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P.W.B., M.I.S.  
June 3, 1942.

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DIGEST OF THE JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT)

Propaganda into the Japanese Empire, to assist military strategy, has the following Policy Goals, which have been agreed upon, in the light of our naval and military strategy, by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee:

1. To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale;
2. To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort;
3. To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities;
4. To split Japan from her allies and from neutrals.

The following Propaganda Objectives have been stated, as points to be conveyed to and fixed in the enemy mind as a means of assisting the achievement of the Policy Goals:

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese in the official statements of their government and other lawful news sources within Japan.
2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.
3. To convince the Japanese people that their interests are not served by their present administration, so that the common people will not consider a defeat of that administration to be a defeat of themselves.
4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that lasting victory is unattainable; that Japan cannot enlist and hold the necessary aid of other Asiatic peoples.
5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.
6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan; and therewith to increase the Japanese burden of counter-espionage.
7. To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.
8. To exploit the present economic difficulties of the Japanese, and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as war continues.

Propaganda Themes are enumerated in detail, as suggested means whereby the Propaganda Objectives are to be attained. Some of the more important of these, listed without reference to the particular Propaganda Objective to which each is attached, are the following:

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- (a) To convey trustworthy and timely news.
- (b) To avoid sending atrocity charges concerning Japanese into the Japanese Empire, except under specific conditions.
- (c) To censor all American threats against Japanese--whatever the source--unless the threat is official in nature or is compatible with international law.
- (d) To use the Japanese Emperor (with caution and not by name as a peace symbol).
- (e) To point out the illegitimacy and arbitrariness of the present military government, and the fact that this government has wantonly endangered all Japan, including the Emperor and his House.
- (f) To use American and other well-disposed Japanese as propagandists and as propaganda themes.
- (g) To promise Japan post-war prosperity and happiness, if we win.
- (h) To show that Asia will not be neglected by the United Nations, that our war aims apply to Asia, and that--as the Undersecretary of State has said--"The age of imperialism has ended."
- (i) To show that the American, British, and Dutch record in Asia is not one of which to be ashamed; that the Filipinos are loyal; and that, as Generalissimo Chiang pointed out, Korea has no Gandhi.
- (j) To suggest to the Japanese that the Germans in Japan may either be American agents in disguise, or else German fifth columnists preparing for their Fuehrer a Japanese version of Der Tag.
- (k) To attempt to launch rumors of underground troubles in Japan, and to reach the attention and interest of maritime wireless operators.

Some Relevant Characteristics of the Japanese emphasizes particular points in Japanese behavior or thought which should not be overlooked by American propaganda. Among these are Japanese attitudes concerning:

- 1. Disease.
- 2. Fire.
- 3. Espionage.
- 4. Resentment against "Inferiority".
- 5. Fondness for slogans.

Operations and Techniques presents brief comment on:

- A. Propaganda Classified as to Contents. (News and Rumor are stressed.)
- B. Propaganda Classified as to Medium. (Shortwave radio and news "planted" in neutral sources seem to be the chief present media.)

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- C. Propaganda Classified as to Group Addressed.
- D. Propaganda Liaison with Allies. (The necessity of cooperation with the Chinese propaganda agencies and machinery is made plain

Special and Cautionary Suggestions

- I. Function of the Theater Commander. His relation to psychological warfare is made plain.
- II. Shintoism. Religious questions, even of Emperor-worship, are to be avoided altogether for the present.
- III. The Emperor. Cautious but persistent reference to the Emperor (but not by name) is recommended.
- IV. The Imperial Tradition. A similar treatment is to be accorded the Imperial Tradition of Japan.
- V. The Race Issue. It is regarded as urgent that the race problem be fought on all propaganda fronts, domestic as well as foreign for the purpose of forestalling the Japanese attempt to launch a racial war in Asia.

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**J A P A N   P L A N**

**(FINAL DRAFT)**

June 3, 1942

Joint Psychological Warfare Committee  
(J.U.S.C.S.)

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JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

(J.U.S.C.S.)

June 3, 1942.

The enclosed JAPAN PLAN (FINAL DRAFT) has been developed through conferences of the governmental agencies interested. This plan will be changed from time to time to fit new circumstances and the progress of military policy.

It is further understood that the several agencies, military and civilian, concerned will pool and circulate such research data and other findings as may assist in the general implementation of this plan. Background data or reference material, to be annexed to this plan, are especially desirable.

*O. N. Solbert*

O. N. Solbert,  
Colonel, G.S.C.

Chairman, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

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## JAPAN PLAN

### PROPOSAL

It is proposed:

(1) That a general plan for propaganda into the Japanese Empire, which will assist our military strategy and operations, be adopted;

(2) That the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, together with the various government agencies concerned in the operation of such a general plan, draw up and agree on a detailed plan.

This plan will be modified as events require by periodic changes issued by proper military authority to maintain synchronization with military strategy.

### DISCUSSION

In order to increase the effectiveness of our total propaganda effort into the Japanese Empire, and above all to increase the degree of correlation between propaganda and military strategy, it is necessary that agreement be reached among the various government agencies concerned about the kind and methods of propaganda to Japan.

Propaganda into Japan proper has four main present objectives:

(1) To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale;

(2) To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort;

(3) To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities;

(4) To split Japan from her allies and neutrals.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee place before the Joint Chiefs of Staff the completed and agreed-on plan for adoption as a guide, until a subsequent plan is drawn up.

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## THE JAPAN PLAN

Although propaganda into Japan will not proceed under the most favorable conditions until the United Nations have achieved military victories, it is necessary to establish a plan for interim operations. Once propaganda objectives are stated and agreed upon, channels for action may be discovered by practical application and experience.

Political aims condition propaganda objectives. To date, these aims are documented in the speeches of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain in political instruments, such as the Atlantic Charter and its application to Asia, the United Nations Declaration, and in other authoritative statements and acts of high officials of the United States and Great Britain.

The following JAPAN PLAN consists of six portions:

- I. Propaganda Policy Goals--immediate ends for which propaganda shall operate. (p. 2)
- II. Propaganda Objectives--propaganda points which are to be conveyed to and fixed in the enemy mind. (p. 3)
- III. Propaganda Theses--allegations or arguments used to achieve the propaganda objectives. (p. 6)
- IV. General Comment on Operations and Techniques. (p.23)
- V. Some Relevant Characteristics of the Japanese. (p.27)
- VI. Special and Cautionary Suggestions. (p.30)

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## POLICY GOALS

The following immediate objectives or policy goals have been agreed upon, in the light of our military and naval strategy, by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee:

1. To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morale.
2. To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort.
3. To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities.
4. To split Japan from her allies and neutrals.

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PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese in the official statements of the government and other lawful news sources within Japan.

The Japanese news, radio, and propaganda system is insulated against outside interference by the difficulty and peculiarity of the Japanese language to Westerners. This makes it all the more necessary to penetrate the defenses which the language and the national thought have provided, and to cause the Japanese to heed United Nations news. (~~Distrust of the official news sources can only be developed by creating trust in United Nations sources.~~) Once preliminary obstacles begin to disappear, the vulnerability of the Japanese news sources may be found enhanced by their consistent understatement of Japanese losses.

2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.

The Japanese people and government constantly face adjustments of standards from their own past and of standards adopted from European civilization. It is possible for war against Japan to be conducted with considerable propriety and humanity on both sides, but the maintenance of such conduct requires nicely gauged appraisal of Japanese mentality. Brutalization of American-Japanese warfare would be a disservice to our armed forces and our nationals in Asia. It might render achievement of victory more difficult. Correct behavior should be encouraged; cruelty and reprisals, discouraged and postponed.

3. To convince the Japanese people that their interests are not served by their present administration, so that the common people will not consider a defeat of that administration to be a defeat of themselves.

Japan's war policy is based on two concepts, first, that the Japanese people, by history and ability, have a special mission of Asiatic leadership, and second, that the present is an age of world anarchy in which every nation is in real danger of attack and in which no nation will long survive which does not secure and develop an economic sphere adequate to support large

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scale military forces. These two concepts have been thoroughly sold to the Japanese people. Our task is thus a very difficult one of counter-propaganda. We must convince the Japanese people that their real interest lies, not in squandering their resources in a futile struggle for power, but in the renunciation of aggression and in cooperative creation of a world in which both they and their neighbors can have a secure and honorable position. We will fail if our propaganda is not prepared in full awareness of the psychological obstacles in Japanese minds which must be overcome--obstacles which are in some cases based on very real grievances against the international system of the last decades or against the United States.

4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that lasting victory is unattainable; that Japan cannot enlist and hold the necessary aid of other Asiatic peoples.

Japan's continuing difficulties in Korea, Manchuria, and China should be emphasized. Her successes with the Thai and the Burmese must be minimized as only temporary. Germany's failure to rouse anything but sullen hatred from the enslaved populations of Europe shows the impossibility of consolidating military victory by force. To convince a people that their war effort is futile is an established psychological warfare technique for promoting defeatism.

5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.

Many potential cleavages can be discovered by careful study of Japanese social, political, economic life prior to December 8, 1941. Where Japanese are known to have entertained distrust, that distrust should be nourished. Since the war effort and its initial successes have undoubtedly shifted alignments of opinion, however, every effort should be made to secure intelligence reports giving reliable evidence as to cleavages which may now be vulnerable to our propaganda.

6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan, whether native or foreign; and therewith to increase the Japanese burden of counterintelligence.

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Here full advantage should be taken of the Japanese fear of espionage, sabotage, and of all hidden acts and conspiracies. Life in Japan, even in peace, is seriously complicated by the incessant activities of a vast domestic espionage. To increase this anxiety and distrust will further complicate the ordinary processes of living, transportation, and trade. It will also lower morale, if the Japanese are made to believe that traitors, fifth columnists, and agitators are working undetected in their midst. It is a function of psychological warfare to create and foster this.

7. To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.

Japan's close association with Germany rests chiefly on one very strong common war aim--the defeat of the United Nations--and only slightly on other common interests, on political theory, or on mutual respect and sympathy. We should emphasize the arrogance of the Germans, their historic contempt for the Oriental, their racial theories, their distrust of the Yellow Peril, as well as their insatiable ambition for world rule and a monopoly of world trade.

8. To exploit the present economic difficulties of the Japanese and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as war continues.

War, pestilence, and famine go hand in hand. We know that the Japanese have made and are making extraordinary sacrifices for what they believe to be their duty. But, hungry and ill-clothed as they may be today, their lot will be infinitely worse if their insane policy of war and conquest is continued. Temporary successes may provide them with raw materials of military value, but they cannot eat rubber or drink oil. Prosperity belongs only to nations enjoying a free economy, peace, and the ability to trade anywhere in the world. Japan is bound to lose its temporary gains.

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PROPAGANDA THESES

1. To increase distrust by the Japanese of the official statements of the government and other lawful news sources within Japan.

The basic elements in any modern propaganda system are those which apply to the unbiased peacetime dissemination of news: Timeliness and truth. This objective is accordingly the application to Japan of a policy basic to all United States propaganda--transmission of the truth, presentation of worthwhile news along with our statement of the case, and discrediting of the enemy news sources.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To keep United States and United Nations news of high news value pouring in on Japan from all sides.
  1. An increased timeliness of United States news is strongly to be desired. If the Japanese have the first telling of a news event, it is far more difficult to undo the damage than it is to present our version from the start.
- b. To counter all Japanese lies or exaggerations whenever it is strategically possible to do so.
- c. To reiterate the fact that only democracies can endure to be told the truth, and that enemy censorship is a sign of the enemy government's fear of its own people.
- d. To show that racial and political minorities enjoy a freer press in the United States and United Kingdom--even in wartime--than anywhere else in the world.
- e. To make all news so interesting or palatable that every short-wave set will become a source of rumors.
  1. It is vitally necessary that news be transmitted in correct Japanese, and that no blunders--like Berlin's humorless reference to Shangri-la--be committed.
  2. It is also necessary to assess the propaganda effect of each news item before sending it, to ensure smooth operation of propaganda programs.

2. To maintain between Japan and the United States civilized standards of war conduct.

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This objective is, of course, subject to the general adoption of a Federal propaganda policy for all atrocities. In Japan's case, it is essential:

- a. To protect Japanese under the authority of the United States, to wage war in accordance with a strict interpretation of the formally applicable international rules, and to give the United States government and people fully publicized credit for such action.
  - 1. The obligation of the military and political officers of the United States to maintain the honor of this nation is, of course, beyond considerations of immediate situation or strategy. Owing, however, to the federal character of this government, and to the irresponsibility of some portions of the press, there is a danger that the Japanese will believe Japanese internees or prisoners to be mistreated.
  - 2. Japanese sensitiveness is such that, despite their own laxities in proper legal behavior, they will expect the United States to fulfil its obligations. Evidence of such fulfillment will counteract the Japanese propagandist allegations that the Americans are barbarians.
- b. In atrocity reports (whenever publication of authenticated cases is agreed upon by the War and Navy Departments) to complain against specific Japanese persons or units, not against the Japanese Empire as a whole.
  - 1. The criticism of all Japan would have no valuable results in Japan. The other nations of the world do not need to be told that the Japanese are atrocious and inhumane conquerors; but this should not exclude detailed indictment of the methods of exploiting the conquered areas.
  - 2. Criticism of individual Japanese, or of specific Japanese military or naval units, would have the advantage that it would facilitate correction, and--by discrediting the enemy in a concrete and believable form--might have a chance of being believed by some Japanese.
- c. Compliment Japanese civilization in its non-military aspects.
  - 1. Compliments to Japanese civilization might help keep tempers, assist in making other propaganda palatable,

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and would have a slight, indirect, but cumulative effect of helping the Japanese think of themselves and the Italians as civilized peoples in contrast to the third partner of the Axis, barbarized Germany.

2. Such compliments should be paid carefully, and should not encourage the Japanese to regard us as milksops or to feel they have a Kultur to impose on the world. It should be kept in mind that such material will be transmitted throughout Asia.

d. Meet improper or savage Japanese threats with ridicule which will embarrass the Japanese officer or agency issuing the threats. Censor similar American threats, and prevent their transmission overseas.

1. Stupid or ill-timed threats from the American side may lead to immediate reprisals upon American prisoners or internees. This is enough to justify censorship. A statement in a prominent newspaper that the Japanese people should be massacred or sterilized might contribute toward unprintable horrors to the Americans under Japanese control.

e. Leave to the Chinese the conduct of atrocity propaganda directed toward Japan; if necessary, establish contact through official channels to this end.

1. Chinese propaganda is not going to improve or worsen the savagery of Japanese war conduct. Chinese prisoners will be butchered, tortured, subverted, or prostituted, no matter what Chungking says.

2. Disappointment in Chungking would be avoided if a separation of tasks were effected between the two nations, and the United Nations would then have the benefit of two mutually complementary propaganda campaigns, each adapted to the needs of the country of issue.

3. Chinese propaganda may appropriately derogate the Japanese Emperor, and touch on the dangerous theme of Japanese republicanism, whereas ours could not. The Chinese, because of the long Far Eastern past which they share with the Japanese, could find the appropriate political terms for such themes while Westerners--analyzing Japanese political experience, rather than feeling it--might make serious errors of taste or judgment.

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3. To create a schism between the government and the common people of Japan, by showing the people that their interests are not served by the present government, and that defeat of the present military government will not mean defeat of the common people or the frustration of Japanese culture and ideals.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To point out to the Japanese that their present militant leaders have gone far astray from the path of conduct set forth by the Meiji Emperor (ruled 1867-1912) and are acting contrary to the desires of the present Emperor. The Meiji Emperor's sense of honor, his quasi-constitutionalism, those policies of his which were Anglophile, and so forth, should be stressed--not his expansionism. In connection with indicating the real desires of the present Emperor the following points (suggested by officers of the State Department) might be used:
  1. The Emperor was on the point of issuing an Imperial Rescript in November 1931 to halt the Army's depredations in Manchuria but was afraid that issuance of the Rescript would result in widespread assassination by the chauvinistic military of leaders close to the throne who held ideas different from the chauvinists;
  2. That prior to Matsuka's departure for Geneva in 1932 the Emperor informed him that the last thing which the Emperor wanted was any break with the democratic powers but as Matsuka was a tool of the militant leaders Matsuka did not carry out the wishes of the Emperor; and
  3. That the Emperor was opposed to the Tripartite Agreement prior to its consummation and that, when he could not prevent its consummation, he emphasized his desire for peace. (Published data are not available for documentation of these points, but they have been obtained from sources considered reliable; use of them cannot expose the United States to the charge of employing deliberate lies in propaganda).
- b. Show that the President's message, sent December 6, 1941, to the Emperor was improperly delivered, if at all.
  1. It may be noted that the State Department received a telegram, purportedly from Ambassador Grew at Tokyo dated Dec-

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ember 8, 1 P.M. Tokyo time (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington time) quoting an oral statement which the Foreign Minister said he had been instructed to make by the Japanese Emperor. The Emperor was reported by the Foreign Minister to have expressed his desire that the memorandum delivered by Ambassador Nomura to the Secretary of State on December 7 be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's message. In view of the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, it would probably be difficult to substantiate the statement that the President's message sent December 6 to the Emperor was never delivered. However, for propaganda purposes, publicity might be given to the alleged reply by the Emperor through the Foreign Minister with the allegation that the Emperor must not have received the message or, if he did, was not permitted by Japanese militarists to alter the decision already reached by those militarists to attack the United States. (Data supplied by the State Department)

2. Under either of the alternatives stated above, the Emperor was subjected to indignity.
  3. Emphasis on the criminality of the Pearl Harbor attack, and on the true stupidity of its superficial brilliance of execution, may be brought out as a related smirching of the Emperor's honor on December 7/8 by the militarists.
- c. State that the Emperor is still victimized by the military leaders. (At this point of propaganda, particularly close correlation of combat and psychological warfare is necessary, since the military leaders of Japan will be most vulnerable to criticism on militarily adverse occasions. Uninformed timing in use of this theme could be damaging to the issuing agency.)
1. As the Emperor is regarded by the Japanese in much the same way as the national flag is regarded by Western nations, the statement that he helped to cause the war is of adverse propaganda effect. Hints that an intra-government Japanese anti-war group does exist would undermine Imperial prestige while seeming to show proper respect and concern for the Emperor.
- d. Our Chinese or Japanese collaborators might add comments on the Emperor which would not be accepted from Westerners.
1. The Meiji Emperor was the only Emperor of recent centuries to possess true qualities of leadership. His son, the Taisho Emperor, was insane, and his grandson, the reigning

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Showa Emperor, is pretty much of an ineffectual. Consequently, appeals to Meiji are appeals to a figure beyond criticism and reproach, and can be used against the regime.

- e. Quote the provisions of the Imperial Japanese Constitution of 1889.
  1. Provisions concerning personal rights.
  2. Provisions concerning quasi-parliamentary government.
- f. Suggest that the Japanese military have duped the Japanese people, and that the German Nazis have duped the Japanese military.
- g. The traditional, pre-1931 friendship of the American people for the Japanese people could be described.
  1. Interruptions to this friendship could be ascribed to the ambitions of the Japanese military in general and of specific, named persons in particular.
  2. This theme is worthy of strong emphasis.
- h. Create a general picture of Japanese well-treated and happy under pre-war and current American rule.

This theme should not be employed until the American-Japanese situation has settled down and a broad unquestionable background of fact exists.

1. Such a picture would help offset Japanese popular fears of the Americans, without making the military feel any better. It would facilitate the spread of Japanese defeatism.
  2. Action taken within this country to improve the conditions of the American Japanese would correlate admirably with propaganda into Japan. The appropriate domestic propaganda agencies might draw the attention of both public and private welfare agencies to this point.
  3. The happy life of the Japanese at home before the coming of military rule might also be described, coupled with the statement that persons under democratic, non-aggressive government still enjoy the blessings of personal freedom and relative prosperity.
- i. Employ the factual, honest theme that the democratic world is a prosperous, humane world which the Japanese may rejoin on the basis of the United Nations declaration, if they make themselves worthy candidates for readmission.

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1. It is recommended that in praising the democratic world it be pointed out to the Japanese how many contributions the United States has made in a friendly and helpful manner to Japan, thereby assisting Japan to become a great power, pointing out at the same time the falsity of the propaganda of their leaders that we have attempted to impoverish Japan and weaken her. In this connection, evidence might be included along lines as follows: An impoverished country could not have become so great industrially as Japan has become and have had its standard of living increased as Japan's standard of living increased during the peaceful early 1920's. This was effected largely through American financial and technical aid.
2. It is usually advisable to pass over the dissimilarities of ideology among the common peoples of the world, and to point out similarities. All United Nations propaganda will, of course, point out that the common men of all countries hate militarist aggression, and love peace. It might be added that Americans and Japanese are particularly similar in their belief in business enterprise, in international trade, and in industrial progress.
- j. Persuade the Japanese that a democratic peace will bring them comfort and prosperity. (Caution: It is necessary to avoid naivete in this matter, since a materialistic dollars-and-cents approach to holy patriotism can be very offensive, most of all to the Japanese. The implication should never be made that the Japanese might accept a peace which was not just to all, purchasing comfort with dishonor. Rather, it should be stressed that comfort, individual happiness, and prosperity will be the concomitants of the peace which is going to be brought to Japan by the inevitable democratic victory. All that the Japanese common people can do now is to wait for liberation from our common enemies, the aggressive militarists, and move when the final hour is at hand. This would supplement the propaganda themes concerning class cleavages and counterintelligence.)

Particular emphases are:

1. The burdensomeness of rationing and the wartime restrictions should be brought forth whenever the common Japanese can be reached by standard-wave radio or other means.
2. Since Japan is in the fifth year of war, and nearing the sixth, and is in the eleventh year of operations in China, emphasis on peacetime comfort is worthwhile. Good cloth instead of the Ersatz sufu, good rice, real money instead

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of inflationary shimplasters---such detail could lend vividness to current propaganda.

3. Loss of the valuable tourist trade, and the opportunities for small independent shopkeepers should be emphasized.
  4. Show that democracy is economic as well as political, and that the plain Japanese can make a free, honest living when the militarist-monopolists are overthrown, and free commerce and tourism is restored.
  5. Pleasure and comfort should be presented as artistic, beautiful, dignified, and having their own spiritual and moral worth in terms of humane civilization. The Japanese is contemptuous of what he conceives to be American hedonism.
4. To convince the Japanese leaders and people that victory is unattainable: That Japan can not enlist and hold the necessary aid of the other Asiatic peoples.

It is necessary to exploit to the fullest the psychological warfare advantages offered by the humane political aims of the United Nations, as these may be expressed (e.g. in the Atlantic Charter and official pronouncements) from time to time by the United Nations leaders, as well as to employ other appropriate themes. It is particularly essential that every political thesis be stated in a way appealing to Japanese thought:

- a. To convey to the Japanese the message of world democracy and freedom, transposing these concepts into concrete terms familiar to Japanese, making plain the fact that the Axis leaders are waging a foredoomed struggle against worldwide forces of progress and freedom.
1. The application of the United Nations war aims to Asia, and not merely to Europe, must be underscored.
2. It must be made plain that the United Nations, composed of free peoples, are unable---by the nature of their own institutions---to hold other peoples in degradation and bondage. (The statement of Generalissimo Chiang, that Korea could have no Gandhi, is worth citation.)
3. Aggression, fascism, and militarist imperialism---and their Japanese equivalents---must be condemned as outdated and doomed. The irreversible progress of freedom---in Asiatic as well as Euro-American settings---must be shown as the

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true course of the future, and "newness" or "futurism" in fascism shown to be false. The Japanese are sincerely anxious to keep up with and adopt the best new features of civilization outside Japan. Today Britain and America seem old-fashioned; Germany and Italy, fresh and new. This attitude must be combatted by putting United Nations war aims as new, good, progressive in Japanese terms.

The political directive contained in the speech of the Undersecretary of State on May 30, 1942, should be brought forth clearly: "The age of imperialism is ended. The right of a people to their freedom must be recognized, as the civilized world long since recognized the right of an individual to his personal freedom. The principles of the Atlantic Charter must be guaranteed to the world as a whole--in all oceans and in all continents."

4. To show that China, the land of the ancient sages (such as Confucius, Mencius, or the military writer, Sun Tzu, who are still as highly esteemed by the Japanese as they are by the Chinese) has remained wholly oriental while adopting democracy.
  - (a) Show that Japan's ally, Wang Ch'ing-wei, has to follow the teachings of Sun Yat-sen in form, because the Chinese of all groups have accepted democracy.
  - (b) Describe modern democratic leaders of Asiatic race.
5. Further political directives shall be exploited as they are put forth.
  - b. To show American mobilization for war and war production. (The living standard of the United States should not enter into propaganda against Japan as an evidence of our economic superiority. To do so would only encourage the Japanese in feelings of the patriotic self-righteousness of their own enforced sacrifices. American productive capacity for civilian use should be mentioned only to show what we are abandoning, and converting for war. Use of this theme in any emphatic way while United Nations defeats continue would be useless if not damaging. \*\*\*Production becomes significant only when its application at the fronts has been demonstrated by victories.)
    1. Comparative figures on the productive capacities of the United States versus Japan and the United Nations versus the Axis with respect to:
      - (a) Airplane, tank and truck motors.
      - (b) Shipping.
      - (c) Steel, machine tools, and dies.
      - (d) Foods for our armies and those of our Allies.
      - (e) Weapons of war of high quality by mass production

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methods. (Extremely simple graphs showing the relative production might be used.)

2. The high degree of United States industrial development and agricultural mechanization permits us to release for military service an even greater proportion of the male population than countries which can exploit subject people. Machines are our coolies.
- c. To show American superiority in technical knowledge and equipment. Japan is cut off from the Western sources of technical training while training of the United States for war and war production is reaching its highest level.
  1. An attempt should be made to turn the Japanese admiration for American inventive genius into a fear that we will produce more and more effective weapons while Japanese war technology will cease to grow.
- d. To explain the physique, hardihood, and health of the American people.
  1. Show that American sportsmanship has engendered an invincible will to win.
  2. America's frontier heritage is not unknown abroad, and may be developed as a subsidiary theme in explaining the toughness of Americans.
- e. To persuade the Japanese government group, who are the ones most likely to be reached by shortwave radio propaganda, that consolidation of victory is impossible because of the ineradicable hostilities and non-cooperation of the Asiatic nations Japan has conquered.
  1. The fact that Japan cannot trust the Nanking and Peking traitors may come in for comment at this point.
  2. Point out that some of the traitors, disillusioned with Japan, may be working in secret for free China.
  3. The Japanese home public should be informed of all instances of Asiatic resistance to Japan which the United Nations news and intelligence services may bring to light.
- f. To persuade the common Japanese people that after thirty-seven years of Japanese domination, Korea is still a potential menace to Japan.
  1. This point may usefully be coordinated with plans for American propaganda through and among Koreans.

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2. Timing should be devised to prevent miscarriage of potential Korean aid.
3. Korea and the Philippines may appropriately be contrasted.
- g. To show the Japanese people the ineffectuality and corruption of their present exploiting methods throughout Occupied Asia.
- h. To attack the entire concept of Pan-Asianism as a justification for the false and pretentious Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere.
  1. True intra-Asiatic cooperation may be presented as unobjectionable to the Americans and the other Western peoples of the United Nations.
  2. Chinese attacks on Pan-Asianism may be usefully and properly quoted.
- i. To show the true meaning of America's Monroe Doctrine in contrast to the violent and fraudulent "Asiatic Monroe Doctrine" of Japan.
5. To promote cleavages between Japanese classes and groups.

To do this it is essential:

  - a. To apply intelligence and research activities to the psychological situation within Japan.
    1. The impact of war has undoubtedly led to new alignments in Japanese society, economics and politics. Current information is essential to the exploitation of new cleavages, and to the propaganda avoidance of old fissures which might incorrectly be presumed to exist.
    2. Full utilization of cleavages which exist in fact will be of the highest propaganda value.
  - b. To create divisions and conflicts among the ruling classes and the different types and grades of the legislative, the administrative, and police bodies, and within the regime in general. Some possible lines of difference which have been suggested are the following:
    1. The army extremists v. big business.
    2. The army extremists v. the Court circles.
    3. The army v. the navy (particularly on the issue of pay, procurement, supplies, and also with respect to world-wide reputation.)

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4. Intra-army cliques.
5. Labor v. employers.
6. Tenants v. landlords.
7. Bureaucrats v. people.
8. Expeditionary Forces v. men who stay safely at home. (See also Propaganda Objective #6, on minorities. Both these groupings will require to be brought down to date.)

c. Attack individuals by name.

1. Rumors spread best when there is foundation in fact; research will disclose a sufficient number of illustrations in the case of the Japanese. Such attacks might be libel in time of peace, but the existence of a state of war qualifies the legal nature of the case. Rumors about intimate personal traits or habits (among which sex and drink rarely lead to the discreditable) should be confined to whispering campaigns; stupidity, bad manners, personal feuds, laziness, cowardice and dishonesty may be charged on the radio.

d. Corruption should be charged against the Japanese civilians in broadcasts which reach the military, and vice-versa.

1. Broadcasts beamed at the N.E.I. and F.M.S. (but intended for interception by Japanese) might properly include accounts of Japanese corruption in "Manchoukuo", broadcasts beamed at Japan might stress the farthest periphery of the occupied area, and so forth. (Data concerning this corruption may be obtained from the Department of State, other official sources, and private persons from the Far East.)
2. Supplementary to this, items concerning the German leaders could be gathered from the European Leftist press of pre-1940 days, and sent along to Japan.
3. The reaction to be expected and cultivated is one of embarrassment that corruption should exist, and in the case of corrupt persons, one of envy and anger that the hearer is not in on it.

e. Threaten Japan with revolt of the Japanese workers and farmers. (Note the particularly strong connection between the two.)

Data on the Japanese domestic situation should be gathered as a preliminary to use of this theme.

1. Until further information from Japan is available, the farmers might be stressed more than the workers, in view of the fact that urban labor is relatively well paid at

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present.

2. This fits in with the Japanese dread of the class war, and also with directives #6 and #7 following. Hints as to radical lower-class organizations are appropriate.

6. To exploit anxiety concerning internal treason, subversive activities, violent or covert incidents by minority groups within Japan, whether native or foreign; and therewith to increase the Japanese burden of counterintelligence.

To do this it is essential;

- a. To use the following minorities in a manner suitable to the immediate occasion, properly timed and with appropriate safeguards for the preservation of potentially friendly groups:
  1. Radicals. The Japanese government has a great fear of radicals and of radicalism. The "proletarian" influence of labor, literary groups, and students has been tremendous in the recent past.
  2. Intellectuals. Professors and students even in the government colleges, are largely suspect in the eyes of the authorities. Experts of all kinds, particularly those who have lived abroad, are likely to antagonize the chauvinists either intentionally or accidentally.
  3. Koreans. Most educated Koreans speak Japanese. They have to. Many live in Japan, and are not assimilated. Military directives as to timing are especially important in this instance. Premature action might frustrate potential Korean aid.
  4. Overseas Japanese. Overseas Japanese, assimilated to other loyalties, could be used as bogies within Japan. Their value to the United Nations could usefully be exaggerated. American Japanese might be used immediately for broadcasts in Japanese wherein they stated that Japan's aggression earns Japan universal dislike, that they themselves prefer American citizenship, and so forth. The propaganda aim would be to strike at Japanese sensitiveness to world opinion.

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5. Unspecified (non-existent) Traitors. An adaptation of ~~the British Colonel Britton campaign~~ would consist in conveying coded or plain messages to Japanese traitors who may or may not exist.
  - (a) If the Japanese could be made to suppose that our Japanese language broadcasts contained items of immediate naval interest, the wireless operators of Japanese ships would be more likely to receive instructions to listen to KGEI and other United Nations stations, with a consequent leakage, through them, of rumors or news from our sources.
  - (b) It would be preferable to use much imaginary groups, even with a sacrifice of some propaganda results, than to invite persecution of potentially useful minorities (such as Koreans, Chinese or neutrals in Japan.)
6. White Men. German technicians, civilian and military, are of material aid to the Japanese war effort. These Germans enjoy considerable freedom of movement.
  - (a) It is no less difficult for Japanese to distinguish between various White nationalities than it is for the average American to tell Chinese from Japanese. Therefore, it will be possible to impede both the Germans' freedom and their aid to the Japanese war effort, by circulating rumors and in other ways suggesting to the Japanese that American spies are to be found in Japan, disguised as Germans and equipped with all the apparently proper official credentials.
  - (b) A second approach to the problem of Germans in Japan would consist in showing that these Germans amount to a German Fifth Column in Japan, designed to further Japan's interests insofar as they may coincide with Germany's, but to subvert Japan when Germany's world strategy shifts. The Japanese could be shown that between themselves and the Reichswahr there is nothing but the Red Army, and between their Navy and Germany's nothing but the British and American fleets. Therefore, if Japan and Germany begin to win, Japan will be left alone in the Old World, face to face with a victorious German power, and with a German fifth column which can strike at the core of Japan's war effort. If Japan and Germany lose, Japan will have played Germany's game in vain.

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(c) On the simple, practical level of personal antagonism, Japanese could be shown that the Germans in Japan are swilling themselves and profiteering, while the poor Japanese pay for the war.

7. Fanatical groups (either real or imaginary). The Japanese fear of underground action might be played upon by the use of fanatical groups as a threat. Since the present military regime owes much to the aid of once-underestimated nationalist secret societies, the regime would not be likely to underestimate such groups again.

b. To launch rumors concerning the extent and usefulness of United Nations espionage in Japan.

1. Probable Japanese credulity would be amply facilitated by Japanese traditions of American deviltry and cleverness.

c. To demonstrate the effectiveness of United Nations intelligence.

1. The technique and appropriateness of such an action is, patently, a matter for the operating agency to decide. If KUREI could ever broadcast, "Takahashi-san, of the War Office, lunched at the Imperial Hotel one hour ago, and picked his teeth while he left the building," the effect of the report--if true--would be serious. This is a mere instance, of course.

d. To jest about the ineptness and comedy of Japanese counter-espionage.

1. Propaganda of this type could be beamed to occupied Asia, as a means of thwarting the Japanese strategy of terror.

e. To damage public morale and increase bureaucratic counterintelligence by the instigation of actual sabotage within Japan.

1. Such sabotage will await the development of military operations, and the coming of a generally worsened Japanese will-to-fight.

7. To split Japan from her Axis associates, and to promote difficulties between Japan and neutral powers.

To do this it is essential:

a. To emphasize utterances of the Japanese which are offensive to her allies or to neutrals, and to forward Axis or neutral utterances which offend Japan.

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1. The very best propaganda of this kind cannot originate in the United Nations, but must spring from the actual antagonisms of the Axis powers for one another, and of the neutrals for the Axis.

2. In neutral countries, although scarcely in Axis areas, it will be possible to cause utterances which--when brought to the attention of the Japanese--will elicit Japanese replies which will thereupon antagonize the neutral involved. These offensive Japanese replies should then faithfully be forwarded to the neutral concerned.

b. To stress the potentialities of a German-Japanese split.

1. To indicate the historical truth that Hitler's Germany is a faithless ally. The Soviet Union was treated as a quasi-ally by the Germans, but betrayed at the opportune moment. German quotations concerning the "Yellow Race" or the "Yellow Peril" (both by the Kaiser and by Nazi leaders) could be used to show German contempt for Japan and the probability of a German betrayal.

2. To make plain to the Japanese the world-wide extent of Hitler's aims.

3. To show the long-range incompatibility of the National-socialist ideology and Japanese Kokutai.

4. To show that Germany's practical aims include much of the area claimed by Japan. German title to the N.E.I. through the conquest of the Netherlands, German aspirations in Wang's China, German interest in the Indian Ocean can be used. The Transocean-D.W.B. representative in Chungking in August, 1940, stated categorically that Germany would, after conquest of Russia, do what the Russians had failed to do, and acquire the hegemony of East Asia, starting with Siberia.

5. To show, in cold-blooded and realistic studies of power-politics and world strategy, that German-Japanese cooperation is realistic now, but will not continue to be such for long. The partnership of Germany with Russia and France to deprive the Japanese of the fruits of victory following the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, and also the fact that Japan fought Germany in 1914-1918 might be recalled to the Japanese. (This type of formal argument may perhaps await the development of standard-wave transmission, with quasi-educational features, into Japan.)

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- c. To develop specific plans for the alienation of given countries particularly Vichy, France, and Japan.

8. To increase the economic difficulties of the Japanese and to emphasize Japan's progressive economic deterioration as the war continues.

The creation of economic difficulties is primarily a subject for economic warfare, rather than for psychological warfare. Propaganda appeal to subject peoples for such economic warfare may, as occasion arises, be extended along the lines indicated below, although the entire problem of implementation is more difficult and extensive than in the employment of purely psychological or political themes. Upon indication by the appropriate economic-warfare authorities, or the presentation of suitable combinations of events, it will be useful to exploit by propaganda the following themes:

- a. To increase the difficulties of exploitation by Japan of the resources acquired by conquests.
- b. To increase the strain on Japan's external and internal communications and transportation.
- c. To increase the consumption, hoarding, dispersion, and wastage of Japan's resources.
- d. To reduce production in and for Japan.
- e. To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.
- f. To confuse and depress the Japanese monetary and credit systems at home and in the occupied countries.
- g. To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and the neutrals.
- h. To provoke or exploit commercial rivalry between Germany, Italy, and Japan in the Far East.

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## OPERATIONS AND TECHNIQUES

The following outline of operations and techniques covers the general field of propaganda, irrespective of source, target, or purpose. The appended comments reflect special conditions which apply in the particular instance of Japan.

### A. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO CONTENTS

#### 1. NEWS

In the instance of Japan, as in the case of most other enemy areas, the dissemination of honest, factual news is a major function of propaganda. The clarity, trustworthiness, and impartiality of the news will enhance its value as a "carrier" for other forms of propaganda. It has been pointed out that timeliness is of high value in the news distributed for propaganda purposes, and the United Nations news which is many days tardier than Axis news loses most of its propaganda value.

#### 2. Official Statements

#### 3. Official Communiques

Propaganda of the two foregoing types should avoid the appearance of propaganda, particularly in the Far East. Imputation that an enemy government is using high, honored, official channels for propaganda stratagem is--when demonstrable--of high counterpropaganda value.

#### 4. Rumor

Liaison with Chungking should be continued for this purpose.

#### 5. Emotional or Rational Debates and Appeals

The value of these depends in direct measure on their palatability to the receiving audience. In the instance of Japan, this requires the appropriate utilization of a large fund of Japanese information, and a willingness to pay a propaganda price for a specific appeal--that is, to concede something to the enemy's vanities or foibles in order to engage his attention. Like all other propaganda, this should never be hostile, didactic, or superior in tone.

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## 6. Propaganda "Events" or Incidents

Non-verbal propaganda of a very effective sort may be developed through the creation or incitement of events which will cause the enemy to announce news or show reactions which amount to propaganda favorable to our cause.

### B. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO MEDIUM

#### 1. Short-wave Radio

Shortwave radio is the chief present means of reaching Japan. It is essential that the audience for shortwave radio be kept in mind. This audience will consist almost entirely of persons trusted by the Japanese government; hence such propaganda should be of a kind palatable to Japanese official circles. On the other hand, the mere fact that this audience is restricted does not necessarily imply that the ultimate dissemination of news transmitted by shortwave will be narrow; it has been pointed out that the "scarcity value" of shortwave news gives the hearer an almost irresistible temptation to distribute the choicer items he has heard. Shortwave propaganda can thus become rumor.

Furthermore, it is to be noted that the Japanese place special value on news which they do not think is addressed to them. Therefore, propaganda in reality addressed to Japan should on occasion be beamed to other areas of the world and in languages other than Japanese. Such propaganda attacks may be routed through the various Occidental countries, particularly Germany and the Spanish-speaking nations, as well as India, China, and the Netherlands East Indies.

Japanese sensibility includes swift reaction to what the Japanese regard as the public opinion of the world. Propaganda ostensibly from neutral sources would accordingly carry weight.

#### 2. Standard-wave Radio

Experts on Japan have agreed that standard-wave broadcasts, which could reach the many home radio sets operated in Japan, would be of immense value to the United Nations cause. Obstacles to the initiation of such a standard-wave propaganda program are chiefly of a technical and geographic nature.

#### 3. The Domestic Press

The domestic press of Japan, which is excellent and includes some of the finest newspapers in the world, may at the present time be presumed to be almost completely beyond the reach of United Nations action.

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Japanese correspondents in neutral countries (e.g., Domei men in Switzerland) are as fond of scoops as are other reporters, and may be made the victims of "plants".

#### 4. The Neutral Press

The neutral press is, like the neutral radio, of genuine importance in reaching Japan. The press of those neutral nations still in contact with Japan would be particularly valuable in this respect. The Japanese abroad can then transmit home material covertly inserted in the neutral press by us.

#### 5. The Subversive Enemy Press

This may be omitted from consideration at the present time in view of difficulties of distribution and of liaison. It is highly probable that virtually no subversive printing operations are carried on within Japan. At a later date, depending upon a change in the international situation, Soviet channels might be employed to reach this press.

#### 6. Military Agents

Intelligence difficulties of United Nations agents within Japan are presumably sufficient to prohibit their undertaking any non-essential auxiliary activities--such as propaganda--for the present.

#### 7. Pamphlets (Surface Distribution)

Chinese and Korean channels may perhaps be exploited for the purpose of developing programs for the distribution of pamphlets within Japan. Japanese pelagic fishermen constitute a possible although difficult channel of communication.

#### 8. Pamphlets (Aerial Distribution)

Within such limits as the tactics of air warfare may permit, the use of pamphlets as an accompaniment to bombs is strongly to be desired. It has been agreed that the Japanese would not be impressed by pamphlets unaccompanied by bombs--as in the instance in the Chinese raids on Nagasaki and Taiwan, or the British raids on Berlin in the autumn of 1939--but that pamphlets could powerfully reinforce the effects of actual bombardment.

#### C. PROPAGANDA CLASSIFIED AS TO GROUP ADDRESSED

The following list of groups has already been covered in the discussion of Propaganda Objectives, above, and is here repeated simply for the purpose of providing a check-list:

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1. Distinct groups within Japan
2. Subversive groups within Japan
3. Japanese leaders
4. Neutral groups (i.e., groups of neutrals within Japan, as well as neutral groups outside of Japan which might effect Japanese opinion.)
5. Domestic (American groups affecting Japan)

## D. PROPAGANDA LIAISON WITH ALLIES

For the purpose of implementing this JAPAN PLAN, propaganda liaison with the Chinese National Government is most essential. The following implementing policies are to be recommended:

1. To effect contact with the appropriate Chungking authorities for the purpose of launching and maintaining whispering campaigns in Northeast Asia.
  - a. General contact in Chungking, through the proper and elaborate Chinese channels, would not be as effective as direct, informal contact with the Military Affairs Commission (Political Department), the Kuomintang Party-Ministry of Publicity (also termed Central Publicity Board), and the Party and Government War Area Affairs Commission.
2. To carry out psychological warfare operations within Japan through the medium of Chinese, Korean and other agents contacted through the Chungking authorities. (See Korea and China Plans.)
  - a. Separate American propaganda through Korean channels would presumably duplicate the facilities developed by Generalissimo Chiang. Operations within Japan can in most instances be effected through the Chinese.
3. Association of Chinese, United States, and other agencies (to the degree requested by Chungking) to operate upon and against Japanese personnel in Occupied Wang Ch'ing-wei/China.
  - a. Some of the "traitors" in the puppet governments are undoubtedly in contact with Free China authorities, and to that extent afford us a channel direct to the Japanese military.
4. To employ the Free Japanese in China, and under Chinese authority, as a propaganda topic.

Propaganda association of the United States and Great Britain is proceeding satisfactorily.

Liaison with the Soviet Union for psychological warfare against Japan, with which the Soviet Union is not at war, is a difficult question.



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## SOME RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPANESE

The Japanese Government's system of thought control, built up over many years, has provided effective defense against enemy propaganda. Under this system, Japanese thinking has developed a set of values that is different from our own. We place great emphasis upon freedom of speech and upon individual liberty. To the Japanese these concepts are not of prime importance. They put the emphasis on the importance of the State.

In a few instances, Japanese thought patterns are by their own nature vulnerable to attack. It is these particular patterns which ought to be exploited in our propaganda, because once touched they provide the network by which the propaganda spreads.

### 1. Disease.

A potentially vulnerable point in Japanese thought is the fear of disease, which may or may not be deeper than that in other countries, but which is made real by the fact that Japan is relatively much cleaner and healthier than the areas now invaded.

Japanese care is obvious: Large numbers of people on the streets of Japan wear masks over their mouths and noses against infection by cold or other germs. Intensive search is made of family records in all marriage arrangements for any traces of insanity or tuberculosis. Japanese regulations in China for passage on Japanese ships or entry into Japanese occupied cities are very severe. These regulations require much more frequent vaccination and cholera inoculation than is considered necessary by Western doctors; passengers on ships coming into Japan from China undergo very careful examination, and have at times been required to take rigid cholera tests before the ship could be cleared from quarantine. Japanese army regulations have required people debarking at railway stations to walk through an antiseptic bath, and those going to the Japanese consulates to wash their hands in an antiseptic solution before being admitted. This intense nervousness about disease could be fed by rumor. For example the following news items might be broadcast repeatedly with slight variations.

- a. "Reliable reports show that the naturally endemic plague is spreading and attaining the proportions of an epidemic in Java and South China."
- b. "Cholera has been reported spreading in Burma and South China."
- c. "Malaria is rampant in the Singapore area."

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- d. "Amoebic dysentery is spreading rapidly in the Shanghai area, and smallpox has broken out again."

## 2. Fire

Fear of fire is deep-rooted. Japanese houses are extremely inflammable, being built for the most part of wood and paper. Disastrous fires whether as a result of earthquakes or less spectacular causes, are not infrequent. A large section of the city of Shikazuka was razed in 1940 by a fire which started in a private house and quickly spread through the city. The Japanese are constantly aware of the fire hazard. Over generations there has been developed a communal system for the control of fire which calls for participation by each household in nightly patrol. On windy nights extra precautions are taken and the patrol calls out, "It's a windy night, take care of fire."

Fire control is the most emphasized part of the air-raid drill. This fear of fire could be exploited by spreading rumors among the soldiers in China and elsewhere concerning the damage done by Allied air-raids by fires. It could be stated that new and terrible bombs which acted too quickly for control had been used and had caused damage much more severe than officially admitted.

## 3. Espionage

A further attack is through the awareness of espionage which is common among the Japanese. (See Objective #6) It is related to the belief that the individual is unimportant and that the State is all important. Almost every Japanese is a willing unofficial espionage agent for the State. This attitude provides a mechanism for propaganda spreading. By permitting ostensibly confidential information to reach Japanese nationals in this country, it may be expected that they will find a means to pass it on to the officials of the State.

## 4. Resentment against "Inferiority"

In a loose, broad sense of the term, the Japanese people are frequently said to have a "sense of inferiority"--the sense of smallness as a people and as a nation surrounded by the great and large Russian, Chinese and American nations. As a psychological problem, this is controversial. The reality of their resentment of race discrimination and ridicule is unquestionable. This sensitiveness should be watched lest offenses against it damage our propaganda.

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Fear of failure, sensitiveness to ridicule, lack of a Chinese-type or Western-type sense of humor are related features which might be utilized. Belief in the "manifest destiny" and divine right of the Japanese to rule the world has been fostered in the thought control system to offset the sense of inferiority which many Japanese may feel the Chinese and Westerners to be imposing on them. When defeats occur they should be exploited to the fullest to counteract the "manifest destiny" view point.

5. Fondness for Slogans.

All ideographic languages are far more compact than languages based on the mere transcription of sound. The Chinese ideographs which the Japanese and Chinese both use--with general but minor variations in meaning--lend themselves to the pithy statement of political, military, or social ideals. Many such statements, which are explicable in English through circumlocution or lengthy analysis, are untranslatable in any real sense, because the compactness--which is the heart of the meaning--is lost. Thus, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai Toa kyooei Ken) looks like humane common-sense in the original, whereas the English translation is not only obscure but silly.

It is necessary to render United Nations slogans in forms which will go across with the Chinese or Japanese. Proverbs, definitions, epigrams, condensations--these are far better than statements of logic or argument. The mere fact that our own slogans, translated back into English, might seem awkward or obscure is no obstacle to their use in the Far East.

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SPECIAL AND CAUTIONARY SUGGESTION

I. Function of the Theater Commander.

In a theater of war, the conduct of psychological warfare is a function of command. The theater commander has on his staff officers responsible for its conduct. The psychological warfare activities of all government agencies operating in a theater will be coordinated with military operations by the theater commander. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is responsible for furnishing any assistance to the theater of operations that is requested by the theater commander through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is the Chinese theater commander, any psychological warfare program to be conducted by United States agencies in his theater takes the form of assistance to the Generalissimo. Such aid should be offered to him through military channels.

II. Shintoism.

It is understood that for the present no religious questions are to be raised with the Japanese. State Shinto is to be subverted only insofar as it may constitute an element of some specific point which is under attack.

III. The Emperor.

The Emperor Hirohito (properly referred to as the Emperor of Japan) should not be mentioned by his given name of Hirohito; when referred to by title he should be presented as an unhappy friend of peace and constitutionalism.

Since the Emperor is the focus of Emperor-worship, he is a symbol--honored as are national flags in the West--which can be used to justify political and military action. In the past, the military leaders of Japan have exploited the symbolic aspect of the Emperor for their militaristic schemes. Nevertheless, it is possible to use the Emperor-symbol (not his name) in justifying criticism of the military authority, and in strengthening the case for a return to peace. If this is done, it will also have the partial effect of causing widespread skepticism about the godhood and infallibility of the Emperor, which in itself will damage the political stability of Japan.

Use of the Emperor in connection with the several Propaganda Objectives stated above may be found most useful.

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Occasional attacks on the Emperor might be requested from the Chinese, to the end that the Japanese would not find their Emperor-Concept invulnerable. Such attacks--allegations, for example, that the Emperor is nothing but a plain, rather stupid human being--would come better from a Far Eastern people than from Westerners.

#### IV. The Imperial Tradition.

Occasional valuable reference may be made in an informed, sophisticated way to the fact that the Japanese militarists are jeopardizing the Imperial Tradition which--objectively considered--has been a distinguished national asset to the Japanese people. By their rash war against the United States, Britain, and China--and the impending war with the Soviet Union--the militarists have risked the ruin of this tradition, and face interruption of the undisturbed growth of Japanese political culture.

#### V. The Race Issue.

It is essential to avoid giving unwitting aid to the Japanese propaganda attempt to convert the Pacific war into a racialist, Pan-Asia war.

It is therefore advisable to institute a program of propaganda directed toward people in this country to lessen the strong racial prejudice existing in white Americans toward colored races, including the Negro. Such propaganda could not take the form of direct statements regarding this racial prejudice, but could be done indirectly by telling of the accomplishments of colored races. For example, publicity could be given to valuable work being done by Americans of Japanese ancestry.

This policy respecting race might be followed throughout the implementation of the Propaganda Objectives enumerated above.

It is obviously essential to avoid reference to such terms of racial opprobrium as "little", "yellow", "slant-eyed", "natives", etc.

Within limits of considerable care, it will be possible to meet Japanese anti-White propaganda with the utterances of American Negro leaders. The following suggested theme has been transmitted by officers of the Department of State:

"Our colored people have gone into the war with a splendid spirit. The skill which Negro officers are showing in leading their men is of a high order. The leadership of Negro officers has proved to be a source of strength. Negroes are enthusiastically supporting the United

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States and the war for many reasons, among which is the important reason that the Negroes feel that the Japanese have become traitors to the colored peoples of the world in their treatment of Koreans and Chinese.

The suggestion is made that Dr. Joseph L. Johnson, colored, former United States Minister Resident to Liberia, might be a valuable speaker in this connection."

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