

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-16-B-7(G)
AS-5/EF30/EG
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial No. 02767916

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 30 1942

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To : Addressees Listed Below.

Subject: JANOWSKI, Werner, German Espionage Agent.


Reference: (a) Circular Conf. Memo from DNI, 10/1/42,
Subject, "German Sabotage Agents",
(SC)AS-5/EF30, Op-16-B-7, AS-5/EF30/EG,
Serial 02340316.

Enclosure: (A) Conf. Memo concerning Background and Movements
of Werner JANOWSKI, German Espionage Agent,
landed at New Carlisle, P.Q., Canada,
11/9/42.

1. Enclosure (A) has been prepared from information
furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence by a highly confidential
source. This information must be closely held within the Naval
Establishment.

2. The information contained in Enclosure (A) is that
available in the Office of Naval Intelligence at the present time
and is not to be regarded as complete; neither is it to be regarded
as necessarily accurate in all its details. JANOWSKI is character-
ized as an inveterate liar, and the information which he has
furnished must be accepted with caution. It is believed, however,
that taken in connection with that contained in Reference (a) and
other information available, it may be of value in indicating
certain operations of the German Intelligence organization.

FINISH FILE.....


J. B. W. Waller,
By direction.

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In reply refer to Initials
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CONFIDENTIAL

Op-16-B-7(G)
A8-5/EF30/EG
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial No. 03022316

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Dec 29 1942

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To : Addressees Listed Below.
Subject: JANOWSKI, Werner, German Espionage Agent.
Reference: (a) Conf. ltr. from DNI to same addressees,
Serial # 02767916, same subject, 11/30/42.
Enclosure: (A) Memo. of report on information obtained
from interrogation of SUBJECT.

1. Reference (a) disseminated preliminary information concerning the background and movements of Werner JANOWSKI, a German espionage agent, who was landed from a submarine at New Carlisle, P. Q., Canada, during the night of November 8-9, 1942.

2. Enclosure (A) is a copy of a report received from another governmental agency and serves to amplify the information contained in Reference (a). Enclosure (A) is forwarded in its entirety, as received from the other agency, except for the omission of approximately 4 pages which describe the submarine trip from Kiel to New Carlisle already covered by Reference (a). Inasmuch as Enclosure (A) is a verbatim copy of the report as received in the Office of Naval Intelligence, no attempt has been made to correct certain minor errors in the translation of German phrases and technical descriptions.

3. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for the information of addressees and to assist in the building up of a comprehensive picture of German espionage and sabotage plans and methods. As in the case of Reference (a) it is believed that the information contained in Enclosure (A) should be treated with caution insofar as the accuracy of specific statements is concerned. All sources agree that JANOWSKI is an unreliable individual. Nevertheless, much of the information tends to fit in with that previously received and disseminated by the Office of Naval Intelligence. In this connection, attention is especially invited to the objectives of JANOWSKI's mission and the data on the organization of the German Intelligence System. JANOWSKI's own experience as well as the in-

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Serial No. 03022316
 Subject: JANOWSKI, Werner, German Espionage Agent.

formation he gives concerning other individuals would appear to indicate that there is considerable interchange of personnel between the espionage and counter-intelligence branches of German Intelligence. This interchange probably does not exist in the case of personnel coming under Section 2, or the Sabotage Section, of the Abwehr, who receive a distinct and specialized training.

4. The dual use of personnel for espionage and counter-intelligence duties is illustrated in an interesting manner in the cases of those persons whom JANOWSKI describes as being members of the organization "Todt", the construction corps of the German Army, in Western Europe. As reported by JANOWSKI, these individuals are at present serving as counter-intelligence agents in the occupied areas, but if and when the German Army is forced to evacuate these territories, certain of these agents will remain behind to report on the movements of allied troops, being equipped for this purpose with portable radios, - thus becoming intelligence agents.

5. The section of the report dealing with the codes and radio equipment which JANOWSKI brought with him is forwarded for general information. It is emphasized that future agents will undoubtedly be equipped with different codes but the detailed description of those which JANOWSKI carried may be of assistance in indicating the general type of codes supplied such agents. Similarly the description of the radio equipment may be of some assistance for identification purposes.

6. The manner in which JANOWSKI was caught by Canadian Police authorities illustrates once more either his congenital inadequacy for the mission or the lack of complete indoctrination by his superiors. Of more immediate importance from a counter-intelligence point of view it illustrates the excellent results which can be obtained by the prompt reporting of suspicious circumstances on the part of civilians and prompt action on the part of police authorities before an agent has left the area where he landed.

J. B. W. Waller
 J. B. W. Waller,
 By direction.

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United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

CONFIDENTIAL

Rear Admiral H. C. Train
Director
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

F
182/EF30
182/EF74/EF13-396

Dear Admiral Train:

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SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED
1/20/43

(5) 2/11/43

Reference is made to my letter to you dated December 19, 1942, concerning the landing of Werner Alfred Waldemar Von Janowski on Gaspé Peninsula, Canada, on December 9, 1942, from a submarine.

As of possible interest to you, there is attached hereto a memorandum setting forth additional information obtained from the further questioning of Janowski.

It is desired that all information concerning Janowski be kept strictly confidential due to the present status of this agent.

Sincerely yours,

J. E. Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enclosure

cc Major General George V. Strong
Assistant Chief of Staff
G-2, War Department
Washington, D. C.



The Source of this information shall NOT be disclosed to anyone outside the...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 907026

MEMORANDUM

Re: WERNER ALFRED WALDEMAR VON JANOWSKI, ✓
alias Werner Von Janowski, Werner
von Janowsky, William Breton, William
Braulter, William Branton.

(K) *mm*
card
(See letter)

The following information has been obtained as the result of further questioning of Janowski:

German Morale

According to Janowski, morale in the German Army is still high but has weakened to the extent that victory for Germany is no longer regarded as a certainty. The attitude now is that if Germany does not win, no one will, but all nations involved will utterly exhaust themselves.

Civilian spirit in the bombed industrial areas is low, according to Janowski. He stated that in these areas the workers do long shifts in the factories and spend nights in air raid shelters. This strain, together with poor food and clothing, and a growing sense that Germany may lose the war have greatly lowered civilian morale.

Janowski stated that outside of the bombed areas civilian morale is fair and civilians back the Army and the war effort reasonably well but there is growing dissatisfaction with the Nazi Party and the Gestapo. Hitler is still regarded with favor and as above the Party. It is freely admitted in conversation that he has made mistakes but the tendency is always to blame other Party leaders for having misled Hitler. Janowski claimed that both Army men and civilians are becoming discontented with the Nazi Party and that the friction has increased tremendously during 1942. He sees the possibility of a break between the Army and the Party in the near future and claims that the only thing that has prevented such a break before now is the knowledge that it would weaken or destroy Germany's war effort. There is, however, a growing feeling that the political party has blundered and that the war may be lost through continued blunderings. If this feeling grows, the Army may openly break with the Party in order, in Janowski's opinion, to attempt to strengthen the war effort, not to end the struggle.

While the intention of such a break with the Party by the Army would be to aid the war effort, Janowski does not think it would, in fact, have that effect. He stated he believed that such a break would rapidly reduce Germany to a state of chaos and three distinct groups would form.

mm
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Ger. Morale
202

(K) *mm*
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104-400
Rev.
Groups

- 2 -

The first group would be comprised of the Nazi Party. Himmler is said to fear a break and to have started months ago re-recruiting his Gestapo, S.S. and S.D. troops to their present strength of about 3,000,000. These men have the latest equipment and their authority exceeds that of the Army. They are detested by Army men and civilians alike and would be "exterminated" to the last man, according to Janowski.

The second group would be comprised of the Army, less the junkers and general staff, and the civilians.

The third group would be comprised of the general staff, which is regarded as a tool of the Party or as a tool of the Prussian junkers, and, according to Janowski, would be attacked by both major groups. He claims there is extreme dissension among the higher ranks, some officers leaning toward the mass of the Army and opposed to the Party, while others are what he terms "Party stooges".

Janowski advised he has concealed in the basement of his home in Berlin a sub-machine gun and a plentiful supply of ammunition. This he claims he hid away against the day that it could be used against the Party. He stated many other junior officers have taken similar action.

According to Janowski, should such a break come it would, because of the numbers involved, amount to civil war and disrupt Germany's present effort. It is this fact, coupled with the belief instilled by German propaganda that in the event of losing the war Germany will be invaded by vengeful armies of all countries and utterly destroyed, that has prevented the break before this.

Should a split with the Party lead to civil war and chaos, Janowski believes there is a decided possibility that the Army-civilian group would gain the upper hand and would turn to Communism, despite years of anti-Communist propaganda. The turn to Communism would be brought about not through belief in that ideology but in the hope that such turn would hold off the Red Army and even gain some measure of protection from them against the feared destruction.

As regards Party leaders, Janowski gave the following as the general opinion of the German people:

Hitler - above Party and still almost a religion to the mass of Germans. Mistakes are blamed on others and the only reproach against Hitler is that he sometimes follows advice of others instead of his own intuition.

Goering - liked by the mass of the people and regarded as having ability, although his popularity has gone down considerably as a result of the bombings.

Ribbentrop - opinion divided among civilians and intensely disliked by the Army.

Himmler - regarded as having ability but hated by all groups and classes. He is believed to be tremendously ambitious and a man who would stop at nothing in order to achieve additional power for himself.

Goebbels - detested by all classes and groups.

German Agents in Canada

Janowski remembered that there were ten or fifteen Germans in the Lehrregiment who had spent some years in Canada. It is probable that some of these men will be sent to Canada as agents in the future. Janowski recalled only one by name, as follows:

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card*

Hellmuth Wiede - this man is said to have lived in Montreal for several years prior to 1938, in which years he returned to Germany. Janowski met this man in 1940 in Brandenburg. Janowski has not seen him since but has heard of him and believes that he is still in Germany.

Janowski was not able to recall any other names but stated he would be able to identify photographs and might remember names if they were mentioned to him.

During discussions in the Berlin headquarters of the Abwehr, the possibility of raids by submarine borne troops on isolated points in eastern Canada was discussed, according to Janowski. Such raids would be intended to destroy Canadian morale, for propaganda purposes in Germany and to cover the landing of agents. The discussions were not definite and no plans for such raids were actually made, but Janowski believes attempts along these lines entirely possible.