

al Inspectors initiated action to seize the account and NIS turned its efforts to the Portland, Oregon, area. These efforts were again unproductive. During this same period, information came to light that a credit card belonging to the Postal Clerk had been utilized at motels in Mobile, Alabama, and Jackson, Mississippi. Inquiries in these areas disclosed that several of the missing money orders had surfaced, but that both they and the credit card had been utilized by an individual posing as a well-known former professional football player rather than the Postal Clerk. This raised the possibility that the Postal Clerk had been the victim of foul play and was no longer in possession of the money orders and related equipment. As the investigation neared the end of its fourth month, the Postal Inspectors reported \$58,000.00 worth of the missing money orders had been cashed.

The investigation returned to Texas, the last area where the Postal Clerk had been positively identified. The foul play aspects of the case were heightened when a badly decomposed body, matching the general description of the Postal Clerk, was located in a Houston bayou. Comparison of dental records indicated the body was not that of the Postal Clerk. Pursuing other leads, NIS began a follow-up on leads pertaining to the former professional football player. These leads took NIS to the Middle Atlantic states and a meeting with the real football player. This meeting confirmed that the football player was not involved and that someone was impersonating him. The investigation entered its fifth month with no sound leads. At this stage, the Postal Inspectors advised the Postal Clerk was still active and had now cashed \$63,000.00 worth of money orders. They reported the money orders were being cashed from coast to coast and were

being used to purchase airline tickets. They expressed the belief that the Postal Clerk was purchasing the tickets, obtaining cash as change and later returning the tickets to the airlines for a refund.

Mid-way through its sixth month of investigation, the Postal Inspectors reported the Postal Clerk had been apprehended at the El Paso, Texas, airport. 835 imprinted money orders, totaling \$334,000.00, were recovered from him at the time he was apprehended. During the course of the investigation, he had cashed \$66,000.00 worth of the stolen money orders. The remaining blank money orders, the printer and validating stamp were recovered hidden beneath the house trailer which he and his wife had occupied in San Diego. What did the Postal Clerk have to say? During interrogation, he indicated he had regularly been stealing funds from the ship's post office for over a year before his departure and that he had covered these thefts, amounting to approximately \$15,000.00, by falsifying postal paperwork. He reported he had visited approximately 30 cities, from coast to coast, and Puerto Rico, using the proceeds from the money orders. What about the money orders that were cashed by other persons? What about the fake professional football player? The Postal Clerk indicated he had a girl friend cash a money order for him in Texas. He related he had met an individual who claimed to have been a professional football player and befriended him. The individual stole the Postal Clerk's credit card and some of the money orders and then disappeared. The final outcome of the case is pending, but the Postal Clerk has been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in San Diego on 16 counts arising from the misappropriation of Postal Funds and Property and Uttering False and Forged U.S. Postal Money Orders.

## The Missing Marine

By: S/A G. L. Duffy

In mid-August 1978, a Marine Gunnery Sergeant assigned to an I&I staff disappeared. At the time of his disappearance he was awaiting trial on five counts of distributing obscene literature which stemmed from an after hours employment. The Naval Investigative Service was not notified at the time of the man's disappearance and the initial investigation into the circumstances was conducted by a local police department. Additionally, the command conducted JAG inquiries. It was not until three months after the disappearance that NIS became aware of the disappearance through a request by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Obviously much precious time had already slipped by.

Initial inquiries established certain unusual circumstances connected with the disappearance; strong indications of homosexual orientation on the part of the man, and initially conflicting stories within the command regarding subject's after hours employment in an "adult book store." Also the investigation of this man's disappearance by the local police department had been concluded with no particular result.

After recovering the results of police and command inquiries there were many areas immediately and subsequently identified as requiring pursuit. Among these were some obvious ones such as detailed financial inquiries; interviews of military associates and civilian neighbors; interviews of family members and checks regarding the man's phone usage and mail.

There were also some not so obvious leads developed, including inquiries with doctors specializing

in gender changes after a listing of such individuals was found in the missing man's notebook; detailed inquiries into the corporate makeup of the adult book store which employed the missing man. These inquiries identified an individual who was reported to have association with organized crime figures as a result of his pornographic activities. These findings led to contact with the FBI and the ATF, however, neither agency was able to furnish any information leading to the location of the missing man. It was interesting to learn that two individuals interviewed by NIS as associates of the missing man had also been interviewed by the FBI during an investigation related to the homicide of an individual involved in pornographic dealings. These inquiries also led to an individual who was of the opinion (which could not be confirmed or further elaborated on) that the missing man had been executed by the operator of the adult book store where he worked. Attempts to locate the book store operator met with frustration.

A further aspect of this investigation was the hypnotic interview of the last person known to have seen the missing man. This interview developed information regarding the disappearance which had previously been unknown. This information was furnished to the local police department, however, to this point it has not borne fruit.

If investigative success were measured strictly by number of leads covered, investigative man hours expended, as well as hours given to thoughtful consideration of the situation then the whereabouts of the missing man would certainly have been determined. Unfortunately, as we all know, while these things are necessary for successful resolution they do

not guarantee it and at this point the missing man is still that ... "missing." However, from a strictly academic point of view the inquiry into his disappearance was fruitful and pointed out once more that there is no substitute for professional investigative efforts skillfully applied when the goal is development of information across a wide and involved front.

## Highlights Of The Retirement Party for Earl S. Richey





## Successful Negotiation

By: S/A H. P. Hansen

At approximately 2330, 11 Feb 1980, the Security Department Dispatcher NAS Corpus Christi, telephonically advised the NISRA Corpus Christi Duty Agent that a suicide had occurred aboard the station in Room 228, BEQ 1730. Upon arrival of the Duty Agent around 2358, 11 Feb 1980, it was learned no suicide had occurred, but that the occupant of Room 228 had barricaded himself in his room and in addition to threatening to kill himself, had apparently discharged a firearm therein.

The following actions were effected: All rooms on the affected wing of the BEQ were evacuated. Through BEQ records and interviews the identity of the suspect was established. Command personnel were notified, and the suspect's medical and service records were requested. An ambulance manned by two corpsmen was dispatched to the BEQ and positioned so as not to be visible from the suspect's room. A Navy psychiatrist was notified. Security Department personnel were posted in immediately adjacent locations to create an inner perimeter as well as in more remote locations from which they could observe the exterior of the suspect's room.

On-scene interviews developed the following information: A member of the NAS Corpus Christi BEQ staff, while making rounds, heard loud noises emanating from Room 228. The two Security Patrolmen attempted to enter the suspect's room, using a master key, after the suspect had told them to go away. The door could only be opened about three inches because of furniture placed against it. The suspect said

he had a gun and they subsequently heard what sounded like a firearm being discharged. Immediately thereafter, evacuation was effected, and one Security Patrolman began talking to the suspect. This patrolman said the suspect claimed to be upset because his step-father had died, felt he had nothing to live for and wanted to blow his brains out. The suspect also said he had a .44 magnum, an AF-15, and two boxes of shells. He kept asking for a beer. The Security Patrolman was requested to keep talking to the suspect.

A negotiator's post was established down the passageway from the suspect's room and a Command Post was established in a room in an adjacent passageway.

Suspect's medical and service records disclosed no pertinent information. The psychiatrist was briefed by NIS Special Agents and he was of the opinion the suspect was merely attempting to draw attention to himself and did not intend to commit suicide or hurt anyone. The Commanding Officer, fully briefed, concurred that negotiations should be the tool employed, regardless of the time involved.

A NIS Special Agent, who had received NIS hostage training, assumed control of the negotiations and with the Security Patrolman who had been talking to the suspect continued the effort. In addition to the NIS Special Agent negotiator and the Security Patrolman assisting him, another NIS Special Agent and Security Patrolman were present in the negotiator's post.

At 0104, 12 Feb 1980, a noise was heard from within the suspect's room which sounded like a firearm being discharged. Prior to this time, sporadic conversation with the suspect had resulted in his indicating he desired to be left

alone. Through prior arrangements, made during NIS-sponsored Barri-caded Captor/Hostage training, a field telephone was obtained and placed in front of the door to the suspect's room. When it was rung, the suspect, who had not spoken for about 30 minutes, mumbled something unintelligible. Sounds of furniture being moved inside the suspect's room were heard.

At about 0203, after the suspect had been informed several times that a field telephone was in front of his door, he opened the door. The suspect was wearing a surgical mask and brandishing a firearm. While squatting in the doorway to his room the suspect talked to the NIS Special Agent negotiator. During this period, on at least two occasions, the suspect placed the weapon to his head. Once, after apparently inspecting the cylinder, the suspect placed the weapon to his head and pulled the trigger. The weapon did not discharge. The suspect kept asking for something to drink and was informed several times that if he would relinquish the firearm he would be provided with a soft drink.

At about 0216, the suspect re-entered his room and locked the door. Within moments he again opened the door, brandished the weapon, and again squatted in the doorway. The suspect continued talking to the NIS Special Agent negotiator. At 0227 the suspect passed the weapon down the passageway and he was then provided a "Mr. Pibb," which was rolled down the passageway to him. At 0229 about three hours after first notification of the incident, the suspect voluntarily stepped away from the door to his room and placed his hands on the bulkhead. He was apprehended immediately.

Subsequent interrogation of the

suspect resulted in his admitting firing three rounds in his room. The suspect advised he was depressed, had personal problems, and had been drinking prior to the incident. A crime scene examination of the suspect's room resulted in evidence being obtained indicative that a firearm had been discharged.

The primary problem experienced in this matter was that initially there were far too many persons in the general area of the suspect's room. This problem was immediately addressed. Command cooperation was outstanding throughout the situation.

## Hostage Negotiation Training at NISO Norfolk



*S/A Sotack serving as the principal negotiator.*




*S/A J. D'Avanzo (NIS-251), who portrayed the hostage taker, is shown being taken into custody*




*S/A John Love (NIS-26), who served as technical consultant to the Norfolk Agents, demonstrates field operation of modern crisis negotiation communication gear recently purchased by NIS.*




*S/A Sotack, S/A Thomas and S/A Getek, the NIS negotiation team at the command post.*



*S/A Matakas listens intently to an exchange between negotiators and hostage taker as it is broadcast throughout the command post.*



*S/A Getek monitors a request of the hostage taker.*



*Two members of the Naval Base Norfolk Special Police SWAT Team at their assigned position on the inner perimeter.*

## **Barricaded Captor/Hostage Incident - Guam**

By: S/A W. J. Klemp

One day recently a Marine PFC assigned to Marine Barracks, Guam was sentenced to confinement for unauthorized absence. Later that same day, while being processed to go to the Brig, the PFC asserted that he was not going to permit himself to be confined, or "to be taken alive," at which time he took his wife hostage at knife point and barricaded himself in the Adjutant's Office. While in the office, the suspect unsuccessfully attempted to start a fire on a desk using matches and tissue papers he saturated with "Real Kill" insect spray.

NIS assistance was sought after initial command efforts were unproductive in neutralizing the situation. Special Agents Barron and Simon immediately responded to the scene where they were briefed by command representatives, after which arrangements were made to clear command security personnel from the area in the immediate vicinity of the Adjutant's Office. Following this, S/A Barron commenced face-to-face negotiations with the suspect through the open office doorway. Subsequently, S/A Barron became involved in the negotiations owing to his being acquainted with the suspect in prior operational matters. The negotiations lasted approximately one hour during which time suspect displayed a box cutting knife in the vicinity of his wife's face and neck while he repeatedly stated that "I am not going to the Brig," and "if you come in here I'm going to hurt someone."

Towards the latter phase of negotiations the suspect requested

to speak with a Navy doctor (psychologist), who had earlier evaluated the suspect as being unfit for retention in the service. The doctor was located and telephonically briefed regarding the situation. The doctor then spoke briefly to the suspect by phone, after which the doctor immediately responded to the scene where he assisted in the negotiations and ultimately arranged for the suspect to surrender, which occurred without incident. Following his surrender the suspect was admitted to NRMC Guam and two days later he was MEDIVACED to NRMC Great Lakes for further treatment.

The barricaded captor/hostage incident lasted approximately two hours, during which time no one was injured or property damaged.

## **Crime Scenes Can Be Beautiful**

By: S/A Carl J. Merritt

On 20 December 1979 at 0-Dark-30, NISRA New London's Duty Agent was contacted and informed that a sentry aboard a nuclear submarine had just reported an exchange of fire with an armed intruder who, with a companion, had allegedly attempted to board the "fully armed" boat which was in port for the Christmas holidays. Initial contact and interview of the sentry disclosed that he had allegedly gone aft of the boat to take a routine and required depth reading, and while returning to his on-pier sentry shack, was confronted by an individual dressed in what was thought to have been a diver's wet suit. This individual was, according to the sentry, standing on a timber bumper affixed to the pier's edge and appeared to have just climbed to that spot from the Thames River in which the boat was docked.

When the intruder realized he had been sighted, the sentry claimed the man fired two shots at him with a handgun, knocking his (the sentry's) glasses off with one of the rounds. The sentry then claimed to have returned fire, hitting the intruder in the chest and knocking him back into the river. Running to the edge of the pier to confirm his "hit," the sentry then claimed to have observed the second man swimming approximately 20 meters from the boat and to have then fired several rounds at him. The sentry then allegedly ran back to his on-pier shack and turned in an emergency alarm. Other sentry personnel from a sister submarine tied up at the same pier, overhearing the shots and seeing our sentry in an apparent state of panic, turned in similar alarms and a chain reaction up and down the pier area began.

The purported incident coming as it did on the heels of the Puerto Rican shootings and CONUS bombings created a situation at New London for which "flap" would be a rather mundane description. The Base instantly took on the appearance of an armed camp. Marine reaction forces immediately deployed throughout the pier area and armed Coast Guard patrol boats began sweeping the Thames. Early morning duck hunters and fishermen sensing that something was amiss, were observed hurriedly departing the area to seek calmer waters.

The sentry, during initial NIS interview, steadfastly maintained that the incident had indeed taken place; however, the subsequent crime scene examination would disclose some rather interesting non facts and conflicting data. Temperature at time of incident and examination was -10 degrees celsius ('Twas cold). The sky was overcast and there was a rolling fog/mist on the surface of the river. The

pier, where the incident allegedly took place, was clear and dry, save for a few ice spots in poor drainage areas, left by a previous day's dusting of snow. There was an undisturbed heavy coating of frost on the timber bumper at the pier's edge. Five .45 calibre shell castings and an empty .45 calibre magazine were recovered within a 5 meter area near the end of the pier.

The sentry's broken glasses were also recovered. One lens was completely missing and the frame was twisted almost to right angles. There were, however, no broken glass fragments in evidence anywhere on the pier. There was no blood, water, ice or other evidentiary items on or near the wood bumper where the intruder had allegedly stood. Divers, who were deployed by the Duty Agent, also turned in negative reports after searching both the river bottom and the hull of the submarine.

The alleged intrusion was then reenacted, with the sentry placing himself and the other players in their position. A fully suited diver was positioned on the timber bumper. The distance from this bumper to the water's surface was just over 2 meters, which precluded the actor from climbing to the bumper from the water. The actor (diver) also left very definite foot impressions in the previously undisturbed frost layer. (These impressions were still evident several hours later when the entire crime scene was reexamined during the daylight hours). With the sentry's assistance, the diver (actor) feigned the firing of gunshots in the same manner as the intruder had allegedly done. It was noted that if rounds had, indeed, been fired they would have impacted on the hull of a nearby floating drydock, however, a detailed examination of this vessel's hull failed to disclose any such impressions. A mi-

crossoscopic examination of the sentry's broken glasses failed to disclose any indication that they had been impacted by a projectile and as mentioned earlier, no portion of the missing lens was ever found.

The sentry, who we might add showed no physical damage or wound, had also indicated that he had observed the second intruder swimming perhaps 20 meters from the submarine; however, during the crime scene examination, at this distance the water's surface could not be observed due to mist/fog. A service record check disclosed two previous incidents wherein our sentry had been discovered allegedly unconscious or asleep while on duty. Pressure on every available telephone line was mounting but, as the alleged crime scene began to give more and more indication of false reporting, previously dashed plans for Christmas leave began to take on a brighter image.

A subsequent and more serious session with the sentry (identified thereafter as Subj) led to his admission that the entire incident had been a hoax. Subj later related that his desire/need to bring attention to an emotional problem (real or imagined) had led him to cry wolf. The crime scene in this particular case was indeed beautiful. Almost every aspect of it disclosed not the presence of pertinent facts, but the absence of same, thereby leading the early defusing of a situation that was neither wanted nor desired. (This writer is most appreciative of the efforts of the three assigned New London Special Agents who, non-stop, developed the "non evidence" and "made the case.")


## Port Security

By: NIS-22Y Staff

The Port Security Division (NIS-22Y) of the Internal Security Department performs duties in support of the Secretary of the Navy's responsibilities as executive agent for the Department of Defense in the U.S. Port Security Program. The overall objective of the Port Security Program is to protect sensitive U.S. facilities and installations in port areas against intelligence collection activities which might be conducted from communist merchant ships.

The head of the Port Security Division is the DOD representative on the U.S. Port Security Committee, an inter-agency group composed of members representing the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Transportation. The Port Security Committee considers national security questions dealing with visiting communist merchant ships, and, where appropriate, makes recommendations to the National Security Council.

In order to represent DOD security interests, the NIS Port Secu-



rity Division conducts Port Security Vulnerability Assessment Surveys to determine vulnerabilities of defense facilities and installations, and defense contractors dealing with classified contracts, to intelligence collection from communist merchant ships in American ports and territorial waters. All major U.S. ports and port areas have been surveyed at least twice since the program's inception in 1972, and surveys continue to be conducted to ensure that the information remains current.



In the preparation for and actual conduct of these surveys, the Port Security Division may call on NIS field components to provide logistic and administrative support and to make introductions to local military and security authorities. Occasionally, NIS-22Y may also request NIS field components to assist in collecting specific material or information in support of the Port Security Program.

The Port Security Division also works closely with the Naval Intelligence Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the service intelligence organizations, and other federal agencies, in technical and intelligence areas relative to the Port Security Program. A comprehensive data base is maintained in the Port Security Division, includ-

ing materials on foreign merchant ships, international merchant shipping, foreign electronic equipment, charts and other navigational data on U.S. ports, and other materials necessary for the performance of the port security mission.



The head of the Port Security Division is CDR Mike Brennan (formerly Executive Officer, NISO Seattle, from April 1969 to August 1971), who is also the Executive Officer of the NISHQ. He is assisted by two Navy officer analysts, LCDR Mike Lebedeker (formerly Executive Officer, NISO San Francisco, from December 1969 to July 1972) and LT Kevin Grillo, and one intelligence specialist, IS3 Tom Holt.

## Liaison In Spain

By: S/A John Walsh

Liaison, a simple, single, trisyllabic word, encompasses a plethora of responsibilities and time-consuming efforts. As defined in the dictionary, liaison is a "means or agency for maintaining or furthering communication or unity, as between parts of an armed force or departments of a government."

In order for an agency, especially a law enforcement organization, to function smoothly, liaison is an absolute necessity. Whether in the U.S. or abroad in a foreign country, liaison must be established with counterpart agencies, if one is to survive in the much needed area of information exchange. Liaison is not something that automatically occurs but rather an art, which requires considerable time, effort and personal contact. Along with all the many duties and responsibilities inherent in being a NIS Special Agent, liaison should never be overlooked or taken for granted. Good reliable liaison contacts can certainly make the agent's job easier, often resulting in the rapid receipt of most desired information. Conversely, the absence of such liaison would have required a significant expenditure of the agent's time and efforts to achieve the same results.

Focusing on Spain, one can vividly illustrate the need for liaison in order to accomplish the day-to-day routine duties. Starting with the military Base where the NIS office is located and working outward, the following liaison is required at a minimum. The Security Department, including Shore Patrol, and the Marine Barracks both have law enforcement and security responsibilities. Since

the U.S. presence in Spain is permitted by Treaty, each base in Spain is under complete Spanish control and commanded by a senior Spanish military officer. Therefore in addition to the above agencies, liaison must also be effected with the Spanish Security Department, which exercises control over all Spanish military and civilian employees. Venturing into the communities contiguous to the Base, one encounters the Civil Guard (La Guardia Civil), a paramilitary organization engaged in providing security against terrorism and stemming the flow of smuggling and narcotics trafficking. The Directorate of General Security (DGS) is a civilian police agency responsible for investigations of all major criminal offenses in Spain. Within the DGS is the National Police, a uniformed agency responsible for normal police duties in cities with 20,000 or more population. Each city has a Commissioner (Comisario) who heads the DGS unit responsive to the respective community. On the intelligence side of the house, the Superior Center for Defense Intelligence is a military organization concerned with both domestic and foreign intelligence. Bilateral counterespionage operations would be coordinated with this agency. Additionally, they are tasked with the collection of data regarding terrorist organizations operating in Spain and, in that capacity, possess information regarding any potential or real threat to U.S. installations from terrorist groups. At the national level liaison with the U.S. Embassy is imperative to include the Sensitive Reporting Facility; Regional Security Officer, U.S. State Department; U.S. Defense Attache Office; Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice; and other related agencies. In addition to the above, liaison contacts are also appropriate within the U.S. Consular offices

located in major cities throughout Spain.

How then does one approach this monumental task of effecting and maintaining liaison contacts with so many activities? The answer is not simple and requires a concerted effort to schedule appointments, visits and other related meetings. Within the Base community, liaison can be effected both formally, by infrequent visits to discuss mutual business objectives or informally, during the course of normally scheduled social functions. Beyond the Base within the Spanish community, structured visits must be scheduled on a periodic basis and should be interspersed with hosted luncheons and/or cocktail parties. Careful attention must be directed toward recognition of assistance provided by the utilization and presentation of mementos or letters of appreciation/commendation. Occasional presentations of gifts in honor of promotion, transfer or retirement of Spanish officials are also considered appropriate. Also of paramount importance, are seasonal gifts presented by the office as inducement and in return for cooperation and services rendered throughout the year. These meetings, luncheons and informal gatherings provide for a closer working relationship and ensure rapid response in time of need. Established contacts, as most agents are acutely aware, can save considerable time and effort in securing vital, needed information on an investigation or operation. Nurturing this relationship requires conscientious attention by all personnel to ensure that the U.S. displays sincere appreciation for their cooperation and is willing to extend whatever assistance they should request. Providing technical support to Spanish law enforcement agencies, which normally operate on a low budget, is greatly appreciated and any supplies or aid

given results in further cementing a solid working relationship.

Periodic travel to the capital, at least monthly, ensures a free flow of information between counterpart U.S. and Spanish agencies with the NIS office, especially in a country such as Spain where the office is considerably isolated and air travel is required. Again, one must concentrate on establishing contacts and making known the mission and needs of NIS as well as enlightening those agencies with regard to the services that can be provided to them by NIS.

As noted, much can be written on the need for liaison and it is a subject which can be discussed with ease. However, accomplishing the mission and establishing good liaison requires considerable effort and is indeed no easy task. The old cliché "easier said than done" certainly applies to establishing liaison. One becomes immediately aware of the need for solid liaison contacts when serving abroad just in order to accomplish the routine, daily business. To attempt to meet the organizational goals without liaison is sheer folly and would amount to nothing more than working in a vacuum, hoping that vital information would find its way to the ears of the NIS office before disaster strikes.

## The Olongapo Card Game Scam

By: S/A L. M. Miller & J. R. Gehri

The city of Olongapo is a favorite liberty call for U.S. servicemen of the Pacific Fleet. At any one time it is possible to have as many as 10,000 men enjoying the various activities that the city has to offer. However, because of the number of servicemen that frequent the city, some of whom are very naive, being away from home the first time, they become easy victims to unscrupulous schemers, who unfortunately over shadow the many positive aspects of Olongapo. One of these activities is known as the Card Game Scheme.

The Card Game Scheme works on the premise of leading an individual into believing that he will receive a large amount of money for very little effort. It usually starts when a serviceman walks off the Base and is approached by a Philippine National. The serviceman is asked if he will assist the Filipino by sending a letter to a relative via the FPO Postal System, for which he will receive some monetary compensation. The serviceman is told that the letter is for a U.S. Navy sailor. The willing target accompanies the Filipino to a prearranged residence where several other Filipinos are waiting. The residence usually contains photographs and plaques of U.S. Navy ships. He is offered a drink and a conversation ensues with the other occupants while he waits for the letter. Slowly the topic is brought around to cards and a plan whereby the group knows of a rich Chinese gentleman or landlord, whom they do not like, and how they can acquire a large sum of money from him. The serviceman listens to the conversation with great interest. Naturally the businessman always

carries a large sum of cash with him wherever he goes and loves to play cards. The serviceman is told that this particular businessman does not trust the Filipinos and only plays cards when an American is a participant.

A plan is then devised and the Filipinos provide a demonstration on how the card game will be fixed and he, the serviceman is assured of winning. For this he will receive 50% of the take. As a result, the serviceman meets the businessman and sure enough he has a suitcase containing a substantial amount of American currency. Subsequently the card game begins and the serviceman wins the first several hands. However, as the game progresses, the serviceman starts to lose and is asked to utilize some of his own personal money to cover the wager. This usually comes after a serviceman is dealt what appears to be a winning hand. Unfortunately the hand does not quite beat the businessman's hand.

If the serviceman is lucky, the game ends at this point; however, if the group feels that the individual has additional assets available, they will continue with the con. Another hand is dealt and this time the serviceman has a hand that is assured to win; however, the businessman also has a good hand and bets beyond the serviceman's ability to cover. At this point the serviceman is asked if he has additional funds that he could acquire. If yes, the hands are placed in sealed envelopes and the serviceman sent out to obtain the additional cash. Usually the other card players are pretending that they have lost all their money and desperately need his help. Often, if the serviceman does not have additional funds, he will be given a check, sometimes personal, sometimes treasury; however, always stolen or counterfeit, and asked to

cash it aboard the Base. The serviceman will be told to meet an individual outside the Base after he has cashed the check and they will return to the game together. Again the serviceman loses. Distressed at losing all their money, often they, the group will convince the serviceman to meet with them later. They will tell the serviceman they were able to put together additional cash and if he could purchase certain items from the Base Exchange, they would be able to sell them on the blackmarket and recoup-erate some of the losses.

This particular scheme has been operating in the city of Olongapo for several years and many U.S. Navy personnel have fallen victim to the scam. Frequently, the serviceman will withdraw savings from the Credit Union or spend his entire paycheck, leaving him without resources. Often he engages in illegal activities to compensate for the losses which impact on both the U.S. Navy and the local economy.

Recently a Disbursing Officer off a guided missile cruiser fell prey to this illegal scheme which resulted in him stealing and then losing approximately \$50,000.00 from the Disbursing Office. After first losing all of his personal funds to four men in Olongapo he returned to the ship, then berthed in Subic Bay, RP, several times in one day until he had removed almost \$50,000.00. This individual was subsequently interrogated after NISRA Subic recommended a surprise audit which revealed the money was missing from the ship, and not until the interrogation did he realize that he had been the victim of a dishonest card game. Although NIS personnel were able to identify the four men involved in the scam the money was not recovered.

## **NIS Support of Indian Ocean Operations**

By: S/A J. R. Gehri


Daily, hundreds of commercial vessels transverse the Indian Ocean carrying vital oil supply to the U.S. Over the past several months, continued political upheavals have transformed this part of the world to an area of constant crisis and unrest.

The United States government has long since recognized the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, maintaining a constant presence there by way of the U.S. Navy, which lends and supports our allies in that part of the world as well as protects our own vital interest. Continuously, ships of the Seventh Fleet make their way across the South China Sea, past Singapore and through the straits of Malacca the gateway to the Indian Ocean. In addition to the Fleets presence, there situates a small atoll at the far end of the Chagos Archipelago, known as Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territories. In cooperation with the British government, a small naval facility is being constructed, consisting of a communications site, a refueling pier, and air facility.

With the influx of U.S. Navy vessels in the Indian Ocean, NIS has had to respond and move with the growing needs of the Navy. The continued build-up at Diego Garcia has resulted in the request by CINCPAC to maintain a constant agents' presence aboard the Island.

Several years ago, NIS created a one-man office on the Island under the reporting cognizance of NISO Philippines; unfortunately,

the office was short lived and was closed within one year due to lack of adequate work. However, these are new times and new situations. Diego Garcia has been growing in size and stature, and is considered the center of Indian Ocean operations for the Navy. Sailors and supplies passing through the Island from Subic Bay, Philippines, on their way to Indian Ocean deployed ships, have resulted in the tasking of nis with added responsibility to provide more encompassing services to all commands effected by the sudden and rapid growth. At the present time, NISRA Subic Bay Philippines has been tasked to provide the necessary manpower to service the Island. Subsequently, agents from NISRA Subic have been rotating on a 30 day basis covering all investigative assignments and activities aboard the Island. Prior to the CINCPAC request, agents were traveling to and from the Island on a one week rotation basis each month as necessary. Investigative work on the Island challenges the agent to the fullest extent, often existing and working under conditions similar to camping out.



The commands aboard Diego Garcia, along with numerous ships that stop for supplies, experience similar problems as other naval commands, i.e., thefts, assaults, drugs, and wrongful destruction,

all of which require professional investigative assistance from NIS. In addition to the investigative activities, NIS assists the local Master-at-Arms Force by providing training and advice on conducting investigations under their area of jurisdiction, thus providing liaison necessary to maintain a continuous investigative effort. While an agent on Diego Garcia does not experience the constant case load as an agent aboard one of the aircraft carriers does, it is his growing presence that is a necessity and comfort to the commands situated thousands of miles from the nearest Naval Investigative Service Resident Agency. One of the major drawbacks is the 12-hour flight which has become affectionally known as fly me, MAC to Diego Garcia.



## What's A Polywog?

By: S/A V. H. McPherson

Though the following is not meant to deter Special Agents from what would be one of the most challenging tours in their careers it might enlighten everyone to the dangers of crossing the equator in a U.S. Navy vessel. If nothing else I hope to warn potential Polywogs that time honored tradition will rate higher than an agent's credentials when in the vicinity of 00000 latitude. Problems for two Philippines' agents began when they responded to Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) to conduct an investigation into the death of a crewmember assigned to a USNS ship.

The investigation required that the two agents board the ship for a six day cruise between Sri Lanka and the Seychelles Islands, a course that required traversing the equator. The first major mistake on the part of the agents occurred when one of them was asked if he had ever been a Polywog and he responded with "What's a Polywog?" Although the second agent was more adept and prevaricated, claiming that he had crossed the equator on at least two occasions, his failure to produce a shellback card placed him in the same position as his traveling companion, a Polywog. Suddenly the crew, which had conspicuously avoided all contact with the two agents until this point became quite loquacious. The agents stuck to their "guns" and refused to submit to the indignities predicted in their future. However, the master of the ship stated he could no longer protect the agents from the initiation rituals after the fourth day when it was discovered that every possible witness

had been interviewed at least twice. The actual trials and tribulations suffered by the agents during the remaining days leading up to the rites will not be dealt with in account. First it would take away from the pleasures that other agents might experience if they find themselves in a similar position and furthermore the other Polywog involved might sue me.





As the accompanying picture(s) can attest an old set of clothing should be packed for any ocean cruise whether you travel as an agent or a "Polywog." Being a person who has always enjoyed a good

joke, I can honestly say that one of the best I've seen occurred on the ship in question after finally submitting "voluntarily" to the tradition of the sea. The two agents were informed that the ship was out of shellback cards at that time and would forward them at a later date (to date still not received). so we are back to the original question "What's a Polywog." In the simplest terms, anyone that does not have a valid shellback card in his possession when he crosses the equator is a "Polywog." If this situation ever happens to you at least you will enjoy recalling that you know at least two agents who have gone through the whole ceremony and are still "POLYWOGS."

### Stale Dating

By: S/A D. Tomaso

Ever hear of it? Probably not, but it could play a role in your evidence handling. It refers to the commercial practice of placing a bookkeeping time limit - usually 90 days to 6 months - on the period a check is considered negotiable. Once this expires, the check is voided for record purposes and a new one must usually be sought.

This came to light when a NISRA holding some \$200,000 in checks received an inquiry from a Navy Finance Center. In this case the checks had been in evidence well over six months awaiting trial resolution. Fortunately, the matter was resolved by putting the U.S. Attorney and the Disbursing Officer together to work out the mechanics, with the NISRA serving as intermediary with the firms authoring the checks.

While not a major issue, it was somewhat embarrassing that the

potential problem had not occurred to either the NISRA, the NISO concerned or NIS Headquarters. The remedy that suggests itself, would be for the NISRA placing checks in the evidence custody system to touch base with the appropriate finance office and trial counsel or U.S. Attorney early on to avoid a similar situation down the road.

## **Profile of NISRA Pensacola, Florida**

By: S/A V. K. McDonald

The Navy in Northwest Florida is composed of two main installation areas, the Greater Pensacola Navy complex and Whiting Field. The Pensacola complex was initially constructed in 1826 and designated as the Pensacola Navy Yard. The present site was selected because the Bay of Pensacola is extensive, with ease of access from the sea, and affords secure anchorage for vessels of the largest class.

In its early years, the base dealt mainly with the suppression of slave trade and piracy in the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean. Possessing a large basin, a floating drydock and other facilities for building, docking and repairing the largest warships of the times, the Yard turned out such masterpieces as the steam frigate USS PENSACOLA, which saw Civil War action at both the Battle of Mobile Bay and the Battle of New Orleans. When New Orleans was captured by Union Forces in 1862, Confederate troops stationed at Pensacola and fearing attack from the West, retreated from the Navy Yard reducing most of the facilities to rubble.

After the Civil War, the ruins at the Yard were cleared away and work was begun to rebuild the base.

Many of the present structures on the Naval Air Station were built during this period. In 1906, a great hurricane and tidal wave destroyed many of the newly rebuilt structures, and less than two years later, an epidemic of yellow fever brought reconstruction to a standstill.



In the fall of 1913, the old Pensacola Navy Yard was selected as the location for the first Naval Aeronautic Station. When the U.S. entered World War I, the Navy had only 38 pilots, 54 planes, three balloons and one air station - NAS Pensacola. Students who knew how to fly were taught to fight in the air, and by war's end, seaplanes, dirigibles and free kite balloons were housed in steel and wooden hangars stretching over one mile down the air station beach. The Twenties at Pensacola continued to be a decade of growth for naval aviation. A carrier fleet was being built and NAS Pensacola had an important role in related training. Seaplanes also came into wide use after World War I, and many seaplane hangars were built aboard the station. Some still stand and are used as recreation, supply, aircraft rework, and physical training facilities.

As the nations of the world moved toward World War II, NAS

Pensacola became the hub of air training activities. After the fall of France in 1939, Congress authorized the purchase of 15,000 aircraft and NAS Pensacola speeded the pace of training activity. The number of pilots training in Pensacola reached its peak in 1944, when 12,000 men completed training and flew a combined total of almost two million hours. War in Korea presented problems, as the military was caught in the midst of transition from propellers to jets, and the Naval Air Station revised its courses and training techniques. Nonetheless, NAS Pensacola produced 6,000 aviators from 1950 to 1953. Pilot training requirements shifted upward to meet demand for the Vietnam War which occupied much of the 1960's and early 70's. Pilot production was as high as 2,552 (1968) and as low as 1,413 (1962).

In 1971, NAS Pensacola was picked as the Headquarters site for a new command, Naval Education and Training Command (CNET), which combined direction and control of all Navy education and training.

NAS Pensacola today has a myriad of activities including the Headquarters and Staff of the Chief of Naval Education and Training; Training Air Wing 6 and subordinate squadrons; Naval Aerospace Medical Institute; Naval Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory; Naval Aviation Schools Command; Naval Air Rework Facility; Blue Angels Flight Demonstration Squadron; and the Navy's only aircraft carrier designated for pilot training, USS LEXINGTON, which operates from Pensacola into the Gulf of Mexico. A recent addition to the Pensacola "fleet" is a reserve destroyer and a destroyer tender located at Mobile, Alabama.

The Naval Air Station "main-side" is populated by some 6,000 military personnel, and nearly 8,000 civilian employees. The

combined payroll is more than \$16 million monthly, an important factor in the area's economy.

In order to service NAS Pensacola "main-side" and the surrounding installations, NISRA Pensacola is staffed by a Special Agent-in-Charge (GS-13), and Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge (GS-12) and five Special Agents. Satellite Units located at NAS Whiting Field are currently manned by two Journeyman Agents and NTTC Corry Station is serviced by an additional Journeyman Agent. There is also an Agent assigned to the USS LEXINGTON. Administrative support to the NISRA effort is rendered by a secretary/typist, clerk typist and one military yeoman.



The case load at NISRA Pensacola is varied, with the "normal" amount of drug and theft cases. However, an increasing amount of time is being spent on initiating operations to identify fraud in the local area. Many such endeavors have been rewarded with prosecution by the U.S. Attorney.

Agents assigned to NISRA Pensacola readily find suitable and relatively low cost housing, a characteristic which is rapidly disappearing elsewhere in the United States. Large, beautiful homes in the best locations in town can

still be purchased for ninety thousand dollars. Conversely, adequate rental units can be easily acquired for under three hundred dollars. Types of housing vary as much as demand, ranging from modern to casual living with a Spanish flare.

Agents and their families assigned to NISRA Pensacola find that they are situated in a warm temperature zone, and its climate is typical of the region along the upper Gulf Coast. The winters are mild (keeping fuel costs down) and the summer heat is tempered by the southerly prevailing winds from the Gulf of Mexico. For those sunshine lovers, the city averages 343 days of the year in which sunshine occurs. Pensacola Beach is the city's most scenic attraction. More than 40 miles of Florida's beaches extend along the Gulf Shore of Santa Rosa Island. The glistening purity of its white sand and the clarity and color of the Gulf water are unsurpassed anywhere in the world. You name your water sport and Pensacola has it.

A tour at NISRA Pensacola presents both a seasoned and new Agent an enjoyable and challenging tour of duty. It is no wonder that a tour of duty at Pensacola is believed one of the most sought after assignments within the Naval Investigative Service.

## **Fraudulent Altering of Government Paychecks**

By: S/A Jim Kiker

The following is an outline of a possible modus operandi to be used in fraud against the government by forgery. S/A J. R. Kiker developed this information during interviews in connection with the altering of a U.S. Government check.

According to knowledgeable sources, the rectangular punches in a Navy payroll check no longer reflect the amount of the check. Smaller activities, such as many ships, now prepare their checks by typewriter since the limited numbers do not justify computer printing. An IBM self-correcting Selectric is often used, and the lift-off tape works very well on the check paper used in government checks. One source recalled that on the ship he was previously assigned to some four hundred checks were prepared each payday, and while preparing them errors were invariably made. However, with the self-correcting feature of the IBM (latest models of competitors now have this same feature) it was merely a matter of backspacing and typing in the correction. This procedure leaves no evidence to the naked eye, and checks could even be reinserted in the typewriter and acceptable corrections made.

The detection of such forgery would probably not occur until a balancing of the accounts. At onset suspects would be anyone in the chain of check handlers, i.e., disbursing clerk, payee, bank teller, bank official, any of whom could be working alone or as part of a conspiracy.

Compounding the problem somewhat is the fact that a person can request any reasonable number of small checks, the sum of which total the amount due. For example, a person due \$500.00 might ask for six \$50.00 checks and two \$100.00 checks. The forger would then have practice checks or just more checks to raise. Any checks ruined during practice could be torn up and duplicates requested as only the barest of excuses is needed.

## **Fabricated Allegations**

By: S/A C. B. Rollins

Recently, NISRA Memphis received a complaint of a rape alleging both vaginal and anal penetration of a seven year old female dependent. Initial inquiries identified the suspect as an 11 year old cousin. A number of interviews were conducted in a highly charged and emotional environment, but led to the discovery that the rape complaint was spurious. The victim had been forced by a relative to fabricate the story, as the latter thought such a charge would assist in her custody struggle for the victim. These investigative findings were corroborated by medical opinion that victim had never been penetrated.

## **Approach of the PCS Season**

By: Mr. N. T. Lutsch

The annual surge of duty station rotations will commence in two to three months. This period of time is accompanied by enough difficulties that unnecessary ones should be avoided at all costs. Those personnel who will be rotating should read or re-read Chapters 38 and 39 of NIS-1. Considerable information is contained in the two chapters which will make the PCS more orderly and resolve many of the questions that are likely to occur.

Certain key steps should receive top priority. If the transfer is to an overseas area, applications for passports should be processed as soon as they are

received from NISHQ. The travel questionnaire is next in order of importance as this document is the principle tool used in preparing travel orders. It should be completed as fully and accurately as possible and sent to NISHQ (0028) with a minimum of delay.

Certain problems have a way of recurring and they are merely highlighted as follow:

a. Commercial Air Travel: For travel outside CONUS, NISHQ can only authorize Category Z - it cannot direct it.

b. Actions That Can Be Accomplished in Advance of Travel Orders: After the travel agreement has been completed and signed and a firm date established for reporting to the new duty station, virtually all aspects of the PCS except actual travel to the new permanent duty station may be effected. Such action would include a house hunting trip when authorized, sale and purchase of real estate, and setting firm arrangements for shipment of household goods.

c. Advances: Funds may be drawn against the orders up to the amount authorized. The amount of advance will cover travel by other than a GTR, TQS expenses for up to a maximum of thirty (30) days, and per diem expenses. Advances are not issued for house hunting trips, TLA, real estate transactions or the Foreign Transfer Allowance.

d. Renewal Agreement Travel: This is a benefit granted to an employee upon completion of a tour overseas and agreement to extend for another tour. Travel is authorized to the place of permanent residence in CONUS. Home leave may normally be utilized in conjunction with renewal agreement travel approach requests.

e. Overseas Travel Arrangements: Must be arranged through servicing transportation office. The NISO to which the employee is assigned will transmit the message requesting a port call. NISHQ will prepare dependent entry approval requests.

f. TQS Computations: In CONUS, all calculations are currently based on a per diem rate of \$35.00. In Hawaii, Alaska, the Territories and Possessions, local rates prevail.

As a final word on this topic, changes to the travel orders will certainly be necessary in some cases. Normally, the changes can be accomplished with minimal delay. Requests for changes should be submitted in writing (SSDs will suffice) and the changes should accompany the original travel orders when a claim for reimbursement is made. Travel performed must be consistent with the allowances and itinerary specified in the travel orders.

## **Law Enforcement Retirement**

By: N. T. Lutsch

Following World War II, Congress was convinced of a need to liberalize the Civil Service Retirement Act to permit certain law enforcement employees the ability to retire from federal service earlier than normally allowed. It was agreed in Congress that law enforcement was an occupation calling for the strength and stamina typical of young men and women. Law enforcement was recognized as being more physically taxing than other position in the federal service. A change to the basic retirement law was determined necessary as a means to encourage older employees in law enforcement to retire.

On 11 July 1947, Public Law 80-168 was passed and provided for retirement at age 50 after 20 years of service with a liberalized annuity computation of two percent (2%) for each year of service. Significantly, this law applied only to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The next year, on 2 July 1948, Public Law 80-879 was enacted. This law extended the benefits, previously accorded only to the FBI, to officers and employees whose duties "...are primarily the investigation, apprehension or detention of persons suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States." It should be noted that the term "primarily" has a significance which will be discussed below.

Public Law 92-382 was enacted in 1972 and extended the more liberal retirement benefits to federal firefighters.

A significant amendment to the law enforcement retirement provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act occurred with the enactment of Public Law 93-350 on 12 July 1974. That law:

a. Changed the annuity computation from 2% to 2 1/2% for each of the first 20 years of service and 2% for every year over 20;

b. Provided a \$50,000 lump-sum payment to the survivor of an individual killed in the line of duty;

c. Permitted the inclusion of premium pay (for administratively uncontrollable overtime) in calculations relating to the "high three years" of salary; and

d. Fixed a mandatory retirement age at fifty-five upon completion of 20 years of law enforcement service.

So much for the legislative history of the so-called law enforcement retirement benefits. Certain terms are unique to the law in applying coverage. The law refers to employees who are "primarily" involved in investigations, apprehension, etc. Such employees are referred to as being "basically covered." Obviously excluded from the category are the supervisory and administrative personnel of a law enforcement organization. While such personnel have established rights to retire under the law enforcement provisions of the law, such rights are derivative rather than "basic." To ensure the rights, they must have moved to the supervisory or administrative positions directly from a "basically covered" position without a break in service. While an individual can "carry" coverage from one organization to another (eg., FBI to NIS) there must be recognition by the Office of Personnel Management (formerly the Civil Service Commission) of the law enforcement mission and basic eligibility of the organizations involved regarding law enforcement retirement. If an individual moves from a "basically covered" position to a non-covered supervisory position with another federal agency, eligibility for retirement under the law enforcement provisions is suspended. To continue the eligibility, such an individual must return to a "basically covered" position within a federal agency. All service in between such "covered" positions does not count for purposes of accruing the required 20 years.

NAVINSERV first established eligibility for retirement under the special law enforcement provisions in November, 1957. At that time, the Civil Service Commission reviewed the duties of the civilian Special Agents working under contract with the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Civil Service

Commission determined those duties to have met the criteria established by the law. Routine requests for retirement under the law enforcement provisions were submitted thereafter. The only problem encountered was one of time for processing and the fact that each application was reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

In July 1975, NISHQ initiated direct liaison with the Civil Service Commission to effect a streamlining of both the laws' coverage regarding NAVINSERV Special Agents. The Civil Service Commission consented to perform a comprehensive review of all available facts and documentation. Following that review, they approved, effectively before the fact, all subsequent requests for retirement concerning the Naval Investigative Service Special Agents. Processing time for such requests is now short - in relative terms. If the local civilian personnel office and payroll office act in a timely fashion, action in such applications is normally completed within three months. Such action previously required six to nine months.

Benefits under the special provisions of the law are significant. To illustrate, assume two individuals, of the identical age, commence employment with the federal government on their 24th birthday. One is employed with NAVINSERV as a Special Agent and the other with Agency "X." Each progresses in an identical fashion for a career encompassing a total of thirty years and each is eligible for retirement at the age of 55 having attained a grade level of GS-12, step 7. The high-three average salary for the NIS Special Agent is \$32,455 while the figure is \$29,641 for the individual with Agency "X"; the difference is due to premium pay. The Special Agent will have a multiplier of 70% while the running

mate with Agency "X" has a multiplier of 56.25%. In terms of raw annuity, the Special Agent will receive \$22,718.50, some \$6,045.44 (36.25%) more than the non-agent counterpart. Further, the Special Agent obviously has the alternative of retiring at the age of 50 with a raw annuity of \$19,473, 16.8% greater than the running mate who must work five years longer.

Once twenty years of covered service have been accrued, there is no requirement to remain employed as a federal law enforcement officer. In such a case, an eligible employee may quite literally become a federal dog catcher until age 50 - or any age thereafter - and retire when ready. There is a requirement to remain employed until age 50 in a position covered by the Civil Service Retirement System. An employee may not leave federal service after attaining the required 20 years (before age 50) and still retain the more liberal retirement benefit. Under such circumstances, earliest annuity eligibility will be at age 62 and the annuity computation would be based on regular rates.

Applying for optional retirement under the special law enforcement provisions is relatively simple. NISHQ (Code 28) will prepare a Statement of Service upon notification of a pending retirement. That document will be sent to the NISO of the applicant. The applicant must complete an application for retirement benefits and forward same to his/her NISO. The NISO will prepare a Personnel Action Request (SF-52) and attach both the Statement of Service and the completed application. Following the last day of service, the personnel office will forward a copy of the personnel action to the servicing payroll office. The latter will compile the payroll records of the individual, issue final pay check

for wages due and, either combined with that check or by separate issuance, will pay an amount for settlement of lump sum annual leave. The payroll office will also prepare a final accounting of wages paid and contributions made to the Civil Service Retirement Account. The document containing this information is referred to as the final SF-2806; it must be forwarded to Bureau of Insurance, Retirement and Occupational Health, Office of Personnel Management for adjudication. If all required documents are available at the time of submission, OPM will make an immediate issuance of the final annuity figure. If some document is missing, interim payments will be issued until a final adjudication and calculation can be made. The applicant should retain a copy of the Application for Retirement with his/her personal and legal records.

Myriad questions can be posed concerning retirement and specifically optional law enforcement retirement. It is strongly recommended that if not answerable through the corporate memory of NISO personnel, such questions be forwarded to NISHQ (Code 28). There is an understandable yet appalling lack of knowledge concerning law enforcement retirement benefits in the general personnel community.

As a final point of trivia, many people commonly refer to the law enforcement retirement benefit as "6C" without knowledge of this citation. It derives from the fact that Title 5, U.S.C. 8336(c), as amended, sets forth the provisions of optional retirement as a law enforcement officer.

## OVERSEAS ALLOWANCES

The following tables provide information, based on most current data possible, regarding the overseas duty stations of NAVINVSERV. Periodic updates will be furnished in the future.

<u>POST</u>	<u>TEMP<sup>1/</sup> LODGING</u>	<u>FAMILY<sup>2/</sup> STATUS</u>	<u>HOUSING<sup>3/</sup> ALLOWANCE</u>	<u>DIFF RATE %</u>	<u>COST OF LIVING</u>
		GS-14-18	10-13	7-9	
05BM	47 <sup>A/</sup>	WF 130	110	90	0
	65 <sup>B/</sup>	WOF 110	90	75	
05GT	6	WF 40	40	40	10%
		WOF 40	40	40	
05RR	-	-	-	-	5.0%
08FA	25	WF 66	55	44	0
		WOF 55	55	44	
12AA	-	-	-	-	25.0%
60GA	7	WF 52	52	41	0
		WOF 45	41	33	
60NA	26	WF 84	84	68	0
		WOF 84	84	55	
60SX	21	WF 63	63	43	0
		WOF 63	43	41	
60GN	18	WF 47	40	33	0
		WOF 40	33	29	
60HQ/60LN	70	WF 140	121	97	
		WOF 140	97	81	
60KF	6	WF 39	39	34	10%
		WOF 39	34	26	

60RT	13	WF WOF	77 55	55 50	50 40	0	
80MI/80AG/ 80CM	6	WF WOF	40 40	40 40	40 40	0	7.5%
80HQ/80BP/ 80HN/80KH	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.5%
81AJ	24	WF WOF	37 36	36 34	36 34	0	
81IW	19	WF WOF	49 49	49 39	49 39	0	
81MW	31	WF WOF	44 41	41 40	40 40	0	
81KH/81YK	27	WF WOF	72 58	57 49	54 43	0	
81YH	36	WF WOF	90 83	83 57	57 51	0	
81KI	31	WF WOF	54 50	50 50	48 38	10%	
83HQ/83SU/ 83PS/83CU	16	WF WOF	44 44	44 44	30 30	15%	
83MQ	25	WF WOF	70 70	70 63	63 47	10%	
83SM	6	WF WOF	40 40	40 40	40 40	0	

1/ RATE SHOWN PER DAY NOT TO EXCEED 90 DAYS PRIOR TO OCCUPYING QUARTERS

2/ WF - WITH FAMILY; WOF - WITHOUT FAMILY.

3/ RATE SHOWN IN HUNDREDS PER ANNUM.

A/ DECEMBER 1 - MARCH 15

B/ MARCH 16 - NOVEMBER 30

## Around the NIS

Recently a NISHQ approved narcotics ICIO was terminated following the successful identification of several USMC personnel as drug dealers aboard MCAS Kaneohe, Hawaii. During the course of the ICIO, one NIS registered source purchased cocaine from nine marines (one of whom also made a marijuana sale) and two purchases of LSD from two marines. The implicated drug dealers ranged in rate from E-3 to E-6. To date, two of the suspects were convicted at Special Courts-martial and were awarded confinement and BCD's; three suspects are currently deserters; and prosecutive action is pending for the remaining suspects. Owing in part to the success of this ICIO, a more sweeping NISHQ approved narcotics ICIO was initiated at NISRA Kaneohe, and thus far, the later ICIO has been extremely fruitful; details to follow at a later date.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

Recently Roger TEEL, DRDO, NISO Europe, experienced mechanical difficulty with his POV a 1972 Citroen, considered by some to be a marvel of French engineering. It is in fact interesting to watch it start up, rising slowly as it does on its hydraulic shocks, much like a hydrofoil reaching cruising speed. At any rate the mechanical problem was diagnosed to be a malfunctioning transmission part. Knowing the high cost of auto repairs in London, Roger cleverly ordered the necessary part which came to a little over \$4.00 then took the part and ailing but high riding Citroen to a local "Coachworks" to have the part changed. His bill came to a shade over \$275.00. During the repair process an exhaust hose (no like parts in stock) was ruptured and now his French marvel not only rises up

like a camel when started it also fills with blue fumes. On warm days he keeps the windows down but when the thermometer drops, having no heater, he keeps the windows closed tight. The blue fumes that fill the car give the effect of blue tinted windows all around and once inside it is difficult to see Roger at the wheel. But we know he's in there - we can hear him when he coughs.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

As the time for summer vacation planning approaches, a suggestion has come in that perhaps there is renewed interest in a program which was highly successful in the past. What is involved is the promulgation of a central listing of those NIS Special Agents who are interested in allowing another NIS family to occupy their residence during the period they are also vacationing out of the area. The goal is to allow for "house swapping" between agent families thus reducing the costs of vacation lodging and at the same time providing for a reliable "house sitter" while the family is away.

If anyone is interested in participating in such a plan, please forward to the Editor, NIS QUARTERLY, your name, a brief description of your residence and nearby vacation points, a statement as to conditions for occupancy and dates of availability.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

NISRA Alameda followed the RCMP tradition of always getting their man last month by filling in a prolonged gap in an unsolved burglary. Their case had been closed on a quarter's break-in when word came that the stolen property might still be in the area.

The odds seemed slim, but in

due course Special Agent Carolyn Silberstein was sent to check it out. Some hours later she reappeared -- muddy but unbowed, with a large cache of jewelry and other high value items recovered from the crawl space of a house aboard the station. Remarkably, the items had gone unnoticed for over three years, despite regular PWC inspections.

A solid suspect was developed, and the only mystery remaining was how to get the government to pay the dry cleaning bill.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

In Portland, Oregon, within a matter of hours, a seaman managed to construct and detonate two explosive devices; one aboard ship that slightly injured a crew member and the other in a parking lot that destroyed a row of public telephone booths. The devices consisted of fused plastic garbage bags filled with a mixture of oxygen/acetylene gas. Interestingly, the perpetrator obtained all his material from aboard ship; garbage bags from a work center, masking tape and oxyacetylene from an unattended welding set. The seaman related he filled the bags with random amounts of gas, taped the bags closed and then fashioned fuses with long strips of masking tape and kleenex. The masking tape when lit, burned down to a piece of kleenex that flashed and ignited the bag of gas.

The force of the parking lot blast distorted the metal frames of two telephone booths and shattered the glass panels. A ceiling portion that housed a ventilation fan was blown approximately seven feet from a booth. Neither explosion caused burning.

Crime scene examination of the area disclosed the tied off end of a plastic bag and particles of a

burnt plastic bag from the interior of a booth. Interrogation confirmed that the Subject had taped the bag to an interior frame of the booth so that the wind would not blow out the fuse.

Local authorities advised they had not seen an improvised explosive device of this sort for several years, but that detonation of oxyacetylene obviously remained an inexpensive, highly effective means of destruction.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

Okinawa - What follows is a highly descriptive English translation of an article which appeared in the 15 Nov 79 issue of the Japanese Customs Service Newsletter relative to a "Liaison Softball Game" which occurred on 20 Oct 79. The excellent relationship of NISRA Okinawa with host country law enforcement agencies is evident.

**--WORKSHOP ROTARY--**

Chasing of a white ball under  
autumn sky

The Investigative Division has been conducting division recreation in autumn as a yearly event. This year, too, in the afternoon of 20 Oct 79, having challenged the Naval Investigative Service Resident Agency, Okinawa a softball game was held.

The typhoon #20 had just passed by and it turned out to be a very fine day for a ball game. The white ball clearly reflected in the background of green grass and players feverishly practiced to heighten everyone's interest.

With determination to revenge for a crushing defeat last year against NIS team, Customs team was formed by members of the main office and Okinawa City Branch. The NIS team members however, were

big, their average age was much younger than Customs' and with the cheering support of their family members, the tide was in favor of NIS from the start of the game.

The game was started with 10 members from each side, with rules of no fast ball, no walks and no stealing of bases. At the toss of a coin, Customs team decided to bat first.

Customs could not score any in the first inning while the opponent brought in 6 runs on hits and errors on our team. It was a one-sided game as the opposing team had 4 home runs in addition to other slugging hits, with Customs team losing this year too, with a score of 22 to 4.

After the game, each participant shook hands to praise the other's participation and promised to further cooperate with each other in their daily work to conclude the day under an atmosphere of friendship.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

On 22 Jan 80, NISO Norfolk conducted a Hostage Negotiation Exercise with the participation and assistance of personnel from NISHQ; NRMC Portsmouth; Base Police Naval Station Norfolk; Marine Barracks, Norfolk; and COMFIVE. The scenario

of this exercise consisted of a disgruntled Marine who took two hostages (another Marine and a civilian clerk) into an area and barricaded themselves. Communication with the hostage-taker was established and inner and outer perimeters were also formed as well as a command post placed in action. Various ploys were attempted by the hostage-taker and countermeasures were then exercised by the negotiator as well as the command representatives at the command post. Lessons were learned as a result of

the exercise, but the most critical one, which was brought out time and time again, was that without communications there is a total breakdown.

The exercise did generate press interest and an article appeared in the local press the following day.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

Captain Jerry E. ONHAIZER retired in ceremonies Feb 29, 1980, as Commanding Officer, Naval Investigative Service Office Norfolk. He was relieved by Captain Edward B. YOUNG.

Captain ONHAIZER, who completed over 24 years of Naval service, has commanded NISO Norfolk for the past year and a half.

Captain ONHAIZER completed a fruitful career in Naval Intelligence with assignments to Navy PIC and DNI (OPNAV), Washington, D.C.; Commander Carrier Division One; Fleet Intelligence Agency; Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet; and two tours at NISO Norfolk as Executive Officer and again as Commanding Officer.

Captain ONHAIZER plans to reside in the Virginia Beach area with his wife and four children.

**\*\*NIS\*\***

Congratulations to S/A Robert C. Thompson, from NISRA Norfolk, who was married to the former Betty Ann P. Berling on 16 Feb 1980.

Congratulations to S/A Thomas P. Shelko, from NISRA Fleet Support, who was married to the former Lynn S. Henderson on 17 Feb 80.

Congratulations to the following S/A's and their wives on new arrivals to their homes: From NISRA Portsmouth, Raymond and Beckey Wellborn on the birth of

their daughter on 12 Jan 1980; from NISRA Little Creek, Michael and Rebecca Chimarys on the birth of their daughter on 15 Jan 1980; and from NISRA Norfolk, Richard and Barbara Skelton on the birth of their son on 20 Jan 80.

## Retired Ring In

S/A Dallas H. DEVINNEY, NISRA Pearl Harbor retired on 31 December 1979 after 37 1/2 years of naval service. This was Dallas' second retirement, as he initially "pulled the pin" in 1962 following 20 years of active duty in the Navy. That same year Dallas came aboard with NIS (then ONI) at NISO Norfolk (then DIO, 5ND), where he remained for 11 years. Besides Norfolk and Pearl Harbor, Dallas also did a tour at NISRA Marianas. Dallas and his lovely wife, Faith, have elected to remain in Hawaii where Dallas embarks on a new career in paint sales, while Faith continues in her role as the backbone of the administrative force at NISRA Pearl Harbor. All their many friends wish them fair winds and following seas in the years to come.

## NIS Naval Reserve Training

By: LT J. A. Hutchison, USN

The NISHQ Reserve Unit has hosted one training seminar this year and another is being planned for early summer, which will help keep NIS dedicated naval reservists up-to-date in matters of counter-intelligence and NIS organization and management. The Counterintelligence/Counterespionage course held at Naval Air Facility, Wash-

ington, DC, in March was the second annual CI/CE course for NIS reservists. The course utilized instructors from a broad range of DOD and Federal agencies and provided an excellent introduction to CI/CE policies and procedures both within NIS and at the national level.

In June the NISHQ Reserve Unit, together with faculty of the Defense Intelligence School, will present a two-week ACDUTRA Investigative Supervision and Management Seminar for NIS dedicated reservists. This program was developed jointly by NISHQ Training Division personnel, NISHQ reservists and the faculty of the Defense Intelligence School. Lessons learned from this presentation will be used to develop a course for use by senior NIS management personnel.

## In Memoriam

Mr William E. Marshall, age 53, died suddenly on Tuesday morning, 26 February 1980.



Bill joined NIS in June 1951 and saw duty at NIS Headquarters, NISO Washington, NISO Boston and NISRA Washington. He transferred to DIS in 1972 and retired from that agency in 1976. He served on active duty with the Navy from 1944 to 1946. He is survived by his wife, Lillian, two daughters and a son. Bill is the brother-in-law of retired NIS RDO Joe Oulahan.

Bill was an excellent agent and a find person.

\*\*\*

Former Special Agent Kenneth S. "Doc" Reid, age 68, who spent the majority of his 30 years with NIS at Norfolk, passed away at Norfolk on Thursday, 21 February 1980, after a long illness. He is survived by his wife, Anne, at 1417 West Little Creek Road, Norfolk, VA 23505, and a step-daughter, Betty. The funeral was held on Sunday, 24 February 1980, from Zion Grace United Methodist Church, Norfolk. Burial was in Forest Lawn Cemetery, Norfolk.



Mr. Reid, who was formerly employed by the Norfolk Police Department, joined NIS In November 1942 and served at NISRA Norfolk until 1961 when he transferred to NISO Japan as Supervising Agent. He served in that billet until August 1964 when he returned to NISO Norfolk as the Assistant Supervising Agent for Criminal Matters. He retired on 11 January 1973 after a long and most distinguished career. He was an excellent investigator, an outstanding leader and a fine person.

#### CONTRIBUTING EDITORS:

*New York - S/A Kent E. Walker*

*Norfolk - S/A Bruno E. DeMolli*

*LCDR J.D. Ennis*

*Charleston - S/A J.A. Wheeler*

*New Orleans - S/A John R. Michaud*

*San Diego - S/A T.J. Hicks*

*San Francisco - S/A Clyde J. Roach*

*Europe - S/A A.J. Kersenbrock*

*NISPAC - S/A William J. Klemp*

*Japan - S/A Larry E. Ferrell*

*Philippines - S/A V.H. McPherson*

*NIS - 22 - S/A Troy N. Gillispie*

*NIS - 23 - S/A H.L. Abrams*

*NIS - 25 - S/A J.J. D'Avanzo*

*S/A B.E. Hudson*

*NIS - 26 - S/A B.W. Given*

*NIS - 28 - Mr. N.T. Lutsch*

*Special thanks to Kathy Clendenin for administrative support*

*Design & Layout - Janet D. Herbert  
& S/A Jack Tuckish*

## From the Editor's Desk

*This is the second issue of THE NIS QUARTERLY to be published. Despite some typos and transposition of photos in the first issue, we have had some good reaction from the field on the content and style of the publication. We have tried to improve our product in this issue and solicit comments for further improvements. The quality of THE NIS QUARTERLY is directly attributable to the input received from the Contributing Editors and their outstanding performance is sincerely appreciated. With that kind of support, the magazine is here to stay. As I head off to my new job counting beans, pencils, et al in NIS - 28, responsibility for THE NIS QUARTERLY will transfer to the good hands of my relief, Dan Foley.*

