

**RESTRICTED***Wilson*  
**ONI-T-8-10**

*Training Manual*

FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO  
INVESTIGATIONS SECTIONS OF  
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Prepared by  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

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## PROMULGATION

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION,  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
*Washington, January 10, 1941.*

1. This Manual has been prepared for the training of Officer and enlisted personnel, special agents, and agents assigned to duty in the Domestic Naval Intelligence Service.

2. It is to be used in the instruction of personnel of the Naval Intelligence Service in the history, organization, personnel, and duties of Investigations Sections, methods and courses to be followed in conducting Investigations, and in the methods of preparing written Investigation Reports.

3. The contents of this Manual must not be revealed to any person outside of the Naval Service.

4. Authority is granted to issue registered copies of this Manual, on memorandum receipt, to regular Officers of the Navy and Marine Corps, Class I-V (S) Naval Reserve Officers, Special Agents and Agents assigned to duty with the Naval Intelligence Service, and to such additional Offices and Commands as are designated in the Distribution List.

5. This Manual is classified as RESTRICTED.

W. S. ANDERSON,  
(By Direction).

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(III)



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INVESTIGATIONS SECTION TRAINING MANUAL

**Part I.—*Organization***

(1)

## CHAPTER 1.—INTRODUCTION

### SECTION I.—HISTORICAL

#### 11101

The Investigations Section is one of six Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of the Naval Intelligence Division (Office of Naval Intelligence) of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

#### 11102

The Office of Naval Intelligence was created March 23, 1882, by General Order No. 292 issued by Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt. In his annual report for the year 1882, the Secretary of the Navy says: "An Office of Intelligence, now generally recognized as necessary to the effectiveness of an Army or Navy, and established by a General Order, has been organized for the purpose of systematizing the collection and classification of information, for the use of the Department, in relation to the strength and resources of foreign navies."

#### 11103

In 1883, the Secretary of the Navy reports: "In order that the Department may be supplied with the fullest and most accurate information as to the progress of naval science in this and other countries, and the condition and resources of foreign navies, an Office of Naval Intelligence has been established for the collection and classification of such information and for its publication, as far as may be advantageous and suitable."

#### 11104

With the establishment of the Office, without Congressional action and with no appropriations, began the practice of sending Naval Attachés to foreign countries for collecting Naval Information. This practice has been continued and expanded until the present day. The first U. S. Naval Attaché was Lieutenant-Commander French E. Chadwick who was sent to London in 1882. The second was Lieutenant-Commander H. Buckingham who was accredited to France, Russia, and Germany in 1885. The third was Lieutenant Nathan Sargent accredited to Italy and Austria in 1888. No more Naval Attachés were sent for several years.

#### 11105

During the War with Spain, this office became active in the secret service field and furnished valuable information concerning the movements and disposition of the Spanish naval forces. It also supplied information concerning the activities of Spanish agents and information regarding the defenses of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines.

**11106**

At the time of the outbreak of the World War, July 1914, the Office of Naval Intelligence was carrying out its peacetime duties of supplying the necessary information to keep the Administration and the Navy Department in touch with the naval activities in all countries of the world.

**11107**

A "General Plan" for this service was prepared in 1915 by which was assigned the task of securing information concerning the state of preparation of the navies of probable enemies, the movements of probable enemy forces and their progress of war preparation and political and financial conditions. This plan was one that could be used in time of war and contemplated obtaining information through various undercover and secret service activities.

**11108**

The first step towards the present highly integrated investigating service in the domestic field was brought about through the great increase in the size of the home office after we entered the World War, due principally to establishing what amounted to a counterespionage and secret service. To carry out this service an "Aide for Information" was placed in each of the fifteen Naval Districts, and Branch Offices of Naval Intelligence were established in each of our large seaports and manufacturing centers. The activities of the Aides and Branch Offices in our large ports of entry were tremendous. The District Aides acted as the direct representatives of the Commandants of the Naval Districts in matters involving Naval Intelligence. The Branch Offices of Naval Intelligence operated directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence.

**11109**

In the fall of 1916, the first Branch Office (a small undercover one) was established in New York. This was the actual start of the present investigating organization and was to prove one of the largest and most useful phases of the war work of Naval Intelligence. The New York Office was used as a model for the others. These Branch Offices, working directly under Washington, covered work which could not properly be turned over to the District Aides for Information. Their work was of paramount importance and a complete task in itself. The Branch Offices had the handling of many of the secret agents operating at home, under the general supervision of Washington. These agents were of a class by themselves, and it required special type of men and women to successfully engage in the work.

**11110**

When the United States entered the World War it was found that our allies already had in operation a much more efficient War Information Service than we had. They supplied us with information in regard to enemy strength, disposition, and probable intentions. This was considered as obviating the necessity for our organizing as large a

foreign secret service, for obtaining much war information independently, as would have been the case had we relied more completely on our own resources. Counterespionage became the greatest activity of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Within the United States and its territorial possessions this task was carried out by the District Aides for Information and the Branch Offices. Their greatest activities included investigations involving Naval and civil personnel, censorship, sabotage, shipping, plants with Navy contracts, radio, etc. The dual establishment in some of the Naval Districts, i. e., Branch Offices and Aides for Information, caused some confusion and friction. There appeared to be no justification for more than one organization and it was determined that all Naval Intelligence activities in each District should be placed under the District Aide (later the District Intelligence Officer).

#### 11111

After the World War, reorganization and simplification of the Naval Intelligence Service progressed systematically until the present organization of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operation shown on ONI Organization Diagram, Plate I.

O.N.I. ORGANIZATION DIAGRAM NO. 1  
 CORRECTED JAN. 8, 1941  
*W.S. Anderson*  
 W.S. ANDERSON, REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. N.  
 DIRECTOR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

RESTRICTED

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
 NAVY DEPARTMENT




PLATE I.



**SECTION II.—RELATIONSHIP OF INVESTIGATIONS SECTION  
TO OTHER BRANCHES AND SECTIONS OF THE NAVAL  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION**

**11201**

The relationship of the Investigations Section to the other five Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Branch and to other Branches of the Naval Intelligence Division can be readily seen by referring to the Office of Naval Intelligence Organization Diagram No. 1, Plate I.

**11202**

While the Investigations Section is only one of the many sections of the various branches of the Naval Intelligence Division, it bears a special relation to the other sections in that they all look to it as the principal agency in the Domestic field for conducting investigations.

**11203**

The Domestic Intelligence Field includes the Fifteen Naval Districts, Potomac Area, Guam, American Samoa and Naval Station, Guantanamo, Cuba.

**SECTION III.—RELATIONSHIP OF THE INVESTIGATIONS  
SECTION OF THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION TO  
NAVAL DISTRICT INVESTIGATIONS SECTIONS**

**11301**

The relationship of these sections is best indicated by designating the Investigations Section of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations as the National center or headquarters and the District Intelligence Investigations Sections as the Field Offices of the Naval Intelligence Service.

**11302**

The relationship of the District Investigations Section to the other Sections of the District Intelligence Branch and to other Branches of the District Intelligence Service parallels that set forth in Section II for the Naval Intelligence Division.

**11303**

In connection with the relationship of these sections it will be noted that while Commandants of Naval Districts provide the District Intelligence Organizations and normally operate them, the organization as a whole is distinctly a function and activity under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Naval Operations. (See ONI 19.)

## **CHAPTER 2.—ORGANIZATION, PERSONNEL, AND DUTIES OF THE INVESTIGATIONS SECTION OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRANCH**

### **SECTION I.—ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL**

#### **12101**

The Investigations Section Organization consists of a Section Office subdivided into three Groups. These Groups consist of Officer Assistants, Clerical Force and the Field Office.

#### **12102**

The Officer Assistant Group varies in size depending upon the work load of the Section. In time of peace it is composed of one or two Assistants and is greatly expanded in time of war.

#### **12103**

The Officer in Charge of the Section has an Office of Naval Intelligence designation of 16-B-3.

#### **12104**

The Clerical Force in time of peace is a part of the pooled Clerical Force of the Domestic Intelligence Branch.

#### **12105**

The Investigating Personnel of this Section is organized to carry out special investigative assignments in the vicinity of Washington or as may be necessary in any other part of the Domestic Intelligence Field.

#### **12106**

The organization diagram of the Domestic Intelligence Branch, Plate II, shows the general details of the Investigations Section Organization.

#### **12107**

The Officer personnel assigned to this Section may be from the Line, or Staff, of the regular Navy or from Class I-V (S) Naval Reserve Officers, or from both. The principal part of the personnel in time of war will be Class I-V (S) Naval Reserve Officers.

#### **12108**

The Clerical Force is composed of Civil Service appointees or enlisted clerical personnel qualified for handling secret and confidential correspondence and papers.

## 12109

The personnel of the Field Office is composed of Officers, enlisted men or civilians appointed as Special Agents or Agents. The Special Agents and Agents are specially selected individuals trained in Investigative procedure.

## 12110

The Investigations Section Organization which succeeds is the one organized in such a manner that its structure and mechanics of operation automatically assist the investigator and further his efforts. Results are the only appropriate gauge of its effectiveness, and the nature of these products and the most efficient methods for obtaining them should receive careful consideration when matters of organization are under discussion. It should be borne in mind that the products of **investigations**, i. e., comprehensive records containing the desired information in readily available and usable form, and security (investigative protection), are the two items which are of real importance and interest to the various Branches and Sections of the Office of Naval Intelligence and to the other activities of the Naval Establishment which the Investigating Service serves.

## 12111

**Selection of personnel.**—The most efficient organization devised and the most comprehensive and accurate methods developed are **of but little value if suitable personnel are not assigned to this duty.** In selecting such personnel the factors of integrity, intelligence, culture, and psychological aptitude are of primary importance. Professional knowledge and experience come next, and by this is meant the knowledge and ability to handle persons and situations rather than a routine experience with usual police methods and investigative technique. **These can be taught.**

## 12112

**Permanency of personnel** is of great importance in order to (a) develop experienced investigative Executives and Operatives; (b) promote continuity of contacts, operations, and general cooperation within the Intelligence Service and with other Government and local agencies, etc., all of which are of vital importance to a technical service of such a specialized nature; (c) maintain a high degree of **efficiency with long term projects**, and (d) insure logical and orderly development.

## SECTION II.—DUTIES

### 12201

The general duties of the Investigations and other Sections of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of the Naval Intelligence Division are set forth in the TASK assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Branch.

### 12202

The task of the Domestic Intelligence Branch is to secure, evaluate and disseminate all classes of information (pertaining to Naval and Maritime matters) including that of actual or potential enemy, enemyagents and sympathizers, and of all subversive activities as will assist and facilitate the protection of the Naval Establishment. The execution of this TASK necessitates maintaining a liaison with other Government Departments and agencies for exchange of domestic intelligence information.

### 12203

The part of the Domestic Intelligence TASK assigned to the Investigations Section can be defined as:

(a) Secure, evaluate, and disseminate information from all sources concerning actual or potential enemy, enemy agents and sympathizers, and of all subversive activities in the Domestic Intelligence Field.

(b) Conduct investigations of personnel in, employed by, or controlled by the Naval Establishment.

(c) Maintain close liaison with and cooperate with agencies of other Government Departments through the Domestic Intelligence Network.

(d) Maintain a record of movements of any class of individuals when so directed.

### 12204

By a directive of August 17, 1940, the President of the United States, issued instructions that all cases involving the integrity, loyalty, and possible subversive activities of Federal employees would be investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These investigations to be undertaken only upon the specific request of the Government Department or Agency concerned and after the Department or Agency had made sufficient preliminary investigation of the case to justify a detailed investigation. The cases in this category particularly apply where employees in the Federal Service are suspected of violating provisions of Section 9A of the Hatch Act and Section 15 (f) of the Emergency Relief Act of 1941 regarding alleged subversive activities.



ORGANIZATION DIAGRAM  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRANCH  
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS




PLATE II.

## **CHAPTER 3.—ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL AND DUTIES OF NAVAL DISTRICT INVESTIGATIONS SECTIONS**

### **SECTION I.—ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL**

#### **13101**

The plans for the organization of the District Intelligence Services are made by the District Commandants based on directives issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

#### **13102**

Naval District Investigations Sections are each a Section of the Intelligence Branch of the District Intelligence Service. The Organization conforms in general to that given in the preceding Chapter for the Investigations Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence.

#### **13103**

While not curtailing the responsibility of any local Commandant or Commanding Officer for the proper and efficient operation of the Intelligence Unit under his command, Navy Yards, Operating Bases, Torpedo Stations, Supply Bases, Training Stations, Hospitals, etc., and District Zones are not to be considered INDEPENDENT intelligence units but are to be considered field units of the District Intelligence Service. Such units bear the same relationship to the District Commandants as the District Organizations bear to the Chief of Naval Operations. The District Intelligence Officer has the same relationship to all Field units in the District as the Director of Naval Intelligence has to the District Organizations.

#### **13104**

The duty of supplying personnel to District Intelligence Service Headquarters and Field Service is placed on the District Intelligence Officer under the direction of the District Commandants. The majority of the personnel for this duty is composed of Naval Reserve Intelligence Officers who perform Intelligence Duties voluntarily when not in active duty status.

## **SECTION II.—DUTIES**

### **13201**

District Investigations Section duties parallel those of the Investigations Section of the Domestic Intelligence Branch of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations set forth in the previous chapter.

### **13202**

While the duties of the District Intelligence Service and therefore those of the District Investigations Section are normally carried on under the direction of the Commandant, the Director of Naval Intelligence may communicate directly with the District Intelligence Officer regarding Intelligence matters. It is, of course, the duty of the District Intelligence Officer to keep his Commandant fully informed in the premises.

## **CHAPTER IV.—ORGANIZATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE NETWORK**

### **SECTION I.—GENERAL**

#### **14101**

The Domestic Intelligence Network includes all Agencies, both Government and private, used by the Investigations Sections in the execution of their Domestic Naval Investigating Service Tasks.

#### **14102**

Schematic Diagrams of and Instructions for the use of the Network are located in the Confidential Files of the District Intelligence Office.

INVESTIGATIONS SECTION TRAINING MANUAL

**Part II.—*Investigative Procedure***

(26)



## CHAPTER ONE.—INTRODUCTION

### SECTION I.—INVESTIGATIONS DEFINED. OBJECTS AND AIMS

#### 21101

(1) **Investigation.**—"The act of investigating, careful inquiry or research, to track, to trace up, to act scientifically." (Webster.)

(2) Investigation is an art applicable to all phases of intelligence work. It is employed when specific questions must be answered, or solutions reached, through special means other than routine Naval procedure.

#### 21102

The difference between the terms **Inquiry** and **Investigation** essentially is one of **degree**.

(1) An **Inquiry** is the seeking of information by ordinary methods; conversation, telephone, regular correspondence, etc., and may be carried out by the regular administrative and operating forces of the Naval Establishment through routine channels.

(2) An **Investigation** implies a more intensive effort. It may involve undercover or detective methods, and require coordination with other investigative agencies, and therefore, should be carried out by the Investigating Service of Naval Intelligence.

#### 21103

**Operatives** (investigators) are those specialists who must solve the particular problems not susceptible to routine treatment. They should be qualified to determine the military significance of the problem, whether the National Defense is threatened, the identity of the persons involved, how to neutralize immediate effects and to guard against repetitions. They must act for the best interests of the National Defense in general and the Naval Establishment in particular.

#### 21104

Legal Evidence may be defined, for the purpose of this section, as the **legal proof** of facts concerning persons and their activities, or circumstances relating thereto, obtained in conformity with legal practice and the rules of evidence.

#### 21105

**Intelligence Information** is comprised of facts concerning persons or activities, technical matters or circumstances, obtained from available sources and capable of positive substantiation. It must relate to the National Defense or to the Naval Establishment.

**21106**

The methods and techniques employed in investigations are not so restricted as in the collection of purely legal evidence. Operatives may properly adopt a broader view, appropriate to the execution of such tasks. They should strive to maintain high standards of accuracy and comprehensiveness.

**21107**

In general, it will be found advantageous to follow the conventional routine of legal evidence procurement in order to: Insure accuracy of the information, substantiate it, and in some cases make the information available for civil enforcement work and for military (Naval) tribunals, and train Operatives to properly cooperate with FBI and other Governmental and local law-enforcement agencies.

## SECTION II.—SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

### 21201

An Executive Order of June 26, 1939, directs "that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The Directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

"No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above."

In conformity with the Executive Directive of June 26, 1939, an agreement was entered into June 5, 1940, between the Directors of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Military Intelligence Division, delimiting their responsibility in connection with the investigation of espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, which directly affects the concurrent cognizance and investigative jurisdiction over these matters, as exercised by Domestic Intelligence and particularly as outlined in the preceding paragraph. The substance of this agreement as applied to the security (investigative protective) duties of the Investigations Section is as follows:

(a) The investigative cognizance and protective responsibility assumed by one agency in a particular field of activity imposes the concurrent obligation of providing a pool of all information collected in that field, for the mutual benefit of the other agencies having cognizance.

(b) Nothing in the agreement shall be taken as implying that the particular agency responsible in such particular field is alone interested in or will work alone in that field.

(c) There is a mutually recognized necessity for close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields of activity.

(d) The Office of Naval Intelligence will assume responsibility for the investigation and disposal of all cases of espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under Naval employment or Naval control.

(e) The Office of Naval Intelligence will assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in the above categories involving civilians on the Islands of Guam and American Samoa.

NOTE.—For delimitation of the investigative responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division as outlined by this agreement, see Appendix C.

### 21202

The point that it is desired to stress is that the fullest cooperation is desired between the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division, and all their representatives in the field, in handling matters with which they are jointly charged.

## 21203

The Investigating Service of Naval Intelligence may be called upon to obtain, or to deny to others, any information in which the Naval Establishment is interested. It is also concerned with the Investigative Protection of the Naval Establishment and its paramount interests. Effective defense measures must take cognizance of:

(1) **Espionage, or Positive Intelligence**, is the obtaining of information of national (Naval) significance by secret methods, agents, spies, traitors, and other informers. The timely transmission of this information to the proper agencies is the most important and hazardous phase of the work.

(2) **Counterespionage, or Negative Intelligence**, includes the supervision, coordination, and active operation of all investigative measures intended to prevent espionage.

(3) **Sabotage**, when directed against the Naval Establishment, is the proper concern of the Investigating Service. To discover and identify potential saboteurs, and to neutralize their efforts, is a vital function. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, or immediately prior thereto, it may be expected that **Combatant Sabotage** will be employed against us. This form of warfare is now an established practice of many foreign secret services, by whom it is regarded as an extension of military operations to the enemy "Home-front." It consists of attempts to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy war potential by means of actual destruction, or disorganization of, his systems of supply, finance, communications, transportation, power and light, as well as the undermining of the national morale. For this work, especially procured sabotage agents are placed in key positions, from which they will attempt to reduce the mobility of the enemy forces and to contact and assist their own military units.

21203

The point that it is desired to stress is that the fullest cooperation is desired between the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Federal Bureau

### SECTION III.—ESSENTIALS OF OPERATION

#### 21301

To be effective, an Investigating Service must be based upon the following principles:

(1) **Centralization of supervision.**—Such centralization results in economy of force and effort, well-coordinated field operations, and permits of intelligent evaluation of information obtained.

(2) **Standardization and Uniformity**, insofar as may be practicable, of all routine matters, investigative procedures, files, indexes, charts, forms and reports.

(3) **Employment of Proven Methods** of investigation which are appropriate, accurate, and comprehensive.

(4) **Adequate and Continuous Training** of all Operatives in the special technique of Naval investigative procedure. This training should be supplemented by practical field experience whenever the exigencies of the service permit.

(5) **Maintenance of High Morale** of the personnel of the service. This is most important, not only to ensure the prompt and efficient performance of duty, but also to avoid the dangerous vulnerability which results from disaffection.



#### SECTION IV.—GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RULES FOR CONDUCTING PRACTICAL INVESTIGATIONS

##### 21401

The Operative should develop a strictly professional attitude towards investigative work. An investigation should be approached with confidence, and with pride in the ability to do a thoroughly accurate and finished piece of work. Only a rank amateur will attempt to employ sensational methods of the dime-novel order. Each investigation should be regarded as a scientific problem, requiring careful analysis, logical reasoning and the practical demonstration of facts. These facts must be supported by convincing testimony, physical evidence and other substantiating data. The temptation to take short-cuts should be resisted. To quote a famous physician, "A diagnosis by intuition is a rapid method of reaching the wrong conclusion."

##### 21402

Any display of vanity, boastfulness, carelessness, officiousness or ignorance of technical matters, brands the Operative as personally incompetent, reflects discredit upon the Service, and discourages the cooperation of other investigative agencies.

##### 21403

The investigator should take advantage of every opportunity to add to his professional knowledge and technical skill, whether by precept from the more experienced, by practical work and observation, or by professional reading.

##### 21404

Investigations, as conducted by the Naval Intelligence Service, are not usually for the purpose of effecting immediate arrests and prosecutions. In this respect the objective of the Investigating Service is generally in sharp contrast with that of civil law enforcement agencies. Our purpose is to discover, step by step, the identity, location, purpose, and activities of entire espionage, sabotage, and propaganda groups—not with a view to routine arrest, but with the purpose of maintaining a close and constant surveillance of the members and their activities. In this way we shall be able, upon the outbreak of open or declared hostilities, to seize the entire organization and thus to paralyze the enemy at a time when his system of secret service cannot be easily rebuilt. The Naval Intelligence Service in carrying out its functions of securing information which will assist the protection of the Naval Establishment in such instances, must move rapidly in order to frustrate these activities. Ordinarily, any premature arrest, incautious investigation, or precipitate action serves only to warn the inimical agents that they have been discovered, thus allowing the enemy ample opportunity to abandon the com-

promised system, substituting in its place new and separate organizations, the existence of which it may be difficult or impossible to detect. This dual conception of counterespionage work is absolutely essential to the proper functioning of the Investigating Service.

#### 21405

The suggestions contained herein are intended to serve only as **general guides** to Operatives conducting special investigations, and are not to be regarded as inflexible rules. Inasmuch as it is impossible to predict the exact course which an investigation may take, much depends upon the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and imagination of the Operative, and his capacity for logical reasoning. In general the procedure indicated should be followed as closely as circumstances permit, but any rule or suggestion which is obviously inappropriate should be either modified or disregarded.

#### 21406

**Nothing set forth in this manual should be construed as limiting the resourcefulness and constructive imagination of an Operative in the conduct of specific investigations.**

#### 21407

##### GENERAL RULES

- (1) Conduct investigations as discreetly and unobtrusively as is consistent with the effective execution of the assigned task.
- (2) Study technical Naval subjects in order to become a more efficient Naval Intelligence Operative.
- (3) Be on the alert for signs, conditions, and circumstances characteristic of inimical activity (Modus Operandi).
- (4) Become familiar with the various methods of intercepting communications.
- (5) Learn the basic fundamentals of cryptography and cryptanalysis.
- (6) Learn to describe persons accurately and to make full and exact identification.
- (7) Do not rely on memory alone. Make immediate notes as complete as circumstances permit, in a **case notebook**, of all pertinent information.
- (8) Collect, properly label, and preserve all documents, clues, and evidence for the technical examination by experts (when such an examination appears to be an eventuality).
- (9) Use the camera, photostat, and other copying apparatus to reproduce documents and for the detection of erasures, alterations, obliterations, and secret writing.
- (10) Whenever possible, make use of **Regular Contacts** and other routine sources of information.
- (11) Develop an adequate number of **Special Contacts** (informants and informers) to cover all phases of the specific investigation which is being conducted.
- (12) Collect, correlate, evaluate, and preserve all documentary evidence for intelligence use.

(13) In cases where espionage or sabotage has occurred, search the scene systematically for physical evidence and clues.

(14) Shadow, or otherwise conduct special surveillance of, all subjects, suspects, and their contacts, and plant agents on suspected premises if it appears desirable.

(15) Interview, under pretext or otherwise, persons who are believed to be in possession of information relating to subjects under investigation.

(16) Interview, under pretext if necessary, subjects, suspects, and others of interest to the Naval Establishment when they have been arrested by law enforcement agencies.

(17) Become familiar with the organization plan of espionage groups and with the special technique of sabotage agents.

(18) Study the organization, methods, and policies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other agencies, learn their capacities and limitations, for the purpose of effective and intelligent cooperation in investigations which may be jointly conducted.

(19) Learn to write clear, brief, and comprehensive reports, avoiding redundancy but including every detail of importance.

#### 21408

Members of the Investigating Service are, in a sense, always on duty. Situations may suddenly develop which appear to be of interest or importance to the Navy and the National Defense. When such circumstances come to the Operative's attention, and he has reason to believe that inaction on his part would be prejudicial to the interests of the Navy, he should assume responsibility for such initial protective or investigative steps as may be required to determine the exact nature of the activity and to assure the security of the Naval Establishment. His action should be reported as soon as possible to the proper executive, and discretion should be used in applying the above principle.

#### 21409

It should be noted that Federal laws prohibit a Naval Intelligence Operative from employing or causing to be employed any private investigator or investigating agency for the purpose of conducting, or acting as assistants in completing an investigation (Ref. U. S. Code, Title 5, Art. 53).

## CHAPTER 2.—INVESTIGATIONS OF PERSONS

### SECTION I.—GENERAL REMARKS

#### 22101

**Investigations of persons** are made to determine the history, general background, location, present activity, and sometimes the future intentions of individuals in which the Navy is interested. As herein described, this type of investigation embraces many features of the "Neighborhood Investigations" and the "Applicant Investigations" as conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

#### 22102

The extent or scope of this kind of investigation depends upon the purpose for which it is conducted. It may involve only a simple identification of the subject by routine methods, or, as in the case of an intelligent and elusive espionage suspect, it may require the most exhaustive research and extensive and detailed inquiry. The suggestions contained herein provide for the widest and most comprehensive investigations which may be found necessary, yet the Operative is expected to follow these guides only as far as is required to reach his objective. He should never make an unnecessary inquiry.

#### 22103

When one office of the Naval Intelligence Service requests another to conduct an investigation, they should enclose with the request complete information including Personal Identification of the person. They should also **plainly indicate the importance of this specific part of the investigation** in relation to the whole investigation with which it is connected. The request may be made by letter, 5" x 3" file card, Investigation Report or Summary Report.

#### 22104

Investigations of Persons are usually of the following types:

- (1) Applicant investigations.
- (2) Suspects (to be located, identified, questioned, or placed under surveillance or arrest).
- (3) Persons in hiding to be located.
- (4) Personal histories, background, etc., to be determined for miscellaneous reasons.



## SECTION II.—APPLICANTS FOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

### 22201

The secret introduction, by an espionage organization, of an agent into the intelligence service of another country, is properly regarded as a great achievement. In spite of the difficulties involved, however, this feat has been accomplished many times and often with rich rewards. Used against our own Naval Intelligence, these tactics might enable an enemy to win unchallenged access to all of our secret information, including the knowledge of our points of greatest vulnerability. The value of such information is obvious and Operatives must always be alert to prevent infiltration of this kind into our own Service.

### 22202

We may expect such attempts at penetration to be directed at our weakest point, which is the enrollment of new Intelligence personnel. We may also expect the most favorable time to be chosen, that is, during rapid expansion in times of emergency. For this reason, the investigation of I-V (S) Officer applicants and civilians applying for appointment, either as Clerical Assistants or as Operatives of the Service, is **one of the most important tasks to which an Operative may be assigned**. It is not to be regarded lightly, nor to be carried out in a perfunctory manner.

### 22203

Every application should be scrutinized minutely and the first fact to be determined is why the applicant desires a position in the Intelligence Service. If careful study of the applicant reveals that motives of loyalty, patriotism, and desire to be of service are paramount, and that there are no direct or indirect connections with foreign or subversive elements, the investigation may proceed along routine channels. If, however, the applicant has alien connections or sympathies, or if he has falsified his application, or if he repeatedly attempts to enter the Intelligence Service after having been denied admission thereto, he should be placed upon the Suspect List and investigated accordingly.

### 22204

After the above considerations, the most important is the **character of the applicant**, and moral turpitude of any kind should be considered disqualifying. To enroll a gambler, a drunkard, or a philanderer is to invite the corruption of an agent and the betrayal of the Service.

### 22205

Applicant investigations must be conducted discreetly. Inasmuch as they are only preliminary surveys confined to ascertaining the character, connections, and qualifications of an individual for whom an



officer's commission may be in prospect, the "inquiries" (not "investigations") must be made as a strictly confidential matter. They must, however, be thorough. Persons interviewed should be selected and interviewed with care and full information regarding the status, local reputation, and relationship to the applicant of each of these sources of information should be shown in the **Body** of the Investigation Report. This will aid in evaluation and the determination of any element of favoritism, prejudice, or undue influence which may have affected their statements. The list of persons interviewed should include not only references given in the application, but also a number of disinterested persons qualified to testify regarding the applicant.

#### 22206

For the sake of completeness, it is desirable to follow some orderly procedure in carrying out the investigation. Work in a methodical and systematic fashion. Do not cut corners or rely upon second- or third-hand testimony. The following outline is suggested, and includes the **personal history** of the applicant, a study of his **reputation and character** and his **professional or technical ability**.

#### 22207

Arrange to obtain a completely filled out "Application and Personal History Statement," and use this as a source of leads.

Personal history should include:

- (a) Name and address(es).
- (b) Age.
- (c) Place of birth.
- (d) Race and nationality.
- (e) Legal residence.
- (f) Names of parents (including mother's maiden name), nativity and nationality, etc.
- (g) Records of marriage, divorces, and close relatives.
- (h) Education, showing institutions and degrees, with dates.
- (i) Political and religious affiliations.
- (j) Profession, business or trade, with records of previous employment.
- (k) Clubs, societies, and fraternal organizations.
- (l) Professional and charitable organizations.
- (m) Business connections, significant stock-holdings or directorships, etc.
- (n) Records of travel, residence abroad, etc.
- (o) Records of previous military, naval, or other Governmental service.
- (p) Miscellaneous information.
- (q) Explanation of above-listed items of the "Application and Personal History Statement":

(1) The actual age of the applicant should be definitely established. School and college records show the age, given at a time when a motive for misrepresentation is unlikely. It is sometimes necessary to verify the birth records with the proper State Bureaus of Vital Statistics, etc., particularly if some discrepancy in the reported age, nationality, or nativity is discovered or suspected. These records usually also reveal the names, nationality, and nativity of the parents.

(2) When the parents, or other close relatives, are found to be living under the jurisdiction of any totalitarian power, a **special note** to that effect should be included in the Investigation Report.

(3) The political and religious affiliations of the applicant are of concern to the investigation only if the political party in question is extremely radical, or if the religious sect be of the fanatical variety.

(4) Try to obtain a complete itinerary of all foreign travel. If any suspicion attaches to special contacts or prolonged stop-overs abroad, check the deposits made to the applicant's bank account upon his return to this country, and trace them to their source. At the same time, make other investigations to detect improved financial status.

(5) Obtain an official transcript of the applicant's military service record, if in this country. If served elsewhere, obtain his discharge papers and other official documents for examination and verification. (The Bureau of Navigation checks the transcripts in the case of class I-V (S) Officers and Domestic Intelligence Branch, ONI, for Agents and Special Agents.) All inquiries pertaining to such transcripts should be made through the Domestic Intelligence Branch, ONI.

(6) If the applicant has long been a resident in a city, check the **newspaper libraries** ("Morgues") for additional items of his personal history. Check **newspaper indexes** (The New York Times is one of the best annuals) and, if the applicant is of some prominence, the "Obituary" files of local and national newspapers.

(7) If the applicant is a professional man, biographical data may be obtained from business and professional directories. A few examples are given below:

- (a) Who's Who in America.
- (b) Who's Who in (State, City, or Section).
- (c) Who's Who in (particular profession or industry).
- (d) Directory of Directors.
- (e) Cyclopedia of American Biography.
- (f) Martindale and Hubbel's American Law Directory.
- (g) Directories of Federal, State, County, and Municipal Bar Associations.
- (h) Directory of the American Bankers Association.
- (i) Directories of various Insurance and Underwriting groups.
- (j) Medical, Surgical and Dental, local and National Association Directories.
- (k) Trade Associations and other Professional Directories.

(8) (The items listed above will furnish an abundance of leads which may be followed as far as circumstances require.)

## 22208

**Reputation and character.**—The honesty, personal integrity, and strength of character of the applicant are the most important considerations with which the investigation is concerned. The investigator should collect the following data:

- (a) General reputation.
- (b) Social and professional standing.
- (c) Family relationships.
- (d) Criminal and police records.
- (e) Personal habits and mode of life.
- (f) Opinions and utterances.

- (g) Financial and credit standing.
- (h) Civic and patriotic enterprises.
- (i) Close friends and companions.
- (j) Membership in secret societies, associations, or movements of political significance.

(1) In contacting **references** it must be remembered that their opinions are probably biased in favor of the applicant (check their statements with disinterested sources). Politicians usually do not know much about individuals they have recommended. After writing a complimentary recommendation, a reference may tell things that he would not put on paper. Do not interview relatives unless you believe them to be unfriendly to the applicant. **Warning:** Never express, in an interview, any opinion concerning the applicant or his chances of obtaining the appointment.

(2) Learn from the applicant's **competitors** his professional standing, reputation, or honesty, ethical standards and his reaction to social, political, or financial pressure and influence. Consider carefully the motives and sentiments underlying these opinions—enmity, jealousy, friendship, sense of obligation, etc., may influence statements.

(3) If the investigation reveals any business activity or employment which the applicant has failed to mention in his application, find out why it was omitted. Interview the employer in these cases. Learn if the applicant was well liked and respected: if not, why not? Was he a complainer, an agitator, a loafer, or a leader? Did he "watch the clock"? Why wasn't he promoted? Learn from each of the applicant's former employers, under what circumstances he left their employ.

(4) It should be determined whether the applicant's **family relationships** are normal and creditable. Are all close relatives citizens; are any of them engaged in criminal or questionable activities? Any scandal, rumor, or charge reflecting against the character of the applicant should be investigated to a logical and reasonable conclusion.

(5) The **Police and Court Records** of each town or city in which an applicant is known to have resided should be checked, as well as the County Sheriff's Office in any county where he lived or made his summer (vacation) home. (While making inquiries, it will be found convenient to interview former friends and business associates to further determine the reputation and character of the applicant.) Unless police records show an excessive number of minor traffic violations or other petty misdemeanors, these need not be included in the Investigation Report. However, all serious misdemeanors, felonies, and other criminal offenses should be reported in detail.

(6) Much may be gained from a study of the applicant's **personal habits**. It is important to note if he is a heavy drinker, an habitual gambler, or if he frequents the society of questionable women. Equally important is the question whether he has extravagant tastes which cause him to live beyond his means. Such a type would be dangerous in the Service, where he might be tempted to augment his Naval pay in illegitimate ways. Discreetly question managers, bartenders, waiters, hat-check girls, doormen, bell-boys, etc., at the cafes, restaurants, night clubs and hotels regularly patronized by the applicant.

(7) If the applicant is a journalist, writer, lecturer, or teacher, a



Careful review of his contributions may disclose radical or otherwise objectionable opinions.

(8) "A man is known by the company he keeps" and the kind of persons with whom the applicant associates reveals more of his character than will many of the opinions which may be expressed about him. This is also true of the organizations to which he belongs. If any of these are subversive in nature, the applicant must be regarded as either ill-intentioned or stupid.

(9) A visit to the local merchants credit association will give the investigator information concerning the applicant's financial standing, reliability, and business integrity. Other leads may be obtained from the applicant's banker and business associates.

#### 22209

**Professional or technical ability.**—Information regarding the subject's experience and skill is not only necessary to determine his fitness for the Service, but also is needed, after his appointment, for an "Operative's Avocation Index," which should include a complete record of all former experience in business and various trades, and, in addition, a list of hobbies, avocations and special interests. (See (4) this paragraph and paragraphs 23508 and 31220.) The following data should be supplied:

- (a) Professional standing and experience in present occupation.
- (b) All previous occupations, with dates. Names of employers and length of time employed.
- (c) Evidence of psychological aptitude for intelligence work.
- (d) Estimate of applicant's sound judgment, intelligence, integrity, acumen, executive ability, fairness, dignity, poise, personal appearance and neatness.
- (e) Note of any handicapping physical or mental defects.
- (f) Special technical knowledge or skill of value in Intelligence work.

(1) Knowledge of the applicant's mental characteristics as well as his professional standing is best obtained from his business or professional associates.

(2) The subject's physician may be discreetly interviewed to determine any hidden physical or mental defects.

(NOTE.—Medical examination of applicants may not reveal epilepsy, stuttering, drug addiction, etc.)

(3) Estimate of the subject's psychological aptitude for Intelligence work is best made by responsible and experienced Intelligence Operatives. This may be effected by a long conversation or interview conducted by the Intelligence Officer himself, or by an experienced Operative.

(4) The list of special technical knowledge and skills useful in Intelligence work is almost infinite, but the following examples are suggestive: Experience as a lawyer, prosecutor, or investigator; a reporter, photographer, or writer; crime laboratory experience; radio, telegraphy, and telephony; language expert, translator, interpreter; sound recording and interception; public-accountant, bookkeeper; explosives, firearms, and ballistics; forensic medicine, chemistry, and toxicology; cryptography and cryptanalysis; microscopy and spectrography; fingerprint classification and document expert; surveying and mapmaking. (All hobbies should also be listed).

22210

The Bureau of Navigation Manual, Part H, Chapter 2, Sections 1 to 3, inclusive, outline the general requirements and qualifications of Naval Reserve Officers. Paragraphs H2101, H2301, and H2308 deal specifically with the general requirements and qualifications for Class I-V(S) Officers. Operatives should fully familiarize themselves with the above sections and articles before undertaking any applicant investigations in connection with the Naval Reserve Intelligence Officers or other members of the Naval Reserve.

Naval activities, not only in the United States but in foreign countries, may include applications for civil service positions in the Naval Reserve. Particular attention should be given to these positions as ones of great responsibility and trust.

22302

From the standpoint of Intelligence, the nature of the information furnished by an informant or other source is of great importance. It is essential that the statements contained therein are true. The possibility that the candidate may be an espionage or sabotage agent must first be eliminated. If the investigation has been requested for any other special reason, the Operative of course should be fully informed of it.

22303

The second consideration is whether the subject is of good character and reputation; if he is honest, truthful, and dependable, and without dangerous habits such as gambling, extreme extravagance, drunkenness, or fanaticism of any kind.

22304

The technical qualifications of the applicant should be determined by the particular branch of the Service concerned. They are of interest to the investigator only if it appears that, for some hidden purpose, the applicant has exaggerated or minimized his skills.

22305

During the investigation, the Operative should not be influenced by the opinions or findings of other classes of Naval personnel. They seldom show a realistic appreciation of counter-espionage work, and too often regard applicant investigations merely as necessary evils to be avoided or gotten over with as quickly as possible. The investigator should ignore this attitude, which reflects only a lack of intelligence training in the other branches, and should concentrate on the problem in hand. He should pursue his investigation discreetly and independently and submit his report direct to his superior in the Investigating Service.

22306

The lines he should follow have been broadly indicated in the preceding Subsection. A few additional suggestions are offered:  
(1) Find out who sponsors or recommends the applicant and why. Who suggested that he make the application?

(48)



### **SECTION III.—OTHER APPLICANTS**

#### **22301**

The Investigating Service may be requested to assist in checking applications for reserve commissions, or other positions in various Naval activities, not connected with the Intelligence Service. This may include applications for civil-service positions in the Naval Establishment, particularly when these positions are ones of great responsibility and trust.

#### **22302**

From the standpoint of Intelligence, the prime requisite is to determine if any inimical or ulterior motive underlies the application, or if any of the statements contained therein are false. The possibility that the candidate may be an espionage or sabotage agent must first be eliminated. If the investigation has been requested for any other special reason, the Operative, of course, should be fully informed of it.

#### **22303**

The second consideration is whether the subject is of good character and reputation; if he is honest, truthful, and dependable, and without dangerous faults such as gambling, extreme extravagance, drunkenness, or fanaticism of any kind.

#### **22304**

The technical qualifications of the applicant should be determined by the particular branch of the Service concerned. They are of interest to the investigator only if it appears that, for some hidden purpose, the applicant has exaggerated or minimized his skill.

#### **22305**

During the investigation, the Operative should not be influenced by the opinions or findings of other classes of Naval personnel. They seldom show a realistic appreciation of counterespionage work, and too often regard applicant investigations merely as necessary evils to be avoided or gotten over with as quickly as possible. The investigator should ignore this attitude, which reflects only a lack of Intelligence training in the other branches, and should concentrate on the problem in hand. He should pursue his investigation discreetly and independently and submit his report direct to his superior in the Investigating Service.

#### **22306**

The lines he should follow have been broadly indicated in the preceding Subsection. A few additional suggestions are offered:

(1) Find out who sponsors or recommends the applicant and why. Who suggested that he make the application?

(2) Check Civil-Service applicants through the local Labor Board. Before interviewing the Secretary or other members of the Board, make sure of your man. He may be a "stool" for labor groups or for special cliques of employees.

(3) See that the fingerprints of Civil-Service applicants have been checked in Washington, D. C., by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Obtain photographs and handwriting samples.

(4) If subject is unmarried, what woman is he interested in? Who pays the bills?

(5) Is the applicant of draft age? Is he "dodging"?

(6) When, as often happens, it is discovered that a Civil-Service applicant has been previously employed on numerous Government projects, and appears to be constantly drifting from one to another, **find out why** before proceeding any further. When such a man voluntarily quits a ten-dollar-a-day job to take another at six dollars, proceed with caution! **Use the utmost discretion** in cases of this kind.

(7) When indicated, check bank accounts, Postal Savings (See Pars. 25102-25103 and 25302 (35)), State Employment Records, etc.

(8) Stop the investigation and report in specific detail when a felony, gross delinquency, theft, or falsified application is discovered.

## SECTION IV.—LOCATING SUBJECTS AND SUSPECTS

### 22401

One of the regular tasks of the Investigating Service is the locating of subjects, suspects, and other persons whose whereabouts is unknown. This may happen when the subject is expected to arrive from another district, or when the trail of a person under surveillance has been lost, or when a report, with serious implications but only fragmentary information is received.

### 22402

Just as a Naval Commander locates the enemy at sea by certain well recognized methods, i. e., radio direction-finder, scouting planes, retiring search curve, etc., so should the investigator follow a **methodical plan** employing established methods of search.

### 22403

This plan should consist first of the **summary of known facts**. These constitute the leads. The first leads to be followed are those which promise the quickest results, by direct and expedient methods. If the results are negative, the next most likely leads are followed, and so on in the order of their importance, until all known leads have been exhausted. When this happens, the Operative should carefully scan his case-notebook list of Information Sources (See Par. 32301), to make sure that he has missed no likely source of additional leads. It is often helpful to have another investigator review the notes on the case. His fresh viewpoint, more often than not, will reveal useful clues which the Operative has overlooked. Rarely, it may happen that an Operative feels that he has reached the end of the road and that further efforts are useless.

### 22404

From this impasse, however, there is yet a way of escape. It consists simply of applying **deductive reasoning** to the known facts for the discovery of new leads. This is not as difficult as it sounds. Suppose, for example, the address to which the subject's baggage has been sent has been considered a lead. But the baggage has been lost and the address found to be fictitious. A careful review of the report on the baggage may reveal that, among other things, a golf bag was included. The **inference** is that the subject is a golfer, the **conclusion** is obvious, that he may be found on one of the local golf links.

### 22405

In locating Subjects and Suspects, the Operative should frequently consult Part 2, Chapter 4, for sources of information. Additional suggestions are given below.

(1) Provide yourself with as complete a description of the subject as possible. This includes photographs, personal description, style of dress, habits, peculiar mannerisms, fingerprints and classification if available, etc.

(2) If the subject is spotted and his address is desired, it may be possible to simply tail him home. If he takes a cab, and you believe him to be apprehensive, do not follow. Get the cab number, contact the taxicab company supervisor, have him call the driver and find where the subject was delivered. This is however a somewhat dangerous practice, as experienced agents will often change cabs or drive to an intermediate address in order to break their trail.

(3) If you miss a man at the station or terminal, cover all cabs, also his baggage, or locate through the expressman.

(4) If the subject has local friends or relatives, make discreet inquiries of them, under some pretext. Learn the subject's local history and background; make a list of his friends and the places he usually frequents.

(5) Place 30-day mail coverages on close relatives, particularly subject's mother or some favorite brother or sister from whom he borrows money, etc., also his sweetheart, close business friends, creditors, or lawyer. (These covers may yield good results on holidays or family anniversaries.)

(6) Contact the family mail carrier and cover all boxes through which letters are likely to be mailed by the subject.

(7) Arrange with Post Office Inspector to place subject's name on the carrier's bulletin board for the information of all mail carriers.

(8) Send a registered letter (return receipt) and follow it.

(9) If subject owns stock, has an annuity or pension, life insurance policy or other fixed income, or a local bank account, trace him as outlined in Chapter 5.

(10) Get subject's service record (or abstract), if any. Search Veteran's Administration files.

(11) Does the man pay union dues, or subscribe to a favorite magazine? From what address? Study of past records over a period of time will often reveal subject's former resorts, where past acquaintances may be interviewed, possibly under pretext. He may also return to these places as he is familiar with local conditions.

(12) Cover all places of employment for persons of the subject's trade or profession. **Use caution** in contacting employment bureaus. Some are espionage centers!

(13) What fraternal organizations does the subject belong to? From what addresses were recent dues received? To what address are his notices mailed, and his membership cards sent?

(14) Is the subject a regular church member? What church?

(15) If he is of foreign birth, look for him at clubs, cafes, and hotels frequented by others of his race. In these inquiries exercise extreme care. Use informer of the same race, if possible, to go under cover at likely spots. (See Chapter 2, Section IV.)

(16) Remember, a man must eat and sleep. Check restaurants he has patronized or where his favorite cooking may be served. Cover the class of hotels he has used in the past.

(17) When **special medicines** are used by the subject, contact logical drug stores. Trace any prescriptions or registered medicine leads that can be developed. Many pharmaceutical houses now use "con-



trol numbers" (identifying serial numbers) in the manufacture and distribution of their products.

(18) When the subject owns a car or may purchase one, place information requests with "automobile underwriters" and with State boards of motor vehicles.

(19) Send bogus telegrams and have **delivery** and **forwarding** checked with both Western Union, Postal Telegraph, and the telephone company.

(20) Try a bogus long distance telephone call to the subject, from another town. Check with the telephone company on **unpublished** numbers **if you have a good lead**.

(21) Use sound at any promising point.

(22) If you hear a **rumor** that your subject is to make an appearance somewhere, **be there yourself**.

(23) **Do not take anything on trust.**—Some of the people you interview will mislead you on general principles, others will repeat only what they have been instructed to say.

(24) In large cities, the captain of the police precinct in which the subject formerly resided, and the chief of detectives, have many exclusive sources of information, which may be utilized by discreet consultation.

(25) If the subject is of sufficient importance, report the facts to your directing officer, who may communicate with the Investigating Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence and request a National Information Request or Detention Request to be circularized through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Bureau of Immigration. (All Information Requests and Detention Requests should be accompanied by the appropriate Identifications.) He will also notify MID of the action taken.

(26) Keep in mind that no investigation can be outlined by hard and fast rules. The Operative must adapt the foregoing suggestions to meet special needs as they arise. In the last analysis, it is his ingenuity and practical imagination which brings success, as much as do modern methods and organization teamwork.



## **CHAPTER 3.—INVESTIGATION OF INIMICAL AND SUBVERSIVE GROUPS**

### **SECTION I.—INTRODUCTION**

#### **23101**

The Navy has a vital and paramount interest in all groups who attempt or intend: Espionage in the Naval Establishment, the sabotage of Naval Material and the propagandism and subversion of Naval personnel. Investigations of such groups will be conducted wherever they threaten Naval interests. This will naturally be in those areas including Naval bases, harbors, ports, fuel and supply depots, and where the forces afloat may be concentrated in coastal districts.

#### **23102**

In this type of work, the cooperation of many Operatives and the coordinated effort of more than one agency is usually involved. In some cases the investigating and law-enforcement strength of the entire nation may be needed. This demands a clear understanding, on the part of one investigating agency, of the jurisdiction, policies, methods and capacities of the other agencies involved. Conflicting purposes, duplication of effort, and misunderstandings can be avoided only when all agencies adhere to policies mutually recognized and agreed upon by their respective coordinating heads.

#### **23103**

Group investigations in detail, are similar to the investigations of persons, but they are markedly different in purpose, method, and scope. The purpose is dictated by Intelligence objectives, Naval interests, or National policy. The methods are those particularly adapted to the investigation of organizations. The scope is determined by the location, size, and extent of the activities.

#### **23104**

Each of the groups which threaten Naval interests will have fixed agents, "nests," cells, or even minor headquarters located in or near important Naval areas. This provides Operatives, who, in civil life are normally residents of those areas, with exceptional opportunities for valuable work. Their knowledge of the district, and their many local acquaintances, should enable them to conduct very effective extended surveillances of these organizations.

#### **23105**

However, before beginning any operation against an inimical group, the **Operative must consult fully** with his superior officer. No independent investigation is to be undertaken without specific orders.

The investigator must keep in mind that any impetuous action may not only result in his own failure, but also may sacrifice weeks or months of work which has been done by fellow agents. All investigative work outside of the Naval Establishment should be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division of the Army. (See also Pars. 21404 and 21408.)

### 23106

The various inimical groups may be classed as follows:

(1) **Foreign espionage services.**—Interested in either Military (Naval) espionage or industrial espionage, or both. (Chief weapon—deception.)

(2) **Sabotage organizations.**—Various types may plan sabotage with military (Naval) purpose; sabotage with antisocial or anticapitalistic intent; combatant sabotage. (Chief weapon—destruction.)

(3) **Subversive groups.**—These may be motivated by indirect military purposes, anti-American or antisocial purposes. (Chief weapon—propaganda.)

NOTE.—A few subversive groups present the triple-threat of espionage, sabotage, and subversive propaganda.

## SECTION II.—FOREIGN ESPIONAGE SERVICES

### 23201

The full disclosure of these services is the main purpose of counter-espionage work and the most difficult problem which confronts the Intelligence agent. Law enforcement or police procedures are entirely inappropriate for this work. Experienced counterespionage agents have long since learned the futility of attacking espionage services by routine methods of investigation which may have proved successful in ordinary crime detection. This is the elite corps of enemy agents; individuals of outstanding intelligence, unusual talents, and intensive training. The Operative will do well to approach this task with an attitude of wholesome respect for the ability of his opponents. As a rule it is better to overestimate the enemy than to underestimate him.

### 23202

The typical espionage service is made up of the following classes of agents:

(1) **Consular and diplomatic agents**, military and naval attachés, members of special missions, observers and other official and quasi-official representatives.

(2) **Special agents**, who may work under the direction of the above officials, or more often, independently under orders of the foreign intelligence section of their respective countries. These agents may act as organizers, inspectors, supervisors, couriers, or to carry out special missions.

(3) **Fixed agents**, resident in districts to which they have been assigned, and responsible for espionage activities in that area.

(4) **Informers**, working under the direction of fixed agents. They may be located in vital industries or in the armed forces of the United States. They work on either specific or general assignments.

### 23203

Although diplomatic and consular representatives, and their staffs, are in this country ostensibly for the performance of duties connected with their offices, they have often, especially in wartime, actively aided or directed espionage activities. They are doing it now. This activity is in addition to that of the military and naval attachés, whose recognized function is, of course, the obtaining of information of interest to their respective departments. Other persons included in this officially recognized group are the "students," exchange professors and registered propagandists, who may be expected to engage in subversive activity under the cloak of their frankly acknowledged purposes.

### 23204

Officially unrecognized and disavowed are the trained espionage experts. They are picked from among the graduates of foreign es-

pionage schools where thorough training prepares them to assume naturally whatever character is assigned to them. They enter the United States in many guises; as refugees, commercial travelers, representatives of steamship companies, travel agencies, industrial concerns, etc., ad infinitum. The entry may or may not be legally made. One European power regularly exchanges steamship "crew members" for homeward-bound agents. Another power practices the wholesale substitution of fishing boat crews while away from American ports.

## 23205

Depending upon their mission, the stay of the agents may be short or indefinitely prolonged. Some are regularly admitted on their immigration quota and acquire citizenship solely as a means to their ends. Others circumvent the immigration laws by temporarily leaving the country and reentering it on another passport, or by actually forging passports or falsely obtaining genuine ones. On these trips they act as couriers and carry reports out of the country on their persons. The subterfuges and extremes employed by spies to remain at their work in this country are many and space is not available to cite them in detail. Of one thing, however, the Operative may be sure—**every trained espionage agent has a legitimate reason for being in his area, and he can prove it!**

## 23206

The fixed agent plays a less spectacular role than does the special agent but he constitutes an even greater threat to the National security. A more or less permanent resident of his community; a naturalized citizen when necessary; engaged in a profitable and well-established business; regarded as loyal and patriotic; a respected member of society; this is his stock in trade. His duties are the surveillance of military and naval leaders, the collection of all information of military or naval importance and its secure transmission to his superiors. He is often the recipient of a pension or an annuity from irreproachable sources. This is his pay. He gathers information from various subordinates, to each of whom he is a "letter box." These subordinates he selects and trains personally. They are usually unknown to each other. Such is his importance to the espionage service that months, and even years, may pass without subjecting him to the risk of a personal contact with his superiors. In time of war he is the "innocent merchant" who is persecuted because of "war hysteria."

## 23207

The informer, or working spy, is drawn from many classes. He may be a confirmed criminal, with antisocial outlook; a radical with revolutionary instincts; a misguided "patriot" working for his mother country; a weakling entrapped in his own vices, or a callous traitor prompted by motives of gain. Whatever his nature, he is selected because he has, or can obtain, access to information of value to his employers. He is told nothing except what is expected of him. He is usually paid by the job. After the first one, he is bound to his



employer by fear of betrayal and by the expectation of further lucrative employment. In time of war, he often betrays his employer, to save his skin, and is willing to work for both sides.

#### 23208

The exact form which an espionage service will assume is determined by the ease or difficulty with which it is set up and operated. In Europe and Asia, where counterespionage pressure is heavy, the plan variously known as the "satellite," "octopus," or "**echelon**" **system is used**. This safest of all systems requires that supreme authority be vested in one or two heads. These **espionage chiefs alone** are aware of the identity of each **district leader** under their command. The various district organizations are isolated from each other and no district leader knows the identity of another. The plan is duplicated within each district, whose leader alone knows the identity of his **fixed agents**, at least one of which is located in each important town of the district and all of whom are unknown to each other. The fixed agent, in turn, selects, trains, and employs his own **subordinates**, who are, again, unknown to each other. This strict separation of the members of the service prevents the compromise of the whole system through the arrest of any one member.

#### 23209

Under very heavy pressure, all sorts of elaborate precautions are added to those inherent in the system. False names or other discreet identification are used instead of names, separate post-office boxes are provided for each informer, members are deceived as to which power employs them, meeting points are constantly changed, and so on, all for the purpose of preventing wholesale disclosure of the system.

#### 23210

Espionage services operating in the United States have not, as yet, paid us the compliment of adopting this strict system of organization. Here, groups of foreign agents have freely met to exchange notes, to perfect their plans, etc., apparently confident of their own security. This situation has its advantages; an alarmed opponent is much more elusive than an overconfident one. For this reason public announcements of counterespionage "drives" and loud threats aimed at subversive groups are not in the best interests of the Investigating Service.

#### 23211

The best espionage practice is the establishment of several separate and parallel services to insure complete coverage and provide against total loss of contact in emergencies. The Operative is therefore warned not to allow his knowledge of one espionage service to blind him to the possible existence of other separate and distinct services of the same foreign power.

#### 23212

Every secret organization has its vulnerable points. The espionage agent is well aware of the weaknesses of his own system. In fact,



an important part of his training is devoted to the repair and concealment of these weaknesses. They nevertheless remain. Three principal points for attack are as follows: **The directing heads**, who, when they have official or semiofficial status in this country, cannot conceal themselves from counterespionage agents; the **actual worker**, who must pass through security lines to do his work; **all channels of communication** and financial transactions.

(1) The known or suspected heads of espionage services, together with their staffs, may be surrounded by a net of surveillance covering home and office, telegraph, telephone, mail, and personal contacts. If this net is skillfully applied, all means of communication pass under counterespionage control. It follows that the suspect cannot exercise his supervision of espionage activity without disclosing the identity of one or more assistants. Obviously a delicate task, not for novices, this surveillance may nevertheless be accomplished successfully, especially if the suspect is a senior in high position. Important personages are less afraid, less cautious, less imaginative, and less likely to heed the warnings of subordinates. They are usually self-confident and impatient with details of security measures because of their ignorance of their purpose. When there is this assumption of infallibility on the part of the suspect, successful surveillance is reasonably certain. (Technical details of such surveillance are described elsewhere in this manual.)

(2) The working spy is the member of the service who takes the most risks. Just how serious those risks are depends upon the effectiveness of security measures in force at the point of penetration. Prior to the recent recognition of a state of "limited emergency" the risks were very slight indeed, and the chances of identifying the spy were correspondingly very poor. As security measures improve and penetration becomes difficult the espionage agent will be forced to exert himself and to take more and more chances in order to accomplish his objective. This will be the case particularly when the American press and technical publications can be dissuaded from presenting gratis to the spy information which he would otherwise take serious risks to obtain. Some suggestions for picking up the trail of this type of agent are given below:

(a) Train and place undercover agents in points of great vulnerability—where vital information and secret formulae are kept—where experimental work of interest to national defense is performed—where war plans and policies are discussed.

(b) Close the loopholes—free information—free bulletins—published technical discussions—public discussions—official apathy and indifference—and **force the agent** to "come and get" the information he wishes.

(c) Arrange for the surveillance of the suspects already in your files.

(d) Stage a series of supposedly secret "tests." Provide for the usual newspaper publicity regarding each of these. The "tests" or "trials" should be reported as concerning a new bombing device, new and powerful explosives, a new type of Diesel featherweight engine, etc. Conduct the tests at logical and widely separated points. Cover each incident completely with agents, take photographs and note who else is taking them. Note all apparent aliens, take pictures of them. Record all automobile license plates and descriptions of

car occupants. Compile your data. What persons attended all of the "tests," four out of five? Why? Repeat this procedure in real trials.

(e) Get the name of every foreigner employed on important national-defense projects as, for example, the construction of a new destroyer with novel boilers or reduction gears. A certain percentage of these will be espionage agents. By a process of elimination (laborious—but worth while), determine which are the most likely suspects. (This list of suggestions could be extended indefinitely. Use your own imagination to supply additional leads).

(3) Close study of the communications of espionage agents offers a good chance of disclosing the system. This may be done in many ways: By mail covers, by covering all telegraph and telephone facilities, by the use of sound and recorders, the close surveillance of known agents and couriers, and so forth.

(a) Perhaps no single source of information has been so productive, in the past, as a close inspection of the bank accounts and all financial transactions of agents or suspected agents. Bitter experience in recent espionage cases, however, has taught a number of groups to disguise their accounts and otherwise conceal the channels through which payments to subordinates are made. They now favor the use of cash, which nevertheless, is usually withdrawn from some bank account and which may be traced.

(b) It is entirely possible even to minutely record all of the correspondence contained in a courier's briefcase while that individual is asleep or otherwise preoccupied or diverted.

(c) The use of code or cipher in espionage communications is an ancient and effective means of insuring the secrecy of the messages. In theory, any such method of communication may be deciphered by skilled cryptanalysts. In actual practice, however, codes may be encountered which are practically indecipherable, the chances against solving them being expressed in probabilities employing astronomical figures. Of course photostats or photographs of all code messages should be promptly forwarded to the Investigations Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, to be referred to the experts in cryptanalysis. (In special cases it may be necessary to actually abstract from the courier's baggage certain items, documents, etc., for chemical treatment or ultraviolet light examination.) The best way to "crack" a code is the method used by the British during the World War, i. e., secretly copy the code book.

#### 23213

If the Operative discovers an individual who, because of circumstances, may be presumed to be an enemy agent, he must exercise the utmost discretion! Contact with the suspect should be maintained **only as long as is necessary** to identify him or to insure that he may be kept under appropriate surveillance. There should be no fumbling of the ball at this point. Better to lose the suspect than to alarm him! Next, report to your superior, lay your plans, enlist whatever assistance is necessary, and continue the surveillance.

#### 23214

In the investigation of a suspect, **the Operative should not be concerned with evidence in the legal sense** except as it effects efficient

cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The facts are of interest ONLY as they afford **reasonable assurance** that the suspect is engaged in espionage. Much harm has been done by agents neglecting this point, and pushing an investigation to dangerous extremes because of a desire for "evidence." If the Operative has a "legal mind," he should attempt to overcome it, or else abandon counterespionage work.

#### 23215

Occasionally, after an espionage agent is discovered, it may be desirable to contact him and by various means, persuade him to betray his employers or even to work against them. This is a question involving many serious considerations and should **never be attempted except by the advice and consent** of responsible authorities of the Investigating Service.

#### 23216

The same thing is true of the introduction of counterespionage agents into the espionage service of the enemy. This is usually a delicate and difficult affair, and should not be attempted by subordinates. It is, however, the proper concern of directing officers, and, where contemplated, should constitute a carefully conceived and skillfully executed project.

### SECTION III.—SABOTAGE ORGANIZATIONS

#### 23301

Sabotage may be defined as: **Any willful and malicious physical damage to physical property.** It may be further defined as: **Any deliberate act, either of commission or omission, which interferes with the efficient construction, operation, maintenance, and supply of the United States Navy, or any part thereof.**

#### 23302

These groups are as follows:

- (1) **Radical international organizations** which endorse, advocate, and practice sabotage as a principal weapon against our form of government.
- (2) **Foreign nationalistic groups** which resort to sabotage either to injure this country or to prevent aid from reaching another.
- (3) **Secret sabotage services** organized by foreign governments, to commit sabotage as a direct or indirect military operation against this country.

NOTE.—Any of these groups may resort to sabotage in a political revolutionary effort.

#### 23303

**The danger of sabotage** from the various radical international groups (Communists, Anarchists, Syndicalists, etc.) is generally well known. They have repeatedly expressed their intention to sabotage the Navy and the vital industries upon which it depends. In many cities they have established regular schools of instruction in which the technique of sabotage is an important part of the curriculum. They have urged their members to join the armed forces of the United States in order to be able to damage vital components of the National Defense, and many of these members are now employed in Navy Yards, aircraft factories, munition plants, and other important Government projects.

#### 23304

Operatives of the Investigating Service should be fully prepared to meet threats from radical organizations in all areas immediately surrounding essential Naval activities. This may be done as follows:

(1) Employ under-cover agents to **join the radical groups.** Because of the poor quality of the membership this is not a difficult task. The "member" should become an active and ardent radical and attempt to rise to a position of influence and authority. Because of the subdivided (cellular) nature of the radical organizations, there should be a number of these informers planted in each Naval district.

(2) Make up suspect lists and files in accordance with current directives on this subject issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

(3) The surveillance of every radical member employed in vital areas. This may be done by a fellow workman, located at the adjoining work bench, etc.

(4) Check all applicants for employment on Government projects and all recruiting station applicants against the District files, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



## 23305

**Foreign nationalistic groups** are largely composed of hyphenated Americans, influenced and directed by secret agents from the countries concerned. A certain percentage of the members are harmless nationals, moved by nostalgic or social impulses to gather with others speaking the language of the homeland, and, for this reason, membership *per se* should not be a basis for suspicion. This innocent percentage is, however, surprisingly low. By means of impressive uniforms, clever propaganda, stirring speeches, inspirational music, and extravagant promises of future benefits, the entire membership of these groups has been instilled with a spirit and fervor which may easily give rise to **acts of violence**. The Naval Investigating Service should watch all such organizations who meet in the immediate vicinity of important Naval activities.

## 23306

At most nationalistic meetings, or "festivals," while the main body is otherwise engaged, the directing officers meet in secret to discuss their plans. This meeting is usually held in the same building, or one adjacent to the main hall. The form which this meeting takes is revealing. Military courtesies are observed. A guard is placed at the door. Reports are read, orders transmitted, and plans discussed. It is known that, in part, these plans deal with the **sabotage of vital industries** supplying the armed forces of this and other countries.

## 23307

These groups have learned, from the last war, that premature, incomplete and poorly coordinated sabotage efforts have a bad effect upon American public opinion. They plan therefore, in the future, not to commit acts of violence until war with this country is inevitable, or the defeat of their own country is seriously threatened. When that time comes, however, an intensive, widespread and **well coordinated sabotage program** is planned in order to paralyze, by many **simultaneous blows**, the war potential of this country.

## 23308

In the light of this program, and in view of the widespread distribution of foreign nationals employed in Naval activities, the duties of the Investigating Service are clear. Only a well prepared plan of defense will protect the Naval Establishment against attacks of this kind. The following measures are suggested:

(1) Place carefully selected informers or Operatives in these nationalist organizations. These informers must be able, because of birth, connections, language qualifications, etc., to carry out successfully the under-cover operation. (See Section IV.) They should be planted only in those groups which are organized in vital Naval areas and which contain members employed by the Naval Establishment. (Unless the Navy is directly concerned, such surveillance is the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.) The main objective should be to gain the confidence of the leaders, become familiar with the plans and to keep abreast of developments.

(2) Have other, and easily spotted agents, not under cover, to attend all public meetings of the nationalist group. They expect this; the arrangement will satisfy the leaders and divert suspicion from the under-cover members.



(3) Duplicate, in the case of these groups, the procedure suggested under Paragraph 23508. (It should be kept in mind that, in preventing a general concerted attack, **time is the most important factor.** Lists should therefore be kept in readiness for immediate action.)

### 23309

**Special sabotage services**, organized by foreign governments, may be expected from any unfriendly power or even from one which is merely providing for future contingencies. The classic example is now, of course, the effective work done by Major Quisling in paralyzing the Norwegian defense at the time of the German invasion. Because of the disastrous effect of this work on the Norwegian Naval forces, and because of the likelihood that similar attempts may be made against this country, a brief review of the technique is desirable.

### 23310

Vidkun Quisling was the leader of the Nazi party in Norway. In 1936-38, although his party numbered only about 6,000 votes, he managed, owing to the confusion existing in national politics, to gain the post of Minister of Defense. From this strategic position he obtained officer's commissions in the Army and Navy for 35 or 40 of his men. He placed them at vital points. Because of total neglect of military affairs by the labor government, these men were allowed to remain at their posts, even after Quisling had been supplanted as Minister of Defense. Here they stayed until and during the occupation by Germany.

### 23311

At the time their previously prepared plans were carried out to the letter, essentially as follows:

(1) All of the diplomatic and consular corps, and all Press Attachés, Commercial Attachés, "business" advisors, Travel Bureaus, and cultural groups (Nordische Gesellschaft), appeared in uniform and were revealed to be, **without exception**, Military or Naval Officers.

(2) These officers, assisted by Quisling's appointees in the government, and also by the large influx of recently arrived German "visitors," proceeded at once to their assigned tasks.

(3) Armed squads took over the offices and operating rooms of all telephone, telegraph, and radio stations and proceeded to send out their own orders.

(4) The forts were ordered not to fire on the advancing German fleet. All the officers left the Bergen fort, but the enlisted men (Norwegian Coastal defense is part of the Navy) fired seven salvos before hauling down the colors. All the forts were very short of ammunition. The fort at Oscarburg, before obeying its orders to surrender, fired on the Blücher and sank her with 1,700 men, an Admiral and General with their staffs. The fort at Kristiansand sank the Karlsrühe. When a nearby ammunition dump was blown up, it surrendered.

(5) Because orders were withheld, the mines, which should have been laid in the fiords, remained aboard the mine layers in the harbor until the morning of the ninth, the day of invasion.

(6) Mobilization orders were held up until five A. M. on the ninth.

(7) Orders were issued to various army units to lay down their

arms. The officer in command of the sixth division at Narvik was, however, shot as a traitor for so ordering.

(8) Quick raids by commandeered automobiles were made into areas occupied by Norwegian troops for the capture of divisional staffs.

(9) The Germans were in possession of maps far superior to those used by the Norwegians; obviously the result of long and diligent work by expert cartographers.

(10) The key officers of every German advance column told observers of spending all of their vacations in Norway. The Naval officers at Bergen had spent their summers yachting in that area. The same was true at Stavanger and Oslo. Army officers were partial to the valleys and had fished all the prominent streams. In several cases, Norwegian forces were trapped because the Germans knew the region better than they did.

(11) Small portable radios were used for communication between directing officers and secret agents, some of whom were serving in the Norwegian forces.

(12) Much use was made of rockets and lights, sheets laid out in patterns, haystacks set afire, etc., to guide the air and parachute forces. It is the expressed opinion of the German pilots that, without these aids, most landings would have failed.

(13) At Bergen, the consular staff who had seized and held the city, were reinforced by troops who came ashore from merchant vessels where they had been concealed for several days. This also happened at Kristiansand, Narvik, Trondheim, and Stavanger. Each of these ships carried its own quota of all types of supplies, so as to be self-sufficient. The trucks which were on board were already loaded and the antiaircraft guns were accompanied by their crews and ammunition.

(14) The uniforms of the invaded country were often used by German agents to spread fake reports and dissension. (Germans arrived at Calais in French uniforms, and 70,000 sets of British battle dress were captured from the Germans at Arras.)

(15) Orders and directions were placed on advertising billboards to assist advancing German columns.

(16) Arsenal and munitions factories were among the first places seized. They were generally inadequately defended.

(17) By order of Quisling's agents, given two weeks before the attack, **all antiaircraft guns** were sent to Kongsberg to be overhauled. These were captured there before they could be fired.

### 23312

In this campaign, so disastrous for Norway, it is apparent that elements of propaganda, espionage, combatant sabotage, and combat intelligence were successfully combined. No better example could be given to illustrate how closely related and interwoven are the operations of the various branches of secret service.

### 23313

In this section it has been shown from what groups, and under what circumstances, sabotage attacks may be expected. The various forms which it may take and the technique which may be used are discussed in the next chapter. In planning a defense, it is only necessary to study the nature of the attack, and the appropriate defensive measures will immediately suggest themselves.

## SECTION IV.—SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS

### 23401

Subversive organizations are those whose purpose or effect is to corrupt, weaken, or overthrow the government, or the forces which maintain and defend it. Included in this category are: The secret services of unfriendly powers who prepare for our defeat in war; the radicals who would sacrifice democracy for totalitarianism; the pacifists and religious fanatics who would leave us defenseless, and the misguided fellow travelers who unwittingly assist them all.

### 23402

The means used to accomplish these purposes are many: Tons of smuggled propaganda are distributed by subversive groups, thinly disguised as cultural associations, fellowship forums, libraries of information, lecture groups, travel bureaus, and trade missions. "Educational" films, made abroad, are shown in many cities. The radio is used to broadcast class-hatred and totalitarian propaganda. Thousands of religious fanatics march from door to door with phonographs playing records urging the listener to join groups which refuse either to defend the United States or to salute its flag. Like a contagion, subversion spreads into every corner: Into schools, churches, relief groups, workers trade-unions, Government civil services, and even the Army and Navy.

### 23403

The real danger of the radical forces lies in the effective manner in which they penetrate and influence much larger organizations, whose purpose is legitimate. Here they appear as vociferous minority groups, and conceal their real purpose by loudly expressed concern over the plight of the underprivileged, social injustices, racial inequality, the exploitation of the worker, etc. In a thousand ways they create suspicion, dissension, fear, and violence. When attacked, they cunningly appeal to American guarantees of civil liberty and thus use for a shield the very Bill of Rights they would destroy.

### 23404

Good discipline, the will to fight, and the conviction that the cause is just, are the essentials of high morale. Subversive groups must not be allowed to contaminate or weaken this spirit of the Navy. The following methods will be used:

(1) The distribution of Communist, Pacifist, Fascist, Nazi, and fanatical religious literature in the fleet. This propaganda is handed out in barracks, shore stations, theaters, canteens, and on the dock to sailors returning to the ship. When visiting is allowed, it is carried aboard in bundles to be dumped in inconspicuous corners, stuffed in ventilators, etc. Communists use children and adolescents (Pioneers and Young Communist League) to do this work, to avoid clashes with

sailors. The literature may be smuggled aboard in supplies, newspapers, magazines, etc. The contents of this literature ranges all the way from mild pacifism to incitement to mutiny.

(2) The enticement of the service man to meetings, rallies, "festivals," "picnics," and all kinds of subversive gatherings. Here the speaker directs his attention to the futility of war, the slavery of the masses, the corruption of national leaders, the state of servitude of the armed forces, the injustice of unequal ranks, his right to higher pay, the right to mutiny, the wickedness of battle, etc. If the Navy man shows any interest, the subversive efforts are redoubled. He is invited to "inner circles" and private discussions and every argument used for his conversion. If they are successful, he is sent back to the ship as a "leader," "missionary," or organizer.

(3) Every attempt is made to establish small groups, units, cells, and cadres in the various ships of the fleet. To date, these efforts have met with only limited success. Some Pacifist, fanatical religious, and Communist units exist; to the credit of the American sailor it may be said that they find the going very difficult.

#### 23405

It should be apparent to all Operatives that, regardless of the present loyalty of the men in the service, it is unwise to allow them to be freely and indefinitely subjected to the inimical influences of groups whose purpose is the destruction of morale. In this connection, the investigation of all subversive groups in Naval areas should be conducted for the **primary purpose** of discovering any active infiltration into the Naval Establishment.



## SECTION V.—UNDER-COVER WORK

### 23501

**In the struggle between nations, no country can afford to ignore, or fail to adopt a weapon found effective by the enemy.** In the war of the Intelligence Services, the enemy has made important gains by means of secret agents placed in this country. In our own defense, we must counterattack with the same weapon—under-cover agents.

### 23502

An agent under cover is one whose real identity and purpose are unknown to his associates. He may be said to be partly under cover when he conceals his identity in making a simple inquiry. He goes completely under cover when he assumes the identity and purpose of another. Depending upon the objective, the deception may be continued for a short or very prolonged period. In some cases, as when an agent has joined the enemy's forces and has been raised to a position of trust, the masquerade has gone on for years, to the great advantage of his real superiors.

### 23503

Ordinarily, the Operative will find it unnecessary, in the course of an investigation, to adopt any elaborate subterfuge. Indeed, unless he is well prepared to maintain his role, it may be dangerous to do so. Exposure results in ridicule and failure, and often closes avenues by which the information might otherwise have been obtained. It is usually best to seek information by following the path of least resistance. Any investigation presenting difficulties which appear to justify the impersonation of another should first be discussed with the Operative's superiors.

### 23504

On the other hand, and especially in counterespionage work, it is often just as important to conceal the Navy's interest in certain information as it is to obtain it. This requires the agent to proceed unobtrusively and by indirection. By giving some simple and plausible reason he may often obtain the information in the most natural way. When expertly done, his interviews will not leave a ripple on the smooth routine of his contacts. Later, they will remember neither the conversation nor his appearance. This "low visibility" is a decided asset in working against foreign agents, and it should be carefully cultivated. Avoid both the appearance and the company of the blunt and officious law-enforcement officer who, exuding the majesty of the law, advertises as he goes, and heliographs his position at frequent intervals by flashing his badge.

### 23505

Vital information about dangerous groups is usually unobtainable except from members. To question a member, however, may reveal undue interest and cause alarm. Any information which can be safely picked up is apt to be old and relatively unimportant. We are not so



much interested in **what has happened** as in **what is happening**; or better yet, **what is going to happen**. To learn this we must have inside information.

#### 23506

First, a careful search should be made for a possible informer in the group. If membership lists can be obtained, they should be combed for individuals who appear weak enough to be bought. If a likely prospect is found, he should be carefully investigated, as an individual; many points of attack may appear. The actual attempt to purchase his services should be considered from every angle, in consultation with superior officers, before it is made, and it must usually be done in such a way as to positively conceal the interest of the Government.

#### 23507

If a member cannot be safely bought, a potential member can sometimes be induced to join. On the fringe of each group are individuals, qualified in every way for membership, and to whom membership has been offered, who are holding back because they are not completely in sympathy with the purpose or activities of the organization. When these persons are found, they can often be induced to accept the proffered membership and to enter the group as informers. Whether or not they should be aware of their service to the Government is a question which must be determined in each individual case by the officers of the Investigating Service.

#### 23508

If no member or potential member can be bought, it may be necessary, especially in time of war, for an Operative to go under cover and obtain membership for himself. This may be difficult, but it is never impossible. Any group that has members can be joined, by the right person. To determine which, among our Operatives, is the right person, we must consider the qualities of natural ability, psychological aptitude, experience, language qualifications, etc., as well as the agent's special skills and former trades. Here will be demonstrated the **usefulness** of an Operative's Avocation Index (see Par. 22209), which will show each investigator's special talents as well as the areas in which he is well known.

#### 23509

Wartime expansion should produce, in each District, a number of Operatives whose service connections have not been revealed to the public, either by attendance at open Reserve Officer meetings, dinners, dances, and other social affairs, or by the inclusion of their names in published lists, rosters, and directories. If such a group can be found, and it must be done, they should be listed and regarded collectively as a reservoir from which under-cover Operatives may be drawn. Once so classified, every effort should be made to conceal their Intelligence connections, and for this reason, they should not be used in open investigations or other semipublic positions. Except where necessity demands that they identify themselves confidentially, they should deny all connection with the Investigating Service, and the other members of the Service should likewise disclaim any knowledge of them. The practical details of such an arrangement, com-

munications, etc., may be worked out by each individual administrative officer. When the Service connection of these Operatives does become known, as it eventually will, they are not lost to the Navy, but are transferred, either to some other District to continue under-cover work, or to the larger group of investigators who are not under cover, in the same District.

#### 23510

The requirements for successful under-cover work are most exacting. **The agent must live the part he plays.** The prime essentials are convincing appearance, work, speech, bearing, opinions, and general deportment. Very convincing support for the impersonation will be given by attention to minor details: The slang of the trade, table manners, cleanliness, callouses, hobbies, recreations, choice of tobacco, etc. His clothing and accessories should all bear out his story. This applies to the contents of his purse, his magazines and papers, the labels and laundry marks on his clothing. He should be thoroughly familiar with his pretended occupation and be able to skillfully practice it; he may be asked to do so at any time. He should say little about his past but should be ready to give convincing corroborative details of his "history" when required to do so. A few worn letters, soiled certificates, streetcar tokens and match folders from the proper city should be kept about him, or left in his belongings where they may be found by the curious. Nothing about him nor in his possession should suggest his real identity or purpose.

#### 23511

Although some assignments demand completely under-cover work, the vast majority require only minor **subterfuges and pretexts**. Some such expedient is used in the course of nearly every investigation, usually in order to conceal the Navy's interest or to hide the purpose of the inquiry. Some of these pretexts will be employed as more or less routine practice, and, for this purpose, the investigator will be armed with a few false cards, passes, or credentials. Others will be adopted on the spur of the moment and to fit the circumstances. The usual pretexts consist of impersonating city inspectors, repairmen, public-service men, salesmen, solicitors, census, or directory agents, etc.

#### 23512

In carrying out an impersonation as a temporary measure the Operative should be sparing of words. Actions not only "speak louder than words," but they can also be made to lie more convincingly. When the Operative wanders into an apartment in paint-spattered white cap and overalls, carrying a similarly decorated step-ladder, he has announced his business. Words are superfluous. The observer has already concluded that the Operative is a painter and this conviction is stronger because it was reached independently. **You don't have to deceive people who are ready to deceive themselves.** The same effect can be obtained by small and trifling, but strongly suggestive equipment such as: Two blocks of wood glued together and a bottle of glue, a rubber window washer and a chamois cloth, a pencil over the ear and an order-book protruding from the side pocket, a large basket of flowers. Let the observer first form his opinion, then talk; it is easy to convince a person that he is right.

23513

A few general reminders to the under-cover agent are given below:

(1) **Do not confuse regular investigations, no matter how confidential or how many ruses or pretexts are used, with completely under-cover work.**

(2) No credentials on any completely under-cover assignment.

(3) Never begin an under-cover assignment without first making a complete and exhaustive study of the case with superior officers.

(4) Make your "introduction" to the group logical and convincing.

(5) Remember you may be **constantly under observation.**

(6) **Immediately destroy** all communications received.

(7) **NEVER CONFIDE IN ANYONE.**

(8) Have no more money in your possession than you can logically explain.

(9) Never be seen in the company of an officer. Make your contacts carefully and by prearranged plan.

(10) Write and mail from the post-office only.

(11) Never use the same telephone twice in calling your superior officer; always try to use a dial phone.

(12) Never publicly recognize another Operative if either of you may be on an assignment.

(13) Check up all Operatives on under-cover work at regular pre-determined intervals.

(14) Try to avoid making notes. When necessary use apparently innocent figures, as in doing sums, telephone numbers, street addresses, laundry lists, etc. Memorize.

(15) Never act mysteriously, never brag, never show off.

(16) Do not admit knowledge of foreign languages, except in your role. Same thing is true of Naval affairs.

(17) If there are rumors that an under-cover man is about, have another Operative come in for a "sacrifice play" and help "discover" him.

(18) Be suave and considerate in your dealings with women and treat them all with consideration. Even if this is not strictly in character, it will pay dividends in the long run.

(19) Every officer of the Government is forbidden to violate public policy. This includes the commission of, or incitement to, crime; the use of minors in certain phases of investigation is prohibited.

(20) Do not impersonate Federal, State, County, or Municipal law enforcement officers. You may thus antagonize those who might assist you.

(21) If arrested with others it may be best to undergo the same treatment they get. When this will not assist your investigation, refuse to make a statement except to an officer of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. You may then be "removed in Federal custody." This should be a last resort if your case is not completed.

(22) Don't ask questions except as a part of your role. Questions attract attention.

(23) When you have completed an under-cover assignment, return to the office and immediately collect all your fragmentary reports, notes, etc., and compile the required Reports and Summaries for filing while the data are fresh in your mind.

## SECTION VI.—NEUTRALIZATION OPERATIONS

### 23601

In the investigation of hostile and subversive forces which threaten the Navy, the Investigating Service is not only concerned with the ultimate capture and imprisonment of these groups, but is concerned with the protection of Naval activities against physical damage.

### 23602

For various reasons it is **often not advisable to make a frontal attack** on espionage or subversive groups: To do so may reveal the state of our own preparedness. It may cause the enemy to set up new services against us. It may drive a subversive group "underground" where they will be difficult to locate. The State Department might become involved because of alleged violations of diplomatic immunity, and so on. Under these circumstances, however, it is not necessary either to stand helpless or to be goaded into making a premature attack. In a hundred subtle and indirect ways the foreign agent may be robbed of his effectiveness and prevented from accomplishing his purposes. This constitutes neutralization.

### 23603

The scope and methods of neutralization operations may be made clear by the following examples:

- (1) When a known or suspected foreign agent is a Naval employee, he may be plausibly transferred to a new position and thus deprived of the opportunity to do harm.
- (2) If an agent is known to be stealing information, that information can be made misleading and harmful to the enemy.
- (3) An espionage agent who is entrusted with a large sum for the purchase of secret documents may be neatly swindled, by selling him trash.
- (4) When the espionage director must reach an important conference in order to further damage this country, it can be arranged that he miss his plane connections.
- (5) When publicity would be fatal to the purposes of an alien emissary, he may be found and photographed by an enterprising reporter.
- (6) A dangerous radical in a Naval aircraft factory may be "discovered," exposed and held up to ridicule by his fellow workmen.
- (7) A cache of arms, ammunition, and dynamite can be harmlessly exploded by "spontaneous" combustion.
- (8) The fallacy of subversive arguments may be "incidentally" exposed in a chaplain's talk to the crew of a ship.
- (9) Mutual suspicion and distrust may be injected into the ranks of inimical groups.



(10) An entire group of agents on urgent business may be held at quarantine for weeks until certain suspicious "rashes" prove to be harmless.

(11) Suspected mail may be misplaced for days while en route, and arrive weeks late.

(12) If an alien agent is particularly dangerous and persistent he can be found by his superiors to be in possession of incriminating documents which "prove" that he is furnishing information to this country.

## CHAPTER 4.—INVESTIGATION OF NAVAL SABOTAGE

### SECTION I.—INTRODUCTION

#### 24101

In the preceding chapter it has been indicated from what direction sabotage may be expected. The scope and purpose of combatant sabotage has also been briefly discussed. It remains to examine the **specific objectives and techniques of the saboteur**. This study is made primarily to enable the personnel of the Investigating Service to act in an advisory capacity to the officers in command of various vulnerable Naval activities. The secondary purpose is to train the Operative to intelligently attack the problem presented by an act of sabotage committed or planned. (See Par. 23303.) In his study of sabotage the Operative should include in his supplementary reading the Training Manual on Plant Protection (ONI-T-14).

#### 24102

The Naval activities most vulnerable to attack are Navy Yards, especially those engaged in ship building, Naval Aircraft factories, Gun factories, Powder factories, Supply Depots, etc., all of which, with respect to sabotage, are identical with large civil industrial establishments. For this reason, a description of industrial sabotage is included together with that which may take place in other shore establishments and in the various units of the fleet.

#### 24103

The investigator should bear in mind that every act of sabotage or attempted sabotage is not the work of inimical or subversive groups. Many acts of violence are committed by disgruntled or malicious individuals. Each investigation should be approached with an open mind and without preconceived opinions as to the origin of the sabotage. This does not mean, however, that no consideration is to be given the circumstances surrounding the case. Sabotage by violent labor agitators may be expected after unsuccessful efforts to obtain more pay or privileges, and attacks by foreign agents may be closely related to international developments.

#### 24104

The Operative who would become an expert in antisabotage work must study closely the history, the purpose and the methods used by each of the various groups which may resort to sabotage. He should collect and classify all known cases of sabotage committed in the past. Just as in the case of other crimes, he will find that there exists a strong family resemblance between the acts committed by any one group. If he is familiar with these characteristic features (modus operandi) of the various types of sabotage, the Operative may be able to quickly identify any act as the work of some certain group. If, in addition, he can be given some hint as to the present intentions of the various groups, from under-cover agents or other sources, his success is rendered almost certain.

## 24105

When sabotage appears to select predominantly Naval targets such as radio stations, guns, directors, planes, ships and other points of immediate value to the National Defense, the attack has very serious implications. Indeed, if it is coordinated and widespread, such an attack may be our first indication of the beginning of an undeclared war against the United States.

## 24106

Deliberate acts of destruction may occur, which, upon careful analysis, appear to be for the purpose of discrediting or implicating certain foremen, petty officers, or other supervisors. This type of sabotage is quite common, and can usually be traced to the jealousy or ill-will of some subordinate who seeks revenge for a real or fancied wrong.

## 24107

In many cases, **sabotage may clearly indicate the motive behind it.** For example, an incendiary fire in the blueprint room is either to tie up production or **to cover the theft of certain prints.** Again, let us suppose that a small machine, used in the manufacture of a minute part of an airplane motor, has been completely destroyed. At first glance, no clue to the motive or to the identity of the saboteur may be apparent, and the act itself may appear to be relatively unimportant. But investigation discloses that this machine was absolutely indispensable in the manufacture of the part; that no other machine is available to replace the one destroyed, and that the part is, in turn, absolutely necessary in the assembling of the motor. Furthermore, we learn that no other company manufactures this particular motor part. As for the motor itself, we are now not surprised to find that it is the model upon which the Navy depends for its aircraft procurement program. The simple act of sabotage is no longer simple. The evidence is already conclusive that the saboteur was a highly trained professional, and an agent of a foreign secret service. He had skillfully searched for, and found, the nerve center of the entire aircraft expansion program, and having found it, he struck a paralyzing blow.

## 24108

In the example given above, the Operative will find, not only a clue to the identity of the saboteur, but also a clear indication of the course to be followed in providing adequate protection for the Navy's vital lines of production and supply. Like the saboteur, the Investigating Service must also seek out these points of great vulnerability, but they must do it first! Once these points are located, recommendations should promptly be made to the proper authorities for their removal or correction. This is usually accomplished by establishing widely separated parallel lines of production. Pending the removal of these "bottle-necks," they should be surrounded by every possible safeguard.

NOTE.—The greatest care should be exercised in the writing, handling, and distribution of memoranda concerning points of vulnerability. Correspondence of this sort should be classed as SECRET.

## SECTION II.—SPECIFIC SABOTAGE OBJECTIVES

### 24201

The general objectives of sabotage organizations have been indicated in the chapter dealing with those groups. For the purpose of instruction, however, it is necessary to describe more specifically the many points which may be selected for attack, and which, consequently, must be given special protection.

### 24202

The specific objectives of the saboteur are, naturally, the points of greatest Naval vulnerability. That these points are sometimes far removed from the battleship itself is often not appreciated, even by the Naval Officer. Yet certainly a ship which is deprived of fuel, ammunition, or other supplies is, for a time, no more useful than a ship which has been sunk. The saboteur is not ignorant of this fact. In a time of great emergency he is hardly likely to attack a single engine room when he can cripple several ships just as effectively, and with much less risk, by destroying oil barges, pipe-lines, Naval Fuel Depots, etc. To thus immobilize a division of battleships, even for only a few days, may dislocate the tactical disposition of the entire fleet and place it at a serious disadvantage.

### 24203

The oil which flows to the boiler rooms and the ammunition which is delivered to the guns are as much a part of the fleet as the rudder which guides the ship. And this is just as true when the oil lies in tanks ashore and the ammunition in railway cars in transit. We have therefore a vital and paramount interest in the Naval lines of supply which extends to their very sources.

### 24204

We must therefore, in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division, insure the security of the Navy at all points. For this reason we shall include in our study, not only the forces afloat and the shore establishments, but shall also consider the essential lines of supply upon which we are dependent. The principal points which may be attacked are as follows:

- (1) **Naval factories**, machinery and equipment. Gun factories, powder factories, aircraft overhaul, etc.
- (2) **Shipyards**, new construction, cranes, pumps, compression plants, installed turbines, etc.
- (3) **Docks, Wharves**, Piers and terminals, dry docks, loading and unloading machinery.
- (4) **Depots and Storage**, Supply Depots, Fuel Depots, Ammunition depots, small arms arsenals, etc.



(5) **Power and Light**, central power stations, substations, transmission lines, and transformers.

(6) **Water Works**, pipe lines, pumps, fire-fighting apparatus, and purification plants.

(7) **Transportation facilities**, shipping terminals, trains, tracks, and bridges.

(8) **Communications**, radio, telephone and telegraph stations, roads, and searchlights.

(9) **Labor**, civilian, civil-service, and W. P. A. employees.

(10) **Shipping**.—Combatant ships, planes, transports, supply ships, tankers and repair ships, and all other auxiliary or potential auxiliary vessels.

#### 24205

**Naval factories** may be attacked in the same manner as civil industrial plants: Materials will be spoiled; key machines "accidentally" wrecked by willfull neglect; fires will occur at night in departments using airplane dope, especially when firewalls are open or absent; file cards will be destroyed or stolen to cause confusion and blue prints and specifications will be altered. The saboteur will cause powder plants to be blown up, at night if possible, during rain or snow storms, to avoid a charge of murder and for concealment. Corrosive chemicals and abrasives will be used on all machine bearings simultaneously. Attacks may occur at so many points that the only effective defense is a carefully trained under-cover group of workmen scattered throughout the plant to watch each vulnerable spot. (See ONI-T-14.)

#### 24206

**Naval shipyards**, in which warship construction is under way, offer many targets for the saboteur. Among the most common are: Fires started in freshly painted compartments; shorting fire-control cables; cutting main cables (electric drive); destruction of main gears and reduction gears; destruction of turbines; disabling hydraulic steering mechanism; lead rivets passed by hand testers; weakening members under electric cranes; burning up gear boxes; disabling air-compression machines and magazine sprinkler systems.

Attacks may occur at so many points that the only effective defense is a carefully trained under-cover group of workmen scattered throughout the plant to watch each vulnerable spot. (See ONI-T-14.)

**Supply and Fuel Depots**, particularly outside the main base, are highly vulnerable. Explosions and fire will be used on fuel tanks and against wooden buildings housing plane parts, motors, electrical equipment, etc. Ammunition and small arms arsenals may be attacked by fire, explosives, or may be isolated by destruction of bridges and railways. Large gasoline or oil tanks may be used to destroy adjacent

(5) **Power and Light**, central power stations, substations, transmission lines, and transformers.

(6) **Water Works**, pipe lines, pumps, fire-fighting apparatus, and purification plants.

(7) **Transportation facilities**, shipping terminals, trains, tracks, and bridges.

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#### 24207

**Docks and Wharves** are most vulnerable to fire, which will be used against docks which have wooden warehouses, or upon which inflammable material is stored, or which have railway tank cars on them. Piers may be badly damaged by heavy merchant vessels which develop "steering gear trouble" during international crises. Heavy explosives will be used on dry-dock caissons or gates.

#### 24208

**Supply and Fuel Depots**, particularly outside the continental limits, are highly vulnerable. Explosions and fire will be used on fuel tanks and against wooden buildings housing plane parts, motors, electrical equipment, etc. Ammunition and small arms arsenals may be attacked by fire, explosives, or may be isolated by destruction of bridges or railways. Large gasoline or oil tanks may be used to destroy adja-

cent railways, buildings, factories, or even units of the fleet which may be anchored close inshore. Large stores of food may be destroyed by fire or contaminated by chemicals, or botulinis cultures.

#### 24209

**Electric power** and light supply may be cut off from Naval activities at several points. Where no grid system exists, the central power plant may be destroyed, otherwise, local transformers or power cables will be disabled. These attacks usually precede incendiary and explosive attempts, for the purpose of creating darkness and rendering useless electric driven fire-fighting apparatus.

#### 24210

**The water supply** to Naval stations, factories, and Navy yards is vulnerable to a degree which varies with circumstances. If it is the only source of water for fire-fighting, a fresh-water system has a dual importance. It will always be damaged in connection with well-planned incendiarism. If communists or radical labor elements are involved, permanent fire-hose coils will often be found cut in a number of places. The drinking water may be polluted to produce widespread disease among workers, or rendered undrinkable or unfit for steam boilers, etc. The point of contamination will depend upon accessibility, location of filtration plants, purifiers, etc.

#### 24211

**Transportation facilities**, tracks, bridges, etc., will be destroyed by trained saboteurs only when no alternate route exists. Main-line crossings, turntables, Navy terminals, and spurs will be favorite points of attack. Foreign agents will favor the dynamiting of bridges, communists may tamper with switches to cause train wrecks or tear up long stretches of track. Highway bridges may be destroyed. Transcontinental tunnels are in danger, especially if a Pacific coast attack is planned by a foreign power.

#### 24212

Except in attacks on isolated stations, **communications** will be threatened only in widespread civil disturbances or as a preliminary to war. To insure complete silence of any Naval area, all facilities will suffer: Telephone, telegraph, and radio stations. Main trunk lines will be cut in several places, but to prevent rerouting efforts, attacks will be made on local switchboards and telegraph terminals. Radio stations will be crippled by cutting power supply, the destruction of transformers, tubes, or instrument panels. Advance provisions for the use of Navy portable radio sets in emergencies should be made. If necessary, police-patrol cars can be used, or planes run out of the hangar and motors started to generate power for the plane's radio.

#### 24213

Very effective sabotage is aimed through **Labor**. Saboteurs will use any of the antisocial groups, violent labor agitators, and malicious

or criminal persons who can be induced or coerced to perform acts of sabotage. These individuals exploit any unrest, often acting hastily and without coordination. One unpatriotic employee of an aircraft overhaul factory or Navy yard may cause a large number of employees to strike or to damage Naval matériel. As a result, there will be a retarding of production, inferior and careless workmanship, an increase in spoiled material, broken tools, and many minor failures requiring the repair of machinery. By means of subtle propaganda, there will be general discontent and disturbances; misunderstandings, suspicion, and quarrels engendered among the workmen. By the corruption of Labor Boards, foreign agencies will attempt the wholesale introduction of saboteurs into civil-service positions, without proper investigation. Cliques of civilian employees will attempt to gain control of Naval factories, and foreign-language-speaking groups will form nuclei for combatant sabotage programs.

NOTE.—These are NOT the methods of legitimate labor unions. The investigator must not allow himself to be drawn into bona fide labor disputes. The best way to avoid the appearance of partisanship is to enlist the aid of real union officials, who will usually gladly assist in combatting practices which reflect against all honest union members.

#### 24214

**Shipping**, of any kind, can be sunk. In the case of merchant vessels, Naval auxiliary, tankers, and supply ships this will be done at sea by delayed-action incendiary devices and explosives. In combatant vessels it may not be attempted; they are much more easily disabled. This will be done by: Electrical fires, by flooding magazines, by burning up boilers, the destruction of turbines, by crippling the steering mechanism, by the destruction of centrifugal blowers, by disabling motors, by shorting director-circuits and all other electrical circuits, by burning out main and other bearings and by destroying reduction gears. The most vulnerable parts of a combatant vessel are the multitudinous electrical cables. They should be guarded as closely as possible, inspected regularly with circuits tested frequently. Any general attack on shipping will include all of our aids to navigation. Bells may be silenced, buoys sunk, or shifted, lights extinguished or faked, beacons wrecked, and radiobeacon stations disabled.



### SECTION III.—SABOTAGE TECHNIQUE

#### 24301

Before the Operative can advise as to the proper defense against sabotage, he must know what methods the saboteur will use. In the preceding section we have shown **where** the saboteur will strike. It is now proposed to show **how** these attacks will be carried out. This knowledge is equally necessary for the successful investigation of acts which have been already committed.

#### 24302

To list all of the materials and methods used in sabotage would be almost impossible. The following items have been selected as representing commonly used and typical methods. With the progress of time, the saboteur may be expected to devise new and ingenious means of destruction. To meet each new threat, the Operative must call upon his own ingenuity.

#### 24303

The greatest single weapon of the saboteur is fire. It is easily started, destroys dangerous evidence, and spreads rapidly. It requires only ignition, fuel, and air. Used principally as follows:

(1) The most common **starting fuel** is gasoline. Ether, alcohol, airplane dope, carbon disulphide, benzene, naphtha, kerosene, oils, paint, or turpentine may be used. All are easily obtainable. Any of these substances may also be placed in fire buckets to be added by others after the fire begins.

(2) **In closed compartments**, rooms, warehouses, or ship's holds, the fumes of the above liquids may be concentrated in explosive mixtures. Other gases which may be used either for incendiary or explosive effects are the commonly used methane, natural gas, acetylene, propane, Fuelite, blaugas, Thermoline, rock gas, Nugas, and the refrigerants ethylene chloride and methyl chloride.

(3) **Igniting fuses** which give brief delay are: Dynamite fuses, powder trains, twisted paper, oakum, oil-soaked rope, plumber's cotton packing, punk, lighted cigarettes, and mechanical triggers with powder caps.

(4) **Delayed action fuses** which afford time alibis are many. An upright candle over a powder train may be used. A lighted candle tied in the middle by a cotton string and suspended high over a bucket of gasoline, enables the saboteur to say, "I wasn't there." The hour may be set by the sun's rays focused through a hand lens, glass bottle or concave mirror and falling upon oil-soaked waste, excelsior or other fuel. Alarm clocks may be set to trip weights, mouse traps and other devices to detonate powder caps.

(5) **Electric Wiring** may be shorted and the point covered with benzene-soaked waste when the current is off. The telephone or doorbell may be used to start fires. For example a piece of blotting

paper saturated with a solution of iodine in household ammonia may be placed between the clapper and the bell. Upon drying, this mixture becomes a highly sensitive explosive. If an open can of ether is placed just below the phone, the first caller will start a fire. The same thing can be done with a spot of glue and a toy-pistol cap. Alarm clocks may be used to throw electric switches sending current into electric flat irons or soldering irons set in pans of gasoline. In these cases, the telephone operator or recording meters may indicate the time the fire was set.

(6) **Prolonged delay**, such as is required to allow a ship to reach midocean, is effected by specially constructed clock-work igniters, or by incendiary "pencils," of the type made famous by Dr. Walter Scheele. The pencil is essentially a section of lead pipe divided by a copper disc or partition into two chambers. In one half is placed a mixture of potash and sugar, in the other half is placed sulphuric acid. The copper disc is slowly dissolved by the acid and when eaten through the acid combines with the powdered mixture to produce an intense flame. The copper disc is ground to varying thickness to determine the timing of the fire. Several variations of this ingenuous device employ a third chamber containing thermite to insure a more destructive flame. This timing disc is now employed in the German delayed action aerial bombs.

(7) **Chemical Ignition** is also accomplished by the most simple devices. Advantage is taken of the fact that metallic sodium floats on most liquids and ignites upon contact with water. The saboteur may place a can of water near a bucket of gasoline. He covers the water with a thin layer of gasoline and floats a piece of sodium on the layer of gasoline. When the latter evaporates the sodium is lowered into the water, bursts into flame, ignites the remaining gasoline on the water and the flames spread to the adjoining gasoline bucket. Potassium may be similarly used. Both are obtainable at drug stores. Any oxidizing oil, such as common linseed oil, may be depended upon to cause spontaneous combustion. Rags, overalls, or waste soaked in this oil and stuffed in tight corners, behind electric cables, in paint lockers, and all closed compartments will eventually burst into flame. With some material this may take place in an hour. The new electric cables are heat and flame resistant, but all of the ships in commission prior to 1941 may be so damaged. Other chemicals which may be used to cause fires are: Ammonium and aluminum nitrate, antimony sulphate, potassium and barium chlorate, chromic oxide, copper chlorate, etc. All are easily obtainable from dye or meat-curing establishments.

(8) **Intense heat** is ordinarily produced by thermite mixtures. These consist of aluminum powder, obtainable at paint stores and factories, in combination with iron, chromium, or manganese oxide. Ordinary iron rust will do. The aluminum and the oxide powders are mixed and ignited by any hot flame, a bit of magnesium ribbon from the drug store is excellent. The resulting fire generates a heat of 3,000° centigrade and quickly penetrates iron and steel walls, bulkheads, or ship's hulls. A 10-pound incendiary bomb of thermite will burn clear into the ocean from any part of a ship's hold. Scheele's device is usually used, both for igniting and timing.

(9) **Static electricity** may be used in many places with good effect by simply disconnecting all grounding wires or devices used to protect

against static. This may be done on fuel tanks, large fuel trucks, and on heavily belted machinery in factories where **dust or powder** is heavily concentrated. Serious fires will result when atmospheric and other conditions are right.

#### 24304

**Explosives** are used in submarine and land mines, bombs, and all sorts of disguised containers such as lumps of coal, nail kegs, barrels of tar, boxes of merchandise, etc. High explosives are used principally to sink ships, to kill, and to destroy specific heavy targets such as dams, generators, presses, caissons, docks, bridges, and so forth. The most common methods are:

(1) The use of **commercial dynamite**, which is in the form of wax-paper-covered sticks, and which is composed of a mixture of nitroglycerine, wood pulp, and sodium-nitrate. Dynamite is easily purchased anywhere, but in order to escape the registration of sale which is required in most States, the saboteur is likely to steal from supplies kept on hand at mines, quarries, construction camps, and farms. The sticks may be packed, cut, or moulded into any kind of container. They are ignited or detonated by caps containing fulminate of mercury, into which the end of a powder fuse has been inserted. Some detonators are exploded by electrical current from dry cells. These are the kind which are used in time bombs.

(2) For very highly concentrated explosives the saboteur may use **nitroglycerine**. In obtaining this exceedingly sensitive and violently explosive liquid he usually follows the practice of professional safe blowers. These gentry cut up dynamite sticks into small pieces, place in a kettle, cover with water, and cautiously heat over a fire until the oily liquid rises to the top where it is skimmed off with a spoon and poured into a bottle as "soup." This liquid will detonate very easily, the bottle itself may be thrown as a "bomb."

(3) The simplest **bombs** are constructed by tying several sticks of dynamite together with a detonator and fuse. The standard white fuse burns at a rate of a foot in 40 seconds. (Warning to those who would attempt to "throw it back"), the actual flame is several inches ahead of the point visible on the outer layer of the fuse. An attempt to kill is usually made by surrounding the dynamite with nails, slugs, or metal which will be hurled in fragments by the explosion. The standard "pineapple" is a short length of one-and-a-half-inch pipe, threaded and capped on each end, and containing a stick of dynamite. The fuse passes through a hole drilled in one end to a detonating cap inside. Disguised bombs may look like anything: Boxes of candy, cigars, mail packages, ink stands, thermos bottles, etc., etc. They may tick, or emit an odor, depending upon whether they are actuated by clockworks or chemicals. They are often made to explode when a loose string is pulled or a clasp or fastener is released. They may be built into a lunch pail and "forgotten" and left on a workbench. The saboteur may drill a hole in a frosted light bulb, pour it full of nitroglycerine, cover the hole with scotch tape, and replace in a light socket. A turn of the light switch will, of course, cause a violent explosion.

(4) Very damaging but less violent explosives are produced by **black powder**. Bombs have been constructed by the use of the powder obtained from one or two boxes of shotgun shells. The larger items



of ordinary fireworks may also be used as a source of supply. Black powder does not require detonation, but may be exploded by a powder fuse or even ordinary wicking. (Smokeless powders consist largely of nitrocellulose instead of black powder.)

(5) Some **other explosive materials** which we may expect to be used by the saboteur are: Glycerines and potassium permanganate, picric acid compounds, guncotton, potassium chlorate, and sulphur or sugar, cans of gasoline with fuse attached, nitrogen iodide, and lead resinate, etc.

(6) **Warning.**—Some bombs are manufactured with a set trigger or some easily disturbed detonating device, which when "armed" will **explode if the bomb is touched.**

#### 24305

Less spectacular than fire and explosions but producing much greater total damage, are the many methods of **mechanical destruction**. A few of these are:

(1) Any part of a ship which is dependent upon electric control may be disabled by "**shorting**" **electric cables**. This has been done by driving needles, pins, and nails into the cables. The sabotage is concealed by using the side of the cable lying next the bulkhead, or by snipping the head from the nail, driving home with a punch, and painting over the hole. A point beneath the tag on the cable is often chosen. On one carrier the main cable to the electric drive was sawed in two. Similar attacks may be made on fire-control wiring before an engagement.

(2) While most power-cable sabotage is done while the cable is dead, crippling fires have been "accidentally" produced by dropping a crow-bar across the control panel circuit to steering mechanisms. The burn and fusion behind the panels concealed traces of the attempt.

(3) Ships have been completely crippled by the destruction of the **reduction gears** while at sea. This was accomplished by the introduction, into the gears, of pieces of steel such as nuts, bolts, spikes, etc. Next to the magazine, the main gears are the most vulnerable part of a ship. They are reached, as are the turbines, through manholes or hand-holes which are sealed, as is a railway freight-car. (A seal is no barrier to a saboteur. These covers should be heavily locked).

(4) **All bearings**, including the main bearings, may be disabled by introducing ground glass, sand, carborundum and emery powder, diamond dust, filings, or other abrasives. The communists of certain sections have adopted the adding of hydrofluoric acid to the lubricating oil. This powerful acid is used for etching glass, is easily obtainable and would probably be dangerous, even in a 1,300 gallon sump tank. The Operative must examine the oil, if any remains after a bearing is destroyed.

(5) Turbines may be destroyed by sand, shot, or other foreign bodies which the saboteur may place in a steam line. At high speed the foreign particles have the effect of bullets on the turbine blades.

(6) The inattention, even for a few minutes, of a water tender, may result in a **burned-out boiler**. This is rendered more likely if the feed pumps to the boiler have been jammed. Boilers have been destroyed by contaminating the water which passes through them. Tannic acid and liquid soap have been used for this purpose.



(7) The **steering gear** of ships have been damaged by the introduction, into the hydraulic system, of various kinds of dirt and debris.

(8) The **magazines** may be damaged by flooding, due to tampering with the thermostatic mechanism.

(9) **Centrifugal blowers** have been completely wrecked by the simple closure of the flaps at the blower inlets.

(10) The cables of all **hoisting mechanisms** may be partly cut with the possible resultant destruction of planes, boats and motorboats.

(11) **Planes** may be disabled by the use of pliers, files or acid on guy-wires, rudder and control cables. The combination of sugar in the gas tanks and disabled valves of flotation gear is a specially menacing one.

(12) **Food** may be rendered inedible by kerosene, paraffin or dyes. It may be made poisonous by the addition of sodium flouride, arsenic, antpaste, botulinis cultures and nitrobenzene.

(13) Various and **sundry acts of sabotage** such as crippling air-compression systems for firing turrets, tampering with safety valves and devices, removing governors, shutting down engine cooling systems, cutting through bolts, rivets, and members, etc.

#### 24306

**Naval railway spurs** may be disabled by the usual fire, explosives, and thrown switches. In addition a communist plan may be used for quickly destroying miles of track. This scheme entails the use of an engine. They propose to pass a length of heavy steel cable through the rear coupling. A loose rail is then thrust crosswise beneath the track. Each end of the cable is passed through the bolt holes in the ends of the rail and knotted. The engine may then move off leaving a wrecked line behind it.

## SECTION IV.—SABOTAGE INVESTIGATION

### 24401

In the investigation of sabotage, it is important for the Operative to have in mind a picture of the **most likely suspects**. All saboteurs are not long haired fanatics, speaking broken English and suddenly introduced by an influx of labor recruits. On the contrary, the trained foreign agent is apt to be an excellent and trusted workman, familiar with local language dialect, manners, and customs. He may be long resident in the community with full citizenship status. He may have disarmed the suspicion of fellow workmen by the modest expression of frank and honest sympathy with the country of his origin.

### 24402

In contrast, the violent labor radical or communist is apt to be radical in speech and opinion as well as in action. It is not like a communist to keep his mouth shut. Questioning of his associates will show that, at some time or other, his conversation has revealed unmistakable evidence of his radical beliefs. Telltale words, such as liquidate, exploit, masses, proletariat, dialectic, classes, reactionary and world revolution, will creep into his speech, and in all dissension, his voice will have been louder than the rest.

### 24403

It is a common and serious mistake, and the result of ignorance and wishful thinking, to assume that every **Naval uniform** covers an honest heart. It is precisely this kind of thinking which makes the American uniform such a perfect disguise for subversive activities. We have had communists, saboteurs, and spies in the uniform of the United States Navy, and, in the present unsettled times, we may expect to have more of them. The naive impression that sabotage cannot occur on a ship which has only officers and enlisted men aboard must not be shared by members of the Investigating Service, whose usefulness depends upon a more realistic viewpoint.

### 24404

In an investigation into the cause of fires it will be necessary to determine the following facts:

- (1) Time of occurrence, time of discovery, who reported, who was present, who arrived afterward.
- (2) Where did fire start, how did fire start, how did it spread? Did it begin at more than one point?
- (3) Had all fire-prevention precautions been taken? Were all fire-fighting means available and employed?
- (4) Interview and take written statements of all concerned. Detailed statements may reveal important discrepancies.
- (5) Search the scene and collect and label all items which do not belong there. Collect specimens of oil, dirt, charred wood, and other inflammable material.
- (6) Note any distinctive odor present. Call attention of others to any such odor.

(7) Particularly note late arrivals at scene, undue interest, excitement, talkativeness, theorizing. These are characteristic of pyromaniacs.

(8) Was any insurance involved? Who stood to benefit in any way whatever? Had any discontent preceded the fire? Had any threats been made; any previous attempts?

(9) Place under-cover agents in suspected groups. Collect their remarks, theories, and opinions expressed.

(10) Was amount of damage consistent with amount of fuel normally present?

(11) List new employees. Check former places of employment for record of similar fires.

(12) Who was unexpectedly absent; "unavoidably detained." Determine if these persons obviously established alibis.

(13) If chemicals, explosives, or mechanical devices were used, check widely all sources of this material; who purchased them?

(14) If needed, enlist cooperation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, especially for laboratory analysis. (See ONI-T-14.)

#### 24405

**All sabotage investigations** are similar to the above, though many varied procedures may be required. In the solution of any crime, it is necessary to follow a methodical plan, which, as the investigation progresses, may involve searches, surveillance, under-cover work and identification. These procedures are fully described in this manual; it remains only for the Operative to intelligently apply this knowledge for the solution of his problems.

#### 24406

When the Operative is called upon to deal with a known or suspected **unexploded bomb**, certain special procedures are necessary:

(1) Clear area of all persons, post guards to keep them out.  
 (2) Call fire department, medical and rescue party.  
 (3) Remove all inflammable materials that can be safely reached. Shut down all adjacent power and fuel lines.

(4) Collect mattresses, rugs, tarpaulins, etc., to cover the explosive and to build a working shelter.

(5) Mattresses may be tied to hand truck, chair, etc., to be pushed toward bomb as a movable shield.

(6) Explosive container may be lassoed, or snared with a wire loop at the end of a pole, hauled gently onto a tarpaulin or rug and then dragged into a wide field or other safe area.

(7) If a fuse is long and visible, it may be pulled out or cut—some bombs have duplicate triggers, however.

(8) X-rays are sometimes used to determine how to open the bomb safely. Call into consultation explosive experts, available at any Dupont, Atlas, or Hercules powder company; at Army and Navy ammunition factories or dumps; and at quarries and mines and some police departments.

(9) A bomb may be doused in oil, **but not in water**, as many electrical and chemical bombs would be detonated by the latter.

(10) In case of doubt, evacuate the area and wait for the explosion. If on shipboard, heave the doubtful explosive overboard. If in the open, the bomb may be detonated by rifle fire.

## CHAPTER 5.—SOURCES OF INFORMATION

### SECTION I.—INTERVIEWS

#### 25101

All interviews should be for one purpose, **the obtaining of pertinent information** by conversation. The skill with which interviews are made depends upon the individual Operative, who should constantly strive to improve his ability in this regard. The information sought may relate to any Naval activity, or to any subject of investigation, and this wide range involves contacts with individuals in every walk in life. These individuals may be grouped as follows:

(1) **Government officials** whose cooperation is sought, or whose personal knowledge is desired.

(2) **Police**, or other local authorities, with records or access to records which contain desired information.

(3) **Business and professional men** and other private individuals, who by reason of their activities and training, may throw light on the activities, habits, and background of subjects under investigation.

(4) **Acquaintances**, neighbors, or associates of the subject who must be cautiously interviewed.

(5) **The subject of investigation** himself, who may be interviewed by ruse or subterfuge, but always discreetly.

(6) **Informants** and informers, to verify their reports and to determine further action.

(7) **Complainants**, in order to determine the probability, authenticity, and importance of the complaint, and the real reason it was made.

#### 25102

Interviews with Government officials, heads of firms, important business executives, etc., should be conducted as quickly as possible and in a businesslike manner. Appointments should be obtained in advance and the time to be required stated. Upon arrival, the Operative should identify himself and state his business promptly and courteously. If others are present, his business should be described as "confidential" so that the interview will not take place before witnesses. As soon as others have left, come to the point. Unless he is careful, the Operative will find himself being interviewed. The best way to avoid this is to stick to business during the conversation.

#### 25103

In other types of interviews, it is often desirable to establish a **friendly relationship** with the subject, and for this purpose, the conversation may be guided along the lines of common interests, mutual acquaintances, and similar experiences. The informal atmosphere thus created is conducive to frank and open statements and may even lead to important confidential disclosures. The Operative should remember, in all interviews, that nothing is more fatal to easy con-



versation than the sight of pencil and paper. Do not, therefore, attempt to take notes unless requested to do so, or until the informant has said all he is going to say. Then the Operative may produce his notebook if he feels the subject will not be alarmed or antagonized. In any case, write down all notes **immediately** after the interview is over and while the facts are freshly in mind.

#### 25104

In **interviewing a subject** (suspect) the Operative should attempt to gain his confidence, learn the motive behind his acts, and any other relevant information. In the beginning, it is wise to avoid any sharp or peremptory interrogation. Instead of this, a sympathetic approach may be used with profit, and the subject's vanity, self-pity, rationalizing, and sense of justification may be fully exploited to stimulate his talkativeness. If the subject includes false statements in his remarks, it is best to allow him to continue his deceit until he is hopelessly entangled in contradictions. Then, in attempting to explain these inconsistencies, he will often reveal matters which he had intended to keep secret.

#### 25105

Various civil law enforcement agencies have developed interview and examination procedures which depend, for their effectiveness, upon some manifestation of aggressive "police power." The Naval Investigating Service is not primarily concerned with enforcement work, except in the possible wholesale concentration of aliens in time of national emergency. The use of **high-pressure methods** is discouraged, not only because these tactics may reflect against the Service, but also because, in investigative work, force is a poor substitute for brains.

## SECTION II.—EXAMINATIONS

### 25201

**Examinations** are different from interviews in that their chief object is to obtain signed statements containing factual information of interest to the Navy. These statements are usually used to provide leads for further investigation. Under certain circumstances, however, they **may** be used in proof of facts, or for prosecutions by law-enforcement agencies. Every material statement should be checked point by point.

### 25202

Signed statements should **NOT** be obtained from: Confidential informers; from cooperating agencies of the Government under certain special circumstances, or when official reports and letters will suffice; from volunteer informants of a special nature, who are friendly to the Navy, and whose services would be lost if official statements were required. Statements are purely voluntary, and the subject must be informed of his right to refuse to answer any or all questions, before the examination begins. **This fact should clearly be shown in the opening statement.**

### 25203

In order to be valid and useful to the law-enforcement agencies with whom we are cooperating, statements should be obtained in the following manner:

(1) Statements are of two kinds—**Interrogatory** (question and answer) and **Narrative**. In a narrative statement the verbatim questions and answers do not appear. Only the answers, presented as a recitation of events in chronological order, are given. The questions are to be inferred.

(2) In **all statements**, the first part identifies and describes the case. The second part shows the relation of the statement to the case in question. The third part is the "body" and contains the deponent's story. The fourth and last part is the authentication.

(3) The **authentication** should mention the number of pages, the fact that the deponent has read it over and made certain corrections, additions, or alterations, and the fact that the statement is true to the best of the deponent's knowledge and belief, and the fact that it is an entirely voluntary act on the deponent's part and that he was "offered neither reward, immunity, nor threat" in connection with the statement.

(4) Interrogatory Statements usually require stenographic assistance. Narrative Statements are better adapted to use in the field.

(5) Narrative Statements have one technical advantage over Interrogatory Statements. In court, the latter are often attacked in detail by the defense on the grounds the questions asked are "leading questions." Narrative Statements, on the other hand, have one weakness. They may be rendered inadmissible by attempts of the

Operative to edit them, using words or phrases that the deponent does not clearly understand. Statements should be as near verbatim as is possible, and should contain the subject's exact words, **including** slang, blasphemy, and profanity, but **excluding** obscene vulgarity.

(6) The Operative must not simply say that the deponent was "Informed of his Constitutional rights." Avoid this phrase unless you can prove the deponent knows the Constitution.

(7) Use, in the statement, only the **expressions used by the deponent**. For example, the identity section of the statement may be expressed in the following simple style, "I, John Doe, understand that I don't have to say anything more, and that anything I do say will be used against me." Always use the word "will" instead of "may."

(8) In writing a statement, it is usually best to make one or two **simple errors** on each page. While the deponent is reading the statement, the Operative should apologize for his carelessness, and request the deponent to make the necessary corrections in ink, and initial them. These corrections will later prove that the deponent actually read the statement.

#### 25204

The following suggestions will be found helpful in taking statements:

(1) Study and analyze the subject to ensure making the proper approach and obtaining maximum cooperation.

(2) Watch for and either exclude or include, depending on the particular circumstances and purposes of the Government, any discrepancies or conflicting statements.

(3) After signing by the deponent, the statement should be witnessed, preferably by the stenographer for accuracy of transcription, and by the Operative(s) for authentication of content and identity of deponent.

(4) If witness can be "sworn," this may be advisable for moral effect.

(5) The motive or interest of the deponent in the case should be brought out so as to be apparent in the statement.

(6) Always emphasize the voluntary character of the statement to preclude later charges of compulsion, and demonstrate, if possible, the lack of ulterior motive on the part of the deponent.

(7) Every pertinent point should be brought out by the questioning.

### SECTION III.—ROUTINE SOURCES OF INFORMATION

#### 25301

The success of an investigation service depends upon the number and variety of its sources of information, and whether or not the most advantageous sources have been developed and properly utilized. The most experienced investigative agencies in this country maintain a card file of such sources for their use. Operatives should carry lists of these sources, typewritten on the flyleaves of their case notebooks for quick reference.

#### 25302

Civil law-enforcement agencies, and other investigative agencies (Federal, State, County, and Municipal) should be freely consulted. As a general indication of the regular sources which are most useful, the following commonly consulted routine sources are furnished:

(1) **Federal Investigating Agencies.**—(a) G-2 Section, War Department, General Staff, MID, also Intelligence Police.

(b) Investigations Section (16-B-3) Office of Naval Intelligence Division and the Naval District Investigations Sections.

(c) Federal Bureau of Investigation (particularly the National Defense Division) of the Department of Justice, and the Field Division Offices and Resident Agents of the Bureau.

(d) Treasury Department Agencies:

Secret Service Division.

Narcotic Bureau.

Internal Revenue (Income Tax) Intelligence Unit.

Internal Revenue, Alcohol Tax Unit.

U. S. Coast Guard Intelligence Unit.

(e) Other Federal Agencies:

Postal Inspection Service.

Division of Investigations, Interior Department.

Wages and Hours Division, Labor Department.

Division of Investigation, U. S. Civil Service Commission.

Division of Investigation, P. W. A.

Division of Investigation, W. P. A.

U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice.

(2) **State, County, and Municipal Investigating and Enforcement Agencies.**

(a) State Police and Highway Patrols.

(b) State Attorney Generals' Offices (Investigating Units).

(c) State Fish, Game, and Fire Wardens.

(d) County Sheriffs' Offices (Criminal Divisions).

(e) County Coroners' Offices.

(f) County Fish, Game, and Fire Wardens, and County Constables.

(g) Municipal Police Departments.



- (h) **Municipal Coroners or Medical Examiners.**
- (i) **Municipal Fire Marshals.**
- (j) **Other Municipal Agencies** such as City Prosecutor's Office, Health, Sanitation, Building and License Inspectors, Truant Officers, etc.
- (3) **Court Records** and those of **Penal and Probationary Agencies.** (Federal, State, County and Municipal) useful for criminal records, recidivity, associates, and friends of subjects.
- (4) **Tax Records,** may locate real estate, or establish location of hidden funds, investments, etc.
- (5) **State Registrars of Motor Vehicles** furnish all data on cars, ownership, photographs of commercial drivers, and many excellent leads for investigation.
- (6) **Public School Records** allow family movements to be traced. Teachers may even cooperate and have children write essays on "Life at home," "Father's business" etc.
- (7) **Post Office Department** officials are able to help the Operative in many ways. In small towns contact the Postmaster if no Post Office Inspector is available. The Superintendent of Mails can post names on carriers' bulletin boards, furnish changes of address, names of box-holders, etc. Special order of Postmaster General is necessary to inspect Postal Savings Account. Inspectors are excellent investigators and the best contacts.
- (8) **County Agents** have maps and information concerning every farm, its entrances, size, amount of livestock, etc. Also, these people hear a lot of gossip and facts of local interest.
- (9) **County Clerk's or Recorder's Offices** contain files of deeds, mortgages, and certified copies of articles of incorporation of companies, etc. Remember, many titles and other documents may be executed by "dummies."
- (10) **Voting Lists** are used to check addresses, names, occupation, length of residence, etc.
- (11) **City Clerk.**—If subject conducts a business which includes the sale of alcoholic beverages, tobacco, cosmetics, drugs or chemicals, or is engaged in certain other commercial activities, he must obtain a municipal license—the application is filed with City Clerk.
- (12) **Probation Departments,** chiefly interested in rehabilitation and have close contacts with Red Cross, Associated Catholic Charities, Community Chests, Salvation Army, Social Service Clearing House. Much easier to get information from the Probation Department than direct from some of these other agencies.
- (13) **Boards of Health** keep records of vital statistics and conduct regular inspections of all public places where food is served, prepared, or handled.
- (14) **Marriage License Bureau** has records of principals, witnesses, birthplace, nationality and certain medical records (in some States).
- (15) **Works Progress Administration** has files containing records of all persons who are, or have been employed by the WPA.
- (16) **State Workmen's Compensation Boards.**
- (17) **Insurance Company Clearing Houses.**—Hooper-Holmes Bureau, 102 Maiden Lane, New York City, and the National Association of Life Underwriters, 11 West 42d Street, New York City, have complete records on applicants for, holders of, and claimants or beneficiaries of any life insurance policy, including those persons whose

application has been rejected. For Fire Insurance, the National Board of Fire Underwriters, 85 John Street, New York City, performs the same service.

(18) **Registry and Documentation of Vessels** is handled by the Marine Division of the various United States Customs Houses, where detailed information concerning such vessels and their ownership may be obtained.

(19) **Immigration Bureau, Department of Justice.**—This Bureau has photographs and fingerprints of all recent immigrants, their temporary and permanent address (as given) and the status of their naturalization. (Aliens often fear deportation, and for this reason gladly cooperate.) If an old case, be sure to have name of vessel, date and Port of Entry.

(20) **Corporations in Foreign Trade** are listed by the Bureau of Customs of the Treasury Department with the locations of their branches abroad.

(21) **The Veteran's Administration** maintains extensive files relating to former members of military and Naval forces, including the dependents of deceased soldiers. Many regional offices are maintained throughout the United States and its possessions. Many valuable leads may be found here.

(22) **Securities and Exchange Commission** supervises the registration of security issues and suppresses fraudulent practices in the sale of securities. It also supervises trading in Stock Exchanges and Public Utility holding companies. Especially valuable source of information in tracing funds, financial background or financing of subversive groups **especially** if the company in question has **already** been investigated by the Commission.

(23) **United States Maritime Commission** makes surveys of the American Merchant Marine, cooperates closely with the Navy Department and is authorized to investigate: Lines from United States Ports to foreign markets; types of vessels to be employed in this service; frequency of sailings; shipyards of the United States; Aircraft engaged in foreign commerce; promotion of foreign trade on American vessels; employment and wage conditions in ocean-going shipping, and the **citizenship of officers and crews.**

(24) **United States Employees' Compensation Commission** has records showing data advanced in connection with obtaining compensation which may offer leads.

(25) **Railroad Retirement Board** covers employees of any railroad, express company, sleeping-car company, and all associated agencies. This includes employees of railway labor organizations, their State and National legislative committees, their insurance departments, and, in some circumstances, their local lodges and divisions.

(26) **American National Red Cross**, a relief organization with wide-spread local, state, national and international ramifications. One purpose is to serve, in accord with military and naval authorities, as a medium of communication between the people of the United States and their Army and Navy.

(27) **Social Security Board**, which maintains extensive records of all wages earned by any individual in employments covered by Title II of the Social Security Act. (Should be used as last resort and requests sent through the Investigating Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence.) This Board also maintains Employment Centers in

the principal cities of the U. S. (one to each State), where (a) Commercial and Professional, (b) Hotel, Restaurant and Domestic, and (c) Industrial and Construction, workers may register when seeking employment, or where employers may register their inquiries for personnel. There is, also, a "Veterans' Placement Representative" in attendance.

(28) **Field Offices of the State Department.**—(Domestic Passport Agencies and U. S. Dispatch Agencies) are concerned with passports and visas, certain phases of the immigration laws, and licensing of certain exports. May furnish important leads.

(29) **Federal Communications Commission**, through its twenty-four Field Offices, investigates and reports on all companies engaged in interstate communication by wire or radio. Supervises the licensing, regulation, and monitoring of all radio stations. Inquiries should be sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence in the form of Information Requests.

(30) **Office of Government Reports** has many functions, mostly concerned with publicity, but it does create *Central Clearance Indexes* in the various States, which furnish detailed information on all persons receiving Federal or State assistance.

(31) **Commercial Credit Bureaus**, such as Dun & Bradstreet, Poor's and Moody's Services, National Association of Credit, National Retail Credit Association, most of them with headquarters in New York City, and many of which have local branches widely distributed, are very useful sources of information. The associations maintain *elaborate files* on every person who ever made use of personal credit. All addresses, bank accounts, records of judgment, reports on general worth, and data on real or intangible assets are recorded, and may furnish excellent leads.

(32) **The Western Directory Company** is a clearing house for all retail credit associations, transfers records of credit from one locality to another when subject moves. This company operates under different names in various cities. The Operative may locate the agency by inquiring through the credit manager of some large department store, discreetly.

(33) After **charge accounts** are located through the credit bureaus, the Operative, in a personal interview with the president, manager or credit manager of the individual stores, may learn: from what bank accounts the bills are paid; to what addresses the bills are sent; the average monthly expenditure, and information of possible value concerning the nature of the purchases, including to whom delivered.

(34) **General Indemnity Insurance, Bonding Companies, and Title Guarantee and Mortgage Companies** often repay the effort to become familiar with their business. In addition to excellent leads obtainable from the companies, useful "fire-maps," compiled by underwriter's associations and used by title mortgage and trust companies, are usually available. If not, good substitute maps may be had at the county clerk's office, tax assessor and tax collector's offices. Get acquainted with an insurance adjuster and go around with him to learn what sources he finds at these places.

(35) **Banks and Personal Loan and Finance Companies** should be contacted, preferably through regular informants. Do not attempt to specify the exact records you wish to examine unless you are familiar



with the complicated banking business. Simply state what you are trying to find out. If your informant in the bank is cooperative and intelligent, he will usually be able to trace the desired information quickly. For this purpose it is highly desirable that the bank informant be a ranking official, whose activity upon behalf of the Operative will not be questioned or impeded by the authority of other officers of the bank. It is sometimes necessary that the Operative be armed with an official letter requesting cooperation in the matter under investigation. This is particularly true in cases where no competent informant has been already developed at the bank. In complicated searches of the banking records, it may be best to request the search to be made by Accountants of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or through the cooperation of the appropriate Bank Examiners.

(36) **Trade Union Records** are very useful in locating union members and obtaining leads of various kinds, provided, that the Operative has successfully established a **confidential informant** among the union officials. This is sometimes difficult because of the mistaken but persistent idea, held by the union members, that Government officials are opposed to legitimate union activities. **The Operative must never become involved in any labor dispute, industrial inquiry, or antagonize officials of legitimate labor organizations.**

(37) **Railroad Companies** are cooperative and are able to assist in tracing individuals through: Special tours, advance bookings, bills of lading, etc. The railway special agents are highly competent investigators, and are usually glad to aid in formulating surveillance plans by "open wire" through their station-to-station and party lines.

(38) **Bus Transportation and Terminals** have less complete records than do railroads. Their bills of lading are available at transfer points and, in the case of companies operating freight lines, show the name of the truck driver who delivered the goods to the consignee.

(39) **Steamship Companies** record: The names and addresses of all passengers, as given; the time of voyage; point of disembarkation for each passenger; date of arrival; what land transportation has been booked; or advance hotel reservations made; copies of messages sent by radio, etc. Stewards and stewardesses may give excellent information. (They are often enemy agents, however). If the ship is in port, see the captain; if at sea, interview the owners or the president of the chartering company.

(40) **Air Lines and Air Ports** usually can furnish the same kind of information as steamship companies. While the time of travel is much shorter, the air stewards and hostesses are in closer contact with the passengers and may be able to give valuable tips to the Operative. **Airports** have their own administrative and maintenance force which is not much concerned with the passengers, but air-line ticket offices and operations managers with teletype and ship-to-ground radio facilities may help greatly. Telegraph offices at airports may furnish excellent leads.

(41) **The Press**, including reporters, newspaper offices and news-agencies are prolific sources of all kinds of information, some of which may be of the greatest value. **Personal contacts** with the press should always be cultivated, but the Operative should be on his guard to avoid being "pumped" or otherwise imposed upon. A good newspaper reporter is a good investigator, but his purpose is to publish and that purpose may often be fatal to the interests of the Operative.



(42) **Telephone Companies** maintain records containing excellent leads. All toll tickets for long-distance calls show the city and number called and names, if the call is person-to-person. These leads may require Out-of-District Investigation Requests, to determine identity of persons involved. Signature cards and service applications may be useful. Telephone records also indicate when telegrams have been sent by telephone.

(43) **Telegraph Companies** file their originals for six months, after which they are moved to district headquarters. Money orders are held for three years with drafts attached, after which the drafts become a permanent record. Originals are often written in the subject's hand, and, in emergencies, the Operative may be able to obtain the next sheet on the blank, which can be processed (iodine, fumes, photography, etc.) to show the message.

NOTE.—The District Intelligence organization should set up the proper contacts with commercial activities controlling communication facilities.

(44) **Water, Electric, and the Gas Companies** have records extending back for several years giving addresses and some limited credit information concerning subscribers. These public utilities are often the first agencies from whom it is possible to obtain addresses of persons recently arrived in the city. Personal contacts by Operatives, with subordinate executives or other employees are often valuable.

(45) **Real Estate Agencies and Agents** of the reputable sort may aid greatly in a check of their tenants.

(46) **Fraternal Organizations** should be contacted only in exceptional cases, and then through State or National headquarters where responsible officers will view the matter in a broader, more impersonal light, than can local officials.

(47) **Employment Agencies** may give valuable information concerning persons registered with them. At least, the applicant's statements and handwriting may be found.

WARNING.—Many foreign secret services purchase employment agencies outright and use them to place their agents in strategic positions. Know your agency!

(48) **Automobile Protective Bureaus** have complete records on all cars and can furnish information as to registration and ownership. These Bureaus are nonprofit organizations maintained by the insurance companies and are:

Automobile Protective-Information Bureau, One hundred sixty-six West Van Buren St., Chicago, Illinois.

Automobile Underwriter's Detective Bureau, One Liberty Street, New York, New York.

National Automobile Theft Bureau, One Liberty Street, New York, New York.

Inquiries concerning motor vehicles should be sent in the form of information requests to the Investigating Section of the Naval District in which the Bureau is located.

(49) **Hospital Records** reveal records of wounds or serious accidents, scars, birth records with many other vital statistics, etc. Best contacts are informants on the administrative staff or some hospital official or patriotic trustee.

(50) **Registered Medicines** are often to be traced through control numbers (Serial Identification Numbers). Many persons who regularly fill certain prescriptions may be so located.

(51) **City Directories**, if they are up to date, furnish addresses and occupations and assist greatly in preparing daily work schedules.

(52) **Sea Service Institute** (of New York City) and many similar institutions in other seaports, handle the mail of merchant seamen and know in advance their ports of call.

(53) **Hotel Associations** are organized in all large Cities and in State and National Associations. At the offices of these Associations, index files are kept of known criminals, bad-check passers, confidence men, card sharps, poor credit risks, etc. In maintaining these files, information is regularly disseminated to other members on cards similar to those used by our Service. These facilities are available to investigating agencies. By dealing with the Association directly, we may learn about any guest of a member hotel, **without disclosing** the Navy's interest. The great potentialities of such an arrangement require that each District develop its Hotel Association contacts with the greatest care and diligence.

### 25303

The list given above is quite brief. It is intended only to indicate the direction to be followed in compiling ready references. Routine Sources, together with other Contacts, are the tools of the Operative—his stock in trade. Without them, he will be as helpless as an attorney without lawbooks. With them, he will be able to learn almost anything—provided, he knows what information each source may be expected to furnish. This means that each source must not only be listed—it must be studied.

## SECTION IV.—REGULAR AND SPECIAL INFORMERS

### 25401

Instructions regarding **Naval Intelligence Informers** are located in the confidential files of the District Intelligence Office. The information contained in the following paragraphs of this section will be considered as applying to Informers in general.

### 25402

In the preceding section we have listed **places** which provide information. This section deals with the **persons** from whom information may be obtained. These may be: Certain cooperating officials; persons inspired by loyal and patriotic motives; individuals actuated by hatred or desire for revenge; informers hoping for reward or gain; those who wish to ingratiate themselves with Naval officials and others, who hope to gain admission to the ranks.

### 25403

When information is volunteered, the first step in evaluation is to learn the reason it was offered. Judged by the motive, it is obvious that some information will have value while some will be worthless or actually misleading. For this reason it is necessary, when developing personal contacts, not only to obtain informers widely distributed and strategically located, but also who are trustworthy and dependable.

### 25404

For the purpose of this manual, "Informer" may be defined as follows: "An individual who confidentially informs a member of the Intelligence Service of a violation of law or furnishes other information indicative of actual or potential tendencies inimical to the Naval establishment, Naval interest, or the National Defense in general, with special reference to actual or potential espionage or sabotage."

### 25405

The regular personnel of the Naval Intelligence Service, including Agents, is neither adequate in numbers nor suitably located to insure obtaining all the information of legitimate interest required by the Intelligence Service. Discreet use should, therefore, be made of the services of Informers to the number and in the locations indicated as necessary. However, Informers should be used only for strictly legitimate and proper purposes to further the accomplishment of the mission of the Naval Intelligence Service.

25406

The procurement and **employment of informants should be kept secret.** This precaution is necessary for the sake of both the informant and the Service. The Operative's responsibility in this regard must never be neglected. The names of confidential informants should never appear in written reports. They should be referred to as confidential informants (either a registered fictitious name or serial number). The names should be forwarded by separate letter to the appropriate executive, who may place them in the confidential file. Where circumstances warrant, special arrangements may be made for contacting the informant. These arrangements should also be recorded on the card in the "Information Sources Index." The service of dependable informants should continue indefinitely, as long as they retain their position of advantage.

25407

As a general rule, before employing Informers, it should be ascertained by an appropriate investigation that they are loyal, and otherwise generally reliable. It is recognized that there may be occasions when it is necessary to employ Informers who do not fulfill these desirable basic requirements, but, in such special cases, alleged information obtained from them should be accepted with appropriate reserve.

25408

Good Informers may be located, incidentally, while carrying on regular investigative and intelligence activities and a lookout for them should be maintained in areas in which their services are needed. Members of the Naval Intelligence Service should exercise the greatest care not to disclose the identity of or compromise the security of Informers. Reports received from them should, as a rule, be copied and the original reports destroyed. Notes on information supplied by them should not disclose the source of the information.

25409

It is generally necessary to develop the use of Informers upon an individual basis. That is, Informers, as a general rule, will prefer to confide their information only to a specific individual or individuals in the Intelligence Organization and will not wish to do business with anyone not well known to them and, therefore, not enjoying their confidence.

25410

In connection with the use of Informers attention is again invited to the requirement of general cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Military Intelligence Division in investigations concerning espionage and sabotage. Any duplication or interference will be avoided by maintaining good personal liaison locally



with the representatives of the other agencies. There should be sufficiently full, frank, and specific exchange of information as to prevent, for example, more than one agency paying the same Informer.

### 25411

A short list of persons who, under certain circumstances, may be very useful informants is appended below. This list, together with the other sources mentioned in this chapter, should serve as a nucleus for the Operative's case notebook list for ready reference. (See Pars. 25301 and 25303.)

- Automobile salesmen.
- Air Line Employees
- Baggage handlers, deliverymen, transfer men.
- Bankers, cashiers, and messengers.
- Barbers.
- Bartenders.
- Beauty Shop and massage parlor operators.
- Businessmen.
- Café Employees and Entertainers
- Camera and photographic developing company employees.
- Chauffeurs, taxicab operators.
- Chemists.
- Clubs, society and association secretaries.
- Court Clerks.
- Customs Officials.
- Dentists.
- Doctors, officials of boards of health, etc.
- Druggists.
- Dry cleaners, laundry deliverymen.
- Employment agency clerks.
- Entertainers, general.
- Grocers, neighborhood delicatessen clerks, etc.
- Gunsmiths.
- Hotel managers, bellboys, telephone operators, waiters.
- Household servants.
- Inspectors, building, health, industrial, etc.
- Insurance investigators.
- Janitors, charwomen, window cleaners.
- Laboratory workers; chemical, testing.
- Lawyers, patent attorneys, etc.
- Locksmiths.
- Milkmen and home deliverymen.
- Money lenders.
- Newspaper reporters, editors, distribution managers, newsboys.
- Notaries public.
- Police officials, detectives.
- Postmen.
- Public Utility employees, meter readers, telephone repairmen, etc.

Race track employees and bookmakers.  
Radio dealers and repairmen.  
Rental agency clerks and agents.  
Secretaries and stenographers.  
Social workers.  
Stationery store, mimeographing and job printing employees.  
Steamship agents, travel, and tours agents.  
Tailors.  
Tax assessors and collectors.  
Teachers; language instructors, trade schools.  
Telegraph messengers.  
Travel Agency personnel.

## CHAPTER 6.—SURVEILLANCE

### SECTION I.—SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONS

#### 26101

**Surveillance is the act of watching.**—It is one of the most important means of protecting Naval activities, discovering subversive agents and collecting information. Depending upon how closely a subject is to be watched, the procedure is described by professional investigators as tailing, shadowing, or roping.

#### 26102

**Tailing** is the art of keeping track of a subject or suspect as he moves about from place to place. Any information acquired in this process is incidental to the main fact of the location of the subject. The act of **shadowing** a suspect involves closer contact than mere tailing. Here the Operative is expected to learn details of the subject's activity; mail handling, habits, conversation, contacts, etc. In both tailing and shadowing, the investigator must remain undiscovered. In **roping** a suspect, however, the Operative makes his acquaintance and, under various pretexts, establishes his relationship as a friend or, preferably, a companion.

#### 26103

In intelligence work, surveillances are usually conducted for the following specific purposes:

- (1) To locate the residence, place of business or activity and the usual haunts and contacts of suspects and subjects.
- (2) To determine the routes used and the routine followed by espionage and sabotage suspects.
- (3) To locate and definitely fix under-cover communication systems and courier services.
- (4) To find a suspect by observing his friends and known associates.
- (5) To determine the nature and scope of suspected activities.
- (6) As a protective measure to guard against the surprise and discovery of other Operatives conducting certain secret examinations.
- (7) In order to check up on informers, informants, and members of the Service, who may be suspect.
- (8) To obtain other intelligence or evidence of violations.

#### 26104

The prime requisite for successful surveillance is the ability to remain undiscovered. This cannot be done by such transparent and obvious devices as rushing from doorway to doorway. It can be achieved, however, by basing the procedure upon what is, essentially, a study in psychology. The first step is to recognize that the subject may be highly trained, that he is probably watchful and perhaps even apprehensive. All this makes him extremely sensitive to any abnormality or irregularity in his environment. Therefore, there must be no irregularity apparent.

**26105**

It will be practically impossible to conduct a surveillance without coming into the field of vision of the subject. Since this is unavoidable, the Operative must present such an appearance as to be able to pass through this field of vision, not once, but several times, without registering upon the consciousness of the subject. This requires that the agent blend perfectly with his surroundings. There must be no unusual movement or appearance, no oddity of sound or color, no peculiarity of face or figure to attract the slightest attention. It should be necessary to actually count, even the smallest group, before discovering the Operative.

**26106**

This does not mean that the agent should be mute, motionless, and mediocre under all circumstances. On the contrary, inactivity will, at times, be dangerously conspicuous. To properly blend with the crowd, he must do as they do: If they cheer and wave, he must do the same; if they are hurrying, he must keep pace; if all are laden with packages, he should be similarly burdened; at the end of a workday, he should contrive to appear as tired and disheveled as the rest. In this way only will he escape attention.

**26107**

In spite of these precautions, the attention of the subject may be drawn to the Operative. This often happens because of the necessity for close approach or because of the lack of proper cover. When it does occur, the Operative should quickly divert this attention from his own person to some matter with which he is ostensibly occupied. This matter should, if possible, be self-explanatory, such as: An unstamped envelope in the hand and a request for stamps; empty bottles in the hand to exchange for full ones; a pebble in the cheek and a request for toothache drops, or a watch to be repaired. Any such pretext may allay the suspicions of the subject. (See par. 23512.)

**26108**

There is another psychological fact with which the Operative should be familiar. It is this: The subconscious mind records, cameralike, everything in the field of vision. If any object is repeatedly so recorded, it passes into the conscious mind and becomes the focus of attention and conjecture. Therefore, in order to stay out of the consciousness of the subject, it is only necessary to so alter one's appearance as to avoid duplicating any impression which has previously been made. This does not require a disguise, for the subconscious mind is not capable of analysis, it only requires a structural alteration of the image produced.

**26109**

In the practical application of this knowledge, slight changes of dress may be very effective: Differently colored gloves; alteration in the shape of the hat, or exchanging it for a cap; a reversible topcoat or muffler; the substitution of horn-rimmed glasses for the metallic variety, etc. A slight change in gait or carriage may be useful, although exaggerated disguises should never be attempted.



**26110**

A surveillance is begun by locating and identifying the subject. If he is not known to the Operative, a full description should be obtained. This should include all photographs obtainable, description of general build, dress, and manner, and any peculiarities of gait or carriage which may assist in picking up the subject in crowds or poorly lighted areas. If the subject is known to any informant, the latter can be tailed and indicate the person to be followed by speaking to him, dropping a newspaper at his feet or some similar device. Before beginning any surveillance the Operative should arrange for emergency communication with the office, suitable reliefs and for adequate transportation facilities.

**26111**

Many secret agents are habitually suspicious and routinely carry out certain maneuvers calculated to elude or discover pursuers. If the subject doubles on his tracks in subways or on the street; if he stops in an uncrowded street and scrutinizes all passers-by; if he watches the reflections in the glass of show windows, he is probably both experienced and suspicious. These antics do not prove, however, that the Operative has been discovered. On the contrary, if he has been discovered, the subject may proceed calmly on his way, well satisfied that he has located his pursuer and not at all ready to exchange him for one he does not know.

**26112**

The only practical way to tail a subject in a large building is to follow him closely. Where numerous elevators, stairways, escalators, and fire escapes exist, the possibilities of losing the subject are obvious. Caution must be used when the subject approaches street-cars, elevated railways, subway and bus stops. If the Operative is not careful, he will be outmaneuvered and either tricked into boarding the car first or being left behind, while the subject follows an opposite course. Unless the surveillance is urgent, and in the nature of pursuit, it is often best on these occasions to swallow one's chagrin and pick up the subject at a later time or assign the surveillance to another agent.

**26113**

A common and effective method of foot surveillance entails the use of three agents, and is known as the "A, B, C" system. It consists briefly of bracketing the subject on all sides. "A" follows as the usual tail. "B" keeps abreast, across the street. "C" follows "A." If the subject should quickly turn a corner, or enter a doorway, "B" is often in position to take the place of "A." In any case "B" and "C" should alternate in relieving "A" because of the latter's more vulnerable position.

**26114**

A few general suggestions of value in the surveillance of persons are given below:

- (1) If subject enters a phone booth, take the adjoining one, deposit a nickel and call the "time number" or the "weather number."
- (2) When subject is registered at a hotel, do not contact the so-called "manager," who is merely an executive assistant; see the house detective or the real managing director.
- (3) Never admit following a subject. If you are accused of such a thing, deny the charge emphatically with every appearance of outraged innocence. **You are compromised—arrange for a relief.**
- (4) Do not be too quick to assume that you have been discovered.
- (5) Keep "working contact" with the subject. This distance is elastic, from five feet in crowds to several hundred feet in the country.
- (6) Local cover may be momentarily provided by vehicles, light stanchions, newsstands, showcases, posts, police and fire boxes, or other persons.
- (7) Do not turn corners at a run or trot, your subject may be waiting for you.
- (8) All corners are not opaque. You may be observed in the glass shop windows. You may use them yourself.
- (9) An open newspaper makes an effective shield. Don't forget to turn the pages.
- (10) Make notes, when unobserved, on stiff cards from your pocket. **License numbers** and car descriptions are important.
- (11) Report at once by telephone if the subject is lost, stating your plan for picking him up and where you can be located.
- (12) Have sufficient funds for any emergency.
- (13) If you enter a restaurant with the subject, order after he does and pace your eating with his, in order to be ready to move off naturally.
- (14) On unfrequented streets at night, stick close to walls, shadows, hedges, etc. Use caution at corners, the subject may plan an assault.
- (15) When entering an elevator, get in ahead of suspect and face about slowly. If you have a helper below, mark a match paper with the floor number, hand it to the operator and follow the subject. Your assistant will question the operator and get the floor number.
- (16) **Do not recognize or speak to another Operative unless you are sure he is not doing surveillance work.**
- (17) If subject writes a telegram or note, get the next sheet in the pad—use iodine gun. Secure the blotter—use mirror.
- (18) When required to meet train at a small station, board it at the preceding stop and ride in with the subject.
- (19) Many secret agents tip lavishly and win the allegiance of hotel employees. Many of these employees are aliens—be careful.
- (20) In a hotel: The employees report meals, drinks, and visitors taken to rooms; the starter knows registration numbers of cabs in which guests depart; the credit manager has some record of all guests; maids report if bed is unused; telephone operators listen in on all "interesting" conversations; the hotel garage may cooperate in getting time of arrival and departure, mileage, and may aid in search of car.
- (21) Operatives should carefully secure their own rooms, especially their baggage contains case notes or credentials. (Spring locks may be opened by the insertion of thin celluloid strips, nail files, pieces of clock springs, etc.)
- (22) When leaving a surveillance, or any contact with subversive groups, **make sure that you are not tailed** home or to the office.

## SECTION II.—SURVEILLANCE OF AUTOMOBILES

### 26201

Foreign agents and subversive groups in this country make constant use of automobiles in carrying out their activities. In this way they are assured of ready and convenient transportation which is independent of outsiders in its operation. This is not entirely true, however, as garage employees, mechanics, filling station attendants, etc., all have some opportunity for observing the car.

### 26202

The Operator should have a good description of the car in question, and the registration should be checked to establish its authenticity. Addresses of all garages in which the car may be kept should be obtained. At every opportunity the speedometer should be checked for mileage in order to more closely determine the extent of its use. These readings should be recorded and compared with the known trips made by the car. **Watch for registrations in other States.**

### 26203

In trailing an automobile by means of another, the Operative should stay as far to the right as traffic permits. This places him in a relatively blind spot of the subject's mirror. The Operative should allow as many cars to separate his own from the subject's as he may consider prudent. When two cars are used, one may be ahead of the subject, or on a parallel street where the subject's car may be spotted passing at intersections. The use of **portable short wave radio** sets in the surveillance cars greatly facilitates the tailing procedure.

### 26204

It is best to have two Operatives in a trail car; one to act as driver and the other to make observations, to take notes, to operate the radio or to continue the tail on foot. Cars should be parked well back of the subject's car, unless it is very dark and suitable cover is available. They should never be parked in front of a vacant lot. It is better to park in an alley or driveway, and the Operative may even knock on the door of a house and make a harmless inquiry to give the impression that he is on some genuine errand.

### 26205

When working at night it is helpful to have a three-way electrical switch by means of which either one of the headlamps may be darkened. This arrangement may give the appearance of three different following cars. Yellow cellophane may also be used to cover the lights, providing yet another change which may be misleading.

**26206**

When an automobile is to be used in surveillance, arrangements should be made with the State Bureau of Motor Vehicles to conceal the real ownership of the car. In reply to any inquiry concerning the license number, they may be instructed to answer as follows: "Should you wish, you may make a written inquiry of the State Board, who will mail a registered reply to the business or address furnished." Then, if the written inquiry is forthcoming, the registered letter may be sent, but it will contain only a request for the reasons as to why the owner's name is desired. Meanwhile the Operative will be notified of the name and address of the person who is interested in identifying him. It usually happens that this person is only an inquisitive individual, but sometimes he may be found to be a subversive agent.

**26207**

The following suggestions may be useful:

- (1) If traffic permits, best working contact is a block behind the subject—in the city, and just in sight—in the country.
- (2) When two or more cars are used, rotate positions frequently.
- (3) Have sufficient funds. Carry a can of gasoline. If the subject stops at a filling station, you may stop elsewhere and fill up your own tank.
- (4) Shift drivers, change or remove hats, raise or lower the top or windows and use removable stickers on windows to avoid recognition. (See par. 26109.)
- (5) Watch your subject, as well as his car. He may shift to a taxi or to another automobile.
- (6) Be sure your car is ready for extended action, before beginning to tail another.



### SECTION III.—SURVEILLANCE OF PLACES

#### 26301

Surveillance of places, as conducted by the Investigating Service, refers particularly to Naval buildings, and to barracks, clubs, quarters, and offices in which the Navy has primary interest. This surveillance is, however, no different from that applied to civil establishments. In the terminology of the investigator, these surveillances are known as **plants**, and they are, essentially, extensions of personal surveillances to include the places which the subject frequents. These operations may be directed against various entire buildings, or against certain specific areas therein, such as apartments, suites of offices, club rooms, hide-outs, places used for storage, and so forth.

#### 26302

Plants may involve direct under-cover work, i. e., Operatives working as janitors, watchmen, cleaners, and other building inmates. More often, however, a **fixed surveillance** is imposed, in which a room, suite, or an adjacent house is used as a base of operations. The surveillance may be maintained during all or a part of the day, depending upon circumstances. Sometimes a fixed surveillance is maintained in the open country, as at an aviation field or ammunition depot. These require suitable cover and certain special equipment, portable radio, car, etc.

#### 26303

In general, the surveillance of places is conducted for the following purposes:

- (1) To discover the exact nature of the activities carried on at a particular place.
- (2) To determine by what means such activities are carried out.
- (3) To determine what their ultimate purpose is.
- (4) To identify all persons concerned, whether they are unknowingly and innocently associated or are intentionally involved.
- (5) To determine the exact part each individual plays in these activities and their relationships to each other.
- (6) To estimate the exact military or other Naval significance or interest of these matters.
- (7) To devise and execute the most effective plan (from all angles) for neutralizing the activities of suspects.
- (8) To obtain information of importance to the Navy.
- (9) To locate individuals who may be in hiding, wanted for questioning or to be apprehended.

#### 26304

Fixed surveillances require four principal operations, each of which should be carried out with equal care and discretion. These are: **The preliminary survey**, which is, in effect, a scouting operation to determine later requirements and points of advantage; **the installation**, which involves all the details of establishing the watch; **the operation**, which includes all the activities to maintain surveillance, sound recordings, keeping a log, photography, etc., and **the discon-**

**tinuance**, or withdrawal, in which all equipment and evidence of use must be removed as carefully as they were introduced.

### 26305

Here information is acquired in many ways: **Conversations overheard**, with or without electrical devices; **observation of movements**, assisted by field glasses, periscopes, mirrors, etc.; **Recording** done by still and movie cameras, with both copying and telephoto lenses, and by sound-recording equipment; **analysis of data** by means of compiling time-tables of movements, charts, diagrams, and schedules, and the cooperation of special informants.

### 26306

The following requirements have been determined from actual experience and should be studied by the Operative:

(1) Study all the files and know as much about the case as possible before beginning operations. Have photographs at hand.

(2) Form a team with other Operatives, allocate special duties and be sure all hands can quickly perform them.

(3) Conduct your preliminary survey cautiously, but thoroughly. In selecting a location, it is preferable to make arrangements with the owners or managers, and with the knowledge of trustworthy police officials.

(4) Keep complete records, notes, and log. Always inform your relief of all events on your watch.

(5) Act normally, do not arouse the suspicion of neighbors or other nearby persons. Reduce glare of necessary lights with blue cellophane covers. Arrive and depart singly and use individual keys.

(6) In isolated areas or exposed positions, where a fixed plant is impossible, use irregular but frequent passing patrols: Pedestrians, hunters, laborers, vendors, picnic parties, highway police, etc.

(7) Sound equipment, including recorders vitally necessary in foreign language groups, should be complete. This includes extra tubes, wire, microphones, induction pick-ups, head sets, and all necessary installation tools and equipment, etc.

(8) Have transportation always available but out of sight. (Around corner or in alley.)

(9) Communications should be by unlisted telephone, and two-way short-wave radio if necessary. Hook up phone with independent low-toned buzzer and signal light, so that either may be used. A long extension cord on a hand phone set is helpful.

(10) Study local residents, loiterers, and hangers-on to discover lookouts or scouts.

(11) Keep glasses (binoculars—telescopes, etc.) out of direct light to avoid reflections to the subjects. Relieve man on glasses every 10 minutes to avoid eye fatigue.

(12) Try to make the premises look natural. Keep equipment out of sight and have furnishings, etc., to support a story on innocent activities, which you should have ready.

(13) Wherever possible, always have a camera set-up and in proper focus to cover the principal entrance to the subject premises, and change aperture and shutter speeds frequently to conform with momentary conditions.

## CHAPTER 7.—SEARCHES

### SECTION I.—SEARCHES IN GENERAL

#### 27101

The search is the most important operation in counterespionage and one of the most productive branches of investigation. By its means we may discover the enemy's plans, intercept his communications, obtain proof of his subversive activity and cripple his attempts at propaganda, sabotage, and armed violence.

#### 27102

To search effectively, the Operative must learn **what** things to look for, **where** they may be concealed and their **significance** when found. He must be trained to search so thoroughly as to discover a hidden pin, and yet, if need be, so carefully as to leave no trace of the attempt.

#### 27103

This **need for thorough searching** has been increased by the ingenious methods of concealment used in modern espionage and sabotage. It has been repeatedly emphasized by the diligence with which searches are made by foreign counterespionage services. These searches abroad provide significant clues to the methods of concealment which may be used by foreign espionage agents in this country. It must not be said that the Naval Investigating Service is one member of the country's forces through whose hands an alien agent may pass with impunity.

#### 27104

No search should be made unless there is a very strong reason for believing that there is something to be found. No search should be relinquished until something is found, or every possible hiding place examined. An unsuccessful search is a great deal worse than no search at all, inasmuch as it may reveal the Navy's interest or indicate to the enemy which methods may be successfully used against us.

#### 27105

The following list indicates, as examples, some of the articles which should have special significance for the counterespionage agent:

(1) **Items which may furnish investigative leads** such as: Letters, telegrams, postcards, notes and memoranda, address books and diaries; wastebasket contents; bills, storage checks for automobiles and baggage, paper match-covers and theater tickets; receipts and telephone toll notices; notation of telephone numbers and addresses on pads or

on walls near telephone; road maps, train, bus, steamship, and airway schedules; newspaper clippings and files of articles dealing with espionage and sabotage.

(2) **The products of espionage** (information of value in war) such as: Stolen official and secret documents or copies thereof; reports, descriptions, samples or models of military (Naval) subjects; communications in cipher or secret inks; maps of Naval or Military areas or roads, building charts, or sketches; notations and written calculations of obscure significance; plates, photographs, and moving-picture negatives and microphoto film rolls.

(3) **The tools of espionage and sabotage** such as: Weapons, chemicals, abrasives, and explosives; drugs, narcotics, bacterial cultures, or poisons; short-wave radio equipment; copying cameras and microphotographic and micrographic outfits; binoculars, telescopes, telephoto camera lenses; copying paper; key sets and burglar tools; miniature cameras; code books; supplies of inks, seals, blank passports and other documents, stamps, letterheads, and official stationery; medicines, tablets, toilet articles or perfumes containing silver compounds, cobalt salts, potassium ferrocyanide, ammonia or other chemicals used in the manufacture or development of secret inks; articles to prevent the leaving of fingerprints such as rubber or silk gloves, colodion or Nuskin; photographs and dossiers of officials or persons of military or Naval importance, and large amounts of cash or traveler's checks.

#### 27106

The above list indicates **what** the Operative is to look for; it remains to consider **where** he is to search. Since ancient times it has been the practice of secret agents to reduce their dispatches to minute proportions for the purpose of concealment. For more than seventy years (since the Siege of Paris) it has been possible to enclose the contents of a newspaper within a collar button. It is obvious, therefore, that our searches must be intensive and exhaustive.

#### 27107

As examples of places where espionage or sabotage material may be hidden, the following list has been selected: (Each one of these examples has actually been used in cases of espionage.)

(1) In false bottoms, covers, and sides of **trunks, boxes, and hand luggage**; under trunk and baggage linings and under shipping and other labels.

(2) The inner linings of clothing, hat ribbons, sweat bands, shirt collars, cuffs; inside buttons, especially leather, cloth-covered or crimped metal buttons; in furs and feather hat trimming; in hollow heels, under linings and laces of shoes.

(3) In hollow canes, pipes, cigarette holders, toothbrushes, pencils, pens, flashlights, and umbrella handles.

(4) In books, magazines, trade catalogues, notebooks, and timetables; in the copy, between the lines, and inside the covering.

(5) In tobacco, cigarettes, cigars, and the tubes, jars, bottles, and labels of toilet articles, medicines, and cosmetics.



(6) In watchcases, locket, rings, brooches, and other jewelry or trinkets. Pins and buttons may be used for identification.

(7) Worked into soap, sausages, fruits, cakes, candy and preserves, and their glass, paper, porcelain, and tin containers.

(8) Carrying cases of cameras, field glasses, cigarette lighters, and spectacles.

(9) In glass eyes, hollow and false teeth; ear, nose, and mouth cavities; in the mouth and rectum of men, in the rectum and vagina of women; in wounds and under bandages; under wigs and in the hair. (Messages have often been written on the skin.)

(10) Code messages have been sent in jewelry designs, in sample price tags, in price catalogues, sheet and player piano music, stitching in cloth, in photographs and under them; on passports, in stamp albums, in paper and metal money, and the lining of billfolds and pocketbooks.

(11) Messages have also been contained in candles, hard-boiled eggs, and olives.

(12) Bombs, both explosive and incendiary, have been built into lumps of coal, candles, and pencils, and also have been concealed in dead fish.

### 27108

At this point, the reader must have concluded that espionage and sabotage material may be concealed ANYWHERE. This is correct, and searches must be conducted accordingly.

### 27107

An example of places where espionage or sabotage material may be hidden, the following list has been selected: (Each one of these examples has actually been used in cases of espionage.)

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(3) In hollow canes, pipes, cigarette holders, toothbrushes, pencils, pens, flashlights, and umbrella handles.

(4) In books, magazines, trade catalogues, notebooks, and time-tables; in the copy, between the lines, and inside the covering.

(5) In tobacco, cigarettes, cigars, and the tubes, jars, bottles, and labels of toilet articles, medicines, and cosmetics.

## SECTION II.—SEARCH OF PERSONS

### 27201

The search of persons is frequently necessary: When outsiders are found in Naval restricted areas or aboard ship; when persons are suspected of espionage, sabotage, or theft; in wartime, when persons are leaving areas under control of Naval authorities, and during coordinated operations with law-enforcement agencies.

### 27202

When making a personal search, the first thing to do is to **determine if the subject is armed** and, if so, to **immediately disarm** him. At the same time the subject should be allowed to make no movement, either against the Operative or for the disposal or destruction of anything in his possession. Agents are particularly cautioned to watch for weapons of deceptive appearance, such as sword and gun canes and for pistols disguised as fountain pens, or penknives. Tear gas guns may also be used. This preliminary search should be carried out quickly but carefully and cautiously. The principal parts of body and clothing to be covered are as follows:

- (1) Hat and overcoat, including sleeves and pockets.
- (2) All outer pockets and waistband.
- (3) Between shoulder blades and around the coat collar (particularly for knives.)
- (4) Inside the coat or shirt sleeves, under armpits and along the sides of the body.
- (5) Between the legs, near crotch, and the thighs or calves (strapped knives or guns).
- (6) Walking sticks, umbrellas, books (with hollow space for gun) or briefcases.

### 27203

During this preliminary search the subject may be quieted and his attention diverted from overt attempts, if he is questioned by the Operative regarding articles discovered on his person. If the subject may later become a defendant in legal proceedings, now is the time to warn him, that while he has a right to refuse to answer all questions, anything he may say will be used against him. In the excitement of being searched he may later forget the warning.

### 27204

After a search has commenced, and before it is completed, **grant no request of the subject**. To do so may result in losing espionage or sabotage evidence down the toilet drain.

### 27205

When the preliminary search is ended, and in those cases where a detailed search is indicated, the subject should be removed to a closed

room with bath or showers connected, all of his clothing should be removed and examined in detail. All pertinent objects should be positively marked for future identification. (The mark X is not sufficient.) They should be placed in separate containers, labeled and sealed. At the conclusion of the search, an inventory should be made of all articles found and of all articles kept for further examination.

#### 27206

The detailed examination should be carried out with the assistance of medical or dental corps personnel. The clothing and buttons must be searched separately and in detail. The properly qualified medical examiners should search all the body orifices, wash the hair and skin with dilute alcohol and administer a purge if necessary.

#### 27207

In **searching women** the usual routine of search should be carried out by Operatives only as far as the hat, hair, topcoat, dress, gloves, shoes, and stockings. This should always be done with several witnesses present, and with the greatest possible consideration. The subject may then be turned over to the medical personnel, who with nurse corps assistance, will duplicate the routine described above.

#### 27208

In the strip search of both men and women, notes should be made of all bruises, wounds, scars, tattoo marks, etc. (Many persons vaccinated in Germany have four equidistant marks on the arm). These distinguishing marks may later be listed with other physical characteristics as an aid in identification.

### SECTION III.—SEARCH OF PLACES

#### 27301

Counterespionage work frequently requires the search of rooms, offices, buildings, automobiles, or outside areas. The technique employed will be partly determined by the time available and whether the search is to be conducted openly or secretly. In either case, the best results are usually achieved by the coordinated efforts of several Operatives who may subdivide the area and thus quickly examine a large number of articles. These Operatives form a search team, and before beginning their work, they should be fully instructed by the agent who will direct their activities at the scene. The plans should include a survey of the area to be examined, the designation of special duties, and provisions for meeting any contingency which may arise.

#### 27302

The directing officer should see that all necessary equipment, such as keys, cameras, flash bulbs, screwdrivers, wrenches, hat pins, etc., are properly assembled and packed in ordinary luggage containers. He should also be responsible for obtaining the lay-out of the place (sketch or floor plans) and for making the necessary arrangements with the building supervisors and local authorities to guard against interruption. These outside contacts should be kept at a minimum and should not be made until the shortest practicable time prior to the commencement of the search. In this way the subjects will not be warned through information leaks.

#### 27303

When the time is ripe, entry should be made as unobtrusively as possible, arrangements made to guard against surprise, and the entire area quickly surveyed. When it is determined that no persons are present in concealment, and that no alarms, cameras, recorders, or booby-traps may be encountered, the search may start. Specific areas are assigned to each agent who should proceed in a methodical and orderly manner.

#### 27304

When a specific article is the object of search, or when the time is extremely limited, a brief examination of the area and its contents may suffice. The procedure outlined below indicates the plan to be followed in **detailed searches**, particularly when espionage suspects are involved:

- (1) If a **latent fingerprint search** is desired, this should be done first and should be completed before other phases of the search begin.
- (2) The **directing agent** should establish himself at a central point and all pertinent material should be brought to him for examination, copying, photographing, and inventory.



(3) Begin at an inner doorway as a point of reference; examine the casings for nails and nail-holes, spliced or loose boards, large cracks, cracked or fresh paint, mortised inlets and paneling. All hardware should be removed and examined, and all apertures inspected, sounded, and measured for size and depth.

(4) Proceed around the outer periphery of room examining the walls, cornice, baseboards, and adjacent flooring. Look for large cracks, loose joints, fresh joiner work, and traces of use or spotty discolorations. Caked dust between boards indicates disuse; look for cracks with no dust or that which indicates disturbance.

(5) Examine light fixtures, outlet boxes, wall plugs, and wiring. Disassemble and examine telephones. Copy or photograph names, addresses, or phone numbers found scribbled on the wall. If any numbers, either on the wall or phone book, appear to have been erased, photograph with infrared process. Examine phone book for check marks.

(6) **Bookcases** and shelves should be examined as any other piece of furniture, and all books should be removed. Inventory should list author, title edition, and publisher of all books if code usage is suspected. If the number of books is large, flash photographs of the entire bookcase may be substituted for listing. Wall and desk calendars should be examined and all notations copied.

(7) **Window frames, curtains, sashes, and drapes** should be examined as were the doors. Roller shades should be completely unrolled, examined front and back and the roller taken apart for inspection. Drape linings, heavy curtain rings, curtain poles, ornaments and the cloth-covered or metal balls at the ends of curtain cords should be opened and examined.

(8) **Furniture** of all kinds and bedroom furniture in particular is often used for concealment. In a bedroom all furniture should be at least partially disassembled for search. The bed clothes should be removed from the bed, laid on the floor, and felt over carefully or probed. It may be possible to hang them up and examine by transillumination from a strong flashlight. If the search is secret, the mattress may have to be probed with hatpins, otherwise it should be taken apart.

(9) **Drawers** should be removed, emptied and drawers and contents minutely examined. Particular attention should be paid to sides, joints, bottoms and drawer handles. The legs should be examined for splices, the castors removed and the legs tested for bored and plugged holes. All upholstery, which is not opened up, should be probed with hatpins.

(10) The paper or wooden backing of **mirrors and picture frames** is a favorite hiding place for papers, documents, thin books, maps and drawings. These articles should be dismantled and thoroughly inspected. Examine the wall color behind pictures to determine if they have been newly hung.

(11) **Ceilings, cornices and stairs** should receive careful scrutiny because they are usually neglected in a casual search, as the intelligent subject will realize. Push, pull, pry and attempt to lift all treads and rises on stairs to determine if they are loosened. If necessary, dismantle railings and bannisters.

(12) After encircling a room, **narrow the search** by continuing in a path about four feet from the walls. Remove the rug and examine

the underside with care. Test each floorboard separately, particularly at the ends and joints.

(13) **Kitchen, pantry, and bathrooms** are too often neglected in a search, yet they offer innumerable places of concealment. If a search is made of the premises of a **person in flight**, all haste should be made to the **fireplace, kitchen, or furnace** where valuable material may be rescued from fire. All cans and containers should be searched and opened if necessary. Examine linoleum and tiling for caked dirt in the interstices, as in the case of flooring. Examine all plumbing and disconnect all traps, drains, and straight runs of pipe which the subject might disconnect.

(14) Special attention should be given all papers, or **scraps of paper**, found in furnaces, waste baskets, fireplaces, trash cans, and cuspidors.

(15) All **clothing, shoes, linen**, etc., should be examined by portable ultraviolet light, as well as by the more usual methods. This process quickly reveals any solution which has been used on the garments, as well as many laundry marks which are made with fluorescent ink.

#### 27305

In **searching an open area**, the methods used, are, in the main, adaptations of those already described. Rough terrain or heavy undergrowth increases the need for careful and accurate measures. The principal difference is that open areas are best searched from the center of investigative interest to the periphery. If a number of Operatives are engaged in the search, the area may be divided into appropriate subdivisions. If identification of footprints is involved, all outsiders must be barred from the area and a path marked for the use of the searchers. Do not permit loud conversation or promiscuous calling back and forth.

#### 27306

In **searching an automobile**, begin with the tires and proceed systematically through every part of the vehicle to the top. Hub-caps, the reflectors of spot, head, tail, and parking lights should be removed and searched. Doors should be removed, disassembled and examined. False bottoms in the flooring must be looked for. It may be necessary to search the motor block for welded compartments added to the casting. The back of the instrument board may have clamps or false fuse boxes for concealing articles. Completely false or subdivided gas tanks have been used as secret compartments and articles have been secreted in the crankcase and differential housing. All upholstery and padding in the top, sides, seats, and back rests should be carefully sounded with a long hatpin and the seams and stitches inspected. The tool and battery compartments and even the inside of the battery should be searched.

## CHAPTER 8.—IDENTIFICATION

### SECTION I.—DESCRIPTIONS OF PERSONS

#### 28101

The ability to fully and accurately describe an individual, who has been seen but once or twice, is a most valuable asset to the Operative. This ability may be developed by study and practice. Few people retain a mental picture clearly enough to describe details, unless each detail has been separately noted and stored in the memory. In observing a person, then, the Operative should allow his gaze to travel from one feature to another, classifying each part in his mind according to the type to which it belongs. The physical description list should be memorized to serve as a check-off list in making such observations. Constant practice will greatly improve one's skill in this regard.

#### 28102

The first modern and systematic method of describing persons was devised by Dr. Alphonse Bertillon of the French police service and was known as the "Portrait Parle" (spoken picture). Originally, the portrait parle was associated with the so-called Bertillon System of Identification (an inaccurate and cumbersome method based upon anthropometric measurements), which was discarded with the adoption of the modern fingerprint classification.

#### 28103

Today the portrait parle, in revised form, is combined with other than purely physical data to form descriptions practically amounting to abbreviated dossiers. The facts need not be obtained all at once, but may be added as they become known, and recorded as follows:

- (1) **Identification number**, if used.
- (2) **True name**.
- (3) **Aliases**.
- (4) **Status** (Espionage Agent, Subversive Leader, Dangerous Saboteur, Disloyal Officer, Suspected Enemy Courier, etc.)
- (5) **Activities**.
- (6) **Fingerprint classification**, with copies of prints.
- (7) **Photographs**, with dates and places.
- (8) **General Description** (with date).
  - (a) Date of birth.
  - (b) Place of birth.
  - (c) Nationality.
  - (d) Naturalized citizen of—Naturalized at —.
  - (e) Parents and grandparents, if obtainable.
  - (f) Literacy, education, languages, and accent.
- (9) **Physical Description**.
  - (a) Sex, height, weight, build and color.

- (b) Posture, carriage, complexion and skin.
- (c) Head, hair, hairdress, whiskers and moustache and degree of baldness.
- (d) Forehead, eyes and eyebrows.
- (e) Ears, cheekbones, cheeks and nose.
- (f) Mouth, lips and teeth.
- (g) Chin and jaws.
- (h) Neck, shoulders and spine.
- (i) Hands, fingers, rings, feet and toes.
- (j) Marks, deformities, amputations or peculiar appearance.
- (10) **Dress**, and jewelry.
- (11) **Habits** and peculiar behaviour.
- (12) **Vocations and avocations**.
- (13) **Friends and associates**.
- (14) **Usual haunts**.

## 28104

Clear word-pictures of the subject may be painted by the use of the following standard descriptive phraseology:

(1) **Height** is usually determined by comparison with that of familiar persons. A "short man," 5 ft. to 5 ft. 5 in., a "medium man," 5 ft. 6 in. to 5 ft. 10 in., and a "tall man," 5 ft. 10 in. to 6 ft. and over. **Weight** is estimated.

(2) **Posture and carriage** may be described as erect, stiff, loose, bent, slumped, indolent, or brisk.

(3) **Complexion and skin** may be florid, sallow, pale, fair, dark, tanned, transparent, smooth, or rough.

(4) **Head** is large, medium, small, long, short, square or round.

(5) **Hair** is parted, pompadour; straight, wavy, kinky, curled; dark, brown, blond, gold, red; thick, thin, partially or completely absent, frontal, occipital or total baldness.

(6) **Moustaches** (little value because changeable).

(7) **Forehead**. Broad, low, high, bulging, straight or receding.

(8) **Eyebrows**. Slanting up or down; bushy or meeting; arched, wavy or horizontal; wiry, thin or penciled.

(9) **Eyes**. Blue, dark brown, light brown, gray; albino; clear, bloodshot or jaundiced; white spots on iris; arcus senilis (a glassy ring surrounding the iris); large, small, deep-set, protruding; squinting, cockeyed, slant-eyed; absent or diseased; close-set or widely separated.

(10) **Ears** are small, large, flat or projecting out from head; pierced or cauliflowered; lobule touching or not touching cheek; oval, rectangular, triangular or round; with tubercle missing, present or large; hairy or not hairy.

(11) **Cheekbones** are prominent or not, high or low.

(12) **Cheeks** are fleshy, full, medium, thin or sunken.

(13) **Nose** is long, medium or short; thin or bulbous; hooked, Roman, straight, pug or saddle shaped; deviating to left or right; nostrils flared, high, large, small, thick or translucent.

(14) **Mouth** may be large, medium or small; drooping or upturned at corners; habitually held open; twisted or distorted by speech or laughter.

(15) **Lips** may be thick, thin, compressed; red, blue, or pale; puffy or full; parted or retracted over teeth.



(16) **Teeth** are white, dull, yellow, or discolored; gold capped, inlaid, braced, filled, broken, or absent. For detailed description fill in the following diagram which represents the number of each tooth when viewed facing the subject:

(Upper teeth)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
(Lower teeth)	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32

If a tooth is missing, cross out its number; place a check against any other numbers commented upon and refer to each tooth by its number.

(17) **Chin** is small, large, square, pointed, dimpled, double, flat, arched, prominent, or receding.

(18) **Jaw** is thin, fleshy, long, short, narrow, wide, delicate, or heavy.

(19) **Neck** may be long, short, straight, curved, thin, fat, or puffy. Adam's apple prominent, medium, or absent.

(20) **Shoulders**—thin, medium, heavy, square, round, or sloping, broad, narrow, stooping, or unequal.

(21) **Hands** are long, medium, short, stubby; broad, narrow, thin, bony; soft, white, red, rough, calloused, smooth, or hairy.

(22) **Fingers** are short, medium, or long; thick, spatulate, square-tipped, or tapered, deformed, stained, shortened, or absent.

(23) **Distinctive marks** consist of scars, moles, tattoo marks, pockmarks, freckles, birthmarks, lameness, amputations, bow-legs, pigeon-toes, knock-knees, etc.

#### 28105

Almost all distinctive skin marks may nowadays be removed by plastic surgery or other cosmetic methods. There is, however, a possibility of determining if such a mark has been removed. This is done by applying moist heat to the part or by vigorously rubbing the skin. Either of these measures will cause the normal skin to redden and thus reveal the scar as a blanched line or area.

#### 28106

In obtaining a description from some individual who has not carefully observed the subject, the informant should first be allowed to tell all he remembers, without interruption. He then may be questioned regarding any details of the descriptive list which has been omitted, care being taken not to suggest the proper answers to him. The questioning of the informant for comparison of descriptions, and the informant's comparison of the subject's appearance with that of persons present or mutually well known also may be helpful.

## SECTION II.—FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION

### 28201

Any investigation may depend, for its success, upon the proper **development, recording, and preservation of fingerprints.** The ability of the Operative to perform this function has been made more than ever necessary by the recent enactment of laws providing for the fingerprinting of both resident and transient aliens.

### 28202

It is not necessary for the Operative to learn to classify fingerprints. This highly technical work is ably performed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose services, in this respect, have been placed at the disposal of all departments of the Government. This agency, upon receipt of fingerprints from the Navy, first classifies them and then attempts to identify the subject by comparing his prints with the millions of specimens which are kept on file. In order to be of greatest assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this work, the Operative must be able to obtain and forward prints in the **best possible condition.**

### 28203

When fingerprints are obtained aboard ship, or on other stations employing only active service personnel, they should be sent to the **Identification Division, Bureau of Navigation.** Accompanying these prints must be a list of the names and service numbers of all persons to whom the prints might belong. The unknown prints are then directly compared with those of each service man whose card is on file in the Bureau of Navigation.

### 28204

If, however, Civil Service employees are involved, the prints should also be sent to the **Division of Identification, Federal Bureau of Investigation.** Here they will be classified and checked against those which are routinely submitted for filing by the Civil Service Commission at the time of the civilian's employment.

### 28205

Fingerprint identification is based upon the well established and legally recognized fact that the friction ridge patterns which appear on the hands and feet of all human beings are individually characteristic, permanent, and unchangeable. Cuts and burns interrupt the ridges by destruction of tissue, but leave, in turn, unique marks of identification in the form of scars. Fingerprint patterns take various fundamental shapes which are capable of classification and indexing,

thus permitting rapid identification by comparisons between known and suspected fingerprint impressions.

## 28206

The friction ridges of the skin on the hands and feet are formed by rows of pore openings joined in continuous lines. Through these openings is constantly exuded a varying amount of perspiration. This perspiration consists of about ninety-eight percent water, together with small amounts of fat, salts, urea, glucose and acids. Although the concentration of these substances varies widely, some is always present. When an object is touched with the fingers some of the excretion is transferred and, unless smeared, leaves a print on the object.

## 28207

Excretion from the glands of the nose, face, and hair is much more oily than that of the hands, but it is usually present on the fingers, where it facilitates the development of latent prints into a visible form which may be photographed or "lifted." The fact that, under the stress of excitement, the excretion of perspiration is greatly increased, assists in obtaining good prints at the scene of illegal activity.

## 28208

In the course of an investigation it may become necessary to record the fingerprints of a number of persons, some of whom may be suspects. In such circumstances, the use of the following equipment is recommended:

- (1) Glass, enamel, or surfaced metal plate.
- (2) Roller for spreading ink.
- (3) Printer's ink.
- (4) Card holder.
- (5) Cleaning fluid and rags.
- (6) Standard fingerprint record cards.

## 28209

The following procedure is used:

- (1) Place a **small amount** of ink from tube in middle of plate.
- (2) Spread thinly and uniformly over the plate with roller.
- (3) Place card in holder.
- (4) Standing on subject's left, use both hands and roll palmar surface of his thumb on the plate **towards the body**.
- (5) Place the inked thumb on its side at the edge of the space indicated on the card and roll it, as before, across the space.
- (6) Repeat for each finger in turn, rolling **away** from the body on the plate and then on the card.
- (7) Clean equipment; allow card to dry.

The hands must be clean and dry before printing. The subject should not be allowed to assist but should relax his fingers. Watch the subject lest he deliberately substitute the wrong finger in order to change his classification. If the card has a blank for signature, obtain this before starting the printing.

## 28210

The Plain (unrolled) impressions of the fingers on each hand and the thumbs are very important for the identification of latent fingerprints. These **plain impressions** are the ones most likely to be left inadvertently by an individual committing a crime, or by others whose identity is in question.

## 28211

Prints of the **sole of the foot** are sometimes of value for comparison with hospital records or for other identification. The friction ridges here are as distinctive as those of the hands and fingers. The ink is applied directly to the foot by means of the roller. The print is obtained by means of a roller made of tightly rolled magazines covered with a blank fingerprint card (reversed). The roller must be of sufficient diameter to take the entire sole of the foot, which is inked and carefully rolled from the heel forward to the toes.

## 28212

**Latent fingerprints**, even fragmentary ones, are among the most positive means of identification which we have, provided that there are known prints with which they may be compared. Fragmentary prints may be compared by means of **poroscopy** which identifies the number, position and relationship of the pores found in one or more friction ridges. Even a single ridge pattern, if it is sufficiently complete, may be used as a basis for satisfactory identification.

## 28213

Latent prints are readily developed on polished or other hard smooth surfaces, and, under certain conditions, are even obtainable from cloth, paper, or other soft and porous substances. The direct method of developing a latent print, particularly on smooth surfaces or hard-finished paper, is by dusting it with fine powder of some contrasting color. This powder clings to the moist or greasy sweat deposits while it is brushed away from the surrounding areas. The result is a pattern which is in sharp contrast to the surface and which may be photographed or lifted off.

## 28214

Latent prints on **porous surfaces** are developed by chemical reactions (silver nitrate, iodine fumes, etc.) and not by dusting. They must be photographed since they cannot be lifted. **Visible fingerprints** are left by fingers which have come in contact with greasy matter, ink, blood, dirt, or other contrasting substances, and should be photographed although they may sometimes be lifted. **Plastic fingerprints** are occasionally found in heavy grease, viscous oil, chewing gum, butter, soap, flour, putty, tar, dust, etc., and should first be photographed in oblique light and then lifted by a moulage process.

## 28215

The principal methods used in the development and preservation of latent prints may be briefly described as follows:

(1) All fingerprints which are visible to the naked eye should be photographed before any attempts at dusting or lifting are made.



If the print is only faintly visible, oblique light, from a flashlight or portable lamp, may bring it into sharp relief. After the exposure is made, dusting may be used for additional pictures. Only when photography is completed should attempts be made to lift the print. Photographing may be done by any of the special fingerprint cameras and process films on sale by leading manufacturers, but good results may also be obtained with ordinary good quality cameras.

(2) **In dusting latent prints**, the contrasting powder is applied by means of a very soft camel's-hair brush, atomizer, or dusting bag. The excess is brushed off or gently blown away. Care must be taken to use only the tip of the brush, and that lightly, in a circular movement along the lines of the print pattern. Dusting powders may be purchased from drug companies in prepared form or improvised from readily available material such as cigar ashes, pencil leads, powdered inks, charcoal, soot, etc. All light powders are used on dark backgrounds and vice versa. If time and space permit, it is always wise to place a known print on the same surface, as a control, to test the various powders and to obtain the greatest contrast. **Powdered copper (precipitated)** is used as a developer when the surface contrasts with dark brown. This powder is never brushed on, but must be poured over the print and the excess dumped off. It is especially useful for the development of fresh prints on paper, although prints may also be taken by this powder from handkerchiefs, blotters, letters, fingernails, etc.

(3) **Gray** powders are composed of mercury and chalk (one part of druggist's gray to two parts of talc). **Black** powder consists of two parts of fine carbon and one part of lamp black, by weight, to which one-third part of fine graphite is added. **Gold or bronze** powders are made from bronze, brass, or copper dust. **Aluminum** is the powdered variety obtainable in any paint shop. **Dragon's blood** is made from vegetable matter and rosin and is obtainable at drug stores. It contrasts with both light and dark backgrounds. The last two named powders are among the most useful.

(4) **To lift a fingerprint** that has been powdered, special tape (white or black for contrast) may be obtained from various firms specializing in such equipment. In an emergency, scotch tape, or even ordinary adhesive tape may be used, although they are both much inferior to regular lifting tape. The tape is placed over the print, pressed evenly and gently, and then peeled off, carrying the powdered pattern with it. The pattern is then covered with transparent tape, in order to protect it in handling, and an identifying ticket attached. This ticket should bear the date, serial number, Operative's initials, and other identifying data. Fragmentary latent prints should always be photographed and developed. Even though such fragments lack deltas or classifiable patterns, they may afford the twelve identical points of comparison which make an identification certain.

28216

Recent fingerprints on paper, as well as a large percentage of writing in secret inks, can be developed by means of **iodine vapor**. This vapor causes the prints to appear in dark brown color which may be photographed, although, unless specially treated, they soon fade, leaving no

trace of the development. The iodine fumes may be applied as follows:

(1) By means of an **iodine gun** or atomizer (which may be of the familiar hand-operated bulb type), containing iodine crystals. The reservoir is gently heated to vaporize the iodine, and the fumes steadily forced over the suspected print in a room free of drafts. After a few minutes, the latent print will appear. Because of the evanescent nature of the print, it must be photographed immediately.

(2) A more satisfactory **iodine vapor bath** may be constructed of glass and wood, or improvised from an ordinary small rectangular fish aquarium. This bath, or cabinet, is raised on supports a few inches above the work table. Through a round hole cut in the floor of the cabinet protrudes the bottom of a porcelain dish which contains iodine crystals. The questioned papers are hung in the cabinet from wires stretched across the top. A fairly close-fitting lid is applied, heat applied to the bottom of the dish, and the cabinet rapidly fills with iodine fumes. Through the glass front, the latent prints may be seen to appear within a few minutes.

(3) When a **permanent development** is desired, iodine vapor prints may be fixed by means of a solution of Palladium chloride. To 55 cc. of distilled water, add eight to ten drops of concentrated hydrochloric acid and one gram of powdered Palladium chloride. Heat solution until powder dissolves and dilute with 500 cc. of distilled water. A few drops of this solution should be cautiously spread over the print by a small strip of paper. Remove excess solution with a corner of a blotter and allow to dry.

#### 28217

Fingerprints on paper which are over a month old are difficult to develop with iodine fumes. However, latent prints up to eight months old may be developed by the use of a 3 percent solution of **silver nitrate** (1 oz. of silver-nitrate crystals in a quart of distilled water). This treatment will also develop many kinds of secret inks. It depends upon the fact that the silver nitrate combines with the salt of perspiration to form silver chloride, which turns black when exposed to light. To obtain the reaction, the paper is placed in a tray of the silver-nitrate solution and thoroughly wetted. It is then removed, blotted, and dried, and exposed to sunlight or ultraviolet light for several minutes. When the prints are developed, the paper is washed in warm water for an hour to prevent the blackening of the entire paper. (Rubber gloves should be used to prevent staining the hands.)

#### 28218

The use of iodine vapor does not interfere with the later use of the silver-nitrate solution. When both methods fail to reveal prints or secret writing, ultraviolet light may often be used to good advantage.

NOTE.—The forging of latent fingerprints is becoming more easy of accomplishment as new latex and plastics are developed. These forgeries cannot always be detected microscopically, but chemical analysis and search for minute sweat droplets may reveal their spuriousness.

### SECTION III.—TIRE AND FOOT TRACKS

#### 28301

Much may be learned by the careful examination of tire or foot tracks at the scene of illegal activity. Many Naval shore establishments are traversed by roads which allow the entrance of automobiles, even at night, and most important buildings are usually located at a distance from guard fences which must be covered on foot. It is evident, therefore, that many attempts against the security of the station will leave traces in the form of prints.

#### 28302

The tracks made by a person walking or running may furnish a fairly accurate picture of the individual, with clues as to his approximate height, weight, length of stride, robustness, sobriety, etc. The following points of measurement should be noted:

(1) **The walking line** is a straight line drawn in the direction of movement and is usually touched by the inner margins of the heel prints in succession. Stout or infirm people, persons carrying a load, etc., usually spread their feet to obtain greater stability, and hence the right heel line and the left heel line are separated, although more or less closely parallel.

(2) **The foot line** is the center line of the individual footprint and meets the walking line at an angle normally  $30^{\circ}$  to  $32^{\circ}$ . City dwellers are more likely to turn their toes outward. Parallel foot lines are uncommon and walking with toes turned in is quite rare. The foot line is usually constant under normal conditions.

(3) **The step length** is the distance between the centers of successive heel prints. It is roughly proportional to the height of the individual, although the walking habits and rate cause wide variations. The step length varies from 20" to 40". Women, because of unstable footgear, and infirm persons, take short steps, while tall men and track athletes take longer steps than usual. An alternately long and short step denotes a limp while a wavering walking line and varying step length indicates uncertain equilibrium as in drunkenness, disease, wounds, or other physical weakness.

#### 28303

The footprint may be identified by comparing its **details of wear, make, and construction** with known shoes. Each person has a characteristic walk which wears out his footgear in a more or less characteristic manner. The outer rear corner of the heel and the lateral margin of the sole are usually brought down more strongly than other parts of the foot. These parts of the shoe consequently wear most rapidly. The marks from this cause and the wear due to rough terrain or certain types of industry, make a pair of worn shoes comparatively easy to identify. Rubber or composition heels and soles increase the pos-

sibility of surface prints, especially on polished or painted wood, linoleum, cork, tile, etc. Here the print may be found and photographed by means of oblique light.

### SECTION III—TIRE TRACKS 28304

A study of **tire tracks** will reveal the size, direction of travel, and approximate weight of a rubber-tired vehicle. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a very extensive file of tire-tread designs which will enable them to promptly identify any pattern which is submitted. Size may be determined by the width of the tread and the distance between faults recurrent in the tire print. Identification of any particular tire depends, as in the case of footprints, upon the comparison of faults, scars, or wear marks with the identical details in the tire itself.

### 28305

All tracks should be photographed before attempting to make casts of them. In taking photographs of any impression, an ordinary foot rule should be placed beside the print so that it may appear in the finished picture and serve as a scale of measurement.

Casts are made when it is necessary to permanently record any cut, break, worn spot, or fault which may identify the object in question.

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## SECTION IV.—MOULAGE METHODS

### 28401

As in the case of fingerprints, it is often necessary to make a permanent and accurate record of foot and tire tracks. This is accomplished by the making of molds, casts, or models in plastic material, the various processes used being collectively termed **moulage**. These processes may be applied, not only to foot and tire tracks, but also to other impressions which have been made in any material whatever. By these means we may also construct detailed replicas of tools, weapons, containers, dies, stamps, seals, etc., which often are of great value in intelligence work.

### 28402

The kinds of material used are determined by circumstances. By the use of rubber compounds, plaster of paris, agar compound, and other specially prepared substances, it is possible to turn out very fine work, but it is important that the Operative should not be entirely dependent upon these preparations. In an emergency he should be able, with a little ingenuity, to produce satisfactory casts from such common and quickly available substances as tallow, casein glue, plastic wood, cement, or ordinary paraffin. To accomplish this, it is necessary to become thoroughly familiar with the methods used in moulage, rather than to rely upon the memory to retain the complex formulae which may be found in textbooks devoted to the subject.

### 28403

Although there have been introduced, in recent years, many new moulage compounds, **plaster of paris** remains the most important material used for casting. Its advantages are that it is cheap, readily obtainable, quickly prepared, sets quickly, and produces a firm and substantial cast. Its disadvantages are that it is rigid and requires "piece molds" where undercutting is encountered, that it generates some heat, and that it must be used immediately after mixing or else thrown away.

### 28404

In order to obtain the finest detail, the best grade of plaster should be used. This is commonly called "art" or "dental" plaster. The following precautions should be used in mixing:

(1) The plaster should be added to the water, which is constantly stirred, until the mixture approximates the consistency of melted ice cream, or pancake flour. The exact proportions are best determined by experiment. The thinner mixtures reproduce the finest details, but if too thin, the plaster will fail to set at all.

(2) Any coloring matter or hardening chemical must be dissolved in the water before the plaster is added.

(3) Thin mixtures set very slowly. The setting process may be accelerated by adding one-half teaspoonful of salt to each pint of water.

(4) One part of saturated potassium sulphate solution may be added to ten parts of water to shorten the setting time. This solution also **prevents expansion** of the cast.

(5) One teaspoonful of alum per quart of water reduces the setting time and also assists in the separation of a plaster cast from a plaster mold.

(6) One part of saturated borax solution to ten parts of water will **retard the setting** of plaster by fifteen minutes or longer, but the resultant cast will be **sharper and harder** after setting.

#### 28405

In making plaster casts from plaster molds, a **separating medium** must be applied to the inner surface of the mold. While either petrolatum or sweet oil may serve the purpose, more satisfactory results are obtained from a solution of one part of gum mastic dissolved in four parts of amyl alcohol. This solution is applied to the inside of the mold with a brush and allowed to dry before casting. Another mixture which is immediately ready for use is three parts of castor oil to one part of alcohol by weight. To separate wax from plaster molds, the mold is soaked in warm water and lathered with shaving soap before the wax is poured.

#### 28406

When plaster of Paris is used, it is mixed on the scene and poured into the print until the bottom is covered. Care should be taken to prevent the falling liquid plaster from damaging the impression. In the case of footprints, this may be done by pouring the plaster into the region of the instep, usually the least important part of the print. It is good practice to pour plaster from the container into a spoon held close to the print from which it may overflow and trickle into the impression. Discard mixtures which are too thick. They cannot be thinned.

#### 28407

After the bottom of the print is covered, bits of twigs, wire, or matches may be buried in the remaining plaster to serve as reinforcing material. Footprint casts should be at least one-half inch thick at the weakest point. It may be necessary to surround shallow prints by a dam or wall of earth to obtain the proper thickness. Before the plaster has set, the Operative should scratch his initials on the cast for future identification. When it has set, the cast is carefully lifted and washed in warm water, care being taken not to injure it by pulling out twigs or grass which may be imbedded therein.

#### 28408

If more than one cast is desired from a print, it should first be stiffened by spraying with shellac and then sprayed with oil or gently brushed with grease, vaseline, etc. By this means, a cast may often be made and lifted without injury to the impression. This method of **stiffening the print** is also required when the impression has been made in dust, sand, flour, soft snow or other finely powdered matter. Ordinary "fixativ," obtainable in art stores, may be gently sprayed

into the air above the print and allowed to settle into it. When a thin film of the fixative has hardened, spraying may be done more directly. In casting an impression in hard snow or ice, the print should first be dusted with talcum powder to insulate it against the heat generated by the plaster.

#### 28409

Various compounds containing **agar** are used in making small accurate **molds** of a wide variety of objects. By the use of these compounds, minute detail is obtained which permits of the accurate identification of tools or weapons by means of a cast of their traces and marks. The usefulness of agar negative material is increased by its property of nonadhesion to most other materials and even to another layer of agar which has already set.

#### 28410

The **agar material**, after being ground in a food chopper, should be stored in tight containers to prevent excessive loss of moisture. To prepare for use, it is heated in a double boiler to the boiling point (212° F). If too dry, a half cup or more of water may be added. This is absorbed and forms part of the viscous solution at this temperature. When ready to pour, the mixture should have the consistency of thick cream. The following additional suggestions are offered:

- (1) Enough of the agar should be melted to produce a cast one inch in thickness.
- (2) The liquid agar adheres readily to vertical surfaces, and when hot, flows into very small crevices. It may be applied with brush, spatula, or syringe.
- (3) Brushing the first layers into undercuts will reduce the risk of air-pockets or bubbles forming.
- (4) To cause the agar to set quickly, it may be cooled by pouring ice water over it.
- (5) In making a cast of tool marks, a dam of modeling clay is constructed around the impression and the agar poured into the crater thus formed.
- (6) Agar is a good insulator of heat and the cast may be comparatively cool on the outside and still be in the liquid state within. For this reason, the entire mass should be reduced to a temperature of 70° F., or less, before an attempt is made to remove the mold.
- (7) The finished mold is slightly elastic and has a rubbery consistency. It will separate easily from the object molded and may be pinched a little to break away from undercuts.

#### 28411

The **reproduction of wax seals** may be accomplished by many different methods. One of the simplest is briefly described as follows:

- (1) Cover the paper with cardboard in which a hole has been cut to fit over the seal. Upon the cardboard build a wall of plasteline or modeling clay around the seal.
- (2) Mix a quantity of plaster of paris of the finest quality (dental plaster), and pour into the mold.
- (3) When the cast has thoroughly dried, remove gently from the mold so as not to break or mar any of the sharp corners of the cast.

(Several casts may be made to provide against accidents.) You now have a perfect plaster replica of the original seal.

(4) Make a moulage mold from one of the plaster casts and, from that, a metal cast of dental composition. Place the metal cast in an electroplating bath (copper) for an hour or more, depending upon the strength of the current.

(5) When this electroplated cast is removed from the bath and cleaned, preferably by an experienced seal-cutter or die-sinker, it will be found to be a very fair facsimile of the original seal.

(6) **The most accurate copies of seals** are made by taking agar impressions and processing them as described above; the positive cast to be first electroplated, then the electroplate shell is cleaned out and filled with solder, for strength, and a handle affixed.

## 28412

A simple and inexpensive process for taking impressions of large flat surface is that known as **stereotyping**. When no moulage materials are available, it may even be used to reproduce seals and other small impressions. It is carried out as follows:

(1) The surface is brushed or blown free of dust or loose dirt. Then lime-free printing paper, thin blotting paper, cigarette paper, silk paper, or toilet paper is wetted and laid over the surface.

(2) The wetting may be done by immersion or by sponging until the paper is quite soft. The paper is then pressed gently into intimate contact with the surface by a soft clothes brush, one sheet of paper at a time. Deep cavities or crevices will probably tear the wet paper, but more should be added and gently tapped down with the brush until the entire surface is covered with a bed of paper pulp.

(3) Additional sheets are now added which have been wet down with thin binders, such as paste, gum arabic, starch, or glue, and then brushed as before. When the sheets of paper form a fairly thick layer, they are allowed to dry thoroughly or may be dried by the application of heat, hot air, or a fan.

(4) When dry, the paper cast may be rolled up without damage and will constitute a very faithful reproduction of the surface.



## SECTION V.—IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

### 28501

The Naval Investigating Service is constantly dealing with documents, passports, letters, postcards, notebooks, and other papers. The identification of these papers as having significant relation to espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities is one of the important duties of Intelligence agents. The identification may be based upon the subject matter; addresses, postmarks, or cancellations; the presence of secret messages; forged seals, signatures, or photographs; fingerprints; erasures, secret inks, or watermarks.

### 28502

Documents found during a search may have to be left in place to avoid disclosing the fact that a search has been made. They may, however, be photographed separately if care is taken to replace them in their original state and position. If time permits and there is reason for so doing, they may even be dusted with precipitated copper to include fingerprints in the photographs. Needless to say, a thorough and detailed examination of documents is scarcely ever possible, if the search is to be kept secret.

### 28503

When valuable original papers are found during a search, the Operative must never succumb to the temptation to remove these papers if such an act may be discovered by the subject, should secrecy be an important consideration. Failure to observe this precaution has resulted in the alarm and escape of many espionage agents. No matter if chemical examination is indicated; no matter what conclusive proof of guilt is shown; no matter if the Operative believes the document will not be missed, **it must be left alone.** (See Pars. 21404-23214.)

### 28504

When papers may be removed with safety, they should be placed in cellophane envelopes, or other transparent covers. This affords adequate protection and enables the documents to be readily distinguished without handling. The names of all persons known to have handled each item should be placed on the label to aid in the identification of latent prints. The label should also carry a serial number, duplicated in the Operative's case notebook which should contain data regarding where, when, and under what conditions the document was obtained.

### 28505

When papers may subsequently be used as **legal evidence**, the Operative must see that each item is properly marked so that it may later be positively identified. These items must be kept in the personal possession of officials who may thus testify to an unbroken

chain of custody and to the fact that the documents have not been removed, substituted, or tampered with. No person who cannot appear in public court (under-cover agents) should mark the evidence. Documents of evidential value should not be cut, perforated, torn, or otherwise mishandled. They should always be photographed and the print and negative filed in a place apart from that in which the original is kept.

#### 28506

In removing original documents which are to be given a technical examination, the following precautions should be observed:

- (1) Handle by grasping the edges of the paper, preferably using gloves.
- (2) Do not fold and unfold or make new creases.
- (3) Except in writing the initials of legal identification, do not touch with pen, pencil, liquid paste, chemicals, varnish, or dirty fingers.
- (4) Do not make a tracing.
- (5) Do not expose the paper to extremes of heat, light, or dampness.
- (6) Make no repairs.
- (7) Do not attempt the casual reconstruction of burned or charred papers. (See pars. 28508, 28509, 28510, and 28511.)
- (8) Do not use an eraser or rub with the fingers.
- (9) Attach no clips, pins, or paper holders.
- (10) Do not puncture, perforate, or punch for filing.

#### 28507

Examination of documents may be carried out in District or Field Offices in the following manner and order:

- (1) Obtain a clean table free of ink-bottles, paste, etc., which might soil the document.
- (2) Carefully scrutinize the paper as a whole under any **strong (reflected) light**. Consider the subject matter as to relevance, plausibility, timeliness, and naturalness. Look for unnecessary words or awkward sentence construction. Weigh the significance of any sketch, diagram, or underlining. Search for any faults or abnormalities of writing, print, color, or spacing.
- (3) **Examine by transmitted light**, holding the paper up to a frosted bulb, or better, a light cabinet with a "flash opal" ground glass cover. The rest of the room should be dark. Look for disturbed fibers, uneven grain, minute perforations, stains, and the watermark.
- (4) Use **oblique light** in a darkened room. With the paper just below the eye level, use a small light source, a fountain pen flashlight will do. Look for irregular points of brightness or areas of dullness, disturbed fibers, evidence of erasures, etc.
- (5) Examine with hand lens or jeweler's loupe; if minute traces of forgeries, erasures, or artifacts are present, repeat the examination with a binocular microscope with low power objective lens.
- (6) Dust and develop latent prints with contrasting powders as described in Paragraph 28215.
- (7) Photograph and lift prints.
- (8) Photograph the entire document under artificial light with the

paper held flat on the table beneath a sheet of good quality glass, free of flaws or distortion.

(9) Repeat, using infrared lamps, filter, and film or plates. Make several exposures of unequal lengths.

(10) Examine for fluorescence under ultraviolet light. A mercury vapor, quartz tube lamp should be used.

(11) Place document in iodine vapor bath (Paragraph 28216).

(12) Apply silver nitrate solution treatment (Par. 28217).

(13) Place a sheet of plain white paper over the document to be examined and apply heat by means of a moderately heated electric flatiron. An electric hot plate with rheostat control may be used. Use caution to avoid scorching the original.

(14) Omit (12) and (13) if documents are to be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further study.

#### 28508

It is obvious that **charred or burned documents** often may contain the most important information. The handling of such fragile material is a difficult problem and, in most instances, Operatives should confine their efforts to the careful collection and preparation of the fragments for shipping. This may be done as follows:

(1) In **removing the fragments** from a grate, stove or furnace, first close the flue, adjacent doors and windows and guard against all currents of air.

(2) When possible, remove ashes **en masse** by gently inserting beneath them a thin sheet of metal or cardboard. If this is not possible they may sometimes be removed in layers. If this cannot be done, the fragments may be removed singly, by means of a camel's hair brush, or other soft appliance.

(3) The fragments are placed in a firm cardboard box which has been padded with tissue paper and lined with the same substance. The tissue paper is then folded over at the sides and ends to cover but not to contact the ashes. No attempt should be made to pack firmly. The remaining space is evenly filled with a few crumpled sheets of fine tissue, and the cardboard lid applied.

(4) Whenever possible, the box is transmitted by messenger, and held carefully without juggling about. When necessary, it may be mailed and classified, according to the regulations, as either Secret or Confidential and treated according to the rules of its class. It may be sent either to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Technical Laboratory, or to the Office of Naval Intelligence, Investigations Section, Washington, D. C. In either case a full explanation in a letter of transmittal should accompany the boxed ashes.

#### 28509

Under certain circumstances, it may be necessary to attempt the reconstruction of burned papers in the field. The fragments are gathered up as described above and carried to a table in a draftless room. They may be treated as follows:

(1) Each fragment is first inspected in ultraviolet light. A facsimile of each fragment with the writing seen thereon is made. (It may be possible to photograph in this light.)

(2) The fragments are then placed on cellophane, or other transparent paper, and gently steamed so as to allow them to lie flat. When this has been done they are carefully sprayed with fixative from an atomizer.

(3) When dry, all of the fragments are photographed, in ordinary light and by infrared methods. The clearest of the resulting prints are then carefully cut out and pieced together.

(4) One method of direct reading is sometimes possible by spraying the charred fragments with a 10 percent solution of ammonium acetate or the fixing fluid containing magnesium and thorium nitrates which is used for strengthening gas mantles. The paper is then dried and carefully ignited so as to leave a white ash with readable traces thereon.

#### 28510

Fragments of **torn paper** are sorted and placed on a cellophane backing with the same surface uppermost. First lay out the four corners which have two cut sides. Next fit in the top, bottom and sides (with one cut edge). Now gum the peripheral edges to the transparent backing. Fill in the remaining pieces by trial and error, taking care to accurately fit each overlapped edge. The edges of torn paper usually have an overlapping of the right hand fragment over the left. When all fragments are in place paste them to the backing and cover the whole with another piece of cellophane to form a smooth surface. Bind the edges with scotch tape.

#### 28511

Paper which has been **chewed or watersoaked** may sometimes be reconstructed by soaking in very thin lacquer, alcohol, etc., and spreading the fragments out carefully with needles. The opened fragments are mounted as for torn paper. The alcohol or lacquer will help to retard the digestion of paper by saliva which proceeds very rapidly once it has begun.



## CHAPTER 9.—PHOTOGRAPHY

### SECTION I.—USE IN INTELLIGENCE

#### 29101

Photography represents one of the most important aids to intelligence and investigative work, whether it concerns the obtaining and transmission of information, the copying of documents and records, the reproduction of the scene of significant activity, the identification of persons or the numerous laboratory techniques in which it plays an important part. The universal adoption of the camera as an instrument of Intelligence, and the high degree of development which has been reached in this field, demands that every Operative be at least **familiar with its potentialities.**

#### 29102

In **disseminating alien propaganda**, the motion picture is widely used in this country. Foreign-made films are imported both openly and secretly and used to influence public opinion. Russian-made films are imported wholesale and distributed widely to public theaters under communist control. German films are brought here both for public and private showing before Nazi groups. The night before the German invasion of Norway, high Norwegian Government officials were invited to a private showing of a film vividly portraying the destruction which had been inflicted upon Poland for daring to resist the invader. The audience is reported to have left the theater pale and visibly shaken, and it is impossible to estimate to what extent this one picture destroyed the Norwegian will to resist. Here in the United States, Japanese naval officers have come ashore from the vessels of the Japanese Navy, and exhibited to large groups of Japanese-Americans moving pictures intended to demonstrate great superiority of the Japanese form of government over that of this country. Though the pen be mightier than the sword, we may yet find the picture more potent than the pen.

#### 29103

**The camera in espionage** is known to all. The spectacle of vessels of foreign registry, their bridges crowded with photographers, passing close to anchored units of the United States Fleet, is familiar to every Naval Officer. Only slightly less well known are the continual and persistent efforts made to photograph naval activities ashore, aviation fields, harbor defenses, new aircraft, oil fields, new ship construction, etc. So brazen have these spies become, that one party of alien agents, who were surprised in the act of photographing a strategically important oil pipeline, impudently told a protesting motorcycle officer to mind his own business. They were traveling in their own consul's official car. In Europe, restrictions against photographing have

forced espionage agents to use miniature cameras, cunningly concealed in watches, canes, waistcoats, and even in eyeglasses. When, in an effort to expose the film carried in such a manner, the great munitions works flooded their entrance passages with X-rays, the agents cleverly countered by enclosing their diminutive cameras in cases of lead foil.

#### 29104

The **transmission of intelligence information** to the espionage agent's homeland is, or ought to be, the most difficult part of his task. We have good reason to believe that this is being done by means of microphotography. This process enables sheets of typewritten material, or even fair-sized maps, to be reduced to microscopic dimensions and transported as tiny rolls of film, which are read by projection upon a screen. The practical limit to which this photographic reduction may be carried, depends, at present, only upon the grain size of the film. It may be expected, however, that grainless film will soon be available. In that case, the possibilities of reduction, and correspondingly, the difficulties of detection, will be immeasurably increased.

#### 29105

The **photography of papers and documents** is equally valuable to both espionage and counterespionage agents. The former may often gain access to confidential data such as war plans, blueprints, gunnery reports, secret specifications, and code books. To photograph these documents and leave them behind, achieves the double purpose of the spy, i. e., to obtain information from the enemy and to leave him with a false sense of security. The counterespionage agent may use the same tactics in examining the baggage, notes, and correspondence of the enemy agent.

#### 29106

The use of **photography at the scene of sabotage or espionage** is just as important as that at the scene of any other crime. The photograph affords an irrefutable permanent record of many details which may escape the Operative at first examination and which may later prove of great value. Suppose, for example, that documents have been stolen at night from some naval building which stands on open ground. As soon as possible after discovery of the theft, and before conditions have been materially altered, the agent should begin his work. A general view of the outside of the building and the route taken by the thief should be photographed from several angles. Next a close-up of the door or window through which entrance was effected should be made. There should be included detailed photographs of the methods or marks of entry, i. e., traces of tools on window frames, door jambs, transoms, etc. As previously mentioned, the **photography of foot tracks**, tool impressions, and other marks should be correlated with moulage work. Other pictures are taken of the interior of the building and such significant details as may be helpful in the solution of the case. Here also will be required the photography of latent and developed fingerprints.

## 29107

The Operative may be required to take **photographs of persons** under a wide variety of circumstances. Many will be made with the full cooperation of the subject, as in checking applicants for employment, in preparing papers of personal identification and in clearing up cases of mistaken identity, etc. Others may be taken of entire groups, as for the identification of suspects by witnesses. Some photographs may be required for dissemination to cooperating law enforcement agencies. Often suspects may have to be photographed without their assistance or indeed even without their knowledge.

## 29108

The many uses to which photography may be put in the **technical laboratory** cannot even be enumerated here. The Operative should, however, not only be able to carry out certain valuable procedures, such as infrared photography and the projection of microfilm positives, but he should also be familiar with the many other possible uses of the camera. In this way only, will he be able to take full advantage of the laboratory facilities which have been made available to the Naval Service by cooperating Federal agencies, or utilize such as may be built up at the different field offices. To acquire this knowledge, it is strongly recommended that every Operative study the technical works listed under this subject in the bibliography.

## 29109

The use of photography at the scene of sabotage or espionage is just as important as that at the scene of any other crime. The photograph affords an irrefutable permanent record of many details which may escape the Operative at first examination and which may later prove of great value. Suppose, for example, that documents have been stolen at night from some naval building which stands on open ground. As soon as possible after discovery of the theft, and before conditions have been materially altered, the agent should begin his work. A general view of the outside of the building and the route taken by the thief should be photographed from several angles. Next a close-up of the door or window through which entrance was effected should be made. There should be included detailed photographs of the methods or marks of entry, i. e., traces of tools or wire, how frames, door jambs, transoms, etc. As previously mentioned, the photographs of foot tracks, tool impressions, and other marks should be correlated with monograph work. Other pictures are taken of the interior of the building and such significant details as may be helpful in the solution of the case. Here also will be required the photography of latent and developed fingerprints.

## SECTION II.—PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT

### 29201

Inasmuch as this manual is primarily intended for the Investigating Service in the field, only such apparatus as is suitable for actual field service or for installation in a field office laboratory will be described. Some of this equipment may, in peacetime, be regarded as optional, but it is not peace for which we prepare. In planning to meet the requirements of war, each field office should be guided by the amount of work it may be called upon to handle and also to what extent it may expect help from local laboratory facilities.

### 29202

The principal characteristics of field equipment are that it shall be rugged in construction, portable in type, and capable of operation by trained, but not necessarily expert, Operatives. Only apparatus of the best quality combines the features of accuracy, reliability, and simplicity of operation. The Operative should avoid makeshifts.

### 29203

For **identification, copying, and technical work**, a small but complete "graphic" type of commercial camera, such as is used by news photographers, is best. In the smaller size (2¼ x 3¼ film pack and plate), this type will be found most convenient and satisfactory. The camera should be equipped with two view finders, an internally coupled range finder, a nine-inch bellows extension, drop bed, ground-glass focusing, focal plane and between lens shutters, with time and one second up to 1/1000-second speeds. It should also have a rising and falling front, synchronized photoflash attachment, and at least three film-pack holders to permit of daylight infrared film changes in the field. For use with this camera, there should be added a firm tripod with detachable brackets for photoflood and photoflash bulbs, a universal head, universal clamp, and two ordinary goose-neck lamps with cords twenty feet in length.

### 29204

The **photography of persons**, when it must be done quickly and discreetly, requires a different type of camera. Here we need extreme portability, high speed, and some possibility of concealment. Since no one camera satisfactorily combines all of these qualities, we must depend upon several types to fit various circumstances or else adopt one as a sort of compromise with our needs. Three of these types are as follows:

(1) At least three different makes of excellent candid cameras offer: High speed lenses for snapshots in any light; telephoto lenses where distance work is mandatory; copying lenses; built-in range finders and



the use of various kinds of standard motion-picture film. This type is **excellent** for quick shots, **fair** for copying and **poor** for concealment.

(2) One camera, described as an "all-around" instrument, is of the small bellows type, takes a  $2\frac{1}{4} \times 3\frac{3}{4}$  film pack, has an anastigmat f/4.5 lens and rapid compur shutter with speeds up to 1/200 second. These features, together with rack-and-pinion focusing, double extension bellows and bed and rising-sliding front give great flexibility of purpose at moderate cost. This type is **fair** for quick shots, **good** for copying and **poor** for concealment.

(3) One camera, on the American market, can be completely concealed in the hand. It is equipped with a view finder, an f/3.5 lens, shutter speeds up to 1/1000 second, daylight loading and uses 9.5 mm. film. Very fine grain film and special developer must be used to obtain the best results. It may be evaluated as **good** for snapshots, **poor** for copying and **excellent** for concealment.

#### 29205

At least one good 16-mm. motion-picture camera should be included in the field outfit in order to make a continuous record of certain activities. This should be a serviceable machine, made by one of the manufacturers of commercial motion-picture cameras, and not a toy. It should be equipped with a variable speed device and a turret head with the finest lenses, permitting quick changes from close-ups to normal or telephoto work. This camera is not only useful in identification, as from concealment, but it may also be used to copy a book during a search. One Operative may rapidly turn the pages, while another takes a continuous close-up motion picture of the action. This camera, together with a portable tripod and other equipment, may be easily carried in an ordinary handbag.

#### 29206

The field office should also be supplied with the following equipment:

(1) A sturdy microfilm reader of improved type to be used with all small film and photographic records.

(2) An efficient film projector which will permit the study of single frames or glass slides.

(3) A photorecord apparatus, an electro-copyist or a small production photostat machine.

(4) A good, medium sized, precision enlarger, embodying the advantages of both condenser and diffuse types of enlargers. It should be able to enlarge up to 16 diameters on baseboard with a two-inch lens, and should have universal features such as camera back adapter, detachable copying lights and microscope attachments, so that with extra condensers it will serve the entire negative range and be available as an auxiliary technical and copying camera.

#### 29207

Good **sources of light** must be available to do good work. The most commonly used are as follows:

(1) **Daylight** is necessary in many forms of field photography but is often variable and unreliable for technical work which demands constant sources subject to arbitrary control.

(2) **Artificial incandescent sources** are most efficient and practical, particularly for copy work, infrared, process, and microphotography. The best types are the high efficiency tungsten filament gas-filled lamps. Photoflood and movieflood lamps operate at very high temperatures, greatly increasing their production of both visible and infrared light, and are equally satisfactory in the field and laboratory.

(3) Where electric current is not available, flashlight battery operated **Photoflash lamps** produce very bright light of short duration. This light is generated by the burning of thin aluminum foil in an atmosphere of oxygen. The time of maximum light production corresponds exactly with the time of maximum sensitivity of infrared plates and films. Except where long exposures are required, these lamps may therefore be used in infrared photography.

(4) **Carbon arc lamps** are very useful in the projection of films, lantern slides, etc., as well as being good sources of infrared rays. For use in the field laboratory, the type producing the so-called "flame arc," with automatic adjustment, is best.

A very convenient **portable carbon-arc lamp** is on the market, which, by means of two filters, produces bands of radiation effectively producing a **fluorescent reaction**. The lamp is carried in a small case which also contains a transformer enabling it to be used on any 110-120 volt power circuit.

(6) **Mercury arcs** should be the mercury vapor type of ultraviolet lamps with high pressure oxide coated electrode and quartz tubes. The most reliable types can hardly be described as portable.

## 29208

The selection of the proper **film, plates, and filters** is most important, but cannot be discussed here. The constant improvements which are being made would soon invalidate any advice which could be given at present. Operatives are referred to the many excellent books and particularly manufacturer's publications on the subject.

## 29209

The **dark room** should be large enough to allow for the installation of printers and enlargers and to provide space for separate benches and sinks for plate changing, plate developing, printing, and washing. Ventilation should be maintained by light-proof vents with a suction fan on the exhaust vent. Internal arrangement should be carefully planned to insure the proper relative location of enlargers, printers, fixing bath, washing tanks and drying racks. A double door designed to exclude all light is a necessity.

## 29210

The **water supply** of the dark room is important. Sinks should be larger than eighteen inches by thirty-six inches, and constructed of slate, cement, enameled steel, or lead. Taps must not be so high as to splash or so low that large graduates cannot be placed under them. **Trays** should be large enough to hold four plates at a time. Composition trays are as satisfactory as any. Tanks are designed as special equipment to be used with many miniature and motion-picture cameras. These special tanks usually give much better results than

ordinary equipment. Graduates required are sized one ounce, eight ounces, sixteen ounces, and thirty-two ounces. **Drying facilities** should include an automatic print dryer and such other mechanical conveniences as may assist in the speedy production of accurate photographs.

#### 29211

Whenever possible, the dark room and photographic laboratory should be combined with the general technical laboratory. Arrangements should be made so that one room may be made totally dark, in order to carry out examinations by means of special lights, infrared, or ultraviolet rays. Storage facilities for supplies should also be provided.

### SECTION III.—PHOTOGRAPHIC TECHNIQUE

#### 29301

This section deals, not with the technique of the photographer, which can be learned from books, but with the **photographic technique of the Intelligence agent**, which is an entirely different matter. To increase his skill in the technical procedures of photography, the Operative should study and practice the art.

#### 29302

Any agent may find an easily concealed vest-pocket camera helpful in an emergency. When he is forewarned, however, as when a search is planned, he should be provided with a complete field kit for photography. This should be kept in readiness and should consist of an innocent appearing dark traveling bag containing the following articles: The general view camera; film, extra film pack, and spare film pack holders loaded with infrared film; photoflash and photoflood bulbs with flash gun; numbering or marking device for identifying the pictures; filters, focusing cloth, and ground glass back; flashlight, foot rule, universal tripod, stand and reflectors, and a snapshot or candid camera. Unless photography is the sole purpose of the search, a second bag, containing additional field equipment such as fingerprint set, magnifying glass, steel tape, notebooks, sketch paper, pencils, rule, moulage materials, special tools, etc., should also be taken.

#### 29303

In carrying out the **photographic work incidental to a search** the following suggestions will be found helpful:

(1) Show no unnecessary lights; use your photoflash bulbs in inside rooms whenever possible. In large office buildings, with the help of the janitor, two or three whole floors may be illuminated to indicate that cleaning is in progress. It may be necessary to cover the windows with heavy cloths or blankets secured by wedges.

(2) Organize a team of Operatives for the handling of large quantities of material. For example: One man may collect the material and mark its original position, a second arranges the material and supplies identification, a third presents it in front of the camera operated by a fourth, and the first man returns it to the proper place.

(3) The men, materials, and method of search photography units should be tried out in advance of a real search. Constant practice is necessary in order to acquire the necessary skill. Many "trial runs" should be made.

(4) In photographing room interiors for later study, it is often helpful to print one picture in reverse. When taken at the scene of a crime, as when sabotage or espionage theft has been committed, duplicate each picture with one showing rules, yardsticks, and marks or arrows pointing to significant items.



## 29304

In **fingerprint photography** No. 520 Kodak Process Film Packs are very satisfactory. One or more films may be removed for development before the others have been exposed. The pack should be numbered for identification. In photographing prints on glass, a piece of black velvet may be used as a background. Glass containers, such as bottles and tumblers, may similarly be filled with ink, milk, or other contrasting liquid if this does not effect the evidential value or character of the contents or residue. Bright, well-illuminated exposures of Process film will often bring out details which the eye has missed and which are of particular value in the solution of difficult problems in latent print photography.

## 29305

Photography by fluorescent light is useful in the examination of many documents and papers. A few examples may be given:

(1) **Questioned documents.**—Fresh erasures treated with ink eradiator and not washed will show black in ultraviolet light. Sometimes the erased ink writing may be seen.

(2) **Mail examination.**—If a glue different from the original has been used in resealing an envelope, this will often be apparent by ultraviolet inspection. Gum arabic gives no luminescence but dextrin has a strong one. Sealing waxes which appear identical to the eye, may show quite different degrees of luminescence.

(3) Most of the common **secret inks** will be revealed in ultraviolet light.

(4) Stains in any sort of fabric, forged stamps, etc., all may be discovered by ultraviolet light.

## 29306

Since ultraviolet light is reflected from the object as ordinary visible light, it may be photographed with an ordinary camera and ordinary lens. A special filter is used to absorb all the reflected ultraviolet light. Several of these filters are on the market. A wet filter consisting of a 1-percent solution of nitrate of cerium ammonium may also be used. The photography must be done in a totally dark room, with the ultraviolet light source at right angles to the object surface. Rapid orthochromatic plates or films are used. The exposure time is very long, as much as 20 or 30 minutes. There are photometers especially designed to determine the value of the luminescence. Operatives who wish to specialize in ultraviolet photography may obtain further details on request from the Eastman Kodak Company, of Rochester, New York, and should, in addition, refer to the existing textbook references to this subject.

## 29307

**Infrared photography** may be used for Intelligence purposes, in overcoming haze in distance photography and in the laboratory for the following purposes:

(1) Detection and deciphering of erasures and forgeries.

(2) Deciphering of charred documents or those which have become illegible from age or handling.

- (3) Detection of stains and irregularities on cloth.
- (4) Differentiation between certain inks, dyes, and stains visibly identical.
- (5) Study of fingerprints.
- (6) Examination of the contents of sealed envelopes.
- (7) Detection of certain kinds of secret writing.
- (8) Photography of subjects in the dark.

## 29308

There is no fundamental difference between the practice of infrared photography and that in which visible light is used. Anyone equipped for photography with ordinary orthochromatic or panchromatic plates or films can make infrared photographs without any additional equipment other than a filter for use on the lens of his camera. There are certain precautions which must be taken as a result of the sensitivity of the materials to the invisible radiations, but these do not involve any unusual practice. Apart from the filter, the only thing which the general photographer will find of special convenience is infrared dark room safelight, but even this may be unnecessary when it is not an inconvenience to operate in total darkness while loading and developing. When technical laboratory work is to be done, it may be desirable to use special lenses, plates and films, to compound particular developers, and so forth. It is, however, often necessary to do this in ordinary photography so that the use of the infrared does not place any unusual demands on the photographer's time or skill.

## 29309

The special requirements of infrared photography are few, simple and as follows:

- (1) All equipment, such as plate holders, film magazines, carrying equipment, and the bellows and shutter of the camera itself must be impervious to infrared rays. Otherwise, the negatives will be clouded.
- (2) The focus for infrared is roughly 1/200 part longer than the lens focal length for visible light. This distance is negligible in short focus lenses.
- (3) Anastigmat lenses used on hand cameras are usually satisfactory, especially when stopped down to f/8 or less. For the most exacting work, lenses specially designed to give sharp focus in the infrared must be used.
- (4) Infrared plates are sensitive to other bands of light and we must therefore use filters which allow only the passage of infrared light, and absorb the other bands.
- (5) For infrared photography of outdoor subjects, haze penetration, photomicrography, document copying, or other contrast work the following filters are often used: Wratten (Eastman) Nos. 23A, 25, 29, 70, 89 and 89A; Agfa (Ansco) Nos. 42 and 23. For examination of documents for forgeries and erasures the best filters are: Wratten (Eastman) Nos. 87 and 88A; Agfa (Ansco) No. 85.

## 29310

When it is necessary to take a picture of the subject without alarming him, we may use a **concealed camera**, photography under pretext, or a

telephoto lens. Cameras may be concealed in anything large enough to cover them. Very ingenious devices have been used for operating the camera in its false container. This kind of equipment cannot be purchased, but it may be manufactured by any person with an inventive turn of mind.

## 29311

**Photography under pretext** may be very successful if the Operative plays his part well. When meeting ships, trains, or planes, a likely role would be that of a press photographer; in the street one could play the commercial street photographer; when necessary the agent could pass from house to house as an itinerant portrait photographer. Many other ruses such as an interest in real estate, a magazine photographic contest or in taking a picture of a third person, may work well depending upon the circumstances.

## 29312

By means of **telephotography** it is possible to make pictures which could not otherwise be obtained, without discovery. Mounted in a room across the street from the subject's location, the telephoto lens gives almost the advantages of a close-up view. The lens and camera **must be solidly supported** and operated without the slightest vibration. When operated out of doors, a long lens shade should be used to avoid attracting the subject's attention by reflections from the lens. Under ordinary conditions, sunlight is the principal illumination, and it may become inadequate on cloudy days or at dusk, and there may be some distortion on very hot days. For a continuous photographic record, as of a file of persons leaving a building or of an agent in the act of receiving money, a motion-picture camera and telephoto lens should be used.

29310

INVESTIGATING SECTION TRAINING MANUAL

**Part III.—*Records***

(176)



## CHAPTER 1.—REPORTS, INDEXES, AND FILES

### SECTION I.—REPORTS

#### 31101

The task of the Investigating Section of Domestic Intelligence Branch is to secure, evaluate, and disseminate such information as will assist in the protection of the Naval Establishment. To be useful this information must be put into a readily available and usable form for evaluation and dissemination.

#### 31102

The form used for this purpose is the Report, which should contain in clear detail the results of the investigation.

#### 31103

The report should be a complete recital of all pertinent facts which will enable the reader to act quickly on the information contained.

#### 31104

Standard printed Report forms have been prepared to afford the Operative a definite place to record the essential facts, and to enable each item to be found easily when the Report is referred to later.

#### 31105

The Standard Report Forms consist of (1) Investigation Report and (2) Summary Report.

#### 31106

**The Investigation Report** should be prepared with particular attention to a comprehensive coverage of the investigation, consistent with brevity. While it is essential that all information, personalities, leads, etc., should be mentioned, it is important that inconsequential matters should be excluded. Investigation Reports must have continuity and follow in logical order the previous phases of the investigation.

#### 31107

The first page of the Investigation Report will be colored green and printed as shown in Plate No. (III). This report will contain:

(a) "SUBJECT" (A brief indication of the principal subject(s), person(s) and/or activity(ies) covered by the particular investigation.

(b) "Report Made At" (Place where report is made).

(c) "Date" (The actual date on which the Operative prepared the report—not the date the investigation was made, but the date the report was typed).

(d) "Report Made By" (Name of Operative making the report, or, if a joint report, name of Operatives—NOT the name of the reporting

**office** but of the individual (or individuals) actually making the investigation, EXCEPT where the confidential or under-cover status of the Operative might be jeopardized, in which case such Operative (or Operatives) should be designated by a registered symbol. A list of the Operative symbols should be furnished the Office of Naval Intelligence).

(e) "Period Covered" (Statement of the actual period covered by the investigation or that part of the investigation included in the Investigation Report).

(f) "Status of Case" (A brief indication of the *present* status as: pending; closed; closed in ND-T; etc.).

(g) "Origin of Case" (Brief statement of the facts or references surrounding, or reasons for initiating, the investigation—reason for investigating).

(Examples: "On information consisting of an Out-of-District Lead (Com 3) received stating that John DOE was receiving mail for Richard ROE, and requesting an investigation,"; or "Subject person involved in the John DOE case by reason of his under-cover contacts with the principal suspect and his voluminous correspondence with Richard ROE, Herman HOE, et al.")

(h) "Character of Investigation" (A brief indication of the type of investigative operations instituted in connection with the part of the investigation covered by the Report).

(Example: In such an instance as the first example given in (g) above, the notation might well read, "Personal surveillance of subject—mail cover—general background investigation," "Espionage," "Sabotage.")

(i) "Enclosures" (List of enclosures, attached documents, photographs, exhibits, etc.).

(j) "Copy to" (Distribution List of divisions of the Naval Establishment or other Departments or Agencies of the Federal Government to which copies of the report have been sent, including number of copies sent).

(k) "Source File No." (A file number (Case File Number) entered by the Office of Origin of the Investigation Report).

(l) "ONI File No." (This is a special space (not usually filled in) used by the Office of Naval Intelligence Investigations Section in instances where it is desired to assign a general file number to a very extensive or ramified case, or for other special purposes).

(m) "Synopsis" (Brief introductory explanation, in telegraphic style paragraphs, telling what was found by, known to, or discovered by the Operative—**not what he did to obtain it**, and should consist of not over 250–300 words somewhat resembling the opening paragraph of a newspaper story answering briefly the questions Who? When? What? How? Where?).

(Example: "This is a report pertaining to violation of Articles 14 (8) and 8 (20), Articles for Government of Navy, in that John DOE, Seaman, First Class, and Richard ROE, Signal Man Third Class, conspired and actually carried out a part of the conspiracy to steal and divulge the use or nature of a secret article pertaining to the U. S. Navy and the National Defense, to wit: One secret Fire Control Apparatus, known as —, Serial No. —.")

"Subject persons stole this secret device from the Naval Proving Ground at Dahlgren, Virginia, on or about 1 May, 1940, and transported it in subject DOE'S Buick Sedan (1938) Reg. No. Maryland 132-471; subject persons were apprehended in the act of actually

transferring this secret device to Herman HOE, a — espionage agent at the 'Traveler's Hotel' (Room 325) in Baltimore, Maryland, at 1830 at which time all three (3) subjects made statements incriminating each other and identifying the — Government as the principal."

(n) "Comment and Recommendations" (Case Construction—Theories—Observations or observations and recommendations. A **brief statement** of the Operative's **deductions and reconstruction of the investigation** (or case) as based on the contents of the Report, amplified by the information contained in preceding Investigation Reports on the case and on supplementary information obtained from investigative files and indexes. The Operative should not only include his personal comments based on his special and intimate knowledge of the investigation, but should include any pertinent investigative or other suggestions which he may consider especially expedient).

### 31108

The officer ordering the report made, such as the District Intelligence Officer, should sign the completed report at the foot of the first page.

### 31109

The body of the report on the pages following the first or cover page should be typewritten on 8" x 10½" white paper, onion skin paper to be used where necessary to make sufficient copies for proper dissemination. Pages following the cover page should have a file number or title at the top of the page for identification of the material contained therein in case it should become detached from the cover page.

### 31110

The body of the report is a recital of all activities and discoveries by the Investigators assigned to the investigation, from the beginning of the particular phase covered to the conclusion of the period for which the report is rendered, and all essential facts should be presented in a clear and understandable manner, supported by a list of exhibits, viz: An inventory of all documents and all other evidential, substantiative, or informative material with brief statements of their investigative or other significance should be included. Whenever an exhibit is introduced into the body of a report it must be identified with the List of Exhibits by such parenthetical remarks as "See Exhibit A," etc.

### 31111

The body of the report should also include all substantiative information, facts, statements made by informants, informers, and witnesses and their names and addresses, except for those of confidential informants and informers who should be designated by their assigned serial number or other designation as given in the "Sources of Information File."

### 31112

The narrative of the report should contain a list of the names, addresses, occupations, inimical and suspicious activities of suspects,

subjects and other persons involved with brief statements of the nature and apparent investigative significance of their activities.

### 31113

The reporting of the names of persons who **refuse** to make statements or to give information and the circumstances under which the refusal is made has, at times, as important a bearing on the case as though a statement was made.

### 31114

Every Operative should keep a Case Note Book containing a record of his investigation and the facts ascertained and this record should include everything of investigative significance, even though at the time it may seem wholly unimportant.

### 31115

When the Operative has familiarized himself with the requirements for preparing a proper Investigation Report a few notes may be made of statements to avoid, which while common, are highly undesirable to use: to wit;

(a) "I told him who I was," instead of "I told him I was a Naval Intelligence Agent."

(b) "He admitted that"—instead of "John DOE informed me that he owned, etc."

(c) "I made a voluntary search" (On whose part was the search voluntary?) instead of "Upon obtaining the consent of John DOE to conduct the search, he having informed me he was in full charge and authority, I —."

(d) "Acting on information"—This should never be used except to maintain the anonymity of a confidential informant or informer in which case the complete phrase should read, "Acting on information furnished by number 306, that \* \* \* was the fact."

(e) "By means of a pretext \* \* \*." The report may be better evaluated if the pretext is described, thus—"Posing as an insurance collector who was looking for Jerry DOE, a mechanic, the subject person, John DOE, a machinist, was briefly interviewed in the kitchen and hall of the residence \* \* \*."

(f) "A discreet investigation was conducted"—same remarks apply here as to (d) and (e) above.

### 31116

At the end of every Investigation Report where the Operative considers it advisable to institute further investigative action, a special list of "Investigative Leads," together with appropriate notations as to the action desired, should be set out.

### 31117

The first page of the **Summary Report** will be colored pink and printed as shown in Plate (IV). The general form of the report is very similar to that of an Investigation Report except that it has a space on the cover page designated as—"Investigation Reports Included in this Summary:," where an itemized list of the Investigation



Reports summarized together with essential identifying descriptive material is shown. In addition there is no space for a "Synopsis" on the cover page of a Summary Report. Instead, the summarization itself commences on the cover page in the space marked "Summary" and is continued on regular 8" x 10½" white pages, each page being identified by the file number and descriptive title or otherwise to avoid confusion.

### 31118

Summary Reports are complete, chronological summarizations of the "essential" facts contained in the preceding Investigation Reports and should not be confused with the "Synopsis" appearing on the cover page of all "Investigation Reports." Summary Reports are also often desirable where it is advisable to furnish a cooperating agency, et cetera, with a complete itemization of the facts in a case without sending them a full set of Investigation Reports complete with confidential operations detail.

### 31119

Summary Reports are **special reports** inserted in a voluminous Case Jacket or File at appropriate intervals for the benefit of those wishing to review a particular case in considerable detail without having to read every part of each Investigation Report in the file. They are complete chronological histories of the case up to the point of their insertion, but they are **noncumulative**, i. e., they do not reflect the contents of any previous Summary Reports. Case Files should be closed by a final Summary Report (Case Summary) which summarizes the entire case.

### 31120

At the end of a summary the Operative should include a paragraph(s) setting forth in brief his comments and recommendations in a similar manner to the procedure described in Paragraph (31107 (N)) "Comment and Recommendations," followed by a list of the undeveloped leads both "District" and "Out of District" as set forth in Paragraph (31116).

### 31121

It is essential to proper dissemination of information secured that a sufficient number of copies of all Investigation and Summary Reports be made to permit of a proper distribution. The distribution should be clearly indicated on the Reports, and particular attention should be paid to insure that all Naval Districts, Naval Activities, Government Agencies, MID, and FBI receive copies of such reports as are of interest to them.

### 31122

The officer directing the preparation of a Summary Report should sign the completed report on the last page.

## **CHAPTER 1.—REPORTS, INDEXES, AND FILES**

### **SECTION II.—FILING, INDEXING, AND CROSS-INDEXING**

#### **31201**

Naval Intelligence Offices, due to difference in size, location, activities, etc., do not have the same requirements for filing, indexing, and cross-indexing. Therefore, no system is set forth as mandatory.

#### **31202**

It is possible, however, to outline some fundamental requisites common to all Naval Intelligence Offices in the following paragraphs.

#### **31203**

The material to be filed, indexed, and cross-indexed, developed through investigations, usually deals with matters of which the final solution is unknown and contains, in detail, large quantities of inter-related facts or deductions which must be reduced to usable form, quickly available, long before their final significance is revealed.

#### **31204**

This material consists mainly of Investigative Reports, evidential exhibits such as documents, examination statements, photographs of persons and places, and other pertinent miscellaneous data.

#### **31205**

In general, investigative information to be filed includes leads, suspicious circumstances, and identification of suspects or subjects and their activities, and emanate from approximately the following sources:

- (a) The District Intelligence Offices.
- (b) The District Section of the Naval Investigating Service, its field subdivisions, the I-V (S), or other reserve officers.
- (c) Other Naval activities within the District.
- (d) Informers or informants within the District network.
- (e) Naval Inspection Officers and Inspectors.
- (f) Naval Recruiting Offices.
- (g) Other parts of the Naval Establishment.
- (h) Cooperating agencies, FBI, MID, and other Federal organizations.
- (i) State, county, and municipal investigating agencies.
- (j) Official and unofficial cooperating agencies.
- (k) Miscellaneous anonymous communications, complaints and "crank" letters.

#### **31206**

In order to arrange this material in a readily available and usable form the first step is to attach, in convenient manner, in chronological

order as many Investigative Reports on a Subject as have been prepared.

### 31207

The first unit, thus arranged, becomes the beginning of a Case File and the Summary Reports described in Section I of this Chapter are the briefs of the information within the Case File. Case Files are usually filed alphabetically or given a reference number.

### 31208

If the number of Investigative Reports on a given Subject is not sufficient to warrant establishing a Case File such Investigative Reports are usually filed in the same cabinet drawers with Case Files and in the same order.

### 31209

Case Files deal with (a) individuals, their histories, backgrounds, current activities and probable activities (known as Personal Dossiers); (b) activities of groups or organizations and the individuals involved; (c) things of a miscellaneous or general nature which deal with matters that do not pertain specifically either to individuals or groups but to investigative affairs or are of a generally informative, technical or historical nature.

### 31210

The method of filing routine administrative material is described in the Navy Filing Manual.

### 31211

The key to the Case Files is the master index and the cross-indexes.

### 31212

For the purpose of outlining an indexing plan used by one active Naval Intelligence Office the following description is given:

The master index is composed of 3" x 5" cards, alphabetically arranged by surnames, in drawers fitted in the safe on which appears the subject or name, aliases, modus operandi, references to Case Files and/or specific Investigative Reports, identifications, etc., which comprises *all* the recorded information on that subject or person. In a great many cases, the ONI Information Slips (used to expedite the transmission of information between Districts) serve the double purpose of index cards and brief summaries of pertinent data. When more than one slip is received, from the same or different districts about the same SUBJECT, this office staples them all together—the latest slip on top—and files them all together in the alphabetical index.

### 31213

This office also keeps an "Activity Index," with index cards divided according to party, party activity, nationality, and type of subversive activity, broken down by Navy Yards, Commercial Plants, and other subheads, within the District. This index also serves the purpose of

a cross-index, linking the individual SUBJECTS with their fields of Activity.

### 31214

A separate Index is also kept for Organizations, and another for Commercial Firms, regarding which reports are received.

### 31215

In addition to the above, this office maintains a separate SUSPECT file divided into groups—according to nationality or party affiliations. Names of KNOWN DANGEROUS SUSPECTS, to be immediately picked up in the event of a National Emergency, are carded on cards of one color; those of individuals regarding whom more specific information is desired, but who, in the event of a sudden emergency, would also be apprehended for precautionary reasons, are carded on cards of another color. (See confidential directives on this subject.)

### 31216

This office does not, as a rule, index the SUBJECTS of all FBI Investigation Reports received. If the index of this office includes the SUBJECT already, a note is made on the SUBJECT'S card that the office also has an FBI report on him. Otherwise, FBI reports are filed separately, alphabetically by SUBJECT.

### 31217

When this office desires to determine whether it has information on a particular SUBJECT, reference to the Index will show either that the SUBJECT was the matter of an official letter (in which case the card carries the official file number); or that information concerning him is in the office files; or one or more Information Slips will tell the brief story. If no card appears in the Index, this office then refers to the FBI file to determine whether there has been any investigation of SUBJECT conducted by FBI, copy of reports of which have been received.

### 31218

The office described segregates in separate file drawers its cards of certain nationals, the names of which are distinctive and not easily confused with other nationalities. All other cards are filed alphabetically. The Index, therefore, includes all types of persons regarding whom information has been received—good, bad, or indifferent. Only the Activity and Suspect files group or classify the character of the reports.

### 31219

A "Sources of Information File" is an important aid to any investigation office and Naval Intelligence Offices will find that such a file, preferably prepared on 3" x 5" cards, closely following the confidential "Schematic Diagram of the Domestic Intelligence Network" will be of great assistance in its task. This file should be constantly



kept up as new contacts are established and changes occur in contacts already made and should show:

(1) Routine Sources of Information: What the Source may be expected to furnish.

(2) Regular Informants:

Where and how contacted.

What information can he furnish.

What information has he furnished in the past.

Estimate of reliability.

(3) Special Informants:

Where and how must he be contacted.

What information may be gotten from him.

Estimate of usefulness and reliability.

### 31220

Another file that may prove of value is the "Operative's Avocation File" listing the former vocations and connections of Operatives and I-V(S) officers on active duty as well as the present business, professional, social, et cetera, connections of all District I-V(S) officers not on active duty. (See Par. 2209.)

## CHAPTER 2.—CASE ANALYSIS, CASE CONSTRUCTION AND CONTEMPORANEOUS NOTES

### SECTION I.—CASE ANALYSIS

#### 32101

**Case Analysis** is the science or art of **predetermining the principal** and final investigative objective(s). This is the real **purpose** of the investigation and the true **results desired**. It includes the consideration of **intermediate** investigative steps and their relationship to the solution of the case. It also includes the **perception of the significance** and **evaluation of intermediate** or **contributory** investigative **objectives**, which are determined to be essential to the comprehensive and effective solution of the case. All of the **intermediate** investigative **steps** and **objectives** must be of such a nature, and arranged in such an order, that the final, positive, and substantiated solution of the case will be accomplished with the minimum amount of investigative activity. Nothing should be undertaken which does not either directly or indirectly contribute to the solution of the case, or further the general investigative efficiency of the Service. Case Analysis is the **contemporaneous** and **continuous estimate of the investigative situation** upon which the plan of operation is based. It should take into consideration both economy of force and a clear definition of the principal objective.

#### 32102

Case Analysis is the staff work which the Operative and the investigative executive employ in planning operations, executing specific investigative tasks, and evaluating the situation or significant factors. It is an **indivisible combination of mental processes**, including reasoning, experience, technical knowledge, foresight, imagination, observation, and mental application, and **practical physical activities**. It involves orderly planned thinking, logical reasoning, induction, deduction, analysis, and correct and timely activity.

#### 32103

It involves the proper handling of clues, investigative leads, facts, investigative methods and techniques, and the correlation of all of these matters and activities into a properly controlled and effectively executed operation designed to comprehensively **cover some definite situation** or **attain some specific objective**.

#### 32104

Operatives should school their thoughts into appropriate and proper channels, while at the same time coordinating their activities in order that they be directed into the proper field of action. **Thought** and **action** are so intertwined in these matters that it is sometimes necessary to speak of both at the same time or to imply one while speaking of the other.

## 32105

Attention must be paid to each individual step of mental or physical activity and considerable reflection and analysis of certain statements will be necessary in order to properly perceive and correlate all of the implications.

## 32106

The various steps necessary in applying a **clue** to the processes of a **substantiated case solution**, or some intermediate part thereof, will first be discussed:

(1) **Clues** are **suggestive indications** which point to investigative leads.

(2) **Investigative leads** are matters, facts, or information which if pertinent and if properly traced out or developed **lead towards the truth** in connection with an event, circumstance, fact, or person. Investigative leads are pointers, trails, or significant circumstances indicating specific and concrete courses of investigative activity. If they are pertinent, these leads should bring the Operative to some **intermediate investigative objective** (a substantiable fact or facts of practical significance to the case). Many investigative leads are not pertinent and the Operative must, therefore, determine their significance. It is often impossible to do this without running them down to their substantiated significance. This is the reason why certain cases are difficult to solve and slow in progress.

(3) **Intermediate Investigative Objectives** (substantiated facts) must be completely elucidated, evaluated, correlated, and assembled in their proper relationships. If they are of significance to the case, their evaluation and correlation will result in the perception of some **primary objective** (some substantiable part of the case solution).

(4) When these processes have been applied to all matters which can be ascertained about the case and no further unconsidered matter is obtainable, the case has been investigated as fully and thoroughly as is possible and nothing further can be accomplished by additional investigations unless new material is presented. This is the terminal condition, i. e., the case is either solved or remains unsolvable at this moment.

## 32107

One of the common mistakes made in conducting investigations is that the investigator(s) may **lose sight of the principal objective** (specific case solution) at some point in his operations, and that he may have **been led into extraneous matters** and activities which have **no significance** insofar as his true objective and task is concerned. Sometimes such extraneous matters may be of the greatest importance to some other case, or of other interest to the Navy. Again the matter may form the basis of an entirely separate case or investigation of equal importance with his original assignment. It is the Operative's duty to **concentrate upon the solution of the particular case assigned** to him, but it is also his duty to be on the alert to safeguard the general interests of the Navy and the National Defense. He must, therefore, note such extraneous matters which come to his attention and report them promptly to proper authority. If absolutely neces-

sary, to prevent serious activities actually in progress, he may take appropriate overt action on the spot, but unless otherwise directed the Operative's interest in these matters should be terminated at this time.

## 32108

The following example of the **Investigative Chain** of correlated activity and case construction is given, in simplified form to illustrate the theory of investigative logic and continuity.

Example: If the Operative follows the investigative chain of:

- (1) **Clues** which indicate **investigative leads**, and these
- (2) **investigative leads** are followed up to the point where they clearly **establish a fact** or **facts**, and these
- (3) **facts** are properly substantiated and correlated; then the Operative has **determined some circumstance, demonstrated some fact or established the actuality of some activity**. But he has yet to **determine what the investigative significance**, if any, may be **in connection with the final solution** of the **specific case** to which he is assigned.

## 32109

Case Analysis is this process of completing step by step the investigative chain, analyzing and testing each link, eliminating the inapplicable and discarding the nonessential or redundant, and selecting and retaining all the **essential** information, evidence, and substantiating facts necessary for final and positive solution of the case.

Example: An Operative is investigating a case and uncovers a clue. He must now determine what this clue suggests or to what investigative lead it points. He should then attempt a preliminary evaluation to determine if **any part** of this indicates or suggests possibility of being utilized in the case, i. e., does it appear as though the investigation (following up) of this lead could possibly bring him to the establishment of any **fact** which would be pertinent to any intermediary or final objective of his case, or which might otherwise **assist in the final solution**. In many instances the evaluation of such leads is impossible by mere observation and consideration, and in order to determine their investigative significance in relation to the current case a partial or complete investigation of the lead may be necessary. Such activities are often necessary even though significant results are not obtained as they form an **important part of the elimination process**.

## 32110

Operatives are **particularly cautioned** not to overlook or fail to completely investigate all leads which can in any manner be connected or associated with the solution of a case.

## 32111

If the results of the investigation of such a lead indicate that a solution of any pertinent point is unlikely to be reached through this channel, then the **basic clue** or **clues** which pointed towards the lead should be carefully **reconsidered from other angles** in an attempt to discover whether they contain indications of more pertinent and



promising significance. If no further pertinent indications are forthcoming **such clues** should be carefully preserved (if practical) and recorded for **later consideration** in the light of possible future knowledge, and other clues should be taken up for immediate study and investigation. **Many clues**, investigative leads, substantiated facts, etc., will in actual cases be **indissolubly joined** and intermixed in such a manner that the **processes** of general **case analysis** and **investigation** of numerous matters will have to be **undertaken concurrently**. It will be very unusual to find any such simple clue-lead-fact-solution circumstances as have been described in the foregoing discussion.

(1) Clues which indicate investigative leads, and these  
(2) Investigative leads are followed up to the point where they  
clearly establish a fact or facts, and these  
(3) Facts are properly substantiated and correlated; then the Oper-  
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tive lead it points. He should then attempt a preliminary evaluation  
to determine if any part of this indicates or suggests possibility of being  
utilized in the case. If, yes, it appears as though the investigation  
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ment of any fact which would be pertinent to any intermediate or final  
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discover whether they contain indications of more pertinent and

## SECTION II.—CASE CONSTRUCTION

### 32201

During the course of the investigation, as pertinent facts and substantiating material are collected and assembled, there is a **natural and proper inclination** to attempt to **arrange and join these matters together** to form a coherent "picture of the case," which will naturally contain and logically account for all of the facts and circumstances discovered up to the particular moment. At the same time an attempt is made to so adjust the details of these facts that they will **seem consistent** with **what is known** and with the **theory of the case**. This process is known as **Case Construction**. Imaginative Case Construction is often very valuable **as long as it is not permitted to distort or mar any substantiated fact, piece of evidence, etc.** It is, in fact, the **only method** (exclusive of pure fortuitous circumstance or chance) by which the **products of investigation** (substantiated facts and evidence) can be put together and **integrated into a logical and consistent whole**.

### 32202

Case Construction, or more technically the **reconstruction** of the act(s) and activity(ies), personal relationships, etc., involved in the case, is of **material assistance** to the Operative. By this he can determine with reasonable accuracy the movements of the subject(s) and the course(s) followed by him (them) in the perpetration of some inimical act or conspiracy.

### 23203

In **reconstructing the activity** the Operative will have little success if he attempts to place himself in the position of the subject(s) and then assumes that the subject(s) have acted as he would act. The question is **how did the subject(s) act, not how would the Operative or some one else have acted**. If the Operative is acquainted with the character of the subject or suspect, he may then be able to reconstruct with reasonable accuracy what the subject's actions might have been, particularly if the Operative has **studied and developed himself in investigative psychology**.

### 23204

In tracing the probable course and conduct of a subject, or of some inimical act or other matter of interest, a subject's apparent movements and actions must **not be rejected merely because they seem foolish** or unreasonable. The Operative must be mindful that:

(1) The subject may have **good and sufficient reasons** which are **unknown to the Operative**.

(2) The subject may have been **compelled** to adopt the course of

action because of **definite instructions** from his superiors or because he is under some **misapprehension**.

(3) The subject may have conducted himself in the questioned manner through **stupidity, inattention, or carelessness**.

(4) The subject may have been **irresistibly impelled** to the course of action through some **overpowering desire, controlling passion, psychic disturbance**, irresistible temptation, etc.

### 32205

In reconstructing an activity, the Operative **must not adopt mere probability**, but an effort should be made to **truly reconstruct the activity as it actually occurred on a basis of substantiated fact**. In this reconstruction he should **not assume as a fact** any thing which **cannot be proved** or at least strongly substantiated, nor should he **assume that a fact does not exist** unless the **proof** of its **absence** is conclusively demonstrated.

### 32206

Case Construction and reconstruction are particularly valuable in evaluating and analyzing the statements of subjects, suspects, informants, informers, and witnesses, etc. Do subject's statements indicate that they acted **consistently with the facts** as they were at the time; what **must** have been their **conduct** under certain conditions (which case construction shows existed); if the conduct of an individual was peculiar or exceptional, what caused him to act in such a manner (his actions may indicate faulty case construction).

### 32207

These **vital questions are all involved** in the subject of **investigative psychology** and, in order to become an efficient investigator, **Operatives must master this subject**. This may be done through earnest application to academic study, practical observations, and field work.

### 32208

Until we have proof of what has occurred, our **conception** of the case is **mostly a matter of theory**, but while intelligent theorizing is valuable and may be developed as long as it **is consistent with the proved facts and substantiated evidence**, it is still only a **theory** and must be abandoned as soon as proof **demonstrates the probability of its inconsistency** with the facts.

### 32209

The ability to judge a situation and appreciate when theory should be abandoned or radically modified, is a valuable asset to the Operative; its exercise depends largely upon the analytical qualities of the mind, ability to rapidly readjust the viewpoint, willingness to submerge personal opinions and to concede that all theories are merely suppositions and may not be well founded.

32210

In the matter of **case construction**, **case analysis** also plays an **important part**. It is the balance-wheel or governor which **checks the investigation when it tends to degenerate into an exploratory search**. It prevents the **mere discovery of facts** from becoming the **principal objective**. If case analysis is not utilized, the only legitimate reason for the inauguration of an investigation (the solution of a specific case or problem) will sometimes be pushed into the background in favor of the continuance of objectless investigation.

32211

When such tendencies appear and the Operative's **absorption** in the **search for information**, and the unravelling of **interesting matters** of an irrelevant or redundant nature, commences to **becloud the issue**, then case analysis must be brought into play. This serves to **check** and **redirect** the investigation into **pertinent channels** related to the task in hand, and leading as directly as circumstances will permit toward the principal objective of a satisfactory solution of the case.

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These vital questions are all involved in the subject of investigative psychology and, in order to become an efficient investigator, Operatives must master this subject. This may be done through earnest application to academic study, practical observation, and field work.

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The ability to judge a situation and appreciate when theory should be abandoned or radically modified, is a valuable asset to the Operative; its exercise depends largely upon the analytical qualities of the mind, ability to rapidly re-adjust the viewpoint, willingness to submerge personal opinions and to concede that all theories are merely suppositions and may not be well founded.



### SECTION III.—CONTEMPORANEOUS MEMORANDA

#### 32301

One of the best methods of insuring an Operative's **control of his case** and of his concentration on the effective application of the principles of case analysis and case construction to the subject, **is the keeping of comprehensive, contemporaneous notes and memoranda in a Case Notebook.**

#### 32302

**Contemporaneous notes and memoranda.** The mere observing and recording of evidence as it would be done by the average citizen **will not meet the standards** required of Operatives in connection with accurate investigative work which they are required to perform. In modern investigative practice the necessity for the highest degree of accuracy and attention to the most minute details cannot be overlooked. For example, it will no longer suffice to merely find a special compact copying camera, pair of socks impregnated with sympathetic ink, pistol, exploded cartridge or briefcase radio transmitter at the scene of some espionage activity. In addition the **exact position of each object** and the distances between the various objects, as well as their exact relative position and condition, etc., must be fixed, accurately measured and **a record kept.** Any one of a **hundred exact facts** may become **vital**, and ambiguity or indefiniteness may largely **destroy** the **effect** of what would otherwise be **an important circumstance.**

#### 32303

There is never any danger of securing too much accurate and detailed information, while on the other hand the **absence of proof**, which **diligence could have secured**, is the **greatest cause of faulty** case construction. This is the result of **incomplete case analysis** which is in turn the product of **incomplete collection** and **careless recording** of important clues and information.

#### 32304

The **investigation of matters of importance to the Navy and relating to the National Defense should not degenerate** into a guessing match participated in by Operatives, informants, informers, and the executives of the Service alike; but should be an accurate, comprehensive, and scientific investigation of all pertinent and possibly related matters. Too much emphasis cannot be placed upon the importance of observing everything which can be observed, not merely in a general way, but with regard to the minutest details. The **more facts recorded** in the Operative's **contemporaneous** memoranda, the more useful his Investigation Reports and Summaries will be. The more accurate and comprehensive these reports are, the greater the accuracy of his case analysis and construction. The more accurate his case

construction, the more nearly his investigations will come to the true solution of the case. The **absence of substantiated facts** (properly evaluated and correlated) which would shed light on the true state of affairs, **deprives the Operative** and his **investigative superiors** of **information** which would be of assistance in **correctly evaluating** the investigation. This may result in the **drawing** of inferences **which are not justified by the actual facts** and thus **creating inaccurate or even entirely false information**.

## 32305

It is often the case that Operatives **end their investigations** when they have secured sufficient substantiation to convince themselves. In doing this they overlook the fact that much of what they accept as proof is not sufficiently convincing in character to convince skeptical investigative executives and particularly officers at a distance who receive the information in the form of a cold report without any of the side lights or background which the Operative might personally have in his possession. Operatives must realize that their profession is highly technical and that the average Naval officer does not possess this special **knowledge** and **outlook** regarding the **methods and technique** of espionage, sabotage, and other inimical activities. A given description of the **conduct** of a suspect and his **movements** may not raise even a suspicion of improper activity in the mind of the ordinary officer, but to the **mind** of the **trained** and **experienced** Operative it would **present a typical and highly significant picture** of the operations of an inimical agent with an undercover purpose. This is but an illustration of the difference of the effect of **the evidence of discreet activities** upon the perception of the **trained specialist** and upon the **general officer personnel**, a difference which must be **overcome by proof** so detailed and convincing that the uninitiated officer may understand the significance of the evidence and realize the true implications to be drawn.

## 32306

Since the ultimate purpose of investigation is to obtain thoroughly substantiated information or prove some group of circumstances, the Operative should remember that when he reports either in writing or verbally, he will have to rely upon his memory or some aid to memory or both. A good memory depends upon natural ability, acquired ability and practice, training and effort. **To remember a thing** we must **pay attention** and **observe** so that a **mental impression** is made, and to this we must add the ability to **recall the fact** in question and **to recognize it** as the **original impression**. It is a recognized fact that with a lapse of time and other matters occupying an Operative's attention that those relying solely upon their memory will be **uncertain** and **indefinite** in their facts. While even the **best memories will fail** at times there is no excuse for an Operative finding himself in such a position. Available **facts** and **substantiating evidence** are **scarce** enough in the average case without losing them by relying upon a doubtful memory. **The Operative who would do good work must keep a contemporaneous notebook record of his investigation and the facts obtained.**

## 32307

Full, complete, and detailed notes should be made of every step in the investigation and of every fact ascertained. The Operative should not stop when he has recorded every fact which he considers of importance, but should include **everything of investigative significance**, even though at the time it may seem of little importance. No person can predict whether or not **any fact** is important. Not only the fact but **each significant detail** in relation to the fact should be recorded. So important is the keeping of a complete detailed record that on all lengthy and important investigations **one Operative** (a person who writes shorthand if available) should be detailed to **keep a consolidated Case Notebook**. If two or more Operatives are working in close collaboration on a case it will be sufficient if one of them keeps the Case Notebook, as far as the facts **ascertained by them in common** are concerned, supplemented by the addition of the collated contemporaneous memoranda of all. In this case the notes in the Case Notebook should be **read over and initialed by each Operative after being verified**. In some instances, as where **inadvertent statements** and conversations held with subjects and suspects or informers, etc., and **carried out under cover of some pretext are to be recorded**, it is **not always possible to make immediate notes** of the interview, but whenever it is practicable that course should be followed out. In such cases, immediate notes covering the interview or activity should be made.

## 32308

In connection with the identifying of evidential objects, a record of the marks used should be entered in the Case Notebook.

## 32309

Since the ultimate purpose of investigation is to obtain thoroughly substantiated information or prove some group of circumstances, the Operative should remember that when he reports either in writing or verbally, he will have to rely upon his memory or some aid to memory or both. A good memory depends upon natural ability, acquired ability and practice, training and effort. To remember a thing we must pay attention and observe so that a mental impression is made, and to this we must add the ability to recall the fact in question and to recognize it as the original impression. It is a recognized fact that with a lapse of time and other matters occupying an Operative's attention that those relying solely upon their memory will be inaccurate and unreliable in their facts. While even the best memories will fail at times there is no excuse for an Operative finding himself in such a position. Available facts and substantiating evidence are secure enough in the average case without losing them by relying upon a doubtful memory. The Operative who would do good work must keep a contemporaneous notebook record of his investigation and the facts obtained.

**United States Naval Intelligence Service**

**INVESTIGATION REPORT**

*(Cover Page)*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT:

Report made at: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

Report made by: \_\_\_\_\_

Period covered: \_\_\_\_\_ Status of Case: \_\_\_\_\_

Origin of Case: \_\_\_\_\_

Character of Investigation: \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures: \_\_\_\_\_ Copy to: \_\_\_\_\_

Source File No.: \_\_\_\_\_ ONI File No.: \_\_\_\_\_

SYNOPSIS:

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

PLATE III.



**United States Naval Intelligence Service**

**SUMMARY REPORT**

*(Cover Page)*

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SUBJECT:

Report made at: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ 19

Report made by: \_\_\_\_\_

Status of Case: \_\_\_\_\_

Origin of Case: \_\_\_\_\_

Investigation Reports included in this Summary: \_\_\_\_\_

Enclosures: \_\_\_\_\_ Copy to: \_\_\_\_\_

Source File No.: \_\_\_\_\_ ONI File No.: \_\_\_\_\_

SUMMARY:

PLATE IV.

## APPENDIX A.—BIBLIOGRAPHY

In introducing such a broad subject as Investigation for Intelligence Agents, this manual can be little more than a signpost, indicating the direction to be followed by the serious student. It is hoped that further assistance will be found in the following bibliography, which includes authoritative works on this and numerous related subjects. Operatives hoping to qualify as experts or special technicians in the various branches will realize, however, that skill may not be achieved by reading or study alone. It is equally necessary to devote time and effort to the practical application of knowledge thus gained.

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## **APPENDIX B.—FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION REPRINTS**

The following pamphlets and reprints of law enforcement bulletins, covering technical subjects, are available for distribution by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For technical information these pamphlets should be consulted as the subjects contained therein are not covered by this manual. Additional articles and reprints will be published and issued from time to time by that Bureau. Requests for the use of these pamphlets should be submitted to the proper Naval District Intelligence Officer.

Action of Charred Paper on the Photographic Plate and a Method of Deciphering Charred Records.

Analysis and Identification by the Spectrographic Method.

Applied Physics in the Field of Scientific Crime Detection.

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Ciphers.

Collection of Specimens.

Criminal Identification With Relation to Plastic Surgery.

Dactyloscopic Identification of Cadavers.

Determination of Alcoholic Intoxication During Life by Spinal Fluid Analysis.

Development, Accuracy, and Admissibility of Fingerprinting Evidence.

The Diphenylamine Test for Gunpowder.

Disposal by Police of Explosives.

The Evidence of Fractured Glass in Criminal Investigations.

The Examination of Anonymous Letters—Importance of Scientific Analysis as an Aid to Identification.

Examination of Metals.

Explosives.

Fraudulent Checks.

Fingerprinting Deceased Persons.

Firearms Evidence at the Scene of Crime.

Forensic Firearms Identification.

Glass Fractures.

Identification Aided by Blood Comparison.

Improving the Technique and Methods of Criminal Photography.

The Iodine-Silver Transfer Method for Recording Latent Fingerprints.

Medico-Legal Aspects of Alcoholism.



Review—The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication.  
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 Method of Photographing Watermarks.  
 A Method for Studying the Scale Structure of Medullated and Pigmented Animal Fibers.  
 A Method for Tracing Stolen Gasoline.  
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 A Preliminary Test for Blood Stains.  
 Quantum of Evidence Necessary in Latent Fingerprint Cases.  
 The Relation of Alcohol to Road Accidents.  
 The Reproduction of Original Evidence in the Third Dimension.  
 Restoration of Faded Writing.  
 Restoration of Numbers.  
 Seasonal Effects of Humidity in the Chemical Development of Latent Fingerprints.  
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 Scientific Evidence.  
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 A Simple Method for Determination of Ethyl Alcohol in Blood.  
 Sympathetic Inks.  
 The Taking of Casts in the Snow.  
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 Tire Tracks—FBI Reference Collection.  
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 Thorough Preparedness and Successful Prosecutions.  
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 Unidentified Deceased's Fingerprints.  
 The Use of Ultra-Violet Light in the Examination of Evidence.  
 The Value of a Complete and an Exact Post-Mortem Examination in the Solution of Crime.  
 Bibliography of Crime and Kindred Subjects.  
 The Chemical Development of Latent Fingerprints on Paper.  
 Development and Admissibility of Ballistics and Firearms Evidence.  
 Physical Science in the Crime Detection Laboratory.  
 Scientific Methods of Crime Detection in the Judicial Process.  
 Testimony Concerning Introduction of Latent Fingerprint Evidence.

**APPENDIX C.—DELIMITATION OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, G-2, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN THE FIELDS OF ESPIONAGE, COUNTER-ESPIONAGE, AND SABOTAGE AS OUTLINED IN THE JOINT AGREEMENT OF JUNE 5, 1940**

**I. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

1. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in these categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine Islands.

2. FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—

(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.

(b) Developments affecting vital utilities.

(c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation or communication systems.

(d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

3. FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

4. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War, or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances.

5. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength, and organization of all civilian groups designed to combat "Fifth Column" activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

**II. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION**

1. MID will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishment, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and the Philippine Islands.

2. MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.