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NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATING DIRECTIVE

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Date: *21 SEPT 98* **Unit:** *NL 22*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

APRIL 1948

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ORGANIZATION OF THE SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE,
COUNTER-SUBVERSION SECTION
OP-32D4

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SECTION 1

GENERAL FUNCTIONS

1101

As part of the Domestic Branch to evaluate information of naval interest collected from all available sources pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage and subversion and to disseminate intelligence derived therefrom to appropriate naval authority to enable such authority to plan and execute effective counter and protective measures.

MISSION

1102

1. To advise proper naval authority, before the act, of plans, methods, and the means available for espionage, sabotage and counter-espionage directed against the Naval Establishment and its mission.
2. To advise proper naval authority of situations, trends, and propaganda which threaten the security of the Naval Establishment when such threats stem from actual or potential subversive activity.
3. To maintain in current form suspect files of civilian and service personnel of the Naval Establishment suspected of espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage or subversion, and of individuals and organizations suspected of directing their interests toward the Navy for purposes of espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage and subversion.
4. To maintain reference and background material in such form that the section will be in a position to evaluate, for the benefit of the Navy and for other authorized agencies of the government, information concerned with the Navy pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage and subversion.
5. To coordinate within the Office of Naval Intelligence all activities pertaining to espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage and subversion threatening the Naval Establishment.
6. To collaborate with Op-32Y and appropriate F Branch units.
7. To maintain working liaison with other appropriate government agencies.

OBJECTIVES

1103

The scope of the Section's general functions is world-wide and without geographic limitations in regard to the collection of information within the Section's mission. The scope of the general functions concerned with the dissemination of intelligence produced is primarily limited to the Naval Establishment, both at home and abroad, and secondarily to other government agencies or, with permission of competent authority, to agencies of friendly governments. The scope of the Section's general functions includes briefing the Chief of Naval Intelligence on world-wide subversive trends of naval interest.

SCOPE

1104

A summary of the principal tasks of the Section, based on the statement of objectives, is as follows:

TASKS

1. Maintenance of suspect files of naval personnel and civilian personnel employed by the Navy.
2. Maintenance of files containing selected reference and background material

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- on subversive organizations and subversive trends of naval interest.
3. To advise proper naval authority of plans, methods and capabilities of subversive groups and subversive situations, trends and propaganda directed against and threatening the security of the Naval Establishment.
4. Collaboration with Op-32Y and Op-32F and other branches and sections of ONI.
5. Coordination with ONI of all activities pertaining to espionage, counter-espionage, sabotage and subversion threatening the Naval Establishment.
6. Effective liaison with other government agencies.

1105

NATURE OF
SEC SECTION

The functions of the Section are headquarters staff functions concerned with correlating information from all sources and developing intelligence to be utilized for preventive and protective purposes by responsible naval authority in countering espionage, sabotage and subversive activities.

1106

DEFINITIONS

1. Counterintelligence--Disclosing the plans, procedures and personalities engaged in espionage, sabotage and subversion directed against the Navy.
2. Naval Interest--It is very difficult to formulate a definition of Naval Interest which will cover all situations other than that implied by the words themselves. Good common sense must govern any decision as to whether a subject should be pursued or not. In addition, sound judgment must be used to determine the immediacy of the subject or situation in relation to the Navy's mission in order that the effectiveness of the SEC Section activities be not dissipated on problems which can safely be postponed for future attention. At the same time, since the Navy's mission involves primarily the protection of the United States, the immediacy of the subject or situation should be carefully determined before being abandoned as of no Naval Interest. When doubt arises as to the existence of Naval Interest in a topic, the question should be referred to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

In the normal course of business, Naval Intelligence may receive information concerning activities not of direct Naval Interest, or which may be of prime interest to some other federal agency. In such cases, the information must be promptly transmitted to the agency having prime interest, responsibility and jurisdiction and to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

3. Subversion--Subversion may be defined as the over-throw, wholly or in part, of U. S. government authority by the program of any foreign or domestic person, group or movement through adversely influencing military or civilian personnel in government service and causing or tending to cause the destruction or impairment of the morale, primary loyalty and confidence of such personnel. Naturally, the SEC Section is primarily concerned with discovering and reporting instances of the subversion of naval personnel in terms of the broad definition given above. Subversion is a device utilized against personnel and is designed to impair or destroy morale and the effectiveness of personnel, principally by causing a loss of confidence and faith in authority. Subversion implies mental and psychological damage or destruction of personnel as distinguished from physical damage or destruction of personnel, ships and material.

4. Propaganda--Propaganda in its many and varied forms is the principal method of attack on personnel for the purpose of creating subversion. The SEC Section interest and responsibility pertaining to propaganda is restricted to this phase--the impact and

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effect upon naval personnel, or personnel under naval control.

1107

1. Naval Intelligence is not an action agency in that its responsibility is discharged when it has collected information, processed it by evaluation and disseminated it to appropriate administrative authority.

DELIMITATIONS

2. Requests "for information" or "for information available" are not to be construed as justifying or authorizing formal investigation. Such requests when within the scope of the Section's mission are to be construed as requiring only a canvass of other naval intelligence units and other intelligence agencies or competent sources of information with whom authorized liaison or cooperation exists.

3. The SEC Section is not an investigative unit. In the analysis and evaluation of information the Section may discover the need for an investigation to develop additional information. In such cases, the request for a domestic investigation must be made to the Investigation Section, which unit has the responsibility of determining whether to undertake the investigation itself, to cooperate with or to turn over to the investigative unit of some other appropriate intelligence agency the problem in toto. In forwarding the request, the SEC Section must advise the Investigation Section of the specific points desired to be investigated and such information as will enable the Investigation Section to recognize and develop unexpected leads to collateral information which will be of value to the SEC Section in evaluation.

4. Misconduct of naval personnel or fraud against the Navy does not come within the scope of the SEC Section mission except in so far as such cases also involve espionage, counter-espionage, subversion or sabotage. Any information received or developed by the Section indicating misconduct or fraud must be passed promptly to the naval agency having cognizance and responsibility. When naval personnel is involved, the procedure outlined in the confidential letter of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations dated 4 June 1943, Serial No. 01473416 shall be followed if fraud is suspected.

1108

1. All information pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage and subversion threatening the Naval Establishment originating in or received by Naval Intelligence is transmitted to the SEC Section for evaluation and dissemination. In addition, the Section maintains direct liaison or contact with other sources of information in the Federal Government.

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION

2. The SEC Section does not passively wait for needed information to be uncovered, but actively seeks it through requests to the appropriate units of Naval Intelligence and the cooperating agencies. Analysis of information during the evaluation process frequently reveals a lack of information which would be germane to the subject. It is the responsibility of the SEC Section to determine the advisability of endeavoring to obtain the missing information through the activities of the appropriate unit which might furnish the needed information.

3. Experience has shown that counterintelligence information of substantial value is obtained from reports dealing primarily with positive intelligence. This does not mean that the SEC Section does or should review all material coming into the Office of Naval Intelligence. As in the case of Naval Interest, good common sense and judgment must be used, along with indoctrination of personnel handling intelligence so that counterintelligence value may be recognized and material containing counterintelligence information may be sent to the SEC Section.

4. One of the important functions of the SEC Section is to know what sources are

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likely to have information of value to the Section so that time can be saved by going directly to the proper source. The Section increases its usefulness and effectiveness by knowing where material is quickly available and avoiding a duplication of files and material maintained by other agencies. This has proven effective when requests for unexpected types of counterintelligence data have been made.

5. Collection of information includes having such general background information as is required for evaluation, readily available, although the background data may not be disseminated. This includes the obligation of each SEC Section officer to increase his store of background data by individual study.

1109

EVALUATION
OF INFORMATION

1. The secondary function of Naval Intelligence is the processing of information. The primary element of processing is evaluation. Through the work of evaluation, information is converted into intelligence on which cognizant administrative authority may take such action as he deems appropriate.

All information must be evaluated as to:

- (a) The degree of truthfulness
- (b) The degree of accuracy
- (c) The degree of possibility and probability
- (d) Relationship with known facts and information
- (e) Significance
- (f) Source

All sources of information must be evaluated as to:

- (a) Motive in passing on information
- (b) Capacity to report accurately
- (c) Capacity to recognize correctly significance of things seen or learned
- (d) Ability to gain the information
- (e) Credibility

2. Information is evaluated by SEC Section officers in terms of known fact. Thus, generally accepted patterns of foreign or hostile activity assist in determining whether new reports are true as does the reliability of the source. There are two essential requisites of intelligence evaluation; (a) alertness to the subtleties of fluctuating enemy activity patterns and, (b) an ingenious interpretation of the implications arising out of new data. The process of evaluation is designed essentially to produce an understanding of the organization, complement, activities and future plans of the enemy.

3. Evaluation requires an analytical mind. Care must be exercised in analysis of a situation to avoid accepting too quickly the first reasonable explanation as revealed by the known facts.

4. When information reveals a situation or condition of possible immediate danger to the Naval Establishment and time does not permit thorough and complete evaluation, appropriate naval authority should be informed and advised that evaluation is impossible.

5. Analysis is an essential factor in evaluation. In addition to analyzing the items of information in relation to each other, and the accepted patterns, the body of information should be analyzed for sufficiency. In this manner, the existence of missing information

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mation which may be made available through inquiry or investigation is revealed.

6. It must always be borne in mind that evaluation must be made on the basis of information at hand, often despite the fact that the existence of additional information not yet received may be known. In such cases, great care must be taken not to do an injustice to an individual or organization by the evaluation of incomplete information, but when there is doubt, that doubt must be resolved in such manner as to afford the greatest protection to the Navy and the United States.

7. In counterintelligence work, it is not necessary that sufficient evidence exist, or that it be of such character as to withstand the legal scrutiny of court proceedings before making an evaluation indicating that a dangerous or possibly dangerous situation exists. When the evidence is of such extent and character, the matter should be placed in the hands of appropriate naval authority for action.

8. The SEC Section is in a position and has the responsibility to determine whether a situation or activity indicates a possible danger to the Naval Establishment. The Section will not determine the relative danger, that being the responsibility of the cognizant naval agency. The Section's mission has been fulfilled when the intelligence has been disseminated to the appropriate naval authority.

9. In addition to summarizing information of activities indicating a dangerous or probably dangerous situation, the Section has an obligation to make such statement of evaluation as required to advise the appropriate naval authority of the significance of items included in the report.

1110

1. Dissemination of intelligence necessary to naval commanders or naval authority in making decisions and plans for the safety and protection of their activities is one of the major functions of the SEC Section.

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

2. Only in extraordinary circumstances, where the character of the information clearly indicates a need for such speed in dissemination as to preclude evaluation, will unevaluated information be disseminated. In such cases, the addressee must be informed that it has not been possible to evaluate the information. As soon thereafter as evaluation can be made, the addressee receiving the unevaluated data should be informed of the conclusions reached.

3. Primary responsibility for dissemination is to the appropriate bureaus and offices of the Navy Department and the Naval Establishment, ashore and afloat.

4. Dissemination is made to other federal agencies when circumstances are such as to indicate their direct and proper interest in the matter.

5. In disseminating intelligence to naval authority outside Naval Intelligence such general background information should be given as is required to enable the addressee to understand and appreciate the significance of the situation covered in the dissemination. It has been found advisable to prepare lengthy and complicated material in two parts, one a statement of information, and, two, the evaluation of the material including its significance.

SECTION 2

OFFICES

1201

The Chain of Command down to the Head of the SEC Section is represented by the following diagram:

CHAIN OF COMMAND

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Chief of Naval Intelligence
Op-32

Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence
Op-32B

Assistant Chief of Naval Intelligence
Op-32D

Head, S.E.C. Section
Op-32D4

1202

LOCATION The SEC Section is located in the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

1203

ORGANIZATION Diagrams No. 1 and 2 show the organization of the Section from September 1942 to August 1944. Diagram No. 3 shows the organization from August 1944 until the end of World War II. These diagrams are found in Appendix A.

1204

ASSISTANTS AND SUBDIVISIONS The principal assistants and subdivisions needed on a war basis are indicated on Diagrams No. 4 and 5. Their specific duties would be determined by the nature of the emergency which caused the Section to be placed on a war basis. The title of the subdivisions give an indication of what these duties might be.

1205

WATCH OFFICERS The Section's system of Watch Officers is integrated with the system of Watch Officers for the Branch and is determined by Branch directives.

1206

COMBINATION OF DUTIES The policy of the Section has been and will continue to be that every officer-in-charge of a subdivision be conversant with the mission and procedure of every other subdivision. Each officer in a subdivision is expected to understand the duties of every other officer in his subdivision and also thoroughly understand the policies and administrative procedures of the officer-in-charge of his subdivision. Further, all officers-in-charge of subdivisions are continuously indoctrinated in the policies and administrative procedures of the Section Head. All officers, therefore, are potentially assigned to a combination of duties. Additional duty in connection with special liaison activities and membership on committees will be assigned to officers as the need arises.

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SECTION 3

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF SECTION, UNITS, DESKS AND THEIR DUTIES

1301

Diagram No. 4 shows the Section organization at the present time. Diagram No. 5 shows the flow of matter into and out of the Section.

1302

The principal duties of the Section are listed in Article 1104. (See Chapter III for detailed description.) **DUTIES**

SECTION 4

THE SEC SECTION HEAD

1401

The principal functions of the SEC Section Head are as follows:

FUNCTIONS

1. Formulation of Section policy and plans, based on Branch and ONI directives, for headquarters and the field.
2. Organization of the Section in accordance with Section policy and plans to insure efficient operation at headquarters and to provide a suggested model for SEC Section organization in the field.
3. Preparation of inspection questionnaires for inspections by Branch Head of DIO's and analysis of replies to the questionnaires.
4. Supervision of all Section liaison activities at headquarters.
5. Direction of Section personnel at headquarters in fulfilling the Section Mission and Objectives.
6. Performance of special duties assigned by Branch Head.
7. ONI liaison with Navy Division (JAG), War Crimes Office.
8. ONI liaison with the Administrative Assistant to the President for information relative to minority groups.

1402

The principal responsibilities of the Section Head are as follows:

RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Security clearance of all Section personnel at headquarters.
2. Checking and approval of all intelligence disseminated by the Section from headquarters.
3. Setting up measures for safeguarding the security of the Section at headquarters.
4. Indoctrination and Training Section personnel.

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SECTION 5

RELATIONS BETWEEN SEC SECTIONS
AT HEADQUARTERS AND IN THE
NAVAL DISTRICTS

1501

The SEC Section in the Naval Districts will be organized and will operate, as near-ly as possible, in the same manner as the SEC Section at headquarters.

1502

COMMUNI-
CATIONS

Communications from SEC Section at Headquarters to the Naval Districts:

1. Directives relating to the Section Mission and Objectives.
2. Letters forwarding information and containing requests for information or action.
3. Reviews, estimates of situations and special studies.
4. Teletype messages or dispatches.
5. Visits by representatives from headquarters to the field.

1503

Communications from SEC Sections in the Naval Districts to Headquarters:

1. Letters forwarding information and containing requests for information or action.
2. Reviews, estimates of situations and special studies.
3. Teletype messages or dispatches.
4. Visits by representatives from the field to headquarters.

SECTION 6

CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

1601

Classified nature of work:

The work of the Section deals with matters of all classifications and the regulations governing the handling of classified material must be constantly borne in mind and scrupulously observed.

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CHAPTER II
BASIC DIRECTIVES

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SECTION 1

ONI-19(A)

2101

The basic directive of the SEC Section, the NAVAL INTELLIGENCE MANUAL-1947, known as ONI-19(A), was promulgated 1 May 1947 by the Chief of Naval Intelligence with the approval of the Secretary of the Navy. Article 3104 of ONI-19(A) contains the official statement of the mission and objectives of Op-32D, the Domestic Branch of the Office of Naval Intelligence. The mission and objectives, the tasks and responsibilities of the SEC Section are based on this statement.

ONI-19(A)

SECTION 2

OTHER DIRECTIVES

2201

From time to time specific directives are issued covering certain phases of the SEC Section's work. These directives are always for the purpose of applying the basic directive, ONI-19(A), to special situations or for the purpose of outlining approved techniques. Examples of such specific directives dealing with SEC Section activities are cited below. Copies of these directives are included in Appendix B.

OTHER
DIRECTIVES

2202

CNO confidential letter dated 12 November 1940, subject: Suspect Lists and Files, Serial 0309316. This directive cancelled previous instructions and standardized subsequent procedure in regard to suspects.

2203

CNO restricted letter dated 12 August 1941, subject: Intelligence Information, Proper Dissemination of, Serial 1543316. This directive emphasizes the necessity of prompt and complete dissemination to other government agencies of all appropriate information of interest to such agencies.

2204

DNI confidential letter dated 11 August 1942, subject: Dissemination of Investigation Reports and Cards, Serial 01815616. This directive restricts dissemination of information on suspects to investigative agencies and such others as are entitled to the information by virtue of the fact that action by them is required. The directive requires a security paragraph in letters or memoranda forwarding such information.

2205

DNI confidential letter dated 14 December 1942, subject: Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Reports (except form NNI-119) Reliability Routine, Designated by the Use of Symbols, Serial 02946516. This directive prescribes the reliability rating system now in use.

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2206

VCNO confidential letter dated 4 June 1943, subject: Procedure in Cases Involving Frauds Against the United States Government, Serial 01473416. This directive outlines the procedure to be followed in handling reports involving fraud against the Government.

2207

CNO confidential letter dated 14 December 1943, subject: District Intelligence Bulletins, Serial 02888216. This directive requested that District Intelligence Bulletins be not distributed outside the Naval District Command.

2208

DNI confidential letter dated 1 January 1944, subject: Preparation and Dissemination of Topical Studies and Trend Reports, Serial 0131316. This directive requested the DIO's to inform ONI whenever a topical study or trend report was contemplated in a Naval District.

2209

DNI confidential letter dated 25 February 1944, subject: Restriction of Counter-intelligence Activities, Serial 0349716. This directive suggested topics of little or no naval interest which should not engage the attention of Naval Intelligence.

2210

DNI confidential letter dated 11 August 1944, subject: Preparation of 3 x 5 cards and Summaries of Reports From Non-Naval Intelligence Agencies for Dissemination, Serial 02021316. This directive emphasized the importance of the proper evaluation of information received from non-Naval Intelligence agencies.

2211

DNI confidential letter dated 22 May 1945, subject: Shift in Emphasis in Op-16-B-7 Work, Serial 0697316. This letter, not a directive in the strict sense of the word, suggests changes in SEC Section work which need to be made because of the cessation of hostilities in Europe.

2212

CNO confidential letter dated 26 June 1945, subject: Suspect Lists and Files, Serial 01296516. This directive modified the similar directive of 12 November 1942 and abolished the color card system.

2213

CNO confidential letter dated 8 March 1946, subject: Delimitation Agreement, Revision of, Serial 02303P23. This directive announced the end of joint responsibility of ONI and FBI for coverage of Japanese activities in the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage.

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CHAPTER III
TECHNIQUES

SECTION 1

DISCUSSION OF TECHNIQUES TO
ACCOMPLISH PRINCIPAL TASKS

3101

The suspect files may be grouped under four principal headings:

SUSPECT
FILES

1. Naval personnel suspected of subversive activity or background.
2. Civilian personnel employed by the Navy suspected of subversive activity or background.
3. General subversive and espionage suspects of definite naval interest.
4. General subversive and espionage suspects of possible naval interest.

3102

Principal sources of information for compiling the suspect lists:

SOURCES OF
INFORMA-
TION

1. Reports from District Intelligence Officers.
2. Reports from Naval Attaches.
3. Reports from bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.
4. Reports from other branches and sections of ONI.
5. Reports from other naval activities, foreign and domestic.
6. Reports from FBI.
7. Reports from ID, GSUSA.
8. Reports from the State Department.
9. Reports from other Government agencies.

3103

Reports as received are carefully read and names of individuals who can be classified as suspects of one kind or another are noted. Whenever the name of a suspect who would fall within the four categories listed in Article 3101 is noted, this name is indexed and the report is filed in the Case History Section of ONI, a central ONI depository of information. Depending upon the individual case, summary cards are prepared for Section working files. Information is disseminated to the Naval Districts and to other government agencies by letter and memorandum. Only information of naval origin, of course, is disseminated to other government agencies. The Section does not keep permanent suspect files which are not also reflected in the Case History Section and available to all of ONI. However, the Section does maintain working files consisting of summary cards broken down into convenient categories so that information on the suspect lists may be available readily and on short notice. The techniques described above have been in use, in general, throughout the history of the Section. These techniques are modified from time to time in accordance with existing circumstances. For example, during the war summary cards were made for almost every name noted which might be put in one of the suspect lists and these summary cards were given wide dissemination. At the present time, however, because conditions have changed, the practice of making summary cards has been discontinued except for Section working files. These cards are used for the Section working file and are not given the dissemination normally accorded them. This does not mean that dissemination of information on suspects of naval interest, including naval and civilian personnel, has been discontinued. Instead of using the summary card

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LISTS

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technique, dissemination is made by letter and memorandum and information on cases disseminated is given a very high degree of evaluation. One of the primary tasks of the Section is the proper maintenance of suspect files.

3104

**FILES OF
REFERENCE**

The maintenance of files containing selected reference and background material requires careful selection of items to be included in such files. Experience has shown that the Navy may have an interest in many organizations, groups, trends and situations which, when they first attract attention, do not have any discernible immediate naval interest. Therefore, it is difficult to set up criteria on the basis of which such background and reference material is selected for inclusion in the file. However, some indication can be given of the nature of these criteria. Information should be compiled on organizations which solicit naval personnel for membership. There should be information in the files on the principal foreign organizations in the United States and on their connections with political, cultural, social and religious movements. The Navy recruits personnel from all sections of the U. S. population. Often, however, a decision on whether or not to file certain material for background and reference purposes must be left to the individual officer or analyst who will make a decision based on his best knowledge and experience. It is obviously impossible to file in the Case History Section every type of material and every document which comes to the Section.

3105

**TOPICAL
CONTROLS**

In order that the material described in the above paragraph may be readily accessible when needed, it has been necessary to set up a system of topical controls in the Case History Section. These controls are listed under two headings:

1. Topical or Subject File Index and
2. Country File Index.

The Topical and Subject File Index consists of names of topics on which considerable information has been collected from time to time. The Country File Index is broken down under the names of various foreign countries concerning which information of interest to the Domestic Branch and to other ONI branches and sections has been filed. To illustrate, during the war, as might be expected, considerable information was sought and collected on Germany and on German activities.

The Country File Index on Germany is broken down under two headings:

- a. Germany, under which there are break downs such as "Conditions and Activities in," and "Foreign Influence in."
- b. German, under which some of the subdivisions are "Activities in the U. S." filed by state, "Activities in the U. S.--General," "Intelligence and Espionage Activities" and other suitable break downs. By means of these two file controls information can be filed in the Case History Section in such a way that it can be called for when needed. Also, of course, all reports are filed in the Case History Section under their own subjects. A system of cross-referencing makes it possible for a given report to be reflected not only under its own subject, but under break downs of the Country File Index and Topical or Subject File Index. The file designations are indicated by the sections which send the report to file and cross reference cards are prepared and accompany the report to file. Just as no permanent suspect files are kept in the Section (which are not

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uplicated in the Case History File Section), so also no background or reference material is filed permanently in the Section. However, limited and selected working files are kept on matters of current interest or on matters in which interest is expected in the near future. The topical index categories are not static but change with changing conditions caused by the modification of the patterns of enemy activity.

3106

Another important task is to advise proper naval authorities of threats or dangers to the Naval Establishment. The technique for performing this task can be broken down under three principal headings:

DISSEMI-
NATION

1. Official communications either by dispatch, letter or memorandum to the appropriate Naval Command to give warning of any specific immediate danger or threat.
2. Periodic studies summarizing subversive trends disseminated usually to the District Intelligence Offices and, in any case, within the Naval Service.
3. Special topical studies issued from time to time on special problems. These special studies might be disseminated outside the Naval Service, depending upon the nature of the study.

3107

Another specific Section task is collaboration with Op-32Y and with Op-32F. It is, of course, the duty of all sections of ONI to cooperate with all other parts of ONI. However, Op-32D4 is specifically directed to collaborate especially with Op-32Y and Op-32F. The technique for accomplishing this task can be summarized as follows:

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RATION

1. Careful study by each member of the Section of the mission and objectives and needs of Op-32Y and Op-32F.
2. Careful attention to the matter of including the appropriate section of Op-32Y and Op-32F in the routing of reports keyed to Op-32D4 which are of interest to these Branches.
3. Establishment of personal relationships with appropriate officers in these Branches.
4. Care in including appropriate F and Y Sections on the ladder of all letters originating in D4 which have interest to Y and F.

3108

The coordination within ONI of all subversive activities threatening the Naval Establishment is accomplished in various ways. All activities of the Navy Department and other government agencies address to ONI requests for information on suspects or subversive situations and trends. It is the duty of Op-32D4 to prepare summaries of information which will satisfy the needs of both Navy and outside inquirers. The summaries must reflect all of the information available to ONI in the case of Navy inquirers and all information in ONI of naval origin in the case of outside inquirers. Therefore, when summaries are written, especially in connection with matters affecting the security of the Naval Establishment, the interests of all sections of ONI must be borne in mind and the possibility that other sections of ONI may have special information must be recognized. Also when the Section makes a report dealing with a situation which contains a threat to the Naval Establishment all sections of ONI having an interest in the matter must be consulted. Likewise, the Section must insist that all sections of ONI refer any situation of

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interest to Op-32D4 either for action, for special evaluation or for assistance. An example of this is Op-32D4's insistence that Naval Attache reports dealing primarily with matters within the Section's Mission and Objectives be referred to Op-32D4 for evaluation and suggested dissemination before any action is taken on these reports.

3109

**NECESSITY
FOR LIAISON**

Adequate liaison arrangements and procedures are particularly important to the Section for two principal reasons:

1. Op-32D4 must have information from all possible sources in order to fulfill its mission. All the information necessary does not always come in through routine channels. Therefore, contacts must be established with other government agencies (as well as with naval activities) so that specific information needed from time to time may be obtained quickly.

2. Op-32D4 is not an action agency. Some other agency of the government or the Navy must take action on all intelligence developed by the Section. Consequently it is important to maintain careful liaison to help insure that appropriate action is taken. Of course, the Section is principally concerned with naval activities as action agencies. However, sometimes intelligence produced by Op-32D4 must be acted on by another government agency.

3110

**LIAISON
ARRANGE-
MENTS**

Outline of liaison arrangements:

1. The administrative branch of ONI maintains a liaison list giving the names of officers and individuals who are designated to act as a connecting link between ONI and other government agencies. Representatives of the following government agencies appear on the list corrected as of 1 June 1947:

Commerce Department	Central Intelligence Agency
Natl. Defense Research Committee	Federal Bureau of Investigation
State Department	Panama Canal Zone
Office of International Inform.	Selective Service
& Cultural Affairs (State Dept.)	Treasury Department
Intelligence Division, General	Veterans Administration
Staff U. S. Army	

2. The two government agencies of most importance to the work of Op-32D4 are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Intelligence Division, General Staff U. S. Army. Special official liaison arrangements have been set up for making contacts with these agencies. An Army officer representing ID, GSUSA spends part of each day in the Navy Department where he has an office. This officer brings over from the War Department documents and communications of an urgent nature and is available for personal conferences in regard to matters of mutual interest to ONI and ID, GSUSA. The Section has established a close personal relationship with this officer and usually makes daily contact with him. This officer will handle on an informal basis any matter which does not require official record and will initiate other business on which an official record is eventually made. He also transmits Army requests upon which ONI action is taken. During the War Op-32D4 had an arrangement whereby an officer from the Section was assigned a desk in a corresponding section of ID, GSUSA and an officer from ID, GSUSA

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was assigned a desk in Op-32D4. A very close liaison resulted from this arrangement. However, when ID, GSUSA underwent a reorganization so that Op-32D4 no longer had even an approximate counterpart in the Intelligence Division this arrangement terminated on a formal basis. An officer from Op-32D4 still maintained personal contacts with appropriate parts of the Intelligence Division and acted as a sort of informal liaison officer until a month or two after VJ-Day. Confusion incident to demobilization made this informal arrangement impracticable and it was discontinued. At this time the officially designated Army officer is not used for the majority of liaison connections with the Intelligence Division.

3. A representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation makes daily trips to ONI and calls each day on Op-32D4. Through this officer necessary business is transacted. The Section maintains also telephone contacts with other representatives of FBI by means of which rapid exchange of urgent information can be made.

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CHAPTER IV

ILLUSTRATION OF SECTION TECHNIQUE

SECTION 1

HYPOTHETICAL CASES

4101

In order to illustrate more precisely the techniques described in Chapter III, hypothetical cases based on actual cases in file will now be cited. They will be traced from the moment the case or problem came to the attention of the Section. An attempt will be made to indicate the steps in the evaluation of each case, the dissemination given to the intelligence developed and the final action which resulted. Sometimes, in fact often, the Section never learns exactly what action results from intelligence forwarded to action agencies. It should be remembered that the Section's mission has been accomplished when appropriate naval authority has been warned, before the fact, of a threat or danger to the security of the Naval Establishment.

4102

Suspect files:

SUSPECT
FILES

1. The following example represents a hypothetical case--Naval Personnel:

Subject--George HALL, S1c, USNR.

- a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation notifies the Chief of Naval Intelligence that Subject, who is reported to have subversive tendencies or affiliations, has been inducted into the United States Naval Reserve. The Federal Bureau of Investigation forwards all information in the files containing subversive allegations.
- b. Op-32D4 checks the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence for any previous information on Subject, and finds that the check is negative.
- c. Op-32D4 requests a brief from the Bureau of Naval Personnel containing Subject's personal record and showing that Subject is assigned to an activity in the Fourth Naval District.
- d. A card is made for the Naval Enlisted Personnel working file of Op-32D4, a copy of which is incorporated in the central files of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
- e. Op-32D4 forwards the brief and the information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the Enlisted Discipline Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.
- f. The Bureau of Naval Personnel returns the material on Subject to the Chief of Naval Intelligence, together with a memorandum requesting that Subject's Commanding Officer be made cognizant of his alleged subversive tendencies.
- g. The Chief of Naval Intelligence forwards all available information on Subject to the DIO, 4ND recommending that Subject's Commanding Officer be made cognizant of Subject's alleged subversive tendencies.
- h. The DIO, 4ND notifies the Chief of Naval Intelligence that Subject's Commanding Officer has been made cognizant.
- i. Since Subject has access to confidential material in his present duty station the Commanding Officer arranges a transfer to a duty station in the 8ND where he will not have access to confidential material.
- j. The DIO, 4ND notifies the DIO, 8ND of Subject's transfer to that District

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and forwards all available material containing subversive allegations, a copy of which is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

- k. The DIO, 8ND informs the Chief of Naval Intelligence that Subject remained at his duty station in 8ND for three weeks at which time he was transferred to duty aboard the USS BLANK.
- l. The Chief of Naval Intelligence notifies the Commanding Officer of the USS BLANK of Subject's reported subversive tendencies.
- m. When Subject's Commanding Officer is notified by the Chief of Naval Intelligence he places a surveillance, the results of which show evidence of continued subversive activity. In view of the results of the surveillance it is considered that Subject's removal from the Naval Reserve is warranted, and the Commanding Officer effects his transfer to a shore establishment in the 8ND for separation.
- n. The DIO, 8ND notifies by letter the DIO of the Naval District in which Subject was inducted, who in turn notifies the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A copy of the foregoing letter is forwarded to the Chief of Naval Intelligence.
- o. Subject's discharge is noted in the working files of Op-32D4 and his name transferred from the active files to the Enlisted Discharge File.

2. The following example represents a hypothetical case--Navy Civilian Personnel--Simon WESTON: Mech. U. S. Naval Drydocks, Terminal Island:

- a. The DIO, 11ND notifies the Chief of Naval Intelligence that Subject who is employed at the U.S. Naval Drydocks, Terminal Island is reported to have subversive tendencies.
- b. Op-32D4 checks the files of the Office of Naval Intelligence for any previous information and finds that there is a file on Subject which sets forth his reported subversive tendencies.
- c. A card is made for the civilian employee for the files of Op-32D4, a copy of which is incorporated in the central files of the Office of Naval Intelligence.
- d. Op-32D4 forwards Subject's file to the Office of Industrial Relations with a request that Op-32D4 be notified of any action taken.
- e. The Office of Industrial Relations notifies Op-32D4 that Subject has been discharged and his name flagged by the U. S. Civil Service Commission in order that suitable investigation be made should he again be considered for government employment.
- f. The Chief of Naval Intelligence notifies the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the action taken on Subject.
- g. Subject's termination of employment is noted in the files of Op-32D4 and name transferred from the active files to the civilian discharged files.

4103

REFERENCE AND BACK- GROUND FILES

In the following example, all names of persons and ships are fictitious, though the main facts are based on information in ONI files:

Op-32D4 received a report from the Eleventh Naval District, entitled "Nazi Youth Movement, Reported Attempt to Infiltrate Naval Personnel." The source of the information contained in this report was a reliable informant who had been asked by a Navy enlisted man to join a Nazi Youth Movement which was being formed among Navy enlisted

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personnel. The Navy enlisted man, one James TOWNSEND, RM3c, stationed aboard the USS BLANK, DD operating out of San Diego, told informant the following story while dining one night with informant in a downtown San Diego cafe.

While his ship was undergoing repair at the Mare Island Navy Yard, Vallejo, California, sometime in October 1945, TOWNSEND ran into an old friend, Bob SCHNEIDER, whom he had known in grammar school and high school in their home town, Crawfordsville, Indiana. SCHNEIDER was assigned to the USS AMPERSAND, also at Mare Island Navy Yard. Both agreed to a reunion, and met two nights later at the Wayfarer's Restaurant in lower Vallejo. During the course of conversation, which consisted of reminiscing about their school days together, describing their experiences during the war, and discussing certain features of Navy life, SCHNEIDER told TOWNSEND that he would like him to meet his girl friend, Betty GRAYSON, who was from San Francisco but worked in Vallejo. A few days later TOWNSEND again met SCHNEIDER for dinner. This time SCHNEIDER was accompanied by his friend, Betty GRAYSON, a very attractive dark-haired, intelligent-looking girl of about 25 years of age. Betty GRAYSON appeared particularly interested in TOWNSEND's experiences in the Navy, the treatment he received, etc. She also observed that TOWNSEND, like SCHNEIDER, was of German descent. Then later in the evening Betty GRAYSON asked him if he would like to join an underground Nazi Youth Movement, of which her friend SCHNEIDER was a recent member. She said that this group in the United States was based along the same lines as the Nazi Youth Movement in Germany and that its primary purpose is to undermine the morale of the U. S. naval forces and to create a favorable feeling of good will toward Germany. Betty GRAYSON said that she was the organizer of this movement in the San Francisco area but that she had "friends" in San Diego, along the East Coast and in Germany with whom she maintained close communication. SCHNEIDER then recalled their (SCHNEIDER's and TOWNSEND's) long discussions after German class in high school about German people as compared to other nationalities, their government, relations with other nations, how unjustly they were treated after the First World War, their rights as a nation in the future. GRAYSON said she thought both SCHNEIDER and TOWNSEND were well-equipped "to make a real go of it in the Navy." A week later TOWNSEND told GRAYSON that he would join, but that his ship was due to leave Mare Island for San Diego in the near future; whereupon Miss GRAYSON gave TOWNSEND the names of two "friends" in San Diego. Since that time TOWNSEND said he had contacted one of the "friends" in San Diego, a civilian employed at the Naval Air Station on North Island, and had received a letter from GRAYSON in which she said she thought he would make "a leader in the Youth idea." TOWNSEND appeared to informant to be extremely impressed with Miss GRAYSON, her connections, etc., and, though tactfully and cautiously, tried hard to sell his idea to informant.

Investigative leads were sent out in 12ND to make inquiry at San Francisco and Vallejo regarding Betty GRAYSON and her activities in connection with a Nazi Youth Movement among enlisted personnel in the Navy and ZIO-LA (11ND) was requested to make FBI cognizant of the information. After reading this report, the following steps were taken in this section:

- a. The following names were checked in the main central file in ONI, Op-32C242:
 - Nazi Youth Movement
 - James TOWNSEND

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press. The agency which used to prepare these digests no longer exists and the matter of continuing this service under some other system was under discussion. Certain officers in the F Branch were named members of a committee to represent the head of the F Branch. D4 prepared a list of all foreign language publications currently appearing in the United States and a report on foreign language press digests received, and sometimes prepared during the war by ONI. Recommendations regarding D Branch interest were included in the report. The committee met and, as a result of the collaboration of the F representatives and D4, a report was drawn up and was presented to the Chief of Naval Intelligence.

4106

COORDINATION
WITHIN ONI

Reference has already been made to Naval Attache reports which are written on subjects of primary D4 interest. Such reports must be routed first to D4 for evaluation and for suggested dissemination. The cognizant F section will often indicate certain dissemination believed proper. In the case of one such report the F section had suggested dissemination to three government agencies to whom most reports are sent. In this case, D4 had certain information which made it advisable for one of these agencies to be omitted from the dissemination, and for a different agency, not suggested by F, to be included. The proper dissemination was given this report and the reasons therefore explained to F.

Sometimes it is the duty of the SEC Section to disseminate to a Naval Attache subversive information received by the Section. In March 1945 information was received concerning Japanese activities in Portugal which needed to be sent to the Naval Attache in Lisbon. The information was checked with the Far East Section of ONI and with the Western European Section and then a letter was prepared. The letter was then laddered through these cognizant F sections so that the finished product was the result of coordinated effort by all parts of ONI which had any interest or responsibility in the matter.

4107

EFFECTIVE
LIAISON WITH
OTHER GOV-
ERNMENT
AGENCIES

The two illustrations cited below are chosen because they show the use of a liaison arrangement by D4 to obtain specific information necessary in order to remove a threat to naval security, and the use of a liaison arrangement to make sure that the appropriate division of another government agency received information which D4 had discovered this division badly needed.

A report on a critical subversive situation received from FBI contained the name of an individual who was reported to be working for a company doing highly classified work for the Navy. It was necessary to look into this so that the individual could be removed from such employment. The FBI representative was shown this section of the FBI report and was asked to ascertain, if possible, the name of the company for whom the suspect was allegedly working. The FBI representative made a contact immediately with the proper section of FBI and relayed the D4 request. In a short time the name of the company was obtained. D4 then gave the facts collected to D1 and requested an investigation to verify the employment of this individual by this company and the fact that this company had a classified contract with the Navy. Remedial action could then be taken.

During the war, D4 had a special liaison with the Army, as has been indicated. A D4 officer made it his business to maintain contacts with those parts of the Army having

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interests and responsibilities corresponding to the Mission of D4. One important segment of D4 interest was under the jurisdiction of the Army Service Forces. D4 had prepared a series of counterintelligence monographs on certain Japanese and Japanese-occupied territories which U. S. forces intended to occupy. These monographs were prepared, of course, well in advance of the attacks scheduled on these areas. As war plans progressed it developed that the Navy would not have certain counterintelligence responsibilities which at first figured in the Navy plans. Instead, the Counterintelligence Corps headquarters in the Pentagon sent the material by courier instantly to the Pacific for use there by CIC. This liaison service was considered by the Army very valuable and a letter of appreciation from the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, was addressed to the Chief of Naval Intelligence thanking the Office of Naval Intelligence for having performed it.

In conclusion, it is reiterated that the chief function of the SEC Section is to warn appropriate naval authority of any threat or danger to the security of the Naval Establishment arising from subversive activities. The techniques used to perform this function may change from time to time to meet situations as they develop.

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APPENDIX A

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
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DIAGRAM NO. 1
18 SEPTEMBER 1942
OP16-B-7 ORGANIZATION CHART

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22




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DIAGRAM NO. 2
18 SEPTEMBER 1942
OP-16-B-7
FUNCTIONAL CHART

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


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DIAGRAM NO. 3
23 AUGUST 1944
OP 16-B-7

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FUNCTIONAL: _____

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


DIAGRAM NO. 4
SEPTEMBER 1947
OP 32-D-4

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
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DIAGRAM NO. 5
SEPTEMBER 1947
OP32-D-4

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22
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APPENDIX B

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Date: 23 SEP 98

Unit: NCIS 22

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
Washington

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B
A8-5/QQ/ND
(SC)A8-5(4)
Serial No. 0309316

November 12, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief of Naval Operations
(Director of Naval Intelligence)
To: Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.;
Commandant, First Naval District;
Commandant, Third Naval District;
Commandant, Fourth Naval District;
Commandant, Fifth Naval District;
Commandant, Sixth Naval District;
Commandant, Seventh Naval District;
Commandant, Eighth Naval District;
Commandant, Ninth Naval District;
Commandant, Tenth Naval District;
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District;
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District;
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District;
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District;
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District;
Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District;
Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo, Cuba;
Commandant, Naval Station, Guam;
Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa.

Subject: Suspect Lists and Files.

Reference: (a) Arts. 137, 240 and 328 O.N.I.-19.
(b) CNO conf. ltr. A8-5/QQ/ND, (SC)A8-5(4),
Serial No. 098816 of June 27, 1940.
(c) Domestic Intelligence Branch ltr.
Op-16-B-1 of August 19, 1940.
(d) Domestic Intelligence Branch ltr.
Op-16-B of September 11, 1940.
(e) Memo. to DIO's from Op-16-B of
September 24, 1940.
(f) CNO conf. ltr. A2-8, (SC)A8-5, Serial
No. 0102916 of July 6, 1940.

Enclosure: (A) Information regarding FBI Suspect Files.

1. To clarify previous instructions and to standardize subsequent procedure
in regard to Suspects, this directive cancels and replaces references (b) to (e), inclusive

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2. Reference (a) is basic and remains in effect.

3. Typewritten lists of Suspects, prepared from information at present contained in District Intelligence files, will be completed as expeditiously as possible, and furnished to the Special Agents in Charge of the appropriate Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Divisions within the Districts if this has not already been done. One copy of each list so furnished will be sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Separate lists will be compiled for: (a) Nazi, (b) Fascist, (c) Communist, (d) Japanese, and (e) Miscellaneous. The suspects on each of these lists will be further subdivided into:

- (a) "Known Dangerous," to be immediately picked up in the event of a National Emergency; and
- (b) Suspects regarding whom more specific information is desired but who, in event of a sudden emergency, would also be apprehended.

Blue cards for the "Known Dangerous" and buff cards for Suspects in the second category, will continue to be used. These cards should be sent to each Naval activity concerned, in duplicate.

4. Office of Naval Intelligence and District Suspect files required by reference (a) will be segregated as follows:

- (A) Nazis (Germans),
- (B) Fascists (Italians),
- (C) Japanese,
- (D) Communists,
- (E) Miscellaneous;

and will be so arranged that the following information can be obtained from them on quick inspection:

- (a) Names and addresses of any members of Embassies, Consulates, or Military or Naval Attaches who are known to be engaged in undercover activities in connection with espionage, sabotage, or other subversive activities, or against whom there is a strong presumption of engaging in such activities.
- (b) Names and addresses of known undercover agents in the United States.
- (c) Names and addresses of known undercover agents in the countries contiguous to or near the United States.
- (d) Names and addresses of known paymasters of undercover agents in the United States.
- (e) Names and addresses of known "post offices" of undercover agents in the United States.
- (f) Any other important data which can be practically and specifically made use of.

5. Exchange of information regarding Suspects, in accordance with reference (a), shall include copies to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Divisions and Army Corps Area Headquarters within the limits of Naval Districts.

6. Enclosure (A), giving present information regarding the preparation and maintenance of Federal Bureau of Investigation Suspect Files, is furnished for general information and guidance.

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W. S. Anderson,
By Direction.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCT 22

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A8-2(410812)
Op-16-B
A8/EN3-10
Serial No. 1543316
RESTRICTED

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1941

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: All District Commandants
Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Commandant, Naval Station, Guam
Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa

Subject: Intelligence Information of Interest to Other Governmental
Agencies - Proper Dissemination of.

Reference: (a) ONI-19, Art. 137(b).

1. Effective operation of a Naval District Intelligence Organization requires the prompt and complete dissemination, to other governmental agencies in the District, of all appropriate information of interest to such agencies. The purpose of this dissemination is not only to supply other governmental agencies with information, but to obtain their cooperation in any action which may be required thereon.
2. The policy of the Navy Department in this regard is set forth in Reference (a).
3. The Department is receiving reports from District Intelligence Offices which contain matter of obvious interest to other governmental agencies, but which show no dissemination to the local offices of those agencies. In such cases, the Department must (1) assume that the report was inadequately disseminated in the originating district and (2) either disseminate it to the head offices of the other interested governmental agencies, or request the district concerned to effect complete and proper local dissemination of the report. Such action may result in duplication and usually causes delay.
4. Commandants will, through their District Intelligence Officers:
 - (a) Disseminate appropriate information to offices, in their districts, of all governmental agencies which may be interested in, or authorized to act upon such information.
 - (b) Indicate fully in reports, cards and other communications, to whom the information therein was disseminated.

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/s/ W. H. Ingersoll
(Acting)

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCT 22

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington

Reply refer:
(SC)A-2
Op-16-B-1
A8-1/EN3-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 01815616

August 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: The Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: District Intelligence Officers, All Naval
Districts (except 16).

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Investigation Reports and Cards.

1. The dissemination of Forms NNI-119 and 120, as well as of information cards on suspects - blue or buff, should be restricted to (a) investigative agencies, and (b) such others as are entitled to the information by virtue of the fact that action by them is required.

2. In all cases under (b) above, the report or card should be forwarded by letter or memorandum, calling the attention of the recipient (a) to the fact that it should not be shown to the Subject, nor disclosed in whole or in part, to anyone whose official duties do not entitle him to the information for the purpose of required action, (b) that under no circumstances should the source or sources of the information be revealed unless specifically authorized by the Director of Naval Intelligence, and (c) that after serving its purpose it be returned to the originator.

3. In several instances recently, copies of NNI-119 on applicants have been forwarded to the Bureau of Naval Personnel by field representatives of the Office of Naval Officer Procurement for inclusion in administrative files. Obviously, this is not desirable and may result in serious detriment to sources of information which should, and must, be closely held.

/s/ J. B. W. WALLER
J. B. W. WALLER
By direction

CC: BuPers

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Op-16-B-7(G)
A8/EN3-10
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial #02948516

Dec. 14, 1942

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Addressees listed below.
Subject: Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence
Reports (except Form NNI-119), Reli-
ability Rating Designated by the use
of Symbols.

Reference: (a) Restricted letter from Vice CNO to
all Ships and Stations, dated Nov. 18,
1942, Subject: Intelligence Reports--
Reliability Rating Designated by the use
of Symbols, Op-16-F, A8/EN3-10, Serial 4312416.

1. Your attention is invited to the ultimate paragraph of reference (a) which
directs all reporting officers to commence the use of the new symbol system upon re-
ceipt of reference (a).

2. Your attention is likewise invited to paragraph 8 of reference (a) which
indicates that this evaluation of intelligence is identical with that being used by the Bri-
tish Naval Intelligence and by the United States Army.

3. Manifestly, reference (a) applies to the composition of information cards
as well as to other forms of intelligence and counter-intelligence reports with the ex-
ception of Investigation Reports (Form NNI-119). This latter exception in no way re-
lieves the reporting officer from his obligation of stating the reliability of his informants
in the usual accepted phraseology rather than by a set of symbols.

4. For the sake of uniformity, it is requested that the symbols set forth in
reference (a) be placed on the upper middle portion of the regular "flimsy" card (under
the word "CONFIDENTIAL") where these symbols apply to the card as a whole. If
portions of the information card are of varying reliability appropriate symbols should
precede each portion of the information. In this respect, it is pointed out that such
agencies as the FBI, MIS, National Censorship, etc., are, in essence, media for the
transmission of information rather than actual sources per se, and, therefore, it may be
advisable to use such a phrase as, "reliability of source unknown" when evaluating in-
formation transmitted to the Naval service from the above mentioned or similar Govern-
mental Agencies.

Distribution:
List 10r
Commandant, USCG (5 copies)
Commandant, USMC (5 copies)

J. B. W. Waller,
By direction.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

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Op-16-B-3
A3-1/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 01473416

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1943

From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandants, All Naval District (Except Sixteenth); Commandants, All River Commands; Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps; Headquarters, U. S. Coast Guard.

Subject: Procedure in Cases Involving Frauds Against the United States Government.

1. While cases involving fraud against the United States Government are essentially under the cognizance of the Department of Justice, it is within the province of the Division of Naval Intelligence to undertake an investigation in such cases to ascertain whether and to what extent naval personnel are involved.
2. Where preliminary investigation reveals that personnel of the naval establishment - Officer, enlisted, or civilian - are not implicated, the matter should be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by the District Intelligence Officer for appropriate action.
3. Where such investigation indicates that naval personnel are involved, two copies of the report should be forwarded to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations with a statement of the action taken, contemplated, or recommended by the officer in charge of such personnel. Dissemination of these reports to the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be the responsibility of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
4. In no event should cases involving fraud against the United States Government be referred to the U. S. Attorneys or to any agency of the Department of Justice other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

/s/ H. C. Train

H. C. Train
By direction

Copy to:
UnSecNav (PLD)

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Op-16-1-B
A3-1/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 02888216

14 December 1943

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commandants, All Naval Districts (less Sixteen),
Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command,
Commandant, Severn River Naval Command.
Subject: District Intelligence Bulletins.

1. It has been noted that many District Intelligence Officers are publishing Bulletins covering the activities of the various sections in their respective organizations and distributing these Bulletins to a large number of offices, many of which are outside the Naval District Command.
2. The time, work and material involved in producing and disseminating these publications does not appear justified inasmuch as official distribution of information of value to interested offices has or should have been made already.
3. It is requested that the dissemination of District Intelligence Bulletins outside the originating Naval District be discontinued and that the publication or non-publication of District Intelligence Bulletins for local use be restricted to that considered necessary by the respective District Commandants.

R. E. Schuirmann
By direction.

Dictated - Capt. Perry
Dictated - 7 December 1943
Typed by - Ann Riordan

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Auth: 6012958

Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25

In reply refer to
Initials and No.
Op-16-B-7
A3-1/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 0131316

1 January 1944

From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: List 10r (less DIO, 3ND)
Subject: Preparation and Dissemination of Topical
studies and Trend Reports.

Reference: (a) CNO Letter of 14 December 1943, Ser. 02888216.

1. It is the desire of the Director of Naval Intelligence that District Intelligence Officers notify the Office of Naval Intelligence when they contemplate the preparation of a topical study on a subject or activity extending beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the district of origin. This will enable the Director to make such arrangements for handling the study as will eliminate simultaneous duplication of effort by the Office of Naval Intelligence or any other District Intelligence Officer.

2. It also is the desire of the Director that a Topical Study be submitted to the Office of Naval Intelligence for such coordination with material available from all sources to the Office before being given dissemination to District Intelligence Officers of Districts other than that of origin, or any other Naval or non-Naval agency.

3. It is desired to emphasize the fact that reference (a) must not be construed as relieving District Intelligence Officers of the responsibility for prompt dissemination of reports of significant Counter-Intelligence trends of Naval Interest concerning activities within their respective districts. District Intelligence Officers are expected to make such official reports as frequently as required to keep the Office of Naval Intelligence and other Naval Districts concerned fully informed.

/s/ B. F. Perry
B. F. Perry,
By direction.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
Initials and No.
Op-16-1-B
A3-1/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 0349716

25 February 1944

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: District Intelligence Officers - All Naval Districts.
Subject: Restriction of counter-Intelligence Activities.

1. Counter-intelligence activities of the Naval Intelligence Service are definitely restricted to matters of direct Naval interest, both by the Delimitation Agreement, except as indicated therein concerning Japanese, and by the established responsibilities and jurisdictions of the other Departments, Bureaus and Offices of the government.
2. In spite of these restrictions, it has come to the attention of the Director of Naval Intelligence that a large number of man-hours have been and continue to be expended on theoretical studies of organizations, groups, trends, etc., which are of very indirect or only passing interest to the Navy, and in some cases of no interest whatever.
3. It is appreciated that many of these studies were undertaken to bridge a definite gap, because the Naval Intelligence Service was organized and equipped to do so and that this service has been rendered in a highly commendable manner. However, expansion of other agencies, enabling them now to assume and discharge their individual responsibilities, coupled with the man-power shortage, makes it mandatory that the restriction to direct Naval interest be rigidly applied.
4. No hard and fast definition as to what is or is not of direct Naval interest is deemed feasible. Good common sense must govern any decision, and if there is doubt, the advice of the Office of Naval Intelligence is always available.
5. The following subjects are cited to indicate a few typical examples that are considered to be not of direct Naval interest; when information is received concerning such subjects, it should be accepted by any Naval Intelligence Officer as the representative of an agency vitally interested in national security and forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence for further disposition or turned over to the appropriate local agency for such action as may be deemed advisable, and the Office of Naval Intelligence informed.

Organizations for peace movements.
Activities of Americans, Moslems, Arabs, etc., in Middle East.
Activities of Irish in collaboration with Germans in U. S.
Information concerning economic espionage.
Existence of Abwehr, Gestapo, etc., in U. S.
Activities of Pan-Serb Nationalistic groups.
Spanish honorary consuls in United States.

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6. Directives in conflict with the above are hereby cancelled and will also be the subject of separate correspondence.

R. E. Schuirmann,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NO 7522

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In reply refer to
Initials and No.
Op-16-B-7
A8/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 02021316

11 August 1944

From: Director of Naval Intelligence,
To: Distribution List 10r.

Subject: Preparation of 3 x 5 Cards and Summaries of
Reports from Non-Naval Intelligence Agencies
for Dissemination.

Reference: (a) DNI of 14 December 1942 - Serial 02946516.

1. To clarify the reliability of information received by the Naval Intelligence Service from non-Naval Intelligence Agencies, or other sources, and in addition to the symbols required by Enclosure (A) of reference (a), all 3 x 5 cards or summaries of such information prepared for dissemination shall clearly indicate to addressees whether the information is:

- (a) Confirmed by investigation,
- (b) A summarization of events of common knowledge,
- (c) Unconfirmed information reported to the agency passing it on to the Naval Intelligence Service.

2. Material forwarded to the Office of Naval Intelligence must show the identity of the agency from which it has been received, and other agencies cognizant when dissemination is indicated by the agency of origin.

3. The reliability symbols in reference (a) should be applied to the basic information and original informant, and not to the agency passing the data to the Naval Intelligence Service.

/s/ B. F. PERRY

B. F. Perry,
By direction.

Commandant, U.S.C.G. (5 copies)
Commandant, U.S.M.C. (5 copies)

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Op-16-B-7
A8-1/ND
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 0697316

22 May 1945

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Distribution List 10r.
Subject: Shift in Emphasis in Op-16-B-7 Work.

1. The following pertinent extracts of a memorandum from Op-16-B to Op-16-B-7 are being forwarded for information and guidance:

"1. After cessation of hostilities in Europe all-out efforts of the entire Naval Establishment, including the Naval Intelligence Service, must be concentrated on winning the war in the Pacific.

"3. In so far as the activities of the Counter-Intelligence Group are concerned, emphasis must be continued on the collection, evaluation, and dissemination to appropriate naval authority, of information indicating individuals, organizations or groups that are of actual or potential danger to the Naval Establishment from the standpoint of espionage, sabotage, or subversive activities.

"4. In the furtherance of this mission, it should be assumed that the chief source of these dangers henceforth lies in Japanese-controlled areas and activities, or those allied therewith that may still be capable of rendering them assistance. But with the surrender of Italy and Germany, and the occupation of hitherto Axis-dominated European countries by the Allies, effective assistance from them to Japan will virtually cease or become of negligible consideration. Therefore, the sphere of probable assistance to Japan will shrink to the Western Hemisphere plus certain heretofore neutral nations which may become the channel for communications with Japan. Nationally controlled organizations for espionage in Axis Countries of Europe will cease to exist and continued close study of the movements and activities of their former personnel, within the sphere of Allied control, will be of little or no import or value in prosecuting the Pacific war.

"5. It is felt that the major dangers to the remaining war effort are to be found 'within our gates' - i. e. in subversive influences within the United States and having allied efforts and inspiration in Latin American countries. Their possible effects on the Naval Establishment and its power to bring the war in the Pacific to an early successful conclusion, should constitute the major effort of Naval Counter-Intelligence work.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 B-12 Unit: NCIS 22

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"6. Briefly, the emphasis of Counter-Intelligence work should be henceforth placed on the following as regards their possible effect on the Naval Establishment:

- (1) Oriental Ideologies.
- (2) Latin American Ideologies.
- (3) Marxian Ideologies.
- (4) Sabotage.
- (5) Racial and Minority Groups in the U. S."

H. E. Keisker,
By direction.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 22

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Op-16-B-7
A8-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 01296516

26 June 1945

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List 6.

Subject: Suspect Lists and Files.

Reference: (a) CNO Conf. Ltr. dated 12 November 1940,
Serial 0309316, same Subject.
(b) Enclosure (A) of DNI Ltr. "Counter-
Intelligence Activities," dated 20 March
1944, Serial 0397716.

1. Reference (a) is modified in general by Reference (b) and specifically by Articles 1001, 1002, 1003, 1005, 1006, 1401, 1402, 1403, 1704, 1801, and 1804, and Section 200 of Reference (b).

2. Progress of the war has indicated the desirability of further modification of Reference (a) by elimination of the color card method of classification outlined in paragraph 3 of Reference (a). The Office of Naval Intelligence now maintains its suspect lists by required or desired categories in the form of 3 x 5 cards (without regards to color), which give the (a) name, (b) alias, (c) address, (d) activity, (e) identification data, as an index to the basic material in the central ONI file (Op-16-A-7). This index file is set up in such form as to make immediately available the complete ONI list of known and/or suspected persons engaged in activities within the mission as set forth in Article 1001 of Reference (b). It is desirable that the Naval District Intelligence organizations follow the same procedure in so far as concerned with suspects of interest to the District.

3. It is not felt necessary to replace blue or buff cards now in the files. Degrading as authorized here will accomplish the purpose without expenditure of manpower in needless reproducing on white cards. The color cards will then merely serve as a signal that the subject was at one time regarded with suspicion. The color card system admirably served the purpose for which it was intended.

4. While persons or groups serving the German and Italian governments in intelligence, subversive and sabotage capacities cannot be disregarded, the present stage of the war requires placing the main emphasis upon the following: (a) Oriental ideologies; (b) Latin American ideologies; (c) Marxian ideologies; (d) sabotage and (e) Racial and Minority Groups in the U. S.

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5. Counter-Intelligence units of the Naval Intelligence Service will continue with the collection, evaluation and dissemination to appropriate Naval Authority of information indicating individuals, organizations or groups that are of actual or potential danger to the Naval Establishment from the standpoint of espionage, sabotage or subversive activities.

/s/ HEWLETT THEBAUD

Hewlett Thebaud,
By direction.

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Date: 23 SEP 98 Unit: NCIS 02

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(SC)A8-5
Op-23D
A3-1/A8-5
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 02303P23

8 March 1946

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List Appended.
Subject: Delimitation Agreement - Revision of.
Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. (SC)A8-5, Ser. 0364716 of 18 Feb. 42.

1. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department; the Chief of Naval Intelligence; and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the joint responsibility of ONI and FBI for coverage of Japanese activities in the categories of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage is discontinued.
2. Addressees who were recipients of reference (a) will therefore delete from enclosure thereto Part II-4 and Part IV-2 and change the number of Part IV-3 to 2.
3. Thereafter, coverage of Japanese activities in the above-mentioned categories will be governed by remaining provisions of the Delimitation Agreement (Revised) dated 9 February 1942 as hereby amended.

T. B. INGLIS
By direction

Distribution List IV
CNO
Cincpac
CincLant
Comdts - River Commands
FBI (5)
MIS (5)

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