


OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE



NEWS LETTER



COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION

This Newsletter is intended for all persons concerned with investigations. Sufficient copies are furnished to allow distribution of individual copies to each Naval Intelligence Agent.

THE MCNAMARA RECOMMENDATIONS

A subject of great interest to all of us involved in investigations is the recent action of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Robert S. McNAMARA, on certain recommendations submitted to him concerning the DOD Personnel Security Programs. We know that rumors and rumblings as to its impact have become widespread in the field. This is to present a very abbreviated rundown of its principal provisions as they affect investigations, together with some comments concerning them.

First, it will be required that the Navy and Marine Corps, in future, run national agency checks on all enlisted personnel reporting for duty at basic training. This will considerably more than double the number presently being conducted, and will undoubtedly result in a proportionate increase in NAC expansions -- thus more agent work.

Another requirement, and the one which will affect us the most perhaps, is that procedures are to be developed to assure maximum efficient cross-servicing of investigative leads between the investigative organs of the Military Departments; that the overall number of field investigative units be reduced; and that a standard DOD reporting system be developed for both PSI and criminal investigations.

Implementation of all this will of course require a great deal of staffing and this is now proceeding. What final form it will take is still problematical, but it seems safe to predict that some of you before long will be routinely covering Army and Air Force PSI leads in some areas and they will be taking ours in other areas. This may have the effect of cutting down of some road-tripping. At some later time there may also be some closing down of outlying offices with the relocation of attached personnel to larger, consolidated offices. There also is a likelihood of our occupying the same building or being located on the same installation with the office of a sister Service.

As a means of eliminating the Navy case backlog, we have been directed to assign certain numbers of cases to Army, Air Force, and Civil Service Commission, respectively, each month for the next several months. This has already been started and is expected to have an immediate beneficial effect. Being required to do this certainly gives rise to mixed feelings and one cannot help but regret we were not able to get our own house in order. However, by continuing and intensifying our present efforts we can shorten the time in which outside assistance will be needed. Once we get our books balanced, we should be able to remain sixty days, and ultimately thirty days, current on all personnel security investigations. We can do it!

Additional recommendations to be implemented which are of field interest concern the requirements that (1) a central index of all DOD investigations be established (2) that the investigative files of the three Services be co-located, and (3) that a central national agency check processing center be established. Action is to be complete within one year.

The two final approved recommendations have to do with Navy's present organizational structure for conducting investigations. Changes of some magnitude in the command relationships and in a variety of administrative and management aspects, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, may be expected during the next several months.

Some no doubt will reserve the right to disagree privately with certain of the actions directed. It's hard to contest though that the overall long range effect will be decidedly beneficial, whatever immediate problems may tend to arise.

ONI's policy will be one of the fullest cooperation, and every effort will be bent toward compliance with the various actions directed in both their letter and their spirit.

SPECIAL AGENTS' ASSOCIATION

As stated elsewhere in this Newsletter, we suffered the loss recently of another one of our brother agents, George Park. George was also a member of the Association, and the \$3,000.00 benefit payment was made immediately to his widow. In accordance with a prior vote of the Board of Directors, the assessment due as a result of this particular payment was reduced from the normal ten dollars to five dollars. This amount which is now due and payable to your local representative, will not be quite enough to replenish the fund, but new memberships and earned interest are causing it to grow anyway. As of this date, a total of 597 have joined the Association, of which number 533 still remain active (unless they default on the current assessment). During our 21 months of operation, we have had four deaths, all of which occurred during the twelve month period ending today. We have in this time paid out a total of \$9,000.00 in benefits.

FULL ALLOWANCE OF AGENTS ON BOARD

For the first time in the recent history of ONI, our full allowance of agents, presently 769, is filled. In fact, as of 30 June 1965, 770 (temporary excess of one) agents were on board. This is a notable accomplishment and is due in large part to the outstanding efforts of every agent in the field, "on the street", or in a supervisory capacity to actively recruit and expeditiously process qualified applicants.

Although this represented a major "crash" effort during the past three months, each of you will be proud to know that this was accomplished without the slightest relaxation of our high standards and criteria.

A highly deserved "well done" is due all. However, there is no time to sit around and enjoy plaudits. The recruiting of qualified agent applicants must vigorously continue in order to ensure ourselves that we maintain our "on board" count at our established ceiling, and that we will be prepared to increase this "on board" count with projected ceiling increases. While the numerical increase during FY 1966 is still under study, an increase of 110 agents has already been programmed for FY 1967. Additionally, an increase in our attrition rate can be expected during the next 12-24 months as many of our more senior agents who commenced their services during or shortly after WW-II will soon be eligible to retire.

AGENT CAREER PROGRAMMING

If we accept the premise that every boy wants to grow up to be President, we may also consider the thought that every agent aspires to be a Supervising Agent. Since there are almost 800 agents and only a very limited number of PG-14 Supervising Agent billets, it is evident that only the most highly qualified will advance to these and other similarly coveted supervisory positions. The question then is, how does one qualify himself for continued progress on this advancement path?

There is no stereotyped answer to this question but there are some considerations which may not be evident to all agents. First, there are many areas within and without the field of investigations in which the supervisor must excel. By no means exclusive, they include the following. He must be a highly competent professional investigator, skilled in all the investigative techniques and the proper, timely application of investigative aids. He must be a proficient reporter. He must have an in-depth knowledge of ONI investigative responsibilities and jurisdiction, and of all ONI investigative doctrine. And, in the exercise of all these skills and knowledge, he must demonstrate sound judgement. He must be able to instruct juniors and advise seniors in all these areas with tact and diplomacy to gain and hold their confidence. He must be a superior administrator, and display ingenuity and initiative in the exercise of his investigative management responsibilities. And he must be a team man, a leader who can inspire all others around him with a "can do" spirit, and the will and determination to get the job done.

And yet, not every agent who possesses all of these remarkable qualities will become a top supervisor. Why? Because through either misfortune or more frequently poor planning, even though the agent does excel in these areas, he will not have been in the right place at the right time to demonstrate it in competition with his peers!

There are a few basic ground rules for climbing this ladder to success which all should heed. Not necessarily in order of precedence, they are: Supervising Agents and Assistant Supervising Agents are not normally promoted within their own districts. Tours in both an overseas activity and in ONI headquarters are valuable assists up this ladder. "Advancements" do not always equate with "promotions"; it is frequently an "advancement" to move to a billet of greater or differing responsibilities even though a grade promotion may not accompany such a move. Examples of these advancements are shifting from an SRA (PG-12) billet to Assistant Supervising Agent (PG-12) of a medium size district or Supervising Agent (PG-12) of a small district or transferring from Assistant Supervising Agent (PG-13) to Supervising Agent (PG-13).

It can also be advantageous to shift from one billet to a differing billet in that same grade if the agent involved has not previously garnered the peculiar experience of the contemplated billet, e.g., CONUS to overseas, CONUS district to ONI headquarters, overseas to ONI headquarters, etc. The object of the game, not unlike military career programming, is to qualify oneself in as many professional areas within grade as possible.

The Agent Personnel and Training Division, within the limitations imposed by a very small staff, attempts to assist agents in their career development by

announcing vacancies which exist in various billets overseas and at headquarters, either generally or to various specific agents who, on the record, are evidently qualified. However, most career programming is controlled to a large degree by the initiative of the agent concerned who is prompt in taking advantage of billet openings which may enhance his career potential and requests consideration for assignment to these billets with a minimum regard for his personal convenience.

A final note: Mere adherence to a desirable career program will not in and of itself qualify one for advancement. Other agents will be following similar paths. In the final analysis, it will be an evaluation not only of the agent's qualifying prior assignments but, most importantly, of his performance in those assignments.

AGENT TRAINING ACTIVITIES

The last Basic Training Class of Fiscal 1965 convened at the U.S. Naval Counterintelligence Support Center during the period of 7-18 June 1965. As indicated in a previous ONI Newsletter, recent developments in the investigative field dictated a revision in the ONI basic training concept, necessitating a curtailment of the usual four weeks course, which previously covered all categories of investigations and specialized techniques, to a two weeks training schedule in which the primary emphasis encompassed personnel security investigations and investigative report writing in these background categories. This abbreviated basic course, serving as a pilot program since projected plans for Fiscal Year 1966 tentatively entail six such basic courses to be scheduled, was so devised as to permit the newly hired agent to acquire in timely and meaningful fashion practical guidelines for background investigations. This indoctrination concept, furthermore, will in no way limit the ability and development of the newly-hired agent nor restrict his efforts in the investigative field since complementary courses scheduled for next fiscal year will ensure that he will soon be returned to headquarters to be trained in all phases of criminal and special investigations. The twenty-four agents who underwent basic training in class 6B(65) submitted course critiques documenting their assessment of this new training phase. These critiques are still being evaluated; at the present time no conclusions or determinations have been formulated in respect to possible curriculum changes for Fiscal Year 1966.

CLASS ROSTER AGENTS' BASIC TRAINING COURSE (CLASS 6B(65))

BECKWITH, Robert E.	9ND	BRITT, Jack D.	11ND
CAIN, Richard D., Jr.	1ND	CLIFFORD, Reid F.	4ND
CREATURO, James J.	5ND	DALEY, Joseph P.	3ND
DICKINSON, Dennis W.	9ND	GILBERT, Edward C.	3ND
GLASS, Richard C.	4ND	GOMEZ, Henry (n)	6ND
HANSEN, Rodney J.	NDW	HAWKINS, Carroll L.	NDW
HIGHTOWER, Raymond C.	5ND	HUBBARD, James D.	8ND
LANE, David N.	8ND	McDONNELL, Thomas P.	3ND
McGADY, Raymond W., Jr.	9ND	ROBILLARD, Ralph O.	NDW
SHEERIN, James (n)	3ND	SHERA, Herbert K.	5ND
SILVA, Joseph E.	12ND	THUMM, James W.	4ND
WEBB, Louis C.	9ND	WRIGHT, Forrest E.	1ND

Special Agents Edward J. SHEVLIN, bound for Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and Thomas J. DONNENWIRTH, scheduled for assignment at San Juan, Puerto Rico, were afforded pre-departure briefings and specialized training at SUPPCEN during 24 May to 3 June 1965.

It is hoped that during the summer months some plan may evolve and be implemented wherein agent training correspondence courses and exercises may be devised and coordinated between the SUPPCEN Agent Training Branch and the Supervising/Assistant Supervising Agents of the various districts. The operation, administering, and maintenance of such in-field agent training undoubtedly would enhance agent career development by constant, effective acquisitions of professional skills. Any suggestions and practical recommendations from the field are welcomed!

QUALITY STEP INCREASE AWARDED TO SPECIAL AGENT DAVID G. PEPPIN

Special Agent David G. PEPPIN's tour of duty in Taipei, Formosa, has been marked by a succession of laudatory and commendatory tributes, all of which, while addressing themselves individually to various facets of Special Agent PEPPIN's performance, have specifically referred to the remarkable rapport which he has achieved with officials of the various Chinese agencies with which the U.S. Naval Counterintelligence Support Unit maintains official liaison. His success in this regard can be attributable to his efforts to learn the Chinese language and to understand the Chinese culture and to his distinguished service throughout his present assignment. In fact, Special Agent PEPPIN has been accorded a singular honor by an agency of the Republic of China for in March 1965 a ceremony at the Headquarters of the First Battalion, Peace Preservation Corps at Chang-Hua, marked the dedication of a pavilion within the First Battalion area to Special Agent David G. PEPPIN. It is interesting to note that the only one other pavilion at the Chang-Hua Headquarters has been dedicated to CHIANG Kai-Shek. Such recognition of a foreigner by any element of the Chinese Government is without precedent. The dedication of the PEPPIN Pavilion was attended by LTGEN YANG Yu-Chun, Deputy Commissioner, Taiwan Provincial Police Administration (TPPA); MGEN WANG Lu Chao, Commanding General, Peace Preservation Corps; and by other senior officers of the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration.

On 30 April 1965 Admiral Rufus L. TAYLOR, Director of Naval Intelligence, took official recognition of the outstanding performance of Special Agent PEPPIN by presenting him a letter of commendation, which stated in part: "In your chosen field you have few peers, as demonstrated by your outstanding effectiveness as an investigator, administrator, and representative of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Your foreheadedness and instant responses to the requirements of Naval Intelligence are qualities that are particularly commendable. Principally due to your competence and your initiative in acquiring skill in the Chinese language, our organization enjoys an excellent operational relationship with officials of the Republic of China as well as with other U.S. Government agencies and local military commands. You have been a great credit to the United States Navy. In appreciation of your outstanding performance, you are being awarded a quality salary increase; it is accompanied by a sincere "Well Done."

OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE

On 14 May 1965, the many friends and NAVCINTSUPPCEN coworkers of Special Agent A. J. SULLIVAN assembled in the office of Captain J. O. JOHNSON, USNR, the Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence (Counterintelligence) to witness Captain JOHNSON present "Sully" with a commendation for outstanding performance. This presentation made on behalf of Rear Admiral Rufus L. TAYLOR, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, was accompanied by a highly tangible award of a check for \$300.00.

Although Special Agent SULLIVAN is presently assigned to the NAVCINTSUPPCEN as Head, Agent Training Branch, the award was predicated on his outstanding performance in his prior assignment at the Dallas, Texas, Resident Agency, DIO-8ND. The text of the Director's letter of commendation is quoted as follows:

"Subj: Commendation for Outstanding Performance

"1. Your professional performance while assigned to the Dallas, Texas, Resident Agency of the District Intelligence Office, EIGHTH Naval District, is adjudged to have been outstanding.

"2. Your repeated assignment to the unusual, difficult, and complex investigations; your painstaking attention to detail in the organization and planning of these investigations; your demonstrated skill in the application of sound techniques to resolve matters at issue; and your unusual capability to lucidly report the results of these efforts are commendable in the extreme and indicative of the highest degree of professionalism on your part.

"3. As tangible recognition of the esteem in which your demonstration of outstanding professional performance is held, I have directed that you be granted a cash award in the amount of \$300.00.

"4. 'Well Done'."

MERITORIOUS PERFORMANCE OF SPECIAL AGENT WALLACE M. BEASLEY

On 26 April 1965 Special Agent Wallace M. BEASLEY, who handles the state of Montana for DIO-13ND, witnessed a plane crash in a remote area. Special Agent BEASLEY assisted in removing the occupants of the plane, both of whom were dead, returned to his car immediately and reported the incident over his mobile radio, which is on the Missoula County Sheriff's Office frequency. Special Agent BEASLEY also suggested that the local power company be contacted, as two high voltage cables were across the highway, and also gave the sheriff the number of the aircraft for the FAA. Special Agent BEASLEY further ensured that the persons who arrived shortly after the crash were kept back until the sheriff's deputies and the state patrol took over. An interesting commentary to this incident is the fact that while the mobile radio was primarily installed in the DIO vehicle for obtaining weather information during the winter months, Special Agent BEASLEY here utilized it as a valuable public service. A merited "Well Done!" goes to Special Agent BEASLEY for his prompt and prudent action.

SUPERVISORY SHIFTS

The following transfers or appointments of supervisory personnel have been effected recently, or will be effected in the near future:

<u>SUPERVISOR</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
David J. KERR	Supervising Agent DIO-8ND	Supervising Agent DIO-12ND
William R. ANDREWS	Supervising Agent DIO-14ND	Supervising Agent DIO-8ND
Richard L. VOLLRATH	Asst Supervising Agent DIO-9ND	Supervising Agent DIO-14ND
Harry J. DOYLE	Supervising Agent NCISA-PHIL	SRA Cincinnati DIO-4ND
John F. DONNELLY	Supervising Agent DIO-17ND	Supervising Agent NCISA-PHIL
Fred E. ROBEY, Jr.	SRA Memphis DIO-6ND	Supervising Agent DIO-17ND
Marvin W. SMOOT	DIO-6ND (Charleston)	SRA Memphis DIO-6ND
Gordon T. ROGERS	Senior Agent, NCISU-Subic NCISA-PHIL	DIO-5ND (Norfolk)
William B. JEPSON	SRA Alameda DIO-12ND	Senior Agent, NCISU-Subic NCISA-PHIL
James R. KIKER	RA San Antonio DIO-8ND	SRA San Antonio DIO-8ND
William J. SULLIVAN	RA El Paso DIO-8ND	SRA El Paso DIO-8ND
Stephen S. MORSE	RA Mare Island DIO-12ND	SRA Mare Island DIO-12ND
Paul J. CRISAFULLI	RA Moffett Field DIO-12ND	SRA Moffett Field DIO-12ND
Donald E. ATWATER	DIO-NDW	SRA Bethesda DIO-NDW

A POSITIVE APPROACH

A critique recently received from a Supervising Agent consequent to the seminar conducted at SUPPCEN in April 1965 contained several noteworthy remarks concerning the vital parameters of management, supervision, and backlog predicaments. The following is not intended as "editorializing", particularly in view of the recent "cross-servicing" implementations, but merely to call attention to concepts perennially timely:

"In the matter of the apparently tremendous background investigation backlog existing in some of the districts, to a large extent this backlog reflects an inability on the part of present facilities to pinpoint the exact areas causing such delays. For example, one foot-dragger out of ten can constantly keep a district on the delinquent list. Two out of twenty, etc., etc., can do the same thing. In most cases I think the problem is not so much personnel but the proper utilization of them. Free use of reassignment of cases instead of sticking to the old idea that once an agent got a case he had to finish it. This is pure hogwash! Whether we are talking about hundreds or thousands, the same premise applies. Supervision MUST know who has what. Until the backlog is caught up, I think the Supervising Agent should have no other duties but to constantly concern himself with the actual manipulation of the backlog. It can be done! Regardless of the apparent size of the problem, each district should be required to pinpoint by case, each case by month and year. Reassign from that point. Forget about all others except the mandatory cases. Forget about the old theories that a man should work each case he has in the same area. This is so much nonsense. The idea is to get the oldest case done. It is surprising once you have the cases pinpointed by year and month it is easy to attack the problem. The orders must be clear and unmistakable. Do these now. Do these tomorrow. Do these the next day. My experience has shown that about 50% of the agents are capable of handling a case load of 40. This means literally handling them, meeting all the due dates, deadlines, etc. The other 50% are the ones who keep the pot constantly boiling. They need to be managed. The days of giving an agent a load of 50 to 100 cases and expecting him to manage them should be numbered. Employment of the stamped closing procedure has been most beneficial. This is the kind of thinking that will get ONI out of the hole. Let's consider some new methods of assigning cases to agents. Let's try the lead sheet system. This means for clerical personnel to lift out the leads from a SPH, 119 or 152, place it on a lead sheet for supervisory assignment to agent personnel. Look how many delays this would have saved in the district that did not screen its cases for coverage and assigned cases for agent review and work. Hundreds of these required only LAC's. Some of the LAC's were permitted to take as long as eight months to cover. What a waste! Usually such LAC's would have taken longer if it had not been for expedites calling them to their attention. Is it not reasonable to assume that similar abuses occurred with regard to background investigations? Maybe this is something the proposed management teams can cover as they go from district to district. 'A positive approach is required. It is surprising how many people want to tell you it is impossible to reach the 60-day goal mentioned by Admiral TAYLOR. It is not impossible. It is possible with

personnel presently on board in most districts. Definite goals must be established within each district. Try to meet the goals, constantly readjusting the caseload to place emphasis and effort on that which has been set out to complete instead of trying to intermingle the new with the old. As an example, if District X has 3000 cases over 6 months old and produces 2000 per month and has a total caseload of 9000, the way I look at it they have $4\frac{1}{2}$ months of work. Then why are there 3000 cases over 6 months old? There shouldn't be. Why not cut a list of the 3000 cases over 6 months old and concentrate on them. Forget about the others. Really push the 3000 old ones. This takes more than one Supervising Agent. Six supervisors, possibly some temporarily appointed with power to wield a sharp axe at the cases, could do it. Having wiped out the oldest 3000, concentrate on the next 2000 and on down the line. A special squad could handle all the mandatory deadline cases. It surely would be worth a try. The size of the backlog is important but not all controlling."

"RECRUIT FIXING" IN THE PHILIPPINES

NCISA-PHIL reports that recruitment of all Filipino stewards is accomplished at the U.S. Naval Station, Sangley Point. Approximately 300 applicants are processed each month. Because enlistment in the U.S. Navy will raise the standard of living of a Filipino family from low income to middle class income bracket, many Filipinos engage in what is commonly referred to as "Recruit Fixing." These "fixers" are capable of obtaining school transcripts, birth certificates, etc., and are quite able to obtain documentation which will completely change the individual's identity. This requires "pay off" all along the line and so the price for "recruit fixing" has been reportedly set at 1500 pesos. Presently the recruiting office refers all questionable documents to NCISA-PHIL for examination/investigation, as applicable. When non-payment to a "recruit fixer" is involved, the "recruit fixer" himself has often reported by letter to COMNAVPHIL that the applicant has solicited the help of a "fixer". Through investigation of these recruit cases a new policy has evolved which stipulates that should a recruit applicant pay a "fixer" in Cavite this fact alone will not prevent his enlistment since this agreement with a "fixer" can be likened to a "prepping" for a future career. However, when evidence is uncovered which would involve the payment or solicitation of anyone within the confines of U.S. Naval Station, Sangley Point, to subvert the "prepping" concept, then: If a civilian, he would be fired and referred to the local court for trial; if a military person, he will be court-martialed. This new policy appears to be working very well. The number of letters received from Filipinos has greatly curtailed. As a matter of fact, one cited incident would lead us to believe that the rejected recruit applicant will often take matters into his own hands to satisfy his own sense of justice. A recruit applicant reported, upon invitation, to take his written test for enlistment in the U.S. Navy. After completing the test, he was advised that he had failed and was disqualified. He became indignant and confronted the recruiting officer with: "How come I failed?" To wit the facts were explained. Whereupon the applicant advised that he had been schooled by a "fixer" and had paid him 500 pesos. In return, he was "guaranteed" enlistment in the Navy. This applicant was brought to NCISA-PHIL where he repeated the story. It was pointed out that in his invitational letter he was specifically warned against making payment of any

kind to a "fixer" and that the U.S. Navy had nothing whatever to do with that matter. He simply had failed the examination and was not eligible for enlistment. Further, he was advised that whatever complaint he had he should take up with the "fixer." The next day the Chief of Police, REYES, Cavite, visited the officer and inquired about the recruit and what he had been told. The story was repeated and the chief roared laughing. Chief REYES then explained that the applicant, his father, and older brother had been arrested in Cavite for carrying concealed deadly weapons. At the police station the applicant told of how he had paid 500 pesos to a "fixer" and that he, his father, and brother "were going to get him."

RECENT INTERESTING CASES

DIO-6ND relates that the identity of an anonymous letter writer, who also threatened the life of a Commanding Officer of a naval activity via a telephone call, was uncovered through the investigative efforts of DIO-6ND Special Agents starting with but a single clue at the outset to produce the letter's author. The clue was "KCOLLUB", the signature on the letter. Its contents criticized the Commanding Officer's association with two prominent local jurists, terming them security risks and of being "Blood Brothers" in the Ku Klux Klan. It was deduced that the writer had reversed the spelling of his surname, BULLOCK. Nine individuals were listed in the local telephone directory under that name. Through extensive inquiries and elimination, a U.S. Army sergeant, on temporary leave from active duty because of a disability, eventually was identified as the prime suspect. When interviewed, the sergeant made statements which were at times rambling and incoherent but he readily admitted having written the letter to the Commanding Officer. His anger toward one of the judges named in the letter stemmed from a divorce decree which a contemporary had awarded to the Sergeant's wife, along with custody of their two children. The Sergeant thus considered the judge unfit for visits and access to the Naval facility. Army records disclosed the Sergeant has been diagnosed as a "schizophrenic-paranoid type."

DIO-8ND documents a case wherein a sailor aboard a Naval station contrived to steal twenty-one Navy Relief checks from the Chaplain's Office and negotiated eleven of them with local merchants for various items of merchandise by utilizing a fraudulent Navy identification card. DIO-8ND agents doggedly exploited leads generated by the eleven cashed checks and by deft interviews of witnesses elicited sworn statements graphically pinpointing the sailor as a prime suspect. Subsequent licit permissive searches and "line-up" identification adroitly conducted by the agents compiled concrete evidence linking the suspect to the crimes. The agents even secured from the sailor voluntary handwriting specimens which indisputably, according to FBI expert handwriting analysis and testimony, determined the sailor to be the sole culprit. Although the sailor, upon interrogation, continued to deny culpability in the case and sought the services of a lawyer, the evidence, expertly and professionally garnered by the agents was so conclusive that the command remanded him to court-martial proceedings, where he was found guilty of thirty-one specifications under the charge of forgery (Art 131, UCMJ) and awarded confinement at hard labor for six months and a discharge from the Naval service with a bad conduct discharge.

DIO-9ND reports that a National Agency Check on an inactive reservist disclosed that in 1948 he allegedly entered on active duty in the U.S. Navy under the identity of a deceased brother. The allegation was made by the suspect's wife, who was irritated because he had represented himself to her as a federal agent at the time of their marriage. Investigation to date has disclosed that there was no deceased brother, and that his story was a subterfuge to hide a wife and family in another state.

RELOCATION OF U.S. AIR FORCE RETIRED OFFICER PERSONNEL RECORDS

SUPPCEN has been notified that all inquiries pertaining to records of a U.S. Air Force officer in a retired (pay) status should now be directed to: Military Records Division, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Military Personnel Center, (Symbol-AFTMDRO), Randolph Air Force Base, Texas 78148. This information will necessitate a pen and ink change to enclosure (1), General Services Administration Form R6-1229 of January 1965, to ONI NOTICE 5212 of 19 March 1965, Subj: Retired Records of Military Personnel and Federal Civilian Personnel. Previously these military records of U.S. Air Force officers in a retired (pay) status had been maintained at U.S. Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the relocation of these records to Randolph Air Force Base has been accomplished in order to maintain efficient stowage and to facilitate record-searching requirements.

REVISION OF MANUAL FOR INVESTIGATIONS - ONI-63-1A

Due to demanding operational requirements and additional administrative functions levied and encompassed in recent Department of Defense directives, the Special Activities Section, though well-organized in editing preliminaries in promulgating a revised manual, had to defer printing commitments until the first quarter FY 1966. At the present time it is anticipated that the revision of ONI-63-1A (as ONI-63-1B) can be programmed for printing in August 1965.

COLD BLAST FROM THE NORTH

Now that summer is upon us and heat hangs heavy, we often are reminded of a terse TWX, quoted below, which emanated from 13ND in December 1964 in explanation of why a specific investigation would not be completed by its deadline date: "Investigation involves 500 mi. road trip through 3-4 ft. of snow in minus 51 degree temp. Repeat 51 degrees below zero."

PSI REMINDER

Despite the recent cancellation of ONI INST 5521.9A administrative personnel are reminded of the fact that, when background investigations of naval personnel are completed, the DIO's still have the responsibility of advising BUPERS of the results.

WELCOME ABOARD

LESURE, George G.	3ND	SPURLOCK, Steven B.	9ND
TOBIN, Richard J.	3ND	CAZARES, Andrew A.	11ND
JOHNSON, Hiram W.	8ND	TORO, Jose A.	NDW
CHIARO, Paul D.	NDW	WHELAN, Thomas J., Jr.	NDW
LAUMANN, Dennis C.	NDW	KEENAN, Edward J.	4ND
DOKTOR, Kenneth R.	3ND	STEINBUGL, Raymond C.	4ND
OBERHOLTZER, Harry J.	6ND	LARSON, Arthur D.	NDW
WATANABE, Lloyd K.	14ND	ANDRE, William A.	11ND
HAJOSY, John W.	3ND	MINCHIN, Robert A.	6ND
LAING, William D.	4ND	CASH, Thomas V.	NDW
McFADDEN, Edward J., Jr.	4ND	MAHONEY, John F.	1ND
GRAY, Bert F., Jr.	8ND	SEGERSTEN, Peter G.	1ND
SHULZE, Robert H., Jr.	12ND	CHAMPINE, Russell E.	NDW
TRASER, Francis R.	12ND	PARKEY, Jackie L.	NDW
GIVEN, Bruce W.	13ND	ROSELLI, John W.	3ND
WALTON, John B.	9ND	ASHER, Brian P.	1ND
BRADY, Bobby L.	6ND	LIEHR, Joseph T.	9ND
WHIDDEN, Marshall T., Jr.	6ND	YEO, Donald L.	9ND
McNAMEE, Paul (n)	1ND	HENDRICKS, Peter L.	14ND
FIEGER, Frank E.	9ND		

AGENT TRANSFERS

	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>
TAYLOR, Thomas H.	NCISA-Philippines	DIO-9ND
RAUBER, Louis J.	DIO-6ND	DIO-NDW
HARMER, Clifford E.	DIO-8ND	NCISA-Philippines
TUZA, Conrad J.	DIO-17ND	NAVCINTSUPPCEN
FISHER, Henry J.	DIO-9ND	DIO-NDW
ROGERS, Gordon T.	NCISA-Philippines	DIO-5ND
LYNCH, Warren R.	DIO-11ND	NAVCINTSUPPCEN
SLEEPER, Arnold C.	DIO-11ND	NAVCINTSUPPCEN
PALMUCCI, Victor J.	DIO-1ND	CINCUSNAVEUR
POWERS, Robert J.	DIO-1ND	NCISA-Iceland
STOVALL, Harry J.	DIO-11ND	NCISA--Japan(Naha)
BARRON, Leo E.	DIO-4ND	DIO-1OND
McKENNA, Richard E.	DIO-NDW	CINCUSNAVEUR
HOLDREITH, Harold J.	DIO-9ND	NCISA-Philippines
SWEENEY, Daniel S.	DIO-1ND	DIO-NDW
HOPKINS, Gordon R.	DIO-NDW	DIO-6ND
GIVEN, Bruce W.	DIO-13ND	DIO-12ND
HOWERTON, Elton C., Jr.	DIO-6ND	DIO-NDW
DONNENWIRTH, Thomas J.	DIO-9ND	DIO-1OND

PROMOTIONS

Since the last Newsletter (10 May 1965) 16 agents were advanced to PG-11 through successful completion of their examinations; 33 agents were advanced to PG-10, 5 to PG-12, 1 to PG-13 and 2 to PG-14.

DIRECTIVES OF INTEREST

The following Instructions are among those recently published of interest to agents in the field:

ONI INSTRUCTION 8370.2 of 7 April 1965; Subj: Carrying of Firearms of Agent personnel. (Calls attention to existing regulations relating to the carrying of weapons by civilian Naval Intelligence Agents and promulgates additional instructions with respect thereto.)

ONI INSTRUCTION 12000.10C of 14 May 1965; Subj: Naval Intelligence Agents, Pay Grades 10 and 11; allowance and promotion procedures regarding. (Defines revised qualifications for Pay Grade 10 and establishes procedures for advancement thereto, and restates the policy and procedures regarding advancement to Pay Grade 11.)

ONI INSTRUCTION 5520.78 of 19 May 1965; Subj: Background Investigations; preparation of reports of. (Provides instructions in the preparation of investigative reports of background investigations.)

ONI INSTRUCTION 5500.25 of 21 May 1965; Subj: Utilization of ONI Agents for the protection of Federal Buildings and Properties. (Publishes policy relative to the use of Naval Intelligence Agents in providing protective services for Federal Buildings and properties.

ONI INSTRUCTION 5520.20B of 15 June 1965; Subj: Case Category and Reporting Procedures; revision of. (Promulgates a revised case category assignment system which will more accurately describe the type of investigations being conducted by Naval Intelligence.)

LEGAL NOTES

"Gun decking." This most reprehensible offense which is peculiar to the investigative trade, though fortunately rare, was the subject of a recent decision of the Court of Military Appeals. Involved was an OSI Agent, in military status, who pleaded guilty to nine specifications alleging violation of Article 107, UCMJ, False Official Statement, in that he filed agents reports indicating that he had conducted certain interviews when in fact he had not. The accused was sentenced, among other things, to two years confinement at hard labor. The case is unremarkable legally. The basis of the COMA review related solely to the legal sufficiency of two of the nine specifications, there being a failure to allege an intent to deceive in the two in question.

The Court held that this lack was of no importance since the questioned specifications as drawn were sufficient to allege a falsification of a material matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States in violation of 18 USC 1001 and this offense may be prosecuted as a non-capital offense under Article 134 and carries the same maximum punishment as a violation of Article 107. Furthermore, the accused was fairly apprised of the nature of

the offenses involved and put on notice of what he must defend against by the facts that were alleged in the specifications and by the explanation and inquiry made of him before accepting his pleas of guilty.

Of particular interest, however, quite apart from any of the merits of this particular case is the relating of the misconduct involved to a violation of the Federal Fraud Statute. Similar involvement by a civilian would thus be clearly prosecutable in a United States District Court. This need not be dwelled upon any further, except to close with the obvious comment, "A word to the wise.....!" (U.S. vs. DeANGELO, 15 USCMA 423, 35 CMR 395)



".... interview five neighbors in the vicinity of"