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"THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR"

February 1942.

INTRODUCTION

Americans may shortly hear a great deal about a small Japanese book by one Kinoaki Matsuo entitled "Sankoku Domei to Nichibei Sen," which, translated, means "The Tripartite Alliance and the Japanese-American War." Within the past few weeks, newspapers on both the East and West Coasts have publicized the volume as a Japanese "Mein Kampf," also as "part of a confidential textbook for Japanese naval officers." Time and again the book and the story surrounding its appearance in America have been the pièce de résistance of sensation-loving columnists.

The precise date of publication is unknown, but the copy used by the Navy Department for translation purposes is fifth edition and bears the date October 18, 1940. Although printed in Tokyo, it bears the label of a well-known Japanese bookshop in San Francisco with the number "499". The author had previously written, under the name Naoaki Matsuo, a kindred volume entitled "Remmei no Kiki to Nichibei Sen", or "The Crisis in the League (or Alliance) and the Japanese-American War."

To anyone acquainted with Japan and her modern popular literature, these books appear to belong unquestionably in the class of the cheap, sensational and often trashy pulp magazines and books which are almost as much a part of Japanese life as their newspapers and comic books. Unfortunately, however, most Americans are in no position to judge such a publication and hence are all too likely to accept the verdicts of others who, though equally uninformed, profess "inside knowledge," and will undertake to evaluate anything under the sun. It also happens that a well-known and reputable American publishing house is shortly to publish an English edition of "The Tripartite Alliance and the Japanese-American War." In view of these circumstances, the Office of Naval Intelligence deems it advisable that the various interested offices within the Navy as well as other departments of the Government be informed concerning the volume, its authorship, and possible value prior to the appearance of the English edition.

The book which constitutes the subject of the present report is reliably reported to have been smuggled into this country in December, 1940, or January, 1941, for sale among Japanese "who were known to be all right." According to information of undetermined reliability, the book was intended for the particular use of Japanese intelligence agents in the United States. It would appear much more likely, however, that its

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chief value is as propaganda, or, at the most, reference material for loyal overseas Japanese, some of whom, it is true, are suspected of operating or having operated as intelligence agents in this country.

In February, 1941, Kilsoo Haan, an anti-Japanese Korean propagandist, attempted to interest certain Government agencies in "The Tripartite Alliance and the Japanese-American War" with copies allegedly stolen from a West Coast member of the notorious Black Dragon Society. The Navy Department, however, did not receive a copy.

Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Mr. Haan proceeded to publicize his previous efforts to influence American officialdom and caused quite a sensation with various newspaper stories about the book in question, a serious and timely consideration of which, he insisted, would have precluded the catastrophe in Hawaii. In order to ascertain the value of the publication, the Office of Naval Intelligence thereupon procured a copy, examined it in detail, and herewith issues this report upon it.

The author, Kionoaki (alias Naoki or Nobuaki) Matsuo, reportedly holds a position of some importance in the Information Bureau of either the Japanese Foreign Office or Navy Ministry. It is interesting to note that in his preface he acknowledges "the advice of the Publicity Department of the Imperial Japanese Navy Ministry, the Yushu Kai of the Suiko Sha (a clique within the official Japanese Navy Club) and also the editorial department of the company which publishes 'Umi to Sora' (a naval magazine)."

It should be noted that, although Matsuo expresses mature thoughts, he uses the Japanese language in an oddly inept and halting manner--as if he had lived long in a foreign country and was accustomed to expressing himself in a language other than Japanese.

The report itself is in two parts, table of contents and text. The table of contents contains both chapter and section titles, exactly as given in the Japanese original. Sub-section titles have been omitted because of the fact that they were frequently misleading with respect to contents of the text. The procedure followed in preparing the second part of the report was, first, to examine the whole book and then, on the basis of this examination, to select those parts which seemed most important from the viewpoint of Navy interest. For the sake of conciseness the parts selected were then summarized. In some cases this summarization is presented in the language of the translators, but in the majority of cases the result has been achieved by quoting excerpts taken directly from the text in order to preserve the author's exact meaning.

Because of the lack of time available, the report has had to be restricted as to length. However, it should be noted that the entire

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book will be photostated and translations made available for the future use of interested Government agencies.

Place names and figures censored by the Japanese have been so indicated, and the page numbers of the original text have been repeated in the left-hand margin of the pages of the report. Where words, phrases, or sentences have been omitted, this fact is designated by three periods in sequence (...). Anything which appears in parentheses is the work of the translators and aims to clarify that which immediately precedes. Finally, there are a few instances where the place names could not be definitely identified; in these cases the Japanese phonetic version has been repeated, in parentheses.

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"THE TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR"

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CHAPTER I THE GREAT CRISIS BETWEEN JAPAN AND AMERICA.

Page in Section (2) Battle for the Supremacy of the Pacific. "It
Text: must be taken for granted that the United States will stick by her
'new order'. America is blessed with exceptionally extensive terri-
(12) tory and tremendous luxury in natural resources. At the same time
that the United States combats the 'old order' as typified in Eur-
ope, she persists in the continuation of this 'old order' in the
Far East...

(12) "The United States intends to solve this problem by the
use of arms and has already set out upon a great program of naval
expansion. She has also established a 'life line' between Hawaii,
Guam and the Philippine Islands. Japan must view with great concern
the fact that this 'life line' crosses the Western Pacific, where
it is imperative that we control the sea.

(12) "It can indeed be stated that we are now faced with one
of the most momentous crises in our history. We (the Japanese) do
not ask for war. On the other hand, we can no longer hope for con-
tinued friendly relations with the United States."

Section (3) America and the Second World War. The First
World War turned Japan's attention southwards, thereby throwing her
into direct conflict with United States' interests. The struggle
for the Western Pacific has been one of the prime causes of recent
United States naval expansion and has, at the same time, evoked
Japanese expression of determination to match the Americans ship
for ship. The Japanese feel that, in view of United States-British
co-operation and the acquisition by the Americans of new bases in
the Atlantic, the United States would attempt the same strategy in
the Pacific, and ultimately conclude a full-fledged military alliance
with Great Britain. The section continues with a very brief treat-
ment of each of the following newly acquired bases: Newfoundland,
the Bermudas, Jamaica, Santa Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua and British
Guinea, and then goes on to discuss the effect of this policy on
the Pacific area.

(21) "No matter how the situation may develop, Japan has no
need to feel nervous as long as the United States is concerned main-
ly with the Atlantic Ocean. The ocean which has control of life or
death over our nation has been and still is the Pacific.

"Should the same conditions arise in the Pacific as have
repeatedly arisen in the Atlantic Ocean, or should there be any
chance of the Stars and Stripes flying defiantly over Hongkong or
Singapore, Japan could not remain inactive. Such a situation would
menace the very life of Japan. Although we pray that, no matter how

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self-confident the United States or Great Britain may be, they would never play with fire to such an extent, and although we do not wish for any such conditions, the facts point to a sudden extension of the Devil's hand across the calm waters of the Pacific Ocean... Our suspicion of this intrigue is based upon the report that the United States intends to lease the Islands of Canton and Enderbury, both of which belong to Great Britain, as airplane bases."

- (29) Section (5) Conscription in America. "...There is nothing so hard to understand as conscription in the United States. The United States has more men in the Army than she wants at the present time; neither the labor unions nor the farmers wish any form of conscription, nor do the poorer people wish it. The people who originated the conscription bill are Secretary of War Stimson and other capitalists who are helped by the Jewish financiers on Wall Street and also by their newspaper, the 'New York Times.'

"As the people of the United States themselves intensely dislike the idea of war, they are set against conscription during peacetime. It is worthy of note that the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. were both extremely strong in their utterances against the bill..."

- (31) "Even in the United States there is a strongly rooted totalitarian movement. In contrast to the German Brown Shirts and the Italian Black Shirts, there is an organization which uses a uniform of light bluish-gray. This organization and others instill fear in the heart of the United States... The formal name for this party is the Silver Shirts or Silver Legion, and it is headed by William D. Pelley.

"Usually called the Silver Shirts in the United States, the members have the letter 'L', which stands for the 'L' in 'liberation,' inscribed on the breast of their uniforms. Present membership stands at 50,000, with 2,000,000 sympathizers. The leader of the party,... an outstanding anthropologist and author, uses the slogan 'Return to the pioneer spirit of America. Build America for Americans. Free America from the devilish hands of the Jews.' The party is conducting a fearless campaign against the capitalistic and political power as well as the propaganda of the Jewish people..."

- (32) "The fact should not be overlooked that there are other patriotic organizations which are cooperating with the Silver Shirts, among them organizations composed of American citizens of German and Italian descent..

"Membership in the party is composed of such national heroes as Colonel Lindbergh and Henry Ford, the automobile king. It is also said that Ford provides funds for the activities of the Silver Shirts. The latter have published a list designating as Jews many prominent

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(32) persons beginning with President Roosevelt and Rockefeller and including more than sixty big capitalists. They also assert that the so-called 'Three S' policy (sports, sex, and screen) is a scheme of the Jews, and claim that the Jews and the Reds differ in name only.

"Japan's anti-Red activities in China should be interpreted as a great help to the United States in her fight against Communism. Some of the sympathizers of the Silver Shirts have an extremely pro-Japanese way of thinking, in that they firmly believe that the Japanese nation is America's first line of defense against Communism. Indeed, the Silver Shirt Legion has exerted tremendous influence in explaining, on behalf of Japan, that the anti-Japanese propaganda, so prevalent in the United States since the outbreak of the China Incident, constitutes an essential part of Jewish political strategy. Pelley at one time lived in Japan and has a deep sense of familiarity in his contacts with patriotic and religious groups in that country. His sense of perception is extremely rare for a foreigner. Pelley has said, "Japan, leader of the Far East, and the United States, as protector of both Americas, are, along with Germany and Italy, the builders of a new world order.'..."

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CHAPTER II SHIPBUILDING EXPANSION IN AMERICA.

(38) Section (1) Frenzied America. "The Vinson Naval Expansion Bill had a tremendous effect upon... the world for the reason that it proposed the entire naval tonnage of the United States be increased to two million tons.

(39) "Should this program be completed by 1945, the Navy of the United States will be the mightiest naval power in the world and will thereby assume a clearly offensive quality. It cannot be denied that it would be possible for such a Navy to go in for overseas strategy, especially blockade tactics around the coast of Japan or the South Seas.

(39) "Although there is some doubt as to whether the United States at the present time has enough shipbuilding facilities to complete the above-mentioned program, it must be taken for granted that she will definitely go through with this plan. The reason for this is that she does have some tremendous shipyards..."

Section (2) Ships Under Construction. The first part of this section is concerned with the comparative strength of the United States, French, Italian and German navies as of June, 1939; the Japanese figures are censored. In the case of the United States, of 35 destroyers under construction, 12 had been launched (presumably by June, 1939); of 12 submarines, two had been launched. In addition, two destroyer tenders, two minesweepers, one submarine tender, two ocean-going tugboats, and four seaplane tenders were planned. The cost of a battleship is given as \$70,000,000; that of a "six-inch" cruiser \$22,000,000; aircraft carrier \$31,000,000; destroyer \$8,500,000; and that of submarines \$6,500,000.

Admiral Stark announced at that time that there were under construction battle cruiser(s) of 20,000 tons and aircraft carrier(s) of 23-24,000 tons. The author interprets this as indicating the failure of the "eight-inch" cruisers of the United States as compared to those of Germany, and states that henceforth new United States cruisers would carry 12-inch guns to match the German pocket battleships. About 192,000 tons of such cruisers were to be built.

In September, 1940, President Roosevelt signed a bill providing for the further expansion of the United States Navy. Two hours after he signed it, it was announced that contracts had been let for seven battleships, eight aircraft carriers, 27 cruisers, 115 destroyers, 43 submarines, and one repairship -- a total of 201 vessels. According to an article in the "New York Times", the battleships were to be of 45-55,000 tons; the Associated Press reported the tonnage to be 45,000. In addition it was said that the carriers

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would be of 25,000 tons, and that the total new cruiser tonnage would be 412,000 tons, the larger cruisers being of 15-20,000 tons. In the case of destroyers, total new tonnage would be 250,000 tons, average tonnage per ship being 2,000; total new submarine tonnage 70,000, the average being above 1,500. At that time it was announced the two-ocean navy would be completed in from five to seven years (i.e. 1945 at the very earliest).

PLAN OF COMPLETED TWO-OCEAN NAVY

	<u>1940</u>	<u>Under Construction and/or Contracted For</u>	<u>Total</u>
Battleships	15	17	32
Cruisers	37	48	85
Aircraft Carriers	6	12	18
Destroyers	197	171	368
Submarines	<u>103</u>	<u>82</u>	<u>185</u>
<u>TOTALS</u>	358	330	688

Contracts were simultaneously let for 2,400 naval planes and numerous other naval facilities.

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CHAPTER IV INEVITABILITY OF A JAPANESE-AMERICAN WAR.

Section (1) The Fallacy of Japanese-American Friendship.

This section endeavors to point out that it is ridiculous to imagine a Japanese-American war can be avoided. Inasmuch as President Roosevelt, and the Chief of Naval Operations have already announced such a war to be inevitable in view of United States opposition to the "New Order in East Asia," the author concludes that the only ones who fail to share this belief are either pacifists or wishful thinkers.

- (99) "The state of American defense is comparatively weak and, at least at the present time, the major portion of their Army and Navy is still in the blueprint stage. The various phases of the program are incomplete, and consequently there is absolutely no chance for the United States to win a war against so highly trained an army as that of Japan.
- (100) "Should the Japanese-American conflict be mainly a naval war, its outcome cannot be decided by a land army alone. As we look at the individual navies, the American Navy at the time of writing is far inferior to that of the Japanese Empire. At the present time, unless a capital ship has 14-inch guns as its main battery, it cannot possibly stand in the firing line. Among America's capital ships, there are four old-type vessels which have 12-inch guns as their main battery. The United States has completed only a few of her '8-inch' cruisers, and as far as destroyers and submarines are concerned, the majority of these were built hastily during the last World War. Their battle efficiency has decreased considerably and does not begin to compare with the more modern and highly developed Japanese warships. This is one of the reasons why the United States has gone in for the present armament expansion.
- (100) "So far as the United States is concerned, she will be forced to condone and abide with Japan until at least 1945. Once her armament expansion is completed, however, she will be able to manufacture a plausible alibi and declare war on Japan. Although we cannot say which side will win until an actual state of warfare exists, anybody can see that, with her present naval power, Japan would have the better chance of winning. After 1945 and the completion of her naval expansion, it is easy to surmise that the chances of the United States winning such a war would be far greater.
- (101) "Thus Japan must necessarily start hostilities before the completion of this great expansion program... At the same time America has joined hands with the Chinese Communist Party, who are like rats in a hole. Although she has signed a treaty with Soviet Russia, it is said that the most favorable time for the United States

to take any steps (towards war with Japan) is after she has signed a mutual defense treaty with Canada, Australia and the Central and South American countries.

(101)

"It can be said that the greatest chance of a war between Japan and the United States will occur when the curves (showing comparative naval strength) of both the Japanese and American naval forces coincide..."

"Any person who calmly regards America's moves at such a time will immediately recognize the arrival of the time for the outbreak of hostilities..."

Section (3) Cost of a Japanese-American War. The author states that, while the transportation of Japanese troops to the South Pacific would require a certain amount of cash, the total cost of the war would be less for Japan than for the United States. The Russo-Japanese War was indeed expensive, but a Japanese-American war would be "more convenient and therefore less costly." An unnamed German naval expert is quoted to the effect that capture of the Philippine Islands, Samoa, the Sandwich Islands, and California could be achieved without spending a cent above ordinary military expenditures.

Another important factor discussed is the transportation difficulties confronting the United States in the event of a Pacific war. Inasmuch as the bulk of production resources and sources of food supply are on the East Coast, the distance involved is well over 5,000 miles.

(109)

"One reason the cost of a Japanese-American war would be high, as far as the United States is concerned, is because she is over 3,000 miles removed from what will be the field of battle, ... and it must be said that although Japan's war cost will be small, that of the United States will be terrifically high.

"Furthermore, there will be an impressive difference in the problems of provision and compensation. Not one soldier in the Japanese Army desires any salary. Give a Japanese soldier a small quantity of rice and some fish and vegetables, and he will be more than willing to fight for his nation. But look at American soldiers. They receive more than twenty times the salary of a Japanese white-collar worker, and if they do not receive what amounts to a banquet, they refuse to fight. In the case of the Japanese, twenty to thirty sen suffices where in America it takes from twenty to thirty yen..."

(110)

"Should Japan be able to capture Guam, the Philippine Islands and the numerous South Sea islands at the outset of the

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war, she could fight at her ease. With the outbreak of war, the only thing that Japan will lose will be her trade, and since even now the United States is not buying very much from Japan, the effect of total disruption of trade will be slight. To offset this we can take over the Chinese, Indian, and various South Sea trade routes of the United States. There is no need, therefore, for Japan to deliberately lose a war because of financial crisis... On the contrary, national industries will be benefited and overseas trade will expand..."

(112) "Recently, certain nationalists in Japan have so far degraded themselves as to point out that unless our country grasps hands with Germany, the fate of our own nation will be sealed. Such utterances are too ridiculous to warrant discussion. There is absolutely no necessity for our bowing to Nazi Germany. The Japanese people should have a little more pride in their own country."

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CHAPTER V AMERICAN ARMAMENT

(The table of contents indicates that each of the first five sections of this chapter is given to one category of warships. Only the section on American battleships is included here, since it is believed it will provide a general idea of the manner in which each category is treated.)

(114) Section (1) Battleships of America. "Let us now discuss American manpower and her defenses. The American Navy is known the world over as an offensive Navy. England, France, and Italy have navies sufficient to guard their own territories and practically never go in for overseas operations. The only navy in the world that has any idea of crossing an ocean thousands of miles wide and battling with the enemy is that of the United States.

"So it follows that the United States is the greatest Naval Power in the world... America's Pacific strategy is already completely sketched out, and the method by which Japan could be attacked or the Japanese Navy annihilated has also been carefully planned..."

(115) "However, the present United States Navy has not enough power to take any aggressive action as far as the Far East or Japan is concerned. The General Staff in the United States knows this well and has decided that since the Japanese have only nine battleships, 15 battleships would be sufficient for the United States. Japan has 108,000 tons of large cruisers; so it follows that 150% above that, in other words (an excess of about) 180,000 tons, would be sufficient. Other vessels, such as light cruisers and destroyers, should never be fewer in number than those of the Japanese Navy. As for the air force, they have decided on their present great expansion.

"At the present time, the United States has 15 battleships. Although this force is larger than the nine battleships we possess, it can be said that in battle power they are far inferior.

(117) "As indicated above, there are 18 battleships, but within that number are three obsolete ships, which in reality makes the present total for the United States 15. However, besides these battleships the following are under construction: the 'North Carolina,' 'Washington,' 'South Dakota,' 'Indiana,' 'Massachusetts,' and the 'Alabama.' Counting these battleships and those already contracted for, the total amounts to 32 battleships.

"Looking at the present United States battleship forces, six are less than ten years old, eight less than 15 years old, and four less than 18 years old. The average of battleships is 12 years,

four months. Battle power is composed of 24 16-inch guns, 24 14-inch guns, and 44 12-inch guns, making a total of 92 guns. Average speed of all these battleships is less than 21 knots.

"...The ratio between the capital ships of Japan and those of the United States is three to five. However, should we take the number of guns, which would represent attacking power, the ratio is one to two. In other words, Japan has only half the battle power of the United States. Had Japanese public opinion been a little stronger in supporting Plenipotentiary Kato in his '70% Plan' during the Washington Conference, Japan's reasonable and justifiable demands would have been accepted by both the United States and Great Britain, and neither the number of battleships nor the battle power of our guns would have been in such a sad state as they are now.

(118)

"Against the 15 battleships which constitute the present force of the United States, the Japanese Navy can muster only 88 large-caliber guns as against the 160 of the United States. The efforts required of the Japanese navy in such a case are not to be ignored. Furthermore, after four years we should have to contend with 32 battleships. There is no use discussing the folly of the Washington Conference at this time; however, in order to have one battleship, the 'Mutsu', equipped with eight 16-inch guns, we had to allow the United States to build two ships, the 'Colorado' and the 'West Virginia,' with a total of 16 16-inch guns. We must realize how extremely unfavorable such an arrangement was for Japan.

"The fact that the average speed of the Japanese Navy is two knots faster than that of the United States and that we possess three battle cruisers with speeds of over 26 knots should be of interest. It will also be of extreme interest to watch how the Japanese commander-in-chief handles this advantage or disadvantage, whichever the case may be..."

After the Washington Conference, the United States became interested in the problem of 'elevation of main guns.' During 1923 and 1924, a large appropriation in the United States Naval Budget was devoted to the purpose of redesigning turrets to enable further elevation of main batteries on 13 of their capital ships. According to an explanation given by the Navy Department, Great Britain had redesigned her gun mounts to permit longer range, so the United States felt justified in following suit on the assumption that British ships could shell United States ships before the latter could fire effectively. Judging from the history of naval strategy, such 'out-ranging' would be fatal, and consequently the United States immediately began reconstructing turrets.

(119)

"Generally speaking, shells travel farthest when the elevation of a large-caliber gun (within vacuum) is at 45 degrees..."

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Ever since the Russo-Japanese War and up to the first World War, main batteries of capital ships had elevations of 12 to 18 degrees.

(119)

"The reason for this was that there were technical problems in the mechanism of a turret that would prevent higher elevation. Also at that time battle distances were only about 15,000 meters, and therefore a low elevation was sufficient. However, with the development of torpedoes, advance in the design of observation equipment, and the use of airplanes for spotting, battle distances became greater. To counteract this they had to increase the elevation of the large-caliber guns.

"Although the change in elevation of main guns on the capital ships of the U. S. Navy is in opposition to the spirit of the Washington Conference, the United States nevertheless went ahead redesigning. The maximum range of the 14-inch battleships, 'Texas,' 'New York,' 'Oklahoma,' 'Nevada,' 'Arizona,' and 'Pennsylvania' was increased to 34,500 yards. The rest of the battleships, five in number, had their gun elevation extended to 30 degrees in order to fire a distance of 35,000 yards.

(120)

"Simultaneous with the increase in elevation, the United States converted six of her battleships to operate on heavy oil instead of coal. Judging by the results of tests conducted with the battleship 'Florida',...its speed was greatly increased. During test runs, it is said that this battleship made a speed of 22.32 knots, which is astounding for United States battleships. There is no telling how far these shameless Americans will go."

(120)

"Although we have no means of knowing the details of reconstruction, the main features are believed to be as follows:

- "1. Increase in elevation of main batteries.
- "2. Installation of new or redesigned airplane catapults.
- "3. Attachment of underwater protective devices against submarines, such as the Brewster (bulge) type. For protection against airplanes, decks were increased in thickness and the former 3-inch anti-aircraft guns were changed for 5-inch anti-aircraft guns.
- "4. The former cage-type of mast, characteristic of the United States Navy, was discarded for the tripod type.
- "5. Electric propulsion replaced steam propulsion.

"Let us now discuss electric propulsion. This mechanism was developed by the United States Navy. The theory is to produce electricity by running a generator on a steam turbine and then to

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use this electricity to operate a motor. It goes without saying that the propeller is attached to the shaft of this motor. The reason for putting this extra equipment between the turbine and the propeller is because of the fact that turbines in general operate at highest efficiency when they run at full speed. On the other hand, a propeller which is driven at a relatively high rate of speed within the water is not only inefficient but is also prone to develop trouble. For this purpose a reduction mechanism is coupled between the turbine and the propeller, resulting in the reduction of propeller speed. There are two types of reduction mechanism. With the exception of the United States, all other countries use the geared type, while the United States herself uses the electric type.

(121) "Although it increases cruising range, this electric propulsion necessitates rather complicated mechanism. It is said that the United States Navy is using electric propulsion despite a certain number of disadvantages entailed.

"In 1912 this mechanism was tried out on the 'Jupiter' (the present aircraft carrier 'Langley') and proved to be efficient. The first battleship to use this mechanism was the 'New Mexico,' launched in 1917.

"In fact it can be surmised that cruising range has been increased from the rumor that the 'Maryland' (32,600 tons) has a cruising radius of almost 20,000 miles with a fuel load of 5,000 tons.

(122) "... The following battleships: the 'Mutsu,' 'Nagato,' 'Hyuga,' 'Ise,' 'Yamashiro,' 'Fuso,' 'Haruna,' 'Kirishima,' 'Kongo,' and the 'Hiye,' are all of the 30,000-ton type. However, some of these battleships have been turned into training ships; the most powerful of them are the 'Mutsu' and the 'Nagato.' Although these two vessels are far from inferior to the 'Maryland,' the pride of the United States, and the 'Nelson,' pride of Great Britain, we have been informed that the United States intends to build battleships of 45,000 tons.

"Furthermore, we even know the name of this superbattleship, the 'New Jersey,' and it is said that work will be started the 16th of September of this year (1940) in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. This battleship will have the following specifications:...displacement 42,500 tons, length of vessel 880 feet, width of vessel 108 feet, nine 16-inch main guns, 12 secondary 5-inch guns, four airplanes, and a speed of over 30 knots. Our nation cannot stand by idle while such monsters of the sea are launched one after the other..."

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Section (6) United States Naval Bases: Tutuila, Samoa.

- (144) "The naval base at Tutuila on the Island of Samoa, the only United States possession in the Southern Pacific Ocean, is similar to that of Sitka. As there are wireless stations, fuel depots and warehouses for military provisions, it may be supposed that this harbor will be a base from which to damage or obstruct Japanese trade in the event of war between Japan and the United States."

Alaska "We believe that there have been several special regions established by the United States in Alaska, but Secretary of Navy Knox has shrouded all details in complete secrecy. It is natural for air bases to be established in this territory. Above all, we shall have to take care and watch Alaska which lies directly across the Bering Straits from Japan."

- (147) New Naval Base at Alameda, California. "A new naval base has been established on the peninsula-like strip of land called Alameda, which lies across the Bay from San Francisco, and is equipped with more than ample facilities for the repair and provisioning of a large fleet. This means that there are now two naval bases (the other being Mare Island) within San Francisco Bay, which has a total coast line of 300 miles and surface area of 1,600 square miles. Golden Gate, which is formed by two sheer cliffs on each side and is the only outlet to the Pacific Ocean, has a width of three and a half miles and is said to be protected by impregnable fortifications."

San Pedro Harbor. "In San Pedro harbor, which is part of Los Angeles City, is a fort which is used as a base for submarines and airplanes. This base is blessed by extremely mild weather and is one of the best harbors on the West Coast. Although there used to be many Japanese fishermen, recently the majority of them were forced out of the area."

- (147) San Diego Naval Base. "Situated about 126 miles from Los Angeles and known as the most southerly harbor in the State of California, is famous San Diego City, which is equipped with excellent facilities as a naval base. This San Diego base is ideally situated to avoid effects from winds and waves. The bay is 30 miles long, half a mile to two miles wide, with a surface area of about 24 square miles and average water depth of 36 feet. Compared with Mare Island, with its 23-foot water depth, this harbor should be able to offer facilities for a large modern fleet."

- (148) "American military experts claim that the naval base at San Diego is of extreme strategic importance as a base for the protection of the Panama Canal. Equipment is being installed rapidly, and there are numerous fuel depots, provision warehouses, wireless stations, and other establishments. Aside from being a base for

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airplanes and auxiliary craft, a larger number of soldiers and marines are stationed there than mere defense of the base warrants..."

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Panama Canal. "There are numerous small islands near the entrance to the Panama Canal, among which Flamenco, Pellico, and Naos are heavily fortified. The three-mile embankment or breakwater extending from the port of Balboa to the Island of Naos is equipped with a coastal fort with 16- and 14-inch guns, also with 6-inch rifled guns and 12-inch mortars. There are several companies of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery stationed here, and the land is protected by field fortifications as well.

"For the purpose of handling a large fleet, the port of Balboa is equipped with fuel depots on the docks, provision warehouses, and facilities for the repair of vessels. Indeed, this port has all the attributes of a first-class advance base.

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"Even with such fortifications, America's jittery military departments are not satisfied and, beginning with Perlas (phonetic) Island, the islands of Taboguira (phonetic) and Taboga have also been strongly fortified. Submarines are constantly standing by, and air bases have also been established in this region..

"South American countries have cooperated, and the Galapagos Islands, close to the Panama Canal, have been offered to the United States under the guise of mutual defense..."

"It has also been reported that a secret decision has been reached in the negotiations with the Costa Rican Government for the purpose of leasing Cocos Island. Concerning these negotiations, the United States War and Navy Departments have stated that Cocos Island is not suitable for an American naval base..."

"When we enumerate the United States naval bases indicated above, we have Manila, Guam, Tutuila, Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Alameda, Bremerton, Sitka, and Kiska. The line that connects these various bases extends irregularly for a length of 15,000 miles and encircles from afar the south, east, and north sides of the chief Japanese islands lying in the northwestern corner of the Pacific Ocean.

"Furthermore, inasmuch as they (the United States) have the intention of completely encircling Japan with warships after the great expansion of armaments is completed, we cannot afford to take any chances. Our nation would be in the same position as a rat that has been chased into a bag..."

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CHAPTER VIII AMERICA'S STRATEGY

Section (1) America's Offensive Tactics: The first part of this section pertains to an article by the English naval commentator Herbert Russell, entitled "Japanese Naval Power." Whereas Mr. Russell anticipates conservative tactics to be the chief characteristic of Japan's navy during wartime, Mr. Matsuo asserts that Japan would overcome any initial disadvantages by taking the offensive and adopting new battle techniques. Both Napoleon and General Klauzevich (phonetic) are quoted to the effect that offensive strategy by an inferior force may overcome the defense of a superior force.

(194) "Let us look at actual battles. During the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) Japan had a total warship tonnage of 57,000 tons, while China had a total tonnage of 83,000 tons. During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) Japan had 218,000 tons, while Russia had 317,000 tons. Both of these wars ended in great victories for Japan. During the first World War, Germany had 1,150,000 tons, while Great Britain had 2,450,000 tons of warships, the latter secluded near a small island north of Scotland. During the Battle of Jutland Germany won a victory with only 58% of the strength of the British.

(195) "A nation does not necessarily lose a war because of inferior number of troops, nor can we say that it is disadvantageous to attack under such circumstances.

"No, indeed, an inferior navy which has geographical advantages could, as shown in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, by the clever use of their geographical advantages, engage in offensive tactics and overcome its inferiority. This would lead to eventual victory.

"Judging from various sources of information, the United States Navy has been following the lesson learned by England during the first World War, wherein the British Fleet sought 'idle safety' and was unable to capture the German Fleet. The United States has come to consider that 'Even at the risk of a certain amount of danger, we must advance the battle line to the coast of an enemy country and, by attacking the enemy's vulnerable spots, create chances for a decisive battle.' At the same time, as the result of research on the problem of how it would be possible to lure an inferior fleet into battle and destroy it, the United States Navy has decided upon the completion of the present great expansion and the adoption of a policy of a quick and decisive war.

"It appears that United States strategy would be to attempt to attack the Japanese Fleet immediately after the declar-

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(195) ation of war. However, should the Japanese Navy confine itself to utilizing its geographical advantages in defensive tactics, the United States Expeditionary Fleet would meanwhile proceed to the Philippine Islands. Guam Island has been equipped with various facilities to serve as a base for action calculated to capture the Japanese South Sea Mandate Islands. This means a considerable number of troops would be sent to Guam and, should occasion allow, Formosa and the Bonin Islands would be captured. At the same time Japan Proper would experience a period of terror due to raids by the air forces of the United States.

(196) "As a result, the coastal waters of China and the South Seas would be blockaded by the United States Navy. Not only our overseas trade but also the movements of our fleet would be menaced, and it might even result in the Korean Straits becoming unsafe. Japan would find no alternative except to surrender to the United States..."

"Let us now discuss the plan of operations which the Japanese nation will use against the United States. Roughly speaking, they are somewhat as follows:

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- "1. With the object of preventing any United States Fleet from advancing to the Western Pacific and for the additional purpose of increasing morale in Japan, it is imperative that...(Censored by the Japanese) should be as quickly as possible...(Censored by the Japanese)."
 - "2. 'Surprise Fleets' should be dispatched along the West Coast of the United States mainland for the purpose of attacking United States foreign trade or laying mines in enemy harbors. As far as the Panama Canal is concerned, it must be destroyed or closed, or other proper measures should be undertaken once hostilities begin.
 - "3. Should the United States Fleet start on a naval expedition to the Western Pacific, Japanese submarines and warships should be dispatched for the purpose of gradually reducing the enemy's fighting strength.
 - "4. Japan should hold sea supremacy from the South China Sea to the Sea of Japan in order to preserve the safety of communications between Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Through the protection of such communication routes, Japanese foreign trade and her position in regard to foreign nations will be enhanced. It is also necessary for Japan to have control of the seas extending to the East Indies, and special care should be taken to restrain maneuvers of England and...(Censored by the Japanese).

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- "5. For the purpose of dispatching submarines to the Atlantic Ocean immediately after the opening of hostilities, there should be, if possible, several submarines in this region before outbreak of war. We must threaten the United States from the Atlantic Ocean and not give her any chance to combine the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.
- "6. Japan will mobilize her army and send troops to the region of...(Censored by the Japanese) and...(Censored by the Japanese). Special care should be taken to guard against any activities of the Soviet Union.
- "7. Should the Philippine Islands become independent and declare war on Japan, it will be possible for Japan to completely capture these islands in an open manner.
- "8. Even supposing the Philippine Islands proclaim neutrality, it can be said that Japan has considerable reasons and rights to occupy these islands immediately upon the outbreak of war, inasmuch as Japan is fighting the United States (and any countries sympathetic with her)..."

(198) "The Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China will meet the same fate.

(199) Section (2) American Strategy in the Western Pacific.
 "The United States fears such a plan of attack by Japan and, for the purpose of preventing, before a declaration of war, the destruction of the Panama Canal or any sinkings or attacks against warships moored in harbors, she will do her utmost to combat Japan's strategy. For this reason the tactics of the United States will be of an offensive nature and will result in a deliberate attack against Japan. She will attempt to lure the Japanese Fleet to outer waters for the purpose of destroying it in one decisive battle. The commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet has said in the Senate, 'There are three stages to America's strategy in the Western Pacific. The first step is to move out to the Philippine Islands; the second is to reorganize the fleet in Manila; and the third step is to attack the Japanese mainland'..."

(202) (In connection with the voyage to Manila) "it must be remembered that during wartime a speed of 10 knots is not sufficient; a speed of 16 knots or over is necessary. A large fleet will be subject to attack by submarines and a zig-zag course would have to be taken. This means that every 10 to 30 minutes they would have to put the rudder hard over..."

"It would take 35 days to reach Manila, and during this entire time the Japanese Navy could prepare sufficient battle de-

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fenses. We could, for example, capture the Philippines, Guam, Tutuila and Wake Island. If conditions permitted, we might even be able to stretch our hands towards Midway, close to the Hawaiian Islands.

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"The United States plans on constructing larger battle-ships and redesigning their engines. It is said that, as a result of attempts to increase their cruising radius, she will succeed in gaining a maximum range of up to 20,000 miles. Should this be true, it would be possible for the United States to base ships at Hawaii and yet attack the coastal waters of Japan and, after a battle or two, still have more than sufficient reserve for the ships to return to their bases. Even though Japan should capture Manila, it would not affect this particular question..."

"How can the United States battle fleet protect itself against attacks by Japanese submarines? During the daytime airplanes attached to the fleet would be able to protect it against attacks by Japanese submarines; but inasmuch as aircraft are useless against night attacks by submarines, it follows that cruisers or destroyers would have to be used after dark. Consequently, even if the cruising range of the battleships be increased to 20,000 miles, there is some question as to how efficient they would be, strategically speaking, so long as the cruising radius of destroyers is limited to 6,000 or 7,000 miles.

"The United States Fleet will need the following vessels for an attack against Japan: battleships with cruising radius of 20,000 miles; cruisers with 12,000-mile cruising radius, destroyers with 7,000-mile cruising radius; aircraft carriers with 10,000-mile cruising radius; and other various types of warships and auxiliary vessels. Since these would form such a large fleet, their movements would necessarily be extremely limited. Even the United States Fleet, which possesses battleships with such a great cruising radius, will be compelled to fight the Japanese Navy with extremely common tactics.

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"According to explanations given by the United States Navy Department in the House of Representatives, it is said that a force of 500 merchant vessels will be necessary to support any Pacific strategy. Although the United States at the present time has more than 900 vessels of 6,000 tons or over, roughly one-half of these vessels cannot be used in Western Pacific operations because of their age or speed. At the same time, should such a large number of merchant vessels be assigned for use in the West Pacific, the foreign trade of the United States will be at least three-fourths demolished.

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CHAPTER IX A QUICK AND DECISIVE WAR OR A WAR OF ATTRITION

(207) Section (1) America's Policy of a Quick and Decisive War.
 "There are people who say that a Japanese-American war would end simply in a quick and decisive way; at the same time others claim it would develop into a war of endurance and attrition. Since the first World War, the phrase 'war of endurance and attrition' has become common among all peoples.

"Because the European war lasted a period of over four years, both enemy and allies were completely exhausted. Germany's chaos after the war and Austria's impoverishment need not be discussed any further. The extent to which even the Allies, such as France, England, Italy, and Russia, were emaciated cannot be overlooked. Take the great British Empire for instance. In a war which lasted four years that country lost the major portion of what she had accumulated during the last several hundred years. The devastation caused directly by war is far less than the exhaustion caused indirectly.

"As we look at the probable cause of a Pacific war and as we realize the individual strategic positions, we are prone to look upon a Japanese-American war as a war of endurance or attrition.

"Recently the United States Navy, fully aware of the seriousness of any war of endurance which might undermine the energies of both defenders and attackers, has become wary of falling into the same 'wheel rut'... And..., being convinced that any further pursuit of her lukewarm safety-first policy would deprive her of any opportunity of a decisive battle and would also increase domestic difficulties, the United States has decided to concentrate all her research on the problem of how to force an inferior fleet into open battle..."

"As the United States herself knows fully well, any Japanese-American war which develops into a war of attrition or endurance will become more and more difficult for her. There exists no prospect of victory for the United States in such a war. On the contrary, a war of endurance will strengthen the Japanese position, for we shall never be forced into any tight corner..."

"As far as we are concerned, Japan could handle a war of attrition, but at the same time she would prefer, if possible, a quick and decisive battle. Although we desire such a policy..., we cannot always choose our methods. In other words, it is the United States who possesses the freedom to choose whether the Japanese-American war would be a short and decisive one or a long war of attrition... Japan's strategic position is best utilized

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by acting in a completely defensive manner. For the purpose of utilizing this strategic position, it goes without saying that our policy will be modulated by whatever the United States happens to do.

(210) "Let us discuss why it is that our country would prefer a quick and decisive war. Speaking in simple language; the first reason is to escape the ravages that always accompany any war of endurance... Even though the United States suffers several times the damage of Japan, it does not mean that Japan's suffering would be slight. Thus it follows that, regardless of the outcome of the war, we should greatly welcome as quick and decisive a battle as possible.

(211) "The second reason is that a quick and decisive war is more suited to the national characteristics of the Japanese than is a war of endurance or attrition. From time immemorial we, the Japanese people, have disliked any tedious job and cannot be bothered with any lackadaisical or petty doings..."

Section (2) Japan's Policy of a Quick and Decisive War.

(211) "...It is wrong to presume that our nation is as feeble in powers of endurance as many of our Japanese citizens seem to think. According to popular belief, there is one opinion to the effect that the Japanese people are the most easily excited and, at the same time, the most easily calmed people in the world. Up to the present, fortunately or unfortunately, the Japanese people have never been faced with the necessity of demonstrating any considerable power of endurance, and therefore there is still some problem as to how well the Japanese people can stand a prolonged war. However, judging by the utter lack of any change of spirit during the last four years of the recent China Incident, we have no need to feel disheartened.

(212) "To a certain extent, we may claim that we are one of the more experienced peoples in any prolonged warfare. For our people to organize for a real war of endurance, it will only be necessary to reorganize their economy, increase commodity reserves, lower commodity prices, and refuse to permit personal gains by the munitions industrialists (or any one group of the latter)..."

"The third reason for considering a quick and decisive struggle better than a war of attrition is that the quicker it is settled, the more limited its extent.

"In the event of an extension of the war, the diplomatic machinations will become more intense. Should our diplomacy prove successful, it will be quite all right, but in the event of the failure of our diplomacy, we shall have to face an increased number

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of strong enemies and will consequently find ourselves in an even more difficult predicament.

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"Purely from the humanitarian point of view, international justice demands that the catastrophe of war be limited to the narrowest possible scope."

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CHAPTER X PERIODS IN WHICH WAR MAY START

(214) Section (1) Blitz Tactics. "When will the military activities of a Japanese-American war commence? Before the actual outbreak of hostilities, there are always diplomatic negotiations. Take the Russo-Japanese War as an example: for approximately one year after relations between these two countries reached a critical point, the problem was left in the hands of the diplomats. We can safely assume, therefore, that should any danger of American-Japanese hostilities arise, the natural course of events will be diplomatic negotiations before actual military operations.

"From the viewpoint of strategy, Japan is blessed with an opportunity to act on her own initiative, whereas the United States is forced to take a passive or negative stand..."

(215) "With such a strategic position, what time will Japan choose to start hostilities once important diplomatic questions arise and war clouds darken the horizon? There will be a tremendous difference in the course of the war depending upon the time Japan rises.

"Should war clouds gather between the United States and Japan, the United States will be forced...to send her Atlantic Fleet to join her Pacific Fleet. From Japan's point of view, this fact is of extreme importance. The consensus of military strategists appears to be that Japan will strike before the two fleets merge. Should Japan rise at such a time, it may be said that she has chosen the most opportune moment. For our part, we do not believe that Japan, no matter how quickly she reacts, will start military activities before the amalgamation of the two fleets. The time for Japan to open hostilities would be either after the United States Fleet is steaming towards Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands, or after this fleet has safely reached Hawaii and is about to engage in aggressive action.

"Although in the case of the first alternative, Japan would not be directly menaced, the second alternative would present grave dangers. Even then, the Japanese nation would pin its hopes on diplomatic negotiations with the utmost charity. Japan would most probably confine herself to observing the movements of the United States Fleet after it had reached Hawaii. However, should the United States Fleet once head west after steaming out of Pearl Harbor, Japan would not waste one second. This is indeed the time when Japan should engage in blitz-like war tactics. Should Japan rise at such a time, she can be said to have chosen the period which appeared most imperative to her.

(217) "There is still another time at which hostilities may start.

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- (217) This would be after the United States Fleet had reached Guam or her naval base in the Philippine Islands or Singapore...and would mean that either as a result of weak-kneed diplomacy or chicken-hearted public opinion, Japan had chosen the worst time to strike..."

"Japan is blessed with a free chance to select her own time to commence hostilities, and should she deliberately discard this heaven-sent advantage, she will not only be forced to fight on an even basis with the United States, but will find her strategic position extremely precarious. Japan will probably not do such a ridiculous thing. She will decide upon action before the United States bases itself on Guam or the Philippines. It can be safely assumed that the moment Japan commences military operations will certainly not be after the United States Fleet has left...(Censored by the Japanese)."

- (218) Section (2) The American Fleet and the Time For Japan to Open Hostilities. "It is useless to repeat that Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands is known as the Gibraltar or the Malta of the Pacific and serves as an advance base for the United States Navy. However, there is one disadvantage with Pearl Harbor -- it lies slightly too far east (for effectiveness). It is also too far from Japan. So, no matter how strong a United States Fleet might be congregated in Hawaii, it would be impossible for such a fleet to strike at the heart of Japan. Midway and Wake Islands are admittedly closer to Japan, but these are just small, grassy islands and do not have much importance as bases for any great fleet."

"However, when we consider the Philippines and Guam, although they are likewise territories of the United States, things take on a different aspect. Should a strong United States Fleet base itself on Manila or on Apra, Guam, the distance to the eastern or southern coasts of Japan would be within a radius of from 1,300 to 1,700 miles. From these islands the United States could strike at the heart of Japan."

- (219) "Should the United States lose Guam and the Philippine Islands at the outbreak of the war, she would no longer possess any bases from which she could take direct action against Japan. Even though the United States Fleet should steam west from Pearl Harbor, it would have no facilities and would be forced to return dejectedly to its naval base in the Hawaiian Islands."

"This explains why the anti-Japanese Thomas Millard once said that the defense of the Philippine Islands is the defense of the United States mainland. Thus it is obvious that the military value of Guam and the Philippine Islands is of importance."

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"Let us suppose that India lost Singapore and Australia lost New Guinea. No matter how strongly fortified Sydney and Trincomalee might be, should India and Australia once lose these two bases they would be in the same position as a naked person in front of the guns of an attacking force.

"By capturing Guam and the Philippine Islands and by preventing the United States from regaining them, Japan's long and tortuous coast line would be safe from all bombs. We might even say that the war would come to an end without the slightest discomfiture to the coasts of Japan.

"Is this not a godsend for the fate of Japan? Are we going to deny this godsend and deliberately go in for a tedious war? Or, are we going to fight according to the dictates of the God of Fate by utilizing this opportunity?"

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Section (3) Two Periods in Which War May Start and America's Concern. "There are two other periods during which the Japanese-American War could begin. As mentioned before, one of these periods would be prior to the time that part of the Atlantic Fleet joins up with the Pacific Fleet. Strategically speaking, for Japan this would be the most favorable moment in which to commence hostilities. The other period would be after the combined fleet had left Hawaii and succeeded in entering Manila Bay. In other words, from Japan's standpoint, this would be the worst possible period in which to commence hostilities. Although both of these periods are hard to visualize, wars usually break out at the most unpredictable moments. It behooves us to ponder this question for a while.

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"Should Japan choose the most favorable moment to strike, the outcome of this war will be obvious. Japan will be able to capture the Philippines and Guam easily, where she will most likely erect extremely heavy fortifications.

"It goes without saying that the completion of elaborate defenses will require a reasonable amount of time. According to the results of naval maneuvers conducted by the United States Fleet, it would take at least sixty days for a part of the Atlantic Fleet to leave a naval port on the East Coast of America and head westward, touching at Guantanamo in Cuba, passing through the Panama Canal, and at last entering San Diego or Mare Island, where it would join up with the Pacific Fleet. After this the combined fleets must be provisioned and properly equipped for war operations. It would take an additional sixty days for this fleet to move westward and enter Pearl Harbor.

"Suppose that Japan begins to act at the precise moment

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(221) the Atlantic Fleet leaves its eastern base. There will be at least four months' interval between the arrival in Hawaii of the entire United States Fleet and the previous commencement of operations by Japan. It can be said that the capture of such strategic Pacific points as Guam and the Philippines will be very easy. We will also most likely be able to capture the tiny island of Midway, which acts as an outer defense for the Hawaiian Islands. We can also capture Tutuila in Samoa at this time. In other words, for a period of four months, there will be no restraining power used against the free activities of the Japanese Fleet.

(222) "Should Japan attack during the former of these two periods, there is a possibility that the only water link between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, i.e. the Panama Canal, will be destroyed. This is one of America's chief worries..."

Section (4) The Worst Possible Time for the Commencement of Hostilities. This would be after the United States Fleet had based itself on the Philippines and Singapore, because from these strategically located bases it could seriously threaten Japanese territory. The Japanese naval bases of Sasebo and Yokosuta are only 1,300 and 1,700 miles respectively from Manila, and it is acknowledged that the southeastern and southwestern coasts of Japan Proper could easily be blockaded. Taiwan (Formosa), the Bonin Islands and Kyushu in particular would be subject to extreme danger. Japanese trade routes in East and South China would be cut completely, and Soviet Russia might co-operate with the United States to the extent of assuming control of the Japan Sea. In addition Japan would have to expect air raids and the shelling of her coasts.

The Japanese Fleet might be forced into a showdown battle under adverse conditions, though the United States Fleet would itself be at a disadvantage fighting in strange waters and could not therefore afford to operate in independent units. Or it might happen that the United States Fleet would eventually tire of the vigil and risk defeat by some daring gamble aimed at forcing a showdown.

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CHAPTER XI JAPAN'S ATTACK ON THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

Section (1) The Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Islands.

(227) "Should Japanese diplomacy be hog-tied by the United States, and should the United States Fleet reach Manila Bay before the declaration of war, the Japanese attack against the Philippine Islands will become tremendously difficult. In fact, the actual execution of such an operation cannot be expected (to be successful).

(228) "The reason is that, should conditions be such as to force Japan into such an awkward position before she could attack the Philippine Islands, the United States Fleet would attack the Japanese Fleet within its own bases. If conditions permit, the United States Fleet might even attempt to lure the Japanese Fleet out to waters around the Bonin Islands or towards the China Seas for the purpose of a single, decisive battle. It is hypocrisy to imagine that an inferior Japanese Fleet could attack the Philippine Islands once the United States Fleet had been sent around to Manila Bay; therefore, should a Japanese-American war seem imminent, we must seize our chance and commence an attack against the Philippines before the United States Fleet reaches Manila and also for the purpose of restricting the activities of such a fleet."

"The capture of these islands will not be very easy, for the simple reason that the United States has done her utmost to make the Philippines one of the greatest naval bases she possesses in the Orient.

"Let us now look at the defenses of Manila Bay, which will be the fleet's base. There are strong forts located on the islands of Corregidor, Carabao, Caballo, and El Fraile, at the entrance to the Cavite Naval Base. Every one of these islands is extremely heavily fortified, Corregidor being considered impregnable. This island is equipped with fifteen 12-inch mortars, two 10-inch guns, five 6-inch guns, and four 3-inch guns. The other islands have over ten 12- to 14-inch guns mounted on them.

(229) "Furthermore, there are two lines of batteries behind the City of Manila. The entire area of Manila Bay is heavily fortified, and no matter how strong the attacking force, it will be impossible to approach Manila from the front. Olongapo Naval Base, which is surrounded by strong forts on Subic Bay, protects the flank of Manila Bay from the north. Any attacking force which disregarded this base would suffer extremely heavy casualties.

"The Cavite Naval Base is the main base for the United States Asiatic Fleet. There are over sixty vessels here which compose the fleet and include battleships, light cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, submarine tenders, aircraft carriers, submarines,

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(229) minelayers, minesweepers and other special types of vessels. The present commander-in-chief is Admiral Hart; his flagship the 'U.S.S. Augusta.' Frequently he cruises around China and the South Seas for the purpose of studying any new situations for utilization in future movements.

"The number of soldiers quartered in the vicinity is considerable. It has already been over ten years since the creation of an independent Philippine Air Force, and anti-aircraft defenses of these islands have already been completed. Details of the imposing Philippine Air Force are as follows: approximately 3,000 soldiers and several hundred pursuit planes, observation planes, trainers, heavy bombers, and airships.

(230) "Such being the case, no matter how highly trained the Japanese Fleet may be, it will be impossible for us to attack the Islands from the front. There will most probably be submarine attacks and extensive mine-laying. In the skies, the efficient planes of the Philippines' great Air Force will fly. The capture of the Philippine Islands will not be so easy as the attack against Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War. However, Japan must, regardless of consequences, capture the Islands because of their potential value as a base for the Americans as far as East Asia is concerned.

"We must realize that this is one of the main objectives of the war. Should Japan's forces fail to capture the Islands, our strategic plans will be confined to negative measures. Furthermore, our economic and financial structure will receive a great blow, and we will sink into the depths of extreme poverty.

Section (2) Fleeing of Heavily Damaged Warships and... (Censored by the Japanese). In considering the problem of how much power would be needed for the Japanese to take the Philippines, the author states that it will be necessary for Japan to organize a fleet capable of totally destroying the Asiatic Fleet of the United States. However, inasmuch as this U. S. Asiatic Fleet is expected to double its strength within the ensuing two or three years, Japan may be forced to confine her initial operations to a blockade of the Philippine bases.

According to one naval authority (name and nationality not mentioned), immediately after the outbreak of a Japanese-American war, the United States will consider the Asiatic Fleet a sacrifice, the first "blood offering" to the Japanese Fleet. On the other hand, should there be any warning before the beginning of hostilities, her Asiatic Fleet would leave the Philippines and endeavor to join the main fleet somewhere in the East Pacific area.

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