

DECLASSIFIED

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10  
MAY 1962 EDITION  
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CONFIDENTIAL (UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE)

# Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NIS-09/bjs  
Ser 0680

DATE: 6 Mar 1967

TO : Director of Naval Intelligence  
VIA : Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence  
FROM : Director, Naval Investigative Service

SUBJECT: NIS Activities in 1966

UNCLASSIFIED

Encl: (1) Copy of report on subject

1. Enclosure (1) is a copy of a report designed primarily for circulation to Commanding Officers of the Naval Investigative Service Offices, and for use within NISHQ. It is believed you might be interested in portions of the report, particularly Parts A (Introduction and Major Developments); E (Production and Productivity), and F (Workload Trends). The other Parts and the various Tables are primarily detailed statistical data. A detailed Table of Contents is included, and may assist you in determining other points of interest to you.

Very respectfully,

*E. G. Rifenburgh*  
E. G. RIFENBURGH

3.8.67

92

*This is a good overview & should serve to improve management ability to be alert to changing trends in years to come - if the predictions of better data come to pass. Request you scan - and read sections A, E & F (see above)*

[Redacted line]

ED 12958

21 88 98

NLS 528

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

Naval Investigative Service

Activities Report

1966

**Declassified / Downgrade to** .....

**Auth:** *EO 12958* .....

**Date:** *21 Sep 98* **Unit:** *NCF 22* .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NND 73643*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

PREFACE

Calendar year 1966 witnessed a major reorientation of the investigative and counterintelligence affairs of the Department of the Navy. A new organization responsible for these matters, the Naval Investigative Service, came into being. New command and support lines were established. New techniques for maintaining records of accomplishments and for identifying problem areas were devised and put into effect. Automation is now in the service of NIS.

This report summarizes the major happenings in the new organization and sets forth considerable statistical detail on the activities of the Naval Investigative Service in 1966.

As do all new organizations, the Naval Investigative Service has undergone a period of trial and error in its evolution towards the goal of an optimum functioning organization. Many external influences have precluded full and definitive attainment of the conceptual ideal. Some of these influences still persist, and will persist for considerable time to come.

As with any automatic data processing system, that of the Naval Investigative Service has required considerable "debugging". This debugging is still under way.

This first annual report gives considerable statistical specifics. This specificity is not to be confused with exactitude. Some errors are known to exist and these proceed from several causes. One cause is a continuing inaccuracy in input data. Field submissions of man hour reports have not reflected the care and accuracy that had been hoped for. Occasionally the computer has usurped human prerogatives, and has made an error.

ED 12958  
218898  
NCL 822  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Fortunately, considerable improvement has occurred within the past several months. Further, careful checking at Headquarters has identified and corrected many errors. In some instances, extrapolations and management judgment have been substituted for the data supplied by the various NIS components (including the Headquarters !). The specifics in the report, then, are not absolutely exact, but they are believed to be within 1% of accuracy. In any event, they provide much more specificity and much more accuracy than would have been possible without the computerized system.

This annual report has been produced for several reasons. First, it is hoped that the report will provide the readership with a better understanding of the activities of the Naval Investigative Service. Second, it is hoped that Commanding Officers of the Naval Investigative Service Offices will be encouraged to call upon Headquarters for the type of management data which the report indicates is available. And, finally, it was hoped - and, as the occasion showed, with reason - that the mere act of compiling the report would in itself identify areas where improvements should and could occur, especially in the refinement of management information systems.

All readers are requested to provide constructive comments on the report and to suggest changes both as to format and content. A Fiscal 1967 report will be developed in July, 1967. Only through suggestions and ideas from throughout the NIS can the potentialities of the available automation skills and equipment be fully exploited.

**Declassified / Downgrade to .....**

**Auth:** EO 12958 .....

ii

**Date:** 21 Sep 98 **Unit:** .....

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	Page i
<u>Part A. - Introduction and Major Developments</u>	
1. Organization	A-1
2. Management and Control Data	A-1
3. Inspections	A-3
4. Investigative Backlog	A-4
5. Timeliness of Investigations	A-5
6. Communications	A-6
7. Management Problems	
a. DOD National Agency Check Center and Central Index of Investigations	A-7
b. NISHQ Location	A-8
8. Conclusion	A-9
<u>Part B. - Manpower Resources</u>	
1. Net Man Years Utilized	B-1 Table I
2. Regular Allowance Personnel (RAP) - Gross and Net Availability	B-1
a. Paid Man Years	B-1 Table II
b. RAP - Overtime	B-2 Table III
c. RAP - Loss	B-2 Table IV
3. Non-Component Personnel Availability	B-2 Table V
4. Man Power Highlights	B-3

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~.....

Auth: ED 12958

3. Non-Component Personnel Availability

Date: 21 88 98

4. Man Power Highlights

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

- a. Contract Agents Overtime
- b. Contract Agents - MY Lost due to Reserve Obligations

B-3

B-3

Part C. - Manpower Utilization

- 1. Utilization by Major Function
- 2. Man Hours per Function, including attributed Administrative MH
- 3. Man Hours per Investigative Category
- 4. Percentage of Investigative Category versus Percentage of Case Completions per Category
- 5. Contract Agent Utilization

C-1

C-1

C-2

C-3

C-3  
Table VIPart D. - Manpower Trends

- 1. Military Personnel
- 2. Contract Agents
  - a. Dilution of Experience Levels
  - b. Contract Agent Attrition
  - c. Agent Training

D-1

D-2

D-3

D-4

Part E. - Production and Productivity

- 1. Counterintelligence
- 2. Investigations - Production
- 3. Investigative Productivity
  - a. Productivity - Control Cases
  - b. Productivity - Lead Cases

E-1

E-2  
Table VII  
Table VIIIE-2  
Table IX

E-2

E-5  
Table X**Declassified / Downgrade to .....****Auth:** *ED12958* .....**Date:** *21 Sep 98* **Unit:** *NCIS 22* .....**UNCLASSIFIED**~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL**DECLASSIFIED**  
Authority *NND 73043*

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

Part F. - (Investigations) - Workload Trends

1. 1965/66 Intake Comparisons

F-1

2. Workload Forecasts

F-2

**Declassified / Downgrade to .....**

**Auth: .....**

**Date: ..... Unit: .....**

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Part A - Introduction and Major Developments

1. Organization.

The Naval Investigative Service was established in February 1966 as a partial successor to the District Intelligence Office system and the various Naval Counterintelligence Support Activities. The intent underlying the creation of the NIS -- an intent directed by the Secretary of Defense -- was that its functions would relate solely to investigations and counterintelligence. Tasks not related to these functions were to be assumed by other elements of the Navy.

For a variety of reasons, most of these non-investigative tasks were still "residual" responsibilities of the Naval Investigative Service as of early December 1966. This can be attributed primarily to the difficulties in establishing a proper division of labor between intelligence and counterintelligence -- a division now made almost academic by the SecDef inclusion of the NIS in the "FUMINT" Plan. Notwithstanding this latter (1967) development, a more precise definition of the NIS role is in order. (It is considered that this will be accomplished no later than 30 June 1967. Once it is accomplished, NIS will be able to "purify" its manpower data and concentrate more definitively on those tasks and obligations inherent in its creation.)

2. Management and Control Data.

A quantum increase in the data available for management and control purposes occurred in 1966. Both computer and manually operated equipment are now being utilized to produce the following data which were not available (or available in timely fashion) prior to 1966:

Auth: ED 12558

Date: 21 88 98

Unit: NCBS 22

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

A-1

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73443

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Manpower Utilization (A Computerized System).

Data are now available on a monthly basis on all aspects of personnel availability and utilization: paid man hours, overtime, loss time for various reasons, time expended by category of personnel, by functional effort, etc.

b. Investigative Case Controls.

A computerized system for case controls has been instituted to provide weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual data, which are used for such purposes as:

- (1) identification of delinquent cases, by subject and location;
- (2) insuring cases accountability (i.e., that cases are not lost in the mail or otherwise);
- (3) system-wide and individual component performance with respect to timeliness and production.

UNCLASSIFIED

c. Financial Data.

Weekly reports are produced on financial transactions at the NISHQ, thereby providing the Director current data on allotments and obligations by object class.

Fiscal reports on field activities are provided monthly and quarterly (and, of course, annually).

The various reports together enable the Director both to avoid over-expenditures while insuring that needed operations are not unnecessarily curtailed through inaccurate assumptions as to funding capabilities. In other words, both over and under-expending can now be precluded.

**Declassified / Downgrade to .....**

**Auth:** ED 12958 .....

**Date:** 21 Sep 98 **Unit:** NCIS 88 .....

A-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

d. NISO Performance Data.

Both through headquarters and field inputs, the data needed to assess both current and long-range performance by Commanding Officers, are now compiled monthly. These reports are used for current management and for fitness report preparation. The various data elements and systems that have become available in 1966 permit immediate spotting of trouble areas, analysis of causes, and timely decision making. Further, the data base is utilized for medium and long range studies of productivity, costs, manpower requirements and resources allocations, as well as program and budget formulation and justification. Various information set forth below and in Parts B through E of this report reflect much of the quantitative data now available from the various management and information systems inaugurated in 1966.

3. Inspections.

A formalized inspection program was inaugurated during the year. Both comprehensive and command inspections are being made, in careful coordination with the Naval Inspector General. The team for comprehensive inspections consists of the Director (or a designated military alternate), and civilian or military experts in the various function areas (administration, investigations, and S.E.C.). Command inspections are conducted by the Director (or a designated military alternate) and functional experts as indicated by the size, scope, etc., of the office being inspected.

~~Declassified / Downgrade to .....~~

Auth: *ED 12958* .....

Date: *21 Sep 98* .....

Unit: *NCIS 22*  
*A-3* .....

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 73643*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The purpose of the inspections is to assess mission performance and efficiency, and to work towards more uniformity of concept and doctrine throughout the NIS.

The following inspections occurred in the last half of 1966:

COMPREHENSIVE

NISO Boston  
New York  
PacFltArea (and  
subordinate offices  
in the Philippines  
and Marianas)  
San Francisco  
Washington

COMMAND

Vietnam

UNCLASSIFIED

(By the end of the Fiscal Year - June 1967 - every NISO will have been subject to either a command or comprehensive inspection.)

4. Investigative Backlog.

For several years prior to 1966, the Navy had a severe backlog of investigative work. Security clearance delays, excessive reliance on interim clearances, public criticism, inequities to individuals, were inherent in the backlog -- a situation which finally reached the attention of the Secretary of Defense who directed that it be corrected. Through the uncompensated assistance of the investigative arms of the Army and Air Force, through the reimbursed assistance of the Civil Service Commission, and through thousands of hours of uncompensated overtime by Naval Intelligence personnel (military and civilian), the backlog had been eliminated by late 1965. Moreover, Navy needs for more investigative resources were recognized and the resources were made available.

Auth: .....

Date: .....

Unit: .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

On January 1, 1966, the number of Navy investigations pending was 8,451 -- a radical decline from the 34,914 pending figure on 28 February 1964, when investigative resources were considerably less than those available in January 1966. The January 1966 pending figure was, actually, too small for economical operation since, inherently, approximately two months work on hand for available resources is necessary for full and economical utilization of such resources. (The excessively low figure derived from the fact that Army, Air Force, and Civil Service Commission were still assisting in the Navy's investigative effort.

Operation Referral (as the assistance from other agencies was titled) ceased in February 1966. Thereafter pending work levels gradually rose, and on 31 December 1966, rested at 9,688 or 1.98 months work on hand at the average monthly production level throughout 1966. In effect, no "backlog" -- work in excess of two months production capability -- existed at the end of the year.

5. Timeliness of Investigations.

The Secretary of Defense has established the objective that personnel security investigations be completed in sixty days. This objective was not quite attained by NIS throughout the year, as reflected in the averages shown below for each fiscal quarter in 1966:

<u>Quarter Ending in</u>	<u>Average Completion Time</u>
March	57.2
June	66.3
September	68.0
December	68.86

**Declassified / Downgrade to .....**

**Auth:** *ED 12988* .....

**Date:** *21 Sep 98* **Unit:** *NCR 22A-5* .....

**UNCLASSIFIED**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *NND 73643*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The increases in completion times in the last three quarters of the year reflected an increase in workload slightly greater than the increase in resources. The marked increase between the first and second quarter reflected the different operating conditions in those quarters. (In the first quarter, intake was relatively low -- and NIS was still receiving assistance from other investigative agencies (cf. Page E-3 below.)) The average completion times in the final three quarters can be taken as a likely norm. Navy background investigations will always be slowed somewhat by such factors as the frequent non-availability of references who are at sea and, thus, not immediately available for timely interviews, and the large number of overseas leads, many of which have to be serviced by investigative agencies of foreign governments over whose work schedules the NIS has no control.

Some improvements can be anticipated in 1967, even given a continuation of the foregoing factors, due to the communications developments discussed in paragraph 4. below.

6. Communications.

In October 1965 the NIS went on line on an Autovon network, a dedicated, relatively high speed, teletype network linking the NISHQ with the Headquarters offices of its CONUS field components. The availability of this system has reduced mailing and administrative time by several days per case. Commencing in October 1966, many

~~field offices~~ began receiving and installing ASR-33 off-line

Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98

Unit: NCPS A-6 27

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

tape cutters -- and NIS was thereby able to avoid in many areas the wasteful process of report typing in such sub-offices and subsequent tape cutting from the typed reports.

As yet, all sub-offices do not have tape-cutters, and most do not have transmission capabilities to their respective field headquarters. (The tapes must be mailed in the latter instances.) Further, NIS does not have a dedicated system for communications with its overseas components.

Due attention is being given these "communications gaps" in the early months of 1967, with cooperation from the Director of Naval Communications and the Commanding Officer, NIPPSA.

UNCLASSIFIED

7. Management Problems - 1966.

a. DOD National Agency Check Center and Central Index of Investigations.

The named Centers, under Army responsibility, were created by the Secretary of Defense and were in operation by late May 1966. Whatever the long range advantages of these developments may be -- and, with time and proper imagination and effort there can be many -- their advent occasioned much difficulty for NIS in 1966. In effect, NIS lost direct control over its own counterintelligence and investigative indices, as well as over National Agency Checks of direct interest to Navy (many of which were related to background investigations being conducted by NIS). Innumerable man hours were expended in planning -- both for Army take-over and for NIS to identify and adjust to the necessary changes in operational

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 ..... Unit: NCIS, 22 .....  
A-7

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73643

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

procedures. Navy lost to Army considerably more personnel spaces -- and supporting funds -- than it had programmed to utilize on an in-house NAC and index effort.

By October 1966, most of the disruptions occasioned by these matters had been alleviated. The NAC Center and Investigations Index had begun to operate more effectively. NIS had absorbed its losses, and senior management and planning personnel were once again able to devote a reasonable percentage of their time and efforts to those functions still remaining with NIS.

b. NISHQ Location.

A particularly distracting problem throughout the year has been the question of where the NISHQ should be located -- and, given its current location, of how best to utilize the inadequate space allocation.

In early Spring, the NISHQ was "tentatively" selected as an activity that might be relocated away from the National Capital Region.

As an entirely separate matter, an OSD task group concluded that the NIS investigative and counterintelligence files should move to Fort Holabird -- there to be "collocated" with Army and Air Force files.

Both of the foregoing ideas, and the uncertainty resulting therefrom, and the time that had to be devoted thereto (in conferences, writing briefing papers, projecting space requirements), essentially precluded any meaningful efforts to focus the attention of appropriate OSD space personnel on the immediate requirements for the necessary

~~Declassified~~ ~~Downgrade to~~ to enable NIS to most effectively perform its tasks.

Auth: 2012958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 22  
A-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

By late October, the questions of relocating NISHQ, and the "collocation" of the files had gone dormant. There is no information currently available on whether the ideas will or will not be resurrected.

In the meantime, NISHQ is expanding - both through increased allowances to NIS as a whole and through some centralization aimed at increasing efficiency. The Fairmont Building is now simply inadequate to the Headquarters space needs. The momentary relief from the relocation and collocation questions is being utilized to seek more space in the Washington area.

8. Conclusion.

UNCLASSIFIED

1966 has been a time of reorganization, of many challenging problems, of frequent distraction from immediate management and operating responsibilities. Nevertheless, considerable progress has been made -- not only in production and organization, but in the development of means for measuring and assessing progress. Such progress could not have been made without the increases in NIS resources sponsored by the Director of Naval Intelligence and other elements of the Navy, the requests for which were sympathetically received and acted upon by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense.

Current workload forecasts appear within the programmed increases in resources for NIS.

Considerable work remains to be done. This will always be so.

The current situation, however, is such that personnel at NISHQ can exert themselves with a feeling that their work will be effective and

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~  
Auth: EO 12958

Date: 2/8/98 Unit: NCIS 22  
A-9

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73443



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

worthwhile -- and with the knowledge that the field components of NIS will continue the magnificent effort they have exerted for so many years. It is, after all, the actual production accomplished by these field elements which constitute the contribution of the Naval Investigative Service to the security of the Navy -- and, thus, to the nation.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

A-10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Part B - Manpower Resources

1. Net Man Years Utilized.

a. A total of 1,819 man years were actually "worked" on various NIS tasks in 1966. (A man year of "work" effort in 1966 consisted of 2,024 man hours -- 260 week days minus 7 holidays x 8 hours.) The man years so expended were from two sources:

(1) Regular Allowance Personnel (RAP) -- persons charged to the NIS world-wide allowance:

(2) Non-Component Personnel (NCP) -- individuals such as indigenous personnel overseas who were carried on the rolls of and were paid by various host commands; inactive reserve personnel on training duty; active duty personnel temporarily or permanently assigned to NIS field elements (e.g., Marine personnel at Yokosuka).

Table I reflects the net working man years available from these two sources. Various subparagraphs below, and the tables cited therein, discuss these manpower data in more detail.

UNCLASSIFIED

2. Regular Allowance Personnel -- Gross and Net Availability. The net manpower available from the resources directly chargeable to NIS are derived from the gross (paid) man years, plus overtime, minus various man hour losses. These factors are discussed below.

a. Paid Man Years. During the year, 1,861 paid man years of personnel services were, in effect, chargeable directly to NIS. This includes 414 military, and 1,447 civilian man years. Table II provides a breakdown of these man years by general personnel category. It is to be noted that

Auth: EO 12958

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. Unit: NCS 82

DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

these are gross man years, prior to any deductions for leave or other causes of loss. It should also be noted that the military personnel data includes only the time that military personnel were actually filling allowed NIS billets. PCS time of military personnel is not included. PCS time of civilian personnel is included, as is all civilian training time.

b. RAP - Overtime.

Regular Allowance Personnel worked a total of 108 man years in an "overtime" status during the year. This is a gross figure, prior to subtraction of compensatory time, and including overtime for which cash compensation was paid. We have no precise record at NISHQ as to the number of hours for which cash compensation was paid. Most personnel in grades GS-6 and below were paid cash for overtime. A few agent man years were so compensated. (It is proposed that, in FY 68, the NISHQ maintain data on this matter.)

Table III itemizes the gross overtime by general personnel category.

c. RAP - Loss Time.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

A total of 221.6 paid man years were lost to NIS during the year, from such causes as sick and annual leave, training (formal and "on job"), compensatory time (civilian), and R&R (military); reserve training duty leave by civilian personnel; and various miscellaneous reasons. Table IV reflects the losses by general personnel category.

3. Non-Component Personnel (NCP) Availability.

a. All man hours available from NCP are "net hours." That is, no loss factors are involved. Table V reflects the various sources of NCP assistance by man hours, and translates these man hours into man years,

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~

Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 88 98 Unit: NCPs 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

at 2,024 man hours per year - for a total of 71.16 man years of productive assistance to NIS without charge.

b. The major sources of NCP were indigenous personnel (40.33 man years) and active duty personnel charged to other components of Navy and Marine Corps (23.31 man years). Inactive Naval Reserve personnel on training duty with various NIS elements provided 5.12 man years of assistance.

c. The Office of the Secretary of Defense uses a factor of 1,787 "working" hours per year for an individual on the payroll for a full year. If NIS had hired personnel to obtain the 71.16 net man years cited in paragraph 3.a. above, a total of 80.60 man years would have had to be paid for. (80.60 equals  $\frac{2024}{1787} \times 71.16$ .)

4. Manpower Highlights - Regular Allowance Personnel.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

a. Contract Agent Overtime.

Table III reflects that contract agents worked 70.11 man years in overtime status. Altogether, contract agents worked 775.25 man years (@ 2,024 hours), after allowing for all loss time, and including the overtime. Thus, overtime accounted for 9.4% of the total agent time actually expended in production matters. Utilizing the 1,787 "working hours" per paid man year factor, the 70.11 man years of agent overtime would have required 79.41 paid man years, had NIS had to hire agents for such productive time. (79.41 equals  $\frac{2024}{1787} \times 70.11$ .)

b. Contract Agents - Man Years Lost Due to Reserve Obligations.

Many contract agents have reserve obligations with one of the military services. During 1966, contract agents took 16,160 hours of

Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 89 98 Unit: NIS 82 B-3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

leave for their reserve training duty. This represents (@ 2,024 hours) 8 man years productive time loss. The average reservist takes 2 weeks (80 hours) training duty per year. The 16,160 hours lost, when divided by 80 hours, reflects that 202 of our contract agent personnel took leave for reserve training in 1966. (As indicated in paragraph 3.b. above, the NIS obtained 5.12 net man years of productive effort from reservists who took training duty with NIS. Some such reservists were our own contract personnel. Some were from other activities and professions.)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~ .....

Auth: AO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

B-4

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Part C - Manpower Utilization

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

1. Utilization by Major Function.

Table I reflects that 1819 man years were actually "worked" on various NIS tasks in 1966. The following table reflects the distribution of these man years (in hours) and by percentage among the various major tasks:

<u>Function</u>	<u>Man Hours</u>	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Administration	973,173	26.43
Counterintelligence	237,541	6.45
Intelligence	81,848	2.22
Miscellaneous	84,501	2.31
Investigations	<u>2,304,768</u>	<u>62.59</u>
Total	3,681,831	100.

It might appear that 26.43% is a high "administrative" factor. It should be noted, however, that "administration" in this context includes all investigative and counterintelligence file maintenance and operations -- a basic task in intelligence work.

2. Man Hour Utilization, with Administrative Man Hours Attributed to Major Operational Functions.

The NIS had two major operational functions (investigations and counterintelligence) and two minor operational functions (positive intelligence and miscellaneous -- e.g., censorship, Air Intelligence Reserve, etc.,) for portions of calendar 1966. While these minor operational functions are now being phased out, they did absorb some energy in 1966. The basic unit for operating administrative support to operational tasks in 1966

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~ .....  
was an operational man hour. The following table reflects:

Auth: AO 12958

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;

Date: 218898 CLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

DOD DIR 5200.10

C-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

a. The percentage of time expended per operational task (total operational hours divided into man hours per major or minor operational task), and

b. the administrative man hours attributed to each task (i.e., the percentages in a. preceding applied to the total administrative man hours in subparagraph C.1. supra).

The table also reflects the total man hours (including attributed administrative man hours) expended per operational functions.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Operational MH's</u>	<u>% of MH</u>	<u>Attributed Admin MH</u>	<u>Total MH per Operation</u>
Counterintelligence	237,541	8.76	85,269	322,810
Intelligence	81,848	3.01	29,331	111,179
Miscellaneous	84,501	3.14	30,509	115,010
Investigations	2,304,768	85.09	828,064	3,132,832
Total	2,708,658	100.	973,173	3,681,831

3. Man Hours Utilization per Investigative Category.

For programming purposes, four major investigative categories are recognized. The following table reflects:

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

a. The man hours expended in investigative work (investigators and direct clerical support) per major category;

b. The ratios (in percentages) of the data in a. preceding;

c. The administrative man hours attributed to each major investigative category (i.e., the percentages in b., preceding, applied to the administrative man hours attributed to all investigations in the table in paragraph 2 above).

d. The totals of a. and c. preceding.....

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~  
Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCRS 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

<u>Case Category</u>	<u>Operational MH per Cat.</u>	<u>% Operational MH per Cat.</u>	<u>Attributed Admin MH</u>	<u>Total MH Per Cat.</u>
Personnel Security	1,574,725	68.32	565,733	2,140,458
Criminal	586,647	25.46	210,825	797,472
Counterintelligence Investigations	107,476	4.67	38,671	146,147
Special Activities	35,920	1.55	12,835	48,755
Total	2,304,768	100.	828,064	3,132,832

4. Percentage of Man Hours per Investigative Category versus Percentage of cases Completed per Category.

Calendar 66 case production is discussed in Part E of this report and the Tables cited therein. The following table reflects the percentages of manpower expended per major case category and the percentages of total cases in each category. (The manpower percentages are those reflected in paragraph 3. above.)

<u>Investigative Case Category</u>	<u>% of Man Hours per Category</u>	<u>% of Cases Completed per Category</u>
Personnel Security	68.32	79.5
Criminal	25.46	14.4
Counterintelligence	4.67	3.4
Special Activities	1.55	2.7
Total	100.	100.

UNCLASSIFIED

5. Contract Agent Utilization.

A large number of new agents were hired in 1966, both in replacement of agent attrition and to fill enlarged allowances. (This matter is discussed in Part D of this Report.) Notwithstanding the number of new

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCS 212 C-3 .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73443



CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

hires which had to be trained and absorbed into the sytem, the functional utilization of agents did not change materially from month to month throughout the year. That is, the percentage of total net agent time in administration, supervision, etc., remained generally constant. The significance of this is that NIS was able to avoid undue diversion of experienced manpower to training and supervising the new personnel. Table VI reflects the functional utilization of contract agents by month throughout the year.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 88 98 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

C-44

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Part D. -- Manpower Trends

1. Military Personnel.

The most significant development in 1966 with respect to military personnel was the inauguration of the Civilian Substitution Program. A total of 21 military billets were lost (7 officers and 14 enlisted) to NIS in Phase I of the CivSub Program.

As of this writing, February 1967, the planning for Phase II is being finalized. Current prospects are that NIS will lose 3 officers and 53 enlisted billets in this Phase in late Fiscal 67 and early Fiscal 68.

Following the first phase of CivSub, the relative percentages of military and civilian allowances were approximately 20% military, 80% civilian. Should Phase II eventuate, and should NIS receive the civilian personnel increases requested in the FY 68 budget, the ratio will become 17% military and 83% civilian.

UNCLASSIFIED

The most serious adverse consequence of the Civilian Substitution Program to NIS is the reduction in training opportunities for junior officers for subsequent tours in operational and combat areas. Current overseas officer strength is 33. A minimum of two officers is needed for normal military administration in each of the 11 CONUS NISO's -- for a total of 22 in those offices. Twenty-two officers are assigned to NISHQ -- a bare minimum for military administration, especially since billets are frequently gapped. This leaves a total of 39 billets to CONUS NISO's in which junior officers (usually reservists, fresh from OCS) might obtain some operational experience. However, many of these billets are gapped from time to time. Normal rotation and P.C.S. constraints are applicable.

Auth: ED 12958  
Most junior officers assigned to NISO's are reservists with a one tour

Date: 21 88 98  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

obligation. The net result is that the CONUS NISO's cannot provide a meaningful reservoir of trained junior officers for overseas assignments. The situation will become even more critical with subsequent civilian substitution phases.

2. Contract Agents.

a. Dilution of Experience Levels. A marked dilution of agent experience and skills occurred in 1966. There were 778 contract agents and 12 enlisted investigators (NEC 9592) on board as of 1 January 1966. Nine of the 9592's phased out during the year, while 64 contract agents left the service for various reasons. Thus, 73 experienced investigators were lost to the system. Notwithstanding, the contract agent on board count had risen to 848 as of 1 January 1967. The combined attrition replacements and new hires to fill the increased agent allowance thus required 134 new hires within the year.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

124 new agents were hired in calendar 1965 (to fill new allowances and replace attrition).

The 1965 and 1966 new hires totalled 258. Thus, of the 848 contract agents on board as of 31 December 1966, 30% had less than two years service, and 15% had less than one years service. 31 of the new 1966 hires were employed after 1 September 1966, and were thus still in an in-training status as of 31 December.

The decrease in experience levels was, of course, borne entirely by the CONUS components, since only experienced agents are sent overseas. The strength in overseas components (including Hawaii, San Juan, Kodiak, and Ft. Amador) increased by 28 during the year. In effect, then, the CONUS NISO's had to lose 28 experienced agents while seeking to absorb and train the 134 new hires in 1966.

**Declassified / Downgrade to**

EO 12-958  
the 134 new hires in 1966.

Date: 21 Feb 98 Unit: NCPB 22 D-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The large number of new hires, has, of course, imposed heavy training requirements, both "on job" and at NIS schools. Further, "quality" retention in the investigative program has been difficult. It appears, however, that this important objective has generally been attained. The number of investigative discrepancies has been kept to a minimum and no rise in the rate of disciplinary matters affecting agents has occurred.

More agents are being recruited, looking towards a goal of 890 agents on board by 30 June 1967. An additional increase to 908 is hoped for early in FY 68. The problems of training and absorption will, thus, continue for some time. While helpful in the long run, the "growth pains" will persist.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

b. Contract Agent Attrition. 39 Contract Agents left the Service in 1965. As indicated supra, 64 left in 1966. This increase in attrition rate appears to be due to the availability of better economic opportunities elsewhere, both in immediate pay levels and in long range promotion opportunities. Working conditions are of some consequence also, especially in the matter of uncompensated overtime. Other federal investigative agencies routinely pay overtime for the same type of work. (The overtime work by contract agents is discussed in Part B, paragraph 4.a of this report.)

The departure of an agent from NIS has both production and cost implications. A minimum investment of approximately \$3,000 is necessary to recruit and train an individual to the point where he can make a productive contribution. (The cost of screening and background investigation of applicants, the cost of sending an agent to school, and his salary for a two to three month "non-production" period are included in the cost estimate.)

Date: 21 SEP 98 Unit: NCS 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73043

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A reduction in the attrition rate is thus a matter of great importance.

The factors which contributed to the high attrition rate in 1966 also made it difficult to recruit qualified personnel. In an effort to alleviate both problems, the starting salary of agents was raised, towards the end of the year, from Pay Grade 7 to Pay Grade 8 (i.e., from \$6,451 per annum to \$7,068). Further measures contemplated for 1967 include an all-out effort to reduce overtime requirements -- and cash payment to the fullest possible extent for overtime actually necessary.

c. Agent Training. The formal NIS Agent training program in 1966 was as follows:

<u>Type Class</u>	<u>No. of Classes</u>	<u>Days per Class</u>	<u>Students Per Class</u>	<u>Total Students</u>	<u>Total Student Days</u>	<u>Total Class days</u>
Basic In-	7	20	24	168	3,360	140
vestigations						
In-Service (Seminars)	2	5	15	30	150	10
Photography	2	15	6	12	180	30
Supervising Agents Seminar	1	5	15	15	75	5
	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	12	XX	XX	225	3,765 a/	185 b/

a/ Represents 14.8 man years of net agent time (@ 253 working days per year).

b/ NIS has no full-time agent instructors. Thus, on 185 days (of the 253 working days), senior NISHQ personnel had to devote some time to training duties.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Despite the foregoing training schedule, there were still, as of 31 December, 1966, ninety-five contract agents who had not attended the

~~Declassified and Downgrade to~~ .....

Auth: ED 12908

Date: 21 Sep 98 NCIS 22  
.....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Basic Investigations Course. These agents, plus all new hires in 1967 must, of course, attend Basic classes, and, thus, the training aspect of the NIS responsibility must continue to receive considerable attention.

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 12/18/98 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

D-5

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Part E - Production and Productivity

1. Counterintelligence.

No meaningful measure of counterintelligence research and operations has been developed -- by NIS or any other investigative agency. Certain "quantitative" factors can be established. Numbers of reports written, received, and analyzed; of data cross referenced; of studies made and letters produced, etc., can be developed. However, such a quantitative approach has little relevance to the value of the work accomplished. Further, counterintelligence research and studies are greatly affected -- both in quality and quantity -- by the documentation available from the entire intelligence community. Gaps in counterintelligence knowledge are great. The identities of hostile intelligence operators and the organization and mechanism underlying their activities are only partially known. The collection of information (directly or through liaison), the analysis thereof, the "warnings" to command, the time expended in erecting countermeasures to identified hostile intelligence techniques -- all are interwoven and interrelated. They essentially defy quantitative counts as a measure of value. For this reason, NIS has not sought to establish production norms or standards against which to measure effort in the counterintelligence area. Accordingly, no statistical presentation of production or productivity can be made in the counterintelligence area.

(The Resources Management System, effective 1 July 1967, apparently will force an effort to identify "work units" in the counterintelligence

Auth: EO 12958

DOWNGRADED AT 5 YEAR INTERVALS;

Date: 21 SEP 98

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DDI 302-5200-10

NCIS 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

area. NIS will work towards this end, in conjunction with ACSI (Army), OSI (Air Force), and DIA. As of this writing, however, no meaningful standards have been developed.)

2. Investigations - Production.

Table VII depicts the investigative cases (control and lead) completed, by broad categories, in 1966. Table VIII groups the control cases into the programming categories for which the percentages were given in Part C.4. (The percentages are repeated for convenience.)

3. Investigative Productivity.

Two productivity measurements are maintained. One of these relates to production of "control" cases, i.e., subjects, incidents, etc., under investigation versus the man years expended by the NIS as a whole.

(Statistically, no single investigation is completed in one field component of the Naval Investigative Service. In 1966, each background investigation -- major on the average -- required effort in 3.78/NIS components; an average criminal investigation required effort in 1.35 components.) Table IX reflects the average number of NIS components involved per average case in various case categories.

The other productivity measurement relates to the number of "lead cases" i.e., portions of cases completed per man month of "on-street" investigative time in each field component.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

Each of these productivity measurements is discussed below.

a. Productivity "Control Cases."

It takes approximately one to two months (sometimes more) to complete an investigation. And, as indicated in the foregoing prefatory

Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NEWS 22 E-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

remarks, several NIS field components may be involved in a case. Thus, a control case may not (and frequently is not) completed in the month in which most of the work thereon is done. And final closure of a case may result from completing a minor lead in a field component far removed from the area where most of the work was done. For these reasons, monthly productivity rates on control cases are meaningless. Accordingly, NIS maintains fiscal quarter rather than monthly productivity rates on control cases. Even these quarterly reports were not truly indicative in calendar 1966, for reasons expressed below.

The following tables reflect quarterly, semi-annual, three quarter, and annual rates of productivity in 1966 on control cases, in the major and more time consuming categories of cases handled by NIS. (These relate to cases completed versus man years of actual "on-street" investigative operations. A man year of 2,080 working hours is used here since such is used by ASD (Admin) for assessing relative production rates among the military departments.)

<u>Time Frame</u>	<u>Productivity per Type of Investigation*</u>	
	<u>Background</u>	<u>Criminal</u>
January-March	100.78	44.98
April-June	90.55	48.59
July-September	93.03	45.10
October-December	94.26	44.64
January-June	95.44	46.85
January-September	94.64	46.23
January-December	94.55	45.82

\*Average number of investigations completed per 2,080 man hours of "on-street"

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~  
operations. Supervisory time not included.

Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCRS 22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73443

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

These productivity levels are of only the most general assistance in understanding NIS activity in calendar 66.

The January-March figure on background investigations is essentially misleading. Many cases "closed" during that period and, thus, counted in the production base, were only partial cases. Considerable work had been accomplished on these cases in an earlier time. (They were part of the backlog that had existed for years.)

The April-June BI productivity figure also includes a certain distortion. During this period a relatively low workload on hand in individual NISO's - and the infeasibility of shifting resources to high load districts for short periods - had a dampening effect on the productivity of the system as a whole. More importantly, however, many cases on which NIS had completed its work could not be formally closed since the National Agency Check portion of the case was still pending at the end of the quarter. (The NAC Center was just becoming operational and was having difficulties.)

It was only in the third quarter (July-September) that conditions began to assume some approximation of normalcy. The NAC Center was less a factor in preventing the closing of cases. Sufficient workload was available to permit more economical and productive agent road trips. Various shifts in resources had been accomplished. The fourth quarter reflected a continuation of the upward trend.

1966 was the first year in over a decade when a major investigative backlog was not present. During the "backlog" years, the conditions were such that no meaningful productivity norms could be developed, to serve

Auth: ED 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 22

E-4

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73443

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

in subsequent years as benchmarks against which to measure changes. And, as indicated above, 1966 presented certain anomalies. It is likely, however, that the last half of that year began to reflect conditions of sufficient normalcy that the productivity rate for that period may be meaningful. Six months more experience will be required before a definitive conclusion thereon can be reached.

b. Productivity - "Lead Cases."

A "lead case" in this context is that part of an investigation conducted by a NIS field component. Conditions vary greatly among field components: in geography, percentages of caseload among various categories, etc. For this reason, a NIS-wide norm against which all components might be compared is not feasible. While such a norm is developed as a general indicator, resources allocations must continue to be on the basis of the productivity attained per component - as modified by management judgment derived from case review, field inspections, etc.

Table X hereto depicts the productivity rate (lead cases per 160 operational man hours) attained by each NISO for each month of 1966. (Total operational man hours per month have been factored by 160 hours (20 days @ 8 hours) to provide a standard "man month" basis for productivity computations.) This table also reflects the twelve months average per component (a "running productivity rate".)

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

A study of Table X and the "control" case productivity in paragraph 3.a. immediately preceding will substantiate the statements made in paragraph 3.b. that quarterly control case productivity rates

~~Declassified / Downgraded to~~  
Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 88 98 Unit: NCIS 22

E-5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

were poor indicators. For example, the high "control" case rates in the January-March period were attained despite relatively low "lead case" rates during the same period. (With few exceptions, the lead case rates during January, February, and March were below the annual "running productivity rate.") In the April-June period, when BI "control case" productivity was lowest, most components having a high involvement in BI lead cases had higher "lead" rates than their respective running productivity rates. Only in the final quarter was there a general correlation between "control" and "lead" case rates.

A general correlation between lead and control rates - per quarter year - should be expected. Should this not occur in the first quarter of calendar 1967, an in-depth study to ascertain the cause must be undertaken.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: E012958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 .....

Unit: NCIS J2 .....

E-6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Part F -- (Investigations) Workload Trends

1. 1966/1965 Intake Comparisons.

The total number of investigations requested in 1966 was slightly higher than in 1965, although, surprisingly, the number of background investigations was lower. The data on the two years follow.

<u>Annual Totals</u>	<u>BI's</u>	<u>Internal Security a/</u>	<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Special Inquiries b/</u>	<u>All Categories</u>
1965	39,168	1,800	6,516	10,884	58,368
1966	<u>38,256</u>	<u>2,016</u>	<u>8,352</u>	<u>11,100</u>	<u>59,724</u>
Difference 1965/6*	- 912	+ 216	+ 1,836	+ 216	+ 1,356

\*Minus sign reflects decrease in 1966 from 1965; plus sign reflects increase in 1966

a/ Internal Security Cases: espionage, sabotage, hostage, etc.

b/ Special Inquiries: Expanded National Agency Checks, etc.

<u>Monthly Averages</u>	<u>BI's</u>	<u>Internal Security a/</u>	<u>Criminal</u>	<u>Special Inquiries b/</u>	<u>All Categories</u>
1965	3,264	150	543	907	4,864
1966	<u>3,188</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>696</u>	<u>925</u>	<u>4,977</u>
Difference 1965/6*	- 76	+ 18	+ 153	+ 18	+ 113

As was shown in Part D, paragraph 4, criminal investigations accounted for only 14.4% of the total investigations completed while accounting for 25.46% of the man years expended. And, as indicated in Part E, paragraph 3.a.,

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~ .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

215898  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS. ....  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

agent productivity per background investigation was more than double that per criminal investigation (94.55 versus 45.82). A continuation of the trend of a higher percentage of criminal cases in the investigations "mix" will have profound implications on budget and manpower requirements.

## 2. Workload Forecasts.

A continued rise in work intake is anticipated, especially in the personnel security field.

Commencing 1 January 1967, the NIS share of the total DOD industrial security workload rose from 26.4% to 30%. This will mean 36 additional BI's per month (requiring 5 agent man months, per month), and 72 expanded NAC's per month (approximately 1 agent man month per month).

COMSUBLANT has indicated a requirement for approximately 1,000 investigations of incumbents of or detailees to newly designated billets under the Personnel Reliability Program.

A large scale updating (5 year cycle) of BI's on inactive intelligence reserve personnel is to occur.

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

The Chief of Naval Personnel has approved a program of obtaining Special BI's (or, in special cases, updating BI's) on flag officers, and on most Captains.

Assuming that the foregoing programs can be handled on an orderly basis over a year's time, the increased workload should be within the planned increase in capabilities in FY 68. (Any reductions in budget requests for FY 68 would, of course, invalidate this optimism.) Should these programs commence early in 1967, however, a backlog is bound to occur.

~~Declassified / Downgrade to .....~~

th: ED 12958 .....

to: 21 8898 ~~Unit~~ NARS F-2 .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

NIS will work with BIPED, SUEBLATT, and DNI (02-923) to avoid (to the extent possible) too precipitate action. The industrial workload is, of course, totally beyond NIS control.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCFD 22 .....

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDEX TO TABLES

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Table</u>
Net Productive Time	I
Man Years Charged to NIS	II
Regular Allowance Personnel - Gross Overtime	III
Regular Allowance Personnel - Manpower Loss	IV
Non-Component Personnel Availability	V
Contract Agents - Functional Utilization	VI
NIS Investigative Production - 1966	VII
NIS Investigative Production Control Cases/Programming Categories	VIII
NIS Component Involvement Per Case Category	IX
NISO Productivity Rates	X

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 82 .....

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643





NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE I

CONFIDENTIAL

NET PRODUCTIVE TIME\*

	<u>Man Hours</u>	<u>Man Years</u> <sup>a/</sup>
Regular Allowance Personnel	3,537,853	1747.70
Non-Component Personnel	143,978	71.40
TOTAL	<u>3,681,831</u>	<u>1819.10</u>

\* Net time actually expended on NIS tasks.

a/ Man Years equal man hours ÷ 2024.

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 218898 Unit: NCIS 82 .....

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 73643

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDEX TO TABLES

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Table</u>
Net Productive Time	I
Man Years Charged to NIS	II
Regular Allowance Personnel - Gross Overtime	III
Regular Allowance Personnel - Manpower Loss	IV
Non-Component Personnel Availability	V
Contract Agents - Functional Utilization	VI
NIS Investigative Production - 1966	VII
NIS Investigative Production Control Cases/Programming Categories	VIII
NIS Component Involvement Per Case Category	IX
NISO Productivity Rates	X

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: ED 12958 .....

Date: 218898 Unit: NCIS 82 .....

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE II

CONFIDENTIAL

Man Years Charged to NIS - Regular Allowance Personnel Man Years

<u>Personnel Category</u>	<u>Working Hours on Rolls</u>	<u>Man Years on Rolls*</u>
Officers	251,736	124.38
GS-7 and higher	193,064	95.39
Contract Agents	1,645,846	813.17
NEC 9592	17,120	8.46
Other Enlisted	568,737	281.00
GS-6 and below	<u>1,090,919</u>	<u>539.00</u>
TOTAL	3,767,422	1,861.40

UNCLASSIFIED

\* Man Years = Man Hours ÷ 2024.

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: 6012958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCF 22

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE III

CONFIDENTIAL

Regular Allowance Personnel - Gross Overtime

<u>Personnel Category</u>	<u>Overtime Hours</u>	<u>Overtime Man Years*</u>
Officer	14,558	7.19
GS-7 and higher	5,441	2.70
Contract Agents	141,909	70.11
NEC 9592	1,842	.91
Other Enlisted	47,020	25.23
GS-6 and below	<u>7,784</u>	<u>3.85</u>
TOTAL	218,554	108

UNCLASSIFIED

\* @2024 hours per year

~~Declassified~~ Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 218898 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DDO DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE IV

CONFIDENTIAL

Regular Allowance Personnel - Manpower loss - All Causes

<u>Personnel Category</u>	<u>Man Hours Loss</u>	<u>Man Year Loss*</u>
Officers	28,018	13.84
GS-7 and above	26,522	13.12
Contract Agents	218,652	108.03
NEC 9592	2,145	1.06
Other Enlisted	52,711	26.04
GS-6 and below	<u>120,524</u>	<u>59.55</u>
TOTAL	448,602	221.64

UNCLASSIFIED

\* @ 2024 hours per year

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 218898 .....

Unit: NCIS 22 .....

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE V

CONFIDENTIAL

Non-Component Personnel Net Availability

<u>Personnel Category</u>	<u>Man Hours Available</u>	<u>Man Years Available</u>
Officers, Active Duty	17,179	8.50 <u>1/</u>
Reserve Officers, TRADU	8,174	4.04
GS-7 and above	3,912	1.93
Professional Indigenous <u>a/</u>	49,141	24.28 <u>2/</u>
Enlisted Investigators <u>b/</u>	9,088	4.50 <u>1/</u>
Other Enlisted, Active Duty	20,868	10.31 <u>1/</u>
Reserve Enlisted, TRADU	2,192	1.08
GS-6 and below	944	.47
Indigenous Clerical	<u>32,480</u>	<u>16.05</u> <u>2/</u>
TOTAL	143,978	71.16

a/ Indigenous at GS-7 and above equivalent

b/ Primarily Marine

1/ Active Duty Military Totals - 23.31 MY

2/ Indigenous Totals - 40.33 MY

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~

th: EO 12958

Date: 21 88 98 Unit: NCIS 22

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE VI

Contract Agents - Functional Utilization, 1966

Functional  
Utilization of Net MH in %

Month	Paid + Over- MH time	- Loss Time	a/ Net MH	Admin	Super-b/ vision	On-Street Inves. c/ Ops	Misc.	Total %	
Jan	128,630	10,320	13,030	125,920	3.49	16.20	77.60	2.71	100
Feb	118,900	10,200	13,410	115,690	2.43	16.30	78.30	2.97	100
Mar	144,900	10,890	17,100	138,690	2.40	14.80	79.80	3.40	100
Apr	134,200	10,410	17,210	127,400	2.25	16.00	79.10	2.65	100
May	134,400	16,570	12,770	138,200	2.66	15.00	80.00	2.34	100
Jun	142,350	16,670	21,090	137,930	5.23	16.30	76.10	2.37	100
Jul	133,800	10,020	23,210	120,610	2.45	18.90	76.20	2.45	100
Aug	152,060	12,166	26,640	137,586	2.98	17.40	76.90	3.72	100
Sep	138,780	10,840	16,370	133,250	2.88	16.80	77.80	2.52	100
Oct	140,950	12,380	18,300	135,030	2.85	16.60	78.00	2.55	100
Nov	134,350	11,100	14,600	130,850	2.56	16.39	78.33	2.72	100
Dec	142,536	10,343	24,922	127,957	2.37	16.17	78.82	2.64	100
TOT.	1,645,856	141,909	218,652	1,569,113					

a/ Illness, annual leave, attendance at agent training classes, etc.

b/ Direct supervision of investigative (on-street) operations.

c/ Counterintelligence analysis, research, operations

~~Declassified / Downgrade to~~ .....

All figures are rounded

Auth: EO 12958

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.. NCIS 22

Auth: 21 Sep 98

Auth: 21 Sep 98

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE VII

CONFIDENTIAL

NIS Investigative Production - Control and Lead Cases - 1966

<u>Category</u>	<u>Control Cases</u>	<u>Lead Cases</u>	<u>Total</u>
Background	36,846	99,919	136,765
Other Personnel Security (ENAC's, etc.)	9,641	11,511	21,152
Internal Security	1,736	1,146	2,882
Security Compromises	277	196	473
Criminal Property	443	195	638
Criminal Personnel	8,005	2,790	10,795
Spec. Activities	<u>1,598</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1,617</u>
Totals	58,546	115,776	174,322

UNCLASSIFIED

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: ED 12958

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCRS 22

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643





NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE VIII

CONFIDENTIAL

NIS Investigative Production - 1966 Control Cases - Programming Categories

<u>Category</u>	<u>No. Control Cases</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Personnel Security	46,698	79.5
All Criminal	2,013	14.4
Counterintelligence	8,448	3.4
Special Activities	<u>1,598</u>	<u>2.7</u>
TOTAL	58,757	100%

Unit: NIS  
86 88 12 21  
85 89 12 21  
Declassified / Downgraded to

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643



NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE  
FAIRMONT BUILDING  
4420 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN REPLY REFER TO

TABLE IX

CONFIDENTIAL

NIS Component Involvement per Case Category

<u>Category</u>	<u>No. Components involved</u>
Background	3.78*
Other PSI's	2.19*
Internal Security	1.66
Security Compromises	1.67
All Criminal	1.35

\*Includes NISHQ, since Headquarters work is involved in details of all personnel security cases.

Declassified / Downgrade to .....

Auth: EO 12958 .....

Date: 21 Sep 98 Unit: NCIS 22 .....

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NND 73643