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"For the purpose of attacking the Philippine Islands, the Japanese Fleet will first of all be faced with the problem of completely blockading these islands to prevent the escape of the United States Asiatic Fleet. This will also serve to bring pressure upon Singapore so that the Singapore Fleet will not attempt to strike out. Should this blockade be accomplished satisfactorily, the next step is to...(Censored by the Japanese).

"Although the frontal defenses of Luzon Island, which contain Manila Bay, are extremely heavy, the defenses in the rear of the Island, around Lingayen Gulf in the northwest and in the region of Pollilo Strait and Lamon Bay to the east are (compared with or in respect to) Bias Bay in Southern China...(Censored by the Japanese).

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Section (3) The Capture of Guam by the Japanese Fleet.

"Guam lies 1,340 miles south of the Bonin Islands and about 1,500 miles east of the Philippines. It is approximately in the center between Saipan and Yap, being a little closer to the former. This makes the Island of Guam closer to the Hawaiian Islands; however, a distance of over 3,300 miles still separates them. Take a speed of fifteen knots for example; the United States Fleet, steaming out of Pearl Harbor, would require at least nine days to reach Guam. However, should the Japanese Fleet leave from Yokosuka, which is only 1,360 miles from Guam, she would reach the island about five days before the United States Fleet. As long as the control of Guam falls into Japanese hands during these five days, the result will be identical with that of the Philippine Islands.

"So it follows that the United States is at the present time heavily fortifying Guam and is also expending facilities to take care of a large fleet. Japan's fear is on the increase, and there is no telling how seriously the Pacific war strategy of our country has been inconvenienced. The United States might damage Japan's overseas trade by using this island as a base from which to operate 'Surprise Fleets,' or she might attempt to attack the Japanese Fleet itself and inflict damage. Thus the capture of the Island of Guam is of utmost importance to Japan.

"Although Guam is a small island only 228 square miles in area, there are forts, large wireless stations, fuel depots, and the naval base of Apra... The capitol is named Agana, and eight miles from this town is the Apra Naval Base. A famous wireless station stands on a 600-foot hill called Machanao, while on the tip of Orote Peninsula is a battery equipped with 6-inch guns. About 3,000 marines are stationed in the barracks at the main town. Although until last year the American Navy used this principally as a coaling station, it is now completely fortified, and facilities for the handling of a

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large fleet are already nearing completion.

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"Only second to Guam is the island of Canton, which was leased from Great Britain. This island is said to be a great naval and air base and constitutes a formidable menace. The attack against Guam and Canton should be carried out quickly and simultaneously with that on the Philippine Islands. Should the capture of these islands be delayed, they will possibly become a base of operations...and their defensive equipment will be further strengthened. This will make it impossible for a light force to capture these islands and will consequently impede subsequent attempts even by a large force."

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## CHAPTER XII THE FALL OF MANILA

(237) Section (1) The Attack on Manila Bay and... (Censored by the Japanese). "We must carry out the... (Censored by the Japanese) against Luzon Island at the same time our navy attacks the Asiatic Fleet in Manila Bay.

"However, as the Asiatic Fleet will be waiting in Manila Bay, eager for battle, the purpose of such a naval action would be to enable the safe landing of troops in Lingayen Gulf, Lamon Bay, and other regions rather than to sink warships of that fleet. The attacks of the 'Surprise Fleets' must be carried out with a fair degree of suicidal boldness. Should a Japanese transport fleet be fortunate enough to reach Luzon Island safely and without incident, landing operations would be extremely successful. However, the question is whether it is possible to send such a fleet without the enemy knowing about it.

(238) "Let us suppose that the Japanese Army embarks in Kyushu or the Chugoku region; then they could easily reach their objective within five days. However, since these transports could not take normal routes used by commercial vessels and, furthermore, should they be discovered by enemy ships, the secret would become known and all the regions having feasible landing places would be heavily fortified. Airplanes would probably be stationed in these regions, while submarines would also operate in the waters nearby. Before the completion of any landings, considerable sacrifices may be necessary. Although we cannot surmise exactly what the developments would be, we must be prepared to sustain a certain amount of damage and encounter a certain amount of resistance.

"When Homer Lee wrote a book on the future Japanese-American War, entitled 'Ignorant Courage,' he stated that it was possible for the Japanese to capture the Philippine Islands within three weeks if we were to land a total of 40,000 troops in Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay. Mr. Bywater has said (in his book) that it would take a force of eight divisions.

"Let us suppose that Japan would send an intermediate number of men, say 60,000 troops, for the capture of the Philippine Islands. In that case a transport fleet of 500,000 tons would be necessary and, should the average tonnage of a vessel be 5,000 tons, it would take a total of 100 merchant ships to form it. As the present merchantmen of Japan total a considerable number, no shortage would be felt in this respect..."

"However, if, as General Klunzgrich has said, it is a fundamental rule of strategy that 'Three of attack equals two of defense,'

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(238) then a force of 25,000 troops would be sufficient to attack the United States Army (in the Philippine Islands) with its 16,000 troops. Should we send eight divisions of troops, as Bywater suggests, a tremendous amount would be spent for the upkeep of these troops as well as for the purpose of maintaining communications with the Asiatic mainland and a large number of merchantmen would be needed. This would never be a feasible plan.

"Then again, the United States has on one pretext or another increased her armed forces in China and vicinity ever since Japanese occupation of French Indo-China. Should these troops once be concentrated in the Philippine Islands, their total number would be considerable."

The section concludes with a discussion of landing operations in connection with the attack on Manila. One Lieutenant General Fiske is credited with having once said that a Japanese transport fleet would be completely at the mercy of American bombers and that probably not a single ship would reach the Philippine coast. However, Mr. Matsuo would remind us that the famed Japanese "Wild Eagles" (pilots) are more than a match for the Americans and, furthermore, that the attack on Manila Bay would divert a large part of the United States air forces.

With regard to choice of landing places, Lingayen Gulf is held to be more suitable than Polillo, despite the fact that the latter is only half as far from Manila. Lingayen also has the great advantage of having railway communication with Manila.

(241) Section (2) Islands Under the "Rising Sun." "Once the Japanese Army has in this way approached the rear of Manila, no matter how hard the Army or Navy of the United States struggle, and no matter what various types of new weapons may be used, the fall of this city will only be a question of days and hours.

(242) "Should Japan delay this capture, it will reflect upon both the morale and prestige of the Army and the Japanese people. There is also the possibility that it may entail unpleasant consequence in our overseas trade. Thus it is imperative that we capture Manila as soon as possible, and it should be said that many sacrifices may be necessary to achieve such an end. It may not, after all, be a mad dream to speculate that within two weeks after landing, the flag of the Japanese Empire will fly over the fort of Corregidor at the head of Manila Bay. Should Manila fall into the hands of the Japanese Army and the entire island of Luzon be captured, it goes without saying that all of the Philippine Islands will come under the control of Japan..."

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"Should Japan capture the Philippine Islands and Guam, there will result a very pleasing situation from the military point of view. As Bywater has said, 'Should Guam and the Philippine Islands be given over to enemy hands, America will be faced with a problem that is practically insoluble.' Once the United States loses these islands, she will no longer have a single base in the Western Pacific. Without any base farther west, it will be impossible for her fleet to strike at the heart of Japan from Pearl Harbor.

"On the other hand, with the capture of Guam and the Philippines, morale in Japan will rise considerably. At times, daring submarines may operate along the West Coast of the United States, either attacking American merchant ships or endangering the supply route between Pearl Harbor and the mainland. The American people, who have such a strong sense of self-importance, will be extremely perturbed."

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## CHAPTER XIII A TERRIBLE WAR FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF TRADE

Section (1) America's War for Trade Destruction. Attention is called to the rôle played by the 3,600-ton German raider "Emden" during the first World War and the German U-boat campaign against Allied shipping. The author then goes on to predict that a severe trade war will accompany a Japanese-American war and bring with it widespread submarine, destroyer and cruiser activity.

The Japanese apparently realize that much of their normal trade will be lost to them during wartime, but at the same time seem to harbor naïve ideas on the subject. For example, they consider the Japan-Australia route -- via the west coast of the Philippines, the Celebes Sea, Makassar Strait, Banda Sea, Arafoera Sea, and Torres Strait to be of major importance, but assert that a United States Fleet based on Tutuila, Samoa, would be too far removed (over 2,000 miles) to do very much damage, though admittedly it could attack Japanese shipping off the east coast of Australia.

The author anticipates that the Japanese coastal trade routes, the China route, South Pacific route, Indian route, East African route and Mediterranean route, would be immune from attack, but does not trouble to explain why they should be. A line connecting San Francisco, Hawaii and Samoa would be 4,400 miles long and divide the South Pacific diagonally, enabling the United States Fleet to cut any course used by the Japanese east of 170° East Longitude. Use of South American routes thus would subject their ships to sinking or capture, and use of the route around the Cape of Good Hope would likewise prove too dangerous because of British-American submarine activity.

(248) Section (2) Japan's War for Trade Destruction. "Let us consider which of the United States trade routes would be attacked by Japan... It is an obvious fact that, as a result of the entire Asiatic coast line being blockaded by Japan's naval power, America's Far Eastern routes would be severed.

"The route from foreign countries to Japan and China, America's route to the Philippine Islands, or her route to French Indo-China would likewise not have a chance of continuing operation. At the same time, the traffic between the West Coast of the United States and points west of Singapore would be severed. To proceed from the United States to India, one would have, of necessity to pass through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal.

"An American vessel sailing from San Francisco to Calcutta would normally cross the Pacific Ocean on a straight line, touching at

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- (248) Singapore, and enter the Bay of Bengal. However, during wartime such a convenient route could not be maintained. American vessels would instead follow the North American coast south, pass through the Panama Canal and thence to the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, Suez, and the Red Sea. In such a way these vessels would reach the Indian Ocean and, by rounding Cape Comorin, enter the Bay of Bengal.
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"The normal trade route is about 10,000 miles, while the latter route actually extends 15,000 miles... This would prove to be very troublesome for the United States.

"Let us now look at which will happen to America's trade with Australia. The United States would encounter more danger on this route than Japan would. As we have mentioned before, it is a distance of over 2,000 miles from Tutuila to the east coast of Australia. The distance from one of the Japanese mandated islands, say Ponape Island of the Caroline group, to the east coast of Australia is slightly over 1,800 miles. A Japanese fleet having bases in this area would have a far greater radius of action than a similar U. S. fleet based at Tutuila.

- (250) "Moreover, it is to the disadvantage of the United States that her route to Australia is subject to danger over a wider area than is the case with Japan, whose Australian route is exposed to attack only off the eastern coast of Australia.

"A line connecting Hawaii, Sydney or Melbourne would pass within a distance of only 1,300 miles from one of the islands in the Marshall group, say the island of Jaluit. A direct line connecting the ports of San Francisco and Sydney or Melbourne would be scarcely 1,500 miles from this island. Consequently the radius of action of Japanese warships based on Jaluit would easily cross the Hawaiian-Australian and San Francisco-Australian routes... We can see that America's Australian trade would be rendered impossible.

"The next question is that of America's South Sea trade... Utilizing the island of Yap and describing a circle of 1,500-mile radius, one would enclose on the east the greater part of the Solomon Islands, New Britain, New Guinea, an unidentified island (Japanese pronunciation: Shiroro) Celebes, Timor, Flores, Lompok and Bali. On the west the line would pass through the eastern half of the Philippine Islands and include the greater part of Borneo. We may assume that no vessel flying the Stars and Stripes would ever be noticed west of the 'Coral Sea' (Sango Kai).

- (251) "Should the trade routes with the Far East via the Pacific Ocean, the route with India, the route to the South Seas, and the route to Australia all be severed or damaged, the only trade channels

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(251) left open to the United States are the Canadian and South American routes.

"However, repeated battles for the destruction of trade never decide a war. Should the United States be cowed by our seizure of the Philippines and Guam, we can say that she has lost the Japanese-American war, at least to a certain extent."



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# CHAPTER XIV AMERICA'S RECAPTURE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Section (1) The Philippine Expedition. President Wilson is represented as having once said that Japan could never hold the Philippines even if she captured them. The author, on the other hand, believes an effort to recapture the Islands, once the Japanese had them, would require the entire United States Fleet, and that even then such an attempt would fail because Japanese forces would be too firmly entrenched.

It is understood the Japanese would have about 80,000 troops holding the Philippines. For the United States to match this strength would necessitate an almost impossible feat of transportation. The general rule being that the transportation of one man demands 18 tons of shipping, a force of 10,000 men would have to have 180,000 tons -- in other words 120 transports of 15,000 tons average. An expeditionary force comparable in size to the Japanese Philippine force would need 250-300 ships and would be all too vulnerable a target for attack.

Section (2) Japan's Defensive Position. Japan is blessed by two natural lines of defense: (a) An inner chain of islands, already heavily fortified, which includes the Pescadores, Formosa, Southwestern Islands, Bonin Islands, and the Kuril Islands; (b) an outer chain formed of the Marshall, Caroline, Marianas, and Palau groups. This circumstance forces the United States Fleet to pass through a large area of Japanese-controlled waters to reach their Far Eastern bases and would mean about fourteen days of constant exposure to Japan's "Surprise Fleet." The text goes on to state that, if these continued attacks did not destroy the United States Fleet or compel it to turn back, then the Japanese main fleet at Manila would finish the job. Recapture of the Philippines by the United States, claims Mr. Matsuo, could never be more than an American daydream.

(257) Section (3) Capture of the Bonin Islands by the United States Fleet. "It is frequently said that the United States will take steps for the capture of the Bonin Islands. To the same degree that the capture of the Philippine Islands will prove difficult, the capture of the Bonin Islands would also prove exceedingly troublesome.

"Between Hawaii and the Bonin Islands lies a distance of 3,350 miles, and the ocean route between them is flanked by the various islands belonging to the Mariana group. The distance between the Yokosuka Naval Base and the Bonin Islands is only 530 miles, and it is possible for the Japanese Fleet based at Yokosuka to proceed at a moment's notice and reach the islands within the short

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(257) space of a day and a half (36 hours). Thus it follows that Japan is not likely to permit any easy capture of these islands.

(258) "Moreover, although we are in no position to describe the defenses of the Bonin Islands, let us assume that they are of the same quality as those on the island of Guam. Japan will surely have sufficient time in which to complete such fortifications as may be necessary after the opening of hostilities. Compared to Guam, which will be captured several days after hostilities commence, the Bonin Islands are in an exceedingly favorable position (for defense).

(259) "Should the recapture of Guam and the Philippine Islands and also the capture of the Bonin Islands prove to be impossible, what will the United States Navy do? According to some people, the United States will send large numbers of troops for the purpose of capturing the Kuril Islands or the island of Hokkaido.

"What would be the fate of such an attempt? It is impossible, in reality, to send large numbers of troops to Alaska from the United States mainland, which lies over 1,000 miles away, and then transport them to Japan, which lies an additional 2,000 miles beyond. Should such a reckless plan be attempted, the fate of the United States Fleet will necessarily be immediate disaster. However, we cannot assert that the Kuril Islands and the northern part of Japan will be entirely safe.

"As one method of restraining the activities of the Japanese Fleet, the United States will most probably order the stationing of part of their fleet at Kiska and Unalaska. These units of the fleet will be ordered to operate close to the eastern waters of Hokkaido or the Kuril Islands for the purpose of sinking Japanese fishing vessels and steamships which operate in Arctic waters. The Ochiai Wireless Station and the port of Nemuro, both of which are situated on the northeastern coast of the island of Hokkaido, will undoubtedly be shelled for the purpose of terrorizing our residents there. The United States will most surely pursue some such course; however, should the United States finally realize that she does not have sufficient power to cripple Japan, she will be forced...to resort to a war of attrition or endurance. In other words, she will have to wait until Japan is tired of fighting.

(260) "What would make the United States Fleet suffer most would be the fact that, should the war become prolonged, the Japanese Fleet will be able to stay within her own ports and harbors with sufficient stores and supplies and complete security. The United States Fleet will meanwhile be based on a small island over 2,000 miles away from the mainland and will be forced to undergo continuous disadvantages and inconveniences, which will in turn have disastrous effects upon efficiency and morale."

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"Every move and every action of the United States Fleet will be subject to constant and strict surveillance of the Japanese Fleet. Furthermore, the fact that the location of the Japanese Fleet will remain unknown, will entail severe difficulties to the strategic plans of the United States Navy."

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CHAPTER XV SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE AND HONGKONG.

Section (1) The Question of the Singapore Naval Base.  
American-British collaboration in any future war is almost a certainty. The author states that for the past several years the United States Navy has been hoping to utilize Singapore as a naval base. He then goes on to treat the history of the great base and its fortification since 1934. With respect to both defense features and natural strategic location, Singapore is described as serving as the center of the British military system in the Far East, one of her last outposts of empire.

(263) "Let us now look at the defenses of Singapore. We find it thoroughly armed with army, navy, and air force personnel. There are only approximately 7,000 soldiers on guard at the various fortresses on this island who are in charge of 16- or 18-inch guns, each with a range of from 20 to 30 miles. There are also innumerable anti-aircraft guns manned by these soldiers.

"The heavy gun batteries on the island are indeed rare for any part of the world and can only be compared with the defenses of the Panama Canal. The British Air Force in Singapore has more than two companies of Blenheim bombers and Sunderland flying boats based at Seletar. These last-mentioned seaplanes are capable of long flights of over 3,000 kilometers and are in a position to menace the China Sea..."

(264) "The pride of Singapore Naval Base...is the second greatest dry dock in the world. It is 1,000 feet long, 130 feet wide, 35 feet deep and is capable of easily accommodating battleships up to 50,000 tons. Work on this dock was completed by February, 1938, at the enormous expenditure of £20,000,000 (\$100,000,000). Besides this dry dock there is a huge floating dock, which was towed from the British Isles; a huge pier, 2,200 feet long and capable of accommodating several battleships simultaneously; and a 1,000,000-ton oil reservoir and several others, which are reported to be capable of supplying oil to a large fleet for six months..."

(265) "Will Japan attempt to destroy a United States Fleet which has proceeded to Singapore? This is indeed a big question. It is impossible for any large fleet to make its way through the Strait of Malacca as long as the Pacific fortress of Singapore exists and a strong fleet is based there. No matter how daring the Japanese Fleet may be, it will not be possible for them to attack west of India..."

(266) "Should war clouds gather in this area, the main battle will be fought with airplanes and vessels smaller than cruisers.

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- (266) However, inasmuch as troops stationed in the Dutch East Indies are composed of a mixture of natives and whites in the ratio of three to one, and since their (naval) power is only 5% of that of the United States and British Fleets, they are scarcely worth considering. More than this we are not allowed to disclose at the present time.

"During the time that the United States dillydallys around this region we must calmly observe the behaviour of the Indians and the exceedingly pro-Japanese natives of Burma."

- (267) Section (2) Fate of Hongkong. "As everybody knows, Hongkong is a small island southeast of Canton and lying about 400 miles from Formosa, which is the southernmost outpost of Japan's national defense. For a long time the base at Hongkong has been famous as the headquarters of British Imperialism in the Far East; however, the strength of the British Fleet which is stationed here is not as great as is usually believed. In fact, this fleet is so powerless it dares not engage in any battle against the Japanese Fleet.

"Let us assume that the fortress on the island of Hongkong is actually invincible. If this be the case and should the United States have the use of this island, it would present considerable trouble to Japan.

"With the object of connecting the island of Wen-ch'uan-chou, which lies in front of Kowloon, with Hongkong, a subterranean passage has been constructed. The defense of Wen-ch'uan-chou is reported to have been further strengthened by eleven underground batteries built on a plateau. Besides these batteries there are anti-aircraft batteries in Kowloon and additional underground batteries on the Sheng-ch'i Mountain to the rear of Hongkong. Defense equipment throughout the area of T'ung-lo has been strengthened and a new airdrome for the exclusive use of night landings has been established on the Ching-te Airfield. Naval Volunteer Corps have also been organized, but in spite of this, the actual military strength of all these measures is insufficient.

- (268) "How many days will Hongkong be able to hold out against the Japanese Army? Some say that they can hold out for a week, others for two to three days or even for one day. They all agree upon the fact that Hongkong will finally be taken by the Japanese Army, which would land on Times Bay and Aberdeen Island in the rear of the island.

"...If defense of Hongkong proves impossible, British power on the Pacific will become a thing of the past. In such an

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(268) event, the only movement left for the combined United States-British Fleets will be to approach the southern part of the Japanese Empire. Moreover, Singapore, too, will prove useless unless it is held jointly with Hongkong."

"Let us now consider the sea routes by which an enemy fleet can advance (to Hongkong) from Pearl Harbor or from Singapore...From the standpoint of strategy, the sea route from Pearl Harbor is far more dangerous than that from Singapore. This is because of the necessity that the United States Fleet pass at least once through the area patrolled by the powerful Japanese Fleet operating west or south of Formosa. Furthermore, by this time it can be said that the Japanese Fleet will have occupied Hongkong, which would have the result of putting the South China Sea under our control. Thus it would be quite impossible for any large fleet to advance against us.

(269) "Once Japan becomes aware of the fact that the reason for the existence of Singapore is purely for the defense of India and the security of the Indian Ocean, all we need do is to destroy the United States warships one by one as they emerge from Singapore. However, the greatest concern of Japan at such a time will be the interruption of our South Sea routes. This will be the heaviest blow that United States-British strategy could deal us. In view of this danger, one of the most important problems confronting the Japanese nation is the occupation of the Dutch East Indies as quickly as possible for the purpose of solving the oil problem."

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## CHAPTER XVI THE UNITED STATES FLEET AND ITS ADVANCE TO HAWAII.

Section (1) Forces Needed for a Pacific Battle. Should the U. S. Fleet move to Hawaii, the question of the division of its forces would constitute a serious problem. At least 20% of the total United States Fleet would have to be kept at their Hawaiian bases, 30% would be lost (sunk or badly damaged before reaching Far Eastern waters), leaving 50% to attempt an early showdown. Another alternative mentioned was that a certain proportion of the fleet would be assigned to guard the mainland of the United States and the rest be based at Hawaii, both biding their time in anticipation of Japanese attacks.

Section (2) Concentration of Entire Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Once the present naval expansion program is fulfilled, the United States could send to the Western Pacific a maximum of 30 battleships, more than 40 15,000-ton cruisers, about 184 destroyers and 92 submarines. It is assumed by the author that of this total number, the battle force would leave for Hawaii from Pacific Coast ports, while the scouting force would leave for the same destination from Atlantic bases. In addition the United States Government would presumably conscript about 400 merchant ships for use as auxiliaries. All units would be subject to Japanese submarine attack. The author also states that the Japanese would wound American pride by mining the entrance and approaches to Pearl Harbor and shelling the West Coast of the United States mainland.

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## CHAPTER XVII JAPAN'S "SURPRISE FLEET"

Section (1) America's Overseas Strategy. The subject of study here is the question of who will strike first, the United States or Japan. There is no doubt that, in the event of war, both countries will exert themselves to strike before the other has completed preparation for the struggle. However, despite America's great resources and productive capacity, her people have neither enthusiasm for nor feeling of responsibility toward a war to smash Japan. Mobilization would, therefore, be slow and without spirit. In any case, Japan would be the first to be ready, and would utilize this advantage to seize the Philippines, Guam, and perhaps Wake, Tutuila, Midway and other strategic stepping stones to the Far East. Japan would then lose no time in repairing these occupied islands and converting them into bases of operation for her submarines.

(277) Section (2) Activities of the "Surprise Fleet." "Let us now discuss the matter of the 'Surprise Fleet.' Similar to the United States patrol fleets or the Second Fleet of the French Navy, its main force is composed of submarines. Whenever necessary, these submarines are joined by cruisers, destroyers and, at times, aircraft carriers.

(278) "Such a conflict as a Japanese-American war would involve the entire Pacific Ocean as a battlefield and would also necessitate advance operations in the Atlantic Ocean. So it follows that the formation of any 'Surprise Fleet' could never be composed by any submarines or torpedo units attached to any one fleet. 'Surprise Fleets' must be organized quite independent of the main fleet.

"The Japanese submarines known as the 'Igo' class are best fitted for use in a 'Surprise Fleet,' but at the same time they may be attached to the main force Japanese Fleet for the purpose of engaging in major battles. Disregarding, for the time being, those submarines attached to the fleet, and concentrating upon those which would be most effective as units of a 'Surprise Fleet,' the most efficient would be...(number censored) of 'Igo' class, #1 type, and...(number censored) of 'Igo' class, #53 or #68 submarines. However, should it be impossible to spare a sufficient number of the 'Igo' class for 'Surprise Fleet' operations in distant waters, we must, if necessary, utilize submarines of the 'Rogo' class.

(279) "In the future it will be necessary for all classes of submarines to possess sufficient structural strength and cruising power to enable them to operate independently on the Western Pacific. Even at the present time, some of the 'Rogo' class submarines have a cruising radius of roughly 10,000 miles despite the fact that such a huge cruising radius cuts down their structural strength. With

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(279) the protection of suitable mother-ships, however, it will be easy for these submarines to cross the Pacific Ocean. Even the smaller types will be able to establish glorious records off the Pacific Coast of the United States.

"Should the Japanese Navy be successful in immediately capturing Midway Island and make this a base for submarine operations, it will prove to be invaluable for surprise attacks, as it lies scarcely 1,600 miles from Hawaii.

"Vessels that accompany 'Surprise Fleets' should include, among others, ...(number censored) of minelayers of the 'Igo' class, #21 type. These vessels would load many mines and distribute them in the entrances to American ports or harbors, or wherever the United States Fleet or any of its warships might operate. Furthermore, conditions permitting, these vessels would attack the enemy fleet or would appear on enemy routes of communication for the purpose of destroying trade. Their effectiveness cannot be disregarded.

"'Surprise Fleets,' as noted before, employ submarines as their main force, but they are also accompanied by a flagship, which is always a cruiser... Besides the submarine force, there should be torpedo units accompanying the destroyer force. These units, cooperating with the submarine force, could make night attacks on the enemy fleet. They would have other duties, such as sinking enemy submarines, and would enhance the efficiency of any 'Surprise Fleet.'"

The chapter concludes with the statement that whereas United States submarine crews can stand only three weeks of sub life at a stretch, the Japanese can stand three times as much. The sinking of a few battleships, cruisers, and transports by the "Surprise Fleet" would have a severe effect upon American morale.

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## CHAPTER XVIII ATTACK ON JAPAN BY THE UNITED STATES FLEET.

Section (1) Expedition to Japan and its Circular Formation.  
The capture of the Philippines would not be decisive. It goes without saying that the United States Fleet would attack Japan despite the difficulty of operating without proper bases.

Studies and conferences conducted since the Russo-Japanese War have resulted in comprehensive United States plans for a Pacific expedition. Such a fleet, with all its transports and auxiliaries, would extend 30 miles and require considerable scout and escort forces. The scouting force (composed of at least ten vessels) would be 200-250 miles in front of the main body and would fan out over a front of 250 miles. The nighttime scouting force would probably have an additional eight cruisers in order to reduce the distance between units from 25 miles to 12. In addition there would be at least eight light cruisers farther back, formed about and protecting the capital ships. Thus a total of some 26 cruisers would be needed were the circular formation of 1938-39 used.

It is also assumed that about ten battleships and several aircraft carriers would be in the center of the formation. Next would come the above-mentioned ring of cruisers, then a circle of about 50 destroyers, and finally an outer ring of submarines. In the rear would follow two cruisers serving as submarine tenders and the rest of the expedition. The circular formation itself would be some 30 miles in diameter.

Section (2) Dispersion of the American Fleet. Japan will really feel menaced once the United States has a battleship force of over 32. However, once half these are sunk or put out of action the fast Japanese Fleet might well attack the United States mainland and Hawaii while the main United States Fleet is in the Western Pacific. Other United States units, assigned to defense, escort or patrol tasks, would be too scattered and too weak to provide much opposition.

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"...The United States Fleet will plan to lure the Japanese Fleet out to sea in order to be able to fight as near United States territory as possible. Japan, however, will feel it most advantageous to wage a battle in home seas, but at the same time sufficiently removed to prevent enemy units from bombing Japanese territory. As was the case in the battle of the Sea of Japan (in the Russo-Japanese War), the Japanese Fleet will maintain utter silence and its disposition will be unknown. During this time the United States Fleet will be pursued and constantly attacked by submarines and destroyer units. The American Fleet would therefore find it impossible to reach seas proximate to Japan without suffering serious damage.

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"Furthermore, should the United States Fleet once feel the effects of courageous attacks by Japan's 'Surprise Fleet,' it will be forced either to change direction and head for Hawaii and the mainland or to take a roundabout course in order to flee to Singapore. In either case the United States Fleet would most likely disperse completely. This dispersion is what will give Japan real cause for fright.

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Section (3) Movements of the Japanese Fleet. "Immediately upon receipt of the report that the United States Fleet has concentrated in Hawaii, how much fighting power will Japan muster and where will it be sent?

"...The Japanese Fleet will most likely steam towards the Bonin Islands for the purpose of destroying the enemy.

"Should the United States Fleet proceed towards Kiska Harbor in Alaska, it will either attempt to raid the Kuril Islands, which lie about 800 miles distant, and then advance southwards, or else will head for Midway Island and from there proceed to the vicinity of the Kuril Islands, all the while subject to submarine attacks by the Japanese. Rather than do this, it might proceed directly towards the Bonin Islands, because a decisive battle with the Japanese Fleet in that region would not so seriously jeopardize the United States Fleet. It could move into battle with practically its entire force, and it is believed the United States will most likely elect this last-mentioned course.

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"At such a time the Japanese Fleet would adopt a waiting attitude in the region of the Bonin Islands and would naturally elect the most favorable conditions under which to engage the enemy. Moreover, the Japanese Fleet will allow the United States Fleet to approach as close as possible and will then exert every possible effort to attack it from the rear (from the line of retreat).

"How much of a battle force will the Japanese Fleet find necessary at such a time? We would estimate that at least 90% of our battleships and new cruisers, 80% of our (other) cruisers and destroyers, and 80-90% of our submarines will be distributed among the first, second, and third fleets..."

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## CHAPTER XIX COUNTER-ESPIONAGE AND AMERICAN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST JAPAN.

(292) Section (1) Raids on Tokyo by American Air Force. "Assume that the United States Fleet advances to a point within 300 miles of Japanese territory. It is not difficult to imagine that they will attempt the bombing of Japan Proper by utilizing aircraft cruisers.

"Everybody assumes that in the event of a Japanese-American war, Tokyo City will suffer aerial bombardment. If this supposition should prove correct, from which direction will the United States launch an attack?

"First of all, we must bear in mind the fact that the United States is building airplane carriers of 25,000 tons. Six of these are under construction and 12 others have been contracted for. Moreover, these carriers will have a capacity of 200 planes. There are also rumors to the effect that construction of so-called 'aircraft cruisers' is being planned..."

(293) "Should such plans be realized, as was the case with the so-called 'Mosquito Fleet,' these cruisers will prove to be a formidable menace. Nor is this all. It has been reported that these aircraft cruisers will mount 9 6-inch guns and have a capacity of 36 airplanes. They will have a speed of 33 knots, and should they ...send out airplanes, Japan will find them most troublesome..."

"It is supposed that a fleet of about 100 airplanes, based on these aircraft cruisers, will advance on Tokyo from the northeast. If plans go according to schedule, these planes will cruise as far as Osaka, following the Tokaido (Eastern Seaboard Highway), and from Osaka will turn eastward to rejoin the United States Fleet. The total distance of such a flight would be about 1,000 miles..."

(294) "What will be the results of such an action? Of course it is realized that the United States is exerting every effort to increase the effectiveness of these air attacks in the same way that Japan counts heavily on submarine warfare..."

"If the United States Air Force succeeds in making an air raid on Tokyo, how much damage will be caused? Should their Air Force carry out such suicidal raids on Tokyo, it must be admitted that this city will suffer heavy losses. No Japanese has yet forgotten the horrors of the Great Earthquake of 1923. It should be remembered that the havoc caused by the fire which accompanied the earthquake was many times greater than that caused by the earthquake itself.

(295) "Let us suppose, then, that Tokyo is attacked by an enemy air force, each plane laden with hundreds of incendiary bombs. Can

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(295) we deny that such a catastrophe will occur? Will not Tokyo be reduced to ashes?..."

"The entire city of Tokyo, with innumerable wooden buildings, will naturally become a target for bombing. Once these incendiary bombs drop, everything in the vicinity will burn to ashes.

(296) "In such a case the attacking air force will not need to fly lower than 1,000 meters. While the Japanese in Tokyo are looking for enemy planes, fires will break out one after another in all parts of the city and will fill them with panic and fear.

"Such things as poison gas bombs and liquid poison gas would not demand any accuracy of aim. We can but shudder with fear when we imagine the inhabitants of Tokyo smothered with poison gas.

"From another point of view, however, things will not happen quite so simply. First of all, Japan herself has both an air force and air defense organizations. It must be noted that the national defense of Japan Proper will be doubled by the participation of the so-called 'Wild Eagles' (Japanese pilots).

"Furthermore, one of the fundamental principles of aviation is that 100 planes under adverse conditions can be defeated by one plane operating under favorable conditions. It is now recognized by the world that the efficiency of the latest airplanes manufactured in Japan is far superior to that of those produced in the United States..."

"Of a possible 100 planes sent at any one time by the United States, it is believed that only 20% will be able to reach the skies above Tokyo. Should bombs be dropped by these airplanes have 10% accuracy, the damage inflicted upon Tokyo will be negligible..."

(297) Section (2) Raids on the Kansai District by the American Air Force. "Let us assume that United States planes carry out a raid upon the Kansai District. Let us consider from what direction this force will approach this district. The northern route would be from the Sea of Japan, across the Bay of Wakasa, over Biwako (Lake Biwa), and down the Yodogawa (Yodo River). From the west, this force would approach flying east over the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai). An eastern route would be to fly over the Bay of Ise, thence over Lake Biwa and to the heart of Osaka, following the western direction taken by the Kansai railroads. From the south, an attacking force might come over the seas west of Kishu and proceed in the direction of Osaka Bay."

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(297) "It goes without saying that during daylight and even during night-time, the surface of the ocean, (the river) Yodogawa and the railroads would furnish sufficient guides. The regions around the Bay of Ise, Kishu and vicinity, Tosa and vicinity, the Kitan Straits, or the southern section of Kyushu, should also be guarded as possible invasion routes..."

(298) "This (confusion caused by bombing attacks) is especially the case with Japan, since we have no underground shelters. And what shall our citizens do in the face of fire and poison gas attacks?..."

(299) "The method by which enemy airplanes will attack our cities is, first of all, to drop numerous incendiary bombs on various spots for the purpose of starting conflagrations. Part of this force will attempt the destruction of water reservoirs, while large bombs will be dropped on munition factories, ports, gas tanks, large warehouses, large buildings, and government institutions. These will probably be shattered to dust.

"The second attack will be for the purpose of demoralizing and instilling fear in the hearts of city dwellers. This will be attempted by dropping poison gas bombs on places where the panic-stricken inhabitants will congregate for shelter..."

"The places to be bombed and the method and order to be followed are all planned previously with the aid of spies operating in enemy countries during peacetime. Once hostilities break out, the enemy will send operatives for the purpose of ferreting out information concerning important defense facilities and will no doubt attack them."

(301) Section (3) Air Raids and Counter-Espionage. "General Ludendorff, the originator of the term 'fifth column,' has written in his book 'Totalitarian Warfare:' 'With the development of airplanes and the perfection of the fifth column, we shall not only drop bombs but shall also strengthen our propaganda technique by bombing enemy citizens with printed matter. We must not forget that, among other instruments of propaganda, the radio enables us to say whatever we please.'

"Let us now consider strategies used by Germany in her North European and Belgium campaigns... These spies would capture various air fields immediately upon receipt of secret wireless messages and furthermore would send out powerful short waves for the purpose of guiding transport planes.

"It goes without saying that a single point of light during an air raid would form an ideal target. And by infiltrating

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(301) operatives, it will be possible for them to guide airplanes by placing infra-red searchlights in the shadow of chimneys. These are impossible to detect on the ground.

"Spy activities are not confined to air raid periods alone. Present warfare involves mobilization of an entire nation, and any negligence in regard to such things as natural resources, manufactures, economics, or thought tendencies, would be a serious affair. Should the opposing nation be able to destroy these essentials of national defense, it will be possible for them to block the initiation of any military activities. Even if military operations do get under way, it will be possible to overpower an opponent before the actual use of arms occurs.

"Destruction of such pillars of national defense would be carried out mainly by espionage, propaganda, and 'strategy' even during peacetime. This is what is known as 'secret warfare.' Such a nation as the United States feels keenly the necessity of arriving at a quick and decisive solution of any military war by the use of this secret warfare. Should the United States depend upon armed warfare alone, it would necessitate lengthening the period of hostilities and result in the exhaustion of national power.

(302) "The following are some instances of the secret warfare that the United States has waged against Japan:

- "(1) During the Washington Conference the United States was successful in having Japan's armaments reduced unreasonably by ferreting out the treaty figures which Japan would accept.
- "(2) The United States has increased the difficulties of solving our overpopulation question by the passage of the Immigration Law.
- "(3) The United States is suspected of stirring up trouble by instilling international, individualistic, and communistic thought, and also by the spread of the defective aspects of liberalism.
- "(4) She has attempted to obstruct Japanese expansion and has seriously wounded Japan by her policy of aiding Chiang Kai Shek.
- "(5) Economic blockade of such things as material and technical aid.

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- "(6) Suspicions of backstage machinations by the United States in connection with the lack of material resources and the frequent fires which have occurred in recent times.
- "(7) Deception of our nationals by the use of 'sex, sports, and screen,' and their attempt to lower morale by democratic propaganda.

"In addition, recent activities of American spies have been unusually outstanding. In nine cases out of ten these spies obtain information in a scientific manner by analyzing material which accompanies secret information. In other words, they scientifically collect all fragmentary data from such things as newspapers, magazines, almanacs, statistical reports, government publications, pictures, and photographs. By this method they gather the required information. Furthermore, they approach various individuals, organizations, religious institutions, factories, etc... This is the method by which they attempt to spy on our national secrets."



## CHAPTER XX THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLE BETWEEN JAPAN AND AMERICA

Section (1) Sinking of American Battleships. It is alleged that Japanese submarines operating between the United States mainland and Hawaii would undertake suicidal attacks on United States shipping and battle forces, wreaking havoc among them. With regard to the circular formation, the author points out that Japanese subs could break through the formation from the sides, taking advantage of poor visibility and the distance between units of the United States Fleet. The latter, unable to keep in close contact with each other, would be forced to depend upon signal and wireless communication. Chances of torpedo hits on capital ships would be excellent, and half the torpedoes launched would reach their targets.

Seagoing subs based on the Bonin Islands and other units of the Japanese Fleet would attack the United States Fleet from the rear once the latter neared Japanese waters. Whereas the Japanese might lose as many as five destroyers in the fray, the United States would lose five large warships (capital ships or 10,000-ton cruisers) and one or more aircraft carriers, seriously damaging both American battle power and morale. Japanese destroyer units, the author reiterates, are more than a match for American submarines and destroyers, particularly in night fighting, and would even ram enemy ships as a last resort.

(312) Section (2) Escape of the American Fleet. "The United States Fleet, having suffered heavy damage from attacks of the Japanese 'Surprise Fleets,' will be forced to give up her grandiose plans for attacking Japan. After pausing to reorganize her forces, this fleet would proceed homeward with her battered warships in the center..."

"At such a time, units of the United States Fleet will have suffered such serious damage as to preclude the maintenance of high speeds; maximum speed would probably be about 16 knots. The Japanese Fleet, on the other hand, can easily do 20 knots, an advantage of 4 knots per hour. Moreover, three of our battleships of the Kirishima type develop a speed of over 26 knots and our '8-inch' cruisers, more than ten in number, have a maximum speed of 40 knots. The battleships will be able to slowly creep up on the United States Fleet while our cruisers simultaneously converge to cut off their advance...and thereby engage the enemy..."

(315) "...The minute the Japanese Fleet comes within accurate firing range, her nine capital ships will simultaneously open up with 72 14-inch and 16 16-inch guns. However, should we figure that one Japanese capital ship had been heavily damaged by enemy planes at this time, total gun power would be reduced to 60 14-inch

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and 16 16-inch guns.

(316) "Compared with this the United States Fleet will have had two capital ships sunk by submarine attack. In addition, a third capital ship would be badly damaged; still a fourth would be lost by destroyer action, and another by airplanes. In other words, the United States Fleet would lose five battleships to Japan's one,... leaving her (the United States) with only seven capital ships. Their main gunnery would be composed of 56 14-inch and 16 16-inch guns, giving Japan a slight numerical superiority.

(317) "And let us now consider fire accuracy. During the battle of the Sea of Japan in 1904, the Japanese Fleet had 32% efficiency, while during the battle of San Diego Bay in 1898, the United States Fleet had only 14%... Even if we figure a 50% increase in fire accuracy for the United States, this would give only a 21% efficiency. Comparing this with England's 21.7% during the battle of Jutland and Germany's 33.3%, the fire accuracy of England and the United States is roughly the same, while that of Germany and Japan are similar. At the same time it must be remembered that present-day gun and fire accuracy are kept a strict secret by the various nations, and the truth is hard to discover..."

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CHAPTER XXI JAPAN'S CAPTURE OF HAWAII AND THE CLOSING OF THE  
PANAMA CANAL.

(319) Section (1) Japan's Capture of Hawaii. "After the great United States Fleet has been defeated by the Japanese, it will most probably return to Pearl Harbor in Hawaii because of serious damage. Subsequent actions of the United States Fleet will be to reorganize and equip Hawaii as her first line of defense or to decide to relinquish the Hawaiian Islands and restrict her first line of defense to the coast of her mainland, near San Francisco.

(320) "The Hawaiian Islands are indeed an important area and, should the United States Fleet be beaten by the Japanese Fleet, these islands will become of major concern to Japan. First of all, Japan must seize control of all public utilities and finances in the Islands. Unless Japan plans on and achieves permanent capture of Hawaii, the United States will never give up her ambitions in the Pacific Ocean.

"Even though the United States should not give up Hawaii immediately after her defeat, her fleet would send its main force to the mainland because the United States coast would be in danger. Should she leave her first line of defense at Hawaii, it would merely mean that she would leave there a certain number of warships for the purpose of defending the mainland against attacks by the Japanese Navy. In any case Japan will be forced to take over these islands.

"...Should the United States Fleet base itself on San Francisco, it will be impossible for the Japanese Fleet to attack the Hawaiian group, which is situated one-third closer to the United States than to Japan. Japan should attack the Hawaiian Islands only when the possibility of capture is strong and she can see that she will be able to maintain complete control after occupation... Thus the Japanese attack against Hawaii must of necessity be after the United States Fleet has become inferior to that of the Japanese nation.

"Should the United States Fleet lose more than half its effective force in a Western Pacific engagement, and still refuse to capitulate to Japan, it goes without saying that Japan should proceed to Hawaii and enter into the second phase of her strategy..."

(322) "She, Japan, will then proceed to the next stage in her strategy, which involves, first of all, the attack against Hawaii, and secondly, the capture of all islands in the Pacific Ocean belonging to the United States. In other words, Guam, Tutuila, Canton, Wake, Midway, the Aleutian Islands, and all the other new bases must be captured."

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"THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR"  
 ("Sankoku Domei to Nichibei Sen")  
 by KINOAKI MATSUO

CHAPTER XX THE GREAT NAVAL BATTLE BETWEEN JAPAN AND AMERICA

Page in Section (3) Air Raids and Counter-Espionage. "Probably there  
 Text: are still persons who doubt the saying that spy defense is the cardi-  
 (300) nal rule of air defense. Richard Rowan, the American expert on spies  
 who wrote the well-known book "Spies and the Next War," classifies  
 as follows the spheres of coordinated activity related to attacks by  
 spies:

- "A. Bombing of centers of enemy troop mobilization.
  - 1. Guiding air force by means of signal(s).
  - 2. Explosions and incendiary in unison with bomb-  
ing.
- "B. Bombing of strategic places by enemy air force.
  - 1. Guiding by means of signal(s).
  - 2. Explosions and incendiary in unison with bomb-  
ing.
- "C. Bombing of fortifications.
  - 1. Guiding by means of signal(s).
- "D. Bombing of harbors and naval bases.
  - 1. Guiding by means of signal(s).
- "E. Bombing of enemy warships.
  - 1. Bombing of enemy fleet and transports by air force  
in conformity with reports from spies who have  
secretly entered enemy territory.
- (301) "F. Bombing of cities, communication centers, railroad junc-  
tions, etc.
  - 1. Guiding signal(s) whenever the occasion demands it.
  - 2. Schemes to demoralize the enemy civilian populace.
  - 3. Spreading wild rumors of the sort which dampen the  
fighting spirit of enemy combatants and circulat-  
ing false reports that the native regions of var-  
ious persons have been subjected to air bombings.

*D-3-11*  
*Spies and the Next War*

"As is clearly shown by Mr. Rowan's classification, sig-  
 nals constitute ideal guides for any forces engaged in air raids.

"In the current European War is it not clear that the suc-  
 cess of Germany's astounding blitz tactics is due to the underground  
 activities of the 'fifth column'?"

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"General Ludendorff, the originator of the term 'fifth column,' has written in his book 'Totalitarian Warfare': 'With the development of airplanes and the perfection of the fifth column, we shall not only drop bombs but shall also strengthen our propaganda technique by bombing enemy citizens with printed matter. We must not forget that, among other instruments of propaganda, the radio enables us to say whatever we please.'

"Let us now consider strategies used by Germany in her North European and Belgium campaigns... These spies would capture various air fields immediately upon receipt of secret wireless messages and furthermore would send out powerful short waves for the purpose of guiding transport planes.

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"It goes without saying that a single point of light during an air raid would form an ideal target. And by infiltrating operatives, it will be possible for them to guide airplanes by placing infra-red searchlights in the shadow of chimneys. These are impossible to detect on the ground.

"Spy activities are not confined to air raid periods alone. Present warfare involves mobilization of an entire nation, and any negligence in regard to such things as natural resources, manufactures, economics, or thought tendencies, would be a serious affair. Should the opposing nation be able to destroy these essentials of national defense, it will be possible for them to block the initiation of any military activities. Even if military operations do get under way, it will be possible to overpower an opponent before the actual use of arms occurs.

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"The following are some instances of the secret warfare that the United States has waged against Japan:

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- "(3) The United States is suspected of stirring up trouble by instilling international, individualistic, and communist thought, and also by the spread of the defective aspects of liberalism.
- "(4) She has attempted to obstruct Japanese expansion and has seriously wounded Japan by her policy of aiding Chiang Kai Shek.
- "(5) Economic blockade of such things as material and technical aid.
- "(6) Suspicions of backstage machinations by the United States in connection with the lack of material resources and the frequent fires which have occurred in recent times.
- "(7) Deception of our nationals by the use of 'sex, sports, and screen,' and their attempt to lower morale by democratic propaganda.

(304) "In addition, recent activities of American spies have been unusually outstanding. In nine cases out of ten these spies obtain information in a scientific manner by analyzing material which accompanies secret information. In other words, they scientifically collect all fragmentary data from such things as newspapers, magazines, almanacs, statistical reports, government publications, pictures, and photographs. By this method they gather the required information. Furthermore, they approach various individuals, organizations, religious institutions, factories, etc. This is the method by which they attempt to spy on our national secrets.

"The objectives of destructive operations in war strategy are, in essence, the various institutions which the individual, the group, or the nation possess. It is possible for the persons who are connected with such institutions to prevent these acts and to increase their vigilance, thereby precluding any possibility of enemy action. Furthermore, we should constantly strive to uphold and maintain a strong attitude and firm determination. We should never be swayed by propaganda or enemy scheming. Although in the midst of a violent anti-Japanese 'secret war,' we should never falter in strongly upholding the pillars of our state.

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(322) "For Japan to capture Hawaii, it will be necessary to have the help of the Army along with the Fleet. However, before such an attack, we must establish a foothold by seizing Midway... It is believed that this island will fall after one day's shelling.

"The islands of Canton and Enderbury (in the Phoenix group) may be considered to be in the same category, and although they are great naval and air bases, their end will be the same as in the case of Midway.

(323) "Let us now look at Hawaii, where there are some 150,000 or 160,000 Japanese residents, more than half of whom are so-called nisei (second generation Japanese). The question of the sympathies of these Japanese, after the outbreak of a Japanese-American War, has been thoroughly discussed during the last few years. Some of the aliens among them have returned to Japan and others have become naturalized United States citizens, but the great majority of them will probably act under directions of the Territorial Government of Hawaii (should war break out).

"As far as the United States Government is concerned, it will find it impossible to send 150,000 or 160,000 Japanese home. Therefore, they will most probably collect these Japanese in one area and place them under surveillance for the purpose of preventing disturbances. This would be the most logical procedure. Otherwise, should the news once reach Hawaii that the Japanese Fleet had won, these Japanese might immediately organize volunteer corps and undertake the capture of the Hawaiian Islands... However, as long as the United States Fleet is stationed in these islands, such an occurrence will be impossible.

"Should there be any slip, some such tragic incident as a wholesale massacre might occur. The Japanese residents, among all others, have no weapons... It is said that air bases alone number over fifteen, and it may be assumed that during wartime these units will be developed to make it very difficult for Japanese residents to fight... However, it goes without saying that, with the landing of the Japanese Army on the Islands, these resident Japanese will be of extreme help..."

(325) "Should the United States Fleet withdraw to Pearl Harbor in a subdued state, vessels able to make the voyage will be sent to the mainland to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese after the capture of the Hawaiian Islands. By the time the Japanese Navy, loaded with Army troops and escorting transport vessels, attacks the Hawaiian Islands, the seas around these islands will be protected only by mines and disabled warships, and it will be possible for the Japanese Navy to effect a landing quite easily. However, since the forts are extremely strong, a frontal landing will not be attempted."

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"For a distance of twenty miles along the northwestern coast of Oahu there extends a beach with shallow water ('shoaling beach') which will be the most likely spot for landing operations. It is said that any army of 50,000 or 60,000 soldiers will be required to protect this region, so we may well imagine that an army of 20,000 or thereabouts will be helpless..."

"Landing operations can never be carried out without sacrifices, and in the case of Hawaii, they will necessitate several hundred times the sacrifices needed for a German invasion of Great Britain. A suicide landing party would have to be organized and protected by shore shelling. Thus, allowing for the aforementioned sacrifices, it may be possible to capture these islands without too much trouble once they have lost the protective power of the United States Fleet.

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"Let us now consider the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands. It is truly America's greatest advance base of the United States Navy and is of extreme strength. Close to the narrow entrance to Pearl Harbor lie some ten capital ships, two aircraft carriers, fifteen cruisers, fifty destroyers, and numerous submarines..."

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"The Air Force is composed of practically equal numbers of Army and Navy planes... Unless Wheeler and Hickam Fields and the three other auxiliary airfields are completely destroyed by the Japanese Air Force, a Japanese landing party will be in extreme danger. There are, in addition two airfields on the island of Hawaii, two on Maui, one on Molokai, two on Kauai, and one proposed for the island of Lanai. Every one of these air bases must be completely destroyed in order to render all enemy air action impossible..

"Hickam Field is of especial interest because it is headquarters for the 18th Flying Corps of the United States Army Air Force and has both bomber and interceptor units. This must be the first objective.

"Heavy coastal batteries are concentrated between the two peaks on the southern edge of a hill encircling Pearl Harbor. The entire island of Oahu is within shelling radius of these guns. (From page 326 of text) As far as these heavy gun batteries are concerned, there are at the present time over twenty 14-inch and 12-inch guns and about ten big guns of smaller caliber. During wartime these will probably be supplemented, and our Army must take proper countermeasures in order to attack. It goes without saying that units of the Japanese Army will be necessary in addition to marines... (Censored by the Japanese). The Japanese Fleet will attack with the help of transports; but, depending upon conditions there, the transports should be concealed in the shelter of undefended islands until

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(327) an opportune moment provided by the action of our Navy permits the landing of Army troops. After landing, one week will be sufficient in which to capture the entire island of Oahu, and inasmuch as the other islands are practically undefended, there should be no problem there.

(328) "Once the Japanese capture the Islands, our countrymen will be immediately released and will be free to continue their normal occupations under Japanese control. The task of provisioning our Army will be easy because of the presence of numerous Japanese residents in the Hawaiian Islands... We will experience no difficulty in obtaining stores.

"Should Japan conquer the Hawaiian Islands the United States might ask for peace..."

(329) "The United States has spent considerable time and money on great armament expansion and war preparations, and should there remain a single thread of hope, she might elect to continue the struggle. However, a United States which has lost the battle power of its fleet will find it impossible to take any appropriate steps, regardless of how far advanced her design in airplanes or superiority in scientific war strategy. So it might be that, simultaneous with the loss of the Hawaiian Islands, the United States would capitulate to Japan."

(330) Section (2) Closing of the Panama Canal by the Japanese.  
"The last remaining question is, 'What will happen to the Panama Canal?'

"The canal is over 4,600 miles from Hawaii and 8,000 miles from Japan, and an attack upon it will not be easy. At the same time, should such an attack be attempted despite untold obstacles, the only possible method would be to use small numbers of troops..."

"Even though Japan should capture the Panama Canal, as soon as a second Japanese-American war breaks out, the canal and the region around it will be subject to attack by the United States. As long as Japan controls the canal, the United States Fleet will be completely divided into two units which could not merge even during wartime.

"Without the help of strong naval power, American imperialism will not be able to continue. The peace following the Japanese-American War should be a real peace, without any menace of arms. It would also follow that China, i.e. the real China under the 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,' would be able to escape European meddling. Moreover, Central American countries, such as Mexico, and the small countries of South America would be freed from United States pressure."

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(332) "Although the defenses of this canal were believed to be quite strong up until last year, guns emplaced around the canal were of extreme vintage and their forts were also out of date.

"According to the results of maneuvers carried out by the United States Navy, there reportedly was a possibility of an '8-inch' cruiser and a single aircraft carrier capturing the canal; thus it seems that, while the canal is not subject to easy capture, it is far from being impregnable..."

(334) "...At the present time the United States has several new cruisers and gunboats and a certain number of submarines stationed in the Canal Zone. At the Army Air Base in Puerto Rico is a strong Air Force composed of medium long-range bombers and observation planes. The strengthening of the canal itself and its entire anti-aircraft defenses is being steadily pushed..."

(335) "The capture of the Panama Canal, although not impossible, is accompanied by trouble and danger. As long as Japan is able to realize actual benefits from its capture, over and above the sacrifices necessary, control of the canal would be worthwhile. On the other hand, our dauntless fleet might attack the Panama Canal and destroy it to the utter amazement of all World Powers."

## CHAPTER XXII AMERICA AND THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE

Section (2) America's Tendencies. It is Mr. Matsuo's impression that the consummation of the Tripartite Alliance stunned the United States, and he refers to statements made at the time by President Roosevelt, Sumner Welles and Admiral Richardson. American public opinion came to be divided between those who advocated total blockade of the Japanese Empire and those who stood for war. Admiral Yarnell announced publicly that the United States was fully prepared for any eventuality.

To this American display of temper Premier Prince Konoye made strong reply, promising war should the United States ask for it. All Japan looked upon United States naval expansion as an unfriendly gesture despite the fact it apparently was aimed more at the Atlantic menace than at that in the Pacific.

With regard to British-American foreign relations, the author holds that British and American courting of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been more successful than either the silk boycott or their moves against Mexico. The seriousness of the Soviet problem is emphasized because of its extreme pertinence to Japan's future course of action. The author notes that at the time of writing, while there existed considerable anti-Russian feeling in the United States because of the Soviet attack on Finland, all the signs indicated a steady and durable improvement in official American-British-Russian relations.

Section (3) Significance of the Alliance. The beginning of this final section is given over to historic illustrations of three types of alliance: offensive, defensive, and offensive-defensive. The Tripartite Alliance is held to supersede all past alliances, however, in that it is the first total alliance, and Mr. Matsuo goes on to set forth its provisions.

The Japanese are uncertain as to whether a full-fledged alliance exists between Great Britain and the United States binding them either in Europe, the Far East, or both. In any case Japan is on the alert, ready to fight in self-defense at any moment. That the Japanese were aware such a time was close is apparent in the last sentences of the text:

(352) "The United States has already confidentially advised its residents in the Far East to evacuate. We may imagine that conditions will henceforth become worse and worse. At this time the United States of America should note well the fact that Japan is fully cognizant of the worst possible exigencies."