

CONFIDENTIAL

Notes on Collaboration between British
and United States S.O.E.

OBJECT.

1. The object of these notes is to lay down the principles on which such collaboration must be based, the reasons behind these principles and the machinery by which they might be effected.

PRINCIPLES.

2. COOPERATION AT H.Q. LONDON/WASHINGTON.

This is dependent on close liaison resulting in a common policy and is essential if we are to avoid crossing lines either in policy or in the supply of materials.

This liaison could be effected by a British liaison section working alongside Colonel Donovan's headquarters in Washington and a similar American liaison section working alongside S.O.E. headquarters, London. The duties of this liaison section would be :-

- (a) To represent the views of their respective headquarters on all policy matters so that a common policy for every theatre can be decided on.
- (b) To discuss with the H.Q. to which they have been accredited cases of dispute in the field which have been referred to that H.Q.
- (c) To exchange information and to keep their headquarters fully informed of matters of interest.
- (d) To co-ordinate the production, demand and supply of equipment from British and U.S. sources.
- (e) To exchange both operational and technical intelligence, and information on methods of training.

Such a liaison section might consist of one head liaison officer (who would be a high level representative charged with executive functions) supported by requisite staff.

3. COOPERATION IN THE FIELD.

It is essential to avoid the situation where there will be two completely independent organisations working in the field, with all the consequent dangers of crossing of lines, competition for agents and material etc., and inviting attempts by foreign governments, or groups with whom both organisations would be dealing, to play one off against the other.

In some cases the problem could be dealt with by assigning the given region exclusively either to the American or British organisation, the organisation which agrees to stay out being represented at the most only by a liaison officer and small staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

There will, however, be very few of these simple cases and in most areas the position will be that whilst an area is predominantly a British or American sphere of influence, both countries will have some interests inside it and will need to establish some sort of representation and possibly a system of agents.

It is suggested that the general principles to be adopted in such cases should be:-

- (a) Each area should be defined as being either a British or American area.
- (b) Inside a British area it will be agreed that the control and direction should be British and that the policy should be laid down and all instructions to the Mission or Missions in that area should be issued from London. In an American area the same procedure would apply as regards Washington.
- (c) In the field in a British area there would be a British Mission, the head of which would be controller for the whole area and who would look for his direction and instructions to London. There could, if the Americans so wished in the same territory, be an American Mission which would have its own headquarters, its own stations and its own agents, but the American Mission and its head at those headquarters would work under the direction and control of the British controller. The head of the American Mission could report direct to Washington on any matter he wished with a copy to the American liaison mission in London, but he would receive his instructions from London and through the British controller and would only act on communications received direct from Washington with the agreement and consent of the British controller. In an American territory the same principles would apply with the roles reversed.
- (d) In the event of a difference of opinion arising between the British or American controller and the head of the British or American Mission inside his territory which could not be settled locally, the issue would be referred to London or Washington respectively, and it would be the responsibility of the headquarters in question to settle it with the liaison mission attached to it.

Even these rather general principles may not be able to be applied strictly in all cases and it may be necessary to make exceptions in certain countries to meet special requirements.

PRINCIPLES

2. COO

This common either

The section Washington C.O. section

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

Record of Discussion regarding
Collaboration between British and United States
S. O. E.

17th June, 1942.

We set out hereunder a draft record of conversations on the above subject which took place on Tuesday morning, 16th June 1942 between Colonel Goodfellow, Colonel Garland Williams, and Colonel Taylor and Mr. Keswick, and further conversations which took place in the evening of the 16th June, between Colonel Goodfellow, Colonel Taylor and Mr. Keswick.

The object of these discussions was to review the position in all areas throughout the world where collaboration between the British and American S.O.E.s was possible with a view to determining how the principles set out in the paper headed "Notes on Collaboration between British and United States S.O.E." handed by Sir Charles Hambro to Colonel Donovan, (copy attached hereto) should be applied to each area.

It was understood that the conversations were purely exploratory in character and that any agreement of views reached between the parties would in no way bind their principals without specific confirmation. It was further agreed that the procedure should be that a record would be made of the discussions and agreed between the parties and that subject to confirmation by principals, further discussions would then be held covering each area in detail at which the appropriate Directors of the British S.O.E. would attend, with a view to working out agreements for each area in the most exact terms possible.

The various areas were reviewed in the following order and the following conclusions were arrived at:

1. INDIA.

It was agreed that India should be regarded as a British area where all operations would be carried out by the British Mission with control being exercised from London. The American S.O.E. would have the right to send out a liaison mission to be attached to the British Mission for liaison purposes, but not for operational purposes.

2. CHINA.

It was agreed that this area, of which the headquarters would be at Chungking, and which cover the whole of China including Japanese occupied China, Manchuria and Korea should be regarded as an American sphere of influence. The American Mission would be established at Chungking and would direct all S.O.E. activities in this area. It would be controlled from Washington. The existing British Mission at Chungking would be reduced and would be turned into a liaison mission attached to the American mission. The British liaison mission, in

addition/-

addition to its liaison duties, would render any assistance which it could to the American mission, but only at the latter's request and under the latter's control.

3. AUSTRALIA.

It was agreed that British S.O.E. would have no responsibility for and would take no action in the area covered by General MacArthur's Command and that of the American Naval Command in the South Western Pacific. This area would be considered as covering New Guinea, and the Islands of the East Indian archipelago up to and including Java and Borneo. It would be for the American S.O. . to make its own arrangements with the I.S.D. which already exists in Australia under General MacArthur's control. British S.O.E. would continue to give any assistance asked for to this Mission.

4.

It was agreed that Burma, Siam, Indo-China, Malaya and Sumatra should be regarded as a no-man's land which could be worked into as convenient by the British S.O.E. mission in India, the American S.O. . mission in China, and I.S.D. in Australia. Line crossing inside this area would have to be avoided by close liaison between these three missions.

5. EAST AFRICA.

It was agreed that the area covered by the British S.O.E. mission which already exists with its headquarters at Durban, charged with working into Madagascar, and Portuguese East Africa should be regarded as a British area. American S.O. . would have the right to have a liaison mission attached to the British Mission at Durban.

6. WEST AFRICA - Frawest & Neucols.

Whilst it was agreed that the area covered by these two existing British S.O.E. missions - namely the West African colonies from the southern boundary of Morocco to the boundary of South West Africa with Portuguese West Africa should be, for the time being, regarded as predominantly a British sphere, it was recognised that the American S.O. . had a very definite interest in this area, since if any military action on a large scale were to be undertaken by the United Nations in West Africa, such action would predominantly be the responsibility of the American Military authorities. The American S.O. . therefore consider that they must place themselves in a position to be able to carry out S.O.E. services for the American Command if such a situation should arise. The following procedure was accordingly agreed upon:-

American S.O. . would establish missions corresponding to our Frawest and Neucols missions. The programme of these American Missions would be worked out in as much detail as possible between Washington and London. Copies of this agreed programme would then be sent to the Heads of the American Missions and the Heads of the British Missions with clear instructions in both cases that the execution of this programme by the American Missions would be discussed step by step with the heads of the British Missions and no action taken until agreement had been

reached/-

reached with them. If such agreement could not be arrived at the point at issue would be referred to headquarters to be settled between London and Washington, and until decision was given no action would be taken by the American Missions. It was contemplated that the programme which would be worked out between London and Washington for these American Missions would be essentially preparatory in character, consisting of the placing of American representatives at appropriate points, the establishment of dumps of materials, collection of information and operational intelligence, and the working out of plans against appropriate targets.

2. COOP

This common pool either in

This section w
Washington
S.O.E. he
section w

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Such officer (w
executive

3. COOP

It is
be two com
field, with
competition
by foreign
would be d

In so
the given
organisati
represented
staff.

7. ATLANTIC ISLANDS.

It was agreed that these Islands comprising the Azores, Madeira, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands should be regarded as an American sphere and operated by an American Mission controlled from Washington. The British S.O.E. would have the right to attach liaison officers to the American organisation.

8. BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

It was agreed that in view of the fact that all Military Commands in this area were British Commands, that the principal political authority was the British Minister of State at Cairo, and that the whole of the territory other than Turkey within which and from which operations could take place or be based, was wholly or partially under the British S.O.E., with its headquarters at Cairo, should be regarded as predominantly a British area. At the same time it was appreciated that there were many ways in which the American S.O.E. could be of great assistance in this area. It could call upon resources in regard to equipment, materials and possibly personnel which were not available to the British S.O.E., and in certain areas, for example Turkey and Iran, American personnel could, in some respects, operate more easily than British personnel.

The British representatives stressed the extreme complexity of the situation, with particular regard to the fact that S.O.E. have to work in this area with a number of Allied Governments and foreign freedom movements or resistance groups, and emphasised the delicacy of the political situation in various occupied or semi-occupied countries, and the necessity of any S.O.E. organisation conforming to the policy of the local authorities, such as the Minister of State, the local Military Commanders, and the local diplomatic representatives. They were accordingly of the opinion that if line crossing, confusion and friction with local authorities was to be avoided, it was especially essential that in this area there should be unity of control in the field and unity of direction from a single headquarters. They accordingly suggested that the set-up should be as follows:

The controller of the existing British S.O.E. Mission would be regarded as being in charge of all S.O.E. operations in that area and would be responsible for all S.O.E. activity to the local authorities, particularly the S.O.E. Sub-Committee of the Minister of State's War Council, and to headquarters in London. An American S.O.E. Mission should be set up in Cairo with the object of providing such assistance as it could to the British S.O.E. and of contributing to the British S.O.E. services which would only be available from the American side. The form and extent of the organisation of the American Mission and also the

scope/-

2. The scope and character of its activities would be discussed and settled by the Head of the American Mission with the British Controller, under whom he would be working. In the event of failure to reach agreement the issue would be referred to headquarters to be settled between London and Washington, and in the meantime, the views of the Controller would prevail. The Head of the American Mission would communicate direct with Washington on any matter he pleased, but it would be clearly laid down that as regards any action the American Mission would look to the Controller for direction and instructions and would take no action except with his approval.

3. The substantial effect of this arrangement would be that there would be a single S.O.E. machine in the area, at the head of which would be the present Controller, but that under him there would be two organisations, namely the existing British S.O.E. organisation covering the whole area of the Mission, and a small American organisation which would be fitted in by the Controller into the general programme wherever it could help.

9. WESTERN EUROPE.

It was agreed that collaboration between the British and American S.O.E.s in the Western European area (which should be understood as covering Scandinavia and the Baltic area, the Low Countries, France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia) would have to be arranged in two stages.

On the British side it was appreciated that as there will, at some future date, be a very large American force based on Great Britain with the task of carrying on military operations in Eastern Europe, there must eventually be a complete American S.O.E. attached to this American Command to carry out S.O.E. services for it in those areas in Western Europe which have been allocated to American forces. Once those areas were known it would be easy to apply the principle that all S.O.E. activities within the area allocated to the American Command would be carried on by the American S.O.E., the latter taking over from British S.O.E. any field organisation which the British S.O.E. might, in the meantime, have established in territories eventually placed under American command.

It was recognised firstly that this division of military force was still some way off; secondly that it would be some months before the American S.O.E. would be in a position to operate as an independent organisation attached to the American Command; and thirdly, that not only would some interim arrangement have to be come to regarding activities by the American S.O.E. in Western Europe pending the drawing of the lines of demarcation, but even when the areas of the British and American Commands had been determined there would remain countries unaffected by these invasion plans in which both the British and the American S.O.E.s might wish to operate. To cover the interim period referred to above before any area could be allocated to the American S.O.E. as their exclusive territory, it was suggested that the following procedure should be adopted. An American Mission would be set up in London with two main functions. The first would be the preparation of an American S.O.E. organisation for attachment to the American Military Command. This would be largely a matter between the American S.O.E. Mission and the American Command in Great Britain, and the British S.O.E. would only be involved to the extent to which it could give assistance particularly/-

001
01

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

2.

7

APPENDIX I.

North Africa and Iberian Peninsula.

British
The S.O.E. representatives suggested that North Africa should be regarded, at least for the present, as a territory which should be operated from London and they outlined an arrangement by which a combined British-American organisation would be operated under a British S.O.E. officer with headquarters at Gibraltar. The factors which the British S.O.E. had principally in mind in making this suggestion were that

2. common either
secti
wash
S.O.E.
sect
- (a) Gibraltar is the natural base for S.O.E. operations in North Africa. It would be the point at which all stores would have to be assembled for distribution in North Africa and it is the site of the S.O.E. W/T Station which would eventually operate all agents W/Ts in North Africa and would provide the main line channel to London in the event of other lines failing. As an S.O.E. headquarters at Gibraltar would be dealing with British authorities in that fortress such dealings would be facilitated if a British S.O.E. officer was in charge.
 - (b) At the present stage London is perhaps a better operational headquarters for dealing with North Africa than Washington from the point of view of distance and facilities for the consultation of interested parties.
 - (c) It is desirable that Madrid, which has a direct interest in the North African picture through Spanish Morocco and an indirect interest in the French North African situation, should be kept in step. As the dominating factor in Madrid as regards S.O.E. work is the British Naval Attache, there would be certain advantages in having a man in charge at Gibraltar who had close relations with him.
 - (d) British S.O.E. were prepared to supply their best available man in the person of Colonel Clarke who had been dealing with this area for a long time, who would be persona grata at Gibraltar, Tangier and Madrid, and who enjoys special relations with the British Naval Attache in Madrid and with the American S.O.E. staff in Lisbon and North Africa.

2

British S.O.E. suggested that, if their ideas were acceptable to their American colleagues, they would propose that the whole area of the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa should be grouped together as a single mission to be operated under the control of London. The exact relationship of American to British personnel at Lisbon, Gibraltar and Tangier would have to be worked out in the course of further discussion, the guiding principle being the necessity for a certain minimum degree of unity of control in the field and direction from a single headquarters.

The American representatives expressed the view that the North African area should be regarded as a predominantly American sphere in which a combined American and British organisation would operate under the control of Washington. The main factors which they had in mind in making this proposal were that

(a) /-

(a) Any approaches to French authorities in North Africa would almost certainly have to be made through American channels.

(b) Any military operations which it might be decided to carry out in North Africa would almost certainly be the responsibility of the United States authorities and the command would be American.

2. * (c) All discussions with French authorities in North Africa were intimately bound up with the economic policy to be adopted towards North Africa by the United Nations. This was predominantly a matter for Washington's decision and it was absolutely essential to co-ordinate any political-military negotiations in North Africa with the policy of the Bureau of Economic Warfare in Washington. This could obviously be done most effectively if control of the S.O.E. organisation engaged in these negotiations was in Washington also.

The American representatives therefore proposed that an American Mission should be set up with headquarters at Gibraltar and they indicated that they would like to send a new and senior officer to be head of this Mission. They thought that the Iberian Peninsula should be separated from North Africa and that special arrangements should be made for Anglo-American collaboration in that area.

19th June, 1942.

Record of Discussion regarding collaboration
between British and American S.O.E.

We set out hereunder a draft record of conversations which took place in the afternoon of Thursday June 18th 1942. There were present, representing American S.O. . Colonel Goodfellow, and representing British S.O.E. Brigadier Gubbins, Colonel Taylor, Mr. Kerwick, and Captain Pleydell-Bouverie.

The object of the discussion was to review in more detail the position regarding collaboration between British and American S.O.E.s in the Western and Central European area, which was covered in a general way by the discussions of the 16th June recorded in paragraph 9. of the Record of Discussions dated 17th June.

Brigadier Gubbins who had not been present at the previous discussions, explained in more detail the activities of the British S.O.E. in Western Europe, and pointed out that some clarification, and perhaps a certain modification of the conclusions reached at the previous meeting and set down in paragraph 9. referred to above were required.

The discussion then ranged over a wide variety of problems and for purposes of clarity it is proposed, in this record, to set down a summary of the conclusions reached in a more systematized way than would be possible if a merely historical record of the discussion were attempted. These conclusions, in so far as they modify those reached at the previous meeting, should be regarded as replacing the latter.

The division of the area in question for purposes of discussion into those countries likely to be invaded by the Allied Forces, and those not likely to be so immediately effected, was again recognised, as was also the fact that arrangements

for collaboration covering the former territories would have to be treated in at least two phases. For purposes of convenience, therefore, the summary of conclusions will follow this classification.

A. INVASION SPHERE.

This sphere covers Norway, Holland, Belgium and France. Arrangements for collaboration would have to go through at least two phases, of which only the first could be discussed in detail at the present time. This first phase would be one in which the British S.O.E. would continue very much as it is at present, working both on the development and operation of a field force of agents in each of the countries concerned, and on the building up of a S.O.E. liaison organisation for attachment to the appropriate Military Commands to accompany them to the Continent; whilst the American S.O. concentrated on preparatory work, at the same time giving such assistance as they could to the British S.O.E. in its task of operating the field force abroad. This phase would end as soon as the stage was reached when the question arose of a S.O.E. liaison organisation attached to an American command taking over the actual operation of a field force abroad.

1. FIRST PHASE

(a) Organisation in the Field

It was agreed that it was essential that the field force in each of the four countries concerned should continue to be treated as one whole, the object being to create throughout the area likely to be invaded by Allied Forces a single united nations fifth column organisation to be at the disposal of the Allied invading force, whether American or British. This would mean in practice that the American S.O. Mission in England would not, with the exception of the case referred to at the end of this paragraph, put agents

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

of their own into these countries who would function separately from the existing field force and who would be operated separately by them from London. If agent personnel was available from American sources it would be treated exactly like agent personnel available from other sources and infiltrated by the existing headquarter organisation into the appropriate country to work as part of the one existing field force there. In effect, during this first phase, there would be no change in the character or method of operation of the field force abroad, the American S.O. simply contributing such assistance as they could in regard to personnel, equipment, facilities, intelligence, etc. The type of assistance particularly envisaged by the British S.O.E. representatives was, - passports, air transport, and assistance regarding dollar transactions.

The exception referred to above is the case of American representation at Vichy. It was appreciated that as long as the United States retain diplomatic relations to the Vichy Government, it was possible for the American S.O. . to have an organisation based on their diplomatic mission inside Vichy France, and in fact they have made all arrangements to establish such representation. It was further recognised that American S.O. . representatives in Vichy would inevitably make contacts and create, though perhaps not on a large scale, a system of agents. It was agreed that such a field force, should not, as far as could at present be seen, have any direct connection with the normal S.O.E. field force in France. At the same time to avoid confusion, it was agreed that (1) this Vichy organisation would be operated by the American S.O. Mission in London and not by Washington direct, and

- (11) that the S.O. . Mission in London would operate in and in accord with closest collaboration with and under the general direction of the British S.O.E. French

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

- 4 -

(b) Liaison Organisation.

It was agreed that the American S.O. would concentrate primarily upon the recruitment and training of liaison staff, which would eventually be attached to the American Commands in order to provide for the latter S.O. services in the areas in which they would be operating. It was envisaged that the American S.O. would recruit this personnel in the United States, give them preliminary training there and then send them to England for further training. Such recruitment, and training, would, of course, be the responsibility of the American S.O., but the British S.O.E. would place all training facilities in England at their disposal. The American S.O. would of course only require to recruit liaison personnel for attachment to American Commands with qualifications for operating in those countries which would be invaded by American forces. It was considered probable that a sufficiently definite indication of those countries could be obtained at an early date. As soon as such indication had been given the British S.O.E. would cease to recruit and train liaison personnel for those countries which had been allocated to American Commands.

At least a certain proportion of the American S.O. liaison personnel would have to be given, as part of their training, an intimate knowledge of the field organisation with which they would eventually have to work and this could only be done by training them in the country sections concerned at British S.O.E. headquarters.

2. SECOND PHASE.

This phase would commence, as indicated above, when not only had there been a definite allocation between British and American forces, but when also the American S.O. liaison personnel for attachment to American Commands had been more or less completely organised and the

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MND 871091

tes S.O.E.

B

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

F
G

2. U
common
either

secti
wash
S.O.E.
secti

2

3

arose as to whether they ought not to take over the operation of the field force in the areas in which they were going to function. It was agreed that it would be possible at this stage to lay down arrangements to cover this contingency since so much would depend upon factors which are at present unknown, e.g. the actual allocation of the Commands, the imminence of the invasion itself, etc. Thus, if Norway were allocated to the United States forces, it would be comparatively simple once they had reached the necessary stage of development for the American S.O. liaison organisation attached to the American Command for this area to take over the operation of the field force in Norway, absorbing for that purpose as much as was necessary of the country section which had hitherto been running it. On the other hand it would almost certainly be impracticable to split up the control of the field organisation in the area comprising the Low Countries and France, since not only would the field force in France form a whole which could not be divided between two separate controlling headquarters in London, but also the activities of the field force throughout this area once the invasion had started would be of more or less equal importance to all parts of the Allied line, except in the areas immediately behind the actual fighting. For example, sabotage activities in the area of Belgium or of Luxembourg, or of Chalons could be equally useful to British force fighting in the Low Countries and North Eastern France, or American forces fighting in the region of Rouen or Amiens. A good deal will obviously depend upon the form of military command eventually established, and it might well be found that if the supreme command headquarters for the whole area was established in England, the concentration of the whole S.O. headquarters with that command would be the best solution. It was accordingly

13
14

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

agreed that the way in which the control of the field force, which, during the first phase would be concentrated in the British S.O.E. headquarters, should be allocated between the British and American organisations and would have to be worked out gradually as the situation clarified.

B. NON-INVASION SPHERE

This sphere covers such countries as Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Sweden. The conclusions reached regarding the way in which collaboration should be effected in these areas can be conveniently set out under the three following headings;
Poland and Czechoslovakia.

In regard to these two countries, the secret armies and other underground resistance organisations are operated by the Governments of the countries concerned, the role of S.O.E., whether British or American will continue to be essentially that of providing them with all possible assistance. It was recognised that the British S.O.E. have already been working for a considerable time on the job of assisting Poles and Czechs and coordinating their activities with the strategic policy laid down by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and that at any rate for some time to come the role of the American Mission would only be that of providing assistance which they could make available more easily than the British.

It was agreed that in order to avoid line crossing,

- (a) all dealing with the Poles and Czechs in regard to S.O.E. activities would be carried out by the American Mission in London and not by Washington direct, and
- (b) that whether as a result of an approach by the Poles or Czechs or on their own initiative, the American S.O.E. Mission in London would not make any arrange-

- 7 -

-ments for the giving of assistance to these Allies without first consulting the British S.O.E. and concerting the measures proposed with them.

Germany and Italy.

It was agreed that at any rate at the present stage there was no need to insist upon a single S.O.E. field force in these two countries and that there would probably be room for a long time to come for separate British and American organisations working in these areas. At the same time it was recognised as obviously essential if line crossing were to be avoided, that there must be some 'clearing house' for the operations of the two organisations. It was agreed

- (a) as far as American S.O. . was concerned Germany and Italy would be operated by the S.O. . Mission in London and not by Washington direct,
- (b) that the American S.O. . Mission and the British S.O.E. headquarters should work in the strictest collaboration in regard to these two countries, keeping each other fully advised as to progress and policy, and that they should endeavour, as far as possible, to allocate exclusively to one or the other the various contacts and channels available.

Sweden and Switzerland.

Special problems arise in connection with these two countries since they represent bases from which work can be carried on into several areas.

(a) Sweden.

It was recognised that the American S.O. . would wish to establish representation in Stockholm. It was pointed out by the British representatives that their present Mission in Stockholm was engaged on four separate functions, namely work into Norway, work into Denmark (where we work for S.I.S. as well as for ourselves) and preparations

for post-occupational work in Sweden itself, and work into Germany. It was pointed out that whilst with work into Germany the general principle laid down in paragraph 2. above could have been easily applied and would have involved no very close connection between the American S.O. . representative in Stockholm and the British S.O.E. Mission there, work into Norway, Denmark and Sweden itself was a much more delicate business. As regards Norway, it was clear that activities in this country must be governed by the arrangements for invasion countries set out in Section A. above, and that it would be impossible for the American S.O. . representative in Stockholm to operate any field force in Norway.

As regards the other three countries it was agreed that he should work in the closest possible collaboration and in accordance with ~~under~~ the general direction of the head of the British S.O.E. Mission in Stockholm.

(b) Switzerland.

Switzerland is a base for work into Germany, Italy and France. It was felt however, that unlike Stockholm it would probably be sufficient if it were agreed that any American S.O. . representative in Switzerland should be operated by the American S.O. . Mission in London and not by Washington direct, and that the American S.O. . Mission in London should, in this connection, work in the strictest collaboration with the British S.O.E. headquarters, each keeping the other fully advised with regard to progress and policy and that they should endeavour to allocate, as far as possible, exclusively to one or the other the various contacts and channels available.

With London thus being used as a 'clearing house' it was felt that it would not be necessary, or perhaps not even advisable for the local representatives in Switzerland to have any connection with each other.

22nd June, 1942.

Record of Discussion regarding collaboration
between British and American S.O.E.

We set out hereunder a draft record of conversations which took place in the evening of Friday June 19th, 1942 at which were present Colonel Goodfellow representing American S.O.E. and Colonel Taylor, Lord Glenconner, Mr. Keswick and Captain Pleydell-Bouverie representing British S.O.E.

The object of the discussion was to follow up earlier conversations, as recorded in Record No.1 of the 17th June, particularly paragraph 8 and to review the position in that area in more detail. The following summarises the conclusions reached;

1. BALKANS AND MID EAST.

It was agreed that paragraph 8 of the record of the previous meeting constituted a fair record.

It was agreed in general that the form and extent of the American Mission and the activities which it might undertake should be discussed between the British Head of S.O.E. Mid East and a representative of the American S.O.E. and that their recommendations should be referred to London and Washington for ratification.

British
3/

Regarding the reference in the earlier record to direct communication between Washington and the Head of the American Mission in Cairo, it was agreed that all such telegrams, whether originating from Washington or Cairo should be repeated to the American Mission attached to S.O.E. London. It was also agreed that it would be the responsibility of the American Mission in London to keep S.O.E. London informed as to the content of all such messages which affect British interests. It was agreed that if the American Mission set up their own War Station in Cairo this would be used only for communications with Washington as the War Station belonging to S.O.E. Mid East is already adequate for handling all communications with agents in the field.

A discussion ensued regarding supplies of equipment from America to S.O.E. Mid East. It was pointed out that such equipment comes under two categories, namely

- (a) Service Equipment, including aircraft, naval craft, arms, ammunition, medical stores, building materials, transport, parachutes, containers, clothing, field telephones; and
- (b) Non-Service Specialised Equipment, including explosives, sabotage devices, W.T. sets, War Station and Broadcasting equipment etc.

With regard to the former, it was pointed out that S.O.E. the British Government Department created for waging subversive warfare but that C-in-C Mid East is responsible for all operations

in/

18

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

in that theatre of war. S.O.E. plans must, therefore, conform to C-in-C's operational requirements and to the strategic requirements of the Chiefs of Staff. They are, therefore, submitted to C-in-C for his concurrence and in carrying them out S.O.E. are acting as his agents.

It follows that all requests for equipment in this category must originate from S.O.E. Mid East, who must look to C-in-C Mid East in the first place for the facilities and stores required for operations which he has approved. If, however, he is unable to supply, S.O.E. Mid East advise S.O.E. London and if they cannot be obtained in the United Kingdom, S.O.E. London must apply, through the appropriate Ministry and Munition Assignment Boards, to Washington. And it is at this stage that support from Colonel Donovan for such applications will be of the greatest value.

It was remarked that this machinery has been set up to enable the combined Chiefs of Staff to pool the resources of the United States and Great Britain and allocate them to the various theatres of war, having regard also to transport facilities.

It was agreed that it will, therefore, be impossible for S.O.E. Mid East to make direct application to the American S.O. for equipment of this type. It was considered, however, that if the American S.O. can become possessed of aircraft, seacraft etc., it might be possible for them to send them to their own Mission in the Middle East and place them at the disposal of the British S.O.E. organisation. In doing this, however, it would be necessary for the American S.O. to send their own crews and spares etc., so that the aircraft could be serviced as an independent unit, and it is clear that even this plan would involve negotiations with the military authorities in Egypt. Nevertheless, it was agreed that S.O.E. London should make up a list of equipment in this category of which they stand in need and supply it to the American S.O.

Regarding Non-Service Equipment, it was pointed out that the British S.O.E. are themselves manufacturing all their own special devices and W/T sets. At the same time, it was agreed that there was a shortage of certain types of W/T sets and broadcasting equipment.

Accordingly, it was agreed that S.O.E. London should make up a list of their requirements under this heading and supply it to the American S.O. And it was agreed that so far as this equipment was concerned, there could be no objection to the American S.O. either

(a) despatching it to their American Mission in the Middle East; or

(b) supplying it direct to S.O.E. Mid East.

Regarding personnel, it was explained that there is believed to be a shortage of W/T operators in the Middle East and that it would be useful if say 10 trained W/T operators could be attached to the American Mission for work in the S.O.E. Mid East War Station near Cairo. It was also pointed out that S.O.E. Mid East to-day recruits the majority of its Greek and Yugoslav personnel from their respective armies and that it was desirable to obtain nationals of these two countries and of Bulgaria, Roumania and Hungary from other quarters. Such personnel should be trained as W/T operators and as expert organisers for

infiltration /

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

infiltration into occupied countries where they can assist friendly elements to organise passive resistance, sabotage and revolt.

2. NORTH AFRICA.

The position regarding this area, as set out in Record No.1. para.10 and Appendix I was also discussed on the same occasion, but only tentatively. Sir Charles Hambro discussed it again with Colonel Goodfellow on the 21st June, and in accordance with these discussions a draft proposal as set out hereunder was drawn up for submission by the British S.O.E. to their Chiefs of Staff and by the American S.O. . to their authorities.

"Since a compromise must be found the following suggestion is put forward: -

- (1) North Africa, including Spanish Morocco to be regarded as predominantly an American sphere of influence.
- (2) The American S.O. .to establish the Mission for North Africa, the head of which would be responsible for S.O.E. activities in that area. The existing British organisation would continue and its personnel would remain administratively and operationally responsible to a British head, but the latter would operate under the general direction and control of the American head of the Mission; machinery will be set up to this end.
- (3) General policy would be agreed between Washington and London and instructions would be issued by Washington to the American Head of the Mission, a copy of any such agreed instructions would be sent from London to the Head of the British organisation.
- (4) Gibraltar as an S.O.E. base from which supplies of arms and equipment, transport facilities and W/T facilities are made available would remain outside the area of the North African Mission and under the control of the Head of the British S.O.E. Organisation.
- (5) In order to ensure the closest co-operation and liaison between the Mission and the local British Civil and Military authorities, machinery will be set up which will enable the Governor and C-in-C and the British Consul General Tangier to exercise the necessary supervision and co-ordination."

Gibraltar

3. SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

'In view of the fact that S.O.E. activities in Portugal (other than the use of Lisbon as a base for the creation of lines of communication into France) have been practically reduced to nothing by the decision of the British Ambassador and the Foreign Office, and of the fact that British activities in Spain are to all intents and purposes directed and controlled by the British Naval Attache in Madrid, it was agreed that there was no need to come to a detailed agreement regarding collaboration between the British and American S.O.E.s in this territory in the course of the present discussions. Such collaboration as was possible could be worked out in due course on the spot between the present American S.O.E. representative at Lisbon and Madrid or by his successor, if he were removed, with the local British representatives.

It/-

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091

It was indicated by the S.O.E. representatives that it might be very convenient to have the American S.O.E. handle the few W/T contacts left to British S.O.E. in Portugal.

It was made clear that the section operating in Lisbon on lines of communication into France should not be included in any arrangements for collaboration in the Iberian Peninsula proper.

4. WEST AFRICA.

With reference to paragraph 6 of the Record No. 1 of the 17th June, it was explained by the British representatives that they had been asked by the Minister Resident, Lord Swinton, to make clear to him the relationship they expected would exist between him and any American Mission or Missions based on the territory within his charter, and that they had confirmed to the Minister Resident that the situation, would, in this, as in other respects, be analogous to that existing in Cairo, and that the Head of the British Mission in West Africa would act as the link between any American Mission and the Minister Resident, putting up to the latter the requirements of the American Mission and conveying the decisions of the Resident Minister to the American Mission.

5. FINLAND.

It was agreed that Finland should be regarded as an American sphere and that the British S.O.E. should place all facilities and contacts useful for this country at the disposal of their American colleagues.

6. RUSSIA.

S.O.E. explained the position regarding their liaison mission in Moscow, and their agreement with the N.K.V.D. that neither party would carry out any operations in the territory of the other except by mutual arrangement. It was agreed that as the American S.O. . had no intention, for the present at least, of dealing with Russia there was no need to work out any arrangements for collaboration for this area.

23rd June, 1942.

Record of Discussion regarding collaboration
between British and American S.O.E.

We set out hereunder a draft record of conversations which took place on Thursday 18th June, 1942. There were present Colonel Goodfellow representing American S.O. and Colonel Davies and Captain Pleydell-Louverie representing British S.O.E.

The object of the discussion was to view the position regarding collaboration between British and American S.O.E.s in connection with research, development and production of equipment and devices.

1. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

Colonel Goodfellow stated that Colonel Donovan had no research establishment nor did he intend to institute one. They would place all their problems before the Scientific Advisory Council under the Chairmanship of Dr. Conant.

Colonel Goodfellow asked whether we had any requests as regards scientific research and he was informed that the D.S.A. had supplied a list of items which might be developed and it was thought as well to finish those before embarking on anything new.

Colonel Goodfellow was informed that Major Freeth and Mr. Billingham were kept currently advised as to what we were doing in this country, and so far we had had nothing in return. It would therefore be appreciated if this matter could be taken up with Major Freeth as we were anxious to benefit by American research experience.

It was finally suggested that at an early opportunity representatives from the Radio and Devices Departments of Station IX should proceed to America to discuss the kind of development which should be proceeded with on both sides and so avoid duplication and over-lapping.

2. PRODUCTION.

Colonel Goodfellow informed us that Mr. Billingham and Major Freeth were now established in New York and were in fact managing his production programme.

Our conception of the relationship between S.O.E. and Colonel Donovan's organisation in respect of supplies was then elaborated. It was suggested that there should be an interchange of production figures and that some kind of joint production planning should be evolved. The modalities of this were not discussed in detail.

3. FINANCE.

Colonel Goodfellow was informed that we had come to the conclusion that it would be better to wipe out any kind of cash transaction between S.O.E. and Colonel Donovan's organisation, and that each should supply the other with goods without charge and there would merely be a system of recording types and numbers of goods delivered.

Colonel Goodfellow stated that he had reckoned on cash transactions and had in fact budgeted forward for the amount he was likely to purchase from us, but had not allowed for any goods we might obtain from him without payment.

It was pointed out to him that if we indulged in cash transactions it would probably hold up supplies, in view of the formalities which would have to be undergone by both sides as a result of the very complicated financial agreements between our respective countries.

It was suggested that Colonel Goodfellow should take the matter up with Colonel Donovan, and that Colonel Davis should take it up with Sir Charles Hambro.

4.

As a result of the above conversation a formula, quoted hereunder, was worked out between Colonel Davis and W/Cdr. Venner on behalf of S.O.E. and submitted to Colonel Goodfellow and Mr. Atkins, (Finance Department of the War Office) both of whom have indicated their agreement with it.

"The Office of Strategic Services and the Special Operations Executive both produce ordnance which will be used in practically every case for similar operations, if not in respect of joint operations.

Subject ~~to~~ S.O.E., for its part, having to obtain approval of interested Government departments, it is agreed that the following is the best procedure to be adopted in the interests of both parties;

Resources should be pooled wherever possible and machinery set up

- (a) To determine jointly the types and quantities which each organisation should produce
- (b) The allocation of such production to the various operational centres.
- (c) As regards the question of finance in respect of such production, it was agreed that each side should finance their own production and that whilst detailed records should be kept of the destinations of all issues, there will be no payments, or financial obligations as between the two organisations or their respective Governments".

23rd June 1942.

Record of Discussion regarding collaboration
between British and American S.O.E.

We set out hereunder a draft record of conversations which took place on Monday 22nd June, 1942. There were present Colonel Goodfellow, representing American S.O. ., and W/Cdr. Venner, representing British S.O.E.

The object of the discussion was to view the position regarding finance.

At Colonel Goodfellow's request W/Cdr. Venner gave a general outline of S.O.E. finance and stated that funds drawn from the British Treasury for S.O.E. expenditure were charged to the secret vote. While S.O.E. paid out of such funds the salaries of all officers, the pay of Other Ranks was met from the open votes of the Service Departments. Stores and equipment other than those of a special or most secret nature were also supplied by the Service Departments without a charge falling on S.O.E. funds.

W/Cdr. Venner stated that a normal month's expenditure of S.O.E. at the present time was about £550,000 covering operations throughout the world, but that naturally in an organisation such as S.O.E. the monthly expenditure was subject to much fluctuation and he informed Colonel Goodfellow that in thinking of such a figure in connection with S.O.E. America he must bear in mind to what extent S.O.E. America would have to pay personnel and become liable to pay for stores &c. issued from Service sources.

army

Colonel Goodfellow stated that up to now S.O.E. America had been financed from block grants from the President's secret fund, but that now that it was becoming part of the Chiefs of Staff Department he was not certain what effect this would have in finance, but he thought that grants would be made from Army votes which would be in the nature of confidential funds. He stated that all personnel, officers included, drew their pay from Service Departments.

A discussion then took place on the question of stores and equipment for use by the two S.O.E. organisations and W/Cdr. Venner submitted a copy of the attached minute in regard thereto. Colonel Goodfellow expressed his agreement with the procedure outlined in this minute and took a copy with him stating that it would be most useful to him in making the corresponding arrangements when he got back to America.

W/Cdr. Venner then raised the question of Messrs. Freeth and Billingham's duties and Colonel Goodfellow stated that they were acting in an advisory capacity and while they call for quotations and issue orders for materials &c. from his office, they had nothing to do with finance or accounting which would be dealt with by Colonel Goodfellow's department. W/Cdr. Venner stated that he was glad to have this confirmation since Messrs. Freeth and Billingham were technical men and were not presumed to have the ability or responsibility of handling financial and accounting matters.

The Office of Strategic Services and the Special Operations Executive both produce ordnance which will be used in practically every case for similar operations, if not in respect of joint operations.

Subject to S.O.E., for its part, having to obtain approval of interested Government departments, it is agreed that the following is the best procedure to be adopted in the interests of both parties.

Resources should be pooled ~~where~~^{whenever} possible and machinery set up -

- (a) To determine jointly the types and quantities which each organisation should produce
- (b) The allocation of such production to the various operational centres.
- (c) As regards the question of finance in respect of such production, it was agreed that each side should finance their own production and that whilst detailed records should be kept of the destinations of all issues, there will be no payments, or financial obligations as between the two organisations or their respective Governments.

23rd June, 1942.

Record of Discussion regarding collaboration
between British and American S.O.E.

At their meeting of the 16th June the American representatives handed to the British representatives a memorandum on training, which is quoted hereunder.

As then arranged this memorandum was passed to the British Directors concerned for their comments, and these also are quoted hereunder. From these it will be seen that as regards the ten (out of the total of thirteen) stations which are under the control of Brigadier Gubbins only a very small amendment to the proposals made by the American S.O. . representatives is suggested, whilst as regards the three stations which come under the control of Colonel Davies a somewhat different basis for collaboration than that implied in the original American memorandum is put forward.

TRAINING. - (American Memorandum).

"In the past three months several officers of the American S.O. organisation have been permitted to attend the British S.O.E. training school at Toronto, Canada, where the training was carried on along the lines of the Para-Military and Advanced Schools. It is now considered extremely desirable that a large number of American Officers be permitted to attend the various specialized training schools in Great Britain, and particularly is it considered essential that American S.O. Officers be detailed for short periods of time to the various operational stations and offices in England. This will not only serve as a means of training for the individuals concerned but will be a most powerful factor in insuring unity of doctrine and effort in the future operations of the two national S.O. organisations. To insure this object it is requested that the American S.O. be permitted to send the following number of selected officers for approximately one month's training at the schools or stations mentioned below;

Establishment	Number to be sent at one time.	Total number to be sent
-----	-----	-----
Para-Military Schools	1	3
Advanced Schools	1	3
Industrial Sabotage School	1	3
Propaganda School	1	3
Radio School	1	3
Radio operation Station	2	2
Parachute School	1	1
Camouflage Station	1	2
Station 9	2	10

Establishment -----	Number to be sent at one time. -----	Total number to be sent. -----
Station 12	2	10
Station 61	2	2
Country Sections	8	16
Naval Operational	2	6

BRIGADIER GUBBINS' COMMENTS.

"With reference to the above quoted memorandum, I consider that in some cases the numbers of American S.O. officers to be attached at any one time are excessive, and I suggest that they should be amended to read as follows;

Radio Operation Station	- 1
Station 61	- 1
Country Sections	- 4

It is assumed that the Naval Operational Station referred to is the one at Dartmouth which operates under 'C'. The question of the numbers who can be taken at this establishment at any one time has not therefore been considered."

COLONEL DAVIES' COMMENTS.

Research and Development.

Colonel Goodfellow and Colonel Davies agreed that there should be close collaboration in respect of research and development and that S.O.E. would send out to America in the near future a wireless expert and a Special Devices expert. These officers would make contact through Colonel Donovan's organisation with Dr. Conant's organisation who are advising, conducting research on behalf of Colonel Donovan's organisation. In the meantime should Colonel Goodfellow wish to send a member of his organisation who is directly connected with Research and Development Colonel Davies would be glad to welcome him at station IX.

Production.

S.O.E. have representatives, namely Major Freeth and Mr. Billingham, who are now working directly under Colonel Donovan's organisation. Colonel Davies would be pleased to receive them or any members of their staff for discussions at Station XII.

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 871091