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WAR DEPARTMENT  
The Adjutant General's Office  
Washington 25, D. C.

*Ad. for*  
*2 BCC*

AGAO-S-350.09 (6 Nov 46) B-M

CJM/md 1A-872 Pentagon

26 November 1946

*87/3135*

SUBJECT: Collection of Intelligence in the United States

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Auth: T. A. G.  
Initials: *TAG*  
Date: 26 Nov 46

TO: Commanding Generals,  
Army Air Forces  
Army Ground Forces  
Armies, ZI  
Military District of Washington  
Chiefs of Technical Services

## I. RESPONSIBILITY

1. The Director of Intelligence, WDGS is responsible for the procurement of information and intelligence relating to the activities of individuals or agencies potentially or actually dangerous to the preservation of the military establishment within the Zone of Interior; and for the collection within the Zone of Interior of foreign positive intelligence (par 12, WD Circular 138, 14 May 1946). The Intelligence Division, WDGS will plan, direct, coordinate and supervise all activities within the Zone of Interior necessary for the accomplishment of these missions (par 10 a, b, WD Circular 138, 14 May 1946).

2. In compliance with the established principle of decentralization to the fullest degree (par 10, WD Circular 138, 14 May 1946), all field activities in connection with the accomplishment of the mission outlined in par 1, will be carried on by the Army Air Forces, all Armies, Zone of Interior and the Military District of Washington.

3. The Director of Intelligence, WDGS has concurred in the policy that the most effective exploitation of domestic sources of foreign positive intelligence can be achieved by coordinating the activities of all Federal intelligence agencies concerned with such exploitation. Uniform procedures for these operations as established between the Director of Intelligence, WDGS and the Director of Central Intelligence will be announced by the War Department. It is contemplated that liaison between CIG Field representatives and War Department field agencies will be maintained through local inter-agency offices to be established by CIG.

## II. DEFINITIONS

1. For purposes of clarification, the following definitions are provided.

a. Foreign Positive Intelligence is any intelligence relating directly or indirectly to the war potential of any foreign nation; the

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scope and variety of the information involved herein is indicated by the items listed in the Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID).

b. Domestic Intelligence is intelligence relating to the strategic vulnerability of the United States and to activities or conditions within its boundaries which threaten its security.

### III. OPERATIONS

1. In order to meet the intelligence requirements indicated and fulfil their existing responsibilities, the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, the Commanding Generals, all Armies, Zone of Interior and the Commanding General, Military District of Washington will:

#### a. Foreign positive intelligence

- (1) Develop and maintain their existing contacts with American business organizations for the collection of foreign positive intelligence on the basis of secret liaison with the responsible executives of such organizations who will be kept informed of all activities of this nature in which their subordinates are involved. Existing contacts which are limited to liaison with subordinate personnel in an American business organization will be re-established on the basis of secret liaison with the responsible executives of such organization.
- (2) Establish new contacts with American business organizations for the collection of foreign positive intelligence only after notice to and receipt of clearance from the War Department, unless the establishment of such new contact is specifically directed by the War Department. (Reference Annex, Section II).
- (3) Develop contacts with American travelers to foreign countries who may be sources of foreign intelligence. Field agencies will promote the development of contacts with those individuals whose background, experience, and professional training qualify them as authoritative sources of foreign information on subjects or areas which are of particular interest to the War Department.
- (4) Insure that appropriate security checks have been made prior to establishing contact with any organization or individual for the purpose of securing foreign information. (Reference Annex, Section II).
- (5) Protect the sources of information developed by using a numbering system to identify the sources of any information derived from an American business organization. (Reference Annex, Section III).

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(6) Notify the Intelligence Division, WDGS whenever American travelers are to visit critical areas or possess information of a highly technical nature so that it may be determined whether such individuals should be briefed by War Department personnel. (Reference Annex, Section II).

(7) Transmit without delay to the Intelligence Division, WDGS, attention Chief, Collection Branch, for inclusion in the master contact index, the following contact reports in duplicate: (Reference Annex, Section IV).

NOTE: No organization will be listed if the reporting field agency has had no contact with it for the collection of foreign positive intelligence since 1 January 1946.

(a) A list of all American business organizations with whom they are now maintaining liaison for the collection of foreign positive intelligence information through contact with the responsible executives of such organizations and whose executives have approved officially the giving of their foreign information to the Army concerned.

(b) A list of all American business organizations with whom they are now maintaining liaison for the collection of foreign positive intelligence information through contact with subordinate personnel of such organizations only, i.e.: the responsible executives of the organization have not been contacted nor have they officially approved the giving of their foreign information to the Army concerned.

(c) A list of all other American organizations, not included in a. or b. above, with whom they are now maintaining liaison for the collection of foreign positive intelligence information.

(8) Report information secured by the War Department as outlined in the Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID) and in conformity with specific requests for information initiated by the Intelligence Division. It is especially desired that the steady flow of current information received by business organizations from their foreign representatives in the course of normal operations be forwarded to the Intelligence Division as secured by agencies in the field.

## b. Domestic Intelligence

- (1) Provide for the maintenance of close liaison with appropriate local State and Federal agencies within their respective geographical areas for the collection of intelligence relating to internal activities or conditions outside the Army which threaten the security of the United States. The collection of information for this purpose will consist of the receipt of information from appropriate agencies only in specific cases in which there is a definite indication that the Army may become involved.
- (2) Develop intelligence of a background nature concerning matters which have a specific bearing on the control of espionage, sabotage, subversion and disaffection within the Army. Investigative activities in this connection by military agencies will be limited to persons over whom the Army has investigative jurisdiction.
- (3) Complete such sections of the Strategic Intelligence Digest of the United States as may be required by the Intelligence Division.
- (4) Report promptly to the War Department full information on any disturbance or disorder that might require intervention by the armed forces of the United States.

IV. COORDINATION

1. In order to assist, coordinate and supervise the collection of intelligence in the United States, the Intelligence Division, WDGS will:

- a. Transmit to the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, the appropriate Armies, Zone of Interior, or the Military District of Washington, depending upon the type of information involved, specific requests for information originating within the War Department.
- b. Maintain and provide a current listing of the essential elements of information desired by the War Department on each foreign country.
- c. Maintain a master index of all contacts established by the field agencies with American business organizations and individuals for the purpose of collecting foreign positive intelligence and coordinate such index with the Contact Register to be established and maintained by the Director of Central Intelligence.
- d. Arrange for representatives of the division to make visits to the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, each Army, Zone of Interior and the Military District of Washington for the purpose of assisting, coordinating

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and supervising their activities in connection with the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence (par. 10b, Circular 138, WD, 14 May 1946). The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will be responsible for the execution of like responsibilities in regard to Air Force units.

e. Maintain close liaison with the Central Intelligence Group Headquarters for the coordination of War Department activities in compliance with the operating procedures established by the Central Intelligence Group in connection with the domestic collection of foreign positive intelligence.

#### V. COLLABORATION

1. The allocation of responsibility in the development of contacts with American business organizations and individuals is established as follows:

a. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces will be responsible for the development of contacts with all American business organizations or individuals who are primarily engaged in the operation of air transportation systems, the manufacture of aircraft and allied material, or other activities primarily related to the field of aviation.

b. The Commanding Generals, all Armies, Zone of Interior and the Commanding General, Military District of Washington will be responsible for the development of contacts with all American business organizations and individuals not falling within the category described in par 1a, above. The Commanding General, Military District of Washington will not be responsible for the development of contacts with the Headquarters of US Government agencies in Washington, D. C.

c. In order to effect the allocation of responsibility outlined in a, above, the Commanding Generals, All Armies, Zone of Interior, will, subject to the approval of the organizations and individuals concerned, arrange to transfer their existing contacts with American business organizations and individuals primarily engaged in the field of aviation to the Commanding Generals of the Air Forces of the Air Defense Command, who will then be responsible for the maintenance and development of such contacts as outlined in Section III, OPERATIONS.

d. The Commanding Generals, all Armies, Zone of Interior, and the Commanding General, Military District of Washington will be responsible for direct coordination with the Commanding Generals of the Air Forces of the Air Defense Command within their geographical area for the development of contacts with American business organizations and individuals who are partially associated with the field of aviation and partially with other activities outside that field. In normal circumstances, not more than one military agency will contact a specific organization or individual. If necessary, final decision on the matter of responsibility will be made by the Intelligence Division, WDGS.

e. The Commanding General, Army Air Forces has a direct responsibility for the preparation of strategic air target data which requires the

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collection of essential foreign information from a wide variety of American business organizations. The Commanding General of each Army in the Zone of Interior will collaborate with the appropriate Army Air Force of the Air Defense Command in the collection of strategic air target data and, when necessary, will arrange for direct contact between Army Air Force strategic air target experts and American business organizations with whom he has established liaison.

f. The military controlling office for all contacts with any American business organization or individual will be the Headquarters of the Army, Zone of Interior, Military District of Washington, or Air Force of the Air Defense Command in whose geographical area the head office of such business organization or the residence of such individual is located, whichever is appropriate under par a and b, above. Where an American business organization has numerous branch offices so located that they overlap two or more geographical command areas, no contact will be established with such branch offices unless official approval for such action has been obtained from the military controlling office.

2. Lateral communication and collaboration among Armies, Zone of Interior, the Military District of Washington and the Air Forces, Air Defense Command is authorized and encouraged in connection with all matters related to the domestic collection of foreign and domestic intelligence. (Reference Annex, Section VI).

#### VI. FINANCES

Instructions governing the allotment and expenditure of funds for foreign and domestic intelligence activities will be issued by the Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

1 Incl

Annex for WD Intel Div Directive  
on the Collection of Intel in the US

*Edward F. Witsell*  
EDWARD F. WITSELL  
Major General  
The Adjutant General

#### COPIES FURNISHED:

Director of Intelligence, WDGS  
Attn: Chief, Collection Branch (100)  
Director of Central Intelligence Group (10)

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By auth. Dir. of Intell.,  
WDGS.

Date: Oct 24 46 /s/DJR

A N N E X

For

WAR DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE DIVISION DIRECTIVE

on the

Collection of Intelligence in the United States

C O N T E N T S

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Section I - PURPOSE

The Annex to the War Department, Intelligence Division Directive, hereinafter referred to, as the Directive, presents informational detail.

Section II - SECURITY

1. Before establishing a new contact with an organization or an independent individual for the collection of foreign positive intelligence, the following action will be taken:

- a. The official name of the organization and the full name and official title of the individual or individuals in it with whom contact is contemplated will be submitted to the War Department for transmittal to the Central Intelligence Group for clearance.
- b. The names, addresses, and official position (if any) of individuals, not connected with a business or other organization will be processed as above.

2. In connection with the collection of domestic intelligence, it should be noted that present policy restricts this activity to the receipt from appropriate agencies of information pertaining strictly to the responsibilities of the War Department. In a majority of cases the agencies consulted, especially with regard to domestic subversive intelligence, will be federal, state and local governmental agencies. In such cases security checks are not indicated. In the case of other permissible contacts the security measures adopted should be the same as those set forth in the collection of foreign positive intelligence. In the domestic field there may be rare cases where it is permissible to use clandestine informers connected with organizations or activities of doubtful character. Such informers often are not susceptible of clearance by means of a security check due to their known or admitted characteristics. The use of such persons as a source of information must be calculated risk based on good judgment. The essential point to be observed is that no information be given to such persons.

3. Briefing, subject to prior Intelligence Division approval in each case, will be carried out in exceptional cases only and limited to those individuals who have been carefully checked and the determination made that their character, integrity, educational background and professional training is such that a briefing would greatly increase their ability to secure information of particular interest to the War Department.

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4. Briefing will be confined to those subjects which are identified with the individual's professional training and experience, and therefore deal with that type of information which he can be expected to secure readily and in the normal course of his travels without endangering his personal security.

5. Where the type of information involved is highly technical or the prospective travel itinerary covers a critical area of primary interest to the War Department, arrangements may be made to have the field agencies assisted by personnel of the Intelligence Division, WDGS who are specialists in the subjects or areas involved.

6. Where critical areas are involved, the utmost discretion must be used in every phase of the briefing program in order to minimize to the fullest extent, the risk of compromise for the individual traveler concerned or the War Department.

### Section III - PROTECTION OF SOURCES

1. Protection of the source of information is vital to the success of the entire plan for the domestic collection of intelligence. This is especially true in connection with American business organizations who are, to a greater or less degree, risking their position in foreign countries by supplying information to the War Department. The Directive provides for secret liaison with American business organizations and the classified nature of the entire operation must be uppermost in the minds of all personnel engaged in the activities involved. The value and amount of the information which the War Department can obtain from American business organizations will depend primarily upon the confidence which such organizations have in the War Department's ability to protect their security as sources of intelligence.

2. When deemed appropriate, intelligence personnel may wear civilian clothes while contacting American business organizations for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence.

3. It is mandatory that a Contact Number be given to each American business organization developed by a field agency, under the provisions of the Directive, as a source of foreign intelligence and such Contact Number will always be used in indicating the source of any information received from such organizations. Contact Numbers, may be used to identify individual sources of information if the field agency considers it necessary to protect their identity.

4. The contact numbers will be made up as follows:

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- a. A number indicating the field agency concerned, i.e.: "1" for the First Army, "2" for the Second Army, etc.
- b. The letters "CN" indicating Contact Number.
- c. A dash (-) followed by the number given to the organization established as a contact by the field agency.

The field agencies may number the organizations with whom they have established secret liaison as provided in the Directive in any order they wish. For example, the first organization with whom secret liaison is established by the First Army under the provisions of the Directive, may carry the number "LCN-1", the second such organization may be given the number "LCN-2", continuing in such manner, if desired. These Contact Numbers are for use of the Chief, Collection Branch, Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff in identifying the sources of information collected by the field agencies and once a Contact Number has been given to an American business organization, established as a source of foreign intelligence, it should be permanent. For example, if the First Army assigns the Contact Number "LCN-66" to the Blank Oil Company, that number will always be used to identify that company.

5. When Information received from an American business organization is reported to the War Department on OCS Form 17, the Contact Number will be placed on the second line of the form opposite the word "Source". No description of an American business organization will be given if such description will risk identification of the source.

6. The Contact Numbers established for the field agencies are listed below and each agency will use the Contact Number assigned to it.

First Army	1CN-	First Air Force	8CN-
Second Army	2CN-	Eleventh Air Force	9CN-
Seventh Army	3CN-	Fourteenth Air Force	10CN-
Fourth Army	4CN-	Tenth Air Force	11CN-
Fifth Army	5CN-	Second Air Force	12CN-
Sixth Army	6CN-	Fourth Air Force	13CN-
Military District of Washington	7CN-		

Section IV - MASTER CONTACT INDEX DATA

1. The following specific information is required for each organization named on the lists submitted in compliance with Section III - OPERATIONS, 1. a. (7), (a), (b), and (c), and for each organization established as a new contact for the collection of foreign positive intelligence.

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- a. The official name and head office address of the organization.
- b. The Contact Number assigned to it by the reporting field agency.
- c. The full name and official title of each individual contacted in the organization including both responsible executives and subordinate personnel. Indicate which official authorized full company support.
- d. A terse description of the type of business or other activity in which the organization is engaged.
- e. A listing of the specific foreign countries in which the organization is carrying on business operations or other activities and has American representatives from whom it is receiving information. A separate list should be shown of any foreign nation on which the organization is receiving information, but from sources other than American citizens.
- f. An indication of the type of information the organization can provide and the countries involved. In this connection, the use of Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID) numbers is suggested as a ready method for indicating such information. For example, a source of information on crude oil production in three different countries could carry the notation, "4203.0300 - CHINA, PERU, MEXICO", etc. It is not expected that the field agencies will have this information in complete detail for each contact at the time the Master Contact Index data is transmitted to the War Department. However, they should provide as much information of this type as they have available.
- g. The type of security check made on the organization and its personnel concerned prior to the establishment of an existing contact.
- h. A notation, where applicable, that the organization concerned is a subsidiary organization and clearance for contact with it has been secured from the parent company as provided in Para. 1., f. of Section V of the Directive.

2. It is suggested that use of the following form (mimeographed) will facilitate the transmission of Master Contact Index data to the War Department.

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S E C R E T

MASTER CONTACT INDEX DATA  
(submit in duplicate)

(For use of the Chief, Collection Branch, Intelligence Division, WDGS, only)

ORGANIZATION \_\_\_\_\_ CONTACT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS OF  
HEAD OFFICE \_\_\_\_\_

INDIVIDUAL  
CONTACTS \_\_\_\_\_ Chm.: \_\_\_\_\_ Pres.: \_\_\_\_\_

Vice. Pres.: \_\_\_\_\_ Other: \_\_\_\_\_

BUSINESS OR  
OTHER ACTIVITY \_\_\_\_\_

FOREIGN COUNTRIES  
COVERED \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION  
AVAILABLE \_\_\_\_\_

SECURITY  
CHECK DATA \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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NOTE: Master Contact Index data will be transmitted to;

Director of Intelligence  
War Department General Staff  
The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

Attn: Chief, Collection Branch

It will be marked "TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY"

Section V - TYPES OF INFORMATION

1. Collection action will be guided by:

a. Current War Department Intelligence Plan.

b. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) The "Essential Elements of Information" as listed in the War Department Intelligence Plan are applicable to all foreign countries.

c. Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID).

(1) The Strategic Intelligence Digest (SID) is a compilation of the best intelligence available to the Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff on all factors which are essential to the production of a strategic estimate on a given foreign country or area.

(2) The Table of Contents of the "SID" lists specifically the different chapters to be compiled.

d. Domestic information required.

(1) The activities, affiliations, and organizations of individuals and the aims, activities, and strengths of organizations considered actually or potentially dangerous to the preservation of the Military Establishment within the Zone of the Interior of the United States.

(2) The strategic vulnerability of the Continental United States (Chapter 4, SID) with particular emphasis on natural resources, stockpiles of critical materials, industrial establishments, communications, and government agencies and instrumentalities.

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- (3) Information on race riots, labor trouble, or other disturbances that might involve the employment of U. S. troops.

e. Specific requests for information will be submitted as demand arises.

2. Special sources of Domestic Intelligence. (Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Government agencies)

a. FBI - Field Offices. The functions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation pertaining to War Department interests are set out in letter, AG, dated 14 March 1946, subject: Domestic Intelligence. This letter, quoted in part, states:

- (1) "The Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the request of the Department has assumed the responsibility of furnishing to the Army certain facts which would be necessary for its guidance should the Army be called upon to quell any uprising, riot or other disturbance which might grow beyond the control of civil authorities."
- (2) "FBI Field Division have been instructed to keep constantly aware of any situation which might grow to such proportions as to make the use of Army facilities necessary and to furnish, in ample time for planning purposes, complete data as to the means of any key installations or communication facilities, points most vulnerable to sabotage, localities most likely to be the focal points of violence, and full descriptive data for the identification of ring leaders and key figures."
- (3) "Likewise, FBI Field Divisions were cautioned that these instructions did not, in any way, change its established policy of not interjecting itself into bonafide labor disputes, employer-employee relationships and the activities of labor union organizations, but that the Bureau's policy is merely being expanded to obtain such information concerning the subversive, unreliable and dangerous elements which may be connected with any organization or situation as may be needed by the Army to keep itself constantly prepared to prevent bloodshed or sabotage which could result from threatened riots, revolts, civil uprisings or disorders and lawless mob action."

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b. Other Government Agencies.

- (1) The various Government agencies form the greatest source of domestic intelligence. The successful completion of the mission of collecting domestic intelligence will depend to a great extent upon effective liaison and co-operation with these agencies.
- (1) Intelligence Division is responsible for the liaison with and collection of informational material from Headquarters of Government agencies in Washington, D.C.
  - (a) In event the information is not available at the Headquarters, the request will be sent to the appropriate command for local contact.

Section VI - LATERAL COMMUNICATION AND COLLABORATION

1. It is especially necessary that there be close cooperation between each Army, Zone of Interior and the Air Force, Air Defense Command having similar geographical command responsibility. The Armies, Zone of Interior with the corresponding Air Forces, Air Defense Command are as follows:

First Army  
Governors Island  
New York, N. Y.

First Air Force  
Fort Slocum, N.Y.

Second Army  
Baltimore, Md.

Eleventh Air Force  
Reading, Pa.

Seventh Army  
Atlanta, Ga.

Fourteenth Air Force  
Orlando, Fla.

Fourth Army  
San Antonio, Texas

Tenth Air Force  
San Antonio, Texas

Fifth Army  
Chicago, Ill.

Second Air Force  
Omaha, Nebr.

Sixth Army  
San Francisco, Calif.

Fourth Air Force  
San Francisco, Calif.

2. The Military District of Washington in order to prevent duplication of contact has a division of responsibility in the collection of intelligence with the Intelligence Division, WDGS as follows:

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a. The Intelligence Division maintains general liaison with all United States Government Agencies in Washington, D. C.

b. The Military District of Washington collects from all sources within its area, except governmental agencies, information for the production of intelligence essential to the Command and the War Department.

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