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Authority WD 73643

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NAVSOP 5216/5 (REV. 11-67)
S/N-0104-904-1762 (REV. 11-67)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Memorandum

DATE: 10/13/70

TO: Capt. Edwards

FROM: adm. Harlfinger

Via: Capt. Hatzel

SUBJ:

Seen

1. Attached is provided for your info and any further dissemination you deem advisable.
2. I would like to provide Capt. Vern Jennings a copy. (as you know he works for VAdm. Bowen). Request your concurrence.

Very respy,

J. Q. Edwards

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EO 12958
NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
Date: 21 SEP 98
HOFFMAN BUILDING
301 TAYLOR DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22314

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IN REPLY REFER TO

NIS-09/kac

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Ser 00278

13 OCT 1970

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Subj: NIS and the Blue Ribbon Panel (U)

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Encl: (1) Position Paper: Investigative and Counterintelligence
Support Requirements, U.S. Navy; FY 71 et seq. (October
1970)

1. (U) Enclosure (1) is a "White Paper"--a position paper on the Navy's need for an in-house investigative capability, with especial reference to such need in overseas areas. The paper was developed in the context of the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations pertaining to counterintelligence and investigations.
2. (U) Enclosure (1) addresses two major questions, as discussed below.
3. (U) The first question is the basic one as to why it is essential that Navy have an "in-house" capability for C/I and criminal work, even if its personnel security work is handled by another agency. The enclosure treats this in an elemental fashion--in effect, for an audience that has little background in the subject. (We hope to use the material as a hand-out to appropriate personnel in DIA or OSD who might be staffing the Blue Ribbon recommendations, and whom we wish to educate. The "elemental" coverage approach derives from our observation that there is an amazing lack of understanding in many quarters of what to us seems to be so obvious.) Our argumentation might be summarized as follows:
 - a. Navy has a heavy investment overseas--in personnel, resources, sensitivity;
 - b. That overseas capability is threatened from two directions:
 - (1) military opposition (this point, which would relate to "positive" intelligence, is not further developed);
 - (2) criminal and hostile intelligence operations.
 - c. Proper Navy security, counterintelligence, and law-enforcement actions in overseas areas require detailed and timely information on particular problems. Such information must be collected locally, i.e., at the locale of the Navy commands being served. Such commands are not collocated with other U.S. C/I or law-enforcement capabilities. Navy must thus have its own information collection capability overseas.

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d. An "overseas" capability (item c. preceding) requires a CONUS base for (1) management; (2) training; (3) a source of rotational personnel.

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e. CONUS Navy Cdrs. also require specialized and timely information;

f. The CONUS base needed for overseas operations (cf. c. and d. preceding) provides a nucleus for an operational capability to meet the CONUS Navy Cdrs. needs. It is only logical to enlarge that base sufficiently to meet truly unique Navy requirements.

4. (U) You will recall making a submission to Op-60 on overall Naval intelligence interests that might be affected by the Blue Ribbon Panel. For the sake of completeness, enclosure (1) incorporates the material initially submitted by you on the NIS.

5. (U) The argumentation in paragraphs 3. and 4. above are not new to you. It is therefore questioned whether you will wish to peruse the narrative portions of the enclosure.

6. (C) The second area of coverage in the enclosure pertains to our resource requirements if (1) the PSI tasks and resources were to be transferred from NIS; (2) all other NIS tasks should remain. These resource requirements are discussed on pages 12-15, 19-23, and 24, and are recapitulated below:

a. 300 personnel--for all overseas tasks. This is the number now overseas. With the loss of the PSI task, this number would just about suffice for hardcase requirements.

b. 699 personnel--for CONUS tasks. The narrative portion (pages 19-23, inclusive) gives the methodology utilized in arriving at this figure. (We anticipate (1) closing 91 resident agencies; (2) more time/cost per criminal investigation; (3) lower productivity due to (2) preceding.)

Items a. and b. above total 999 personnel. This would mean a release of around 835 personnel to a consolidated PSI agency--as contrasted with the approximately 950 individuals we are now using on the PSI program. (This spread would be accounted for at 47 personnel overseas and 68 within CONUS.)

Very respectfully,

J. Q. Edwards

J. Q. EDWARDS

Captain, U. S. Navy

Director,

Naval Investigative Service

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Investigative and Counterintelligence Support Requirements

U. S. Navy

FY 71 Et Seq

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A Position Paper developed and presented in the light of certain
recommendations and observations by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel

October 1970

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Date: 21 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

PREFACE

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On 1 July 1970, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel made its "Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense." Two items in that Report concern counterintelligence and investigations, and suggest that changes should be made in the manner in which such matters are now handled within DOD.

Recommendation I-7 of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report states that the functions of the Secretariats and the Service Military Staffs "... related to military operations and intelligence should be eliminated ..." Elsewhere in the Report, it is clearly intimated that these functions should be transferred to a DOD agency, under an Assistant Secretary of Defense.

On page 42 of the Report, the statement is made that "Among ... functions ... where significant economies might result from consolidation, are: ... Personnel Security Investigations."

Intelligence includes counterintelligence. Personnel security investigations are counterintelligence actions. The Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations on intelligence thus clearly indicate that counterintelligence and personnel security investigations should be reassigned from the Department of the Navy.

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The views of the Naval Intelligence Command on the Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations relative to intelligence generally are set forth in various documents and studies. This Position Paper is concerned specifically and solely with the Navy's counterintelligence and investigative interests and functions.

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With respect to these matters, it is the contention of the Naval Intelligence Command that:

- a. The Blue Ribbon Report was not premised on a proper and correct understanding of the nature of the functions;
- b. The Blue Ribbon Panel gathered no information within the Department of the Navy on which it could reach a conclusion as to the possible merits of "consolidating" the personnel security investigative functions of the Navy.
- c. The loss by the military departments of their personnel security investigative tasks (and, hence, the resources devoted to such tasks) might well lead to cost increases of some magnitude in residual departmental investigative responsibilities--and to lesser capabilities in such residual tasks despite the expenditure thereon of higher per unit funding.

It is the purpose of this Paper to:

- a. Summarize general considerations which argue against the proposal to eliminate the counterintelligence functions of the military departments.
- b. Identify certain cost implications of Personnel Security Investigation consolidation, which were apparently not considered by the Blue Ribbon Panel.

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c. Outline the need for a Navy "in-house" counterintelligence and investigative capability, both overseas and within CONUS, should the Personnel Security function be transferred from Navy.

d. Indicate the size staff needed for the purpose in (c) preceding, utilizing already submitted GDIP data as a basis for the calculations.

An index of the contents of this Paper is at the next page.

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Date: 21 SEP 98

Unit: NCIS22

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	<u>Page</u>
Part I Substantive objections to Blue Ribbon proposals to eliminate the counter- intelligence functions of the military departments	1 - 4
Part II Navy Overseas CI and Investigative Needs	
Section 1 U.S. Navy "Investment" Abroad	5 - 6
Section 2 Overseas Security and Counterintelligence.. Considerations	7 - 11
Section 3 NIS Overseas Resources	12 - 15
Part III Navy CI and Investigative Needs within the Continental United States (CONUS)	
Section 1 Rationale	16 - 18
Section 2 Resource Requirements	19 - 23
PART IV Recap of Navy CI and Resource Requirements.	24

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Auth: EO 12958

Date: 21 SEP 98

PART I - Summary of General Objections to the Blue Ribbon Proposal to eliminate the Counterintelligence (including Personnel Security Investigation) functions of the Military Departments

NIC Position

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A. General Comment

1. Intelligence includes counterintelligence. The Navy's most basic counterintelligence role relates to the integrity of its personnel and information. Such integrity is sought through (1) personnel security investigations; (2) counterintelligence operations involving Naval personnel; (3) maintenance of an appropriate data base on Naval personnel and hostile intelligence activities. Relatedly, the criminal behavior of military personnel has significant security and, hence, counterintelligence implications.

2. Retention by the Military Departments of their responsibilities for recruitment, training, administration, of personnel appears to be envisaged by the Blue Ribbon Panel. Such retention would embrace personnel security administration--and this would pose a requirement for a departmental capability to investigate both security and criminal matters.

3. Navy's investigative arm is so organized as to be directly responsive to the requirements of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in matters of security, discipline and the enforcement of the UCMJ. It is so structured as to insure correlation of the criminal and security implications of Naval personnel behavior. This organization permits resource dispersal and operational flexibility

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as necessary to handle peak personnel security, counterintelligence, and criminal loads. The loss to the Navy of its personnel security investigative capability would result in the problems discussed in B. below. These adverse results would occur with no as yet demonstrated countervailing advantages in terms of improved performance or more economical operations in other areas of Department of Defense responsibility.

B. Problems Anticipated Under Blue Ribbon Proposals

1. The automatic correlation of security and criminal investigations would be lost. (A personnel security investigation on a Navy enlistee in basic training is now recorded immediately and centrally within the Naval Investigative Service--as would be an allegation that the enlistee is using narcotics, or has been approached by a subversive organization. The current Navy procedure would link the personnel security and the criminal offense--and permit direct relationships between the requesting and the investigating authorities. This system provides for immediate reorientation of the investigative effort, and continuity in the "chain of evidence" aspects should the situation require court martial action.)

2. Many Navy personnel security investigations require inquiries in overseas areas where Navy investigators are now stationed for all investigative requirements. Workload volumes are frequently too small in many such areas to justify specialists in each investigative category. A consolidated agency would require such specialization, thus enhancing costs in both the personnel security and the criminal area.

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3. Contraction of Navy's current investigative base by the sheer percentage utilized in personnel security operations would entail increased costs in the criminal and counterintelligence area. Approximately 60% of the current Navy "broad-mission" capability would be lost through such contraction. The residual organization would need considerably more than the 40% remaining to avoid a heavy loss in effectiveness in criminal and counterintelligence investigations. Travel time and costs for such investigations would increase, and overall effectiveness would be reduced since there would be no absorption capacity for peak loads. (A recent sabotage case required around forty investigators to accomplish round the clock surveillances and to conduct numerous interviews and interrogations in a 48 hour period. To accomplish these tasks, the Navy investigative component involved was able to assign personnel from outlying areas who spend the majority of their time on personnel security work but are also trained for criminal contingencies. Had those personnel not been available, there would have been no source of personnel for the coordinated, multifaceted, effort necessary, and the probability of a successful resolution of the case is remote.)

4. The aforecited cost increases in the non-personnel security area might well offset any economies resulting from consolidation of the personnel security function. Aside from increases in daily operational costs, consolidation in personnel security cases would of course result in a net increase in the number of DOD investigative agencies. This additional agency would have its own administrative overhead. Further,

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it would have to have resources in many overseas areas for a unitary mission, thus increasing the personnel security costs. It is stressed that no study has ever been made of the "cost-offset" factor in these matters. The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel made no such study.

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21 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

PART II - Navy Overseas CI and Investigative NeedsSECTION I - U. S. Navy Investments Abroad

A fundamental aspect of seapower is the role it plays in a nation's strategy to achieve its national objectives through actions geographically distant from the "homeland". A nation's "investment" in overseas Naval resources is thus a reflection of its capability in this regard.

(S) The U. S. investment in Naval resources in foreign countries (including the Republic of Vietnam) is impressive. The investment includes over 247,000 uniformed personnel (Navy and Marine); over 48,000 service dependents; and over 41,000 civilian employees (including 37,000 Foreign Nationals). To this total of 336,000 shore-based personnel, there must be added the crews of the many ships, including the approximately 150 ships of the Sixth and Seventh Fleets, that at any one time are on station in foreign waters or are enroute to such waters.

The shore-based resources are to be found in 83 separate locations in 34 foreign countries.

(S) While the number of individuals and ships and locations suggests the significance of this projection of U. S. resources to world peace, it is apparent that the real implications lie not in numbers alone, but in types of personnel, in why they are where they are, in their readiness for combat or for "showing the flag." The truly indicative factors are the missions of the forces and type of personnel so posted. Such factors find expression in the point that two major U. S. Fleets are constantly deployed in foreign

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waters, in the fact that there are nuclear weapons storage and replenishment capabilities abroad, in the fact that many nuclear powered submarines deploy for their extended patrols from foreign ports, and, finally in the fact that wide-ranging, sensitive, U. S. security and intelligence collection operations are mounted from many non-U. S. areas of the world.

The pay-off of these deployments, in terms of immediate response to U. S. strategic requirements, finds illustration in the 1958 sortie when the security of Lebanon was at issue, and in the current, on-going (September 1970), alert in the eastern Mediterranean incident to the Jordanian crisis. The suddenness of both of these crises in an era of supposed "peace" reflects the requirement for constant, steady, mature, naval personnel, and for the security of information on U. S. plans, capabilities and intentions.

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..... EO 12958 21 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22PART II - Navy Overseas CI and Investigative NeedsSECTION 2 - Overseas Security Considerations

The considerations underlying particular positioning decisions on overseas personnel and operational units include strategic, tactical, logistical, diplomatic, needs. Whatever the reason, U.S. overseas naval forces represent a major barrier to Soviet plans for world hegemony. Anything that reduces the morale, readiness, sense of dedication to U.S. ideals and objectives of these forces, threatens the security of the U.S., lessens the security of the remainder of the free world, and heightens the possibility of armed conflict.

A potential threat to these forces lies in two arenas.

One ever present possibility is that of a military confrontation with other military forces (Soviet/Chinese Communist, or otherwise.) (This matter is not otherwise addressed in this paper.)

The other type of threat is non-military, and relates essentially to personnel performance. U.S. personnel are subject to social and political forces as varied as the total spectrum of philosophies, mores, and national and ethnic view points, in the countries in which they are located. Many such influences simply exist and do not represent an organized effort. There are, however, influences that are deliberately created. These are of two kinds. One might be purely venal: an organized effort to purvey sex, drugs, and other enticements, solely for material gain. The other is a consciously organized anti-

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U.S. endeavor: a hostile foreign intelligence service or a hostile political force. And never to be overlooked is the ability of the political or the intelligence force to utilize the "venal" organization to compromise and subsequently manipulate a U.S. Naval individual.

Obviously, the participation of U.S. Naval personnel in criminal activities, and the vulnerability of those personnel to inimical intelligence operations, will affect Naval readiness. Appendix (1) hereto is a projection of the FY 71 criminal and counterintelligence investigative workload associated with U.S. Naval Forces abroad (including ship's crews while in foreign waters.) Three considerations should be noted here: (a) these are investigative statistics--projections only as to how many offenses will be identified as such and investigated, not the true incidence of criminal conduct; (b) with few exceptions the offenses will occur within the physical limits of U.S. ships and installations (i.e., not within the foreign economy), and, thus the investigations will take place essentially on Navy "command" territory; (c) appendix (1) does not reflect c/i actions by the Naval Investigative Service, nor the hostile intelligence operations against which these "counter" actions are mounted--since such matters are essentially not quantifiable.

Sophisticated and knowledgeable U.S. Naval leadership, and effective disciplinary actions, must come into play to minimize the adverse impact of criminal or "weak" U.S. personnel, and to frustrate the hostile intelligence forces targetting U.S. interests. Leadership, discipline, and proper "counter" actions require timely and accurate information. The gathering of such information is the function of two professional

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level categories of fact finders: (a) the skilled investigator to determine the identity of those who have in fact committed criminal offenses; (b) the skilled intelligence operations specialist (analyst), who, through research and analysis and proper data recording and retrieval, can identify a hostile threat.

As was stated earlier, U.S. Naval forces and their dependents are in many locations abroad. In the context of the need for information by those responsible for discipline and security, however, there is a common characteristic of all overseas Naval activities: their geographical separation from other U.S. agencies, including other DOD agencies. The major name-places associated with U.S. Naval forces abroad are "one-service" towns: there are no Army, no Air Force, installations and facilities, at Sasebo, at Nea Makri, at Greenock, at Rota, at Sydney, at Iwakuni, at Subic. Further, the influences and problems at each such place are unique: the tendency towards pilferage at Subic is unique; the environment in Greenock is not that of London; that of Rota is not that of Naples, that of Kaosiung is not that of Sydney; Tokyo is not Hong Kong.

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(S) The action that must be taken by a Navy Commander in response to local problems must be carefully tailored, and such tailoring requires localized information: information collected, evaluated, synthesized, placed into context, locally. The decision as to what course the Commander of the Naval Base at Subic might follow when local unrest leads to political assassinations (with consequent threats to the lives of U.S. personnel), must be taken on a real time basis. Guidance to a Marine, who is a sentry at a Special Weapons Stowage site abroad, and

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who reports that he has been accosted by a known Soviet agent in a nearby town, requires an instant and ready data base, to insure proper action not only to maintain the security of the information possessed by the Marine, but also to preserve the option of a double agent operation, should such be decided upon. A counterintelligence unit located remotely from the Navy command where the foregoing types of matters arise, simply cannot supply the timely information needed. A prospective visit by a nuclear powered ship to a Japanese port, when such visit might provoke indigenous protests and demonstrations, cannot be properly engineered, and needed contacts with friendly, indigenous, counterintelligence authorities cannot be effectuated, if U.S. counterintelligence personnel are not directly on the scene and responsive to the on-going operational schedule and the consequent needs of the responsible Navy seniors.

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Appendix I

Naval Investigative Service
Foreign Locations /a
Case Projection - FY 71

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(Projections based on final 4 months of FY 70.)

Investigative Category

<u>Security</u>	250
(Espionage, Sabotage, Compromises, etc.)	
Crimes Against Property	1160
Crimes Against Persons (Non-Sex)	2900
Sex-Crimes	<u>325</u>
Total	4635

/a Locations on Foreign SoilDeclassified / Downgrade toAuth: EO 12958Date: 21 SEP 98 ... Unit: NETS 22

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Authority: ND 73643REF: ...EO 12958.....DATE: 21 SEP 98 Unit: NCTB22PART II - Navy Overseas CI and Investigative NeedsSECTION 3 - Navy Overseas Counterintelligence and Investigative Resources

Current resources available to the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), together with various DOD constraints on overseas personnel allowances, have made it impossible for the Naval Investigative Service to meet all the requirements of overseas Naval Commanders for on-site counterintelligence and investigative assistance. Within governing constraints, however, the NIS has managed to meet certain minimum requirements. The NIS has been able to post 300 personnel to 41 operating locations overseas, including 2 afloat locations. (These data include overseas locations on U.S. territory (e.g., Hawaii, Kodiak, Marianas); as well as locations on non-U.S. , i.e., foreign soil. These locations are grouped together since the operating conditions are essentially the same: an "in-house" capability is required; Navy administration, vice local civil administration, normally prevails; geographic remoteness from non-Navy assistance would pose a prohibitive delay factor should such outside assistance be the Navy's sole help in particular instances.)

The NIS locations have been chosen, and the personnel dispersed, according to 2 basic considerations: (a) fleet requirements (the population, the operating schedules, the sensitivity, of the fleet units, and the supporting shore installations and commands); and (b) the identified locations of hostile intelligence groups.

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Appendix II itemizes the NIS overseas responsibilities and resources, vis a vis commands serviced.

These resources are far from adequate to provide proper counter-intelligence protection against the increasingly aggressive Soviet efforts in certain highly sensitive areas. (Details available in material of higher classification.)

NIS overseas personnel generally divide their time on a basis of 25% counterintelligence, 75% investigations. Of the 75% expended on investigations, 79% are expended in criminal and security (espionage, etc.) type cases. The remaining 21% (of the 75%) are expended in personnel security cases. Thus, $\frac{.21 \times .75}{100} \times 300$, or 47 man years per year, are programmed for utilization on personnel security investigative work. It is to be noted, however, that most NIS overseas personnel (military and civilian) work approximately 30 hours overtime per month. Such overtime aggregates to 5+ man years per month (60+ per year, at 1787 man hours per man year), thus more than accounting for the time spent on personnel security investigations. Relief from the personnel security work would at best enable NIS overseas personnel to reduce their overtime. Further, it might be noted that the 47 man years expended on PSI's are divided approximately equally between clerical and investigative man years, for around 23 man years in each personnel category. Reviewing this figure against the 41 operating locations, it will be seen that, on the average, no location utilizes more than half a single investigator's time per year.

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Date: 21 SEP 98 Unit: NCTIS 22

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In effect, the transfer of the Navy's personnel security investigative program from the NIS would not permit any reduction in the current level of NIS resources overseas. Such a transfer would, however, enable the NIS to increase its counterintelligence and security efforts on behalf of overseas commands to a point considerably closer to the true need than is now possible.

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Date 21 SEP 98

Unit: NCIS 22

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APPENDIX II

NIS OVERSEAS RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES

SEPTEMBER 1970

Senior Commands
ServicedNIS

	<u>Major Component</u>	<u>Operating Locations</u>	<u>Personnel (U.S.)*</u>
CINCUSNAVEUR/ 6TH FLT/COMNAVICE	NISO, Europe	10 (including 2 afloat)	51
COMNAVFORVN	NISO, Vietnam	6	33
7TH FLT/NAVPHIL	NISO, Phil	7	47
7TH FLT/NAVFORJAPAN/ MCAS Iwakuni	NISO, Japan	7	65
COMNAVFOR MAR	NISO, Marianas	1	12
PACFLT/FMFPAC	NISPAC, Honolulu	1	16
	NISO, Honolulu	3	42
	Total Honolulu	4	58
TOTAL		35 <u>/a</u>	266 <u>/a</u>

*Officers/Enlisted Civil Service

/a Does not include Alaska, Panama, Caribbean, GTMO areas, in which NIS personnel totals 34 and in which there are 6 operating locations.

OVERSEAS TOTALS

Personnel: 300

Locations: 41

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PART III - Navy CONUS Counterintelligence and Investigative Needs

SECTION I - Rationale

There are three basic reasons for the Department of the Navy to have an "in-house" counterintelligence and investigative capability within the continental United States. These are discussed below.

Naval criminal or counterintelligence investigations or operations almost invariably require actions in several widely separated areas of the world. This is particularly so in overseas investigations and operations. In the case of investigations, U.S. Naval personnel have extensive roots in the United States and it is frequently necessary to make inquiries in the areas of earlier residence to determine "life-style," to ascertain if there have been earlier incidents of involvement with the same (or a different) type of criminal offense, etc. In the case of a counterintelligence operation, it is mandatory that there be meticulous back-checking of the individual being considered for the operation--as to his attributes and character as well as his capabilities to participate. Further an overseas counterintelligence operation requires meticulous planning at the national level with other elements of the government that might be involved: CIA, FBI, the Bureau of Naval Personnel (for backstopping the personnel action requirements), etc.

These matters require a CONUS capability in management, for liaison planning and coordination, and, of course, for daily operations.

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(C) Another need for a CONUS capability directly incident to the overseas capability lies in the requirement for a CONUS base, a reservoir of talent and resources, for overseas posting. It is apparent that operatives cannot be posted overseas on a continuous basis--and that the supply of such operatives must be continually renewed, through recruitment, training, conditioning. The maintenance of an overseas force of 300 personnel requires a considerable base within CONUS.

The third reason for a CONUS capability lies in the sheer need for direct, responsive, support, to CONUS Navy Commanders at all echelons, up to and including the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy. While U.S. naval strength overseas may be of most immediate tactical interest to hostile intelligence it is apparent that naval resources within the United States will be of no less overall interest to enemies or potential enemies of the U.S. For it is within the U.S. that the Navy has its roots and main trunk: the research and development, the major materiel construction, the personnel recruitment and training, and, finally, the strategic planning and national level decision making. Thus, the CONUS Commanders have as deep and broad a responsibility in the area of counterintelligence, law enforcement, and security, as do their overseas counterparts. They are assisted in the fulfillment of this responsibility by many governmental agencies and elements that are not available overseas (municipal, state, and federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies), but such agencies are not directly responsive to their priority requirements, and to their need for specifically tailored data, as can

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be a Navy capability in these matters. As has been indicated elsewhere in this paper, timely and responsive information is a prerequisite to sound administration.

The size staff needed within CONUS for these matters is presented in Section II below.

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Authority AND 73643~~Secret~~~~SECRET~~PART III - Navy CONUS Counterintelligence and Investigative NeedsSECTION II - Resource Requirements

Summary: It is estimated that the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), the Navy's counterintelligence and investigative arm, would require 699 man years of effort per year in CONUS in FY's 71 and 72 if the NIS were relieved of the Personnel Security Investigative task. (Requirements in later years would be contingent upon changes in overall Naval strengths, tasks, etc.) The functional break-out of the 699 man year requirement is as follows:

(a) Counterintelligence	101
(b) Investigations	598
Crim. Inves. -	552
Int. Sec. Inv. -	<u>46</u>
	598
(c) TOTAL	699

These requirement estimates are based upon various planning factors utilized in developing the CY 1970 GDIP, modified as necessary to accommodate to strength redistributions and the elimination of certain operational locations that would be occasioned through the loss of the personnel now performing personnel security investigations, and the necessary retention of NIS strength in overseas locations (as indicated in Part II). These matters are developed below.

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Authority, AND 73643~~Secret~~~~SECRET~~A. (S) Base Data

Overall NIS FY 71 Requirements (As expressed in CY 1970 GDIP, Page 2) 1905 Man Years

- Overseas Requirements (See Part II, Section 3, Appendix II) 300 Man Years= CONUS Requirements (Including provisions for PSI function) 1605

B. CONUS Manpower Utilization Factors by Function - (i.e., percentages of total man years devoted to the indicated function).

These percentages have been developed over a several year period, and were utilized in the production of the total NIS manpower requirements for FY 71 as expressed in the GDIP:

Counterintelligence/Intelligence	6.1%
Investigations (All Categories)	<u>93.9%</u>
TOTAL	100%
<u>Investigations, by categories</u> ^{/1}	
Criminal Investigations	34%
Internal Security Investigations	2.2%
Security/Protective Services	1/2% = .005
Personnel Security	<u>63.3%</u>
	100%

^{/1} The percentages given relate to those portions of the total NIS CONUS manpower utilized in investigations (i.e., 93.9%). Thus actual manpower requirements for investigations are a function of the investigative percentage multiplied by the investigative category percentage, multiplied by the total manpower available.

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C. (C) CONUS Manpower Requirements, by function, including Personnel Security Investigations. (These requirements reflect the percentages in B. above applied to the man years in A. above).

Total	1605
Counterintelligence	97.9 man years (1605 x 6.1%)
All Investigations	<u>1507.1</u> man years (1605 x 93.9%)
TOTAL	1605.0

D. Adjustments in personnel positioning and utilization if Personnel Security Investigative task and resources are reassigned from NIS.

1. The release from the personnel security investigative load would require a major redistribution of NIS CONUS resources. All operating units whose current workload involves less than the equivalent of one full time investigator on criminal and counterintelligence work would be closed, and the occasional criminal and counterintelligence work would then have to be covered from a remote location. Ninety-one such operating units would be closed. Based upon the portion of the workload of these locations that involves CI and criminal matters, it is estimated that approximately 4500 investigative leads (and, hence, road trips) would be necessary per year. Based upon the average man hours now expended on such type cases, it can be estimated that ^{each} such road trip would cost the equivalent of 2 days per diem (such cost including the travel costs), and would require approximately 10 man years of pure

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travel time by the investigators. Such travel time can only be gained from adding more personnel, since productivity increases cannot be attained during travel dead-time.

2. The NIS currently operates, in the counterintelligence and criminal investigations area, on a basis of approximately 2 professional level producers (officer, IOS, Agent) to one clerical level employee. This level provides for direct stenographic support and administrative services (fiscal, personnel, budget, file, clerks, etc.). Applying this ratio to the forecast of professional level personnel requirements in a "post-PSI period", the NIS can adjust its clerk-producer ratio should the PSI cases be reassigned.

3. Certain "overhead" (i.e., leadership positions) must remain, regardless of the overall size and scope of the "post-PSI tasks."

E. (C) In consideration of the factors cited in D. above, and utilizing various data in the GDIP, the following CONUS strength requirements, and planning factors, have been developed:

CONUS Strength Requirements

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>IOS</u> ^{/1}	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Other Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
52	105	40	374	128	699

/1 Intelligence Operations Specialists

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CONUS Personnel Category Distribution Planning Factors

Officers - 3 in each NISO (1 CO/1 XO/1 JO); 19 in NISHQ

Enlisted - 5 in each CONUS NISO; 50 at NISHQ

IOS - Current strength

Agents - "On-street" - Factored at productivity rates given on page 7 of the GDIP.

Intermediate Supervision - 1 @ each 5 "on-street"

Senior Supervision - 1 Sup. AGt/1 Asst. Sup-Agt in each NISO.

NISHQ - 37 (current allowance, less allowance of 18 for PSI's).

Loss time - 10 MY (Extra travel Man years due to close down of 91 operating locations).

Clerical Support - At rate of 2 producers to one clerk. (This includes operation and maintenance of file systems, communication systems, etc.). Enlisted/Civ. clerical division was premised on effort to insure (1) sufficient enlisted for watch-standing communication guard, (2) sufficient civilians for continuity and for clerical positions in detached locations where there are no officers and, hence, no military leadership.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~PART IV - Navy CI and Resource Requirements, CONUS and Overseas,
by Personnel Categories

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Investigators</u>	<u>IOS</u>	<u>Other Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Overseas <u>/a</u>	39	75	141	13	32	300
CONUS <u>/b</u>	<u>52</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>374</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>699</u>
Total	91	180	515 ¹	53	160	999

/a A break down, by personnel category, of the gross requirements data given on page 15. (These figures reflect the current category break-down. ~)

/b This repeats the data on page 22. D

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