

NIS Newsletter

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Distribution: This Newsletter is intended for all Naval Investigative


Service personnel concerned with investigations and counterintelligence. Sufficient copies are furnished to allow distribution of individual copies to all NIS professional personnel.

Newsletter Items:

Items of general interest are solicited on a continuing

basis from field components. All items of general interest for the Newsletter should be forwarded to NISHQ (252).

NISO's are encouraged to report to NISHQ (251), on a continuing basis letters of commendation, appreciation and other favorable personnel action for inclusion in the Newsletter.



As everyone knows, some very threatening clouds loomed on our horizon as 1971 got underway.

A very basic question had been posed just before Christmas as to whether NIS would continue to exist without a major change in its organization, mission, and tasking.

Throughout the last six months of 1970, a series of budget cuts had forced all sorts of painful readjustments, and we entered the new year with the knowledge that some very unfortunate RIF actions would have to be taken by early February.

These various matters -- and a few others of considerably less magnitude -- have taken their toll of our time and attention these past several weeks. It seems, however, as if the worst has passed, and that we can look forward to the remainder of the fiscal year--and, in fact, considerably longer--with optimism that NIS will remain intact, and that those who are still with us can look forward to

a satisfying and rewarding career.

To put the matter in weather terms, I think the storm has blown over, that the air and sea are calm, and there are no threatening clouds in sight. To continue the metaphor it can certainly be said that we have been blown into some

rocks and shoals. We still have to work our way back into more navigable seas and the course will be slow and tedious at times. I'm not worried, however. The NIS has gone through a traumatic experience--but the personnel have proven without a doubt their steadiness and dedication. With those qualities in such abundant quantity I look forward to the future with complete confidence.


My congratulations and my thanks to all hands.

4. Q. Laundo

VIPREPORT

2

James L. (Jim) HANNAH, Supervising Agent, NISO, HAWAII, since



September 1967, has submitted his request for retirement as of 30 June 1971. Jim's long and illustrious career with NIS began in San Diego in October 1951, as a street agent. Jim was commissioned an Ensign in 1944 and later commanded an Amphibious Gun Boat in the South Pacific. After graduating from San Diego State in 1946, Special Agent HANNAH married the former Madolyn MEYER of San Diego. From 1947 to 1949 Jim was employed as a FBI Agent in Cincinnati, Ohio and Rome, Georgia. After his resignation from the FBI, Special Agent HANNAH returned to the West Coast and worked as an Insurance Adjuster until NIS fortunately coaxed him back into the law enforcement field.

Special Agent HANNAH has served diligently in various supervisory capacities with NIS. Jim was the Head, Review and Control Section (PSI), for four years prior to his assignment as Supervising Agent, NISO, NORFOLK, in 1961. Jim served with distinction in the same position at NISO WASHINGTON from 1964 until August 1967 when he was transferred to NISO, HAWAII.


Jim's youthful appearance is enhanced by his serious approach to physical fitness and belies the fact that he has been a grandfather for the past three years. All who have known him praise his unswerving loyalty, attention to detail, and his energetic approach to problem solving.

Special Agent HANNAH has written the following in anticipation of his impending retirement from NIS.

"I have many fond memories of my years with NIS and can recall many, many interesting cases involving special situations, some serious and some dangerous, some successful and others not so successful. but these would take too long to recount. I've worked with many fine people in this organization during the last twenty years and will consider myself fortunate to find friendships as strong in a new career here in Aloha land. I do hope to continue working for another ten or fifteen years but as yet I have no

firm employment plans."

Everyone extends to Jim a hearty "Well Done" and sincere best wishes for a prosperous second career.



Division submissions report information concerning items of current interest, suggestions as to more efficient methods of operation, and reminders of operating guidelines. Official guidance, commendation and criticism are promulgated to the field by other more formal means. The information printed here is not to be construed as NIS policy.

Personnel Security Investigations Division

A frequent problem has been noted in the reporting of Local Agency Checks in the Sources of Information Section of Synoptic Reports of Investigation. Example: Investigation requires LAC's in La Mesa, California. ROI reports: (3) LAC - San Diego County Sheriff. Failure to add in parenthesis (covers La Mesa), causes considerable delay in the NISHQ closing review of the investigation. Similar situations

also occur in reporting Credit and residence checks.

The practice of identifying and listing the oldest PSI cases was resumed, as of 5 February 1971. As indicated in NIS GEN 052334Z FEB 71 compilation is based on cases processed at NISHQ through COB on each Thursday. Investigations appearing on the list will in many instances be closed at the NISO/NISRA level, but not yet processed at Headquarters. Supervisory personnel at NISHQ are provided with a chronological account of the action in each of these investigations, and thus become aware of the exact reason(s) for the delinquency. Experience shows decisively that in the usual case an investigation becomes grossly delinquent because of poor management or inattention to detail, and not because it is complex or difficult. The "25 oldest" list will result in tightened control at all levels, including NISHQ.

Internal Security Investigations Division

Attention is invited to Para 2-1107, ONI 63-1B which requires that the defense security classification of information involved in any security violations case must be included in the NOCP. That means the currently valid classification. If validity of the classification cannot be determined by the control office, the NOCP should contain a lead to the appropriate NIS office to confirm classification through contact with the document's originator.

In cases involving suspected or alleged loss, compromise, or unauthorized disclosure of classified information, the first investigative requirement is often a determination that the information or material involved is properly classified. In order to establish the basis for investigative action, it can normally be presumed that a violation has occurred since the offense is implicit in the request. In many cases, however, the requester is not the originator of the information. It cannot be presumed that the command requesting the investigation has verified the proper classification; such a determination is incumbent on the investigating Agent and the only accurate method is to contact the originator.

If there is conflict as to whether or not material involved in a security violations investigation is classified, disseminate a lead to NISHQ. NIS-22 will submit the conflict to CNO for resolution.

OPNAVNOTE 5510 Ser 3146P092 of 20 April 1971, Subject: "The Security Information Letter, promulgated new policy concerning potential hostage briefings:

"(1) Article 0305.3 of reference (a) (OPNAVINST 5510.1C) states that defensive briefings in potential hostage situations will be administered by Counterintelligence personnel of the Naval Investigative Service. This policy has been changed and defensive briefings will now, as a general rule, be the responsibility of commands. (EMPHASIS ADDED) Procedures will be established by commanding officers to identify those personnel within their commands who have relatives living in communist countries and may require defensive briefing before they are granted security clearances and/or access to classified material.

"(2) If an investigation for security clearance is being conducted, a representative of the Naval Investigative Service will administer the briefing, if appropriate, as a part of the investigation. If an investigation is not being conducted by the Naval Investigative Service and a command discovers that an individual has relatives living in a communist country, the commanding officer will make a security determination in accordance with Article 1515 of reference (a) (OPNAVINST 5510.1C)...)

The command may request additional investigative coverage before making a final determination and a representative of the Naval Investigative Service will conduct the briefing, if appropriate, as part of the investigation.

This policy change will be reflected in formal changes to both ONI 63-1B and OPNAVINST 5510.1C now in preparation.

Several incidents have occurred recently which indicate the necessity for clarification of NIS policy concerning the handling of investigative requests regarding returned defectors. As in nearly all NIS investigations (other than PSI's), a basic purpose of an NIS investigation regarding defection is to obtain information which can be used in any contemplated prosecution for an offense against the UCMJ. Since there is no offense relating to "Defection" in the UCMJ the prosecutable offense involved in such an investigation is Desertion (Art. 85, UCMJ), and a primary purpose of an NIS investigation of defectors is to obtain information which could be used by the command in any prosecution for

Desertion.

Several defector investigations were opened recently wherein the Subject has already received NJP for UA or there were indications that the Subject would shortly receive such punishment for UA. If, at the time an investigation is requested, it is determined that the returned defector has already been prosecuted, or that prosecution is imminent for the offense of UA, a determination should be made as to whether or not the appropriate General Court Martial convening authority contemplates additional prosecution for the offense of desertion. If not, there is no basis upon which to initiate an investigation and none should be opened, unless another issue has been raised. However, since prior prosecution for UA is not a bar to prosecution for the greater offense of Desertion if additional prosecution is contemplated, an investigation should be opened upon request, and the Subject interrogated after appropriate warning.

In some defector cases, the SEC Department, either at the Headquarters or NISO level, will have interest in information of which the returned defector may be expected to have knowledge. In those instances a debrief will be conducted after the interrogation and reported by separate NIR, directly to NISHQ, in compliance with Section 2-0937.3(e) of ONI 63-1B. This should not be interpreted to mean that a Code 40 debrief and/or NIR is required in every defector investigation. If for example, the interrogation elicits information to meet the requirements of Code 40, the results as reported in the ROI would be sufficient and a separate debrief and/or NIR would not be necessary. If Code 40 indicates no interest in the returned defector, again there is no need for a debrief and/or NIR.

The Commander, Naval Ships Systems Command, has recently disseminated clarification of the roles of NIS,

the FBI, local law enforcement agencies, and contractor security force personnel in cases of threats or acts of sabotage against U.S. Navy ships and installations to NAVSHIPS activities. NAVSHIPS activities were asked to ensure that all investigative bodies know that ships under construction in private shipyards for the U.S. Navy are government property. Shipbuilding contracts specifically provide that ships under construction as well as materials and equipment acquired for ships are government property. Under Master Ship Repair contacts, the vessel, materials and equipment are likewise government property. COMNAVSHIPS also reminded NAVSHIPS activities that NIS has the authority to take whatever action is deemed necessary to insure that the Navy's ' interests are protected. NIS is the point of contact for all matters involving offenses against Navy property, investigative support and assistance in identification of responsibility and jurisdiction.

Criminal Investigations Division

In several recent instances the results of bank records checks have been reported in ROI's and have identified the name of the bank and the official who made the records available for review. In order to protect the source of information from a possible civil suit, such information should be reported as having come from a confidential informant, e.g., "Confidential Informant KI-A-1 provided the following information regarding Subject's banking activity from 21 June to 17 July 1970:...." In this manner neither the name of the banking institution nor the person providing the information is identified, thus protecting them from adverse repercussions.

It has been noted that many agents are unaware of the dissemination of ROI's after they reach NISHQ. In practically every case in which Subject is identified, the ROI is furnished for information and appropriate administrative action to the Seat of Government (SOG) activity exercising overall administrative responsibility, i. e., BUPERS, CMC, etc. In this regard, field units should so advise commands in the event of such inquiry. In many cases, if a command fails to take obligated action after the Subject has been investigated by NIS, the SOG activity will query the command concerned and direct that command to undertake administrative or disciplinary action.

When DATA/NMSG/PATT transmission of reports is utilized, the sender must consider the number of characters capable of fitting on one line. Many times reports are received at their destinations with incomplete lines or garbled sentences at the end of a line making the report either meaningless or unreadable. The maximum number of characters (including spacing between words) that may be used is sixty-nine (69) Anymore will cause the characters to "stack" on the right margin (all in the 69th space) defying interpretation. Failure to take necessary precautions to see that this does not happen causes the receiving component to initiate service messages requesting retransmission resulting in unnecessary time delay. In instances where the message preparation is accomplished by other than a NIS component, it is the responsibility of the NIS component to insure compliance with the above.

While reviewing the results of several apparently related, unsolved burglaries aboard a ship it became apparent that had the same agent conducted the investigations more success might have resulted. The difficulty arose when, due to ships movement, investigations were transferred from one NISRA to another, thus the loss of the investigating agent's "feel for the case." SRA's and Asst. Supv. Agents should bear this in mind; and, within limits imposed by operational considerations, attempt to assign the same agent to work on separate investigations that are interrelated.

There have been several instances recently where investigations have been delayed as a result of operational situations, either because entire commands or certain individuals have been unavailable due to deployments or other operational activities. It is suggested that an ALS be submitted when such situations are going to delay the completion of investigative effort.

Attention is again invited to section 1-0607.3 of the Manual for Investigations concerning the proper method of assigning incidental or impersonal (Generic) titles. The name of the facility, unit or organization, proceeds all other information, followed by the location (if appropriate), and finally the incident. Examples:

USS PINNACLE (MSO-462)/THEFT OF NARCOTICS FROM

PETER POTTER PRODUCE CO., POKEVILL, PA/ FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT

NAVCOMSTA, BAILEY'S CROSSROADS, VA/ BOMB THREAT RECEIPT OF

If DCII checks are to be meaningful and timely the procedures set forth supra cannot be over emphasized.

It is strongly suggested that, whenever possible, the facilities of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Laboratory, Fort Gordon, Ga. be utilized for laboratory analyses. This is true in all situations but is particularly true in the area of document examination. The U.S. Treasury Department Laboratory at Washington, D.C. has a heavy backlog of work and, as a result, examinations there are being delayed considerably. In cases involving Treasurer's checks the Treasury laboratory may have to be utilized, due to the fact that they have access to the original of the Treasurer's checks. However, consideration should be given to seeking assistance for the local Secret Service representative in obtaining the original Treasurer's check on a loan basis.

The lab at Fort Gordon is capable of highly professional work which is completed within an acceptable time frame.

Career Services Division

Overseas Assignments - Occasional self-appraisal of one's promotional and career pattern should be performed by every agent employed by NAVINVSERV. To be viable, an agent's career demands sound foundation. How is that foundation formed? It begins with orientation at the NISO level, augmented by much off duty reading of regulations, instructions and ONI 63-1B. Completion of the NIS Basic Training Course should be the next objective followed by 6 months to one year's experience conducting as many different investigations as possible under proper supervision. At this stage, the average agent will have approximately 1 1/2 to 2 years experience with NAVINVSERV. He should at this time volunteer for transfer to an overseas location which will afford him a broad base of experience to progress in the promotional and career chain. It must be realized that agents assigned at overseas components have the opportunity to conduct a much more diverse pattern of investigations than do agents assigned to CONUS components.

When volunteering for an overseas assignment, the agent with 1 1/2 to 2 years experience should not expect selection to locations such as London, Bermuda, Taipei, Hong Kong, Naples, or Rota. The competition for those locations, is extremely

keen and only the most qualified agents are selected. The less experienced agent should set his sights for an overseas assignment that will reap the greatest rewards for himself, promotionally and career-wise. In the latter category are billets assigned to components such as Vietnam, Okinawa and Subic Bay. After gaining experience at such locations, he could then begin to consider a tour in Taipei or London.

To date, most transfers have been made on a volunteer basis. The operating precept of the Naval Investigative Service is and has been that a properly motivated, intelligent agent will sense the need, early in his career, to gain a broader base of experience at an overseas location and, accordingly, will volunteer for assignment.

To enhance their chances of an overseas assignment, agents should insure their NIS Personnel Data Cards are always current, particularly with respect to language qualifications, duty station preferences and dependency status. The agent's AER file, his Personnel Data Card and his supervisor's recommendation form the basis for his selection or non-selection to a given overseas billet. The Personnel Data Card should be revised promptly if new, employment-related skills or language capabilities are acquired by an agent.

LEGAL NOTES

A review of criminal investigations conducted by NIS Special Agents in which searches based on command authorization have been conducted, has disclosed an apparent lack of understanding of the principles of law governing such searches Initially, it should be noted that the only real distinction between a search warrant issued by a magistrate and a search authorization issued by a commanding officer is in the status of the authorizing official. In the military, the commanding officer merely takes the place of the neutral and detached magistrate to whom requests for permission to search must be submitted for consideration. Both the warrant and the command authorized search, if granted, must be based on reliable information which will support a finding of "probable cause" that a search of a certain place will yield the item which is sought. When requesting command authority to conduct a search, NIS Special Agents should be thoroughly familiar with what information should be furnished to the command and should have a working knowledge of the "Doctrine of Probable Cause". A thorough discussion of the "Doctrine of Probable Cause" is contained in Chapter 26 of ONI 63-1B.

Whenever a request for a command authorized search is contemplated, the NIS Special Agent must present the commanding officer with the "grounds" upon which he must decide whether there is sufficient probable cause to grant the authorization. The facts and circumstances relating to the grounds for "probable cause" will have been collected by the agent during the investigation. The agent, utilizing the request for authority to search form, will then present all information upon which "probable cause" could be found to the commanding officer for his approval. The necessity for including all relevant information in the request for authority to search cannot be overemphasized. Oftentimes, a commanding officer will authorize a search based upon information contained in the request form primarily because the Subject of the search, in his mind, is a threat to the security and morale and not as a result of close scrutiny of the facts contained in the request. The danger lies in the fact that, should the agent not include all pertinent information in the request, the resultant search may be invalidated when closely scrutinized in a subsequent judicial proceeding. In cases where the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is a close issue the NIS Special Agent should urge the commanding officer to solicit the advice of his legal officer as it is he (the commanding officer) who is responsible for the ultimate decision; which decision should be based on the best advice available under the circumstances.

Concluding, an agent must be familiar with the "Doctrine of Probable Cause" so that he can intelligently present information to a command which, in turn, will base its decision solely upon the information furnished to it by the NIS Special Agent. All such information should also be carefully documented for possible use in future judicial proceedings.


The United States Supreme Court during its October Term-1970 delivered two opinions of great importance to the administration of criminal justice. Of particular significance to the military judicial system was the unanimous decision in the case of Relford V Commandant, U. S. Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, No. 98, decided on 24 February 1971. Petitioner, then an Army Corporal, was convicted in 1961 by a general court-martial for violating Articles 134 and 120 of the UCMJ by kidnaping and raping, within the bounds of a military reservation and while in an off-duty status two women, one non-dependent waiting in a parked automobile for her serviceman brother who was visiting the base hospital, the other, who was on her way from the home on the base where she lived with her serviceman husband to the post exchange

where she worked. In this proceeding, the Court granted review on the issue of the scope and applicability of O'Callahan V Parker, 395 US 258 (1969) which held that a court-martial had no jurisdiction to try a member of the armed forces charged with attempted off-post rape of a civilian since such a crime was not "service connected".

The Court ruled in the present case, however, that the facts here differed significantly from O'Callahan in that these offenses were committed on post against persons who were properly there. Based on these and other facts which were distinguishable from O'Callahan, the Court ruled that any offense committed by a serviceman (on or off duty) on a military installation that violates the security of a person or property is "service connected" within the meaning of O'Callahan and triable by court-martial. The Court stressed the interest of the military in insuring the security of persons or property on the military post and the impact and adverse effect such crimes have on the morale, discipline and integrity of base personnel and upon the military operation and mission of the base.

A second decision more directly related to the procedural aspects of criminal trial but of interest to the criminal investigator was the Supreme Court 5-4 decision in the case of Harris V New York, No 206, also decided on 24 February 1971. The Court here held that a statement taken from the defendant in the course of the police investigation but which was ruled inadmissible against the defendant in the prosecution's case in chief because of lack of procedural safeguards required by Miranda V.Arizona, 384 US 436 may, if its trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, be used for impeachment purposes to attack the credibility of the defendant's trial testimony.

The Court refused to permit the defendant, who voluntarily took the stand in his own behalf, to affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility. Although every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, that privilege does not include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to testify truthfully and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth testing devices of the adversary process.




SEC DEPARTMENT NOTES

NIS-40 has established a schedule for making Collection Plan Reviews, and overall Evaluations of the SEC activities of each NIS component. The efforts are separate programs, but are necessarily interrelated. The first NISO evaluation (on NISO Marianas) has been issued. Such Reviews and Evaluations are designed to provide field components with NISHQ guidance, and to insure mutual understanding of objectives, capabilities, and responsibilities. If recipients feel that the Evaluations and Reviews indicate some local factor which is not known at NISHQ, they are encouraged to clarify the situation by a response. The review program described is in parallel with the NISHQ monthly critique of NISO-produced Counterintelligence Briefs.

Unusual Reciprocal Investigation

NISRA Charleston recently assisted in the successful apprehension and conviction of a poacher aboard the Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, S. C. According to the report a civilian entered the station illegally, proceeded to a wildlife feeding area and fired three or four shots with a shotgun. Passersby saw two wild turkeys fall. The poacher was later seen placing two objects, believed to be turkeys, in the trunk of his car. The FBI declined investigative interest but the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service accepted investigative jurisdiction. Inquiries resulted in identification of the civilian's car. Part of the crime scene search is reported as follows: "Inspection of the area where the two turkeys were shot disclosed numerous feathers and footprints leading to and from the adjacent wooded area. The clearest footprint was photographed and a cast made of the print. Samples of the feathers were obtained as evidence." The poacher was subsequently identified by a Marine Sentry, pleaded

guilty in Berkeley County, S. C., and was fined \$100.00.



NISO Travel Bureau

Soon the vacation season will be upon us. Therefore, it is apropos that the "residence swap plan" be reinstituted for interested Special Agents. The basis for the plan is for agents to be able to travel to desirable vacation areas where they may reside rent free in exchange for allowing an agent from another area to occupy their own then vacated residence for a like purpose. To illustrate the plan, . agents in New York and Washington, D.C. exchange residences for a week thereby allowing both families to take advantage of visiting and touring new and interesting areas. Similarly, an agent in San Francisco may desire to exchange with an agent in Los Angeles. It is envisioned that the plan would be administered in each NISO by the Supervising Agent or his designee. NISO's would make area preferences known to pertinent Supervising Agent's, who would merely advise interested parties of possible comparable equitable arrangements. From that point on it would be between the two agents involved to work out the details.

TEEL Winner of 1st NISO San Diego Annual Golf Tournament


Special Agent Roger C. TEEL, Senior Resident Agent at NISRA, Port Hueneme, California, won the first annual NISO, San Diego golf tournament with a net score of 64. The second low net award went to Mrs. Meredith THOMAS of NISRA, MCRD, who was the only distaff entrant. Third low net was won by Special Agent Lyman BUTTERFIELD, ASRA, NISRA, Port Hueneme, who also won a prize for the longest drive, estimated at about 272 yards. CAPT. H. P. LYON took home the trophy for low gross with Special Agent Mathaniel J. HUDGINS, SRA, NISRA Long Beach, and Special Agent Byron M. TAYLOR, NISRA, Naval Station, San Diego, winning second and third places respectively. TAYLOR also won a prize for being closest to the pin on number 14. a par three, while the SRA at NISRA, North Island, Special Agent Ronald E. BRIGHT won a trophy as the most honest golfer with a snappy


150 for 18 holes.

The tournament was held at the very find North Course of the Admiral Baker Navy Recreation Area in Mission Valley and an excellent turnout was experienced. Current plans are to rotate sponsorship of the tournament annually.

WHERE ARE THEY NOW ?

Ten years ago NIS Refresher Course 2R-61 was held at Naval Intelligence Headquarters, Navy Service Center, Arlington, Virginia, from 27 February to 10 March 1961. Of the eighteen class members, nine are still employed as Special Agents, six resigned and three have retired.





NAME

EOD

NISOs/NISRAs assigned

ROW 1 HAEFELI, Paul M. Nov 1956 L TO R

NISRA Charleston, NISO Charleston, NISRA Pensacola, NISHQ, NISRA Long Beach(SRA), NISRA Subic Bay (SRA).

MOTE, Robert M.

Jul 1957

NISO Phila., NISRA Cleveland, NISO Europe, NISRA Frankfurt, NISRA Earle, N.J. (SRA)

MR J.W. LYNCH, CDR R.A. KLARE, MR. C. R. WILSON, MR H.V. SCHULTZ (NISHQ)

- BELL, James H. Nov 1956 NISO Washington, NISO Japan, NISRA Sasebo, NISRA Washington, NISRA Quantico-Resigned 5/65.
- ROW 2 HEDDERMAN, John J. Apr 1957 NISRA Boston-Resigned 1/62 L TO R GOODNOW, Wilbur R. Aug 1950 NISRA Denver Retired 8/70

Dec 1956

FOLTZ, William E.

NISRA Ft Amador, NISHQ, NISO Washington-Resigned 10/63

BYRD, James P.	May 1956	NISRA San Diego, NISRA Phoenix, NISRA Camp Pendleton(SRA), NISO San Diego(Code 30), NISRA Naval Station(San Diego).
BROCK, Raymond Jr.	Apr 1957	NISRA Norfolk, NISRA Charlottes- ville, NISRA Camp Lejeune, NISRA Cherry Pt. (SRA).
PARRISH, James D.	Sep 1956	NISRA New Orleans, NISRA Okla- homa City-Resigned 6/63.
EMERSON, Robert D.	May 1957	NISRA Charleston-Resigned 2/62
HOPKINS, David H.	Nov 1956	NISRA Washington-Resigned 11/61.
HILREY. Harold C.	May 1951	NISRA Chicago, NISRA Omaha,

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ROW 3 ULREY, Harold C. L TO R

KEMERY, Melvin E.

NISRA Chicago, NISRA Omaha, NISRA Kansas City, NISRA Omaha(SRA).

June 1957 NISRA Chicago, NISRA Minneapolis, NISRA Kansas City, NISRA Indianapolis (SRA).

HARRISON, Zachary T. Mar 1957 NISRA Norfolk, NISRA Camp Lejeune, NISRA Bainbridge, NISRA Norfolk, NISRA Cherry Pt., NISRA Camp Lejeune.

NISO New York, NISRA Garden City, NISRA Naples, NISRA Naples(Nea Makri, Greece), NISRA Norfolk, NISRA Little Creek.

KARTIS, James G. Jan 57

SULLIVAN, Arthur J. June 1956 NISO Charleston, NISRA Columbia, S.C., NISRA Gtmo, NISRA Dallas, NISHQ, NISRA Bethesda(SRA).

> NISO Seattle, NISO Kodiak, NISO Philippines, NISO Hawaii, NISO Kodiak(SRA), NISRA Great Lakes(SRA), NISRA Long Beach (SRA), Retired (Disability) March 1967.

MAINO, George

CARNAHAN, Vernon

Nov 1956

May 1951

NISRA Houston - Retired (Disability 12/68.

Statements of The Quarter

The following statements were extracted from reports received recently in NIS-21 and NIS-23.

"Subject's wife has a good reputation in the community as far as he knows, although he does not know her intimately."

"One former instructor stated that Subject is emotionally unstable, but suitable for a position of trust."


"He recommended Subject for a position of trust with the stipulation that it might be a good idea to keep close

watch on Subject at first."

"He described Subject as a very likeable person whose family in (STATE) enjoys a good reputation among guernsey breeders."

"..... excellent worker, followed orders well, and has a good absentee record."

(Subject's sworn statement) "I have on occasions smoked grass, and because I'm a loner I smoke alone. I don't like crowds and smokey place(s) because it's bad for your health."





COMMENDATIONS

LETTERS OF APPRECIATION

SUPERIOR ACCOMPLISHMENT AWARD

MC KEE, J. Brian (\$300) 20

LETTERS OF COMMENDATION

MC KEE, J. Brian

20

LETTERS OF APPRECIATION

KALIHER, Vernon L. RYAN, John A. HORAN, Thomas D. BUTLER, John E. WHITEHOUSE, Robert A. CHANDLER, Charles H. GORRICK, Albert J. DALY, Joseph P. HOGAN, Stephen F. HAIG, Richard D. HALEY, John F. BOLAND, William F. ROGERS, Gordon T. SHARKEY, Thomas J. BELLINO, Richard A. NELMS, Nowell D. BAKER, James J. ANTHONY, Kenneth W. ELMQUIST, Roy C. DONNENWIRTH, Thomas J.

GUTSHALL, Stephen C. 00 HAMILTON, Wayne B. 01 HOUGHTON, Michael M. 01 MACY, John C. 01 BARKER, Lionel A. 01 01 HOWARD, Robert V. RUSSELL, Raymond J. 03 03 STEGER, Matthew E. 03 USHER, Robert R. 03 MULLIN, Thomas A. BELCHER, Francis C. 03 MC KEE, J. Brian 03 COLE, Charles N. 03 USREY, Dennis E. 03 CHRIST, Christ C. 03 GLUBA, Blair M. 05 09 HANCOCK, Laddie A. 09 WALSH, John J. FUJII, Stanley S. 09 09 TATE, Terrance R.



TRANSFERS

Transfers

NISHQ MCKENNA, Richard E. MELIA, Francis M. NISRA UTICA GILBERT, Edward C. ALLAN, Thomas R. NAYLOR, Joseph F. BICKLEY, Charles M. RAINVILLE, Roy A. NISRA ROTA COLE, Charles N. NISRA SAIGON GRIM, Gordon F. NISRA SAIGON FITZPATRICK, Edward J. NISO VIETNAM KERSENBROCK, Allan J. NISRA DANANG DILL, John NISRA NAPLES CREATURO, James J.

From

NISO VIETNAM NISRA FT AMADOR NISRA NEWPORT NISHQ NISHQ NISRA PITTSBURGH NISRA NAPLES NISRA NORFOLK NISRA CAMP PENDLETON NISRA DANANG NISRA NORFOLK NISRA LEMOORE NISRA CAMP PENDLETON NISRA SAN DIEGO NISRA NORTH ISLAND NISRA SAN FRANCISCO NISRA WHIDBEY ISLAND NISO PHILADELPHIA

TO

PROMOTIONS

Authorized Promotions To GS - 13

COLLINS, Emmit F.

14

Authorized Promotions To GS - 12

81

81

19

COMMANDER, Frank A. IWAMOTO, David TESHIMA, Roy

Authorized Promotions To GS - 11

The following Special Agents successfully completed the professional examination administered during the 2nd quarter FY 1971 and have been advanced to GS-11.

MALDONADO, Jose 10 STILWELL, Fredrick L.

DIRECTIVES OF INTEREST

NISINST 5730.1 of 16 February 1971, Subj: Release of Naval Investigative Service File Information to Congress. This instruction sets forth guidelines concerning requests for information from NIS files by members of Congress or Congressional staff personnel.

LATE BREAKING ITEM - PAY RAISE FOR RETIREES

As provided by law, a raise in retirement pay, military and civilian, appears to be in the offing. This occurs whenever the rise in the cost of living, as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, reaches a certain point (3% above a 1967 base point) and remains at not lower than that level for three successive months. According to the Federal Times, indications now are that an approximate 4.2% increase will become due in the July retired check for those civilians on the retired rolls as of 1 June (effective date for military will be a month later). Anyone contemplating taking the big step would be well advised to get with it before 1 June to pick up these extra \$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$\$!!