



Bulletin



From: Commander, Naval Security and Investigative Command
Subj: Bulletin

There is a need for enhancing communications between headquarters and the field offices of this Command. We can satisfy this need and increase our effectiveness in serving the Department of the Navy by selectively publishing information of interest to the members of the Naval Security and Investigative Command. This bulletin is intended for use by all hands.

John E. Gordon
Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, JAGC, USN



A HIGH-PROFILE PSD

NIS Special Agents assigned to protect Lt.Col. Oliver North clear a path through a crowd of photographers and reporters as Lt.Col. North leaves his attorney's office.


Fall 1987

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Naval Security and Investigative Command
Code 00I
Washington, D.C. 20388-5000



Naval Security
and
Investigative Command
Washington, D.C. 20388-5000

The first thing I would like to do as the Commander of the Naval Security and Investigative Command is thank my predecessor, Rear Admiral Cathal L. "Irish" Flynn for doing an outstanding job. As the first COMNAVSECINVCOM, he made enormous strides in enhancing the overall security posture of the Navy.


Next I want you to know that I have all the confidence in the world in this Command. I am looking forward to working with you and to being part of an organization which is responsible for so many of the Navy's security and investigative functions.

This Command has grown tremendously during the past few years and has achieved much, but we can not rest on our laurels. We definitely have our work cut out for us and now that I have assumed command, the responsibility for this organization's leadership and management is mine.

I do not take the words leadership and management lightly, nor do I use them synonymously. There is a difference. Management simply involves the use of techniques to accomplish a task. Leadership involves more. To paraphrase a leader of a bygone era, you must "know your stuff, do your job, and take care of your people."

That is what I am going to do during my tenure here. I am proud to be part of the Naval Security and Investigative Command and I look forward to our facing the challenges of the future together.

Sincerely,


John E. Gordon

U. S. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



...Two Special Agents riding in a jeep along a frequently mined Vietnamese road between Chu Lai and Da Nang to work a fragging homicide... a task force working a multi-million dollar fraud investigation involving bid rigging and collusion in Norfolk...

Physical Security Specialists and Trainers working around the clock to upgrade security for U.S. Navy facilities and personnel in the Persian Gulf... adjudicators putting in long hours to reduce a large backlog of pending security clearance actions ...shots fired as NIS personnel work to establish communications with a barricaded suspect in San Diego...

TIS personnel hard at work putting in sophisticated video surveillance gear at Subic Bay... fraud specialists working around the clock to man multiple wires at covert locations in CONUS... computer specialists providing support to the Bobsled Task Force... secretaries from around the world volunteering to provide critically needed support at Buzzard's Point...


Special Agents controlling CWs in Pattaya Beach, San Diego and Brunswick on drug interdiction operations... a team of five Special Agents conducting a protective service detail out of the home of the Sixth Fleet Admiral in Gaeta, Italy... agents sifting through rubble in a crater left by a terrorist bomb which took the lives of more than 200 Marines in Beirut... a group of agents working through the Christmas holiday in London interrogating an embassy security guard suspected of committing espionage... this is the stuff of which camaraderie grows and what makes all of you very special people.

This SPECIAL feeling that all of you share is more than professional camaraderie, it is a professional kinship of a special sort: not acquired from date of employment, but achieved through being a team player, earning the respect of fellow employees, by performing at one's best at every assigned task, by keeping the confidences entrusted to you, by safeguarding the integrity of oneself and the organization, vicariously sharing in the successes and failures of others, by remaining unswerving in one's dedication to serve and protect.

Professionalism here is not only measured by one's ability, but by one's honesty, persistence, fairness, and loyalty to the fraternity with whom they serve. Our strength is in our unity. We seek out individuals in recruitment who are independent, creative, and imaginative individuals, but ultimately it is our fraternity and camaraderie which gives us our greatest success and legacy. I am proud to be counted as one of you.

As we welcome Rear Admiral Ted Gordon as our new Commander, I ask you to keep up the great work and show him what we're made of!

Best regards,



J. Brian McKee
Director



Rear Adm. Cathal L. Flynn, USN



Rear Adm. John E. Gordon, USN

REAR ADM. GORDON ASSUMES COMMAND

Rear Adm. John E. "Ted" Gordon, JAGC, USN, relieved Rear Adm. Cathal L. "Irish" Flynn, USN, as the Commander of the Naval Security and Investigative Command on September 23, 1987. The change of command ceremony was held at the Washington Navy Yard.

Rear Adm. Flynn, who is the first SEAL to attain flag rank, returned to duty in the Navy Special Warfare community. He is now the Director of Plans, Policy and Doctrine at the U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.

Rear Adm. Gordon was born in Kingston, Pennsylvania on April 25, 1941 and graduated from Kingston High School in 1959. He attended Wilkes College for one year prior to entering the U.S. Naval Academy in 1960. After graduating in June 1964 with a Bachelor of Science degree, he was commissioned as Ensign in the Supply Corps.

While in the Supply Corps, Rear Adm.

Gordon served with several afloat commands. He was a plank-owner and served as assistant supply officer on USS JOSEPH DANIELS (DLG-27). During the Vietnam War, he was assigned on board USS JOSEPH STRAUSS (DDG-16) which was deployed to the Seventh Fleet. His shore assignments included the Naval Air Engineering Center and duty as a contracting officer at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard.

Rear Admiral Gordon transferred to the Judge Advocate General's Corps in 1971 and graduated from Temple University School of Law in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1973. After admission to the Pennsylvania Bar, he was assigned to the Commander Fourth Naval District Law Center, and subsequently became Special Court-Martial Judge in the Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary and Assistant Officer-in-Charge of the Naval Legal Service Office, Philadelphia.

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From 1975 to 1977, Rear Admiral Gordon was assigned as an admiralty attorney in the Office of the Judge Advocate General and then served as a legislative attorney in the Office of Legislative Affairs from 1977 to 1980. Following that assignment, he served as Special Assistant (Law) to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower, Reserve Affairs Logistics) from 1980 to 1981, and subsequently as the Special Assistant (Legal and Legislative Affairs) to the Secretary of the Navy from 1981 to 1985.

In 1986, while serving as principal Deputy for Senate Liaison in the Office of Legislative Affairs, he was selected for flag rank to be Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy (Operations and Management). He was promoted to his current rank in October 1986 and is currently assigned additional duty as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs.

Rear Admiral Gordon's personal awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, the Meritorious Service Medal, the National Defense Medal, Vietnam Service Medal (three bronze stars) and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

Rear Admiral Gordon is married to the former Dorothy E. "Sam" Shemanski

of Edwardsville, Pennsylvania. They have three children; Stephen who attends the Hill School in Pottstown, Pennsylvania and John and Elizabeth at home in Vienna, Virginia.

During Rear Adm. Flynn's tenure as the first COMNAVSECINVCOM, he guided the command through several major organizational evolutions and investigations.

The upgrading of the Navy's law enforcement and physical security program, the reorganization of the Naval Security Force, and the establishment of the Central Adjudication Facility are just some two major accomplishments achieved under Rear Adm. Flynn's direction.

When Rear Adm. Flynn assumed command of NSIC in August 1985, NSIC was already involved in the Walker/Whitworth investigation. But three months later, NSIC found itself involved in another highly-publicized espionage investigation resulting in the arrest and conviction of former NSIC intelligence analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard. Since then, NSIC has investigated espionage committed at the Moscow and Vienna Embassies, and retired Navy Chief Petty Officer Michael Allen's espionage in the Philippines.

NSIC CHIEF OF STAFF APPOINTED

Capt. James E. Ulmer, USN, reported to the Naval Security and Investigative Command as its first Chief of Staff on 13 July 1987.

Prior to coming to NSIC, Capt. Ulmer spent three years as the commanding officer of the Naval Investigative Service Regional Office in Charleston, S.C.

He was born in Portsmouth, Virginia, and is the son of a retired 30-year Navy veteran. His father, Thomas E. Ulmer, spent the first 14 years of his Navy career as an enlisted man and was a radioman chief when he was promoted to ensign. As a flight crew member, the elder Ulmer flew off the old carriers, including the USS Langley, the USS Saratoga and the USS Ranger. His father retired as a lieutenant commander in 1958 and now lives in

Seattle, Washington.

Capt. Ulmer enlisted in the Navy as a hospital corpsman recruit in February 1959 and entered flight training as a Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCAD) in August 1959. He was commissioned as an ensign, USNR, and received his designation as a Naval Aviator in April 1961.

After spending six months with VA-122 as a student, he was assigned to VA-95 as an attack pilot. He spent most of his flying time in A-1 Sky Raiders. In June 1963 he transferred to VU-3 at San Clemente Island. Three years later he entered the Armed Forces Aviation Intelligence Training Command at Lowery AFB in Denver, Colorado, as a student. He graduated with honors and received his designation as an

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intelligence officer in January 1967.

After a three-year tour of duty with the Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., he spent 15 months in Vietnam as an advisor. He later returned to Vietnam for a second tour of duty, as the intelligence officer onboard the USS Midway (CV-41). He was on the USS Midway while it supported the evacuation of Cambodia and Vietnam, and the Mayaguez operation.

Capt. Ulmer has master's degree (with honors) in Systems Management of (Information Systems) from the University of Southern California, and a bachelor's degree in International Relations (cum laude) from the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey,

California.

His decorations include the Defense Superior Service medal; the Joint Service Commendation; the Navy Commendation with Combat "V" and a gold star in lieu of a second award; the Navy Unit Commendation with one star in lieu of a second award; the Joint Meritorious Unit Award; the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; the Humanitarian Service Medal; the Republic of Vietnam Presidential Unit Commendation; the Republic of Vietnam Staff Honor Medal; the Republic of Vietnam Cross of Gallantry; the National Defense Medal; the Vietnam Campaign Medal with four campaign stars; the Vietnam Service Medal; and the Overseas Service Ribbon.

QUESTIONS ABOUT MOVE TO WNY ANSWERED

The following answers were provided by Lt.Cmdr. Bill Moreno, SC, USN, the task force coordinator for move to the Washington Navy Yard:

Q1: What is the status of Building 111 at the Washington Navy Yard?

A1: The renovation will be finished in April 1988, but we will need time to install security systems, telecommunications equipment and ADP hook-ups. The actual move from the Suitland Federal Complex is scheduled to take place in August 1988.

Q2: Who can you contact to find out more information about the move?

A2: The task force is made up of representatives from each directorate and department who can answer questions. They are: Capt. James Ulmer (00); Mr. Tom Filkins (22); S/A Rick Machin (23); Mr. Joe Radigan (24); S/A Larry Farrell (25); S/A Carl Merritt (26); Mr. Dave Pryor (27); Lt. Dennis Baker, CEC, USN, (28); and Ms. Janet Herbert (30).

Q3: What is being done about parking at the Washington Navy Yard?

A3: A survey is being done by Mr. Bob Christopher of L.D. Ridgeway, Inc., to determine the wiring requirements for each directorate and department, but he is also conducting a survey to find out who will be car pooling so we can find out how many spaces we will need at the Washington Navy Yard.

Q4: Are there any plans to move the Information and Personnel Security Directorate and the Central Adjudication Facility from Silver Spring, Maryland, to the Washington Navy Yard?

A4: There are plans to move those two directorates to the Building 176 in the Washington Navy Yard, which is diagonally across the street from Building 111. That move is scheduled to take place within six months to a year after the move from Suitland.

HISTORY

THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE: A PROUD TRADITION OF SERVICE

By S/A Wayne Goldstein

IN THE BEGINNING

During the period immediately following our Civil War, the United States Navy found itself in a state of disarray and woefully incapable of protecting the nation. Along with ships and men, the ravages of conflict destroyed naval strength and readiness, leaving few seaworthy ships when peace finally arrived.

Yet fueled by the indomitable American spirit and spurred with challenge, there arose a class of naval officer who recognized the need for rebuilding a United States Navy that had come to be ignored in the postwar period by government and citizen alike.

The change that came was wholly owed to a recognition amongst the officer class that emerging technological and educational advances had to be adopted if the service was ever to fulfill its duty to the nation. It was precisely during this time and for those reasons that our nation's first organized agency devoted entirely to intelligence collection and associated activities was founded.

Years before, the U.S. Navy had come to recognize the importance of capitalizing on intelligence to counter enemy plans and movements during both the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812; however, those efforts were best characterized as disorganized and fragmented to such a degree as to be ineffectual.

On 23 March 1882, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was created with the signing of General Order 292 by William H. Hunt, Secretary of the Navy, and became the first U.S. Government agency devoted solely to the systematic collection of information regarding foreign military affairs. Originally subordinate to the Bureau of Navigation, ONI would routinely acquire information from military attaches posted abroad or naval officers making cruises to foreign ports, where numerous collection opportunities were presented to command staff personnel. Whether it was charting foreign passages, rivers or other bodies of water, touring overseas fortifications and building yards or conducting other naval related activities as necessary, naval personnel busied themselves collecting information for ONI regarding the strengths and weaknesses of any alien power that could someday pose a threat to U.S. national security interests. 1

ONI quickly gained an enviable reputation and for three decades was considered by U.S. government officials to be the most authoritative and reliable source of information regarding foreign military affairs. Even so, a great deal of information collected by this organization, especially that dealing with European shipbuilding advances and associated industrial improvements, would never be put to substantive use.

In fact, volumes of valuable data frequently lay totally wasted and squirreled away in various navy bureaus because ONI lacked the capability in its infancy to render

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in-depth analysis that would have insured the material was more thoroughly understood and better used. ONI's shortcomings were recognized as especially critical when it was finally realized the United States, with a fleet of wooden sailing ships, was quickly shrinking to inferiority in the face of European navies producing iron hulled men-of-war with rifled guns and metal turrets. 2

IN THE EARLY DAYS

During its early days, ONI was officially tasked by the Department of the Navy to collect specifically categorized information deemed essential to the U.S. defense. To fulfill this duty, the Secretary of the Navy mandated that naval officers who could objectively and skillfully collect and report matters of interest to the Navy be chosen for service with ONI in Washington, D.C., posted to any one of several naval attache positions at U.S. foreign legations, or appointed as special aides to senior military personnel posted abroad. Generally all would restrict their collection to information that was publicly available and could be acquired through overt means like open source publications, from foreign officers with whom the naval attache or aide might associate and through contacts with knowledgeable political or industrial figures.

Initially, the military and naval attache system formally established by passage of Congressional Law on 22 September 1888, allowed for the posting that following year of five officers to Berlin, Paris, London, Vienna and St. Petersburg.

Within five years this rudimentary intelligence network expanded modestly and attache personnel came to be posted in Rome, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo and Mexico City. For years,, the number of naval officers assigned such duties remained limited and at a fixed level or, in some cases, attaches would only be posted to a foreign nation in times of international tension or strife.

It became the primary responsibility of naval attaches to visit naval

bases, shipyards, industrial sites and any other commercial or government facilities associated with building, supporting or directing foreign commercial and military maritime efforts. Though officially instructed to perform their duty in an open manner, our former attaches sometimes found it necessary to employ covert measures and the use of "secret agents" to gather information that would be unavailable by any other means.

Even as it was successful in certain regards, the early attache system was probably no more than moderately effective due to a continual lack of funding and because the posts were difficult to fill with the line officers who generally did not regard such duty as prestigious or career enhancing. 3

Initially, ONI was more concerned with collecting information regarding the characteristics and weaponry of foreign vessels than with tactics, movements, dispositions or the intentions of those navies. However by 1915, when it became one of nine subdivisions organized into the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, ONI would assume responsibility given it by the Navy "General Plan" to develop and gather all manner of information on the navy's possible adversaries.

The plan allowed for certain collection to be done by covert means and by 1916 the first undercover operation, termed Branch Office, had commenced activity in New York City under the control of ONI. Staffed by naval reservists on active duty or civilian volunteers working without pay, the Branch Office garnered some impressive successes in the field of counterespionage while protecting U.S. persons and properties from subversion and sabotage in the wake of growing world conflict.

Simultaneous to these endeavors a separate organization called the Aides for Information was developing and employing personnel who were locally assigned to the staffs of fifteen Naval District Commandants.

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Aid For Information Star

Individuals affiliated with this effort routinely searched passengers on incoming vessels, provided security at docks, warehouses and factories, investigated subversive activity and executed other necessary duties during this extraordinary period to protect the Navy and country from possible foreign inspired subversion. With Branch Offices centrally controlled from Washington, while aides were supervised by their respective districts it was inevitable that confusion, conflict and duplication arose to such an extent that all investigative activities came to be consolidated under the District Aides.

THE WAR YEARS

The preeminent concern of ONI when our nation finally declared war on Germany and its allies was the ferreting out of individuals deemed a threat to the U.S. Navy or national security. Often working on tips provided by a variety of government agencies or patriotic organizations or on information acquired from private citizens swept up by the furor of the time, ONI pursued and worked tirelessly against all those suspected of subversive activity.

ONI operatives became quite skilled at a variety of investigative techniques like surveillance and wiretapping and at one point it was actively involved in some 15,000 subversive investigations each week. The identification and neutralization of subversive elements became especially important to ONI after being assigned responsibility for protecting those war plants executing U.S. Navy contracts. ONI field agents routinely checked those plants for physical security, indications of labor unrest that would affect production, loyalty of factory workers and managers and the identification and elimination of anyone who could pose a threat to that company's vital work for the U.S. Navy.

There is no question that ONI did materially contribute to our nation's security and war-making capacity during this trying time although there was a certain amount of attendant frustration. In its enthusiasm to seek out individuals posing a possible threat to national security, ONI could be blamed for periodically engaging in "witch hunts" or using questionable methods that would later be judged an affront to justice. Intolerance for different tactics or the needs of other government agencies led ONI into repeated conflicts with Army Intelligence and the U.S. Justice Department. Eventually, Rear Admiral Leigh C. Palmer, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was forced to comment in August 1918, "....ONI might be pursuing suspects a bit too enthusiastically."

The Director of ONI at that time was further warned, apparently in the interest of fairness, "...to permit people accused of misdeeds to explain their actions before Naval Intelligence recommended dismissal, arrest or internment." 5

During the First World War, ONI assigned four times the personnel and resources to domestic security work, as it did on foreign collection, after deciding that protecting the home front was its most important mission.

Yet in all fairness, it should be recalled that ONI traditionally

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considered its primary responsibility to be the collection, evaluation and dissemination of foreign intelligence that was of interest to the U.S. Navy. With our nation's declaration of war and involvement in armed hostilities, ONI was quickly forced to adopt many new responsibilities, like domestic security, without the luxury of extensive planning or very much forethought. Considering the seriousness of the time and overall circumstances, it is not entirely surprising that ONI would be chastised for being a bit too over zealous as it attempted to execute its duties in what was thought to be the most effective manner.

As had traditionally been the case, the bulk of all foreign intelligence collection continued to be performed by those naval attaches posted to U.S. diplomatic establishments in foreign countries. During the war years, naval attaches were forced to rely on the use of agent networks to insure the development of necessary and ever-increasing amounts of information. Emphasis was placed on the development of covert capabilities and the establishment of a global spy network that enlisted a string of agents throughout Latin America and the Far East.

Some of these networks proved to be quite effective and lent themselves to the development of valuable information while others suffered poor organization and management, producing little other than scant or erroneous information that had disastrous effects at times.

THE LEAN YEARS

The end of World War I brought a general demobilization and the country's desire to rapidly return to normalcy. With the Armistice signed and our country at peace, few could give reason to the need for maintaining other than a modest military.

Though not completely expendable, ONI without a war machine to support, came to be ignored in large part by the Department of the Navy which cut funding for personnel or operations and pared the organization back in all aspects to its barest minimum.

Several years would elapse until 1926 when a limited effort was undertaken to establish groups of volunteer reserve intelligence officers whose goal became the gathering of information on individuals and activities that could pose a threat to U.S. naval security.

The intent was to create a cadre of personnel who could be called upon to render service in time of national emergency and by the beginning of 1927, some such groups had been created and started to operate in a manner that would be refined during the ensuing several years. Yet the mood of our nation was slow to change and it remained the strongest wish of many citizens that we continue to isolate ourselves from problems and entangling involvements with other nations.



USNR Badge Used in the 1930's

Naturally, few could see the need to collect foreign intelligence and during these years such assignments continued to be regarded as especially undesirable by the regular Army and Navy officers given such responsibilities.

Though ONI by 1934 remained a small and neglected organization with only twenty-four officers and a clerical staff of eighteen, attitudes were slowly beginning to change in certain quarters of government where it was considered necessary to begin collecting more earnestly, information relating to the naval strength, war making capabilities and national intentions of certain foreign powers.

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The chief source of this information continued to be the naval attache system which had generally proven itself to be competent and capable in the past. Additionally, a certain amount of data was collected by persons assigned to intelligence staffs of each Naval District although their contribution was quite often weakened by routinely being assigned too many diverse or non-intelligence activities. When the national ambitions of the Axis Powers finally brought Europe and the Far East to war, President Roosevelt mandated in June 1939, that ONI be responsible for the investigation of sabotage, espionage and subversive activities that posed any kind of threat to the Navy.

By the fall of 1940, a selective call-up of intelligence reservists for investigative and counterintelligence duties began, and following our entry into World War II, the Navy's investigative arm was manned almost entirely by reserve officer personnel.

STORM ON THE HORIZON

It is estimated that by 1940, there were no more than 1,000 people employed by organizations composing the U.S. intelligence community. Of those, most were working as radio intercept operators and although national efforts were generally limited in scope and capability, a good deal of raw information was being collected nevertheless.

One particularly serious problem during this time resulted from the sad fact there was no coordination between these agencies as each routinely worked totally independent of the others. There was no sharing of the intelligence product by agencies that established their own objectives and methods for collection, nor was there any effort to insure essential coverage was afforded all matters bearing on U.S. national security.

During this time, the President routinely received deficient information from several agencies, notably the Departments of State, Army and Navy, because it was never

produced by an integrated intelligence network that was capable of in-depth introspective analysis. It was precisely this disorganized system that failed to recognize the impending danger or protect our country from the devastating attack at Pearl Harbor. 6

As had historically been the case, ONI suffered a rapid and continual rotation of naval officers through its ranks during the years immediately preceding conflict as sea duty continued to remain more career-enhancing than service ashore. Management was not to be spared unrest for between 1940 and 1945, there would be no fewer than seven different directors heading ONI. During 1940 and 1941, ONI relied heavily on 130 naval officers posted abroad as attaches or occupying certain other positions from which they could collect information. Unfortunately, this entire effort emphasized gathering the obvious like data about foreign ports, navies and capabilities instead of the more sublime art of determining the intentions and plans of those particular nations. ONI not only failed to collect the vital information that would signal turbulent times ahead for our nation, but it was also precluded from thoroughly analyzing the material it did develop.

That particular responsibility was solely conferred upon the more prestigious War Plans Division which would invariably rate the worth of information solely on its potential use to fleet units if hostilities ever broke out.

If there was one bright spot amongst these woeful efforts prior to our declaration of war, it was assuredly in the field of military cryptanalysis. By 1939 and 1940, the Navy had made gains in breaking Japanese codes and ciphers although it was the Army's Signal Intelligence Service which cracked that country's top diplomatic code enabling both services to decipher massive quantities of their communication. Assigned the code name "Magic", these collective message translations allowed the President, Army Chief of

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Staff George Marshall and a small number of military officers access to high quality information concerning Japanese military activities, diplomatic positions/policies and indirectly, certain items of information regarding their German ally.

This particular breakthrough served as a vital source of information throughout the war but was never exploited to maximum advantage because the final intelligence product was not shared with precisely those planners and policy makers at lower levels who could have used it to greater national advantage.

Perhaps the most serious shortfall was due to the fact this information was not analyzed in any depth or synthesized with material collected by independent sources and means. Undoubtedly there were countless hints of Japanese intentions, including their plan to attack Pearl Harbor, but the U.S. intelligence effort proved itself incapable of separating meaningful clues from that which was irrelevant in the captured and deciphered traffic.

CONTRIBUTING TO VICTORY

Once the United States was finally forced into war, it was hard work and an indomitable spirit that could best explain how the Japanese Fleet code was broken and the U.S. Navy achieved a resounding victory at the crucial Battle of Midway fought on 04 June 1942.

Admiral Yamamoto devised a plan that employed a feigned attack against American forces guarding the Aleutian Island chain. It was his intention to drive American forces from the Pacific by drawing them northward toward the Aleutians while he captured the strategic island of Midway with a vastly overwhelming contingent.

Owing to the fact ONI had deciphered the Japanese Fleet Code, U.S. Naval commanders knew and effectively countered every Japanese move, dealing them a resounding defeat with the loss of four Imperial aircraft carriers and a forced withdrawal from the area.



Comic strip hero Dick Tracy "served" his country during World War II as an ONI Agent.

The Second World War precipitated the expansion of ONI with manpower and resources made available as never before. On the home front, ONI was directed to conduct personnel security inquiries, sabotage, espionage, and countersubversion cases, examine Japanese activities in the United States and investigate war fraud matters. Even with an end to conflict and the general demobilization of U.S. military forces, the Departments of the Army, Navy and later the Air Force, maintained sizable intelligence components which would quickly gain respected positions in the intelligence community as their respective roles developed in the postwar environment.

A NEW KIND OF CONFLICT

The coming of the Cold War brought an unprecedented reliance on our nation's intelligence community to keep the country aware of threats and fully prepared to meet all manner of conflict. It was during these years that ONI developed as an intelligence organization fully capable of supporting the U.S. Navy in the accomplishment of its tactical and strategic responsibilities.

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World War II Era ONI Badge

Even with the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947, the Navy did not relinquish what it considered a right to an intelligence organization, and stood firm in the belief it would continue to "...collect, evaluate and disseminate that intelligence it considered important to its own need." 7

At the center of today's Naval Intelligence community is the Office of Naval Intelligence which is within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Director of Naval Intelligence is an Assistant Chief of Naval Operations who reports directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and is also indirectly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. With the primary purpose of meeting the intelligence and counterintelligence needs of the U.S. Navy, ONI frequently employs a variety of sources and methods to gather information regarding the intentions and capabilities of many foreign nations.

Routinely such information is shared by ONI with policy makers and contingency planners or within the military community to support the formulation of naval or inter-service plans and operations. It detects and warns of threats to the security of our naval establishment and is

responsible for coordinating all intelligence activities within the Department of the Navy. ONI continually makes meaningful contributions to the U.S. intelligence community and is tasked with advising the Secretary of the Navy and Chief of Naval Operations on all matters relating to naval intelligence and the security of classified naval matters.

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During the postwar years three components were established to carry out ONI field work. The first of these, Naval District Intelligence Offices, under the management of ONI, employed personnel who were assigned to duties in the United States or certain outlying areas and concerned themselves primarily with work in the internal security and counterintelligence fields. These offices, directly responsible to the Naval District commanders, were primarily staffed with civilian agents and augmented by Naval Intelligence officers who conducted security and major criminal investigations involving naval personnel and property.



Vietnam Era ONI Badge

This particular system of District Intelligence Offices was superseded by the United States Naval Investigative Service which was founded in 1966.

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The second ONI field component consists of those intelligence personnel on the staffs of flag officers who are assigned to duties in the United States or overseas. The fundamental responsibility of those assigned to staff intelligence duties is to support area, task force and fleet commanders by developing and furnishing operational or tactical intelligence needed to fulfill mission requirements. Intelligence officers working for such staffs not only support unit commanders, but also perform collection activities that further ONI objectives.

The last component consists of the contemporary naval attache system employing personnel trained to collect intelligence for ONI while assigned to U.S. missions, embassies or other diplomatic posts around the world. Customarily, the naval attaches concern themselves with gathering information on foreign naval developments, capabilities and trends.

These individuals are also responsible for compiling and continually updating data on foreign ports, beaches and harbors since this information would be used in time of conflict to support all manner of naval air, surface and subsurface operations.

A CONTINUING NEED

Never during the history of mankind, has it been more important or challenging to work for world peace than it is today. With the advent and deployment of weapons that are literally capable of obliterating millions of people in a matter of minutes, our nation has been left with no choice but to build and maintain a credible military deterrence. One critical aspect of this force is the Department of the Navy, whose men and women tirelessly guard our nation from within and afar. Helping in turn to protect these people is the Office of Naval Intelligence, which strives to insure that our nation is served by a strong and effective naval establishment. Today's U.S. Navy has a keen appreciation for the crucial importance of timely and meaningful

information. The modern day ONI is staffed by highly trained, capable and devoted personnel who work hard to insure their organization makes a meaningful contribution to the U.S.

intelligence community and national security interests. As potential adversaries continue to deploy technologically advanced weapons systems, the demand for increased quantities of quality intelligence will grow in the coming years. A sizable portion of this information will be gathered and developed by the Naval Intelligence community which will grow and change to meet all challenges. Considering the potential consequences, the Department of the Navy and the United States of America have the need for a permanent, active and professional naval intelligence organization more than ever before.

Footnotes:

1. Jeffrey M. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, The Birth of America's First Intelligence Agency, 1865-1918 (U.S., 1979), p. 6
2. Ibid, p. 10-11
3. Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the CIA, (Fredrick, MD, 1981), p.8
4. Ibid, p. 113
5. Ibid, p. 120
6. Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars, (Washington, 1976), p. 9
7. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., The U.S. Intelligence Community; Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities, (New York, 1973), p. 9
8. Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security, (Cambridge, 1959), p. 106-108
9. Current Secrets, Spies and Scholars, Washington, 1976

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The Author



Special Agent Wayne Goldstein is a graduate of The Citadel, located in Charleston, S.C. He was a member of the Charleston City Police Department for six years, rising from patrolman to detective sergeant.

He joined the NIS in 1982 and served at Mayport, Florida, and Signonella, Italy, prior to coming to Washington, D.C., where he is now part of the NIS Joint Agency Task Force which is investigating national security matters. He is in the process of completing a masters in criminal justice from the University of South Carolina.

NIS Plank Owners' List

In keeping with time-honored traditions, the Naval Investigative Service periodically publishes the "Plank Owners List" showing the top 25 Special Agents in terms of service. The "Plank Owners" as of 1 October 1987 are listed below:

NAME	DUSTA	NIS DATE
1. Kuehl, Winston	11HQ	23 AUG 59
2. King, Laurence P.	03GL	09 NOV 59
3. Naylor, Joseph F.	0026	16 MAR 61
4. Barrows, Robert J.	80HN	13 JUL 61
5. Brannon, Thomas E.	60HQ	05 MAR 62
6. Butler, Lawrence W.	03BN	01 JUN 62
7. Black, Verner Gene	06MP	27 AUG 62
8. Jett, Charles D.	12AL	28 AUG 62
9. McKee, J. Brian	0002	01 SEP 62
10. Reilly, Peter	000Y	02 SEP 62
11. Tatum, Allan D.	81HQ	24 SEP 62
12. Carl, John W., Jr.	12WH	10 OCT 62
13. Skinner, Larry V.	11LB	15 OCT 62
14. Seehorn, Frederick R.	0024	07 JAN 63
15. McCullah, Lanny E.	0022	15 APR 63
16. Perrin, Anthony W.	11PE	20 MAY 63
17. Olson, John V.	12MA	27 MAY 63
18. Williams, Thomas C.	0026	03 JUN 63
19. Usrey, Dennis E.	05HQ	17 JUN 63
20. Stovall, Harry J.	11ET	29 JUL 63
21. McBride, Daniel A.	83SU	09 SEP 63
22. Musante, Paul V.	06RL	01 OCT 63
23. McDonald, Vincent K.	11NC	18 OCT 63
24. Childs, Richard E.	0028	18 NOV 63
25. Brandt, Joseph W.	06CS	04 JAN 64

DIRECTOR'S CUP GOES TO NORFOLK AGENT

Special Agent Virginia L. Hendrickson of NISRA Norfolk Fraud Squad was presented with the Director's Cup Award for Fiscal Year 1986. The presentation was made by Special Agent J. Brian McKee, Director of the Naval Investigative Service, during an awards banquet held in Norfolk.

The Director's Cup is presented annually to a member of the NIS Special Agent corps who has just completed his or her first year of service and who, in the opinion of his or her superiors, has excelled professionally.

"Special Agent Hendrickson came to the NIS with no law enforcement or military experience; yet her professional growth, performance and enthusiasm in her first year of employment have been exemplary," according to a letter of nomination written by Robert J. Tugwell, Special Agent-in-Charge of NISRA Norfolk.

S/A Hendrickson joined the NIS on April 13, 1986. She completed Basic Agent Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center on July 2, 1986, and received a certificate of recognition for her physical fitness level. She also volunteered for special training requiring her short-term deployment aboard a Navy vessel and later attended the NIS Procurement Fraud School.

She was initially assigned to assist in a number of complex fraud investigations and quickly learned the procedures of the procurement system. Through her initiative, Special Agent Hendrickson was able to develop a major contract fraud investigation involving \$1.7 million. The case has since been presented to the U.S. Attorney and accepted for prosecution.

In addition to successfully managing a high personal case load, S/A Hendrickson offered to assist a joint NIS/IRS/FBI Task Force in developing computer programs to trace financial transactions. Independently, she




S/A Virginia L. Hendrickson

developed, tailored and wrote a variety of programs. She set up the program to analyze a variety of data involving more than one million entries. She conducted the data analysis and as a result identified approximately 25 fictitious companies and suspect financial transactions, and incorporated a large number of tax charges for the IRS.

"Special Agent Hendrickson has developed into a major asset to the Fraud Squad and the NISRA," S/A Tugwell said his letter nominating her for the Director's Cup. "She is the consummate team player and regularly volunteers for extra assignments, assists the Special Operations Squad on night surveillances and has admirably performed her duty agent responsibilities on a variety of criminal issues."

SPECIAL AGENT AFLOAT





WATER SURVIVAL TRAINING



NIS Special Agents scheduled for duty afloat recently received water survival training at NAS Norfolk. At left, agents don helmets and life vests before entering the pool. Below left, a helicopter crash simulator carrying agents submerged. During the drill, agents must reorient themselves and escape from the submerged trainer, which even turned upside down on some of the drills. Below, survivors of water survival training take a well-earned breather.

Photos by S/A Jewel Seawood





SPECIAL AGENTS AFLOAT AS OF 1 SEP 87

USS LEXINGTON (AVT-16)	Jewel Seawood
USS MIDWAY (CV-41)	Larry Worthington
USS CORAL SEA (CV-43)	Bob Mulligan Tony Albalar
USS FORRESTAL (CV-59)	Paul Martin
USS SARATOGA (CV-60)	Chris Calimer Tim Carruth
USS RANGER (CV-61)	Leon Carroll Mike Donnelly
USS INDEPENDENCE (CV-62)	Steve Smith
USS CONSTELLATION (CV-64)	Des Wieland Jim Lofstrom
USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65)	Mark Giordano Leo Miller
USS AMERICA (CV-66)	Dan Rice
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)	Steve Gorden Scott James
USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)	Mitch Anderson
USS DWIGHT T. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)	Rich Osborne
USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70)	Guy Molina Rick Jordan
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN-71)	Steve Simpson Don McBride
USS MISSOURI (BB-63)	Bob McCutchin

TRAINING

SEPARATE TRAINING DEPARTMENT ESTABLISHED UNDER S/A DYKES

NIS Special Agent Dave Dykes was appointed July 3 as the Deputy Director of the new Training Department at the Naval Security and Investigative Command. Previously, training was a division of the Career Services Department.

"The Training Department is going to consolidate all the training functions of the command, less those involving the Law Enforcement and Physical Security Directorate," S/A Dykes said. "Before, we had no consolidated central point for all command training. Now we're going to emphasize putting together a coordinated training program not only for special agents, but also for support and administrative personnel in the command."

In order to do this, the Training Department staff will be expanded from its present level of 11 to 31, with most being professional trainers classified in the GS 1712 series rather than special agents, who are classified in the GS 1811 series.

"My personal view on special agent training is that the first priority is to put together a coordinated service-wide program for in-service training," S/A Dykes said. "The second priority which is being done now, is to evaluate the basic agent program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center along with the NIS add-on and by the first of the year make proposals to revise where necessary."

"We've already gone to the field in a GEN to ask them for any input, especially in the in-service program, because we are going to be putting that together in the next few months."

S/A Dykes is a native of Sacramento, California. He attended college in the San Francisco area, receiving a bachelor's degree in business administration from St. Mary's College

and a master's degree in public administration and business from Golden Gate College.

He joined NIS in July 1967 and spent the first six years of his career in the San Francisco Bay area, with assignments at Alameda, the Naval Hospital, the Naval Supply Center and some tours afloat.

From there he was sent to NAS Fallon, Nevada, as the senior representational agent. Following that tour, he went to Hawaii, serving as the ASAC at NAS Barbers Point and later at NAS Kaneohe, and then as SARDO in NISPAC.

He served as SAC at Long Beach, El Toro and Camp Pendleton before coming to headquarters where he was the Assistant Deputy Director for Criminal Investigations until he became head of the Training Department.

DR. BLEVINS JOINS THE TRAINING DEPARTMENT

The former head of the Law Enforcement, Physical Security and Anti-Terrorism Training Division at NSIC, Dr. Larry A. Blevins, has accepted the position of Deputy Assistant Director of NSIC's new Training Department.

Dr. Blevins attended Columbus College in Columbus, Georgia, receiving an associate degree in criminal justice in 1972 and a bachelor's degree in criminal justice in 1975. He then attended Auburn University, where he received his master's degree in criminal justice in 1978 and a doctorate in education in 1983. In addition, he has an extensive background in both the military and law enforcement.

From 1968 to 1971 he was a member of

(Continued)

the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) and served an extended tour of duty in Vietnam. His military decorations include the Bronze Star with Oak Leaf cluster, Purple Heart, air Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Jump Wings, Vietnamese Jump Wings, and the Combat Infantryman Badge.

From 1971 to 1975, he was a police officer with the Columbus (Georgia) Police Department, where he worked his way up from patrolman to training officer.

From 1975 to 1976 the basic and advanced police course at the Regional Police Academy in Georgia, and from 1976 to 1981 taught a total of 14 separate graduate and undergraduate

courses in criminal justice and security as a professor of criminal justice.

In 1982 he became an education specialist for the U.S. Army Infantry School, where he developed the first inter-active video disc on military operations on urban terrain and developed concept and training for the Army's new elite Light Infantry Division.

In 1984 he was promoted to Deputy Director of Enlisted Training for the U.S. Army Military Police Corps and served there until he joined the Law Enforcement and Physical Security Directorate at NSIC in 1985.

NISRA SUBIC BAY

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATOR, FORMER WWII PHILIPPINE SCOUT RETIRES

Mr. Jun Boncodin, PG-18, a well-known figure both aboard the Subic Bay Naval Base and in Olongapo City, retired March 20, 1987, after service with the U.S. Government for 31 years.

Mr. Boncodin began that service shortly after World War II when he served in the U.S. Army as a Philippine Scout assigned to Okinawa. He was hired as a security guard by the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPM) at Subic Bay in 1958. He worked his way up to the job of criminal investigator at OPM and served in that capacity until 1969, when he joined the Naval Investigative Service at the same position.

During his 18-year tenure with the NIS, Mr. Boncodin worked on every conceivable type of criminal investigation. He participated in drug suppression operations outside the Philippines, and attended several investigation-related schools in the United States. For the last several years, Mr. Boncodin has been a Squad Leader within the NIS Resident Agency at Subic Bay.

One of the pillars of Barangay Santa Rita, Mr. Boncodin was very active in the church and related organizations, and was responsible for opening a gym for the benefit of the underprivileged



Mr. Jun Boncodin

youth of the community.

Mr. Boncodin will truly be missed by his friends on the base and in Olongapo. He and his lovely wife Zoila will be living in retirement in Walnut Creek, in the vicinity of San Francisco, California.
