

(3) Implementing the existing Directive establishing  
the JPWC;

- (a) By attempting to secure the voluntary co-  
operation of psychological warfare agencies  
which are not under the direct control of  
the JCS.
- (b) By strengthening and supervising the  
liaison between different psychological  
warfare agencies.
- (c) By initiating and framing integrated plans  
of subversive operations and propaganda  
for submission to theater commanders, these  
plans to include both locally conducted  
activities under the direct control of  
the theater commander and the necessary  
support and assistance for such activities  
from the United States, from other theaters  
and from allied governments.
- (d) By utilizing the supporting agencies  
of the JCS to report upon the psychological  
warfare activities of agencies outside  
the jurisdiction of the JCS and, when  
necessary, to use the supporting agencies  
to supplement or make good any apparent  
deficiency in our psychological warfare.

C. APPLICATION OF TEST FOR SUITABILITY, FEASIBILITY  
AND ACCEPTABILITY

1. First Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - The course of Action is suitable from the point of view of setting up a smoothly operating machinery for the conduct of psychological warfare, but is not suitable from the point of view of obtaining integration of psychological warfare with military strategy because it is not under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action is feasible but only if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to place sole responsibility for the conduct of psychological warfare in civilian hands.
- (c) Acceptability - New directives would have to be issued by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; conflicts of authority would impede and retard the organization of psychological warfare. The course of action does not appear acceptable under present conditions.

## 2. Second Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - The course of action is suitable.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action appears feasible since it would not necessitate a drastic reorganization of existing psychological warfare agencies and would necessitate subordinating them to the policy control of the JPWC.
- (c) Acceptability - Acceptability is doubtful because of the resistance of present independent agencies to military control.

## 3. Third Course of Action.

- (a) Suitability - Suitability of this course of action depends upon voluntary cooperation of certain agencies. If this cooperation is obtained, the course of action is suitable.
- (b) Feasibility - The course of action is feasible since it involves no formal change in the existing situation.
- (c) Acceptability - The course of action is probably not acceptable since it would necessitate new directives.

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D. LISTING RETAINED COURSES OF ACTION

No single course of action seems at the moment to be completely suitable, feasible and acceptable. One course of action, however, appears feasible, acceptable and probably suitable, and even if it should develop later that it were not suitable, no serious loss would result from having attempted to follow it. The retained course of action, therefore, is to implement the existing Directive establishing the JPWC in the manner described in Section C (3).

If upon trial this course of action is found unworkable then the second course of action should be followed.

E. ANALYSIS OF RETAINED COURSE OF ACTION

1. Voluntary cooperation of agencies outside the jurisdiction of JCS would enable JPWC to coordinate all psychological warfare activities and integrate them with military strategy. Implementation of cooperation with outside agencies would involve:

- (a) Submission to the JPWC of propaganda and publicity plans by the OWI, CIAA and other civilian agencies for approval from the viewpoint of military strategy
- (b) Directives from the JPWC to OWI, CIAA and other agencies stating the strategically desirable objectives for propaganda plans or operation.

2. Coordination of psychological warfare plans and their integration with military operations could be obtained by the JPWC under the retained course of action by the following means:

- (a) Directing the Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS, to submit plans for combat-propaganda operations to the JPWC and directing OSS to submit plans for S.O.
- (b) By comparing such combat-propaganda and S.O. plans with the propaganda plans submitted, eliminating divergencies and by recommending to the agencies concerned that they hold consultations among them-

(c) By fitting the propaganda, combat-propaganda and S.O. plans submitted into the framework of an overall plan of psychological warfare strategy for submission to theatre commanders.

3. Supervisory and supplemental functions of the psychological warfare supporting agencies -- including supplying of information to propaganda agencies -- should be divided between the Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS, and OSS, and definite tasks assigned to each.
4. In addition to the organizational measures included in the retained course of action the setting up of an effective mechanism for psychological warfare necessitates rapid completion of the following studies:
  - (a) Inventory of facilities of all kinds for psychological warfare at the disposal of the United States, now or in the near future.
  - (b) Study should be made of the possibilities of psychological warfare in order

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i. Shall American psychological warfare attempt to repeat the ideological methods used in the last War or shall it be considered as a tactical auxiliary in military operations?

ii. Shall it be aimed primarily at projecting the collapse of enemy morale and organization, or shall it follow a policy of attrition by creating difficulties for the enemy in occupied territories, or can the two strategies be harmoniously combined?

iii. Shall American psychological warfare be completely independent or shall it be coordinated as closely as possible with the psychological warfare activities of our Allies?

(c) An estimate of the results which American psychological warfare, if properly organized and conducted, can reasonably hope to obtain in various strategic areas by exploiting any sub-

- (d) A program for greater utilization of various branches of the government and armed services, notably such branches as the army Special Services Branch, S.O.S., and of private agencies for psychological warfare.

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S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 36/1

COPY NO. 9

SEPTEMBER 9, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretary

The attached pages, numbers 30, 31, 32, should be substituted for the same numbered pages in the copy of Basic Estimate of Psychological Warfare in your possession. They represent the revisions made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee at its meeting on September 7, 1942.

A. H. Onthank,

Secretary.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. That the JPWC formally approve the definition of psychological warfare submitted for information by the Subcommittee and revised to read as follows:

Psychological warfare is the coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is to be attained --other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions, -- which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

The accomplishment of these ends demands and includes:

- (a) general propaganda services, operating primarily against civilian groups and using mainly ideological appeals and news manipulation;

(b) operations -

- (1) subversive services engaged in sabotage, rumor-spreading, bribery, etc.;
- (2) combat psychological warfare services directly attached to the armed forces, which act under the theater commander and are exemplified by the German Propaganda Companies.

(c) intelligence services engaged in accumulating information by research and espionage on fundamental social, ideological and leadership vulnerabilities of enemy populations and on the current attitudes and morale of civilian and military groups, in addition to the usual military, naval, political, and economic information.

2. That the JPWC submit through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval the foregoing definition of psychological warfare.
3. That the JPWC base its planning upon the definition accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, elaborating for submission to theater commanders overall coordinated strategic plans for psychological warfare composed of the following elements:
  - (a) Plans for general propaganda operations.
  - (b) Plans for combat-propaganda operations.  
(When the overall plan foresees American military operation in the target area.)
  - (c) Plans for subversive operations including the integrated use of sabotage and demolition work,

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organization and direction of underground political groups, whispering campaigns and other forms of fifth column activity within the target area, supported by appropriate secret activities in other areas likely to have a direct influence upon the target area.

4. That after the Joint Chiefs of Staff have informed the Office of War Information of their wishes, the J.P.W.C., on behalf of the J.C.S., will request the O.W.I. to submit plans for general propaganda to be reviewed for their suitability from the viewpoint of strategy and for coordination with subversive operations and combat-propaganda plans.
5. That the JPWC instruct the OSS to make available for this Committee such special psychological warfare intelligence as may be called for.

*See JCS.12*

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

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1. That the JPWC formally approve the definition of psychological warfare submitted for information by the Subcommittee and revised to read as follows:

Psychological warfare is the integrated use of all means, moral and physical, --other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions, --which tend to destroy the will of the enemy, to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance or sympathy; or which tend to maintain, (increase or create) the will to victory of our own people and allies and to maintain, (increase or acquire) the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.

*through the J staff Planners*

2. That the JPWC submit to the JCS for their approval the *foregoing* ~~revised~~ definition of psychological warfare.

3. That if the *action* ~~definition~~ is approved by the JCS the JPWC base its planning functions upon it, elaborating for submission to theatre commanders overall coordinated

*That the JPWC have its planning upon*

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strategic plans for psychological warfare composed of the following elements:

- a. Plans for general propaganda operations.
- b. Plans for combat-propaganda operations. (When the overall plan foresees American military operation in the target area.)
- c. Plans for subversive operations including the integrated use of sabotage and demolition work, organization and direction of underground political groups, whispering campaigns and other forms of fifth column activity within the target area, supported by appropriate secret activities in other areas likely to have a direct influence upon the target area.

4. That the JFWC, on behalf of the JCS, request the OWI to submit plans for general propaganda to be reviewed for their suitability from the viewpoint of strategy and for coordination with subversive operations and combat-propaganda plans; ~~and that the JFWC periodically issue to the OWI requests for the elaboration of such plans.~~
5. That the JFWC instruct the Psychological Warfare Branch, MIS and the OSS to submit plans independently for combat-

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6. That the JFWC instruct the OSS to collect, centralize, evaluate and make available for this Committee special psychological warfare intelligence, e.g. data on morale in occupied countries.

*Changed*

ANNEX A

German Psychological Warfare Agencies and Operations

Intelligence activities

1. Propaganda Ministry: monitoring foreign broadcasts, analyzing the world press, studying the world film market, maintaining an elaborate card index of personalities of importance in foreign countries, compiling background reports on foreign social systems and foreign attitudes.
2. War Ministry: reports on foreign military matters prepared by Military Attaches in Embassies and by agents of the coordinated intelligence command of the Wehrmacht.
3. Foreign office: supervision of foreign service staff, including propaganda, espionage, and subversive activity personnel, as well as old-style career diplomats and "Ribbentrop men," for contacts with social and business elites in enemy countries; also includes (since June 1937) a liaison office with the Foreign Organization of the Party, under Bohle.
4. Police: espionage agents organized in the Gestapo under Himmler.
5. Labor Front: under the guise of being a welfare organization for the German working class in foreign countries the Labor Front has "organized" these German laborers abroad into espionage and potential sabotage agents.
6. Party: through its Foreign Organization the Party has kept track of millions of Germans abroad and has encouraged the development of highly reliable German fifth columns in certain foreign countries.

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Operational activities

1. Propaganda Ministry: spends an estimated \$540,000,000 annually on propaganda, some \$200,000,000 of which is used abroad. Broadcasts daily in more than 30 languages -- to the U.S. alone some 11 hours a day. Supplies free news for foreign press. Organizes carefully conducted tours through Germany for "cooperative" foreigners. Distributes tons of propaganda literature in foreign countries and aims to build up good will and respect for German cultural achievements through such agencies as the former German Library of Information in New York. Subsidizes the showing of German films -- features, educationals, newsreels -- abroad. Sponsors many "cultural" organizations the aim of which is to develop friendly relations with Germany. Supplies personnel for "Propaganda Companies" in Wehrmacht.
2. War Ministry: besides the usual operations of military intelligence, the High Command controls the activities of the Propaganda Companies, composed of photographers, writers, composers, actors, etc. from the Chamber of Culture in the Propaganda Ministry. These Propaganda Companies have three functions: entertaining the troops; recording the war for the home audience by radio, motion pictures, sketches, and news articles; and demoralizing enemy troops and civilians near the front line by numerous ingenious techniques of combat propaganda.
3. Police: The Security Police supplements the work of occupation troops by employing terroristic measures against the enemy's underground activities. The Foreign Security Police are saboteurs like those recently arrested by the FBI in this country. These sabotage agents are given special training in Berlin and must spend at least one year in the country to which they are assigned before completion of this technical preparation. Willing "foreign Germans" constitute the most suitable personnel for this work.

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- iv. Foreign Office: Using the screen of diplomatic immunity the German consulates and embassies have filled their staffs with all sorts of undercover agents, including military personnel. In the German occupation of Bergen, Norway, the 50 men in the German Consulate there were instrumental in taking strategic positions in the city before the troops had arrived. Since June 1937 the Foreign Office served as the channel by means of which Berlin maintained contact with such fifth columnist groups as the Foreign Organization of the Party, or the German Labor Front organization abroad. In the Argentine, e.g., the local units of the German Trade Union organization received extensive funds through the German Legation in Buenos Aires.
- v. Party: By means of its internal disciplinary and policing system the NSDAP maintains surveillance over all Germans abroad, and thus constrains them -- using persuasion, bribery, blackmail, etc. -- to do their part in aiding the Third Reich. Most influential organization in this connection is the Auslands Organization.
- vi. Labor Front: Mainly concerned with espionage and sabotage in foreign industrial establishments. Probably collaborates with the Auslands Sicherheits Dienst.

## ANNEX B

Italian Psychological Warfare Agencies and OperationsIntelligence activities

1. The Ministry of Popular Culture (i.e. Propaganda): has intelligence sections which draw information on social, political, cultural, and economic conditions at home and abroad from its own agents, as well as from the intelligence sections of army, navy, and air force. It also monitors foreign broadcasts, keeps track of Italian organizations and personalities abroad, and supervises the actions and pronouncements of such as it controls.
2. Army, navy, and air forces intelligence sections: perform all normal functions of such sections, but serve also the Ministry of Popular Culture and are served by it.
3. Foreign Ministry intelligence work is under the ministerial direction of Ciano, and hence of Mussolini. It has functioned closely at all times both on the intelligence side and the policy side, with the Ministry of Popular Culture.
4. The Ovra or secret police has worked chiefly in Italy, but through the CAO (Centro Americano di Operazioni) and parallel sections for work abroad has kept data upon Fascists and anti-Fascists and influential foreigners for many years. Now integrated with and subordinated to the Gestapo, it is scarcely an independent instrument for psychological warfare
5. The Fascist Party abroad, integrated with the Ministry of Popular Culture, has organized

Operational activities

- i. The Ministry of Popular Culture: complete control over the Italian press (including books, newspapers, magazines, etc.), foreign press, propaganda and technical services (such as film and radio). The Press Office issues a daily mimeographed form which is mailed to almost every Italian newspaper and specifies what must be "played up", and what news must be omitted.
- ii. The Foreign Ministry: functions closely with the Ministry of Popular Culture.
- iii. The fasci all 'Estero is the Italian organization abroad whose members have chosen obedience to Fascism. When the work of the Fasci Abroad caused political embarrassment, it was found more effective to entrust a great deal of the work to diplomatic and consular officers in foreign countries.
- iv. The Dante Alighieri Society: agency for distributing Italian information in the Americas and abroad.
- v. Casa d'Italia: cultural and "after work" purposes; function as propaganda centers.
- vi. Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (National Association of Veterans): has some of the ablest Fascist agents.
- vii. Italian industries under the Fascist Government have had interests abroad through which they were able to spread propaganda -- for example, in electrical, automobile or airplane companies or banks.
- viii. In addition to those agencies, there is the Italian language press, made up of about 300 publications in North and South America.

- ix. The Dopolavoro, an "after work" agency, similar to our Community Centers, is the principal channel for reaching the masses. There is no part of the Kingdom, islands, or colonial possessions where the people are not subject to Dopolavoro influence by means of entertainments, films, radio and printed matter. It is the most potent and effective agency of the Government, and has unequalled facilities.
- x. The "Opera Nazionale Balilla" is an effective organization to indoctrinate all youth from the ages of 6 to 21 years and spreads all precise military and Fascist propaganda.
- xi. The Fascist Militia is another effective organization.
- xii. The Secret Police - OVRA - work in harmony with the propaganda system and the "Opera Volontaria Repressione Anti-Fascists" operates in hotels, restaurants, apartment houses, etc., as a counter-information agency. The Gestapo operates in considerable numbers.
- xiii. The entire population is organized into units for the dissemination of propaganda; for example: school children, university students, factories, industries, farms, banks, offices. The party leaders pass down all orders and items of propaganda through the heads of these units. All "spontaneous popular demonstrations" are ordered by higher authorities and unit leaders.

## ANNEX C

Japanese Psychological Warfare Agencies and Operations1. Intelligence Organization

Agencies of propaganda intelligence include the Information Bureau (Johobu) of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Intelligence Sections of the General Staff Office and the Naval Staff Board. The Department of Foreign Affairs is known to have maintained special public opinion observers in various foreign centers during recent years. The Japanese Army and Navy have long been interested in propaganda warfare and it is believed that the military and naval attaches included propaganda intelligence in their assignments. The Department of Overseas Affairs may also engage in intelligence of this sort.

2. General Propaganda

The Board of Information (Joho kyoku), an agency directly under the Cabinet, is the planning and coordinating agency for all general propaganda. When organized in 1940 it was made up of a President, a Vice-President, and 15 councillors. It employed 52 secretaries, 89 clerks and 1 engineer. On it were represented the War, Navy, Home, Communications, and Foreign Affairs Departments. It had five bureaus the third of which was authorized to deal with matters pertaining to information, publicity, and cultural work abroad.

The functions of the Board were broadly defined to include the gathering of information and publicity concerning matters forming the basis for the execution of national policies, control of the press and publications under the National General Mobilization Law, and guidance and supervision of publicity concerning national policies through motion pictures, phonograph records, theatrical performances, and other entertainments.

Imperial Headquarters, organized only in wartime, has Army and Navy Press Sections. These issue official announcements. They appear to be independent of the Board of Information.

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The Department of Foreign Affairs, on last report, had three units concerned with the dissemination of propaganda abroad: the Bureau of Cultural Works, the Board of Tourist Industry, and the Bureau of Information. The exact relationship between these agencies and the Board of Information is not known. Foreign service officials stationed abroad served as agents in the dissemination of material and in the employment of local press agents.

The Colonization Bureau (Takumu kyoku) of the Department of Overseas Affairs is responsible for the encouragement and control of organizations among the overseas Japanese and for propaganda to them.

The Japan Tourist Bureau is supported by the Department of Railways. In pre-war days it distributed sentimental literature, movies, and slides on Japan and cooperated with other agencies including the government-subsidized N.Y.K. in providing free or cheap tours to school teachers, writers, and business men.

The Department of Home Affairs exercises certain powers of press censorship while the Department of Communications controls telephone, telegraph, and wireless communication. The exact division of labor between these two agencies and the Board of Information is not known.

Domei, the official Japanese news agency, is nominally a private organization. It is largely supported by the Japan Broadcasting Association however, and is under government control (probably through the Board of Information). For years it has been the chief source of news for American and other foreign correspondents. Its news services are provided to Japanese papers throughout the world at nominal cost. Its excellent staff of foreign correspondents is no doubt

The Japan Broadcasting Association has a monopoly of broadcasting in Japan both short and long wave and for both local and foreign consumption. It is ostensibly private but is under government control, probably through the Board of Information, and is supported by legal charges levied on radio set owners.

The Society for International Cultural Relations (Kokusai bunka shinkokai) was supported partly by contributions from wealthy Japanese and partly by a Department of Foreign Affairs subvention. It has engaged extensively in international cultural propaganda of all sorts.

The International Students Association (Kokusai Gakusai Kyokai) gives advice, support and instruction to foreign students in Japan. In the past it has particularly cultivated American-born Japanese, and students from Latin America or Southeast Asia.

The Department of Education, in addition to controlling school texts throughout Japan, has in recent years been active in the development of courses of instruction in Japanese for residents in areas occupied by the Japanese.

The Japan-Thailand Association is typical of a considerable number of organizations sponsored by Japanese high in official or social circles for the cultivation of relations with other nations.

#### Subversive Operations Organization

Subversive operations are organized largely through numerous unofficial Japanese organizations, most important of which is the Black Dragon Society. Such work is guided, but probably not fully controlled, by Army and Navy Intelligence Sections.



The Black Dragon Society has in the past been active in collaboration with military authorities in both intelligence and sabotage. It is probably still so used. It is also useful for liaison with subversive elements of various nationalities, such as the Sakdalistas in the Philippines and the India Independence League of Japan. The private initiative of organizations such as the Black Dragon Society is to a considerable degree responsible for the long-range and large-scale organization of Japanese espionage and fifth-column activity in Southeast Asia.

3. Combat propaganda activities

- (a) Radio and loud-speaker appeals to opposing forces to lay down their arms.
- (b) Radio appeals to native peoples during the course of invasion to overthrow governors, to refuse to carry out scorched earth policies, and in general to cooperate with invading Japanese.
- (c) Radio shock tactics aimed at frightening the enemy into giving up.
- (d) Leaflets stressing Japanese strength and past success, past injustices of rulers to natives, with appeals to the latter to kill their oppressors.

A. SURVEY OF THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM

(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Germany faces the dual problem of maintaining domestic support for an aggressive war and undermining the will of the enemy to resist. On the home front, German propaganda has supplemented appeals to German desire for revenge and a place in the sun with appeals for support on the basis of fear of annihilation by the enemy in the event of a defeat. On the foreign front, the development of the military-diplomatic situation has forced Germany to abandon her plan of immobilizing the allies of the power to attack, and has compelled her to attempt instead to destroy the internal unity and external cohesion of the United Nations. A subsidiary objective, but one more likely to succeed, is the prevention of further gains of strength to the Allied cause from the few remaining neutrals. Meanwhile, her conquered countries must be urged to greater efforts.

The principal fronts of this psychological war-

2. European occupied countries
3. Northwest Africa
4. The Middle East, including Turkey
5. Latin America, especially the Argentine and Chile, the only Latin American countries which still have diplomatic relations with the Axis
6. Italy and Japan: Germany's allies
7. United Nations

(2) Effects desired

- (a) To convert enemy, conquered, and neutral countries to an acceptance of German ideals and domination.
- (b) To convince them of Germany's invincibility.
- (c) To instil a false sense of security.
- (d) To undermine their respect for their own democratic values.
- (e) To exploit internal political, social and ethnical cleavages.
- (f) To persuade them, with such tempting ideological concepts as the "New Order," that cooperation with Germany would be the most beneficial course of action,

B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation

(a) Strengths

1. Germany's greatest asset on the foreign

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front was the defeatism, pessimism,  
and pacifism bred in her enemies by the

---

bitter experiences of 1914-1919. This was likewise Germany's greatest domestic morale problem. By systematically building up a powerful military establishment and by conducting her foreign relations in an aggressive and self-confident manner, she was able both to reassure the German people and to demoralize her enemies.

2. The lack of confidence among the peoples of the world in the ability of the United States and her allies to attain the common objectives of the war as so far expressed.
3. Central geographical position, facilitating broadcasting, Intelligence, and subversive activities. Full use was made of these advantages long before the outbreak of hostilities.
4. Relatively long tradition of academic and military studies in problems of psychological warfare.
5. Rich traditions of German sociological and

the developing of a method  
for analyzing and manipulating them.

6. Abundance of technological skill, notably in radio.
7. Willingness of German leadership to accept new techniques: The anti-traditionalism of the Nazi ideology and the period of forced disarmament both stimulated the development of revolutionary methods.
8. Elements of the Nazi ideology appealing to large numbers of non-Germans: anti-Semitism, hostility to organized labor, anti-parliamentarism.
9. Ability of a dictatorship to operate on unvouchered funds.

(b): Weaknesses

1. Domestic opposition to Nazism: tradition of trade unionism; organized religion; strength of Communism before 1933.
2. German fatalism:  
  
This psychological factor renders the Germans docile and willing to contribute to the war effort in order to stave off defeat, but makes for instability in the face of reverses.
3. Abuse of propaganda and censorship, reducing public confidence in official utterances.

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4. Opposition of conquered peoples: accumulated hatred and hope of revenge; presence in Germany of foreign labor capable of subversive activity.
5. Limitations of the ideology, which offers a bright future only to German "racial comrades."
6. Conflicts of personal ambition which arise within and may undermine a totalitarian rule.

(2) Strength and weakness of the organizational set-up.

(a) Strength

Perhaps the greatest strength of the German apparatus for psychological warfare is the recognition of its critical importance by the Nazi leadership. No cost is spared in prosecuting psychological warfare. The centralized and hierarchical Nazi system of government permits quick action and maximum coordination of the many agencies engaged in psychological warfare.

(b) Weakness

The very elaborateness of the Nazi psychological warfare machinery works against it. As the war lengthens, the world at large, including perhaps some sectors of the German people, have had an

psychological warfare has been to awaken  
an attitude of hostility and distrust toward  
everything German which it will be difficult  
even for Nazi Germany to eradicate.