

ONI F-I

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE

DUTY ON FOREIGN POSTS

ONI F-I



CONFIDENTIAL

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
MAY 1948

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 917024

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington 25, D. C.

32B-1
JMC
In reply refer to:

31 October 1949

Op-322H2/mjc
A3-1/EN3-11
Serial 011675P32

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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THOS. B. INGLIS,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Intelligence.

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INTRODUCTION

This directive has been prepared to supplement and support the Naval Intelligence Manual—1947 (short title: ONI-19(A)). It is intended primarily for Naval Intelligence officers assigned to foreign posts, but it does not pretend to be complete. That is to say, a perusal of this directive alone will not provide the individual officer with all the information he will need on assuming his position as Naval Attaché, Naval Liaison Officer, or Naval Observer. In the first place, the directive has been prepared on the assumption that the reader will be familiar with ONI-19(A), for it has not been considered necessary or advisable to repeat information set forth in that manual. In the second place, it is impossible to include in so brief a document as this a full treatment of all the problems with which a Naval Intelligence officer on foreign station will be confronted. For example, information on such matters as disbursing, communications, and security can only be acquired through study and indoctrination at headquarters before the officer leaves for the field. All that this directive can do in such cases is to outline the general nature of the officer's duties and responsibilities and emphasize the necessity for acquiring the requisite detailed knowledge.

It is also obviously impossible for any individual officer to make himself a good foreign intelligence officer simply by reading this directive or any quantity of directives and manuals; these can only be the bases from which to build by actual experience. The most useful purpose which this publication can serve is to call attention to the magnitude of the task which confronts the foreign intelligence officer if he is to do a good job. Beyond that the directive can also serve as a guide and reference for Naval Attachés and other officers on foreign assignment in the performance of their general duties.

There can never be any substitute for thorough preparation in any line of endeavor, and the foreign intelligence field is no exception to this rule. There is no more justification for entrusting an unprepared officer with the command of a foreign intelligence post than there is for giving an unprepared officer command of a ship. It is hoped that eventually all Naval Intelligence officers will have the opportunity of obtaining professional training at the Navy Intelligence School, a part of the Navy's Postgraduate School program. In the meantime, the individual officer can and must prepare himself as thoroughly as possible. There are a number of publications of which he can avail himself, such as *Naval Intelligence* (NavPers 16047). Above all, every officer preparing to depart for a foreign post must consider it his duty to make the greatest possible use of the opportunities for learning his job provided during his temporary duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence. The wise officer will realize that good sense as well as duty dictates such a course of action, for it is much easier to get the answers by personal observation and consultation than by correspondence.

It cannot be overemphasized that the officer going into the field should spend as much time as possible with the officer in charge of the desk of the country to which he is to be assigned. He should become familiar with the material on hand and read reports that have been submitted and criticisms of these reports.

One more word of advice might well be offered: Intelligence is about as far from being a static field as it is possible to be. The officer on foreign duty must therefore constantly be aware of the necessity for professional improvement and for keeping abreast of developments—just as he must constantly seek to increase his basic knowledge of his profession and of the particular country or area in which he finds himself.

It should be noted that the Monograph Index Guide is being revised and brought up to date. This revision includes expected uniformity with similar guides of other United States Intelligence Agencies.

Chapter I

MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

1001. The Mission and Objectives of the Chief of Naval Intelligence are set forth in the Naval Intelligence Manual—1947 (ONI-19 (A)), art. 3101. (See also Navy Regulations, art. 425, ch. 6.) The supporting mission and objectives of the Foreign Branch (Op-32F) of the Office of Naval Intelligence are as follows:

Chief of Naval Intelligence.

MISSION: To administer, operate, and maintain the Foreign Branch; to collect and process information and to disseminate the intelligence derived therefrom, in order to keep responsible naval authorities informed of the war potentials and intentions of foreign nations and of the characteristics of actual or potential theaters of operation; to coordinate intelligence activities on foreign posts; and to support the Naval Attachés and other Naval Intelligence personnel on foreign posts.

Foreign Branch.

OBJECTIVES: 1. To exploit all sources to obtain information concerning the war potentials and intentions of foreign nations and about actual or potential theaters of operation which may be of naval interest.

2. To evaluate and correlate the information in subparagraph (1) above.

3. To supply intelligence on foreign powers and on theaters of operation as required by the policy, planning, operations, and logistics officers of the Naval Establishment.

4. To maintain working liaison, in matters pertaining to foreign intelligence with Army, State, and other Federal Intelligence Agencies.

5. To coordinate intelligence activities of Naval Attachés and other Naval Intelligence personnel on foreign posts.

6. To conduct or participate in joint intelligence activities as directed by the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

7. To advise on the selection and training of personnel for foreign posts and the Foreign Branch.

8. To conduct inspection of Naval Attachés and other Naval Intelligence foreign posts to insure adequacy to carry out the mission assigned.

9. To direct and coordinate the preparation of Naval Intelligence Directives and plans required for efficient operation of the Branch and its subordinate units.

1002. The Foreign Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence is divided into a number of sections and subsections (see chart), each of which has its own specific mission and objectives in support of the over-all mission of the Foreign Branch. (See ONI Confidential Directive, serial 0740P23, dated 20 Feb. 1946.)

Sections of Foreign Branch.

The following chart illustrates the division of world territory among the geographic sections broadly designated as:

F-11. Western Euro-Africa—Middle East Section.


F-12. Eastern Euro-Asia Section.

F-13. Latin America Section.

F-14. Far East Section.

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Chapter II

ORGANIZATION

2001. Naval Attachés, Naval Liaison Officers, and Naval Observers are an integral part of Naval Intelligence and are under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Intelligence (ONI-19 (A), art. 5001).

Attachés Part
of Naval
Intelligence.

2002. Naval Attachés are assigned by the Secretary of the Navy, and commissioned by the State Department to reside at the seats of the various Diplomatic Missions as the public interest demands. They are nominated by the Chief of Naval Intelligence (ONI-19 (A), art. 5002 (b)).

Appointment
of Attachés.

2003. Every Naval Attaché has a dual responsibility: he is ordered to report for duty to the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the country to which he is accredited; at the same time he is required to carry out the orders and directives of the Chief of Naval Intelligence. Thus, the Naval Attaché is at one and the same time a member of the staff of the senior diplomatic representative of the United States and a representative of the Navy Department, to which he reports directly.

Dual Responsi-
bility of
Attachés.

2004. Situations may arise in which the Naval Attaché will receive conflicting instructions because of the dual responsibility referred to above. In such cases the Naval Attaché will carry out the instructions of the Chief of the Mission but will report the circumstances fully to the Chief of Naval Intelligence (See ONI-19 (A), art. 5002.)

Conflicts.

2005. The Naval Attaché in his capacity as a member of the staff of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States has a diplomatic passport and corresponding diplomatic immunity. As a member of the personal staff of the Chief of the Mission he takes precedence with other members of the staff in accordance with Executive Orders currently in effect.

Diplomatic
Status of
Attachés.

2006. Naval Liaison Officers and Naval Observers, whose functions are identical for all practical purposes, are assigned to certain foreign areas as the representatives of the Navy Department in those areas. They are nominated by the Chief of Naval Intelligence. Both classes of officers are issued special passports, but they do not have the diplomatic immunity of a duly accredited Naval Attaché. Such officers do not report to the State Department Mission in the area to which they are assigned, but they are required to pay due deference to the senior State Department representative in the area. The relationship of Naval Liaison Officers and Naval Observers to the Naval Attaché accredited to the Government of the area will be prescribed by the Chief of Naval Intelligence as specific circumstances require.

Status of
Liaison
Officers and
Observers.

2007. It is the present policy of the Office of Naval Intelligence to designate the Naval Attaché as Naval Attaché for Air also. The designation as Naval Attaché for Air authorizes official relations with the foreign governmental agency controlling its aviation activities, whether that agency be under the Army or the Navy, or a separate Air Force (ONI-19 (A), art. 5011).

Naval Attaché
for Air.

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Attachés—
Supervision Of.

2008. Foreign posts are under the cognizance of the Foreign Branch and fall under the immediate administrative supervision of the Collection and Naval Attaché Section, Op-32F41 for intelligence purposes. (See art. 1002 above, especially subparagraph 12.) Personnel matters, finances and supplies, mails, dispatches, and the preparation of directives relating to administration of foreign posts are under the cognizance of the Administrative Branch. (See art. 3103 ONI-19 (A).)

Leaving Post.

2009. A Naval Attaché is empowered to write such temporary additional duty orders for himself and his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the performance of the duties of his office. The Naval Attaché (Observer or Liaison Officer) shall not, except in an emergency, leave the country or countries to which accredited without prior clearance from the Chief of Naval Intelligence. This precaution must be observed because (1) some reason may exist, unknown to the Attaché, which makes it necessary or advisable for him to remain at his post, or (2) there may be some mission for the Attaché to execute in the area he proposes to visit.

Leave of
Absence.

2010. Naval Attachés, Naval Liaison Officers and Naval Observers under the cognizance of CNI are authorized to grant leave to their naval personnel up to 1 month to be spent in the country or countries to which assigned or in the United States. Requests for such leave when it is to be spent in countries other than those to which accredited or the United States shall be addressed to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, naming the countries to be visited. CNI will obtain necessary clearance from the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Commanding Officers of ONI foreign posts will submit their requests for leave to the Chief of Naval Intelligence for approval. Submission of the request will imply that the approval of the Chief of Mission has been previously obtained.

Travel Orders.

2011. Requests for authority or travel orders to visit another country on official business should include sufficient information as to the purpose of the visit to enable the CNI to make a considered decision.

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Chapter III

QUALIFICATIONS AND INDOCTRINATION

Section I

GENERAL QUALIFICATIONS

3101. It is stated in ONI-19(A), art. 5004, that "the Mission of Naval Attachés, Naval Liaison Officers, and Naval Observers is to represent the United States in a thorough and creditable manner, and to procure and to report all information and intelligence obtainable and of value to the United States." This statement in itself makes it obvious that a good Foreign Intelligence officer must of necessity possess considerable ability, tact, resourcefulness, and initiative as well as a thorough knowledge of the area in which he is stationed.

Qualifications.

3102. Bearing in mind that the primary function of all Naval Intelligence personnel is to collect naval intelligence, it is obvious that Naval Attachés, Liaison Officers, and Observers should have as thorough a knowledge as possible of their own Navy and of naval matters in general. Such a knowledge of naval matters will be less important in certain areas than in others, but it can never be dispensed with entirely, since the Naval Attaché is the Naval Adviser on naval questions to other members of the Mission.

Knowledge of Naval Matters.

3103. Ideally a knowledge of naval affairs should be combined with a thorough understanding of the language, history, customs, and culture of the area in which a Naval Intelligence officer is stationed. All personnel not already familiar with the language of the country to which they are accredited must remedy this shortcoming, and the Naval Attaché shall report on their progress in his semiannual report (see ONI-19(A), art. 5027). Similarly it is assumed that all such personnel will make themselves more useful by acquiring an understanding of the country or area in which they find themselves, for such an understanding not only opens new horizons to the intelligence officer but is of great value in enabling him to evaluate the information he acquires.

Language Proficiency.

3104. The capabilities of any intelligence officer can be utilized to the fullest degree only if his general qualifications are carefully furthered and supplemented by systematic training in intelligence duties. That is to say, in the intelligence field, just as in any other, a considerable body of knowledge and experience has been built up, particularly during the last war. It stands to reason that a Naval Attaché or Liaison Officer will be far more valuable to the Navy after he has acquired this professional knowledge. That is why the Postgraduate School of Intelligence has been established at Washington, D. C. Eventually, it is hoped, all Naval Intelligence officers will be graduates of this school. (See ONI-19(A), ch. VII, sec. 1, and art. 3207 of this directive.) In the meantime all intelligence officers should continually strive for self-improvement.

Training In Intelligence Duties.

Specialization.

3105. The ideal Naval Attaché or Liaison Officer then is (1) a competent naval officer who has had specialized training in intelligence duties and (2) an expert on the area in which he is stationed.

Personal
Contacts.

3106. ~~Personal relationships play an even more important part in the work~~ of the intelligence officer than they do in most enterprises. It should not be surprising, therefore, to find that the ability to make friends and to get along with all kinds of people is an important qualification for a Naval Attaché or Liaison Officer. It is often easier to obtain information informally through personal contacts than to submit a request through official channels. The broader the acquaintanceship, the greater is the opportunity for obtaining useful information. (See ch. VI on sources of information.) However, it is well to bear in mind that it is possible to go to extremes in this respect: Some Attachés during the war became so concerned with their social duties and "responsibilities" that they had little time to spare for their intelligence duties. It has been observed that United States Naval Attachés and their assistants on foreign posts frequently devote considerable time to the cultivation of United States citizens residing abroad. While the Navy representatives should be acquainted with United States citizens abroad it is equally if not more important that they cultivate and fraternize with nationals of the country to which they are accredited, and representatives of other foreign countries, so as to establish appropriate channels through which information and intelligence may be derived. The cultivation of acquaintances abroad should not be confined to the "cocktail circuit" of the diplomatic set but should include, if possible, representatives of the professions, of business, of industry, and of the trades—including the barber, the postman, the bus driver, and even the janitor. If proper restraint and tact are exercised valuable informal friendships among these groups can often be formed without impropriety or loss of dignity.

Needs for
Successful
Intelligence
Officer.

3107. A number of other general qualifications for Naval Intelligence personnel on foreign duty could be mentioned, but most of them are—or should be—obvious. A few were mentioned in article 3101; others include patience, thoroughness, judgment, imagination, and administrative ability. What it amounts to is that the qualities which make for success in most lines of endeavor are required in even larger measure for success in foreign intelligence work.

Section 2

INDOCTRINATION

3201. Article 5028 of ONI-19 (A) states that Attachés will be given at least 1 month's temporary duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence for the purpose of indoctrination prior to proceeding to their posts. It must be emphasized that the Attaché should take full advantage of the opportunities provided at this time to acquaint himself with the nature of his duties and responsibilities and to supplement his professional qualifications. The indoctrination period is *not* to be considered as an opportunity only for the officer to settle his personal affairs prior to leaving the country or as a period during which routine items are crossed off a check list.

Indoctrination
in ONI.

3202. The indoctrination program for officers ordered to foreign posts will be flexible enough to suit the requirements of the particular post, of the particular officer, and of the duties which the officer will be assuming. The officer with a considerable experience in the foreign intelligence field and a knowledge of the area to which he is going will obviously need less indoctrination than the officer to whom the work and the area are new. Officers designated as Special Disbursing Agents will require special training (see art. 5204, this directive), and officers with no experience in Naval Communications will need to acquire a thorough understanding of their duties in this respect (see arts. 5305 and 5306, this directive).

Disbursing and
Communication
Instruction.

3203. The most important phases of specialized training and preparation for officers going to a foreign post will center about the Geographic Desk in the Foreign Branch which covers the country to which the officer will be assigned. Except as individual officers are qualified by previous experience or training, which obviates the need for certain training phases, the indoctrination will cover strategic intelligence, the duties of the specific billet, the organization of commands and staffs in the field, the current intelligence situation and requirements, and current administrative problems. In addition, officers should become familiar with the functions of the Geographic Desk. The Desk can also provide useful advice on such matters as living conditions in the area of interest.

Training for
Specific
Country.

3204. The responsibility for the adequacy of the indoctrination provided by the various Branches of the Office of Naval Intelligence rests with the respective Branch Heads. The Administrative Branch (Op-32C) is responsible for the general administration and coordination of the indoctrination program. The Foreign Branch (Op-32F) is responsible for the specialized training and preparation of foreign duty officers by the various "F" sections.

Branch Heads
Responsibility.

3205. The indoctrination program for foreign duty officers will, subject to considerations of flexibility as indicated in article 3202, be handled as follows:

Training for
Foreign Duty
Officers.

1. Op-32C will

(A) Exercise administrative control, provide guidance in administrative matters, and schedule necessary calls.

(B) Provide general indoctrination covering orientation in the purposes of indoctrination duty and in the importance of acquiring a sound background before reporting to the ultimate duty station, and initial indoctrination in the organization and functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(C) Coordinate and monitor the indoctrination program by maintaining liaison with the branches and sections concerned and by keeping in touch with all officers undergoing indoctrination. Op-32C will also periodically review and report on the adequacy of the indoctrination program.

(D) Provide specific assistance and training through

Op-32C-21.

(1) Op-32C-21 (Personnel)—passport and visa arrangements, transportation information, medical requirements, processing of orders, etc.

Op-32C-22.

(2) Op-32C-22 (Supplies and Accounts)—financial arrangements, training of Special Disbursing Agents in the Disbursing School (see art. 5204), etc.

Op-32C-23.

(3) Op-32C-23 (Mail and Files)—handling of mail and dispatches, use of pouches, the files system.

Op-32C-3.

(4) Op-32C-3 (Training)—indoctrination in over-all organization and functions of the Office of Naval Intelligence and of the Administrative Branch, providing of directives, manuals, plans, etc., for study purposes.

2. Op-32F

Op-32F-1.

(A) Op-32F-1 (appropriate Geographic Desk) will provide training in

(1) Strategic intelligence of the area to which the officer is under assignment. This will involve the preparation of a well-balanced study program including carefully selected books, articles, studies, reports, and specific references to the Monograph. The following general categories will be included:

(a) Political: Interests of foreign powers which may conflict with those of the United States.

(b) Economic: The war potential or capabilities, strength and weaknesses of a foreign power, including finance, industry, commerce, agriculture, and transportation.

(c) Geographic elements: Topographic, hydrographic, and meteorological data.

(e) Naval Power: The organization, strength, disposition, readiness, doctrines, command, policy, strategy, tactics, weapons, ship and aircraft characteristics, procurement of personnel, supplies, and material, training and bases of the Navy of a foreign power; the capability of that power's Merchant Marine to support or aid the Navy, the other Armed Forces, and the National Economy; and the capabilities of the Armed Forces, including the Air Force, to support or assist the Navy or to interfere with United States naval operations.

(f) Personalities: Data on the personalities in a position

to direct the foreign policy of the war-making facilities of a foreign power and those who could be influenced to our advantage.

(g) Sociological: Political, ideological, and ethnic forces within a foreign country, psychological characteristics, castes, education, propaganda, etc.

(2) Mission and objectives and the practical means of accomplishing them—i. e., the duties of the particular billet. The officer will be furnished an outline of the structure and procedures of the organization to which he is reporting together with a comprehensive study file. This will include, for example, case studies, illustrations of report forms, samples of good and inferior reports, descriptions of the use to which material is put in the Office of Naval Intelligence, illustrated by selected reports and studies based on the type of intelligence which the officer is expected to provide.

(3) Organization of commands and staffs with which the officer will be in contact—i. e., representatives of other agencies of the United States Government and organizations of foreign powers represented in the area. In this field, every effort will be made again to equip the officer with the practical working knowledge needed for the collection of intelligence in his specific billet—the actual methods to be employed, the personalities who will be encountered, and the problems which must be faced.

(4) Current intelligence situation. The officer will receive a detailed briefing supported by pertinent reports which will provide him with the necessary current estimate and at the same time afford him an outline and illustration of evaluation techniques.

(5) Current administrative problems within the organization or post to which the officer is reporting.

(6) Organization and functions of the Geographic Desk with relation to the rest of the Department. Whenever possible, the officer will be given the opportunity to take a turn at the actual working duties of the desk.

(7) Conditions in the area to which the officer is assigned which might affect personal arrangements: Climate, cost of living, currency and exchange regulations, living accommodation, etc.

(B) Op-32F-2 will brief officers on

Op-32F-2.

(1) Technical intelligence they are expected to develop or for which they are to be alert.

(2) Means of obtaining the desired intelligence. Good and bad technique of securing information should be discussed.

(3) Priority to be given to the collection of various types of technical intelligence.

(4) Technical missions working in the area assigned.

(5) The organization and functions of F-2.

(C) Op-32F-41 (Collection and Naval Attachés) and the appropriate "area" subsection of F-41 will brief officers on procedures and requirements and give such special instructions as necessary.

Op-32F-41.

3. Op-32D
 - (A) Op-32D-1 (Investigations) and D-4 (Sabotage, Espionage, and Counterintelligence) will
 - (1) Brief officers on the counterintelligence of powers in the area to which they are assigned—the plans, procedures, and personalities engaged in espionage, sabotage, and subversion which might be directed against the United States Navy, including espionage which such powers might employ against representatives of the United States Navy in that area.
 - (2) Outline the organization and functions of each section.
 - (B) Op-32D-2 (Security) will brief officers on
 - (1) Policy on releases, disclosures, and exchanges of information. (See art. 5015, ONI-19(A)).
 - (2) The information which the United States Navy has made available to the power concerned.
 - (3) The organization and functions of the section.
 - (C) Op-32D-3 (Contact Register) will (a) brief officers on purposes and use of Contact Register; (b) explain the standing directive which provides this section with names of United States citizens returning to the United States (see art. 4012 of this directive).
4. Op-32V (Air Branch) will
 - (A) Brief officers on the type of information desired by V Branch from the field.
 - (B) Military aviation in the area.
 - (C) The organization and functions of V Branch and related specialized air activities.
 - (D) Schedule calls at specialized air intelligence activities as necessary.
 - (E) Provide specialized instruction for officers designated as Naval Attachés or Assistant Naval Attachés for Air.
5. Op-32L (Liaison) will
 - (A) Advise on aiguillettes, apparel, and visiting cards, including those to be engraved in foreign languages. Handbook on social usage and protocol, dated 25 May 1946, should be followed.
 - (B) Arrange appointments at foreign embassies or legations, State and War Departments, and other calls deemed necessary.
 - (C) Advise on diplomatic and social protocol.
6. Op-32Y-1 will provide supplementary monograph information.
7. Officers will also call at the following activities outside of the Office of Naval Intelligence:
 - (A) Op-20K-21 for instruction in the use of codes and ciphers, particularly those to be found at a specific post (see arts. 5305 and 5306 this directive).
 - (B) Marine Corps, G-2, for amphibious intelligence, order of battle, and G-2 organization.
 - (C) The ONI-Military Liaison Officer will
 - (1) Advise on the organization of Army and Air Force Intelligence.

(2) Arrange necessary courtesy or instruction calls on Army and Air Department intelligence personnel and activities.

(D) Central Intelligence Agency, for information regarding its operations, and particularly the cooperation to be extended its representatives on foreign posts. (Calls arranged through Op-32Y-15.)

(E) The ONI State Department Liaison officer will arrange necessary courtesy or instruction calls on appropriate State Department personnel and activities.

3206. The indoctrination program outlined above can be modified somewhat after the Postgraduate Intelligence School commences to turn out regular classes of specialists. However, some indoctrination will always be necessary to acquaint outgoing officers with current situations and problems and with administrative duties.

Post Graduate
Intelligence
School.

3207. The United States Navy Intelligence School, a part of the United States Naval Postgraduate School, located for the present at Washington, D. C., was established in March 1946. Its purpose is to provide Naval Intelligence with a constant flow of well-trained intelligence specialists capable of stepping into ONI, foreign posts, District Intelligence Offices, or operational intelligence billets.

Naval Intelli-
gence School.

A second aim is to furnish skilled instruction in modern languages to members of the school and to other applicants from within the Naval Establishment and from other government agencies.

The curriculum of the school is divided into four main parts:

(1) The first phase lasts about 6 months and consists of 26 courses averaging a week each in length. These courses are designed to give the student a comprehensive knowledge of strategic, operational, amphibious, and air intelligence and of such related subjects as hydrography, cartography, and meteorology. A considerable amount of time is spent in the study of foreign relations, and the intelligence organizations and armed forces of other countries are examined in some detail.

(2) The second phase consists of a tour of sea duty lasting about 10 weeks. During this tour the students get practical sea experience at the jobs they have been studying, including operational and amphibious intelligence and a short tour in submarines.

(3) The third phase is designed to qualify each student in some modern foreign language. The program is extremely concentrated and varies in length with the language studied. The student is expected to devote some fourteen hours a day to his language studies until he reaches proficiency.

(4) The final phase consists of a thorough study of the area in which the language the student has chosen is spoken. This phase lasts about two months and entails a study of the history, geography, politics, and culture of the area.

Chapter IV

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Naval
Attaché—
Mission of.

4001. The duties and responsibilities of Naval Attachés, Naval Liaison Officers, and Naval Observers are set forth in ONI-19 (A), chapter V. These duties will not be repeated here, but it might be well to call attention to the following extract: "The Naval Attaché is charged with the responsibility for promptly forwarding such information and intelligence as is required to support fully the Mission and Objectives of the Chief of Naval Intelligence" (ONI-19 (A), art. 5016).

Naval Attaché
Dual Responsi-
bility.

4002. It has previously been noted that the Naval Attaché has a dual responsibility (art. 2003), but it must always be borne in mind that "his paramount duty is that of naval intelligence, in the performance of which he is an integral part of Naval Intelligence and is under the direction of the Chief of Naval Intelligence" (ONI-19 (A), art. 5005 (a)).

Naval Attaché
Primary Task.

4003. The primary task of a Naval Attaché, Naval Liaison Officer, or Naval Observer is, then, to collect, evaluate insofar as it is possible at his end, and transmit naval intelligence on the country or countries to which he is accredited. This task is so important that it should never be relegated to secondary consideration in favor of other miscellaneous duties. The Attaché is a collector and evaluator of all information which might affect the plans and strategy of the United States Navy. Consequently, a continuous flow of intelligence is necessary on the navy of the country for which he is responsible, its construction program and repair facilities, its professional efficiency, its leaders and personnel, harbors, port facilities, including fueling, repairing, refitting and available supplies, coastal terrain, bases, lines of communication, and other related items.

Information
Other than
Naval Intelli-
gence.

4004. It must always be remembered, however, that other matters than strictly naval intelligence may well have their effects on the ability of the United States Navy to perform its allotted mission. Therefore, while the primary mission of the Naval Attaché is the procurement of information and intelligence of paramount naval interest, the Attaché should be cognizant of such matters as political and economic developments, the personalities and policies of Government and opposition leaders, and the resources, transportation facilities, and communication systems of the country. Reports of interest relating to such matters, submitted by other agencies of the United States, should be cited, by appropriate references, to the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

Other Duties.

4005. The routine nonintelligence duties of a Naval Attaché in time of peace are numerous and time-consuming. For example, he performs duties of protocol and executes requests from the Chief of the Mission to which he is attached; he receives visiting United States naval vessels, arranges recreation for officers and men, and supervises the procurement of stores and provisions; he personally codes and decodes messages; he acts as disbursing and supply officer; and he handles general administrative reports. Most of these duties are also performed by Naval Liaison Officers and Naval Observers.

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4006. In view of the multiplicity of these routine duties and for a number of other reasons—every Naval Attaché, Liaison Officer, and Observer should set up an Intelligence Record. This Record should include, but need not be restricted to, (1) a statement of the policy evolved for his particular office, (2) the official relations maintained by the office, (3) the intelligence reports which warrant regular repetition, (4) the sources of information which have been developed, and (5) a check-list or schedule by which regularly recurring intelligence reports, publications, and the like are submitted.

Naval Attaché's
Intelligence
Record.

4007. There are other important reasons why such an Intelligence Record should be maintained. First of all, it must be remembered that while the *position* of Naval Attaché, Observer, or Liaison Officer is subject to regular, periodic relief in terms of individual officers, the *purpose, policy, and objectives* of the activity should be consistent, specifically planned, and of a long-range nature. Second, the policies and objectives of different offices in the field may vary considerably. That is to say, while one office may find it advisable to concentrate its efforts on collecting one type of intelligence, another office may find that it can best serve the interests of the Naval Establishment by emphasizing quite a different type of intelligence. It becomes very necessary, then, for each office to have a well-thought-out Intelligence Record, for only in this way can continuity be maintained despite turnover of personnel.

Continuity of
Intelligence
Record.

4008. The policy for the individual Naval Attaché's office will be shaped by a number of factors, including, for example, (1) the relative importance to the United States Navy of the area to which he is going, (2) discussions had and oral instructions received during the course of his temporary duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence before he leaves for the field, (3) the experience of his predecessors, (4) his own experience after arriving at his post, and (5) the monthly Statements of Intelligence Needs emanating from the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Naval Attaché
Policy.

4009. It is incumbent upon the Naval Attaché to work in the closest possible conjunction not only with the Chief of Mission but also with other intelligence representatives, chief amongst whom will be the Military and Air Attachés. This correlation of activity will obviate much duplication of effort among agencies whose ultimate goal is the same—to satisfy the intelligence needs of the United States Government. To that end a joint agreement has been concluded between the Army and the Navy for the collection and reporting of intelligence in the field. The subjects allotted to the Naval Attaché and the Military Attaché respectively are set forth in ONI-19 (A), article 5014, which further specifies that subjects outside these categories will be allotted by agreement and that the two Attachés will "consult frequently to insure that each is meeting fully with the requirements of the other's department" in reporting on the subjects allotted to him. Article 5013 of ONI-19 (A) further directs that this correlation of activity will be implemented by procurement of adjacent office space, establishment of a joint intelligence library, exchange of pertinent data, and "such other measures as may be directed or found to be expedient." Article 5007 of ONI-19 (A) stresses also the obligation of the Naval Attaché to cooperate in coordination measures and notes that this coordination will be the responsibility of the senior United States representative.

Relationship
with Military
and Air
Attachés.

Other pertinent articles in ONI-19 (A) include 3202, 6013, 6014, 12-001, and 12-005.

Comment on
Foreign Policy.

~~4010. It is inadvisable for naval officers on foreign posts to make any comment, either in conversation or in unofficial or personal correspondence, on the wisdom or effect of domestic or foreign policies currently being pursued by the United States Government or any responsible official thereof. Similarly, Naval Attachés will scrupulously avoid unofficial criticism or endorsement of the policy being pursued by the government of the country to which accredited. Any comment of this nature, when deemed to be of intelligence value, shall be made the subject of official correspondence.~~

Naval Attaché
Reports.

4011. The specific reports for which a Naval Attaché is responsible are limited to (1) intelligence reports, forwarded on form NNI-96, and (2) semi-annual reports of an informal nature acquainting the Chief of Naval Intelligence with the activities of the preceding 6 months. The form and content of the semiannual reports are discussed in article 5017 of ONI-19 (A); the preparation of intelligence reports on form NNI-96 is discussed in article 5304 of this directive. In addition, the Naval Attaché will be called upon from time to time to supply specific information for the Chief of Naval Intelligence. Article 7402 of ONI-19 (A) also notes that foreign posts will submit on form NNI-96 and by dispatch weekly reports on ship movements. This may be considered to be in abeyance unless an individual post has specific orders to continue such reports. Attention is further invited to article 5018 of ONI-19 (A) which indicates another item of specific information required: Periodic reports on newspapers and journals of the country to which the attaché is accredited.

Contact
Register.

4012. Naval Intelligence activities abroad will also keep the Office of Naval Intelligence informed concerning United States citizens now resident in the United States, or about to return, whose experience abroad has given them specialized knowledge of a foreign country or area. Lists of such persons will be of use to the Office of Naval Intelligence for inclusion in Contact Register files. Officers on foreign duty will review their files once a month to keep such lists up to date. Information of this nature should include:

1. Name of the individual.
2. Countries or areas known.
3. Occupation while abroad.
4. Expected port of arrival in the United States.
5. Expected date of arrival in the United States.
6. Estimated length of stay in the United States.
7. Home or business address.
8. Other pertinent facts.

Report on
Plans to
Expand for
War Needs.

4013. The duties of a Naval Attaché in wartime will obviously be far greater than in normal times, and it should be recalled that every Naval Attaché is required to include in his semiannual report a statement of the "status of preparation of plans to expand facilities of office to meet war or limited emergency requirements in accordance with intelligence directives" (ONI-19 (A), article 5017 (a) (3)).

4014. Attention is particularly invited to article 5025 in ONI-19 (A), which outlines the procedures to be followed by Naval Attachés in the event of strained relations or war. In connection with the preparation of plans for expansion, it should be noted that Naval Attachés are required to keep a register of United States Naval and Marine Corps Retired or Reserve Officers in their area and also to acquaint themselves with "dependable and loyal American citizens" resident in the area with a view to making use of their service in the event of an emergency.

Register of
United States
Citizens in
Area.

4015. No over-all statement of what will be required of foreign posts in general in the event of war or emergency can be made, for the requirements and needs will vary from post to post. However, each Naval Attaché can and should prepare his own estimate of the measures which would be necessary to put his office on a war footing. It is realized that even this approach cannot be completely realistic, for it is impossible to know in advance which area of the world is likely to be a center of activity in the event of war. Nevertheless, the experience of the past war was that foreign posts of Naval Intelligence were called upon and might again be called upon in event of hostilities to assume numerous tasks not ordinarily performed in time of peace. These duties included, among others:

Estimates of
Measures to
put Office on
War Footing.

(1) Liaison with headquarters of combat units in the area.
(2) Coordination of intelligence activities with other agencies, American and Allied, in the area. A good example would be the Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies which were established in several theaters during the war. For intelligence purposes the Naval Attaché sometimes found himself subordinated to the commanding officer of the JICA in his area.

Coordinate
Intelligence.

(3) Supervision of United States Merchant Marine traffic in the area, including routing, the maintaining of position plots, briefing of masters on enemy movements, checking and reporting on subversive activities of crew members, and so on.

(4) Assisting United States Navy Armed Guard crews, which included such matters as disbursing, obtaining supplies, arranging for medical and dental care, transferring and replacing personnel, arranging for ordnance repairs, and so on.

(5) Taking care of and securing reports from Navy (and often merchant marine and commercial air) survivors.

(6) Handling a greatly increased communications load. In the past war, for example, War Shipping Administration dispatches were handled by foreign posts in addition to their own augmented traffic.

4016. It is the responsibility of Naval Attachés to maintain close working liaison with other United States Naval Attachés in neighboring countries, and to include such Attachés in the dissemination of intelligence material produced locally of mutual interest. These relations are fostered and improved through conferences of Naval Attachés which are held annually, when practicable, but cooperation is best accomplished through the efforts of each Attaché in assisting and supporting his neighboring "opposite numbers" in every way possible consistent with protocol and existing communication facilities.

Relations With
NA's in Neigh-
boring Coun-
tries.

Relations With
Operational
Commanders.

4017. Article 5010 of the Naval Intelligence Manual—1947 is quoted below for compliance:

"The Navy Department has repeatedly laid down the principle that a Naval Force Commander on his own station cannot issue an order to a Naval Attaché. This, of course, is intended in no way to diminish or handicap complete cooperation, which should exist between Force Commanders and Naval Attachés. Where permanent United States Naval Forces are maintained in foreign waters, the Naval Attachés assigned to the countries concerned will forward direct to the Commander of such forces copies of their intelligence reports as may be helpful or required."

Naval Attachés will broaden their interpretation of the foregoing instructions to include dissemination of intelligence reports direct to Commanders of United States Naval Forces temporarily stationed in their respective areas whose missions would be aided by such reports.

Chapter V

ADMINISTRATION

Section 1

PERSONNEL

5101. In time of peace the personnel assigned to most foreign posts will be severely limited in number. The officer complement of the average foreign duty station today consists of the Naval Attaché and one Assistant Naval Attaché. Enlisted personnel have, in many cases, been entirely replaced by civilians. This throws a greater load on the officer complement, for not only will there be no communications and disbursing officers, but even trained Navy enlisted personnel will be unavailable for such tasks.

Limited Office Personnel.

5102. Under such conditions as those described above, it will generally be necessary for the Attaché to concentrate on intelligence and on the necessary protocol, leaving as much of the administrative work as possible to his executive officer, who will probably also be the Special Disbursing Agent for the post. In larger offices the administrative load can be distributed more equitably to allow all officers to participate more fully in what should be their chief function, the collecting of information.

Delegate Administrative Duties When Possible.

5103. It is highly desirable for each post to maintain as much continuity as possible. This will be accomplished to a certain extent by the Naval Attaché's Intelligence Record (see arts. 4006-4007), but it is particularly important for an officer who is being detached to spend some time with his successor. It is even more important that the Attaché and his executive officer should not be relieved within 3 months of one another. This overlapping will permit outgoing officers to assist their successors to make the necessary contacts and to acquaint them with sources of information and the general policy of the office. Similarly, at least 2 weeks should be allowed for each specific turnover of enlisted or civilian personnel.

Continuity of Purposes When Personnel Change.

5104. The use of civilian personnel presents additional problems for the Naval Attaché, for he must familiarize himself with the regulations governing their pay, leave, transportation, and similar matters. For this purpose each post will be supplied with a copy of the Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions (NCPI-NAVEXOS-P-122), but it is advisable for the Attaché to learn as much as possible about such matters before taking up his assignment.

Civilian Personnel.

5105. Foreign posts will also make use of natives of the country in various capacities—as office help, receptionist, stenographer, chauffeur, watchman. Extreme care should be taken in the selection of such personnel and the tasks to which they are assigned. Precautions should be taken to insure that alien personnel do not have access to classified information. The nature of the precautions will vary from post to post, but there should be no laxness under any circumstances (see art. 5405, this directive).

Employing Natives.

Section 2

FINANCE

- Funds.** 5201. General information concerning funds for the operation of foreign posts will be found in ONI-19 (A), chapter VII, section 2, especially articles 7203-7209, inclusive.
- Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual.** 5202. Every foreign post will be supplied with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual. Particular attention is invited to the section entitled "Disbursing Instructions for Naval Attachés."
- Naval Allotments.** 5203. Attention is further invited to Navy Allotment Procedures (NAVEXOS-O-487) of 26 June 1947, issued by the Office of the Fiscal Director, Navy Department, and to CNI letter Op-32C22/erd, L10-5/EN3-11, serial 11323P32, dated 25 July 1947, subject: "Status of Allotment Reports (NAVEXOS-2675) and Allotment Reports for Management (NAVEXOS-2676) 1 monthly submission of by Naval Intelligence Posts."
- Disbursing.** 5204. Every officer who is assigned to duty as Special Disbursing Agent at a foreign post (see art. 5022, ONI-19 (A)), will, if possible, spend 2 weeks in the Disbursing School of the Office of Naval Intelligence before proceeding to his station.

Section 3

CORRESPONDENCE

- Correspondence.** 5301. The general subject of correspondence is treated in ONI-19 (A), chapter VII, section 3.
- Reports Other Than on Form NNI-96.** 5302. Attention is invited to article 5017 (b) (4) in ONI-19 (A), which states that all professional information will be sent in from foreign posts on Form NNI-96. An exception to this rule is noted in article 7321 (b) of the same manual, which states that letters may be used in place of NNI-96 only "where the information is of such grave significance that extremely limited distribution is essential." It should also be noted, however, that routine forwarding of publications and the like, and of newspaper articles or other material not actually reproduced in full should be accomplished in general by means of a covering letter. If such material is included in an intelligence report on Form NNI-96, an abstract of the enclosure should be provided so that the report will not be meaningless to recipients of the report without enclosure.
- Use of Dispatch.** 5303. Nothing in the preceding article should be construed to preclude the forwarding of information of an urgent nature by dispatch.

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5304. (a) A sample of Form NNI-96 properly prepared with a brief summary follows:

OPNAV-N. I. 96-1943 (Rev.)

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

CLASSIFICATION

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(Reference to this report must specify Serial No., Place and Date.)

Serial: 3-C-47 at Roto, Bersavia. Date: 25 October, 1947.
(Start new series each year, i. e., 1-43, 2-43.)

B. I. D. No. 1000.1900.

From: U. S. Naval Attaché. Monograph Index Guide No. 104-200.
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person) Make separate report for each main title. See O. N. I. Index Guide.

Reference: My serial 26-C-47, of 2 April, 1947.

(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source: Local, attaché of friendly power. Evaluation: B-2.

(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—
Identify when practicable, etc.)

A-1 to F-O etc.
Ref.: A8/EN 3-10; SER. 4312416-11 18-42

Subject: Bersavia, Merchant Marine, Subversive Penetration of.

(Nation reported on) (Main title as per Index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF. (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

This report indicates the progress made, during the interval since Reference report, by subversive groups—directed by subversive agents—in undermining the morale of Bersavia merchant shipping position, at home and abroad. Important for the United States is evidence that subversive agents and couriers are gaining admittance to this country by means of forged papers, and that they are physically transported on Bersavia merchant vessels.

1. etc., etc.

Use this form for page 1 (original and copies). Use the 8 by 13 inches plain fold-over as supplied for additional pages. Forward to ONI an original and a "Hectograph Master" copy. Officers preparing and those forwarding reports sign the last page of original and retained file copy of reports only. Submit copies of clippings, sketches, etc., when practical. If practicable, prepare sketches on "Hectograph Master," or in a form suitable for black and white reproductions.

Distribution By Originator: NA Slobovia, NA Glocamoora, EMB Shangri-La.

Routing space below for use in O. N. I.

CLASSIFICATION

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 917024

Reports on Form NNI-96

Preparation of
NNI-96
Reports

In preparing reports on NNI-96 the style should be concise and readable; brevity is a virtue, prolixity a vice. Place yourself in the position of the receiver. Bear in mind always that each Attaché report has to be read, classified, analyzed, and filed and that hundreds of similar reports are flowing into the Office of Naval Intelligence at the same time. Be complete and accurate and never take anything for granted. If there are gaps in your information so state in your report.

Some information received will be entirely false and built up purposely to deceive. Much will be contradictory. The good intelligence report writer must be able to sift facts from rumors. Background information on a country is invaluable; logistics, professional efficiency of its leaders, morale and discipline of the personnel both civilian and military are among the many important subjects the Office of Naval Intelligence needs. The successful intelligence officer is on duty 24 hours a day. The facts should be followed with their significance and deductions drawn from them in connection with other intelligence already on hand, so as to assist the Office of Naval Intelligence in arriving at correct conclusions (NAVPERS 16047 should be referred to frequently in this connection).

Form NNI-96
Entries.

(a) Form NNI-96, has spaces provided for the following entries:

(1) *Classification*: Indicate whether the report is Restricted, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret, or Unclassified. Repeat at bottom of page at place indicated and on each subsequent page.

(2) *Serial*: Unclassified, Restricted, and Confidential reports will be taken together and numbered serially, commencing from 1 January of each year (Example: 1-48). Reports classified Secret will be handled in a separate series, starting 1-S-48, etc. Reports classified Top Secret will be handled in a third separate series beginning 1-TS-48, for example. It is of great importance that there be no omission or duplication of numbers in the series.

(3) *Place of origin* will be entered in the space following the word "at" (Example: Athens, Greece).

(4) *Date*: This will be the date on which the report was prepared.

(5) *From*: Enter originator of the report here (Example: United States Naval Attaché).

(6) *Monograph Index Guide No.*: Here are placed the Index Guide numerical combinations which identify the subject matter covered in the report. More than one number may be used if more than one subject is covered, although it must always be remembered that major topics should be made the subjects of separate reports. In addition to the MIG number, the proper BID (Army Basic Intelligence Directive) number should also be entered in this space. (Example: 104-200; BID 3121.0600).

(7) *Reference*: Here enter, in accordance with Navy correspondence practice, a complete reference to any previous correspondence which requested the information contained in the report or which would be of value in conjunction with the report. If several references are required, enter "See below" in this space and put the references in the space provided for the brief of the report.

(8) *Source*: Here indicate the source from which the information contained in the report was obtained (Example: "Personal observation;" "Greek Ministry of Information;" etc.).

(9) *Evaluation*: Here enter the appropriate symbols (A-2, F-O, etc.) in accordance with the standard list to be found in ONI-19 (A), article 9007.

(10) *Subject*: To fill in this space follow the instructions on the NNI-96 Form (Example: GREECE—Government—Formation of New Cabinet).

(11) *Enclosures*: If enclosures are forwarded with the report, they should be listed in the space provided for the brief. Each enclosure should be carefully labeled (Example: Enclosure (A) to NA Athens report 102-S-48).

(12) Briefs or summaries are required for all reports which run more than one page in length and for any report the nature of whose contents is not clearly indicated by the title. A brief must summarize the important points of a report and must not simply consist of a selection of words or phrases from each paragraph.

(b) The following procedures should be followed in preparing NNI-96 master dittos:

(1) In order to insure that legible copies will be obtained, the ditto carbon accompanying the Form NNI-96 should be removed and replaced by a fresh ditto carbon. It is desirable to have a large supply of Forms NNI-96 on hand, but fresh ditto carbons should be ordered at least quarterly and an excess supply should not be carried because of rapid deterioration.

(2) ONI requires the original and a ditto master copy of all reports. The Form NNI-96 should be assembled as follows:

1. Original flimsy.
2. Ditto master.
3. Ditto master carbon (glazed side facing the back of the ditto master).
4. Ordinary carbon paper.
5. Copy.
6. Additional carbons and copies as desired.

The additional copies are noted to be behind (i. e. below) the master ditto carbon rather than between the master ditto sheet and the original. Unless several carbon copies are made, the master ditto carbon should be backed with heavy paper or a thin sheet of celluloid. It should be remembered that the clarity of the master ditto impression is the primary consideration and that each additional carbon copy made tends to spread and blur the impression on the back of the master ditto sheet.

(3) Typewriters should be clean; worn platens should be replaced; and the touch used should be even and strong. Extreme care should be used with erasures in order to avoid smudging the ditto impression.

(4) After the report is typed, the ditto carbon should be removed and destroyed (in accordance with security regulations), and the tan

backing sheet which accompanies the Form NNI-96 should be carefully and securely attached to the back of the master ditto sheet to protect it in transit.

(5) An office which possesses a ditto reproduction machine is at liberty to make a preliminary run of the master ditto to secure advance copies for limited lateral dissemination to the proper intelligence addressees. However, if such a special run is made, particular care should be taken, for the prime consideration is to provide the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington with a ditto which can be adequately reproduced and disseminated.

(6) The names of preparing and forwarding officers should not be typed so that they appear on the master ditto. They should be typed or written in longhand on the original flimsy after the typing of the report. This enables the Office of Naval Intelligence to have a complete record of the activities of its field personnel without giving the same information to all recipients of its reports.

(7) The practice of sending a carbon copy to the Office of Naval Intelligence separately from the master ditto is discouraged. No classified matter may be sent by foreign mail, and no material of a classification higher than Restricted may be sent by State Department air pouch. Nothing is gained by sending a carbon copy separately in the same courier pouch as that which transmits the master ditto, since the original and the master ditto are seen by the action desk promptly and before reproduction in the office of Naval Intelligence.

Correspondence
by Dispatch.

5305. Officers assigned to foreign duty will receive indoctrination from the Security section of the Naval Communications Section (Op-20K). Such indoctrination will include the general subject of correspondence by dispatch, the use of codes and ciphers, procedures to be followed in setting up a code room, and security measures to be observed.

Training in
Communications.

5306. It will be the responsibility of every officer to take full advantage of the indoctrination offered by Op-20K. It has already been pointed out (see art. 5101 above) that in time of peace the average officer on foreign duty will not have trained enlisted personnel available, and it is unlikely that a communications officer will be assigned to any but the largest posts. The time required for such training will depend on the extent to which the individual officer is already familiar with naval communications and particularly with the system or systems in use at the station to which he is reporting.

Section 4

SECURITY

Security.

5401. It is assumed that all Naval Intelligence officers will be thoroughly conversant with the basic principles of security as set forth in article 76, United States Navy Regulations. In addition, such officers should also be familiar with chapter XI, Naval Intelligence Manual—1947 (ONI-19 (A)).

Classified
Material.

5402. Officers on duty at foreign posts must be particularly conscious of their responsibilities in connection with the safeguarding of classified material—

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simply because such posts are more exposed and because the line of communications with the United States is long.

5403. For all practical purposes there is little need to set forth again here the fundamentals of security. Provision for proper security will be the responsibility of the individual officer, and he must devise means of insuring its adequacy. It has already been noted that Naval and Military Attachés should occupy adjoining offices wherever possible in order to further coordinate their activities. An equally valid reason is the furtherance of security.

**Navy and
Army Attachés
Coordinate
Activities.**

5404. If the Naval Attaché has confidential sources of information he is expected to protect them, for they will be useful only so long as they are confident that they will not be uncovered. Security of such sources is absolutely vital, not only to protect them but to protect the Navy (see arts. 11-008, 11-009, ONI-19 (A)).

**Security of
Information
Sources.**

5405. Particular care must always be exercised in the matter of communications security. The average office abroad will not have a trained communicator, and it is, therefore, incumbent upon each officer to acquire a thorough knowledge of the particular requirements of communications security (see arts. 5306-5307, above). The necessity for such care is illustrated by the recent case of one Attaché who failed to take advantage of the indoctrination provided in Op-20K and compromised no less than three codes in the first few months after arriving at his post. Needless to say, all three codes had to be abandoned at considerable expense and inconvenience to say nothing of the loss of security of all dispatches which had been sent in these codes.

**Communication
Security.**

5406. In section I of this chapter it was noted that offices abroad will often find it necessary to employ native personnel for certain tasks. In countries known to be unfriendly to the United States it is obvious that such personnel must be watched closely, but even in friendly countries there is always the possibility that a civilian employee might be in the pay of a potential enemy.

**Security of
Native
Employees**

5407. The Department of State has assigned a Security Officer to United States Embassies and Legations. This officer has responsibility for the security of the Mission and all smaller posts within the geographic area. Security Officers are appointed as Staff Officers in the Foreign Service, bear the title of Attaché or Assistant Attaché, and have diplomatic status.

**State Department
Security
Officer—Co-
operation With.**

By CNO restricted directive of 30 January 1948 (Serial 998P32), Naval Intelligence Officers on foreign posts are directed to cooperate with the Security Officer at their respective posts in every possible way. These instructions, however, in no way relieve ONI representatives of their normal security responsibilities.

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Chapter VI

COLLECTION AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Collecting
Intelligence.

6001. The general subject of the collection of information and intelligence is treated in chapter VIII of ONI-19 (A). Definitions of the terms commonly used in intelligence work will also be found in that chapter.

Methods of
Collecting
Intelligence.

6002. Most of the information which a Naval Attaché or other officer on foreign duty will turn up during peacetime will be obtained by overt, recognized methods. He will deal directly with the Navy Department or Ministry of Marine of the country to which he is accredited, where he will obtain information either directly or on an exchange basis (on the latter point see articles 5015 and 8008 in ONI-19 (A)). Other information will be obtained through the Chief of the Mission to which he is attached and through his open and above board contacts and acquaintances. All of this will vary considerably from post to post, however. In some capitals, for example, information is, for the most part, obtainable for the asking; while in others an entirely different relationship prevails (see art. 6006, below).

Use of Social
Position in
Collecting
Information.

6003. A Naval Attaché will, by virtue of his position, inevitably be drawn into the social life of the place in which he finds himself and will thus have many opportunities to make acquaintances. It has already been pointed out (see art. 3106, above) that much information can be obtained informally through such contacts if the attaché is alert and makes a good impression. Conversely, it is also true that inept handling of personal contacts can dry up potential sources of information or make it unnecessarily difficult to obtain routine information.

It should not be assumed, however, that the only useful contacts will be those made in the pleasant atmosphere of social functions. A Naval Attaché who is so impressed with his position that he cannot deal with the lower levels of society is not a good intelligence officer.

The Naval Attaché should be constantly adding to his knowledge of the country to which he is accredited, and he can best do this by personal observation of all classes of society. A knowledge of the language and customs of the country will pay rich dividends in this respect.

Above all, the Attaché, as an official representative of the United States, shall conduct himself in such a manner as to reflect credit upon his Government and the Naval Service. Any lapses in deportment are quickly noted, and the prestige and effectiveness of the Attaché are correspondingly reduced.

Maintaining
Official Posi-
tion.

6004. Article 5024 of ONI-19 (A) states that the policy of the Navy Department is "never to resort to methods of obtaining information that might cause a loss of prestige in the eyes of a foreign power." However, it is stated in the same article that this should not be interpreted to mean that "any means of investigating matters of importance that bear on the national defense" should be ignored. Thus article 8003 of ONI-19 (A) notes that covert methods of collecting intelligence may be used if "overt means prove unavailing and the need and urgency therefor are fully justified," and article 8028 *directs*

Naval Intelligence personnel on foreign duty to "develop contacts and covered sources within and adjacent to the potential enemy or hostile country." It is thus obvious that the final responsibility rests with the intelligence officer himself—the responsibility for determining when it is justifiable to run the risk of compromising his position or even the plans and objectives of his Government. This means, then, that the intelligence officer must be qualified, through his own abilities and through training, to assume responsibility and to exercise reasoned judgment.

6005. The necessity for proper security measures cannot be overemphasized in connection with the covert collection of intelligence. Aside from the fact that great care must be taken to maintain the dignity of the United States, it must also be remembered that confidential informants and other sources must be protected from disclosure if they are to remain useful. Furthermore, the use of under cover agents and informants is a matter demanding great skill and care if the intelligence officer is to avoid being "hoist by his own petard." However, the chances are that the average Naval Attaché will have comparatively little to do with the collection of information by covert methods in time of peace.

Collection of
Information By
Covert Methods.

6006. (a) For the purpose of collecting naval intelligence the countries of the world may be divided into three rough categories:

- (1) Countries in which a free exchange of information prevails;
- (2) Countries where considerable, but not all, information is readily obtainable by recognized methods.
- (3) Countries where little or no official information is offered or likely to be forthcoming.

Collection of
Information
in Different
Types of
Countries.

(b) A Naval Attaché assigned to any of the countries in the last category will find that the ordinary methods and techniques described in the preceding paragraphs will be of little use. His acquaintances will be limited for the most part to members of the staff of the diplomatic missions of the United States and powers friendly to the United States. There will be no question of friendly dealings with the Department of the Navy or other Government departments, and the attaché's movements will be seriously circumscribed. As far as attempts to thaw Government officials socially are concerned, the attaché might just as well save his energies for other matters.

(c) On the other hand, covert methods of collecting information will be extremely difficult to use in a police state where the activities of the secret police are widespread. It must be assumed that the Naval Attaché, like all foreigners, will be under constant surveillance and that it will be next to impossible to locate informants. As a matter of fact, he will have to be constantly on his guard against attempts to breach his own security precautions, for his servants and other local employees will undoubtedly be reporting to the secret police.

(d) Collection of information by means which lie somewhere between the overt and the covert therefore becomes necessary in countries of category (3). Good sense and personal observations are the keynotes. Much can be learned by an intelligence officer trained in observation, especially if he prepares a "want list" and works at it systematically, for even in a police state it is impossible to keep everything hidden. The Naval Attaché can occasionally wander off the beaten path on some pretext or another. He can always find business

in a seaport, for example, and once he is there he can find much to engage his attention.

(e) One of the most important sources of intelligence in countries described in the third category has always been material published by governmental and other official sources. Statistics of all sorts are constantly being published by various governmental departments, and, while they may not always be completely reliable, such statistics are hard to disguise or to keep from observers. Thus the attaché should pay particular attention to the publishing activities of countries in category (3). He may not be able to perceive the immediate value of a specific publication himself, but it may supply the answer to something in Washington.