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
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## TWIELVE MURPH

BY LT. EDWARD R. MURPHY, J UNITED STATES NAVY H WALKED OUT OF NORTH KOREA

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WALKED OUT OF NORTH KOREA ON DECEMBER 22, COTS ALMOST A

AFTER 11 MONTHS UNDER THE STIELING YOKE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COMMUNISTS, THAT FIRST WIFF OF FREEDOM WAS INDESCRIBABLY EXHILERATING.

I WISH I COULD HAVE INSTANTLY BLOTTED OUT THE PUEBLO FROM MY MEMORY WHEN I CROSSED OVER "THE BRIDGE OF NO RETURN."

BUT OF COURSE I KNEW THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. IT MIGHT MAKE A GOOD FINALE FOR A HOLLYWOOD PRODUCTION: A MEN -- BATTERED, HUNGRY -- BUT DOGGEDLY TRUDGING ALONG AFTER THEIR CAPTAIN -- WHO HAD KEPT THEM ALIVE FOR NEARLY A YEAR -- RIGHT THROUGH THE IRON CURTAIN AND BACK TO THEIR HOMELAND AND LOVED ONES.

HOWEVER, THIS WASNT EXACTLY THE WAY IT HAPPENED.

WE RETURNED TO THE FREE WORLD IN THE CONDITION WE LEFT IT -A DIVIDED CREW, ILL-TRAINED, POORLY DISCIPLINED, AND STILL IN DISAGREEMENT OVER OUR MISSION. SCARS OF RESENTMENT ABOUT THE CAPTURE AND LONG IMPRISONMENT STILL MARKED SOME OF THE CREW. AND THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SHIP'S SENIOR OFFICERS WHICH FIRST SURFACED AT OUR PRECOMMISSIONING AT BREMERTON NOW HAD VERY JAGGED EDGES.

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THE BEATINGS, THE MISTREATMENT, THE FORCED CONFESSIONS, THE ATTEMPTS TO BRAINWASH US, WERE PERHAPS EASIER TO FORGET

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THAN OTHER THINGS. WE HAD TO RELIVE THESE INDIGNITIES AT THE NAVY'S COURT OF INQUIRY. IN TIME, THEY WILL CERTAINLY FADE FROM MEMORY.

BUT WHAT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO ERASE, IM AFRAID, IS THE SERIES OF MISTAKES -- THE TRAGIC EVENTS WHICH LED UP TO OUR CAPTURES THESE HAUNTED US THROUGH 1-1 MONTHS IN A COMMUNIST

COMPOUND. NOW THEY WERE FOLLOWING US RIGHT BACK HOME. I HAVE TRIED TO SPELL THESE OUT IN PREVIOUS ARTICLES. IN

THEIR ORDER OF IMPORTANCE, THEY ARE: . THE PUEBLO NEVER SHOULD HAVE BEEN CAPTURED IN THE ANMESHED FIRST PLACE. THE INEXPERIENCE OF OUR CAPTAIN AND CREW

US IN AN IRREDEEMABLE SITUATION.

THE NORTH KOREANS PROBABLY JUST INTENDED TO HARRASS US -- AS OTHER COMMUNISTS HAD OUR PREDECESSOR, USS BANNER, ON PREVIOUS OCCASSIONS. ILLEGAL SEIZURE ON THE HIGH SEAS WAS NOT PREMEDITATED. . HUNDREDS OF POUNDS OF SECURITY DOCUMENTS WHICH WERE HIGH-

JACKED BY OUR CAPTORS NEEDNT HAVE FALLEN INTO THEIR HANDS. TNT TO INSTANTLY DESTROY THIS CLASSIFIED MATTER WAS OURS

FOR THE TAKING IN PORT AT YOKOSUKA, JAPAN. I KNEW OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THIS DYNAMITE JUST PREVIOUS TO SAILING TO OUR FIRST STATION OFF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST. I TOLD THE CAPTAIN ABOUT IT. I EVEN ORDERED IT BE BROUGHT ABOARD. IT WAS NOT.

## ADD TWO

• THE ON-GOING DISPUTE AMONG MILITARY STRATEGISTS OVER WHETHER THE PUEBLO SHOULD HAVE PACKED LARGE GUNS AND WHEN AND HOW THESE WEAPONS WERE TO BE USED ADDED TO THE MASS CONFUSION WHEN WE FIRST FELL UNDER ATTACK. .61



. LİKEWISE THE NEVER SETTLED CHAIN-OF-COMMAND DISPUTE BETWEEN COMMANDER (LLOYD M.) BUCHER AND INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, LT. STEPHEN R. HARRIS, WAS HEAPED ON TO THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CAPTURE. C. LACK OF SURVIVAL AND RESISTENCE TRAINING -- HOW TO DEAL WITH THE TYPE OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PUNISHMENT METED OUT BY THE NORTH KOREANS -- WEAKENED OUR DEFENSE AND CONTRIBUTED TO DIVISIONS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS AND CREW.

• INEXPERIENCE WITH THE MILITARY CODE OF CONDUCT AND CONFUSION OVER OUR STATUS AS PRISONERS HELPED THE COMMUNISTS DRAW OUT CONFESSIONS THEY MIGHT NOT HAVE OTHERWISE.

TO CLARIFY SOME OF THESE POINTS:

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THE PUEBLO NEVER AT ANYTIME INTRUDED THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF NORTH KOREA. I CAN'T EMPHASIZE THIS ENOUGH. THERE WILL DOUBTLESS ALWAYS BE THOSE WHO WONT BELIEVE THIS. BUT SOME OF THESE PEOPLE WILL ALSO INSIST THAT OUR MISSION WAS CIA --(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY) DIRECTED AND SUBSCRIBE TO OTHER OF THE PROPAGANDA LIES PEDDLED BY THE NORTH KOREANS.

PERHAPS THESE DOUBTERS CAN ALSO BELIEVE THE PHONY NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS AND RECORDS WHICH SHOW THE PUEBLO STEAMING AT SPEEDS MANY TIMES IN EXCESS OF HER CAPABILITY.


WE WERE SEIZED, THEN, NOT BECAUSE WE HAD PENETRATED THE 12-MILE ZONE ARBITRARILY SET UP BY OUR CAPTORS -- BUT BECAUSE WE LACKED THE SOPHISTICATION TO GET OUT WHILE THE GETTING WAS GOOD.

WHEN WE FIRST SIGHTED THAT NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE CHASER ON THAT FATEFUL JANUARY MORNING IN THE SEA OF JAPAN., WE SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED HIGH-TAILING IT. OUT OF THERE.

ADD THREE

THIS WAS A WARSHIP. SHE HAD HER GUNS TRAINED ON US. AND SHE CERTAINLY MEANT BUSINESS.

IN ANY EVENT, WE DIDNT EVEN MAKE AN ATTEMPT TO CALL HER BLUFF. WE DIDNT GO TO GENERAL QUARTERS? WE MANNED NO GUASS



WE WERE UNDER ORDERS NOT TO BE AGGRESSIVE. AND GOING TO GENERAL QUARTERS AT THAT TIME -- THE CAPTAIN TESTIFIED AT THE COURT OF INQUIRY -- WOULD HAVE BEEN AGGRESSIVE.

BUT IN A WAY WHAT WE DID WAS EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE -- CERTAINLY OFFENSIVE TO OUR PROUD COMMUNIST PURSUERS.

WE SIGNALED THAT WE INTENDED "TO REMAIN IN THE AREA" UNTIL THE NEXT DAY.

THIS TYPE OF IMPUDENCE BY "ARROGANT" AMERICANS WAS JUST TO O MUCH FOR THE NORTH KOREANS.

ADD FOUR

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AND WHEN WE WERE SURROUNDED AND THE SITUATION BECAME CRITICAL, THE COMMANDING OFFICER FINALLY DECIDED THAT IT WAS TIME TO MAKE A BREAK FOR IT -- TO STEAM FULL SPEED FOR OPEN WATERS.

BY THEN, IT WAS TOO LATE. THE NORTH KOREANS HAD OPENED FIRE AND INITIATED THE BATTLE.

AT THIS TIME, THERE WAS NO WAY OUT. THEIR GUNS WERE BIGGER. THEIR GUN BOATS WERE FASTER. OUR SEIZURE WAS INEVITABLE. BUT BEFORE THE TORPEDO BOARTS COME ON THE SCENE -- I STILL MAINTAIN -- WE COULD HAVE ESCAPED.


THE LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE DARKEST CLOUD WHICH HANGS OVER THE PUEBLO.

THE NAVY WILL NEVER FORGET OR FORGIVE IT. THE PENTAGON WILL ALWAYS BE PLAGUED BY IT.

OUR OFFICERS AND CREW WILL BE INDELIBLY MARKED BY IT. THE PUBLIC WILL CONTINUE TO WONDER ABOUT IT.

IT WAS WELL ESTABLISHED AT THE PUEBLO PROBE BY THE NAVY THAT WE HAD NO AUTOMATIC DESTRUCT DEVICES. AND IT WAS STRESSED THAT HAND TOOLS -- FIRE AXES, HATCHETS, PAPER SHREADERS, AND THE LIKE -- JUST COULDNT COMPLETE THE VITAL DESTRUCTION JOB.

WHAT WASNT REVEALED WAS HOW TNT WAS FINALLY MADE AVAILABLE TO US IN YOKOSUKA. BUT FOR REASONS BEST KNOWN TO COMMANDER PHICHER AND THE PUEBLOS WEAPONS OFFICER, LT. JG FREDERICK



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SCHUMAKER, IT WASN'T PICKED UP. ADD FIVE

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AND NOW THE NAVY INFORMS ME THAT EVEN AFTER WE MISSED OUR CHANCES TO GET DYNAMITE IN YOKOSUKA, THE OPPORTUNITY TO GET THERMIT -A CHEMICAL INCENDIARY -- WAS STILL OPEN TO US AT SASEBO, OUR LAST PORT OF CALL BEFORE SAILING TO STATION.

ACCORDING TO THE NAVY THE CAPTAIN TOLD THE NAVAL ORDINANCE FACILITY AT YOKOSUKA HE WOULD AVAIL HIMSELF OF 10 THERMIT BOMBS AT SASEBO. HE NEVER DID.

I DONT KNOW FOR USE WHETHER TNT OR THERMIT, OR FOR THAT MATTER ANY OTHER EXPLOSIVE, WOULD HAVE RID US OF ALL OF OUR CACHE OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS IN THOSE HECTIC HOURS PRIOR TO SEIZURE. I DONT CLAIM TO BE A DEMOLITIONS EXPERT.

BUT I DO KNOW FAR FEWER OF OUR MILITARY SECRETS WOULD HAVE FALLEN INTO OUR CAPTORS HANDS IF WE HAD THESE MEANS OF DESTRUCTION. AND I DO KNOW THAT I, FOR ONE -- AND PROBABLY OTHERS -- WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO BLUFF THE NORTH KOREANS IF THEY WERE WITHOUT THESE SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS.

I UNDERSTAND ALL PUEBLO-TYPE RECONNAISSANCE SHIPS NOW CARRY GUNS. AND THERE ARE STILL AGER (AUXILLARY GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH) VESSELS COLLECTING ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS.

## ADD SIX

THE SEIZURE OF THE PUEBLO WAS THE PRIME REASON FOR THE DEVALUATION OF THIS PROGRAM. I THINK THIS IS UNFORTUNATE.

THE SURFACE COLLECTION PROGRAM IS HIGHLY VALUABLE TO ANY NATION. THE RUSSIANS HAVE PROVED THIS FOR MANY YEARS.

AND THE PUEBLO PROVED -- IN SPITE OF ITS ILL-FATE -- THAT THE AGER PLATFORM IS A WORKABLE ONE FOR GATHERING INTELLIGENCE Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

THE CARRYING OF GUNS IS ANOTHER MATTER. THE PROTOTYPE AGERS WERE NOT DESIGNED TO BE WARSHIPS. AND IT IS IMPRACTICAL FOR THEM TO CARRY ANY WEAPONS LARGE ENOUGH TO WARD OFF A FULL SCALE ATTACK.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE "INTELLIGENCE" MISSIONS -- WHETHER ON SEA OR IN THE AIR -- MUST BE PROTECTED.

PRESIDENT NIXONS RECENT DECISION -- JUST AFTER THE NORTH KOREANS SHOT DOWN OUR RECONNAISSANCE PLANE -- THE EC121 AA TO AGAIN PROVIDE ARMED AIR SUPPORT FOR THESE TYPE OF FORAYS IS A PRACTICAL ONE.

IN THIS WAY, WE PUT POTENTIAL AGRESSORS ON NOTICE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT SIT BY AND ALLOW THEM TO HIGH-JACK OUR CRAFT IN BROAD DAYLIGHT. AND AT THE SAME TIME, WE CONTINUE OUR OWN NON-BELLIGERENT STANCE IN MILITARY INTELLIGENCRE. WE RETALIATE ONLY WHEN ATTACKED.

GEVEN THE BUCHER-HARRIS SCHISM IS DIFFICULT TO COMMENT ON. PART OF IT WAS VAST DIFFERENCES IN BACKGROUND AND PERSONALITY. LT HARRIS IS A HARVARD GRADUATE, SOPHISTICATED, RESERVED, PERHAPS EVEN WITHDRAWN.

COMMANDER BUCHER CAME UP THE HARD WAY. HE JOINED THE NAVY OUT OF "BOYS TOWN" AS AN ENLISTED MAN. AND LATER ON HE RETURNED TO ACTIVE DUTY BY ACCEPTING A RESERVE COMMISSION OUT OF COLLEGE.

THE "C.O." LIKED TO BE THE LIFE OF THE PARTY -- ONE OF THE BOYS. HE WASNT PREOCCUPIED WITH TRADITION, RULES, AND REGULATIONS.

BUT THE PUEBLO WAS HIS SHIP -- HIS FIRST COMMAND. AND HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS RUNNING IT HIMSELF -- WITH NOBODYS ADVICE.

THERE WAS CONSTANT BICKERING OVER LT. HARRIS SO-CALLED "ELITE" DETACHMENT. AND IT NEVER WAS FINALLY SETTLED AS TO WHO -- COMMANDER BUCHER OR LT. HARRIS -- HAD ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THESE 28 MEN AND THEIR SECURITY CLAD DOCUMENTS AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT. ADD EIGHT

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THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY -- RECOMMENDING COURT MARTIAL FOR BOTH OFFICERS FOR FAILURE TO DESTROY ALL OF THIS MATERIAL BEFORE SEIZURE -- SEEM TO INDICATE THAT THE NAVY ITSELF HAS NOT YET UNTANGLED THIS CHAIN-OF-COMMAND ISSUE.

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT SOME TYPE OF FORMAL SURVIVAL AND RESISTENCE TRAINING PRIOR TO THE MISSION WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE DONE THE PUEBLO CREW NO HARM.

MOST OF US -- IF NOT ALL OF US -- WERE TOTALLY UNPREPARED FOR THE PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BRUTALITY HANDED OUT IN DETENTION BY THE NORTH KOREANS.

OUR CAPTORS WERE VERY CLEVER. THEY PLAYED ON OUR FEARS OF THE UNKONWN. THEY MADE IT THEIR BUSINESS TO FERRET OUT INDIVIDUAL WEAKNESSES AND CAPITALIZE ON THEM.


IF WE HAD KNOWN BEFOREHAND HOW THE COMMUNISTS OPERATED, WE MIGHT HAVE PUT UP A STRONGER DEFENSE. CERTAINLY, IF WE HAD BEEN CONDITIONED AT ALL AGAINST THIS TYPE OF TERRORISM, WE WOULD HAVE

EXPERIENCED LESS MENTAL SUFFERING.

NINETH ADU ADD NINE

THE ISSUE OVER THE RELEVANCE OF THE MILITARY CODE OF CONDUCT IN A PUEBLO-TYPE SITUATION IS NOW BEING DEBATED BY ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL, POLITICAL LEADERS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC ACROSS THE UNITED STATES.

THE PUEBLO OFFICERS AND CREW -- TO A MAN -- FRANKLY ADMIT DEPARTING FROM THE CODE DURING IMPRISONMENT IN NORTH KOREA. OUR OFFICIAL EXCUSE -- ENUMERATED TO THE FIVE-ADMIRAL COURT OF INQUIRY -- WAS THAT FOLLOWING THE CODE TO THE LETTER WAS



"SPIRIT" OF THE CODE WHEN THEY COULD. BUT WE STARTED OFF ON THE WRONG FOOT. WE WERE UNDERMINED RIGHT FROM THE BEGINNING BY A "DOMINO" EFFECT. ON THE DAY OF CAPTURE DURING THAT LONG TRAIN RIDE TO WHAT WAS TO BE OF CAPTURE DURING THAT LONG TRAIN RIDE TO WHAT WAS TO BE

SPECIAL FAVORS FROM THE ENEMY." THESE SECTIONS -- UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNDUE DURESS --MIGHT ALSO INCLUDE THE CONTINGECY "OF MY OWN FREE WILL." MOST OF THE PUEBLO OFFICERS AND CREW HELD TO THE

"I WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION OR TAKE PART IN ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL TO MY COMRADES." ELSEWHERE IT SAYS: DI WILL ACCEPT NEITHERPAROLE NOR

ENTIRE SET OF RULES OF BEHAVIOR FOR AMERICAN SERVICEMEN. FOR EXAMPLE, THE CODE NOW READS IN ONE SECTIONRC

OF THE SIX SECTIONS OF THE CODE. IT READS: "I WILL NEVER SURRENDER OF MY OWN FREE WILL." THIS CONTINGENCY OF "FREE WILL" SHOULD PERHAPS THREAD THIS

HOWEVER, IN "SPECIAL" OR PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CODE MAY HAVE TO BE INTEPRETED WITH SOME DEGREE OF LATITUDE. THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR SUBJECTIVITY IS ACTUALLY SPELLED OUT IN ONE


ADD TEN

WARFARE. I DONT THINK THIS IS TRUE. I BELIEVE THE MILITARY CODE IS STILL SOUND -- AND IT SHOULD STAND AS IT IS.

ALL THIS MIGHT INFER THAT THE CODE IS OUTMODED. IT CAN NO LONGER WORK IN THESE DAYS OF SOPHISTICATED PSYCHOLOGICAL

NORTH KOREANS DID NOT AFFORD US THE BASIC RIGHTS AS PRISONERS OF WAR; WE WERE TORTURED AND THREATENED WITH DEATH IF WE DID NOT TELL OUR CAPTORS WHAT THEY WANTED TO KNOW; AND IT WAS USELESS TO APPAREATLY WITHHOLD INFORMATION THE NORTH KOREANS HAD ALREADY GLEANED FROM DOCUMENTS THEY CAPTURED WITH THE SHIP.

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OFFICER DIVULGING INFORMATION WHICH BROKE THE CODE. UNDER EXTREME FEAR AND PRESSURE WE FELL AWAY FROM THIS DICTUM ONE BY ONE RIGHT DOWN THE LINE.

ADD ELEVEN

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THE PUEBLO SAGA IS FAR FROM OVER. IT WILL DOUBTLESS BE REHASHED IN OFFICIAL AND INFORMAL CIRCLES FOR YEARS TO COME. AT THIS POINT, PERHAPS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS MANY ARE ASKING IS: WHY IS THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER TELLING THIS STORY NOW? WHY DIDMT HE SAY ALL THIS AT THE COURT OF INQUIRY? TRISXSKELEIGNXOURXDE WHY IS HE DRAGGING THIS SKELETON OUT OF THE CLOSET? THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY OFFICIALLY SLAMMED SHUT THE DOOR ON THE PUEBLO MATTER. WHY ISNT IT LEFT ALONE?

THERE ARE THOSE WHO PROBABLY FEEL THAT IM A BITTER MAN. SOME EVEN SUSPECT THAT I HOLD SOME DEEP ANIMOSITY AGAINST COMMANDER BUCHER, THE UNITED STATES NAVY, AND OTHER.

THE LAST IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE. ALTHOUGH THE PUEBLO CAPTAIN AND I HAD PROFESSIONAL DIFFERENCES, I HARBOR NO PERSONAL GRUDGE AGAINST HIM. AND I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH THE NAVY. I AM DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED

THAT I WAS NOT GIVEN A FURTHER OPPORUTNITY FOR PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT IN THIS MILITARY SERVICE. THIS SITUATION COUPLED WITH PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS DICTATED MY RECENT RESIGNATION AS A

THE PUBLICS PRIME VIEW OF THE PUEBLO AFFAIR SO FAR 55 HAS CAREER OFFICER.

(CORRECTION: SO FAR HAS) SPRUNG FROM NEWS REPORTS OF THE EIGHT WEEK COURT OF INQUIR Y BUT THE COURTS PROCEEDINGS PRESENTED AN CBLIQUE PICTURE. AT CORONADO, CALIFORNIA.

IM NOT ACCUSING THE NAVY OR ANYBODY ELSE OF

PCOVERING UP " OR "WHITE WASHING."

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HONEVER THE COURT -- BECAUSE OF ITS VERY NATURE -- WAS INTERESTED IN SPECIFIC, PERHAPS NARROW ISSUES.

IT WASN'T SET UP TO BE A TRIAL OR EVEN A PUBLIC HEARING ON THE PUEBLO. MIT WAS A FACT-FINDING PROBE DESIGNED TO FIND OUT PRIMARILY TWO THINGS.

DID THE PUEBLO SKIPPER HAVE THE "POWER TO RESIST" WHEN HTS SHIP WAS SURROUNDED, ATTACKED, AND THEN SEIZED ON THE HIGH SEAS?

2) COULD THE LOSS OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS

TO THE NORTH KOREANS BE , IN PART, ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAPTAIN AND OTHER OFFICERS DURING THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE? THE ADMIRALS SCRUTINIZING THESE QUESTIONS CAME UP WITH

"AFFIRMATIVE" ANSWERS TO BOTH. AND ONLY THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE

NAVY AVERTED THE COURTS MARTIALS AND LETTER OF CENSURE RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.

IN GOOD CONSCIENCE -- AND UNDER OATH -- I WOULD HAVE HAD TO TELL MY STORY -- AS 17 SAW IT -- AT THIS TYPE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDING.

THIS TESTIMONY WAS NOT GERMANNE TO THE COURT OF INQUIRY. IN FACT, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HIGHLY IMPROPER TO HAVE OFFERED IT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

I AM HAPPY TO HAVE HAD THE CHANCE TO AIR -- IN THESE 12 ARTICLES AT LEAST PART OF MY VIEWS ON THIS HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL EVENT.

CURT LM 631\$ Alphomega BSN V 1939