

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350

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#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: DASD(I) Guidance on Indoctrinational Briefings for NEDZI Subcommittee on Intelligence (C)

Enc1: (1) List of Members of Subcommittee (2) Briefing Outline

1. (C) A meeting was called today by DASD(I) Staff to prepare for briefings to be given the NEDZI Subcommittee on Intelligence. The meeting was chaired by COL DEFRANCE, DASD(I) Staff until Mr. Red MORRISON arrived. The meeting was attended by the undersigned and the following:

COL FRED, DIA - 75101 - COL INMAN, AF - 56240

Mr. Y.J. SKALNIK, Army - 70604 Mr. Rowland MORROW, DIPO - 796 Mr. B.K. BUFFAM

2. (C) It was learned that the NEDZI Subcommittee will be briefed by CIA on 4 October, by LNR (State) on 7 October and by components of DOD during the period 11-22 October; however, DIA has asked that its briefing be delayed until at least 18 October when General BENNETT returns from his TAD to the Far East. NSA has asked that its briefing be given on home grounds (rather than on the Hill) and the other activities will probably be permitted to enjoy the same privilege with DASD(I)'s briefing leading the DOD briefings, probably on the 11th.

3. (C) COL DEFRANCE furnished the following guidance along with enclosure (2):

a. In the opening remarks, please indicate that the various components of intelligence do coordinate with and complement each other.

b. Try not to be competitive; keep sales pitch low.

c. Talk to Program III aspects of your organization.

d. Use the President's budget for 1972.

e. Suggest use of 2 to 3 hours as necessary.

f. NSA will cover SCA, but other organizations should talk to where they fit in.



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4. (U) DASD(I) will try to get copies of briefings by DCI and INR (State).

5. We will be informed as to compartmented clearances and security in general.

6. According to DASD(I) quoting (General) Rus BLANFORD and Mr. SLATINSHEK, Representative NEDZI has been critical of DOD but is an honest man.

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Members of Intelligence Subcommittee

Congressmen Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman, Michigan, Democrat

Melvin Frice, Illinois, Democrat O. C. Fisher, Texas, Democrat Alvin E. O'Konski, Wisconsin, Republican William G. Bray, Indiana, Republican

Mr. Frank M. Slatinshek, Counsel to the Subcommittee

Purpose: To make periodic inquiries into all phases of intelligence activities within DoD and within the agencies established under the National Security Act and to make legislative recommendations when appropriate.

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## BRIEFING OUTLINE

- I. Discuss the functions of the organization.
- II. Discuss the organization in order to accomplish the functions.
- III.

Discuss the budget as it applies to your organization.

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During the past five years, the Naval Investigative Service, has conducted around 375,000 investigations, of which 278,000 were personnel security, 5500 were internal security, and over 83,000 were in the criminal category. The remaining approximately 9000 were of a miscellaneous nature, including reciprocal assistance to other agencies, protective services on behalf of the President, Vice President and various) pop and foreign dignitaries.

Also during the period, the NIS produced hundreds of specialized studies of interest to Navy and DOD commanders: studies of security and criminal conditions in various foreign ports of call, analyses of foreign intelligence organizations and operations targeting U.S. Naval interests, and analyses of domestic dissident groups particularly seeking to undermine the morale and discipline of Naval personnel.

Finally, the NIS has engaged, with the FBI within the U.S., and with appropriate other agencies overseas, in several highly specialized counterespionage operations. These operations have been successful in terms of identifying numerous Soviet operatives, and absorbing (and thus neutralizing) a significant degree of Soviet intelligence resources.

One particularly successful NIS effort was the penetration and complete neutralization of the efforts of the Japanese anti-Vietnam war group (Beherein) to maintain an underground defection route--an underground program to induce U.S. personnel to defect and be "exfiltrated" from Japan to the Soviet Union or other European countries. Through injecting an operative into the pipeline, the NIS, in conjunction with Japanese security

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and police authorities, identified the personalia involved, located innumerable safe houses, and frustrated a large on-going exfiltration effort. The operation was so successful that there has been no effort by the Beherein or any parallel group to reconstitute such an effort.

 

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the morale and discipline of Naval personnel.

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