

British

U.S.

1. S.I.S.
2. Naval Intelligence
3. Security Control
4. { Naval Control Service
Reporting Officers.
5. Censorship

1. Naval Intelligence
2. Operations (op- 38-C
possibly Cominch)

3. Censorship.

II U.S. Naval Routeing Office

Small British N.C.S. Office,
working as subsidiary of N.C.S.

COLON

III H.Q. of U.S. Naval Intelligence,
15th District, covering the
Pacific Coast

British Liaison is only made
through the N.C.S. Officer.

IV H.Q. of U.S. Military Intelligence)
(G-2)

British S.I.S. Office for Caribbean *

V

(NOTE: British Censorship Officials

VI U.S. Censorship of Mails and Cables)

have been lent from TRINIDAD to
assist.)

VII U.S. Embassy and Consulate, to the
Republic of Panama

British Legation and Consulate

February 5, 1942 (COPY)

The following memorandum, received this date, relating to CO-ORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, between the British, Dutch and U. S., was prepared by Commander (E) J. P. W. Furse, R.N.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-ORDINATION: CARIBBEAN AREA
(Naval Intelligence and Associated Problems)

→ 1. PANAMA AREA

(a) PANAMA and BALBOA Offices

<u>American</u>	<u>Corresponding British Authority</u>
I H.Q. of U.S. Naval, Air & Army Forces	H.M.S. "DESPATCH" temporarily attached to this Command
II U.S. Naval Routeing Office	Small British N.C.S. Office, working as subsidiary of N.C.S.
	COLON
III H.Q. of U.S. Naval Intelligence, 15th District, covering the Pacific Coast	British Liaison is only made through the N.C.S. Officer.
IV H.Q. of U.S. Military Intelligence (G-2)	British S.I.S. Office for Caribbean

(b) COLON and CRISTOBAL Offices

I U.S. S/M base, and Naval, Air and
Army Forces, all working under
the Command of BALBOA

II British main N.C.S. Office

III Dutch Routeing Office, working
independently inside the
British Office.

IV U.S. Vice Consul British Vice Consul

(c) State of Co-Ordination on 1-1-42 ✓

I (a I). There was no British liaison early in January, 1942, with the U.S. Naval Headquarters in BALBOA except for the casual personal acquaintanceship between the overworked British N.C.S. Officer (Cdr. WARREN JONES, R.N.R.) and some of the U.S. Naval Officers. Commander Jones was on excellent terms with U.S. Naval Authorities, but could not act as a bridge between the American and British Commands which were at opposite ends of the Canal.

II (a II). The U.S. Routeing Officer in BALBOA was just beginning to operate and wanted to work in double harness with the British N.C.S. Officer in PANAMA, but at that time their offices were too far apart to make real liaison practicable.

III (a III). There is a large U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence at BALBOA (and one officer is detached and stays in CRISTOBAL) and they are in touch with the U.S. Naval Intelligence organization along the Pacific Coasts of Central and South America. There is no British Naval Intelligence Officer.

C Cdr. Warren Jones makes some liaison with the U.S. office insofar as movements of shipping are concerned, but there can be no liaison whatsoever over general Intelligence.

For some unknown reason the U.S. Naval Authorities have completely broken off relationship with the British S.I.S. Office.

IV (a IV). The U.S. Military Intelligence (G-2) is in good liaison with the British S.I.S. office, but has no link with the British Navy. Much valuable information of a topographical nature, including photographs, aerial surveys and maps, is being lost to N.I.D. as the S.I.S. are unable to handle such work.

V. (a V). The British S.I.S. makes good liaison with U. S. Censorship and with G-2, but has no liaison or contact with U. S. Naval Intelligence as the S.I.S. representative is persona non grata to O.N.I. in BALBOA. There is an interchange of U. S. and English officers between S.I.S. and G-2, so that an American now works in the S.I.S. headquarters and an Englishman with G-2.

VI. (aVI). The U. S. Censorship works well with O.N.I., with G-2, and with the S.I.S., but has no liaison or contact with British N.I.D. in the Caribbean area.

VII. (A VII and b IV). Cooperation is quite good between British and American Diplomatic and Consular Staffs, but neither the British nor American civilian authorities are in close touch with the Services.

VIII. Coordination between U. S. Army and Navy in Panama is said to be improving, but it appears still to be bad.

IX. U. S. Naval and Military Air Services however work very closely together and cooperate well. General Andrews, C-in-C Panama, is an Air Service officer, and seems to have taken personal command of both Military and Naval air services throughout the Caribbean area, operating them almost as one service.

X. The Dutch and British Routeing Offices in COLON work in complete unison.

XI. (b II). The British N.C.S. Officer in COLON (Cdr. COLQUHOUN) was newly arrived, but showed determination to effect satisfactory coordination with the U. S. authorities. The British N.C.S. staff in COLON are on good terms with the U. S. authorities, but no real liaison is practicable except at the U. S. Headquarters in BALBOA.

(d) U. S. 15th Naval District (Panama Canal)

I. Rear Admiral SADLER, in command, shows desire for close co-ordination and liaison with the British.

II. He is particularly anxious to speed up the reporting of ship movements on the Pacific Coast and to develop this service to the highest possible level.

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 File 3
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Mass. D.
 Mrs. G.
 Action Info Return
 Comment See me
 REMARKS: I

III H.Q. of U.S. Naval
 15th District, cov
 Pacific Coast
 IV H.Q. of U.S. Military Int
 (G-2)
 V
 VI U.S. Censorship of Mails and Ca
 U.S. Embassy and Consulate, to the
 Republic of Panama

(e) Naval Intelligence on the Pacific Coast

I. Admiral Sadler is most interested in the area north of 13° S, and he has only a general "background" interest in the area to the south of 13°.

II. South of PUERTO MONTT in Chile there is very little Naval Intelligence organization by either British or U. S. Navies, except for the isolated post of PUNTA ARENAS (MAGALLANES).

III. From PUERTO MONTT to the PERU-ECUADOR boundary, the British N.I. covers the coast quite thoroughly; there is not any well-developed U. S. organization, and the U. S. Naval Attaches in SANTIAGO and LIMA have proposed to WASHINGTON (about 12-12-41) that all U. S. shipping should be handled by the British Naval Control, Reporting and Security organizations, and that any U. S. organization should be complementary rather than duplication. Action was being taken on these lines in anticipation of approval, throughout December.

IV. ECUADOR and COLOMBIA are not visited by British Naval Attaches, except in exceptional cases, and there are no Naval Control Officers; the U. S. Naval Intelligence in this area is more widely developed.

V. In this way, the British are dealing with most of the work in CHILE and PERU, while the U. S. handle ECUADOR and COLOMBIA: each can assist the other, acting as complementary and counter-checking organizations.

VI. All civil aircraft now use BALBOA airport and not CRISTOBAL, and at BALBOA the U. S. Naval Intelligence are able to censor all the West Coast mails and cables, and interrogate travellers, so that as much information should be expected here from these sources as is obtained in TRINIDAD.

VII. NAVAL ORGANIZATIONS ON PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Authority</u>	<u>British Posts</u>	<u>American Posts</u>
COLOMBIA	Naval Attache	Neger visited by N.A.	Bogota
"	Naval Control or Observer		Buenaventura (Shipping Adviser)
"	Naval Mission		Cartagena (Caribbean)
"	Reporting Officers	Buenaventura	
ECUADOR	Naval Attache	Never visited by N.A.	Quito
"	Naval Control or Observer	-	Guayaquil (Observer or A.N.A.)
"	Air Mission	-	Quito
"	Reporting Officers	Guayaquil	-
"	Unofficial R.O.'s	La Libertad (Oil Co.)	Various agents of Grace Coy.

Country	Authority	British Posts	American Posts
PERU	Naval Attache	Seldom visited by N.A.	Lima
"	Naval Control or Observer	Callao (C.S.A.)	Talara (Observer)
"	Naval Mission	—	Callao and Lima
"	Special Liaisons	Governor of Callao is Anglo-Peruvian who rose to rank of Brigadier in the British Army before retiring, and won D.S.O. with 2 bars	Chief of Staff of Peruvian Navy is a U. S. Active Service Naval Captain
"	Reporting Officers	Talara (includes Labitos)	Talara (Naval Observer see above)
"	" "	Paita	—
"	" "	Pisco	—
"	" "	Mollendo	—
CHILE	Naval Attache	Santiago	Santiago
"	Naval Control or Observer	Punta Arenas	Punta Arenas (Observer)
"	" " " "	Valparaiso	Valparaiso (A.N.A.)
"	" " " "	Antofagasta	Antofagasta
"	Naval Mission	—	Santiago
"	Reporting Officers	Arica	—
"	" "	Iquique	—
"	" "	Tocopilla	—
"	" "	Mejillones	—
"	" "	Taltal	—
"	" "	Chanaral (Temporary)	Chanaral (U.S. are trying to provide a permanent R.O.)
"	" "	Caldera	—
"	" "	Coquimbo	—
"	" "	—	San Antonio (U.S. are trying to provide an R.O.)
"	" "	Concepcion	—
"	" "	Valdivia	—
"	" "	Puerto Montt	—

(f) Proposals for improvement of Liaison.

I. (See c 1). Admiral Sadler stated that he would like to have a British Naval Liaison Officer in BALBOA.

II. (See c 2). Admiral Sadler hopes that British and U. S. Naval Control and Routeing Officers can work together in one building, inside Balboa Naval Base, and he is looking into the question of accommodation.

The British N.C.S.O. is looking into the practical questions involved in moving the main office from COLON to BALBOA, leaving only a couple of officers in COLON to carry on with local routeing, liaison, etc.

III. (See c 3). The U. S. Admiral also asked for the appointment of a British Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer, and asked me formally to put forward this request.

This Officer could work in the Naval Intelligence Office at BALBOA or could have a separate office outside.

If S.O. (I) or Assistant S.O. (I) for the Pacific Coast were stationed in BALBOA instead of in CALLAO, he could carry out these liaison duties, and it would ensure that the U. S. and British organizations on the Pacific Coast were in continual close touch so that they could check up on reports and could avoid all duplication.

The British Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer would also cover the work referred to in C 4, c 5, and c 6.

(g) Miscellaneous Points

I. The U. S. Naval authorities insisted that liaison could only be good if the U. S. and British officers in each department worked in the same rooms or building, as telephones and all other communications and transport in the Panama Canal Zone are so slow, unreliable and insecure.

II. It is the wish of both British and U. S. naval authorities in the Panama area that Naval Intelligence reports should be completely pooled, though sources and organization would not be revealed.

III. It is important that S.O. (I) JAMAICA should receive information obtained from U. S. Censoring authorities.

IV. S.O.(I) still receives no information from the U. S. Naval Authorities about U. S. warship movements.

2. TRINIDAD AREA.

(a) The following offices are concerned:

<u>CORRESPONDING AMERICAN AUTHORITY</u>		<u>BRITISH AUTHORITY</u>
I.	(U. S. CONSUL)	(Governor and Colonial Government.
II.	U. S. Commander in Chief	(
III.		(G.O.C. Local Defence Forces.
IV.	U. S. Air (Navy and Army) bases	Fleet Air Arm Station.
V.	U. S. Naval Base	Flag Officer in Charge.
VI.	U. S. Routeing Officer	Naval Control Station.
VII.	U. S. Naval Intelligence.	Assistant to S.O.(I) Jamaica.
VIII.	U. S. Military Intelligence (G-2)	-
IX.	-	British Security and Intelligence.
X.	-	British Censorship.

(b) State of Co-ordination 10.1.42.

I. (See a I and a II). The difficulties between the lately-transferred U. S. General in Command and the British Governor have gone half-way to being solved by the appointment of a new U. S. General.

II. (See a I). The U. S. Consul is hardly involved in these matters of co-ordination, but has been helpful when he is actually involved.

III. (See a III). The British Local Defence Forces are so small that co-ordination with the U. S. is of lesser importance, and I believe they have been assigned a rather independent function dealing with the "Security" of oil fields, etc.

IV. (See a IV). The American Naval and Military Air Detachments co-operate very closely, and are under the direct orders of General Andrews in Panama and of Admiral Hoover in SAN JUAN, and are not under General Pratt (U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Trinidad).

The British Air Station is quite independent and is virtually for training only, and it does not seem to be in close co-ordination with the U. S. Military Air.

V. (See a V). There is complete harmony between British and U. S. Naval commands, which are both under the command of Admiral Hodges, who in turn is under General Pratt, and General Andrews, and Admiral Hoover. The organization of these Commands is most confusing.

VI. (See a VI). It is intended that British and U. S. Naval Control and Routeing officers shall work in one office, in full co-operation.

VII. (See a VII). The U. S. Naval Intelligence Officer is keen and most co-operative, but is employed on purely internal security and intelligence for the U. S. Naval Base.

The British Assistant to S.O.(I) Jamaica has not yet arrived; when he does arrive he will improve the liaison between U. S. and British Intelligence on Naval subjects, which previously has had to be handled by the British Security Co-ordination Officer.

It is intended that the British and U. S. Naval Intelligence Officers shall work together in the same block of offices as the British and U. S. Routeing Officers.

VIII. (See a VIII) The U. S. G-2 officer works in close touch with the British Security Co-ordination Officer, but overlaps him a lot and tends to try and assimilate the other British and American Intelligence Departments.

IX. (See a IX). The British Security Co-ordination officer has maintained close and excellent relations with EVERY other department, and his efforts are beyond praise. The Security Co-ordination department has been the mortar holding the miscellaneous blocks of the Trinidad structure together.

X. (See a X). The British Imperial Censorship is in full liaison with all British and American departments and receives censorship submissions.

(c) "Unified Command" in Trinidad.

I. This is widely discussed, but seems to be explained and understood differently by most authorities and very few U. S. officers there can agree as to the exact organization of even the U. S. Caribbean Defence Command.

II. The appointment of General Pratt seems likely to simplify matters; Admiral Hodges has been the leading figure throughout in producing co-operation and harmony, and is universally respected and liked.

III. Some confusion is caused at present by Admiral Hoover frequently sending instructions direct to the C.O. of the U. S. Naval Base without keeping Admiral Hodges informed. The U. S. Commanding Officer is not at liberty to pass the instructions to Admiral Hodges even though he is under his direct command.

(d) Proposals for improvement.

- I. The only difficulties seem to have risen from conflicting personalities, which the appointment of General Pratt should go far to solve.
- II. Once the initial questions of "Unified Command" are understood by all authorities, and the minor kinks have been straightened out, there should be no great difficulties left.

3. COLOMBIA

(a) Authorities concerned:-

	<u>AMERICAN</u>	<u>BRITISH</u>
I.	Embassy and Consulate.	Legation and Consulate.
II.	Naval Attaches.	British N.A. seldom visits Colombia.
III.	Naval Mission.	-
IV.	Military G-2 Intelligence.	S.I.S. Organization.
V.	Naval "Shipping Adviser" in Buenaventura.	Naval Reporting Officers but no routeing officers.

(b) Co-ordination situation, January 1942.

I. (See a I). Cooperation and relationships good, except for slight remnants of a long-past feud among the wives. The recent change of British Minister and the present change of U. S. Ambassador should eliminate the last of the friction.

II. (See a II & a III). The U. S. Naval Attaches are very helpful, but liaison would be better if there was a British Attache with whom they could be in touch (see 4 b II and III).

III. (See a IV & V). Co-ordination of these departments appears to be satisfactory.

(c) Proposals for improvement.

Some Reporting Officers need additional staff; this could be either British or American, and if the U. S. propose to appoint any official to these ports there will be no need for an additional British official.

The ports concerned are Cartegena, Barranquilla and possibly Buenaventura (depending on the results achieved by the newly appointed U. S. Shipping Adviser).

4. V E N E Z U E L A

(a) Authorities concerned:

<u>AMERICAN</u>	<u>BRITISH</u>
I. Embassy and Consulate.	Legation and Consulate.
II. Naval Attaches.	British Naval Attache seldom visits Venezuela.
III. Naval and Air Missions.	-
IV. "Security Council" and F.B.I. officers for Security of oil fields.	British Consular Security officers for Security of shipping.
V. Military G-2 Intelligence.	S.I.S. organization.
VI. -	Naval Reporting Officers.
VII. Note: There are no British or American Naval Reporting Officers in Venezuela.	

(b) Co-ordination Situation. 20.1.42.

I. (See a I). British and American diplomatic and consular authorities work very well together, but there is a feeling that Venezuela is in the U. S. natural sphere of interest, and that the British are out-of-place in this country, and there are some signs of attempts to squeeze them out.

II. (See a II and a III). The U. S. Naval Attache is of outstanding ability and energy: co-operation would be far easier if there were a British officer with whom he could deal, as there is usually reluctance for Services and Diplomats to work in very close liaison.

III. The British official concerned (Mr. Anderson, 1st Secretary of the Legation) is exceptionally energetic and keen, and has done really fine work in co-ordination and development of Intelligence work in Venezuela, but the U.S. Attaches have some natural reserve even with him.

IV. (See a IV). As an example of the American reserve described in I and III, the Americans have organized a "Security Council" consisting of the U. S. Naval and Military Attaches, with one representative of each of the 3 chief oil groups, but without any British representative.

The inevitable corollary to this is that the British organization for Security of Ships in port is not co-ordinated with the American organization in the producing areas.

V. (See a V). There is some degree of co-ordination between G-2 and the S.I.S. in Venezuela and close co-ordination between the S.I.S. and the British Naval Intelligence.

(c) American-Venezuelan co-operation.

I. An American Mission under General Ingles from Panama (Security Officer), including U. S. Commander King, visited CARACAS in January 1942 for discussion and negotiation concerning Coastal Defences and Security. It has been agreed, I understand, that the U.S.A. will install coastal batteries on behalf of the Venezuelan Government at the entrance to MARACAIBO, at LAS PIEDRAS and at PUERTO LA CRUZ, and that 3 U.S. "Instructors" will be attached to each gun.

II. Some anti-aircraft guns and machine guns are now being flown to MARACAIBO in U. S. Army transport planes, for protection of the oil installations.

III. In general, American-Venezuelan relations are good.

(d) Proposals for improvement.

I. Appointment of a British Assistant Naval Attache, under N.A. Washington, for duty in the Caribbean area. He would spend some months each year in Venezuela, and would act as a link with the U.S. Attaches as well as with S.O.(I) Jamaica. (This proposal has been included in a report on Naval Intelligence in the Caribbean area).

II. Co-ordination of Security organizations, by arranging for Mr. Anderson to sit on the "Security Council", and by placing our ship-security organization at the disposal of the U. S. Authorities.

III. The British Naval Reporting organization in Venezuela is thorough, but some of the posts are overworked and additional staff is required as follows: these could be British officials, or American officials working with the existing British officials, using British or American cyphers. If the U. S. intend to appoint officials at these ports there will be no need for additional British officials.

PUERTO LA CRUZ.

Cypherer, for handling the movements signals and agents' messages.

CORIFITO.

As for PUERTO LA CRUZ.

LAS PIEDRAS.

Part-time Consular Security Officer, or other Security official, as the distance from MARACAIBO makes it impossible for the C.S.O. there to cover both places satisfactorily.

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5. CURACAO and ARUBA

(a) Authorities concerned

	<u>DUTCH</u>	<u>AMERICAN</u>	<u>BRITISH</u>
I.	Governor & Government	Consul	Consul
II.	Dutch Captain General	O.C. Troops	O.C. Troops
III.	Dutch Army	Garrisons now arriving	Garrisons now arriving
IV.	Dutch Air	Detachment in each island	Nil.
V.	Dutch Navy	U.S. Naval Observer	British S.N.O.
VI.	Dutch Naval Staff	U.S. Naval Observers	Naval Control & Routeing post in both islands.
VII.	Police and Security	F.B.I. at San Nicolas	S.I.S.
VIII.	Censorship	-	-

Note: The Shell Refinery in CURACAO, and the Standard Refinery in ARUBA, have a dominating influence more noticeable even than that of the Government itself.

(b) Feelings of the Dutch population

- I. The Dutch Government maintains an attitude of friendly non-cooperation; they are slow and uncommunicative and only wish that they could live their own lives and defend their own islands without "forces of occupation" from foreign countries.
- II. They did not worry over the British occupation as they realized that it was only a temporary nuisance, but they are alarmed by the U.S. occupation and wonder if they will ever have the island to themselves again. For this reason they hoped very much to concentrate enough Dutch forces in CURACAO to defend the island themselves, at the expense of leaving no forces in ARUBA or SURINAM.
- III. In addition to this external uneasiness, there is a schism inside the islands as the locally-born and part-coloured people feel that the islands are their own, and they much resent the fact that all the senior officials are sent out from Holland. It is commonly said

7-A ROUTING

Date _____

Lt. Comdr. Bel

Lt. Walker

Lt. (jg) Curran

Ens. Gallagher

Ens. Bickmore

CY Germano

Y2c Snyder

Miss Bender

Mrs. Grover

Action Info Return Ret
Comment See me Copy

REMARKS: _____

(c) Feelings and behaviour of Oil Refineries

I. Shell and Arend

These companies are loyal and helpful and take unceasing pains to help us with bunkering, ship repairs, D.E.M.S. work and whatever else is asked of them; they are really good in their efforts to work in the Allied cause. The only way in which they are not actively helpful is over questions of intelligence and of commercial information; in these cases they are not forthcoming and prefer the questions to be raised in London with their head office. This seems reasonable and is no hindrance to us.

II. Standard Oil, LAGO Refinery

This company is far less helpful and has a sense of importance verging on megalomania; they are seriously "up against" the U.S. Vice Consul who was recently appointed to ARUBA.

Before U.S.A. entered the war "Lago" in general was strongly isolationist, though many of the officials were pro-Ally and helpful.

Their attitude is a very straightforward business point of view, that the war is a major nuisance as it interferes with their legitimate business.

In particular, they take an extreme view with regard to speeding-up the time of turn-about of tankers, pressing the shift and crews to such an extent that both personnel and material are affected. Their attitude only applies to the actual time alongside, and not overall time, and in order to reduce time alongside they will postpone minor repairs which later will lead to more serious defects and more loss of time.

Their general attitude seems to be a wish to keep themselves "in the right" and to put other authorities "in the wrong", in order to gain some leverage with which to enforce their own wishes.

In spite of these criticisms, "Lago" is doing a very good job of work in increasing their output, and their own interest and our interest now coincide so that we are able to place a high degree of trust in the Company.

(d) Co-ordination situation, 26.1.42

I. (See a I). The Dutch Government are reluctant to accept protection from the British and far more from the Americans: they are reserved and reluctant to co-operate closely.

They particularly hoped to collect sufficient Dutch forces in CURACAO (from ARUBA and SURINAM) to enable them to do without a U.S. garrison in that island, and they have been working assiduously to become self-sufficient by 1.1.43.

II. The U.S. Consuls in CURACAO and ARUBA are helpful to us and are very valuable allies: they seem to be friendly with the Government and co-operate fully with the British authorities.

III. The British Consul in CURACAO is efficient and capable, but he has almost no friends; he is disliked by the British Colony and Services, and hated by Shell, and gets on badly with the Government.

IV. The British Hony, Vice Consul in ARUBA gets on well with the American and Dutch authorities, but has no great influence or power.

V. (See a II). The Dutch Captain General is a Naval Captain, who is quite friendly but is very uncommunicative; for example, he has refused to give the British authorities any information about the Coast Defence Batteries.

VI. (See a III). There has been virtually no co-operation between British and Dutch troops, the former insisting on independent operation.

VII. (See a IV). The U.S. Air detachments are not yet settled down, or fully fitted into the picture. The Dutch Captain General has issued instruction that the aircraft will inspect incoming vessels closely, and requests that these may be ordered not to open fire. The Naval Control Officers in each island are pointing out that this is impracticable as all incoming ships have standing orders to open fire on any aircraft approaching within 1500 yards.

VIII. (See a V). The Dutch Naval forces act independently for local defence. The British S.N.O. CURACAO does not have close contact with the Dutch Naval authorities, and co-operation is not very satisfactory.

The appointment of a U.S. Naval Observer should be a great assistance.

IX. (See a VI). The British Naval Control Staffs handle all shipping of the United Nations, including Dutch and American. The office in each island is overworked and will need additional staff, unless the U.S. provide routeing officers. Decision on this point is necessary.

X. (See a VII). The F.B.I. are only commencing their work, and are only installed in "Lago" refinery, in ARUBA.

The S.I.S. operates only in CURACAO, and has very little organization in these islands. The M.I.5. officer in Trinidad has contacts in CURACAO.

XI. (See a VIII). The CURACAO Censorship is very weak, but is in good liaison with Trinidad.

6. J A M A I C A.

(a) The British and U. S. authorities now seem to have developed excellent relationships & some degree of co-operation, but both are isolated from the main U. S. Commands in San Juan and Panama. There are no sources of friction between the British and American authorities.

(b) The British authorities are not informed by the U. S. of the arrival and departures of U. S. ships or aircraft, and do not know what U. S. forces are in or adjacent to the island from day to day (a squadron visited the U. S. Naval base in Portland Bay, the S.O.(I) only heard 3 days later, when they left).

(c) S.O.(I) Jamaica does not receive any Censorship submissions from U. S. Centres and hopes that this can be remedied.

7. S A N J U A N.

There is no liaison and little co-operation between British authorities and the U. S. Headquarters in SAN JUAN. The only British official in PUERTO RICO is the Consular R.O. in SAN JUAN, who cannot keep any contact with the U. S. Headquarters.

8. M I A M I.

The Consular R.O. in Maimi is on terms of friendship with the U. S. Naval Intelligence Officer, but closer contact is desirable in view of the large amount of mails and cables which pass through the censorship and of the large number of travellers.

Both East and West Coast air-routes begin from Miami, and 109,000 passengers went through Miami in 1941.

9. GENERAL POINTS.

a. It is important that the various commands in the Caribbean area should be closely co-ordinated, instead of the present semi-independent procedure when neither country informs the other about warship or transport movements, and neither staff knows the movements of the other country's warships, etc.

b. This co-ordination can only be achieved if there is a single Intelligence Centre for the whole area (these notes refer only to Intelligence Co-ordination and do not cover the question of a unified Operational Centre).

c. All other authorities would report Intelligence to this co-ordinating centre, which in turn would be responsible for passing out all relevant information to the authorities concerned.

d. In particular, the following centralized records would be kept up-to-date:

I. Plot of all Merchant ships, and hence various patrols in the area would be kept informed as to what ships might be expected in the patrol area from day to day.

II. Plot of Allied Warships.

✶ III. Card Index of subjects and Enemy Agents.

IV. Photographs, maps, and topographical information.

10. PROPOSED ORGANIZATION.

a. Caribbean Intelligence Centre.

To be situated as may be considered best in order to co-ordinate the 10th and 15th U.S. Naval Districts, and S.O.(I) Jamaica.

b. Pacific Intelligence Sub-Centre or Centre.

A separate organization to be made for the Pacific Coast, centred in Balboa, and either under the control of S.O.(I) Jamaica or operating independently.

c. Liaison Officers.

Each headquarters to have a liaison officer appointed to it from the other country.

d. Censorship.

All censorship stations to pass their submissions to their Intelligence Centre.

e. Detailed directions to be given to each officer and post as to:

I. Routeing and diversion of shipping.

II. Secrecy with regard to shipping movements.

III. Reporting of merchant ships and warships.

IV. Communications.

V. Cooperation and exchange of information between American and British Authorities.