters of naval interest, both in peace and war, to the Chief of Naval Intelligence. In the execution of their mission, naval attachés, naval liaison officers, and naval observers will perform the following tasks:

(a) The collection, preliminary evaluation, and forwarding to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, of information and intelligence on the strength and war potential, and naval strength and disposition of forces of the country or countries to which he is accredited or assigned.

(b) The preparation of plans for the expansion of the activities of his office in the event of war in which the United States is a belligerent.

(c) Cooperation with other United States agencies abroad in the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence of interest to other Government agencies.

(d) In time of war, collection of information on the composition of enemy naval forces, their movements and probable intentions, and cooperation with other Government agencies in the collection of war information.

The naval attaché has, as we have said above, a dual responsibility, first to CNO (CNI), and second to the chief of the diplomatic mission at which he is posted. He is not recognized under the law as a Foreign Service officer, although he carries a diplomatic passport and has diplomatic immunity. He is a member of the official staff of the diplomatic mission of the United States in the country to which that mission is accredited, and is the direct representative of the Navy Department in that mission.

The naval attaché is ordered to report for duty to the chief of the mission, and in general defers to the wishes of that chief in all matters not concerned with the reporting of classified technical and tactical information of no international political significance. These reports are forwarded directly to CNO (CNI). Copies of reports of the naval attaché which do not contain classified technical and tactical information will be furnished, as required, to the chief of mission.

American naval attachés are distributed according to the following principles:

1. The procurement of information of interest to the Navy Department is the controlling factor in the assignment of naval attachés.
2. The assignment, as assistant attachés, of officers who have specialized in various technical or professional subjects is usually limited to those stations which

offer special opportunities to procure technical information.

3. Consultation with the State Department in the assignment of attachés is limited, in general, to assuring that the officer selected for the post is *persona grata* to the State Department, which then takes the necessary steps to ascertain that the selection is acceptable to the country to which the diplomatic mission is accredited.

4. When attachés and assistant attachés are accredited to more than one country, only countries whose mutual political relationships are good are included in the same group.

The number and stations of naval attachés vary according to current requirements. The latest issue of the *Foreign Service List* published by the State Department contains all the pertinent information in this regard.

The duties of the naval attaché may be described only in general terms. The details of the methods and techniques to be followed depend almost entirely on the good judgment and sound discretion of the attaché himself. The opportunities and situations which confront attachés are so varied that fixed rules cannot be laid down; the only solution to the problem is the application of sound fundamental principles to specific cases.

In determining the kind of intelligence which will be of value to the Navy, the attachés have usually been guided primarily by the outline and state of the monograph for the countries of their residence. The monographs are special treatises maintained by the Office of Naval Intelligence on every foreign country about which information is received, organized according to a standard outline contained in the *Monograph Index Guide*, and kept up to date largely by attaché reports. Modification of the outline in use prior to World War II may result from the experience of that war, and from whatever agreements for the future centralization of foreign intelligence activities may be arrived at. However, some sort of standard outline for guiding the collection activities of attachés will continue to be essential.

In addition, the attaché receives, from time to time, requests for specific items of information initiated by, or forwarded through, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and he may receive further specific instructions from the Chief of Naval Intelligence. The diligent attaché will, of course, follow this guidance without permitting himself

to be limited by it. He will be constantly on the alert for every kind of information of possible naval interest, using all his imagination, ingenuity, and resourcefulness, and all his knowledge of the country of his residence and of general naval subjects to uncover it, neglecting no item simply because he has not been specifically asked for it and has no labeled pigeonhole ready.

Naval attachés deal directly with the Admiralty or Ministry of Marine, and, where the military, naval, and air departments are combined, with the Ministry of Defense. Official dealings with any other ministry must be conducted through the chief of the diplomatic mission to which the attaché is assigned. Ordinarily, naval matters will be referred to the attaché by the chief of mission.

The attaché can expect little official information from a government on the real spirit which pervades its navy, the current concepts of strategy and tactics, the extent and results of maneuvers, or the characteristics of its naval commanders, or the efficiency of personnel and matériel. This information can be obtained only through intimate personal and social relationships with foreign nationals, particularly foreign naval and army officers.

In this connection it may be of interest to refer to an incident said to have occurred by Helen Lombard, author of a recent book entitled, *"While They Fought."* According to Miss Lombard, Stalin, at a state banquet, took occasion to drink a toast to the intelligence services of the Allied nations. This is what followed, as she describes it:

An American naval attaché, Captain Duncan, who had experienced trouble getting routine answers from Soviet authorities, seized the moment. He arose, thanked Stalin for the compliment to the intelligence services, but added: "Unfortunately, these services are somewhat restricted in their field of action in Russia, because no information whatever is available." A dead silence followed. All eyes were on Stalin.

The Russian leader broke the spell by throwing back his head and laughing uproariously. When his mirth had subsided, he said: "Come to me when you want to know something about the U. S. S. R. I have all the answers!" The American took Stalin at his word and subsequently forwarded to the Kremlin a questionnaire to be submitted to the Premier. It was never answered.

The sources of information open to the naval attaché are limited only by his imagination, ingenu-

ity, and, most important, his discretion. They include the foreign naval and air departments to which he has official access; visits to ships, dockyards, port authorities and relief organizations, and other government establishments; association with industrialists, politicians, and even lesser civilians; the press, official publications, correspondents, and our own Foreign Service officers from other United States Government agencies. The attachés of other governments accredited to the same country are often valuable as sources of information, and the attaché is at liberty to discuss with them matters of interest which he has discovered for himself. He is not at liberty, however, to discuss or exchange information which has been given to him directly by the government to which he is accredited.

Consular reports contain carefully compiled data concerning the shipping entering foreign ports. In the event of war, particularly with respect to strategic raw materials, information of this kind is invaluable. Regular consular officers, commercial and agricultural attachés, and trade commissioners assigned to missions can and will provide information of strategic importance. The reliability and discretion of these sources, however, must be thoroughly investigated; this is particularly true of unpaid consuls or those who do not belong to the career foreign service.

Private American commercial interests abroad are always well supplied with material of value, particularly with regard to the movements and transfers of vessels, and unusual developments in the field in which they specialize. Representatives of such interests are to be found in nearly every major port in the world, and often have more knowledge of local conditions than our own consular representatives. They are in reality themselves intelligence specialists, observing and reporting the activity of competing firms, both American and foreign, keeping in touch with current political and economic trends, and maintaining close and amicable relationships with official government sources. The attaché should cultivate these contacts.

A word of caution is necessary regarding direct requests made by an attaché to foreign governments for specific information. Custom prescribes that such a request carry with it the im-

plication that corresponding data of our own will be given in exchange.

The Office of Naval Intelligence therefore definitely prefers to acquire information through its Attachés on an unofficial basis, unless it specifically authorizes a direct official request. The same rules apply when the attaché requests permission to attend, or accepts invitations to witness, confidential trials and experiments. It is quite likely that the government to which the attaché is accredited will expect reciprocal privileges in return. The attaché should know, and advise the officials of the foreign power, what the attitude of this Government is with regard to the exchange of information or the extension of reciprocal privileges.

Assistant attachés are sometimes selected for the special purpose of obtaining information on subjects in which they are particularly qualified. In addition to the attachés and the assistant attachés assigned to American Embassies and Legations abroad, naval officers on foreign duty include naval liaison officers and naval observers. These officers do not have the quasidiplomatic status accorded to attachés, and their exact status is the subject of special consideration in each case, to ensure that the best results are obtained and that the countries to which they are assigned have no opportunity for complaint.

The titles United States Naval Liaison Officer and United States Naval Observer are synonymous; the former is used when friendly or neutral countries indicate that the term "observer" is distasteful. While naval attachés are stationed in capitals, naval liaison officers and naval observers are located in major ports or at military and naval headquarters, where they maintain close contact with the sources of strategic information desired by ONI.

Naval attachés proved to be invaluable sources of information and intelligence in World War II. Officers who had previously served in enemy countries made significant contributions to strategic plans, propaganda, and psychological warfare. From attachés stationed in neutral "listening posts," reports concerning the strength and probable intentions of the enemy were received.

From the beginning of the war, naval liaison officers and naval observers, stationed abroad in greatly increased numbers, stimulated a continu-

ous flow to ONI of information and strategic intelligence originating from military headquarters, local commands, personal contacts and observations, friendly intelligence services, local educational or research institutions, trade and industrial companies, and government departments. Their reports concerned enemy, neutral, and Allied shipping movements and statistics, national economy, enemy and Allied orders of battle, national sympathies, military plans, reports of operations, performance of matériel, personality estimates, geography and topography, weather, and much other data indispensable to the planning of naval, military, political, and economic warfare.

In addition to their intelligence responsibilities, these officers had many collateral duties, such as caring for Armed Guard crews and survivors of torpedoed vessels, arranging and advising in the repair of Armed Guard equipment, servicing units of the United States Fleet, and conducting United States naval business with local authorities or headquarters.

An entire book could be written about the achievements of officers of the United States Navy stationed on foreign posts during World War II. Their main duty, however, was to collect and forward information and intelligence of naval interest needed for strategic planning. In fulfillment of this duty they worked closely with the representatives of other United States Government departments and agencies. In the matter of reports, certain definite subjects were allocated to the naval attaché, other subjects to the military attaché, and reporting on subjects outside these lists was assigned by mutual agreement between the two attachés. Thus duplication of effort was avoided and a notable degree of cooperation was attained.

Fleet Sources (Operational Intelligence Officers)

The organization of the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific Ocean Area (JICPOA), the Seventh Fleet Intelligence Center (SEFIC), and the intelligence units of other commands in which fleet intelligence officers worked, will be discussed in detail in later chapters. Primarily, the mission of these units was the collection, processing, and dissemination of information of interest to the operating forces. Their needs, particularly

afloat and at advanced bases, were more tactical than strategic.

Officers assigned to the staffs of area commanders, intelligence centers, and, even, to a more limited extent, those attached to lower echelon commands, however, were anxious to receive and were charged with obtaining strategic intelligence. Often the intelligence upon which a strategic plan was based became, in the operation resulting from that plan, operational intelligence and vice versa. The two fields overlap.

In the area of operations, the sources of strategic intelligence may be divided into several general groups:

1. Photographs, and the strategic area studies resulting from them.
2. Interrogation of Prisoners of War.
3. Captured documents and matériel.
4. Strategic reconnaissance by our agents or forces, or by friendly guerrilla forces, in enemy territory or waters.
5. Radio intelligence.

Each of these sources of strategic intelligence required special techniques of collection and evaluation. In the field of photographic interpretation alone a new science sprang into being. To deal with captured enemy personnel and documents, tremendous efforts to train accomplished translators and interpreters were made. Elaborate liaison and communications plans for contact with reconnaissance forces, coast watchers, and guerrilla bands were prepared and used. Specially trained and skilled evaluators dealt with the information thus obtained.

From these sources, information of strategic value reached the intelligence officers assigned to the large centers, JICPOA and SEFIC, advanced base offices, and staffs afloat and ashore in operational areas. The information was, in many instances, evaluated by specially qualified analysts within these commands for immediate use by area commanders and high echelon staffs, who could thereby appraise their current tactical operations in relation to the strategic goal, and also formulate plans for the future, utilizing this new information.

This intelligence, together with strategic information, was then disseminated to the *F* Branch of ONI in Washington where it was subjected to final evaluation before it reached the top strategic planners.

The *F* Branch, after careful compilation and evaluation of information received from all sources, domestic and foreign, transmitted the resulting reports and surveys as processed intelligence to the High Command in Washington, and to the large intelligence centers, and, through them, to interested commands in the operational areas, thus completing a cycle designed to insure the widest possible use of accurate and significant intelligence.

The organization and functions of the joint intelligence centers and the joint intelligence collection agencies, and the production of joint strategic area studies and surveys, will be discussed in Part Five: Conclusion. The technical intelligence center and the naval technical missions will be described in a chapter on the technical, scientific, and naval power categories of strategic intelligence. Detailed discussion of photographic interpretation, prisoner of war interrogation, exploitation of captured documents, and similar intelligence techniques developed during World War II, will be presented in Part Three: Operational Intelligence. While results obtained by these techniques were used strategically, their operational use in the war theaters was of paramount importance. As we have said previously, intelligence is strategic or operational depending rather on its function than its nature.

In this chapter we have presented a brief description of naval strategic intelligence and of its eight general categories, and a general discussion of the principal foreign and domestic sources from which it is obtained. In the remaining chapters in Part Two the eight general categories of strategic intelligence are divided into groups and discussed in greater detail, with special reference to the naval intelligence viewpoint, in the light of wartime experience gained by American and Allied armed forces and government agencies in World War II.

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

The eight general categories of naval strategic intelligence, listed and briefly described at the beginning of the preceding chapter, coincide with comparable divisions in the broader field of national strategic intelligence. The term "naval interest" is the touchstone by which a particular item may be determined to fit into the national strategic or naval strategic category. However, since naval interest itself has been so widened in recent years, no attempt will be made to draw an arbitrary line of division between national strategic and naval strategic intelligence. Each of the eight general categories of strategic intelligence may be said to have two aspects: The national intelligence aspect, and the naval intelligence aspect, insofar as this text is concerned. The two aspects are interrelated.

Similarly, each of the eight categories is interrelated with one or more of the others; again, no hard and fast distinction can logically be drawn. In this chapter, the political, economic, and geographic categories of strategic intelligence will be discussed. In chapter VII, technical and scientific intelligence, grouped in one category in Naval Intelligence, will be presented together with naval power intelligence. Chapter VIII will deal with who's who, sociological, and counterintelligence.

Political Intelligence

The section of this chapter which is devoted to political intelligence will be divided into the following subsections:

1. Definitions.
2. Need for coordination between political and military strategy.
3. Psychological warfare.

In accordance with the limited objective of this text, no attempt will be made to present a definitive and comprehensive analysis of political intelligence, or of the other seven categories of strategic intelligence. The aim is to provide a basis for

further inquiry on the part of the interested student. Political science, international relations, economics, geography, physics, and combinations thereof may be the objects of lifetime study in themselves. All of these fields have been tremendously broadened by the experience of World War II, and the history of World War II is still being written.

However, enough books have appeared since VJ-day to enable the intelligence specialist to make a preliminary analysis of the role of political intelligence in grand strategy, and of subsidiary developments, during World War II. Prior to our discussion of political intelligence, it is advisable to arrive at definitions of certain terms.

Definitions

The following terms will be defined in the course of our discussion:

1. War.
2. Politics.
3. Diplomacy.
4. Political intelligence.
5. Public opinion.
6. Psychological warfare.
7. Information.
8. Propaganda.

War has been defined by Clausewitz as "the continuation of politics with the means of force." In primitive times, these "means of force" included such weapons as clubs, stone axes, and bows and arrows; now they include many types of guns, ships, and aircraft, directed at the physical being of the enemy, plus the added factor of weapons directed at the mind.

The primary aim of the individual has always been existence. In primitive times men banded together into clans or tribes to increase their chance for survival. These groups required leadership; the interest of the individual was pooled in the common interest, under central authority. Gradually the idea of the state was evolved, implemented, and refined. The central authority of the state was called its government.

To varying degrees, the government of a state served the individual interests of those governed, and the common interest. The internal affairs of a nation were conducted by *politics*, which has been defined by Webster as "the science and art of government." Coincidentally with the rise of modern states there grew up an increased preoccupation on the part of one nation with the internal affairs of neighboring states, because co-existence led to clash of interests, and clash of interests led to war.

Just as internal affairs were conducted by politics in conformity with domestic policy, so external affairs were conducted by *diplomacy* in conformity with foreign policy. Diplomacy has been defined by Webster as "the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations, as in arranging treaties."

Intelligence in its general sense was defined in chapter II. *Political intelligence* may be defined as that part of strategic intelligence which enables the government of one nation to assess, and predict the course of, the domestic and foreign relations of other nations, and to influence them by means short of war, or to attack them more effectively in the event of war.

In chapter IV we defined grand strategy, and pointed out that in modern times nations conduct grand strategies in times of ostensible peace as well as in war. Grand strategy includes both the domestic and foreign policies of nations and groups of nations. Hence political intelligence is of the utmost importance to grand strategy. It is related to the other categories of strategic intelligence, because the resources, location, armed strength, state of scientific development, temper of the people, leadership, and counter-intelligence of nations, are determining factors in the decision whether or not to push international rivalry to the point of armed conflict.

Opinion is defined by Webster as "belief stronger than impression, less strong than positive knowledge." Public opinion is the collective belief of large segments of the population.

For convenience in this discussion, modern nations may be divided into two broad groups, democracies and totalitarian states. In democracies, of which the United States is the outstanding example, governments which derive their authority

from the people, must receive the support of the people in their conduct of domestic and foreign affairs. Hence they are sensitive to public opinion, as expressed through votes and in the press.

Governments of democracies exist for the purpose of serving the interests of the people. Hence it is to the advantage of the governments to know what the people regard as their interests, and to the advantage of the people to know what their interests are, domestically and in matters of foreign policy. The armies of democratic nations are citizen armies, made up of individuals who have not relinquished their voting privilege. Public opinion plays an important part in the shaping of the grand strategies of the democracies. Edward Mead Earle wrote, in *Makers of Modern Strategy*:

Diplomacy and strategy, political commitments and military power, are inseparable. The very existence of a nation depends upon its concept of the national interest and the means by which the national interests promoted; therefore it is imperative that its citizens understand the fundamentals of strategy.

Conversely, in the totalitarian states, governments exist for the purpose of perpetuating themselves, and they conduct domestic and foreign affairs accordingly. They tell the people what the interests of the people are. Opposition is suppressed by ruthless counter-intelligence methods. Since there is only one party, there can be no dissenting votes. Party and government are one; and both are controlled by one individual, or at most, a handful of individuals.

Allen Welsh Dulles, in a recent authoritative book entitled "*Germany's Underground*," sums up the grim transition which occurred from the Germany of the Weimar Republic to the Germany of Adolph Hitler:

The fatal weakness of the political system of the Weimar Republic lay in the ease with which absolute power could be taken from the people and entrusted to that a single thrust can overcome them, the people may be deprived even of the opportunity to make an effective fight to preserve democracy. Yet today in many European countries there are bitter struggles over inserting in the new constitutions the checks and balances that delimit political power. These checks and balances may at times seem frustrating, and appear to make democracy less efficient than dictatorship, but they are really beyond price.

The truth of this is proven by the German story. Under Hitler political parties melted away. Organized

labor, at first seduced by demagogic promises, was later strong-armed into submission. The intellectuals and business and professional men retired in dismay and fear into their work. The army came to heel. The churches remained, but in the political sphere were ineffective. And the sum total was disaster for Germany, leaving a problem in political and economic reconstruction to test man's skill and ingenuity.

Once this transition had taken place, the war of Adolph Hitler with the rest of the world may be said to have begun.

Public opinion is shaped totally, in war and peace, by the governments of totalitarian states. In democratic countries in time of peace it is not influenced by, but itself influences, government; war brings the imposition of certain necessary controls, such as censorship, but these controls are democratically administered. During World War II a civilian agency, the Office of Censorship, was created to deal with civilian modes of communication in the United States; its authority however did not extend to persons and places under military jurisdiction. The success of this agency in upholding the principle of voluntary censorship is well described by Theodore F. Koop in *Weapon of Silence*.

Psychological warfare, which is synonymous with political warfare and war of nerves, includes propaganda services and information services, between which a clear distinction must be drawn. For a definition of psychological warfare we turn to one of the best books on the subject—*Unwritten Treaty*, by James P. Warburg, former executive of the Office of War Information:

Psychological warfare—the struggle for control over the emotions and the minds of men, which determines the loyalties of large masses of people, their willingness or unwillingness to fight, as well as the strength and resourcefulness with which they are able to ward off attack or defeat an enemy * * *

It is not without significance that the Germans, whose favorite weapon is coercion by fear, should call their psychological warfare a *war of nerves* (*Nervenkrieg*); while the British, who rarely threaten and prefer to rely upon the persuasion of promised reward, refer to their psychological operations as *political warfare*.

Psychological warfare as a weapon employed against the government of another state, through the public opinion in that state, is described in the following quotation from *Raum und Volk im Weltkrieg* (*Space and People in World War*), by Edward Banse:

Applied psychology as a weapon of war means propaganda intended to influence the moral attitude of nations toward war. It is essential to attack the enemy nation in its weak spots (and what nation has not its weak spots?), to undermine and break down its resistance and to convince it that it is deceived, misled and brought to destruction by its own government. Thus the people will lose confidence in the justice of their cause so that the political opposition in those nations (and what nation is without one?) will raise its head and become a more powerful troublemaker. The enemy nations' originally solid, powerful and well-knit fabric must be gradually disintegrated, broken down, rotted, so that it falls apart like a fungus trod upon in the forest.

Before World War II, Nazi Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Japan, engaged in this type of psychological warfare on a world-wide scale, while maintaining and extending their holds on the minds and emotions of the masses within their borders. The German effort was closely intertwined with and dependent upon the global espionage network, and sabotage, terrorism and murder were resorted to as well as propaganda.

In the United States and Great Britain the lunatic fringe was encouraged; many of the "hate groups" published magazines and newspapers Nazi-inspired propaganda which was systematically fed to them by German agents. Racial and religious prejudice were carefully fostered; economic and political rivalries were fanned. Sly attempts were made to strike at the unity of the American people, and the unity of the British Empire, and the friendship existing between the English-speaking peoples.

One alleged point of friction exploited by the Nazis was the Irish question. Perhaps the greatest psychological warfare blunder of the Germans was to misjudge the psychology of other peoples. An example of this is the Nazi-inspired and Nazi-financed campaign of terrorism conducted by agents of the outlawed Irish Republican Army in England in 1939, which attempted to highlight the injustice of "partition," and served only to harden British and North of Ireland opinion against Eire. The bomb outrages perpetrated by these hoodlums in the pay of the Nazis failed to intimidate the English, who were aware from the beginning of the German origin of the conspiracy, and of ramifications leading to radical Irish-

American elements in the United States. In his book, *German Secret Service at Work*, Bernard Newman points out how publicity given to the fact that the hand of Hitler was behind the I. R. A. bomb outrages tended to nullify the carefully masked Nazi intrigue:

People wondered where this organization got its funds, for such an extensive program of sabotage demands considerable financial backing. Even before the war started, the secret was revealed: One sum of 65 thousand dollars was placed at the disposal of a German agent in the United States; he in turn passed to an Irish-American, a sympathizer with the I. R. A., and from him it re-crossed the Atlantic to Ireland. The German hope was that this roundabout method would hide any suspicion of the German origin of the funds. But there is no intelligence service so keen as that of the great financial houses; of this, the revelations of the fortunes of the German leaders invested abroad offer ample proof.

Protective measures taken against Nazi attempts to engender political strife by propaganda, sabotage, and terrorism included counter-intelligence, in which censorship played an important part, and counter-propaganda. Economic intelligence is referred to briefly at the end of the quotation above; political, sociological, and who's who intelligence also contributed to the formulation of effective counter-measures.

The word *propaganda* has acquired an unsavory connotation, and there is confusion in the minds of many people as to its exact meaning. In *Unwritten Treaty* Mr. Warburg defines both *propaganda* and *information* in terms of purpose, and draws a distinction between them, making clear the fact that the aims of the two kinds of agency are different, and that propaganda is not necessarily conducted with base intentions:

It cannot be stated with sufficient emphasis that information is one thing—propaganda quite another.

The purpose of spreading information is to promote the functioning of man's reason.

The purpose of propaganda is to mobilize certain of man's emotions in such a way that they will dominate his reason—not necessarily with evil design.

The functioning of an information agency is to disseminate truth—to make available fact and opinion, each carefully labeled and separated from the other. The aim of an information agency is to enable as many people as possible to form their own individual judgments on the basis of relevant fact and authoritative opinion.

The function of a propaganda agency is almost the

exact opposite: It is not to inform, but to persuade. In order to persuade it must disseminate only such fact, such opinion, and such fiction masquerading as fact as will serve to make people act, or fail to act, in the desired way.

Propaganda may be subdivided into two types—white, or overt, propaganda, and black, or covert, propaganda. Both were widely employed by the Allies and by the Axis during World War II, and both depended for their effectiveness on strategic intelligence, particularly on the political category of strategic intelligence.

White, or overt, propaganda is that in which there is no deception as to source. All is open and above-board. Black, or covert, propaganda, sometimes called clandestine propaganda, is in contrast disseminated under different types of disguises. The radio fulminations of Lord Haw Haw were a good example of white propaganda; black propaganda as practised by the Nazis during the war in Poland is well described in the following quotation from *Terror in Our Time*, by Richard Wilmer Rowan:

From sabotage of communication, munitions supplies, and the material resources of the Poles fighting desperately for national existence, it was but a short step in secret-service development to sabotage of the morale and spirit of the Polish people. On September 8, 1939, the Germans produced the clandestine innovation of radio sabotage. They borrowed the wavelength of Warsaw's Radio Station 1 and began broadcasting in Polish, incredible accounts of anarchy and disaster * * *.

Such was the direct assault upon Polish morale. An even more cunning attempt was made by Nazi secret-service operatives when, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, they began broadcasting to Poland from a powerful radio station that, they explained, was "official British." Here the psychological ruse was grotesquely exaggerated optimism rather than the usual hammering pessimism—an optimism intended to produce an eventual recoil of strained perplexity, cruel disappointment, then disillusionment and black despair.

Need for Coordination of Political and Military Strategy

Col. Walter Nicolai, Chief of the German Secret Service during World War I, and one of the most brilliant of modern military thinkers, in pondering the lessons of that war, arrived at the conclusion that economic and political warfare, including propaganda, had definitely become a part of the struggle between nations. He wrote in his book, *The German Secret Service*, published in 1924:

The World War provided the proof that a struggle between nations had grown out of the narrow limits of decisions by arms and had become a contest in which the whole national strength was engaged on the political, economic, and military territories, and, not least, even in the very soul of the people. In the place of a military Intelligence Service there arose a State Secret Service against surrounding countries. It concerned itself with all that might give the State an advantage over another, and equally with economics, politics, and armaments. It did not limit itself any longer to the purely negative activity of inquiry, but engaged in positive action in the economic struggle and in home and foreign political propaganda.

In accordance with these ideas, the Nazis soon contended that the phrase "War in Peace" summed up the role of the intelligence service after the Armistice. He wrote:

The intelligence service will not be hit by disarmament, because propaganda, its positive side, would displace military consideration and become more than ever a political weapon. For these reasons the intelligence service stands on the threshold of new tasks.

In accordance with these ideas, the Nazis, soon after their assumption of power in 1933, began to carry and implement the Nicolai doctrine that "intensified espionage must precede intensified armament for war." Colonel Nicolai operated behind the front of a "private detective agency."

In the mid-1930's thousands of agents were dispatched into the countries that were later to be occupied or threatened into submission by Hitler. Thenceforward the agile brains of Colonel Nicolai and Admiral Canaris, another wise old dog of the German Secret Service, contributed greatly to making the Nazi intelligence services the most efficient in the world. Intelligence played no less important a role than armed might in the new Nazi concept of total war. Hitler, in 1933, had told Hermann Rauschnig that his real secret weapon was espionage.

Since we are here concerned with political intelligence, it may be of interest to select from the experience of World War II some examples of successful and unsuccessful coordination of political and military strategy. Hitler relied almost entirely on political strategy to accomplish his aims during the years 1933-39. The main weapon was the "war of nerves," the Nazi version of psychological warfare.

Military force on a large scale was first employed by Hitler in the attack on Poland; in this opera-

tion, and in the invasion of France and the Lowlands the following spring, Nazi political and military strategy were brilliantly coordinated. Thereafter, invincible German might began to falter.

Under prisoner-of-war interrogation, Rear Adm. Otto Schulz, formerly head of the Intelligence Division of the German General Staff, admitted that he did not know why the political leaders of the Reich had been unable to secure the adherence of Spain to the Axis in that critical period in the spring of 1940 when the military fortune of Germany was at flood tide and that of the Allies was at its lowest ebb. But he says enough, in remarks quoted below, to lay the failure directly to lack of coordination between political and military strategy:

Since at the same time France as an opponent had ceased to exist, thus neutralizing the whole of French North Africa, and Italy, with her rather large fleet, had entered the war on the side of Germany, the situation at sea had changed during the short period April-July 1940 to an extent hitherto unimagined in German's favor.

Only the entry into our coalition of friendly Spain was now required to close the Mediterranean in the west, thus making it to all intents and purposes an Axis sea.

The way to Egypt and the Near East oilfields would thus have lain open and England would have had to accept the compromise peace for which the German political command was striving.

The Naval Command in Wilhelmshaven, on whose staff I was serving at that time, felt certain that the war would develop in this direction and made preparations accordingly, including the allocation of gun crews to the Straits of Gibraltar. Why the political leaders of the Reich at that time were unable to secure Spain's adherence to the Axis, I do not know.

I have the feeling that the enormous strategic possibilities of such a development were not fully appreciated by them and that therefore this solution was not urged by them with sufficient vigor.

According to my colleagues, the German Admiralty had little influence on the consideration of important politico-strategic combinations, since there was no war council composed of representatives of the various high commands, and the most important decisions were made by Adolph Hitler himself (by intuition). In fact, the High Command was merely required to carry out these plans.

In my view, therefore, a tremendous opportunity for quickly ending the war in favor of Germany was neglected.

—"From the North Sea to the Crimea,"

ONI Review.

December 1946.

That such coordination was not lacking in England is attested to by the fact that in May 1940 Sir Samuel Hoare, a member of the British War Cabinet, was entrusted with a very urgent mission to Spain. Before leaving, he received instructions and advice from Lord Halifax, from Neville Chamberlain, and from Admiral Tom Phillips, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. The words of Admiral Phillips, as quoted by Sir Samuel, are of particular interest when compared with the remarks of Admiral Schulz regarding the strategic importance of Spain from the German viewpoint. Sir Samuel asked Admiral Phillips the simple question, "Shall I go to Spain?" The latter replied:

You must go at once. It is essential that the Atlantic ports of the Spanish Peninsula should not fall into enemy hands. With the probable loss of France and the French fleet we are stretched to the utmost in our battle with the U-boats. If the Atlantic ports of the Peninsula and with them the coast of northwest Africa go over to the enemy, I do not know how we shall carry on. It is essential also that the naval base of Gibraltar should remain available for our Mediterranean and eastern communications. If you can do anything in support of these fundamental needs of the war, your mission will be of the highest strategic importance.

It became evident that, if he was to succeed in having any influence with the Franco government, Sir Samuel would need the full status of Ambassador. Therefore his original mission was expanded, and he went to Spain as Ambassador Extraordinary. That Franco, teetering on the verge of belligerency, was persuaded first to a position of non-belligerency and later to a position of unneutral neutrality, was due in large part, if not entirely, to the skilled diplomatic and political activities of the British and American Ambassadors and their staffs, and to the fact that the Allies coordinated political and military strategy more consistently and more effectively than did the Axis.

When he arrived in Madrid, Sir Samuel found it seething with rumor and intrigue. The Nazi war of nerves had been developed to a remarkable and indeed to a frightening degree; Hitler was coordinating his political strategy in Spain with his military strategy elsewhere. The target was public opinion, and, since representatives of the great news-gathering agencies were located in Spain, the products of the Nazi rumor-factory were

picked up and projected round the world, and were further amplified and distorted in transmission. In the following quotation from *Complacent Dictator*, Sir Samuel describes Nazi psychological warfare, or war of nerves, as conducted in Spain in 1940:

It was upon this atmosphere of fear and fatalism that the Nazi machine operated with ceaseless intensity. Spain, being isolated from the outer world, was particularly susceptible to unscrupulous propaganda. No counteracting force of public opinion could exist in a country where even private criticism was a criminal offense. The result was a continuous series of easy victories in the German war of nerves * * *.

The fact that the Nazi technique was always the same made very little impression upon Spaniards whose abnormal condition predisposed them to believe anything that was said with sufficient force and reiteration. The campaign, carefully planned in the German Embassy, would first show itself in ordinary conversation. The talk of Madrid and the other principal cities would suddenly be concentrated on some impending German move, for example, a decisive victory in the immediate future, a new weapon, the immediate invasion of the Spanish peninsula, or the imminence of peace negotiations. In a day or two every newspaper in Spain would re-echo their master's voice with added detail and all the accessories of established facts. By this time, Lisbon and Gibraltar, two hot-beds of rumour, would take up the tale, and the press agencies of Great Britain and the United States, obtaining the news from so many apparently different sources, would send it humming round the world * * *. A stray word or two at first, then a well-authenticated story, finally, a detailed history, accepted and repeated by everyone, and the calumny or lie becomes an axiom.

The struggle between the Allies and the Axis in Spain was basically a political one, but it had important economic aspects. Economic warfare, as well as political warfare, was carried on with no holds barred in that strategic peninsula, and will be discussed later in this chapter in connection with economic intelligence.

The diplomatic background of the Allied landings in North Africa was exceedingly complex. It tied in very closely with two subjects which were controversial during the war: Our relations with Vichy France, and with Franco Spain. Our State Department was angrily attacked by large sections of the American press, which obviously was not in a position to know the real story behind what appeared to be traffic with friends of Hitler.

Our policy regarding France and Spain was framed in accordance with political intelligence,

and governed by long-range strategic considerations, well in advance of the entry of the United States into the war. Three recent books based on hitherto secret documents provide valuable insight into the subject, and the interested reader is referred to them. They are: *Adventure in Diplomacy*, by Kenneth W. Pendar; *Our Vichy Gamble*, by William L. Langer; and *Operations in North African Waters*, by Samuel Eliot Morison. *Complacent Dictator*, by Sir Samuel Hoare, has been referred to and quoted from above; *Wartime Mission in Spain*, by Carlton J. H. Hayes, is also recommended.

Mr. Morison ably sums up the diplomatic background of Operation Torch as follows:

One of the several unpleasant prospects unfolded before the United States by the fall of France in 1940 was that of Germany obtaining control of the French Empire in Africa, as well as the French Fleet. If she succeeded in the former, every trans-Atlantic harbor from the North Cape to the Gulf of Guinea, except those of Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, would be in Axis hands. And if Hitler obtained control of the Toulon fleet, he would have a formidable surface navy to supplement the U-boats and defend his territorial gains. President Roosevelt initiated diplomatic action to prevent either event happening, almost a year before the United States entered the war.

General Maxime Weygand, Marshal Petain's over-all commander of French North and West Africa, was known to be a steadfast French patriot, utterly opposed to a shameful collaboration with Germany. Hence the President, advised by the Department of State, decided in the summer of 1940 that North Africa was the place to halt the Axis encirclement of the Atlantic. A careful program was also worked out with the purpose of turning the eyes of Frenchmen again toward the Statue of Liberty. While the British Government (with the full knowledge and consent of Washington) encouraged and supported General De Gaulle, and so kept the resistance movement going outside French territory, the United States Government (with the knowledge and at times the reluctant consent of the British) continued to recognize and deal with the official French Government at Vichy. We accepted the odium of appeasement for very good reasons: to keep a foothold in Africa, and exert a counterpressure on Marshal Petain to that of Hitler and Laval, who wished to make France a complete ally of Germany. In spite of numerous snags, squabbles, and unexpected turns of events, this dual diplomatic policy made possible the occupation of Algeria and French Morocco by the United Nations in 1942, with a minimum of bloodshed.

In 1940 Vichy France was a potential listening post. In order to exert counterpressure on Mar-

shal Petain, as explained above by Mr. Morison, and to obtain needed political intelligence, we required the presence of a diplomatic representative at Vichy. Consequently Admiral William D. Leahy was appointed on 23 November 1940 as American Ambassador to France.

Part of the mission of the Ambassador was to support the economic status of France in North Africa. In implementation of this policy, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of the American Embassy at Vichy, and Gen. Maxime Weygand, over-all commander of French North and West Africa, initialed an agreement in February 1941 which provided that the United States would supply North Africa with certain products, and that we should send control officers to supervise the distribution of these supplies.

Thirteen control officers, with the rank of vice consul, were dispatched to North Africa by the State Department in 1941. They were supervised by Mr. Murphy, who took up residence in Algiers as consul general. Ostensibly diplomatic officials, their real job was to collect information. They acquired maps, measured and charted fields and coast lines, watched ship movements, and sounded out native sentiment. By the time Col. William A. Eddy, afterward American Minister to Saudi Arabia, arrived at Tangier, the vice consuls had established the groundwork for an extensive intelligence network. Stuart Alsop and Thomas Braden, in their book, *Sub Rosa*, describe the joint OSS-State Department intelligence venture in North Africa:

When he arrived at Tangier, Eddy had been told that the United States planned to invade Africa as soon as it was strong enough to do so. In aid of the landings, he was to set up intelligence posts in the principal cities. He was to establish a chain of communications between them, and with America. He was to prepare the beach-heads and landing fields, and he was to try to nullify French opposition, or if possible, win French support. In the meantime Eddy was to encourage the French to resist the Germans in the event that Hitler beat the Allies to the draw by invading North Africa himself. To do the job, Eddy was to have the services of the vice consuls working under Robert Murphy, and he himself was to direct their efforts in cooperation with Murphy.

In this difficult dual role, Eddy and Murphy worked excellently together * * *. Together they set up five secret radio stations, Pilgrim in Tunis, Yankee in Algiers, Franklin in Oran, Lincoln in Casablanca, and Midway in Tangier. Eddy spent much of his time

traveling back and forth between them. At each post he would call together the OSS men who worked there, and they would sit for hours discussing the latest information and each others' plans. At the end of the discussion, Eddy would give further orders.

In return for the foodstuffs and commodities supplied by the United States under the Murphy-Weygand agreement, General Weygand allowed the vice consuls to work with French Resistance leaders and to report in cipher to Washington by means of the secret radio transmitters. Meanwhile Ambassador Leahy was forwarding political intelligence acquired from the highest diplomatic, naval, and military sources in Vichy France.

Political intelligence received by the Allied top strategic planners enabled them to coordinate political and military strategy in such a way as to assure the success of Operation Torch, the turning point in the European war.

Other examples both of successful and unsuccessful coordination of political and military policy might be cited, but would serve only to underline the implications inherent in those discussed above: That such coordination is essential, that it depends on timely and accurate strategic intelligence adequately disseminated, and upon unity of command. The need for such coordination is less immediately pressing in the present time of ostensible peace but will become more urgent than ever in any future war.

Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, as quoted in the *Washington Post* of 19 March 1947, declared that passage of the Army-Navy-Air Force unification bill was vital because it would give the United States the means to back up "a firm foreign policy." He stressed the need for closely integrating foreign policy with military policy, and stated that he considered the measures proposed to integrate foreign, military, and industrial policy more important than the Army-Navy unification proposals in the administration bill. Provisions to this end, he said, "should prevent us from ever again coming face to face with a war for which we are unwarned or militarily unprepared."

Psychological Warfare

In the definition of psychological warfare presented earlier in this chapter, it was stated that in

German military thinking psychological warfare was synonymous with war of nerves, and in British military thinking synonymous with political warfare. These two aspects of the subject have been discussed above.

During World War II the American psychological warfare effort was planned at the highest levels, and carried out by military and Office of War Information personnel. Radio broadcasts, use of loud-speakers, and dropping of leaflets were among the means employed. In the European theater there was close cooperation between the Office of War Information (American), and the Psychological Warfare Executive (British).

The best over-all account of psychological warfare as employed in World War II is that contained in *Unwritten Treaty*, by James P. Warburg. More specialized accounts may be found in various publications of the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean areas.

Perhaps the earliest use of psychological warfare by American forces to induce the surrender of the enemy occurred on Guadalcanal in the fall of 1942, when a Marine officer, with the cooperation of a POW, took loud-speaker equipment to the edge of a ravine containing a pocket of Japanese troops which was holding up the Allied advance. Several of the enemy were thus induced to surrender, the pocket was eliminated, and the advance continued. Thereafter American naval and military personnel trained in the Japanese language were employed in increasing numbers in the Pacific theater in duties which included psychological warfare as well as POW interrogation, interpretation, and translation of captured documents. Notable among these language personnel were graduates of the Navy School of Oriental Languages, located at Boulder, Colo. Boulder graduates aided in the preparation of Japanese language leaflets which were dropped by the million on the enemy armed forces and the population of the Japanese home islands. Boulder graduates also played a significant part, as translators and interpreters, in technical and other missions sent to Japan by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in the postsurrender period.

All graduates of the Navy School of Oriental Languages were intelligence officers of the Naval

Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve; they served in intelligence billets, at home and overseas.

In the postwar period it has been determined that psychological warfare is a planning and operational function in the Navy, and is within the province not of Naval Intelligence but of strategic plans. However, Naval Intelligence is charged with the responsibility for supplying the necessary intelligence to support the psychological warfare effort.

Economic Intelligence

The second of the eight general categories of strategic intelligence is the economic category. While the scope of political intelligence has been broadened by twentieth century developments in oral, written, and visual means of communication, the scope of economic intelligence has been broadened by tremendous strides forward in technology and transportation. Communications in the sense of lines of transportation and supply has been revolutionized offensively and defensively by air power.

The peacetime commercial airlines of a nation are used in wartime to transport troops and supplies. Therefore air transport capabilities, a factor of negligible importance in World War I, are of prime interest to strategic planners at the present time.

The personnel, planes, ground services, and equipment of United States commercial airlines were placed at the disposal of the military forces immediately after Pearl Harbor. Out of this voluntary cooperation grew the gigantic world-wide operations of the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service. The logistics miracle performed by American air transport during World War II is summed up by Reginald M. Cleveland in his book, *Air Transport at War*:

On Army and Navy errands the airlines flew the equivalent of 26,000 times around the world at the equator. In their war-colored civilian job for the Army and the Navy, they flew 8 billion passenger miles and 850 million ton-miles of cargo. They could have moved the whole population of Philadelphia to London. Their cargoes ranged from presidents and generals to tanks and blood plasma. Out of every 5 sick or wounded men brought back to this country, 1 was returned by air, yet only 1 patient for every 30,000 died en route. Finally, when victory was won, the airlines played a major part in the re-deployment of our troops.

The paragraph quoted above illustrates how but one aspect, the transportation aspect, of but one category, the economic category, of strategic intelligence has been expanded in recent years. If the means of transporting men and material by air have been placed at the disposal of our strategic planners, so have the means of striking directly at the industrial vitals of other nations through air power.

This part of chapter VII will be divided into the following subsections:

1. Definitions.
2. Economic intelligence and the European War.
3. Economic intelligence and the Pacific War.

Definitions

The following terms will be defined prior to a brief and general discussion of the part played by economic intelligence in World War II:

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Economics. | 4. Preemptive buying. |
| 2. Economic intelligence. | 5. Navicert. |
| 3. Economic warfare. | 6. Blacklist. |

Economics is defined by Webster as "the science that investigates the conditions and laws affecting the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, or the material means of satisfying human desires; political economy."

Economic intelligence is that intelligence which aims to disclose the resources of a country in order to determine its ability to equip and maintain armed forces, and its strength as ally or enemy. By examining the capability of a country to supply raw materials and to produce finished goods, we are able to arrive at an estimate of its war potential. Stock piling of strategic materials and production of aircraft and weapons in time of peace are valuable indications of the intentions of a foreign power.

Finance, commerce, agriculture, and transportation, as well as industry, are important components of the economy of a nation, and are therefore germane to economic intelligence.

By means of economic intelligence we can learn the strong and weak points of the economy of an enemy nation in time of war, and shape grand strategy and specific tactics accordingly.

Military and nonmilitary strategy and tactics aimed at damaging the war economy of an enemy

nation compromise *economic warfare*. While a nation thus strikes at the economy, and hence at the war potential, of the enemy, it seeks by various means to strengthen its own war economy. These means include rationing and price controls.

The nonmilitary means of waging economic warfare include preemptive buying, and use of the navicert and blacklist. They are coordinated with and supported by military means such as blockade in force, attacks in shipping, and industrial bombing.

Preemptive buying is the purchase of strategic materials in the open market in neutral countries in order to deny them to the enemy. This will be exemplified and further discussed later in this chapter.

The *navicert* system is a method of control of neutral merchant shipping.

The *blacklist* as a form of economic warfare is a compilation, either public or private, of the names of individuals and firms trading with the enemy or with other blacklisted individuals or firms.

In World War II the Allies struck at the war economy of Germany by means of industrial bombing, and at the war economy of Japan by means of attacks first on her shipping and subsequently on industrial targets. Economic intelligence was needed by our strategic planners in order to launch these attacks and to analyze the results achieved. Data received were used in planning subsequent attacks.

Simultaneously economic warfare was waged in neutral countries by the Allies against the Axis. Much of this activity was conducted on high diplomatic levels.

Economic Intelligence and the European War

Writing in 1942, S. K., in his book, *Agent in Italy*, described the economic regimentation by means of which Hitler, as early as 1933, began to prepare German economy for total war:

The purpose of the New Economic Order is to make Germany the dominant industrial, and hence economic and political, force of the world.

Its basic principle is State-directed planned economy. As Hitler expresses it, the individual can no longer work independently to contribute his mite to the needs of a nation or the world. To economics, more than to politics, applies the Nazi programmatic principle of

community interest before individual interest (*Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*). Freeing this of its overtones of sloganeering, it means the suppression of all private initiative in favor of the State, even if the total effort be somewhat reduced. In dictator opinion, private property no longer exists; thing and man belong exclusively to the sovereign power.

In 1933 Hitler began to create the war economy of Germany by feeding huge arms orders to heavy industry, thus making it dependent on the Nazi regime rather than on revived private trade. Simultaneously, by shepherding organized and unorganized labor into the Nazi Arbeitsfront and giving its officials great authority, he prevented hostile action by industry and finance against him. Arbeitsfront commissars acting with state authority became the *de facto* bosses of factories and industries, and the bosses, owners, and managers became *de facto* employees.

This was not force, but the result of a forced development. At first Arbeitsfront delegates were like inspectors in American defense plants, placed there only to pass on the quality of the product. But they had power also to supervise labor welfare, which they used as a weapon to threaten recalcitrant industrialists. They could demand, and get, plant reconstruction and expansion. Thus the dependence of industry on Hitler had its roots in the distress of German economic life in 1934 and 1935.

By these and other drastic measures Hitler achieved complete dominance over German industry in the interval of ostensible peace between the two World Wars. By the annexation of part of Czechoslovakia he acquired the giant Skoda munitions works, and all of the heavy tanks and other weapons which were completed and on hand. Populations gained by conquest and threat of conquest swelled the ranks of German slave labor. The Nazi counter intelligence agencies were quick to root out disaffection and unrest wherever and whenever they appeared.

With the entry of Great Britain and the United States into the war, economic intelligence was used successfully by the Nazis to guide their U-boat campaign and unsuccessfully in a large-scale attempt at sabotage of American war production. Our antisubmarine methods were ultimately brought to such a point of perfection that the Nazi U-boats were virtually driven from the seas. Navy Intelligence, Army Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation thwarted sabotage attempts in the United States by efficient counter-intelligence measures. There were German and Japanese fifth columns in America, but they were

broken up just as effectively as the Nazi-I. R. A. fifth column in England had been broken up by British Intelligence in 1939.

Bornstein and Milton, writing in 1942 in *Action Against the Enemy's Mind*, explained how the increased significance of economic warfare had led to broadening of the effective range of action of espionage agents to include the industrial hinterland of the enemy nation:

This new Nazi form of the old espionage services, its transformation into a fifth column, matches the metamorphosis in other forms of warfare. In the purely military field, the scope of espionage and the spheres of activity of its agents have been vastly enlarged. Among other things the development of the air arm has created a new line of espionage. Whereas previously the immediate ground combat area was foremost in interest and, in the main, troop movements and shifts were the objects of observation, today it is important to have agents and accomplices in the entire territory of the enemy; to signal directions to planes, to inform them of objects worthy of bombardment, and should parachutists be used, to support them. Similarly, the increased significance of economic warfare at sea has broadened the effective range of action of espionage agents; decisive actions can be planned on the basis of accurate information about sailing times and the routes of single ships and convoys. Much more than ever before, industry in the hinterland has become a battleground for hostile agents. In given circumstances entire campaigns may be decided by the sabotage of industrial activities, the damaging of important factories and the slow-down of production.

In spite of vast sums spent on the recruitment, training, and maintenance of their foreign espionage personnel, the Nazis were unable to hamper American war production, although there is little doubt that they were fully aware of its importance as the arsenal of democracy. To our own counter-intelligence must be added the inability of the German mind to comprehend the psychology of other peoples, a factor which helps to explain failure of the Nazis to execute large-scale sabotage in the United States as it helps to explain their failures in political intelligence referred to previously. Foreign agents, in order to carry out important sabotage in this country, must first learn to exist undetected within our borders, and this the Nazi agents were unable to do after Pearl Harbor.

We waged economic warfare against the Axis, principally in the Latin-American countries, and largely under the cognizance of the Coordinator of

Inter-American Affairs. An entire chapter might be devoted to this subject. For an example of one weapon, preemptive buying, in the variety of weapons employed in economic warfare, we will turn to Spain.

Sir Samuel Hoare, in his book previously referred to, stated that for months on end the word "wolfram" bulked large in his daytime thoughts and in his dreams at night.

Wolfram was the key to British economic warfare conducted against the Axis in Spain by Sir Samuel Hoare, and continued to be the key of joint Anglo-American economic warfare in the peninsula after Pearl Harbor. It was not the only strategic material purchased by the Nazis in Spain, but it was the most important.

After economic intelligence had revealed desperate need on the part of the enemy for certain scarce and strategic materials, including wolfram, which could only be obtained overseas, and after the sources of these materials had been determined, it was the function of Allied economic agencies and diplomatic representatives to attempt to dry up these sources.

Wolfram, a strategic mineral needed for the production of tungsten, which in turn is used to harden steel, was purchased by Germany almost entirely from Spain and Portugal. Carlton J. H. Hayes, in his book, *Wartime Mission in Spain*, describes how preemptive buying in that country was used as a weapon of economic warfare, to deny wolfram to Germany:

Our objective in preemptive buying was not to reduce Spanish imports from Germany, but rather to reduce the volume of materials from Spain must furnish Germany in payment. The device principally resorted to was to raise prices of Spanish products which the Germans wished to acquire. Thus, if Germany was purchasing a strategic ore at, say, \$20 a ton, the Allies offered \$60 a ton. As a result, Spanish producers of the ore began either to sell it to the Allies or to charge the Germans the same high price the Allies were offering. Consequently the Germans, with only a limited amount of pesetas available from their exports to Spain with which to purchase the ore, could buy only a third of the quantity they otherwise could have bought. If they wished to overcome this handicap, they must increase their exports to Spain and thus further burden their own economy to the advantage of the Allies.

Skillful trading with Spain enabled the Allies to encourage Franco in his policy of nonbelligerency;

if we had imposed an embargo on oil to Spain, for example, it is probable that we would have driven Franco into the arms of the Axis. It was to our interest to buy from Spain those strategic materials which would otherwise have gone to Germany, and to sell to Spain enough goods, and the right kind of goods, so that her economy could continue to function.

Strategic bombing of the industrial centers of Germany did not occur until relatively late in the war. It took time for the British to assemble a fleet of heavy bombers for nighttime raids deep into Germany, and for the United States to produce heavy bombers and to recruit, equip, and train the crews to fly them. The Eighth Air Force did not conduct large daytime raids into Germany until late in 1942. Thereafter the frequency of raids and the weight of bombs dropped increased progressively until VE-day.

The results of the combined Anglo-American industrial bombing of the German homeland and German-occupied territory were not fully perceived until after the termination of the European war, when prisoner of war interrogation reports and enemy documents became available, and when target teams had a chance to assess at first hand the damage inflicted.

Beginning with the Allied invasion of Normandy, the emphasis was placed not on strategic bombing, which had paved the way for the invasion, but on tactical bombing, in support of our ground forces. Correspondingly the emphasis shifted from strategic to operational intelligence. Following VE-day, the emphasis shifted to long-range strategic intelligence, as target teams raced through Germany in search of topflight scientific personnel, war criminals, technical equipment, and files and records.

Prisoner of war interrogation and exploitation of captured enemy documents provide valuable strategic and operational intelligence while a war is in progress. After the conclusion of hostilities they provide historical material which enables us to learn of the effectiveness of specific weapons and tactics, and strategic intelligence useful in making plans for the future safeguarding of our national interests.

The basic document on the subject of the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing of Germany

and German-held Europe is the *Over-all Report (European War)* of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, to which students are referred. Under interrogation, prisoners of war have borne out and elaborated the findings of the Strategic Bombing Survey.

Summed up very briefly, the results were cumulative and interconnected. To meet the bombing threat, the Germans dispersed many industries, and placed some underground. This meant an increased reliance on transportation. Production was slowed down when parts were not available, because the plants which manufactured them had been blown out of existence. Bomb damage to factories caused skilled workers to be diverted from their jobs to rebuild the plants. Fires started by raids were more feared than actual bomb damage, because they were likely to destroy whole blocks of dwellings, while a bomb blast often left some portion of a house habitable.

Workers bombed out of their homes, or those who could not report for work due to interrupted transportation facilities, were temporarily nullified as war producers. Morale of both soldiers and civilians was affected by the news that whole cities had been wiped out.

The German war machine itself was slowed down almost to a crawl not only because transportation and war production were crippled, but because systematic bombing of oil storage tanks, refineries, and synthetic oils plants was progressively drying up the fuel supply. Operations and training programs in the German army, navy, and air force had to be drastically curtailed for this reason.

Economic Intelligence and the Pacific War

Although Japan started in 1928 to orient her economy toward war, and although she built up her industrial capacity with surprising speed during the Manchurian and Chinese campaigns, insufficiency of raw materials such as oil, rubber, bauxite, chrome, nickel, and tungsten, all of which she had to import, was the chief limiting factor on her ability to produce for war. In spite of her apparent progress, she remained with an economy having only 10 percent of the potential of the United States economy.

Japanese economic potential was unequal to the burden imposed upon it by the national grand strategy; accumulated stocks of raw materials were not sufficient for a long war, nor was industrial manpower adequate. Japan itself was desperately vulnerable to attacks on its shipping which carried the essential imports. The economic weaknesses of Japan are summed up in the following quotation from the *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

Having a comparatively small, newly developed industry, it had to work without much cushion of underutilized physical plant capacity. Having had little experience with mass production, the country had no opportunity to build up a large force of industrially and mechanically trained personnel. This meant shortages of skills, ingenuity and ability to improvise later on, when the economy was under the stresses and strains of large-scale warfare.

This economic potential could support a short war or a war of limited liabilities. The accumulated stocks of munitions, oil, planes, and ships could be thrown into action and produce a devastating effect on unmobilized enemies. When this initial blow failed to result in peace, Japan, without significant help from Germany, was doomed. Its economy could not support a protracted campaign against an enemy even half as strong as the United States.

The sinking of merchant shipping was instrumental in disrupting the war economy of Japan and bringing about her defeat. The United States Navy played the stellar role in this endeavor. The figures, as given by *Summary Report (Pacific War)*, are as follows:

Eight million nine hundred thousand tons of this shipping were sunk or so seriously damaged as to be out of action at the end of the war. Fifty-four and seven-tenths percent of this total was attributable to submarines, 16.3 percent to carrier-based planes, 10.2 percent to Army land-based planes and 4.3 percent to Navy and Marine land-based planes, 9.3 percent to mines (largely dropped by B-29's), less than 1 percent to surface gunfire, and the balance of 4 percent to marine accidents.

The decision of the United States Navy to make Japanese merchant shipping a primary objective of our submarine campaign yielded unquestionable and brilliant results. If the Japanese freighter and tanker tonnage in operation could be sufficiently reduced, the far-flung Japanese forces could be slowly strangled by insoluble prob-

lems of logistics. And in fact this did happen. But before the planners could reach their decision, they had to evaluate a multitude of complex factors, each depending on a group of items of strategic intelligence. If the shipyards of Greater East Asia had been capable of much more production than we supposed, for instance, or if Japanese countermeasures against our submarines had proved more effective than we expected, our employment of the forces used might not have been so successful.

Intelligence of shipping is classed in the economic intelligence category of strategic intelligence, and is intelligence of definite naval interest. It was needed, during World War II, by our top strategic planners and by our operating forces in the Pacific. The full story of how it was obtained cannot be told here, but we can outline briefly the main function of Naval Intelligence in China in the prewar years and after Pearl Harbor.

When it became apparent in the early 1930's that Japanese ambitions in the Far East might present a serious threat to world interests, China became increasingly an important center of United States Naval Intelligence activity. Japanese methods of economic infiltration and, finally, military and political annexation, made it imperative for our Navy to have much more strategic intelligence about Asiatic waters and the whole complex of Far Eastern areas. The extensive coastline of China, her great river systems, centers of shipping, shipping lanes, and convoy routes were all of interest to our Navy for planning possible fleet and air operations.

In order to assess thoroughly the intentions and possible future plans of Japan, we had to have a complete strategic intelligence picture of that nation. When the Chinese Government had moved the capital from Nanking to Chungking in 1938, the capital from Nanking had moved along with it. After our naval attaché had moved along with it, the staff of the naval attaché was greatly expanded, and it collected and passed on a great deal of information from many sources. This information was sent to Washington where it was processed and tested. If found to be reliable, it became a part of the whole fabric of strategic intelligence for the Far East. Thus we were able to estimate the pattern of Japanese strategy and to plot potential maneuvers.