

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-16-B-6

(SC)A8-5

L9-3/FS/EF13

Pl3-5/FF1

Serial No. 0292116

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

Finished. *[Signature]* File

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 22 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subject: Subversive Activities.

Reference: (a) CNO memo to SecNav, March 28, 1941.
(b) SecNav memo attached to reference (a).

Enclosure: (A) References (a) and (b).
(B) CNO conf. ltr. to Comdts., all N.D., March 17, 1941.
(C) CNO conf. ltr. to Comdts., all N.D., April 16, 1941.

1. Reference (b) questioned whether additional security measures should be taken to eliminate subversive elements and to prevent sabotage in the case of British ships here for repair.

2. Enclosure (B) directed all Commandants to take necessary steps to prepare their commands for any eventuality that may arise from the implications of the "Lend-Lease Bill."

3. Enclosure (C) was sent to all Commandants for information in planning compliance with enclosure (B), and sets forth the following security measures recommended to the Commandant of the Brooklyn Navy Yard:

(a) Coordination and increase of water patrols in the adjacent area by Harbor Police, Coast Guard, and the Navy.

(b) Designation as a restricted area that portion of the yard in which the British ship is tied up.

(c) Careful selection of personnel permitted to work on the vessel.

(d) An intelligence officer to supervise and keep in close contact with the area.

(e) Trusted informants to be designated for work on the vessel.

(f) Special badges for employees within the restricted area to be lifted when they leave the area upon personal recognition.

(g) Only Navy trucks to be permitted in the area.

(h) All supplies for delivery on board the vessel to be unloaded and inspected outside the restricted area.

(i) Physical inspection of all packages going into the area.

(j) Photo-electric eyes, connected to an alarm system at the entrance of the yard basin.

(k) All powder carried on board the visiting vessel to be removed prior to entering the yard.

(l) Additional flood lights in the restricted area.

(m) Clearing bridges of traffic as vessels stand in.

(n) The visiting ship to provide a ship's watch while in the yard.

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Authority *ND 803043*

FILED

(SC) A8-5.

[Signature]
H. R. STARK

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-16-B-6
(SC) A8-5
P13-5/FF1
Serial No. 0203616

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

APR 4 1941

MAR 28 1941

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subject: Subversive Activities

Reference: (a) Sec.Nav. ltr. Nav.HH, undated
(b) Sec.Nav. ltr. A8-5(21) Nav.HH, dated October 14, 1940
(c) Sec.Nav. priority dispatch 221540
(d) Sec.Nav. conf. ltr. Op16-B-6 (SC) QM/EJ3, QM/EJ3,
Serial No. 0273816, dated October 25, 1940.

1. Reference (b) requires all ships and stations to take the utmost precautions to eliminate subversive elements and to prevent sabotage; that reports of action taken be consolidated in passing through the chain of command. The provisions of reference (b) have been complied with.

2. Varying with the size and nature of the Establishment a portion or all of the following measures have been taken:

- (a) Control and supervision of persons having access to the Establishment.
- (b) Restrictions of persons while on the Establishment to prevent other than authorized personnel from approaching or entering vital areas.
- (c) Additional and more frequent patrols.
- (d) Investigation of persons employed on the Establishment.
- (e) Fingerprinting of persons employed on the Establishment.
- (f) Secret, confidential and restricted papers and correspondence are handled in accordance with existing regulations.

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- (g) Security officers appointed to supervise counter-espionage and counter-sabotage activities. APR 4 1974
- (h) All personnel enjoined to be alert for any indications of activities of a subversive nature.
- (i) Reliable personnel of unquestioned integrity have been appointed as unknown observers of small groups of persons employed on each station.
- (j) Additional or more adequate fencing as needed to prevent unauthorized entrance to the station.
- (k) Floodlighting of boundaries and vital areas to facilitate patrolling at night.
- (l) Close cooperation with the local representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division.
- (m) Close cooperation with the local police and fire officials.
- (n) Plant protection surveys as directed in reference (d) to further increase the internal security of the Establishment. The reports are reviewed and commandants directed to request funds when necessary or to take further security measures if there appears to be a need for such measures.
- (o) Fire protection surveys by the National Board of Fire Underwriters. These surveys are reviewed by the Bureau of Yards and Docks and where necessary commandants are requested to make requests for additional funds to increase the protection against fire.

3. Precautions taken to prevent subversive activities within the Shore Establishments appear adequate.

4. Security letters have been revised by the Commander-in-chief of the U. S. Fleet and subordinate commanders advised to issue appropriate orders as are considered necessary to insure a strict and uniform compliance with the security instructions. Special instructions have been issued to cover security measures when the "Alert" is ordered. Special instructions have been issued to ships operating in Hawaiian Area. The Commander-in-chief has advised the fleet that he relies upon each commanding officer for the security

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of his ship and for the discovery and elimination of any subversive elements in his own crew. Various conditions of readiness for action of the Asiatic Fleet have been prescribed and have been maintained underway and at anchor when circumstances indicate their employment. Precautions taken to prevent subversive activities within the Fleet appear to be adequate.



H. R. STARK

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Enc. (A)

Op-16-A
A16-1/ND
Serial No. 0179116
(SC)A7-2(2)

COPY

March 17, 1941

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From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandants of Naval Districts.
Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Governor of Samoa.
Governor of Guam.

Subject: Security of the Naval Establishment.


1. The enactment of law of H.R. 1776 (the so-called Lend-Lease Bill) creates the possibility of public vessels of the British Empire being overhauled and repaired in both the public and private shipyards of the United States.

2. Should this possibility materialize in fact, it is not unreasonable to expect that the agents or sympathisers of the so-called Axis Powers, and powers friendly to them will take active steps to interfere with or prevent the accomplishment of these repairs and overhauls by destruction or damage to the vessels and shipyard facilities and supplies, by subversive activities amongst the personnel and in all other ways calculated to prevent or retard the work.

3. Commandants should now take the necessary steps to prepare their commands for any eventuality that may arise from the implications of the "Lend-Lease Bill."

R. E. Ingersoll

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Enc. (B)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of Naval Intelligence
Washington

Op-16-B-6
(SC) A7-2(2)
A16-1/ND
Serial No. 0281616

APRIL 16, 1941

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From: Chief of Naval Operations
To : Commandants of Naval Districts
Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Governor of Samoa
Governor of Guam

Subject: Security of the Naval Establishment.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-16-A, A16-1/ND,
Serial No. 0179116, dated March 17,
1941.


Enclosure: (A) Copy of memorandum from Plant Security
Section to DIO, 3 ND.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
2. Additional security measures recommended in
Enclosure (A) should be helpful in planning compliance with
reference (a).

R. E. Ingersoll
R. E. Ingersoll
Acting

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Enc. (C)

3ND/L9-7/NY3

LNCC:JTS:WP

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April 3, 1941.


From: Plant Security Section.
To : District Intelligence Officer, 3 ND.
Subject: Security Survey - Brooklyn Navy Yard, N. Y.
(Special Survey).

1. Attached are recommendations covering a special survey made to provide for special operating conditions.

2. The recommendations are the coordinated thoughts of this section and the Navy Yard Intelligence Officer.

Louis B. McCAGG, Jr.
Lieut., U. S. N. R.

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April 3, 1941


RECOMMENDATIONS

Covering Conditions of Immediate Protection:

The following recommendations covering the security of the Navy Yard in Brooklyn, New York are deemed to be of such importance as to warrant their immediate consideration and adoption.

1. Immediate contact with the N. Y. City Harbor Police Patrol to determine their patrol schedule in the East River area adjacent to the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Arrangements to be made, if possible, for increased patrol of this area for the period in which any ships under foreign flag are tied up in the yard. *
2. Immediate contact with the U. S. Coast Guard River Patrol in the same category as recommended in #1 above. *
3. Coordination of the patrol schedules of the Harbor Police and the Coast Guard Patrol, supplementing and augmenting this schedule with a schedules patrol carried out by YP boats based in the yard.
4. According to schedule the North Carolina will leave Dry Dock #4 on Sunday April 6th and will be tied up at Pier C. The two foreign vessels are scheduled to arrive Monday, April 7th and will be tied up on either side of Pier D. One of these vessels will then be placed in Dry Dock #4 for repairs. It is understood that the areas in and about Dry Dock #4, Pier D and Pier C will be designated as a restricted area within the yard. This area will be roped or fenced off, and a guard stationed at all exits.
5. The personnel selected to carry on the required work on the foreign vessels will be carefully selected and definite recommendations will be made by the Yard Intelligence Officer concerning who shall not be allowed to work on these vessels.
6. An Intelligence Officer will be designated by the Yard Intelligence Officer to supervise and keep in close contact with this particular area. Certain trusted informants employed in the various shops will be designated for work on these vessels.

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


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7. Special badges will be worn by the workmen when working in the restricted areas. Such badges shall be distributed and collected at the exit points in this restricted area only on actual recognition of the employee. The movement of personnel in and out of these areas should be restricted as much as possible by the use of carefully planned work schedules.
8. Only Navy owned trucks shall be permitted on the restricted piers and in the neighborhood of Dry Dock #4 and these shall be kept to a minimum by proper scheduling which will minimize traffic congestion in these areas.
9. All automobiles, other than Navy trucks, shall be prohibited from these areas.
10. A physical inspection shall be made of all packages taken into and out of these restricted areas.
11. All supplies arriving at the yard for delivery on board any ships under foreign flag at the yard shall be unloaded outside of the restricted areas and shall be thoroughly inspected, each item accounted for and placed in quarantine for a determined period of time, and again inspected and accounted for before delivery on board the vessels.
12. All lunch boxes and packages carried by the workmen within this area shall be left outside the area at a designated spot or if this is deemed inadvisable, a physical inspection shall be made at the entrance points to the restricted areas.
13. Proper trespass signs shall be erected on the river side of the yard.
14. Photo-electric eyes, connected to an alarm system shall be installed across the pier and bulkhead line at the entrance of the yard basin. It has been determined that such eyes operated satisfactorily over distances of one thousand (1,000) feet. The estimated cost of such installation is under \$10,000.

Contact Mr. M. A. SALAMON, General Electric Company, 570 Lexington Avenue, N. Y. City, Wickersham 2-1311 Ext. 552 for technical advice.

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15. All powder carried on board the visiting men-of-war shall be unloaded in loading area in Gravesand Bay and stored at Fort Lafayette and not carried into the Navy Yard.
16. Flood lights shall be installed on Piers C and D and around Dry Dock #4 to provide adequate lighting.
17. The recommendation of placing barge barricades across the Pier and Bulkhead line to prevent the possibility of sabotage by floating hazards coming down the East River, is deemed impractical by the Yard Personnel because of the volume of traffic passing in and out of the yard basin.
18. The visiting ships shall provide a ships watch covering the stern and water side of their vessels while in the yard.
19. Brooklyn and Manhattan Bridges shall be cleared of traffic during passage of foreign flag vessels to the yard.

*EAST RIVER PATROL SCHEDULE

(1) Police Dept., N. Y. City, Harbor Precinct.

Patrol covers from Erie Basin, Brooklyn to 42nd Street, Manhattan.

Patrol covered twice between 08:00 and 16:00 and twice between 16:00 and 03:00. Seven days a week.

Patrol boat equipped with two-way radio. Reports to Precinct by radio every two hours.

Patrol boat has orders to visit Navy Yard as frequently as possible.

Have arranged visual signals with Marine on duty at yard.

(2) U. S. Coast Guard, Barge Office.

Patrol boat leaves Barge Office between 08:00 and 09:00. Proceeds up East River to Welfare Island and returns to Barge Office by 12:00.

One patrol in 24 hours. No patrol on Sundays.

John T. Shillingford
Lt. U. S. N. R.