Op-23Dl12

NAVY DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



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20 November 1945

MEMORANDUM for Captain A. H. McCollum, USN, Room 1070, Main Navy Building.

Subject:

Objectives of Japanese Naval Intelligence Officers.

Enclosure:

(A) Conf. U.S. Naval Intelligence (DIO 11ND) Investigation Report on subject "Japanese Naval Intelligence Instructions," dated 25 February 1941.

1. In connection with your conversation this morning with Captain H. E. Keisker, USNR, on subject matter, the following information is submitted.

- 2. Lieutenant Commander Sadatomo OKADA, IJN. Among the effects of this officer, obtained from him without his knowledge on 10 April 1941, was a list of items which are believed to represent the types of information he had been instructed to obtain for the Japanese Government. The translation follows:
 - 1. A. Movements of all ships, especially movements of fleet units.
 - B. Progress of the manufacture of war equipment.
 - C. And any other matters bearing on Army and Navy.

2. A. Sailings of Merchant Ships.

- B. Mobilization of reserve officers and men.
- C. Launching of Class B cruisers since January of this year.
- D. Preparations for fleet maneuvers.
- E. Ship building in navy and civilian plants progress of ship building.
- F. Number of men-of-war in the various oceans except vicinity of Honolulu and Far East.
- G. Warship building capacity, also present number and size under construction.
- H. Method of training used for Navy aviation, also for Army large sized plane. (Especially in regard to training in bad weather conditions on sea or over land.)

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- 3. British-American agreements regarding the joint use of bases in the Atlantic.
- 4. Training based upon European war methods. Air attacks on ships. (Also any periodical printed matter on this subject.)

(Photostat of Japanese original available in OKADA's file in Op-23D42.)

- as well as translations thereof, which demonstrate OKADA's attempts to procure the kinds of information listed above. Among these items are notes on the movements of army and navy personnel, war vessels and commercial aircraft; awards of contracts for construction of heavy bombers; training and recruitment programs for various technical schools, both military and private; details of warship construction, including diagrams thereof; a variety of information on Naval and private installations along the West Coast (docks, oil storage tanks, etc.). The range of information collected by OKADA is almost beyond description. He apparently had been well trained by his predecessor, Shigeru FUJII. OKADA and Ordnance Lieutenant Wataru YAMADA were both compelled by the U.S. State Department to leave this country because of their participation in the TACHIBANA case; they sailed from San Francisco on 5 July 1941.
- purposes this case is even more interesting than that of OKADA. OMAE entered the U.S. at San Francisco on 8 May 1935 and for a time reportedly posed as a language officer. Proof of his real identity as an intelligence officer was provided in Enclosure (A), which is a translation of original Japanese documents found in OMAE's possession. This list represents the most complete and enlightening list of Japanese Naval Intelligence requirements ever encountered in this country.
- 5. OMAE will be remembered for having worked in close collaboration with Miss Bettie Yuriko UNO, Tom Kazuo TATSUMI, of the Yamato Hotel in San Francisco. He left the United States on 29 April
- Gommander Itaru TACHIBANA, IJN. This officer directed Japanese Naval espionage on the Pacific Coast during 1940 and early 1941, having under his direction the aforementioned OKADA, YAMADA, Commander Iwao ARISAKA and Lieutenant Commander Sadayoshi NAKAYAMA. So far as is known, TACHIBANA was under the same sort of instructions as are set forth above and, at the time of his arrest on 7 June 1941, there was seized a considerable quantity of photographic equipment, notebooks, diaries, progress charts on conversion of ships, building programs of U.S. naval vessels, data on fleet movements and organization,

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and extensive correspondence from the local Japanese Consulate (Los Angeles, California) and the Japanese Embassý in Washington, D.C. Although ONI does not have the original Japanese documents seized in this case, it does have very extensive translations of them.

- 7. TACHIBANA was released on \$50,000 bond and finally left the country in June 1941 at the request of the State Department.
- 8. As you are no doubt aware, the above are only a few of the many similar cases which could be pointed to for your present purposes, though they are perhaps the best known. This section has considerable data on other cases, as well as on related aspects of Japanese subversive operations in this hemisphere, which could be drawn upon if deemed necessary.

Respectfully,

Alllian G. Care

William A. Carr Lt. Comdr., USNR

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after 7 Dec. 1941 at the direction of Comdr. Hartwell C. Davis, USN(R), then OinC Op-16-B-7. Its purpose was to show Op-16-B-71s cognizance of Japanese subversive activities of the period as well as the dissemination given these materials The attached officials. bo alert the responsible agencies and was assembled Shortly

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PLEASE RETURN TO Op-23D12, ROOM L-2700;

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