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T.S. Wilkinson

REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. N.,
 Director of Naval Intelligence.

CONTENTS

PART ONE

| | | |
|------------------------------------|------|----|
| THE WAR TODAY..... | Page | 3 |
| THEATRES OF WAR..... | | 6 |
| EUROPEAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION..... | | 19 |

PART TWO

| | |
|--|----|
| JAPANESE STRATEGIC MATERIALS..... | 22 |
| THE THREAT TO U. S. RUBBER SUPPLY..... | 23 |

PART THREE

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----|
| GERMANY'S BLUEPRINT FOR CONQUEST..... | 25 |
| THE POSITION OF FRANCE..... | 26 |
| GERMANY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN..... | 27 |
| THE TWO OCEANS..... | 29 |

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PART ONE

THE WAR TODAY

As the fifty-third day after Pearl Harbor draws to its close, the Battle for the World continues to grow in scope and violence. Its panorama is so vast, the instrumentalities which it employs so swift and powerful, the opposing forces so varied that it can be understood only if certain simple factors are kept in mind.

First, then, it must be remembered that this is a struggle between peoples which hold opposite views, not only in respect to politics and morality, but concerning the human race itself. The United Nations are, in general, dedicated to the concept that the individual man is able to govern himself, that he is able to cooperate voluntarily and successfully with his fellows. The Axis powers, on the other hand, hold that human beings, by and large, are generically incapable of controlling themselves and, hence, their environments; that they must be governed by a hierarchy composed of superior men and that Adolf Hitler is the ideal of the "master race" which is destined to direct the affairs of humanity.

It can be said, in other words, that this is a war between peoples who have a fundamental faith in the good will of mankind and those who hold an opposite view. Expressed in political doctrine, the former maintain that the state exists to serve men; the latter, that men exist to serve the state.

On January 1, 1942, the democratic spirit found voice in the grand alliance formed by the United Nations in Washington. This pact accepted the principles of the Atlantic Charter and declared:

1. Each government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the tripartite pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.
2. Each government pledges itself to cooperate with the governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemy.

Thus it was that the free nations arrayed themselves at the beginning of this year to defend their liberty by destroying the foreign menace it.

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Historians say that each war is unique. The present war is unique in one sense and very ancient in another. Fundamentally, the present conflict is an operation conducted for profit, prestige and domination by a group of ambitious, greedy or desperate men against their weaker neighbors. Similar operations have been carried out by men of various nations and races since the dawn of time. In fact, it was not until the latter part of the Middle Ages that a real effort was made in Europe to establish rules of civilized war, to create a code of honor and restrict the incidental devastation of battle to the men engaged on either side. Chivalry formed the character of gentlemen and enabled people, at various times and places to enjoy security against random, vicious and stealthy attack.

The present war is unique in that it is more a battle of instruments and machines. The British Radar equipment is a case in point. The accuracy of our bomb sight is amazing to civilians. Precision instruments and high speed combined with instantaneous communications in the field have given to large bodies of troops the mobility which was formerly restricted to small raiding parties. Thus it is that the campaigns of the present war have the appearance of greater speed and brilliance than could be observed in the mired behemoth trench fighting of the last.

Future historians will encounter difficulty in answering the question: When did the United States enter the Second World War? Perhaps some will say that we were committed by our transferring the British 50 over-age destroyers on September 3, 1940; others may select the President's "shoot on sight" order of September 16, 1941; still others will claim that the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, or our subsequent declaration of war, marks the starting point. Whatever date is accepted, the fact remains that from a naval viewpoint, the "shoot on sight" order drew our battleships and aircraft into the North Atlantic war zone, and brought about our active cooperation with the British forces afloat.

This cooperation is now expressed not only in the pact of the United Nations but in the boards which have been set up for the military and economic prosecution of the war. Most important among these at the present moment is the command organized under Admiral Sir Archibald Wavell and Lieut. General George H. Brett,

USA. Upon them and Admiral Thomas Hart, USN, devolve the defense of the Far East.

It is obvious that unity of command is the more important in this war because of the immense area which it covers; the present conflict also has placed a high premium on another kind of cooperation of which the Germans are masters. This latter type is well illustrated by the Nazi operations against Norway which required that eight coastal points be simultaneously attacked and occupied. The problem was highlighted by the fact that Trondheim was 1,100 miles from the nearest German naval base and that warships were used for troop transports because of their speed. Air support was essential to most of the landings and the Navy was required to give artillery support. That the three services involved functioned with remarkable smoothness is a matter of record.

So too, our Army and Navy have established and are using channels of closer cooperation than they have ever enjoyed in the past in the knowledge that each arm of the service is supplementary to the other and must act as a unit in the common cause.

★ ★ ★

Today the American people stand on the threshold of their greatest military undertaking. Our armament production is rising rapidly; we have established unity of command at the outset of hostilities; we have at our disposal the material, factories and industrial genius of the people of this country. These factors guarantee our ultimate success provided they are used with skill and daring. As one commentator has said, the United States cannot be defeated but she can defeat herself. This implies that there is demanded of each man in our services a maximum of alertness, keen observation and driving effort. To forget for a moment that the German Army is the greatest military organization in history is to court disaster.

Yesterday (January 27th) Mr. Churchill rose in the House of Commons and delivered a report on recent war developments. He closed his remarks with the following words:

"I have never ventured to predict the future. I stand by my original program of blood, toil, tears and sweat, which is all I have ever offered, but to which I added five months later: many shortcomings, mistakes and disappointments. It is because, however, I see the light gleaming behind the clouds and broadening upon our path that I make so bold now as to demand a declaration of confidence of the House of Commons as an additional weapon in the armory of the United Nations."

THEATRES OF WAR

Pacific Theatre

Although Japan's drive for the conquest of Eastern Asia and the mastery of the Pacific did not reach American territory until December 1941, it has been gathering momentum for more than forty years. The modern Japanese Empire, like the German Empire of Bismarck, has been built by successful war.

War with China in 1894 won Japan Formosa and a dominant position in Korea, which she later annexed by force. War with Russia in 1904 won her the southern half of Sakhalin and a dominant position in South Manchuria. Participation in the first World War won her a theoretical trusteeship, which she transformed into possession, of the Caroline and Marshall Islands.

In 1931 she unleashed a new kind of war which served as a model for both Mussolini and Hitler. Disregarding the treaties she had signed and the rights of the United States and other nations, she overran and conquered Manchuria. Six years later she attempted to repeat the process in China, waging one of the cruelest wars which history records.

The outbreak of war in Europe found her still trying to conquer China and thereby lay the basis for the control of all Eastern Asia. The consequent weakening of British and French power in the Far East left American territories, rights and interests in the Western Pacific as the principal obstacle on the conqueror's road.

Japan prepared her attempt to overcome this obstacle by forming an alliance with Germany and Italy in September 1940, and by establishing herself in French Indo-China. As a last-minute cover for her surprise attack, she dispatched a special envoy to Washington to discuss a Pacific settlement. Then, with a duplicity unequalled in modern history, she struck at Pearl Harbor.

This surprise blow gave Japan a great initial advantage, temporarily immobilizing much of the striking power of the United States Fleet.

She has since been trying to capitalize this advantage to the utmost by rapid moves against the Philippines, Malaya and the chain of islands and possessions of the United Nations which stretch from Sumatra to Samoa. To succeed in her war plan she would have to establish a base in these islands from which she could not be driven out. Meanwhile every new base she can occupy in this initial period—while her striking power along most of this island front remains superior to that of the United Nations—will add to the task before us.

But this "stab in the back" transformed America overnight from a divided to a united nation, united for war and for victory. Even in

the initial phase of operations, begun at her chosen moment, Japan has not had all the victories. A foretaste of what her leaders may expect when the tide turns is the list of Japanese losses caused by Allied forces up to January 27. These comprise: one battleship, 3 cruisers, 10 destroyers, 8 submarines, 13 transports, one converted liner, and 31 auxiliary vessels. An equal number in total have been seriously damaged.

Hawaii and the Islands

The attack upon Pearl Harbor was followed by Japanese attacks on Wake, Midway and Guam. Guam fell within five days, but Wake held out against air, sea and landing operations until December 22, in a gallant defense which will live in the annals of history.

During the following weeks, although the Japanese struck with bombs or shells at widely separated islands throughout this area—Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, the Gilberts and the Solomons—enemy occupation was confined to Makin and Tarawa in the Gilbert group. There remained, however, strong Japanese naval and air concentrations in the Caroline and Marshall Islands which might foreshadow a southward move aimed at cutting the chain of Allied islands which stretch across the Central Pacific, and thus flanking communications between the United States and Australia.

Philippines

Japan opened her assault on the Philippines on December 8 by bombing attacks on Davao in Mindanao and airfields in Luzon. Following the bombs came Japanese transports, protected by warships, which established beachheads at Aparri and Vigan in Northern Luzon and at Legaspi in the southeastern arm of the island.

Two weeks after the opening blow, the Japanese moved on the Philippines in force. A large fleet of transports entered Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, to disgorge forces which heavily outnumbered the defenders. Then further landings were made at Antimonan and Mauban, southeast of Manila, and a concerted advance on the Philippine capital was begun. Meanwhile, another strong force struck at Mindanao and made Davao an advance base for Japan.

The Japanese advance on Manila was accompanied by ruthless bombing of the city. Although all military personnel and installations were evacuated and it was declared an open city, the enemy's tactics of terror were continued. Unable to hold greatly superior forces on so wide a front, General MacArthur was forced to fall back on the Bataan Peninsula north of Corregidor and allow the Japanese, on January 2, to enter the capital. The successful shift of his forces

to this position in the face of the enemy was commended as a brilliant achievement.

Three weeks later General MacArthur was still holding out on the Bataan Peninsula, despite overwhelming odds and lack of air support, while the losses of the enemy soared. The rest of Luzon, the Island of Jolo and about half the southern part of Mindanao had been lost.

The Japanese drive on General MacArthur's line was assuming the dimensions of a major, all-out offensive by January 21 when Filipino guerrillas far to the north in Luzon made a surprise raid on the Japanese-held airfield at Tuguegarao, killing 300 of the enemy and proving that resistance on the island was not confined to the Bataan Peninsula. The same day, Army bombers sank an enemy cruiser and fired a tanker off Jolo Island in the Sulu Sea.

By January 23, the entire Japanese 14th Army was reported in Luzon battering at General MacArthur's forces. The American commander shortened his line in the face of this new pressure, anchoring his flanks at Bagac and Pandan Points on either side of the peninsula. The next day he made a surprise counter-attack against the Japanese left, resulting in heavy enemy losses both in men and ground. This counter-thrust apparently demoralized the enemy, who two days later, when General MacArthur celebrated his sixty-second birthday, had not made another major attack. Our forces, during this time and up to January 27, were engaged in strengthening their positions and stopping up scattered Japanese infiltrations.

Pacific Coast

Japanese submarines carried the war to near the California coast on its opening day, when they torpedoed two American ships. Following this initial success, however, their operations in this theatre proved largely ineffective. Japanese submarines were reported to be lurking in Alaskan waters also at the end of December.

Malaysia

Using her newly acquired bases in French Indo-China as a springboard, Japan struck on December 8 with the forces she had concentrated there against Thailand and British Malaya. Thailand gave in after only a token resistance of a few hours, and became a new Japanese base threatening Burma as well as the Malay Peninsula. Orange bombers struck at Singapore, while their land forces seized the Malayan airfield at Kota Bharu.

There followed an enemy success which affected gravely the whole offensive campaign in Malaya. Japanese torpedo planes and bombers sank the two recently-arrived British capital ships "Prince of Wales"

and "Repulse," thereby gaining for Japan unquestioned naval supremacy in Malayan waters and almost unhindered access by sea to the peninsula's coast. Now she was able at will to land new forces behind the British lines and outflank the British defenders.

During the next 6 weeks the enemy pushed their advance more than 200 miles down the Malay Peninsula. The main enemy advance took place along the West coast, where the terrain was drier and more open, aided by air supremacy, infiltration of British lines through the jungle and landings in the British rear. Penang, Malacca, the tin center of Ipoh, rich rubber plantations and the capital, Kuala Lumpur, fell to the invaders. At the end of this period, the British and Indian troops, now reinforced by Australians and additional airpower, had been forced back to a line near the frontier of Johore Province within 80 miles from Singapore.

Meanwhile the enemy had struck also at Burma, bombing Rangoon and Mandalay and invading Tenasserim to occupy Mergui and Tavoy. In this sector the British air force and American volunteer pilots defending the Burma Road bombed Bangkok and other Japanese air fields in Thailand, and inflicted heavy losses upon Japanese raiders. Here also reinforcements arrived, including Chinese troops which had come down the Burma Road. It appeared that Burma, if it could be held, could be developed into a base for a later offensive which would flank the Japanese position on the Malay Peninsula.

In one field the Allies, after one month of war, took a forward step which required nearly four years in the first World War. A unified command was created for the Southwestern Pacific with General Sir Archibald Wavell as Commander-in-Chief and Lieutenant General George H. Brett, U. S. Army, as his deputy.

On January 21, the fighting in the Malay Peninsula became intense. The British left flank was holding under terrific pressure at Batu Pahat, but their right flank withdrew 20 miles from Endau to the vicinity of Bukit Laukap. Large-scale fighting was in progress on the center of the line near Gemas. By January 24, the British center had fallen back to Kluang and their right to Mersing. The line thus established ran almost straight across the peninsula, 80 miles wide at that point, some 65 miles north of Singapore.

The following day the British revealed that in withdrawing they had extricated 800 Australian and 400 Indian troops which had been cut off by the Japanese in the vicinity of Bukit Payong. By this time, however, two British airdromes in the peninsula had had to be evacuated, presumably because of their proximity to the front. Batu Phat fell to the invader January 26, and enemy advances, particularly on the British left, were reported continuing the next day.

In Burma combined Japanese-Thai forces were reported to have pushed by January 21 some 20 miles into British territory to Kaw-kareik, 45 miles East of Moulmein. While rushing their ground forces into position to stem this advance, the British struck at the invaders by air, heavily bombing the Japanese-controlled airdrome at Mesa-rieng in Thailand. At the same time, Rangoon, port of entry for the Burma Road, suffered heavy bombing raids. But the British and American fighter pilots defending the city went a long way toward establishing air superiority over Rangoon on January 23, when they shot down 11 bombers and 19 fighters sent over by the enemy. On January 27, it was reported that the British ground defenders had halted the enemy in Upper Burma at the Salween River, not far from the Thai border, but were not faring so well to the south. Here, the important city of Moulmein, which is almost directly across the Gulf of Martaban from Rangoon, appeared to be gravely imperiled by the Japanese advance.

East Indies

Stretching more than 3,000 miles from Sumatra to New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies may be regarded as the base line of the Allied position in the Pacific. If this line, anchored in the west at Singapore and Sumatra, can be held, Australia will be covered, the Japanese Navy can be kept from controlling the Indian Ocean, and the communication lines to Australia and the Indies, both across the Pacific and via the Indian Ocean, can be kept open. These communication lines are essential both for the defeat of Japan and the supply of strategic materials to the United States.

Outposts of this Indies line were Hongkong and the Philippines, both of which fell under Japanese control within a month. Advance positions north of the line were Borneo and Celebes, both of which were invaded by Japan. During the first six weeks of the war, however, the base line itself and its central bastion of Java were not subjected to more than bombing raids.

Using Davao as their advance base, the Japanese opened their attack upon the Indies by occupying Miri and Kuching in Sarawak, British protectorate in northwestern Borneo. By January 1st they controlled this protectorate.

Nine days later came enemy landings at Tarakan Island, an important oil center on the northeast coast of Borneo, and at Menado on the northern arm of the Dutch Island of Celebes. Tarakan fell after desperate resistance by the Dutch, who succeeded in destroying the oil wells and installations. In Celebes the enemy occupied the tip of its northern arm. Meanwhile, his heaviest air operations in

this theatre were directed against the oil center of Balikpapan in Eastern Borneo and the Dutch naval base of Amboina, Southwest of Ceram.

Thus the enemy had gained strategic positions which enable him to command the Makassar Strait, and these could then be utilized as stepping stones for attacks upon the Indies base line. The Dutch, however, had not remained solely on the defensive. Their bombers and submarines had struck at the enemy with surprising success, inflicting heavy losses on his navy and shipping, which included more than a dozen transports.

On January 21 the expected Japanese drive south began with a series of bombing attacks on the Bismarek Archipelago and along the northeast coast of the island of New Guinea. As explosives fell on Kavieng, New Ireland, and Madang, New Guinea, Prime Minister Curtin declared that the menace of war was "near, clearer and deadlier" to Australia. Apparently moving in force through the Makassar Strait, the Japs kept coming, forcing the Dutch to put the torch to Balikpapan's oil and other fields in Celebes. On January 23 the enemy landed in the Bismarek Archipelago and at Kieta, principal city of Bougainville Island in the Solomons.

Then the United Nations struck back. First Dutch bombers showered destruction on a 31-ship convoy in Makassar Strait. Then American destroyers, submarines and Army bombers began to take their toll. Reports to date indicate that between 10 and 20 enemy warships and transports were sent to the bottom.

Nevertheless, by January 27 the Japanese flag was acknowledged to be flying over the following additional points: Sandakan in British North Borneo; Balikpapan on Borneo's East coast; Tambelan Island, West of Borneo; Kendari on the Southeastern arm of Celebes; Pater Noster Islands in Makassar Strait; Rabaul on the North tip of New Britain; Kavieng on the Northwest tip of New Ireland.

Thus the threat to Australia had developed further and Japan was pushing nearer to the Dutch island of Java, keystone of the Indies line.

China

When Japan began her war in the Pacific, the Chinese attempted a diversion against the rear of the enemy forces attacking Hongkong. This offensive progressed to the suburbs of Canton, but failed to prevent the fall of Hongkong on Christmas Day.

Japan then unleashed an offensive against Changsha, in a fourth attempt to occupy this strategic city on the Hankow-Canton railroad.

the result was a Chinese victory, and a Japanese withdrawal with 33,000 casualties reported.

Meanwhile, China had reinforced her armies in the south near Indo-China and Thailand, and was sending forces to bolster the British position in Burma.

By January 27 Chinese forces were standing beside the British defenders of Burma, while others were said by the Chungking government to be thrusting back the Japanese forces in Kwantung Province to the border of Kowloon, mainland portion of the Japanese-occupied British crown colony of Hongkong.

Pacific Calendar

Filipino guerillas raid Tuguegarao airport as Japs increase pressure on Bataan line. British withdraw Malaya right flank to Bukit Laukap.

Large Jap convoy sighted in Makassar Strait.

Jap-Thai troops push to Kawkaek, Burma. Entire Jap 14th Army in Luzon. "Hurricanes" bag five Japs over Singapore. Celebes oil fields demolished as Kendari is bombed; invasion feared.

Japs make fierce Bataan assault. British Malaya center falls back to Kluang. Twenty-one Jap planes bagged over Rangoon, as Chinese troops bolster ground defenses. Dutch bomb Makassar convoy.

MacArthur counter-attacks brilliantly. Heavy fighting at Sukli, Burma. American and Dutch planes, ships take heavy toll of Makassar convoy.

Japs reform after Bataan setback. British Malaya line anchored Batu Pahat-Kluang-Mersing. Makassar convoy toll placed at 10 to 20 Jap vessels sunk. Jap occupation Balikpapan and Kendari acknowledged.

Japs developing Davao and Jolo as bases. PT sinks second 5,000 ton ship in Subic Bay. Japs occupy Batu Pahat, as British withdraw again.

Dutch sub sinks Jap destroyer. Amboina bombed again.

MacArthur withdraws without loss. British establish Burma defense along Salween River as Chinese reinforcements arrive. British heavily bomb Labis.

Atlantic Theatre

The United States' entrance into World War II as a full participant and us with several distinct items on the credit side of the ledger in the Atlantic:

1) On September 3, 1940; in return for 50 over-age destroyers, the United States had received from Britain the right to establish a series of eight bases reaching from Newfoundland to British Guiana.

2) Following passage of the Lease-Lend Bill on March 11, 1941, the United States had given more effective aid to the Allies in the Atlantic area, including not only provision of armaments and materials but also repair of British warships in American ports and ferrying bombers across both the North and South Atlantic.

(3) On April 9, 1941, with the accord of the Danish Minister, the United States had taken over protection of Greenland and thus gained base facilities there.

(4) On July 7, 1941, at the request of the Icelandic Government, the United States had occupied Iceland jointly with Great Britain.

(5) On September 16, 1941, President Roosevelt had issued a "shoot on sight" order to the U. S. Atlantic Fleet, which placed the Navy on a wartime basis in that ocean.

(6) By late autumn of 1941, British, Allied and neutral tonnage losses in the Battle of the Atlantic had dropped to roughly half the losses of the previous spring, and new bottoms sliding down American ways had tipped the scale against the Axis.

This was the situation when, on December 7, the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor precipitated the United States into total war and Germany and the United States became officially declared enemies.

Just five weeks later—almost a year sooner than during the last war—U-boat visitors appeared along our eastern shipping lanes. On January 14 a tanker was torpedoed 150 miles south of Montauk Point, Long Island, and two other ships were sunk off the Atlantic Coast in the next seven days. These attacks marked the most westward penetration of Hitler's undersea fleet in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic, and to many observers they signaled the beginning of an all-out Axis effort to destroy the Allied bridge of ships near its point of origin and force the United States Navy to disperse its strength by escorting coastal as well as trans-Atlantic shipping.

During the past week the Navy Department announced the sinking of four more cargo vessels by German submarines, but hinted that strong counter-measures were being taken. It announced, "Some of the recent visitors to our territorial waters will never enjoy the return-trip portion of their voyage." The statement gave no details, but urged the public to cooperate in concealing the fate of submarine "excursionists" in a psychological war on German nerves.

On Tuesday, the arrival of an A. E. F. in Northern Ireland was announced in the daily press. These troops are under the command of General James E. Chaney and will presumably participate with British forces in whatever operations against Germany are deemed possible. Prime Minister de Valera of Eire protested the landing to the American Government.

Atlantic Calendar

JAN.

- 21 Navy announces sinking of U. S. steamship CITY OF ATLANTA and Latvian freighter CILVAIRA with loss of 46 lives. U-boats thick along U. S. coast.
- 22 Nineteen U-boats located between Savannah and Cape Race.

Navy declares many "visiting" subs will never enjoy return-trip voyage. Public urged to conceal U-boats' fate as psychological war on German nerves. Six subs spotted between Cape Hatteras, N. C., and Cape May, N. J.

Hitler claims sinking of 18 Allied merchant ships off U. S. and Canadian coasts.

Norwegian oil tanker VARANGER sunk 35 miles off Sea Isle City, N. J. Crew saved.

Navy announces sinking of U. S. ore-carrier VENORE off N. C. Berlin radio claims 12 more ships sunk off U. S. and Canadian coasts.

Navy announces sinking of tankers PAN-MAINE and FRANCIS E. POWELL off U. S. Atlantic coast. Arrival of A. E. F. in northern Ireland announced.

Mediterranean Theatre

The primary objective of the Axis Powers in the Mediterranean is control of the Egypt-Suez Canal-Red Sea area. If that were attained, they could expect to drive the British Fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean and make those waters an Axis lake. Then they would gain an inestimable advantage of safe sea communications to the Balkans and the Black Sea, which would enable them to draw on the resources of those regions and supply their forces there on a scale far beyond the capacity of overburdened rail communications.

Mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean, moreover, would open the way for a large scale land offensive aimed at the oil of Iraq and Iran and an outlet on the Persian Gulf. At the same time, control of the Red Sea would permit submarine and raider operations in the Indian Ocean and open the door to naval cooperation with Japan.

This vital area centering around Egypt and the Suez Canal has two flanks, Africa and Asia Minor. Of these the African flank has been menaced most actively.

In September 1940, the Italians opened an offensive against Egypt from Libya and advanced as far as Sidi Barrani. Then in December came a surprising counter-offensive by the British, under General Auchinleck, who swept the faint-hearted legions of Mussolini across Cyrenaica to El Agheila at the foot of the Gulf of Sidra. Meanwhile, the British had reconquered British Somaliland which the Italians had conquered, had conquered most of Ethiopia and had installed Haile Selassie once more (May 5, 1941) on his throne at Addis Ababa, thereby removing a potential Italian threat to the Sudan and Egypt's back door.

In April 1941, the Germans advanced on another Mediterranean front, through Yugoslavia and into Greece and Crete, thereby gaining positions which constitute a threat to Egypt by air and a potential menace to Egypt via Asia Minor. In a fruitless attempt to defend

Greece and save Crete, the British withdrew some of their forces in Libya. Whereupon the Axis armies there, revitalized by German panzer divisions and troops, unleashed an offensive which regained all the ground the Italians had lost and again raised a serious threat to the valley of the Nile.

As this new threat developed both from Crete and from Africa the British took action to safeguard the Asia Minor flank of Suez. In May they overthrew the pro-Axis regime of Rashid Ali in Iraq. In July, with the help of Free French forces, they won control of Syria and installed a Free French Government. Finally, in September, with Russian cooperation, they removed by occupation the threat of an Axis revolution in Iran. Thus the Asia Minor flank of Suez and the Asiatic regions behind the Caucasus and before the Persian Gulf were consolidated under Allied control.

Another attempt to remove the threat to Suez on the African flank began with a new British offensive against Libya on November 18, 1941. This time the going was more difficult, because the main enemy before them was Rommel's armored divisions, not just Mussolini's men. Once again, however, they drove the Axis forces back past Benghazi to El Agheila.

With this advance, the apparent immediate objectives of the British drive on Libya seemed on the way to accomplishment. These had been: (1) destruction of the Axis forces; (2) elimination of the threat to Suez from Cyrenaica; (3) diversion of German strength from the hard-pressed Russian front to the North African theatre. More distant objectives were also seen. It was thought that a British victory in Libya might prevent a possible surrender by Vichy of French North and West African bases to the Axis. From a conquered Libya, moreover, the British might eventually strike at Italy, the weak member of the Axis.

El Agheila, the gate to Tripolitania, remained unconquered, however. And the capture of El Agheila is a difficult task at best. It means negotiating a narrow strip of land between the coast and huge salt marshes to the south, or the even narrower and more precarious path of comparatively solid sand through the marshes themselves. The latter route was even more impassable than usual, however, when the British reached the outskirts of El Agheila in mid-January, for there had been almost continuous rains.

There were other difficulties, too. First, the supply problem. From the main British bases in Egypt to El Agheila, ammunition, fuel and food for the British had to travel in slow-moving trucks over more than 450 miles of tortuous roads. Supply by sea was hampered

exposure to Axis bombers operating from Sicily and by the damaged condition of Benghazi and other advanced ports. Second, an Axis convoy of 30 ships had slipped through the British sea and air guardians to Tripoli, and new planes and tanks became noticeable by their presence. So, while the British appeared to be waiting for reinforcements—and better weather—General Rommel's strengthened forces lashed out on January 21 and, after two days of fighting, reoccupied Agedabia, 90 miles northeast of El Aghella.

Although this Axis movement was at first thought merely a reconnaissance in force," it turned out to be a full-fledged counter-attack. Following the recapture of Agedabia, a tremendous tank battle developed in the triangle enclosed within Agedabia, Antelat and Saunnu. Rommel's legions had obviously been reinforced.

On Monday, January 26, the center of the Axis drive eastward appeared to have shifted to a point north and northeast of Msus, roughly 75 miles from both Benghazi and Mekili. Press observers believed Rommel might be aiming at Mekili, in an action intended to isolate Benghazi. The area of activity at week's end was approximately 150 miles east of the most forward position gained by the British in mid-January.

On the other side of the ledger, a British radio broadcast an unconfirmed report that Allied air forces recently smashed an Axis concentration of 400 transport planes. Further, press dispatches from Cairo claimed that British bombers and torpedo planes, attacking throughout January 23 and 24, had broken up a large Axis convoy carrying reinforcements and supplies for the German counter-attack. The British reported that they had probably sunk a 20,000-ton liner, set fire to a small merchantman, hit a cruiser and a destroyer with torpedoes, landed bombs atop two warships and two merchantmen and possibly hit a battleship. On the following day, the British Admiralty announced that British submarines had probably sunk two medium-sized transports and two fully-loaded tankers.

Meanwhile, Axis aircraft continued their relentless bombing attacks on Malta, and it is estimated that almost 100 planes have joined in some of the raids.

In other parts of the Mediterranean, the RAF made assaults on Catania and Comiso in Sicily, on the Axis submarine base at Salamis, Greece, and on the island of Crete.

Mediterranean Calendar

JAN.

- 21 Axis forces start "reconnaissance in force" E. of El Aghella.
- 22 ~~Axis forces reoccupy Agedabia. German tanks force British back in El Aghella area.~~
- 23 Germans making full-fledged counter-attack. Axis air operations continue over Malta.
- 24 British engage Germans in tremendous tank battle in triangular area within Agedabia, Antelat and Saunnu. German troops appear reinforced.
- 25 British planes break up large supply convoy headed for Libya; claim probable sinking of 20,000-ton liner, hits on five warships and three merchantmen. Fighting around Agedabia confused.
- 26 British claim probable sinking of two transports, two tankers. Italians and Germans claim aircraft hits on three British cruisers. Rome asserts another Axis convoy has reached Libya. Axis forces now 150 miles E. of El Aghella.
- 27 Rommel reported to lack reinforcements for counter-offensive on large scale. Activity continues N. and N.E. of Msus. Admiralty announces sinking of battleship BARHAM on Nov. 25.

Russian Theatre

In 1934, Hitler said to Hermann Rauschning: "Perhaps I shall not be able to avoid an alliance with Russia. I shall keep that as a trump card. Perhaps it will be the decisive gamble of my life . . . but it will never stop me from attacking Russia when my aims in the West have been achieved."

On Sunday morning, June 22, 1941, the Nazi radio blared the following words: "German People! National Socialists! Weighted down with heavy cares, condemned to months-long silence, the hour has now come when I can speak frankly . . ."

Hitler had taken the gamble. At 0305 on that day, his troops had moved into the U. S. S. R. without declaration of war in an all-out attempt to destroy a people with whom he had but recently signed a treaty of friendship.

For five months following Hitler's momentous decision his armies held the initiative in virtually every sector of the 1,700-mile front stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. Their offensives carried to the suburbs of Leningrad, within 30 miles of Moscow and past Rostov, gateway to the oil of the Caucasus.

The Germans, aided in varying degrees by their Finnish, Hungarian, Slovakian, Rumanian and Italian allies, had taken Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and other important industrial and communication centers. They controlled all of White Russia, virtually all of the Ukraine and the Crimea, except for the naval base of Sevastopol and its outer defenses. At some points the German troops had fought as far as 700 miles east of their June 22 positions.

Hitler had failed, however, in the primary objective of the campaign: the destruction of the fighting power of the Soviet army and air force. The Russian forces had suffered heavy losses in manpower and material. They had not been "smashed—never to rise again," as Hitler claimed in the first week of October.

On November 29 Russian troops reentered Rostov, recapturing a major city for the first time in the war. In the first week of December there was steadily mounting Soviet pressure on the German salients which had been pushed Northwest and Southeast of Moscow. A German spokesman announced that there would be no effort to take Moscow during the winter months. German press accounts began to speak of the stabilization of a "winter line." It was announced that the names of Russian towns would no longer be mentioned in German communiques since the exact position of the lines was relatively unimportant.

The Russian counter-offensive, since the recapture of Rostov, has driven back the Germans as much as 200 miles in some sectors. It has eased the pressure on Leningrad, though communications between the old Czarist capital and the rest of Russia are still severely restricted.

On the central front the Soviet forces won their greatest victory January 20 of this year when they recaptured Mzhaisk, 57 miles West of Moscow, the base from which the Germans' great autumn offensives against the capital were launched. The stubbornness with which the Nazis defended Mzhaisk clearly suggests that their commanders intended it to serve as one of the forward bastions of the "winter line."

In the Donets River basin the Russian counter-offensive menaced the German hold on Kharkov and carried 75 miles beyond Rostov along the northern shore of the Sea of Azov. In the Crimea the Kerch Peninsula, which had appeared in November to be a possible springboard for German invasion of the Caucasus, fell to Russian troops landed from transports in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.

Over the front as a whole the Russians were estimated to have recaptured some 70,000 square miles of the 527,500 square miles of Soviet territory under Axis control two months ago.

During the past week the Soviet forces which recaptured Mzhaisk maintained a steady pursuit of German troops falling back on the important highway leading westward to Vyazma and Smolensk. The Russians continue to claim air superiority over the central front.

To the northwest, meanwhile, in the Valdai Hills sector which dominates Moscow-Leningrad communications, Soviet troops claimed one of their most important advances of the war. Mechanized units

adapted to winter warfare were said to have pressed forward as far as 60 miles in a single day to take Kholm. In the same region Soviet forces menaced the Leningrad-Vitebsk railroad and pushed advance units to a point only 110 miles east of the old Latvian frontier. These developing Russian operations carried a serious threat to communications between the German Northern and Central Army commands.

The Russian front lines on January 27 appeared to run in a semi-circle about 30 miles southwest and southeast of Leningrad, thence south through or very near Chudovo, Novgorod, Kholm and Toropets, there swinging sharply eastward to form the Smolensk-Vyazma salient, with the northern defenses of the salient still turning on German-held Rzhev. Southwest of this salient the Russians hold Mosalsk, and from that point southward to the Sea of Azov the line can be delineated by the important cities reported to be only 5 to 25 miles beyond the Soviet advance units: Bryansk, Orel, Kursk, Kharkov and Stalino.

Russian Calendar

JAN.

- 21 Soviet spokesman says as result of Mzhaisk recapture, "There is no more Moscow front." Russian offensive developing in Valdai Hills sector.
- 22 Russian troops 17 miles west of Mzhaisk on road to Vyazma and Smolensk. Valdai Hills drive gathering momentum.
- 23 Soviet forces in Valdai sector claim 65-mile advance to Kholm, believed to have been intended as one link in Nazis' "winter line."
- 24 Russians widening wedge between Reichswehr's Northern and Central Army Groups. Heavy pressure on German-held Velikiye Luki, 270 miles northwest of Moscow.
- 25 Germans acknowledge "heavy Russian offensive" on Leningrad front.
- 27 Novgorod and Chudovo reported to have fallen to Russians on northwest front. Soviet advance westward on Smolensk road averaging 5 to 8 miles a day.

LATIN AMERICAN COOPERATION

On January 15 the twenty-one American Republics met in an emergency conference for the third time since the outbreak of the war. At Panama in 1939 they set up the hemisphere safety zone. At Havana in 1940 they established a trusteeship for all European possessions in the hemisphere. Now, with the United States forced into the war by the action of the Axis Powers, they are meeting at Rio de Janeiro to provide for solidarity in the face of an attack upon the hemisphere.

The principal object of the Conference is the severance of relations with the Axis Powers. This goal appeared to be in sight on January 21, when press reports from Rio de Janeiro reported that a formula had been found for unanimous action by all the American Republics. Opposition to a break with the Axis had been manifested by only two of the American Republics, Argentina and Chile. The former has traditionally maintained an isolationist attitude in inter-American cooperation. Its government, now headed by conservatives, is more disposed to cling to "neutrality" than are the mass of the Argentine people. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Argentina complements Europe economically rather than the United States and that one third of her people are of Italian descent. In the case of Chile, grounds for her hesitance were an approaching presidential election and fear of possible Japanese reprisals against her long and weakly-defended coast.

When the Conference met the position of the Latin American Republics could be summarized as follows:

Nine countries had declared war upon the Axis—Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras and Panama.

Three more countries had severed diplomatic relations with the Axis—Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

The remaining eight countries—Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay—had announced their solidarity with the United States, treated the United States as a non-belligerent and had taken steps to freeze Axis assets.

On January 27, as the Conference neared its final plenary session, unprecedented progress in inter-American solidarity had been achieved. Unanimous agreement had been reached on a recommendation that all the American Republics break their relations with Japan, Germany and Italy, "since the first of these States has attacked and the other two have declared war on an American country". To meet objections raised by Argentina and Chile, this recommendation was made "in accordance with the procedure established by their own laws and within the position and circumstances of each country in the actual continental conflict". Nevertheless, unanimous agreement on this resolution represented a solid front of the Americas with the United States and against the Axis Powers.

By January 27, Peru, Uruguay, and Paraguay had anticipated the final adoption of this resolution at a plenary session of the Conference by announcing the breaking of diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan. It was expected that Brazil, Bolivia and Ecuador

would follow suit and hoped that Chile and Argentina would eventually take similar action.

~~Steps had also been taken to provide for the severance of all commercial and financial relations with the Axis, for rigid control of radio, telegraph, telephone and aviation and suppression of subversive activities, and for far-reaching hemispheric economic cooperation.~~ Meanwhile, the plenary session of the Conference, which would finally adopt its resolutions, had been delayed in an attempt to reach a basis for settlement of the century-old frontier dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Press reports from Rio de Janeiro on January 27 indicated that such a basis for settlement had been found.

Regarded in perspective, the Rio de Janeiro Conference appears as one of the salient events of the war. The solidarity of the Americas which it manifested may be expected to produce powerful repercussions in the Latin countries of Europe, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy, which have always had strong bonds with Latin America. It means, moreover, the lining up of virtually all the world in opposition to the three Axis Powers and their few feeble satellites.

The unity of the Americas now stands in strong contrast with the situation in 1917, and underlines the wisdom and the value of the "Good Neighbor" policy pursued for the last nine years by the United States. It contrasts even more strongly with the situation which experienced observers feared would have developed if the United States had failed to prevent a Hitler victory on the other side of the Atlantic and had then sought to defend this side of the Atlantic against the Axis Powers.

THE THREAT TO U. S. RUBBER SUPPLY

The government's rapid action in banning all sales of new rubber tires within three days of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor awoke the American people to the serious nature of Japan's threat to our rubber supply. According to data published in newspaper and magazine articles, this threat may be outlined as follows:

The United States normally uses 600,000 tons of rubber a year to meet civilian needs, more than 70 percent of which goes into tires. During the first half of 1941, new military demands raised our rate of rubber processing to 800,000 tons a year. Then the government began applying curbs which decreased the amount processed in December to 54,000 tons, or a rate of 648,000 tons a year. How expanding military needs, on the one hand, and further curtailment of civilian use, on the other hand, will affect our rubber consumption during 1942 cannot be predicted now, although the New York Times of January 12 reports an estimate by Mr. Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, that the country could get along during the war on 450,000 tons a year.

In the past more than 97 percent of our rubber imports came from Southeastern and Southern Asia. British Malaya provided us in 1941 with 56 percent of our total imports and French Indo China with another 5 percent. Imports from both these areas have now been almost entirely cut off by Japan, and the 29 percent of our supply we have received from the Dutch East Indies is endangered.

Thus a total of 90 percent of our rubber imports has now been either cut off or endangered by Japan. We still have free access to another 8 percent we secured from Ceylon, India and Burma in normal years, as well as to smaller supplies we received from South America and Africa.

For reserve against immediate needs, we have a stock pile of about 600,000 tons of crude rubber, most of which is on hand but a portion of which is at sea. It must be remembered, however, that some of this stock pile will be required to fill the needs of our Allies.

Among emergency measures which may be taken to meet our rubber shortage there are three which appear to be of sufficient scope to be effective. The first of these is drastic curtailment of civilian use. The second is the reclamation of old rubber, of which it is said that there is enough in this country to supply at least 600,000 tons of crude rubber and keep our present reclaimed rubber industry working at full speed for several years.

PART TWO

JAPANESE STRATEGIC MATERIALS

The following estimates of Japan's position in certain strategic materials on January 1st, 1941, may be of interest in throwing light on her war position today:

| ITEM | Total use in 1939 | Stocks on hand | Percentage dependence on imports | Principal source | Important supply in W. Pacific |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| Petroleum..... barrels | 37,600,000 | 75,495,000 | 89 | U. S. | N. E. I., Malaya. |
| Iron & Steel..... metric tons | 11,300,000 | 4,110,000 | 65 | U. S. | Malaya, P. I., China. |
| Copper..... do | 223,000 | Large | 61 | U. S. | P. I. |
| Lead..... do | 103,729 | | 92 | U. S. | |
| Nickel..... do | 12,644 | 4,000 | 100 | Canada. | New Caledonia. |
| Aluminum..... do | 101,500 | 65,000 | 93 | Canada. | N. E. I., Malaya. |
| Raw Cotton..... do | 1,700,000 | 303,400 | 100 | U. S. | China. |

It is understood that, in general, Japanese stocks of these strategic materials have not decreased below these figures. Although in July Japan was subjected to severe economic restrictions which drastically curtailed her imports, she had expanded her imports in the first half of 1941 to an extent which offset these decreased supplies.

Her petroleum situation is of particular interest. Stocks on hand are now estimated to be about 72,000,000 barrels. Consumption in 1940 was 33,000,000 barrels, of which 20,000,000 were for military use and 13,000,000 for civilian use. Civilian consumption may now be cut drastically, perhaps by more than half. Army and Navy consumption, on the other hand, must be expected to increase with large-scale and widespread operations.

The period for which Japan's oil supplies will be adequate for her war needs appears to depend upon two "imponderables". The first is how far Japanese consumption will be increased by war in the Pacific. The second is how far she may be able to repair damaged wells and installations in the territories her forces may occupy and then transport their product to her refineries and storage centers.

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Third, we can produce synthetic rubber on a greatly expanded scale. During 1941, our synthetic output was only 12,000 tons, or enough to meet our peacetime civilian needs for about a week. Now Mr. Jesse Jones has announced a plan to expand synthetic production to 400,000 tons per year, and to complete this expansion by the middle of 1943.

These figures indicate that the United States should be able to meet its war needs in rubber, although the American people will face acute shortages until Japan's grip on Malaya is broken. The experience will be a bitter one for a nation that rides on wheels, and should prove an enduring lesson of our dependence upon command of the seas.

PART THREE

JAPAN'S BLUEPRINT FOR CONQUEST

In 1927 few people believed that Hitler would one day rewrite in blood the policies he had described in his "Mein Kampf". At that same time a Japanese Premier, General Baron Tanaka, was drawing up another plan of conquest at the other end of Eurasia. He prepared it for his Emperor, but a copy was secured by the Chinese and subsequently translated and published. Known as the Tanaka Memorial, it should have startled the world, but the public believed it extravagant as they did "Mein Kampf", and accepted Japan's claim that it had been forged.

Japan's actions since that time have taught us not to accept such Japanese claims of innocence. They have shown, moreover, that the Tanaka Memorial, like "Mein Kampf", was an actual blueprint for future conquests. For this reason, two of its salient passages are particularly pertinent now.

I

"For the sake of self-protection as well as the protection of others, Japan cannot remove the difficulties in Eastern Asia unless she adopts a policy of 'Blood and Iron'. But in carrying out this policy we have to face the United States which has been turned against us by China's policy of fighting poison with poison. In the future if we want to control China, we must first crush the United States just as in the past we had to fight in the Russo-Japanese War.

"But in order to conquer the world, we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear us and surrender to us. Then the world will realize that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."

II

"Having China's entire resources at our disposal we shall proceed to conquer India, the Archipelago Asia Minor, Central Asia, and even Europe. But to get control of Manchuria and Mongolia is the first step if the Yamato race wishes to distinguish themselves on Continental Asia."

What has happened since September 1931 in the Far East and since December 1941 in the Pacific seems to show a persistent though myopic effort to carry out Baron Tanaka's design. Such efforts are frequently successful until they reach a certain point.

THE POSITION OF FRANCE

The involvement of the United States in the war and the German defeats in Russia and Libya have changed considerably the position of France, strengthening the influence of those who have opposed "collaboration" with Germany. Such a change was indicated in Marshal Petain's New Year broadcast to the nation, which was attacked bitterly in the German-controlled Paris press.

The mass of the French people appear now to have become convinced that Germany will finally be defeated. This conviction is giving them new hope for the future and increasing their resistance to the "collaboration" policy. For the first time, moreover, this belief is making real headway among the officials at Vichy. It is also spreading more widely than ever before among officials in French Africa.

These developments make for greater French resistance to German demands. How successful that resistance might be in the event of collision in Franco-German relations or a crisis over the entry of Axis forces into Tunisia is one of the question marks in the world situation.

GERMANY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Ever since the Axis Powers made war on the United States and the German Army began its retreat in Russia, the world has been wondering where Hitler would strike next.

Some observers have held that after losing something like one third of his airforce and half of his tanks, Hitler will be forced to concentrate throughout the winter on rebuilding the striking power of the German Army in order to launch an offensive against Russia in the spring. They foresee a period of relative German quiescence during the next two or three months.

Others believe that Hitler is compelled by internal political considerations and a need to maintain morale in Italy and his other satellites as well as at home to offset his defeat in Russia with a victory on another front. There is also the possibility that the curtailment of aerial operations on the Russian front imposed by winter affords him now the best opportunity he may ever have to initiate an offensive in the Mediterranean area.

Taking account of these factors, it would seem wiser to expect a serious German drive in this theatre than to feel that it need not be feared. The pertinent question is which direction such a drive may take.

This question can be answered only by events, but there seem to be certain factors bearing upon it which may cast some light ahead. One is the probability that Germany's forces will be heavily engaged in Russia throughout the winter. This suggests that Hitler's offensive capacity in any other direction may be somewhat limited.

Another factor appears to be a recent deterioration of his position for a drive through Turkey. Indications of such deterioration are the Russian recapture of Rostov, the Russian offensive in the south and the Crimea, the continued command of the Black Sea by the Russian Navy, increased British strength in the Middle East, the effect of winter on military operations against Turkey and the effect of American participation in the war upon the attitude of Turkey.

At the other end of the Mediterranean, there is one consideration which must tempt Hitler towards an offensive through Spain and into North and West Africa. Such a project, correlated with Japan's Pacific offensives, would constitute a world pincers drive aimed at the Americas on the West and most of the British Empire on the East. As a strategic conception, it would have a scope unrivalled on the pages of history, dwarfing the strategic conceptions of all previous conquerors including Alexander and Napoleon.

But here also there have been signs of a recent deterioration of Germany's prospects. The entry of the United States into the war has had a powerful influence in France and French Africa, evidenced to some degree in Marshal Petain's New Year's broadcast which the Germans found so offensive. This same factor is also influential in Spain and Portugal, increasing the likelihood of resistance to a German invasion.

These developments do not, of course, remove the danger of a German drive through Spain. There are other developments which point towards it, such as piling up of German military supplies in southern France and the fact that Germany need no longer fear the effect on American opinion of a push towards the South Atlantic. But it would seem that German prospects for such a push are neither as favorable as they were two months ago nor as favorable as they might become if an initial Mediterranean offensive succeeded elsewhere.

As regards the Central Mediterranean, there are a number of factors which suggest that it may be the theatre of a German winter offensive. Rommel's Army in Libya needs support to avert eventual destruction. It seems clear, moreover, that an offensive in this theatre would be a smaller and less definite commitment for the German Army than a drive against Turkey or through Spain. It might be initiated primarily by airpower, and if unsuccessful, could be broken off in its early stages. If successful, it might lead to the creation of a strong German position in Tunis and the Central Mediterranean, from which to develop subsequent drives against Atlantic Africa and the Middle East. Further factors pointing in this direction are the recent stepping up of air attacks on Malta, large concentrations of German bombers and transport planes in Sicily and Italy, increase of German air forces in Libya and General Rommel's advance past Agadabia.

The balance of these factors thus appears to point towards the Central Mediterranean. But Hitler is always likely to be swayed by factors which are not apparent, or even by "intuition," and to strike in a direction which logic does not suggest.

OUR TWO OCEANS

Wide perspective is a first essential in a war which must be fought across two widely separated oceans. Such perspective may perhaps be assisted by a glance at some of the salient features of our stake in each of these fronts.

Our available forces are now engaged on a much greater scale in the Pacific, where the Army as well as the Navy have been in action. We have suffered some serious losses in the Pacific, and have seen American territories successfully invaded and occupied by the enemy.

Permanent stakes in this area are most of our rubber and tin supplies which are now endangered by Japan. We must always remember, moreover, that Japan's success in her designs would lead not only to her control of these essential American imports, but also to her control of the destinies and the industrial and manpower resources of a billion people.

On our Atlantic front our stakes include the future character of our Western civilization and the future safety of our American hemisphere. We belong to the West, and will be more influenced at home by totalitarian triumphs in the West than we would be by similar triumph in the Orient. There are, moreover, five reasons to believe that the future safety of the Americas could be more endangered on the Atlantic than on the Pacific:

1. The power of Germany, with the exception of naval strength, is immeasurably greater than the power of Japan.
2. The total power of Europe and Africa will be, for at least several generations, superior to the total power of Eastern Asia.
3. The Atlantic is much narrower than the Pacific.
4. South America, our most vulnerable front, is only 1,600 miles from Africa, but is more than 7,000 miles from Eastern Asia.
5. South America is more susceptible to European economic pressure and ideological sapping than to Asiatic.

A glance at only these aspects of our stake upon each of our fronts indicates that our future cannot be safeguarded by anything less than total victory upon both oceans.