

lent opportunities to acquire classified naval information through their contact with merchant ships and cargo. Therefore, appropriate liaison with persons in the maritime industry is required to prevent improper disclosure and to insure that remedial security measures are instituted where necessary.

The merchant seamen desk was necessary during the early stages of World War II, because there was then no effective security check on the loyalty of merchant seamen aboard United States vessels or control over the activities of alien seamen, particularly those of "neutral" countries on shore liberty in United States ports. Earlier in this text, the statement was made that a person does not have to be an active espionage agent or saboteur of a foreign power to interfere drastically with national defense measures or in the successful prosecution of war. This statement has particular application to merchant marine personnel, for much highly classified naval equipment or information may be lost through a seamen's carelessness or failure to perform his assigned duty.

Much information of this nature was received by Commerce and Travel officers and disseminated to the interested agencies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in time recommended the institution of a procedure to prevent issuance of United States seamen's documents to alien seamen or the departure from the United States of such seamen until after a security intelligence interrogation had been conducted. Pursuant to this recommendation the Commandant, USCG, established effective controls over all seamen departing from the United States and over all alien seamen arriving in our ports. This desk also represented ONI on the Inter-Departmental Seamen's Passport Committee, composed of representatives of the Department of State, USCG, ONI, MID, and FBI, which made advisory recommendations to the Secretary of State concerning the issuance of seamen's passports to United States citizens or nationals.

It was the responsibility of the Travel Unit of the Commerce and Travel Subsection to maintain close and effective liaison with the Department of State, United States Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, Military Intelligence Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and

privately operated shipping and overseas aircraft companies. During World War II it was necessary to create three Desks in this Unit for effective administrative control. These were: Inter-Departmental Committees, Travel Authorization, and Passenger and Crew Security.

In November 1941, the President directed that the Secretary of State institute suitable control over citizens and aliens seeking to enter or depart the United States and authorized him to issue regulations and designate the Federal agencies he deemed necessary to cooperate in this undertaking. The Navy Department accordingly was designated, along with the War Department, FBI, and the Immigration Service. All of the Travel Security activities of ONI stemmed from this presidential directive, plus his previously mentioned Executive memorandum to his Cabinet Members providing that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters, actual or potential, should be controlled and handled by MIS, ONI, and FBI.

The Department of State proceeded to create several interdepartmental visa control committees under its chairmanship; on these served officers from MIS, ONI, FBI, and the Immigration Service, the naval officers so assigned being attached to the Inter-Departmental Committees desk. These committees considered applications by aliens for State Department visas to come to the United States and to seek admission by the Immigration Service at a designated port of entry. All information submitted by the applicant and his sponsors, or furnished to the Department of State by the cooperating agencies, was considered by the committees, and advisory recommendations made to the Secretary of State. In work of this kind the ONI officers who participated were mainly concerned in security considerations.

The naval authorization desk received the applications of aliens seeking visas from the Department of State and processed them through the central files of ONI. All information therein which might relate to the applicant or sponsors was referred to the desk where it was reviewed and evaluated. A summary was then prepared of the pertinent information originated by or in the naval service, and forwarded to the Depart-

ment of State for consideration by the visa committees.

Other examples of Commerce and Travel activity, involving liaison and action by another Federal agency in order to safeguard classified naval information of the highest order from improper disclosure, concerned the invasions of North Africa and Normandy.

The passenger and crew security desks in the districts obtained in advance the names of all persons arriving in the United States aboard neutral vessels, either as passengers or as crew members, as well as the names of passengers aboard overseas aircraft; processed the names through the files of ONI, and before the arrival of the individuals, forwarded any identifiable derogatory information to the naval district in which the individual would arrive. The DIO would either disseminate the information to the appropriate action agency or, if circumstances required, participate in the interrogation of the individual. The desks also served as channels for the flow of intelligence from travelers to the responsible naval activity.

Just after the North Africa invasion fleet got underway, a neutral merchant vessel met and passed this fleet. She was intercepted and escorted into New York, for by that contact her crew and passengers had acquired much vital information, the disclosure of which might adversely affect the planned operations. It was deemed expedient, therefore, to make arrangements through Commerce and Travel's liaison with the Immigration Service to have the crew and passengers removed from the vessel, placed under appropriate detention and held incommunicado until advised by the Navy that such precautions were no longer necessary. This was accomplished and the individuals were not released until 10 days after the first landings were made in North Africa.

A case involving XYZ, an alien, is illustrative of the functioning of Commerce and Travel during World War II. XYZ was an alien who illegally entered the United States a number of years before the war. After residing in and traveling about the country, he was apprehended by the Immigration Service, and, in 1942, was deported to his native country which was neutral. Shortly after arriving there, he was recruited by a representative of an enemy nation to return to the United States to engage in espionage activities. Upon acceptance of the offer of the enemy agents, he was given an intensive course in coding and decoding messages, the preparation and use of invisible inks, certain technical subjects, and espionage techniques. False identity documents were prepared and furnished him, and his principals effected his employment as a seaman aboard a neutral ship bound for the United States. XYZ was instructed to desert upon arrival, and to forward desired information through a circuitous channel, employing the usual letter drops in neutral countries.

During the Normandy landings, artificial harbors were to be created at two beaches. In connection with this plan old merchant ships were stripped down, bulkheads removed to permit quick flooding, and explosive charges placed to blow out the bottom. These old vessels were to be maneuvered into position and sunk by the Navy to form an outer breakwater for the artificial harbor. Through a combination of circumstances an alien, the chief officer of one of these ships, was removed and deported from the United Kingdom aboard a merchant vessel which would arrive at New York several days prior to D-day. This alien officer had been a suspect for some time and was believed to be in possession of much information about these and other invasion preparations. Again it was deemed expedient to arrange through Commerce and Travel Liaison to have the Immigration Service detain this alien officer and hold him incommunicado until advised by the Navy that security interests no longer required his detention. This was accomplished and the alien was released 2 weeks after D-day. Also the crew of the merchant ship on which this alien was returned to the United States had to be interrogated by Commerce and Travel officers to determine whether or not any information regarding the impending invasion had been passed to them.

As a result of certain information obtained by Commerce and Travel officers XYZ was interviewed after his arrival in this country and confessed his mission. This information was immediately disseminated to the responsible Federal agencies. From this beginning an espionage ring, which had intended to furnish the enemy information affecting the security of the naval establishment, was smashed.

*The Contact Register*

One of the objectives of the Domestic Branch is to exploit all domestic sources in order to collect information of naval interest. To cover the field completely it is necessary to provide appropriate machinery to locate sources within the United States from which strategic intelligence may be obtained and to maintain an efficient link between the requirements of the Foreign Branch for specific types of information and the district intelligence offices through which the information may be collected. The Contact Register Section was originally established as part of the Foreign Branch for this purpose. At the close of World War II its functions were transferred to the Domestic Branch. The strategic significance of the contribution made by the Contact Register Section to the planning of operations is dealt with in Chapter V.

The United States contains a wealth of both factual and graphic information on foreign areas. The material is not static, and is constantly being supplemented and revised. Inasmuch as intelligence is a perishable commodity, the task of confirming data previously submitted is equal in importance to the securing of data on new subjects and areas. American science, industry, and business have supplied numerous consultants, engineers, designers, and contractors to foreign enterprise. American laboratories have constantly contributed new instruments and formulas which subsequently were adapted abroad for war purposes. American business and science generally have had good foreign connections, and business files in every part of the United States have been found to contain valuable information on an infinite variety of subjects. For years, many individuals have been engaged abroad on scientific expeditions and professional pursuits as missionaries and educators, to study and write about practically every foreign land and subject. Many Americans have made their homes in the most remote places in the world. Upon their return to the United States, these individuals are excellent sources of information on specific areas.

The section maintains a contact register, which is a file listing all firms, organizations, and individuals in the continental naval districts considered as potential sources of foreign intelligence.

By proper indexing and cross-reference it is possible for ONI to locate quickly the most likely sources of information on any given subject or area of naval interest. Additional information recorded by the contact register section consists of data in either factual or graphic form which contribute or offer prospects of contributing something new and of calculated value to the planning and conduct of naval operations or joint Army-Navy operations. To insure complete coverage a contact register of local informants is maintained in each naval district concerned.

As indicated above, the contact register section has the responsibility of apprising the district intelligence officer of the foreign intelligence needs of the Naval Establishment and of coordinating its collection within the United States. All information received from the naval districts is passed to the cognizant section of the Foreign Branch for evaluation and dissemination. The naval districts are kept informed of the evaluations given to the information collected and reported, these comments serving to guide the officers in the districts and insure a higher standard of reporting. Moreover, the section assigns to the collecting units a priority of subjects to aid them in determining the precedence of the information requested.

*Sabotage, Espionage, Counter-Subversion*

The disruption of plans of the Navy and the various Government agencies of the United States for the continuous defense of the Nation is of prime interest to the intelligence organization of any nation with opposing foreign policies. It will therefore be a prime objective of a foreign intelligence service to learn of these plans, as well as of the forces and matériel available for carrying them out. This will be true both in time of peace and in war. To do this, the given foreign intelligence organization will attempt to organize a network of agents infiltrated into the country to work with cooperating informants. Such a network, properly trained and equipped, makes possible the collection and transmittal of vital information and hinders war efforts by such means as sabotage, espionage, subversion or propaganda activities.

As stated above, part of the objective of the Domestic Branch is to produce intelligence that will keep naval authorities advised of the dangers to

the Naval Establishment, actual and potential, from subversive operations, together with an evaluation of the potentialities of the various foreign nations or subversive groups involved. Since these activities are carried on behind a curtain of secrecy, the evidence of their existence is often discovered only in unexpected quarters or in fragments, each fragment perhaps apparently of no significance. It is the skillful connecting, one with another, of these scattered fragments of evidence that can produce the whole story and pave the way for accurate evaluation of whatever threat there may be.

The mission of the SEC section is to administer, operate, and maintain as part of the Domestic Branch the Sabotage, Espionage and Counter-Subversion section, to evaluate information of naval interest collected from all available sources pertaining to espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage, and subversion and to disseminate intelligence derived therefrom to appropriate naval authority to enable such authority to plan and execute effective counter and protective measures. The intelligence produced by the section, whether in the form of spot items or broad studies, is used by other Sections within ONI and by other activities of the Navy and the Government generally as part of the basis for necessary security measures and aggressive action in suppressing espionage, sabotage, and subversion.

During World War II the section was organized in such a way as to concentrate its forces against the major threats. These were ideological rather than purely national, and hence one found specialists concentrating on Nazi, Fascists, Falange, and Japanese ideologies wherever they might be active, as well as other specialists on sabotage techniques and domestic subversive groups. Specialization must never, however, be permitted to lead to rigidity, and it was necessary to maintain sufficient flexibility within the Section to permit modifications to meet changing dangers. Such flexibility is now even more important, because new world situations must be met with a smaller peacetime complement.

In the district intelligence offices the SEC organization is basically the same as within ONI, and the work undertaken is similar, except that it is primarily limited to consideration of matters aris-

ing within the limits of the respective districts. ONI undertakes studies in the national and international fields and, in particular, counter-intelligence studies of foreign areas of naval interest not undertaken in the districts.

Information and intelligence pertaining to the mission of the section is forwarded to it by all units of Naval Intelligence, including naval attachés, observers, liaison officers, and intelligence headquarters overseas, for evaluation and such further dissemination or study as may be required. The section addresses specific requests for information to Naval Intelligence representatives abroad, as well as to the district intelligence officers, and other Government agencies, whenever it is believed that these sources can furnish information needed by the section.

Close liaison with the Intelligence Division, General Staff, United States Army, and with the Intelligence Division, United States Air Force, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of State, the Treasury Department, and other agencies of the Government is maintained by the section in order that an interchange of information on matters of subversion and espionage may be achieved to their mutual benefit. As further sources of information the section regularly studies those items and publications of the domestic press dealing with domestic organizations and movements of interest to the section. During World War II newspapers and periodicals were obtained from enemy and neutral countries and through liaison with the Federal Communications Commission, transcripts of radio news broadcasts from enemy countries were received. Especially voluminous and useful were the many kinds of intelligence and interrogation reports compiled by United States or Allied forces abroad.

There is a constant interchange of information between this Section and other Sections of the Domestic Branch more directly concerned with security. The investigations section frequently calls on this section for evaluation of the significance of information developed in the course of their investigations, whether of a suspect or a prospective employee. This section may be able to advise the security section, for example, that one of the members of an official foreign mission in the United States is a known or suspected enemy agent

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and thus permit control of his visits to the key industrial plants or naval installations. Censorship being one of the key tools of counterintelligence, as well as of security, the closest liaison is maintained between the SEC Section and Censorship in order to identify foreign agents, their contacts, and their means of finance and communication. Similarly this section must maintain close relations with the theaters of the Foreign Branch, since much basic counterintelligence information is intelligible only in the light of current political and military situations in foreign countries. This liaison with other sections in the Domestic Branch and ONI generally is not a one-way affair; not only is the section in a position to furnish intelligence of value in security and strategic planning, but it relies on routine information, both as to individuals and situations, developed by the other sections for much of its raw material. In general the same two-way relationship applies to the SEC section and the district intelligence officer in information of domestic significance.

Two examples of the successful accomplishment of the aim of effective dissemination of information may be cited. By maintaining files of suspect Japanese, this section was able, following the Pearl Harbor attack, to furnish to appropriate authorities information that aided materially in taking into custodial detention those Japanese in the United States who were believed likely to undertake sabotage or espionage activities. In an-

other case the section received information, classed as unreliable, from a naval source in South America to the effect that an individual in Europe about to embark on a Spanish ship for Argentina was an important German espionage agent. The information tied in with previous data already in the section's possession and, though still given a low evaluation, was promptly passed on to British intelligence authorities. The latter removed the suspect from his ship at Gibraltar and established that he was in fact entrusted with a highly important mission by the Germans.

From the foregoing outline it will be seen that the section's primary function is one of research. From a mass of raw material, much of it of no direct naval interest, it must extract that of significance, and put it in such form as to enable naval authorities properly to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Some of its research will concern persons, some will deal with techniques, finances, and communications, some with the current nature and objectives of foreign subversive organizations, official or otherwise. While much of the research is of a long-term nature designed to produce complete studies of value to other activities of the Navy or Government, the section must always be alert for significant single items or even scraps of information which, properly utilized and interpreted, indicate some new threat or trend, or possibly a new angle on an old subversive activity which requires prompt advice to the appropriate action agency.

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**PART FIVE: CONCLUSION**

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## LIAISON AND JOINT ACTIVITIES OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

This chapter is divided into two parts: In the first part, liaison and joint activities of United States Naval Intelligence during World War II will be described in some detail. In the second part, certain postwar liaison and joint activities will be summarized, and peacetime movements toward centralization, integration, and unification of the armed services, with particular reference to national intelligence, will be discussed, and pertinent parts of the National Security Act of 1947 will be quoted.

While the war was in progress, liaison and joint activities were conducted at many levels and contributed significantly to military operations and to such nonmilitary operations as psychological (political) and economic warfare. Speed was urgent; there was never enough time. While the Axis had geared for war over a long period, both England and the United States were thrust into a war for which they were not prepared. Consequently certain liaison and joint activities were measures of desperation. Later in the war, a far greater degree of harmony and efficiency was achieved in the combined operations of American and British forces, and in the joint operations of the American armed services. Through liaison and joint activities, United States Naval Intelligence contributed much to the planning and conduct of operations in all theaters during World War II.

The peacetime emphasis must be not on operations but on national defense, which includes national intelligence. Now that wartime pressure has been removed, it is possible to scrutinize our defense establishment with a view to making it a more perfect and hence more powerful guardian of our national security.

Liaison and joint activities continue to perform valuable services in peacetime, for we must maintain close connections between our Government and the governments of friendly states, and be-

tween the various branches, agencies, and services of our Government.

Because the importance of intelligence is not diminished after the cessation of hostilities, the importance of liaison and joint activities is likewise not diminished, for information and intelligence are conveyed by means of liaison, and in many cases greater effectiveness is obtained by joint than by separate application to a problem.

*Liaison and Joint Activities During World War II*

In the military sense, the word "liaison" means intercommunication between units acting as neighbors. A liaison officer has two principal duties:

1. Speeding the flow of information and intelligence in both directions.
2. Interpreting and clarifying the needs and policies of one service to other services.

Thorough knowledge not only of his own organization but of the organization to which he is assigned is required of the liaison officer.

In American military parlance, joint activities are those in which more than one of our armed services participate; combined activities are those in which American and foreign armed services participate. The British make no such distinction as we make between the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. By combined operations they mean what we mean by joint operations.

During World War II, joint United States intelligence activities were established when it was thought that greater efficiency in this specialized field might be achieved by coordinated Army-Navy-Air force effort. Some types of information yielded intelligence of interest and value to Army, Navy, and Air. Both in Washington and in combat areas the basic material and the finished intelligence available to each service were made available to the joint intelligence activity.

*The Value of Liaison*

On New Year's Day 1945, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced the capture of two

Nazi saboteurs, after they were landed on a desolate beach in Maine by a Nazi U-boat. Within 33 days after their landing they were in Federal prison and one of the men, formerly discharged from the United States Navy, was facing a military trial as a traitor to his country. The final, successful conclusion of this case is a colorful sample of liaison that covered most of the Western Hemisphere.

William Colepaugh, the ex-Navy man, had been under suspicion and investigation since 1940. His dossier is a record of a pathetic, frustrated mind that was never able to effect the espionage and sabotage intended by the Nazis. Colepaugh was the son of fairly prosperous German-born parents and had spent most of his life in Connecticut. He never did very well at school and finally left Massachusetts Institute of Technology having had a miserable time, both academically and socially. During his prep school and college days he was an enthusiastic admirer of the Third Reich, and particularly Hitler. This enthusiasm had been kindled when he became acquainted with German sailors aboard various ships in Boston Harbor. Perhaps as a result of these associations, he shipped out as a seaman in 1940, putting in at ports in the British Isles and South America. After the United States entered the war, he continued shipping out and in the summer of 1942 was apprehended in Philadelphia as a draft dodger. As a result of this, he enlisted in the Naval Reserve in October. At Great Lakes Naval Training Station he again revealed his Nazi sympathies, having numerous German publications in his possession. He was so persistent in his views that he was discharged from the Navy in January 1943.

Once more, he shipped out as a seaman to South America and worked a few months helping to construct radio stations for the Nazis. He next came to the attention of Naval Intelligence officers when he jumped ship in Lisbon in February 1944, after signing up as a steward on the repatriation ship *Gripsholm*. Immediately, investigators went to work and discovered that he had gone to the German Consulate in Lisbon and was provided with a passport to Germany. Upon his arrival there in March 1944, he was sent to schools in Berlin, Dresden, and The Hague and was accepted for service

in the SS Corps (Elite Guard). At these schools he was trained as an agent and saboteur, learning how to handle explosives, short-wave radio, photography, and various techniques of sabotage.

After completing this training, Colepaugh and a companion spy were given about \$50,000 in cash, forged discharge papers from the Navy (under different names) and other false means of identification. The two agents were put aboard a U-boat and left Kiel on 26 September 1944. They crossed the Atlantic and were set out from the submarine in a rubber boat at 0230 on 29 November. In the meantime, Cominch and the Sea Frontier estimated the course and position of the submarine, and the FBI was told that a U-boat was in the vicinity of the Maine coast, probably landing agents. From that time on, the Naval Intelligence officers and FBI cooperated in locating and trailing the possible suspects. They were picked up a few days later, living riotously on their funds in New York City. Their careers were brought to a sudden end before they had an opportunity to begin any serious spying or accomplish any sabotage.

It was only through intensive cooperation among many sections of the Army, Navy, and other Government departments, and with the British, that these two potential spies were caught in time. It began in 1940 when investigators from the naval district and the FBI were concerned because of Colepaugh's alleged Nazi sympathies and his draft dodging. Then, when he was serving as a seaman, British Intelligence and our Embassies checked up on his activity in the British Isles and South America. When he later deserted the *Gripsholm* in Lisbon, our attaché took charge of the case and found that he had gone to Germany. With that information, all customs agents, immigration officials, DIO's, and FBI agents were alerted to prevent his illegal entry into this country. However, it was from the reports of the British Admiralty, Cominch, and the Eastern Sea Frontier that the FBI received the final clue leading to the capture of Colepaugh and his companion in New York. By the time the spies made their way to New York, the FBI had full cognizance of the case and Hitler's emissaries were picked up, trailed, identified, and finally sentenced to prison. Thus, miscellaneous pieces of information, properly evaluated and made available to organizations which might pos-

sibly use them, proved to be extraordinarily useful. No one knew that Colepaugh would be the one to step ashore from the German submarine, but once the criminals were apprehended, it was a relatively simple matter to establish their identity, mainly because the various agencies involved had circulated their intelligence effectively.

In fact, one of the basic requirements of World War II was the high degree of coordination necessary within and without all branches of the Allied services. Establishing effective means of interchange of all types of intelligence involved widespread, complex and often delicate relations with many nations, operating units, and commands in all parts of the globe. Liaison was essential for providing staffs with information to be used in strategic planning and supplying fleet units with a large portion of the necessary intelligence for conducting operations. In the Office of Naval Intelligence, liaison procedure existed on every level of planning and operations from the formal diplomatic plane served by the naval attaché to an informal exchange of information between intelligence officers attached to different operating units in the combat zone. Since the liaison functions of ONI were so extensive, it will be impossible to discuss all of them; however, the problem is so vital, and the work so significant that a review of the broader phases of this activity is necessary.

#### *Types of Liaison*

In organizations as large and complex as the Navy Department, it is not possible for anyone to be aware of all information available in the various bureaus, divisions, and offices. It is nevertheless of the utmost importance that each unit disseminate to all other units concerned any information acquired which would interest those units. In order to facilitate this exchange, the Navy issues at regular intervals a roster of liaison officers who are responsible for the execution of this function. They have a twofold responsibility: First, to understand the organization of the Navy Department as a whole, in order to understand what the individual units require; and second, to insure that information pertaining to those requirements is routed to the proper units. Each bureau, division and office has its liaison officer, ready to pass on information which other units can put to use.

All incoming intelligence, or information as the case may be, is screened by various branches of ONI. Pertinent excerpts or whole documents are then routed to the activities concerned. Conversely, it is the responsibility of the liaison officer for each activity to see that his unit is receiving all the intelligence it needs. If the Naval Transport Service desires information about port facilities in Alexandria, Egypt, the liaison officer for the Naval Transport Service will so inform the British and Middle East desks in the F Branch, which will forthwith furnish all available information.

During peacetime, with the elimination of many activities and agencies in the Navy, this volume of liaison is somewhat contracted, but the importance of effective interdepartmental communication is not diminished.

Liaison with other departments of the Government falls into two broad categories: First, the collection of information not normally available to Naval Intelligence; and second, direct collaboration with Government departments engaged in activities similar to those of ONI.

In collecting information not normally available to Naval Intelligence, the resources of such Departments as Treasury, Commerce, State, and Interior are brought into play. Treasury, for example, can supply facts about the economic resources of foreign countries, and also has information on American industrial and corporate interests abroad. Commerce, through the Tariff Commission has extensive files on imports and exports, and through the National Bureau of Standards frequently examines materials submitted for analysis by technical sections of the Navy—as the report on the examination of balloon paper submitted by the Technical Air Intelligence Center at the time when the Japanese were releasing bomb-carrying balloons which eventually came to rest in northwestern United States. State, with its responsibility for foreign policy, can advise on international relations. Interior, with its knowledge of forestry, may furnish information about vegetation and terrain.

The second type of liaison, that requiring collaboration with departments of the Government working in similar fields, calls for a rapid and direct transfer of information because, frequently, immediate action must be taken by all agencies

concerned with the problem. This is particularly true during wartime when speed becomes paramount in dealing with a complex situation. A section of ONI, such as Commerce and Travel Control, to function efficiently in wartime must employ every available means of cooperation to carry out its work of checking on persons entering or leaving this country and keeping track of shipping between the United States and foreign countries.

If, for example, a cargo vessel is attacked and sunk en route to an Allied advanced base, the Commerce and Travel section will be involved with several Government departments and numerous interested organizations and agencies. This section of ONI will be one of the many agencies directly concerned with the investigation of the ship sunk by the enemy. The War Shipping Administration must be notified to provide another vessel, the owner of the ship and the insurance companies must have full reports, the supplies must be re-ordered and cargo reshipped to the docks. All information concerning passengers, merchant seamen, and Armed Guard must be relayed to the personnel divisions. If men are lost with the ship, next of kin must be informed, and the Maritime Union notified to prepare new records; the State Department must know about any victims to invalidate visas and passports. All information concerning the attack—where the explosion took place, whether it was a torpedo or mine, what warning the ship had, if any, what measures, technical or evasive, were employed by the ship—will be essential to naval research groups and technical experts for their work of preparing countermeasures, new weapons, and developing tactics for convoying on the same problem indicates how important it is to have a system of liaison insuring that every one concerned with the loss of the ship be informed as rapidly as possible.

Furthermore, many of the regular duties of DIO's and other Naval Intelligence officers may fall into this broad category of liaison. In the work of preventing smuggling, illegal entry of aliens, and the activity of saboteurs and enemy agents, a similar sort of cooperative network is necessary. In such activities the Departments of State, Justice, Customs agents from the Treasury Department, investigators from the FBI, MIS,

and ONI may all be focussed on the same problem, and the measure of success is often dependent upon collective action and efficient liaison.

The Navy Department's relations abroad are in the hands of the naval attaché and his staff as a part of the diplomatic mission. The duties of the naval attachés were discussed in a general way in chapter V. In a broad sense, all his responsibilities are essentially of a liaison nature. He must be acquainted with the political and social structure of the foreign government in order to know which individuals and agencies can best serve the needs of this country; in fact, he must know everyone who may be considered as a possible source of information. To do this successfully, he must establish informal as well as formal relations with a variety of well-informed persons and many organizations whose information is of interest to the Navy.

During times of peace in all countries, and during a period of national emergency or war in Allied or neutral countries, an attaché's acquaintance with editors, businessmen, representatives of foreign houses, managers of power, oil, or insurance companies will be particularly helpful in maintaining a "listening post" for the area. From these many sources he is able to come upon information that may be vital to our country or our Allies.

A striking illustration of how a tenuous bit of potential intelligence may be extremely helpful originated in Buenos Aires on 7 September 1943 when our naval attaché received word about a well-to-do citizen of Argentina, Ernst Hoppe, who was a Nazi sympathizer and an important Nazi agent. At the time, Hoppe and his wife were enjoying the sights of northern Spain, vacationing in Bilbao until the ship arrived that was to take them back to Argentina. Inasmuch as Hoppe had visited Germany for several months prior to the Spanish jaunt, there was at least reason to suspect, if no confirmation, that he might be returning to South America with important information—information which was detrimental to the Allied cause.

When ONI received the attaché's report in Washington, time was getting short and rapid action was necessary. As a part of the attaché's message, he added that his informant might be unreliable. In ONI's check, it was discovered that

the informant was not always to be trusted but that he was clearly anti-Nazi.

The ship Hoppe was waiting for was of British registry and was delayed in sailing, being scheduled to depart from Bilbao after 1 October. Since it would not be calling at any Allied port of control after leaving Bilbao, two sections of ONI worked as a joint team in preparing a memo for British Security Coordination at Gibraltar, providing them with the information so that action could be taken on that side of the Atlantic.

The British acted promptly. The ship was called into Gibraltar; Hoppe, suspected of being an enemy agent, was taken from the ship and flown to England where he spent the rest of the war in an internment camp. His apprehension, as investigation revealed, prevented the consummation of an intricate scheme to land papers, political documents, negotiables belonging to high members of the Nazi party, as well as valuable transmitting and microphotography equipment, along the coast of Argentina via submarine. It was further revealed that Hoppe had been an agent since 1936 and had made numerous trips to Europe at Nazi expense, traveling as a "tourist." On this particular mission, he was to be the intermediary, making all arrangements for the rendezvous with the U-boat and the delivery of the strategic cargo. Furthermore, Hoppe disclosed a great deal of information about the location of targets in Germany proper which enabled the British to pinpoint a number of important factories and plants for a bomber command and the Eighth AAF.

The prompt and successful denouement of this case did not depend upon any single party, but was due to cooperation and speedy action on the part of all the agencies concerned, with the naval attaché at Buenos Aires acting as an important link in the chain.

The importance of making full use of the archives, reports, studies and informational facilities of business houses, colleges, universities, and scholars was discussed in an earlier chapter. The significance of this liaison with scholars and experts is shown by an example that occurred in the early days of World War II before the work of this section of ONI had been fully developed. In the middle 1930's a graduate student of a leading university spent many months travelling in Tun-

isia making careful studies of the country, its geography, transportation, and communications, for her doctoral thesis on the economic geography of the area. In the course of her investigation, she had consulted most of the materials available in the United States and in Europe on this part of North Africa. In 1942, she had no means of knowing that the Allies contemplated operations in Africa, and it was only by chance that she met a military officer in Washington who understood the value of her knowledge when the matter was brought up in casual conversation. Her assistance was obtained immediately and her encyclopedic knowledge of the whole region contributed a great deal to the planning and later to the actual conduct of operations. This indicates not only the value of the contact register but also the need for continuing liaison work with colleges, scientific institutions, and professors during peacetime.

In the same way, many of the large industrial corporations, mining and shipping companies, and manufacturing concerns with foreign branches and subsidiaries can be of inestimable aid in supplying accurate, detailed knowledge about many specialized and, frequently, highly secretive developments that are important for our Navy. Often too, they have efficient means for obtaining vital information abroad that would be difficult to get in any other way.

The completeness with which our enemies exploited commercial firms as a means of routine espionage is vividly illustrated by an article based on the report of the Treasury Department as a result of their examination of the Chemnyco Corp. and found that their records—

revealed the existence of an I. G. Farben Committee of Political and Economic Information, which was associated with the Nazi government and with headquarters in Berlin. The files also showed that for years full information on United States industrial plants, inventions, production, and raw materials had been reaching this Berlin headquarters. Weekly reports, costing \$240,000 annually, and based not only on personal observation but on comprehensive digests of technical journals and information services, have been forwarded to Germany \* \* \* still in the offices were maps of railways, highways, mineral industries, oil basins, and pipe lines, oil tanker routes, topographic maps of the American water line and harbors, and a map of the West Indian Islands and the approaches to the Panama Canal \* \* \* not only had weekly reports to Ger-

many been part of General Aniline's espionage since 1936 but these reports were still being sent by circuitous routes (after a state of war existed with Germany) \* \* \* the reports include films of secret United States military equipment, blueprints, microfilms, and data on designs of production of our new warships. Agfa Ansco, one of its subsidiaries, sold movie films under an agreement to develop them for all customers. Since some of its users were often Army, Navy, and Marine Corps personnel, Agfa received their films for developing prior to official censorship and could easily supply extra copies to Berlin. Moreover, through General Aniline's patented Ozalid process for reproduction of blueprints and drawings, it had access to nearly 3,500 industrial plants and to United States Naval Air Stations, whose Ozalid machines were serviced by General Aniline's agents. Through the company's Ozaphane process of microprinting, films of the Ordnance department of the Navy Department's latest developments were available. The complete story of the Navy's newest battleship was found on 35-millimeter film ready for immediate dispatch.—FRANCIS RUFUS BELLAMY, *Espionage Deluxe, Reader's Digest*, pages 36-44, May 1944.

As indicated in the foregoing chapters, on many occasions operations were so thoroughly complex that joint commands, joint intelligence centers, joint collection agencies, and other joint activities were essential. Joint establishments are not always possible, or even feasible, but at the same time it is desirable to know what is going on in the other commands whose activities are closely allied with one's own. United States naval observers were aboard British ships during the last war, studying tactical maneuvers and general strategy as well; and the British in turn had representatives for the same purpose aboard our warships during the large-scale carrier assaults in the central Pacific. Performing a function equally important were the observers or liaison officers for intelligence. The two functions frequently overlapped; an officer might observe for tactics and intelligence. But if operations were sufficiently complex, specialists in each field would be stationed with the other command. Fleet intelligence officers, naval observers attached to the staffs of naval attachés, air combat intelligence officers, photo interpreters—all were employed for liaison purposes. At times, the primary purpose might be to convey our methods and tactics to the other command; on other occasions it would be to study methods and tactics of the other command from which we might learn new

tricks. Most frequently, the task was a combination of the two, to give and receive.

By the end of the war, United States Naval Intelligence officers were aboard the ships of the British Pacific Fleet units, serving as air combat intelligence officers; on the staffs of the naval attachés in various capitals, chiefly London, where observers were stationed with RAF Fighter, Bomber, and Coastal Command Headquarters, and with the Air Ministry; in Southeast Asia, on the staff of the over-all commander, Lord Louis Mountbatten; with British headquarters in Cairo; and with various United States Army Air Forces, especially those stationed in North Africa, India, China, the Philippines, and the Marianas. The duties of liaison officers attached to over-all policy-forming commands, such as those in London, have been covered in a general sense elsewhere in this book. Furthermore, they are strongly akin to those of officers working in intelligence centers. The duties of liaison officers with fighting units, however, were frequently unique and thoroughly determined by the nature of the unit's activity. In some instances the liaison officer really became more than a mere go-between and assumed active operational duties with the unit to which he was temporarily attached. A few such examples follow.

When, in 1942, Air Combat Intelligence was first organized in our Navy, the model for such an organization was found in the intelligence unit of the Royal Air Force. Officers were sent to England to observe and study their methods of training and their operations, and when the training program was established over here, an RAF intelligence officer was billeted to the Naval Air Combat Intelligence School (NACIS) to advise on matters of curriculum and to instruct in the training school. At that time our problems in the Atlantic were the same as those of the British. Both countries were concentrating on the development of techniques for more efficient escort of convoy and antisubmarine tactics, and British methods, considerably ahead of ours, were extremely useful.

As carrier warfare developed in the Pacific, however, unforeseen problems arose, and new intelligence methods were devised to meet these emergencies. By the time British carriers, with

the Fleet Air Arm aboard, were ready to join us in the Pacific war, our procedures for air intelligence had been successfully tested in battle for many months and had become more or less standardized. Although the RAF had had an extensive intelligence organization, the Fleet Air Arm had none, and so the tables were turned. To staff their Pacific Fleet carriers with air intelligence officers, the British sent approximately 30 officers to NACIS and ANIS for training in our methods. As a further means of assistance, experienced ACIO's from our fleet were assigned to the ship's intelligence officer aboard each of five carriers. These officers were more than liaison officers in the usual sense; they actually fulfilled the duties of a ship's ACIO for the British. This made possible direct cooperation with the units of our fleet operating in the immediate area and also enabled us to assist them in developing their own organization and seeing it through the initial, formative stages. In addition, the intelligence officer was able to observe British methods and to pass on to our commands techniques and tactics which might contribute to greater efficiency in our own ranks. The profit was mutual.

The very nature of World War II in the Pacific required close coordination between the Navy, Army, and Air Forces. This was increasingly true as our forces engaged in more frequent large-scale amphibious operations and came closer to the Japanese Empire. To achieve coordinate effort and to minimize attacks on friendly forces, liaison was established between Army and Navy commands. Throughout the war, operational intelligence officers handled a great many of these liaison functions. In many cases it amounted merely to having intelligence officers in naval commands co-operate with Army officers in G-2 and A-2. In other cases it was often profitable to put intelligence officers on full-time liaison jobs.

In the Southwest Pacific, Naval Intelligence officers were assigned to the intelligence section of General MacArthur's staff. In addition, an intelligence officer was billeted to the Far Eastern Air Forces (the supreme Army Air Command in the theater) and to each of the Air Forces, Groups, and Wings comprising the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF). The Army, in turn, assigned intelligence officers for duty with Seventh Fleet Intelli-

gence Center (SEFIC). Liaison was also maintained with British and Australian forces.

In action, the liaison system was important to both branches of the armed forces. Army bombers on overwater strikes sometimes sighted Japanese shipping. This target information was immediately passed via the naval liaison officer (NLO) to Navy submarines or the Black Cat Squadrons—PBYS engaged in low-level night attacks. The submarines in turn often sighted convoys they were not able to attack. When this information was received, the NLO reviewed it, and, if the convoy was within range and an attack practicable, immediately brought it to the attention of the commanding general or his operations officer. Target information received from naval sources other than sightings by combat units was, in the Southwest Pacific area, handled by Army and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) officers assigned to SEFIC. With their intimate knowledge of Army communications and the location and capabilities of their respective units, they were able to disseminate information most expeditiously. The NLO's were important, too, in arranging details for combined operations such as Army air cover for Navy surface vessels, the landing of Army scouts by motor torpedo boats or submarines, or joint Army-Navy aerial attacks on the same target or in the same general area. To prevent attacks on friendly forces, it was important for Army pilots to be briefed on the location of friendly naval vessels they might encounter on any particular strike.

Liaison between Navy and Army provided the opportunity for presenting information of naval significance forcefully to General MacArthur and the major Army air commands. It provided an immediate source for any information the Army desired concerning the Navy, naval plans, or operations; it encouraged Army air strikes on Japanese shipping located by Navy submarines or patrol aircraft; and finally, it permitted rapid interchange of operational intelligence vital to both Army and Navy in planning and executing operations.

By the end of World War II there were roughly a dozen Naval Air Intelligence officers on duty with the Twentieth Air Force. Because of the presence of our major fleet units in the same operating area,

with countless aircraft from our fast carriers frequently hitting the same targets as those selected by the heavy bombers, or striking in the immediate area, it was especially necessary to insure that each command was adequately informed on the movements of the other command.

The principal function of the naval liaison officer operating with an AAF bomb wing was to effect close coordination between the squadrons and the naval forces operating in the area for which the wing was responsible. To attain this close coordination, it was essential that the air force and naval forces thus operating understand each other's capabilities and limitations. The broad picture of the missions had to be understood so that maximum effort might be exerted against the enemy at all times. A secondary but no less important function was to evaluate intelligence information concerning enemy naval and merchant shipping activity for the operating personnel of the wing.

Probably the most important single duty of the naval officers working with the Twentieth Air Force was to assume the responsibilities for intelligence on air-sea rescue. Crews were briefed on the standard operating procedure in effect, and given all information on the positions of rescue submarines and the geographical reference points from which the submarines and planes gave positions. Rescue tactics of flying boats, seaplanes, destroyers, or other craft were constantly reviewed, and the naval liaison officer was responsible for delivering to the bomber command all available naval source information for last-minute briefing, not only on air-sea rescue, but on any other subject which might be of interest to the Army flight crews.

In general, the naval liaison officer was expected to indoctrinate the bomber crews in Navy air-surface operating procedures and characteristics, the accurate method of reporting ship convoy sightings, carrier and amphibious task force operating characteristics, and any relevant information on naval data that might not be available in the normal Army intelligence channels. In turn, information on the bomber command that might be of use to naval forces was passed back to them by the liaison officer. The gain for both forces was considerable. As with many liaison assignments, the

efficiency depended to a large extent upon the initiative of the individual officer. He could do as much or as little as he pleased—a common condition for officers attached to commands for liaison purposes. But wherever naval liaison officers were assigned to Army billets, it was generally discovered that the Army lacked complete information on naval tactics and operations. His duty was clear, and he was on his own to see that it was performed.

The air ground aids section, China, was the subsidiary unit of the MIS-X service of the War Department operating from Kunming. It maintained an underground network of agents and cooperative natives, and set up walk-out routes through territory occupied by the enemy to make it possible for downed pilots to evade the Japanese and escape to a safe area. In the fall of 1944, in anticipation of air operations along the China coast, the United States Naval Group, China, with headquarters at Chungking, established liaison with AGAS China and ordered three ACIO's to Kunming for temporary duty. These officers made personal inspection surveys of Chekiang and Fukien provinces, the coastal region extending from Hankow to Amoy, to obtain E&E (evasion and escape) information and to organize "ratlines" for the walk-outs of pilots, forced down in this enemy-held section of China. The ACIO's briefed village chiefs throughout the coastal area on recognition of United States naval airmen and on the procedure to be followed to return the pilots to American hands. All possible information, including Pointie-Talkies, which were handy simplified booklets with useful Chinese and English words, was disseminated to Chinese civilian and military officials about the problem of rescuing our fliers. This work was possible because of the fluid state of the Japanese lines and the friendliness of the Chinese population.

Later, in the early part of 1945, two ACIO's were sent to the Pacific for briefing aviators and crewmen on evasion and escape along the China coast; one was sent to ComAirPac to brief carrier and land-based flight personnel, and the other was ordered to Com7thFleet and MIS-X to brief both Army and Navy air commands in the Philippine Islands on survival in East China.

In the meantime, the naval AGAS liaison complement was increased to nine ACIO's. They carried on the work along the coastal regions of East China and operated jointly with Army and Chinese personnel. The ACIO's went into areas that had not yet been surveyed and gave assistance wherever possible for successful evasion by both Army and Navy fliers.

Along with the actual recovery of many pilots and aircrewmembers, perhaps the greatest single achievement of this work was the increase in combat efficiency and the boosting of morale of flying personnel as a result of being thoroughly briefed on how to evade and escape. When they realized, particularly in China, that if their plane was forced down, they would in all probability be returned to American hands, many of their fears were dispelled.

When the naval unit was established at Kunming in May 1944, it embarked on a program designed to operate as closely as possible with other agencies of the Fourteenth AAF. This work was concerned with improving relations with AAF personnel, diplomatic attempts to direct the efforts of the Fourteenth AAF intelligence facilities along lines beneficial to fleet air commands, and patient, dogged collection of intelligence materials useful to fleet units. In return, the naval unit attempted to provide the Fourteenth AAF with accounts of fleet actions, tactics, techniques, and estimates of Jap air strength and tactics. Particularly valuable was the making available to the Fourteenth AAF of rapid communications with naval commands via naval group China at Chungking.

An important product of liaison was the establishment of a shipping center as a part of the naval unit at Kunming. Here information was received and intelligence prepared on shipping, in order to obtain for the Fourteenth and for the fleet as complete coverage on Japanese shipping as possible. This necessitated a long-range program involving drawing upon resources of the Fourteenth which included: Close scrutiny of all photographic coverage concerned with shipping and port facilities gathered by the photo reconnaissance agency of the Fourteenth; visual reports of ships seen by aircraft crews; and study of photos taken by hand-held cameras or cameras installed in gun turrets by crews in flight over ports or

China sea areas. In order to make this program more effective, naval photo interpreters trained in the Japanese Merchant Shipping Tonnage (JMST) system of ship recognition were used to analyze all photo runs and to extract identification material. It was also necessary to train the crews of the Fourteenth in the identification of ships so that their visual sightings would be more accurate, and the maximum amount of information could be obtained from the crews.

From this center, information on activities of ports along the southeast China coast, and compositions of convoys, routes, and trends in shipping, were made available and exchanged in the China area with agencies such as JICA, FEA, OSS, British Liaison Office, and naval attaché, Chungking.

When urgent information was received on shipping from an accurate visual sighting or from a photo run by the Fourteenth's planes, it was transmitted by radio direct to ComSubPac. And to speed up transmission of "hot shipping" despatches, photo interpreters and other Naval Intelligence officers were empowered to originate these despatches as soon as received for transmission to our submarines.

Another antishipping project that was carried out as a result of close cooperation between Army and Navy was minelaying in ports held by the Japanese along the China coast. These operations began in October 1943 when a B-24 dropped three Mark 13 mines in the approaches to Haiphong. Although the operation was a limited one, excellent results were recorded, and gradually the campaign was extended, taking in important coastal targets from Hong Kong to the upper Yangtze River. These mining operations proved to be extremely profitable, and much of this success may be attributed to the joint efforts of the Army and Navy personnel of the mine detail. While engaged in planning and carrying out these operations, the naval group was an integral part of the A-3 (Army Operations) organization.

Other results of liaison had to do with the collaborative preparation of intelligence on coastal areas, including beach, harbor, hydrographic, communications, defenses, and coastal airfields. The entire China coast was surveyed, and special de-



tailed surveys of particularly strategic areas were completed.

In the technical intelligence field, the unit used the Navy's technical air intelligence officers (TAIO's) together with Army teams in the China theater. Reports prepared by either service were processed for distribution within the theater at Headquarters Fourteenth AAF.

The over-all results of this naval unit in China produced much effective intelligence of strategic as well as tactical significance. Considering the circumscribed conditions under which forces were operating in China, even this arrangement left much to be desired; but it was a step in the right direction and proved once again that for effective operations, some degree of liaison between Army and Navy units is necessary in the field as well as in the higher echelons.

*Joint Activities*

During World War II, the problem of integrating Navy and Army Intelligence was continuously studied. The study considered all possibilities, ranging from complete merger to varying degrees of joint and allocated activities for improving the intelligence of the armed services. As a result of thorough analysis, it was determined that the merging of all activities was not feasible because of the highly specialized requirements of the Army and Navy.

Special joint and allocated activities were established, however, and saved much duplication and increased the operational efficiency of both services. Joint activities were carried out on particular phases of intelligence where the same basic materials would be likely to produce the specific type and form of intelligence needed by both Army and Navy commands. In those cases, Naval and Military Intelligence personnel worked side by side in ONI, MIS, or A-2 and under various theater commands, wherever it was necessary to establish close relations for joint effort. Allocated activities were carried out by the unit of Naval or Military Intelligence best qualified to perform specifically assigned intelligence services for both agencies.

During wartime, joint activities included the following:

- a. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).

- b. Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS).
- c. Joint Intelligence Collection Agencies (JICA).
- d. Joint Intelligence Agency Reception Center (JIARC).
- e. Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS).
- f. Graphic and Photographic Intelligence.
- g. Technical Intelligence Center.
- h. Joint P/W Interrogation Sections.
- i. Coordination of Japanese Air Intelligence.
- j. Analysis of Air Targets in War Against Japan.
- k. Collaboration in the Assessment of Enemy Shipping Losses.
- l. Assessment of Japanese Oil Position.
- m. Washington Document Center.
- n. Military Intelligence Research Section.
- o. Military Intelligence Research Section, Pacific.
- p. Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.
- q. Coordination in Enemy Alien Repatriation.

*Postwar Liaison and Joint Activities*

Earlier in this text we have referred to the Joint combined Chiefs of Staff, and the wartime importance of the principles of unity of effort and unity of command.


The peacetime importance of unity of effort and unity of command is emphasized in the following quotation from *Summary Report (Pacific War)* of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey:

The Survey has been impressed with the need for concrete and prompt action to encourage adequate research and development; to assure adequate intelligence during peacetime; to integrate our military establishments; and to increase the national appreciation of the necessity for continued strength of the United States as a force for peace.

Even though the United States did not achieve unity of command in the Pacific as a whole, each theater commander used the air, ground, and sea forces assigned to him as an integrated or coordinated team. Coordination and compromise among theater commanders was largely achieved in all major respects. Such lack of complete integration as existed was in large measure traceable back through the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the basic structure of our prewar military organization.

The lesson of the Pacific war strongly supported that form of organization which provides unity of com-

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
THE JOINT STAFF  
APPROVED 22 OCTOBER 1947



mand, capable of clear and effective decision at the top, strengthens civilian control and thus provides closer integration of military policy with foreign and domestic policy, and favors a high degree of coordination in planning, intelligence, and research and development. Such unity of command should, however, decentralize administrative burdens and permit specialized training and the free development of the component forces, even at the risk of some duplication.

Within a department of common defense which provides unity of command and is itself oriented toward air and new weapons, the survey believes that, in addition to the Army and the Navy, there should be an equal and coordinate position for a third establishment. To this establishment should be given primary responsibility for passive and active defense against long-range attack on our cities, industries, and other sustaining resources; for strategic attack, whether by airplane or guided missile; and for all air units other than carrier air and such land-based air units as can be more effective as component parts of the Army or Navy.

In this part of chapter XVI we are concerned with postwar developments in the question of the relationship of intelligence to national defense. The following topics will be considered:

1. Postwar Intelligence Agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group.
3. The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253).

It is evident that the main emphasis in the question of the defense of the United States has shifted from national to continental policy, and that we Americans are now more immediately concerned than ever before with hemispheric defense. Space does not permit of a fuller exposition of our increasingly close military relations with Canada, and with the Latin American Republics. It is sufficient to make the point that the trend is toward greater unity in the Western Hemisphere, while disunity still exists between world powers in the Security Council of the United Nations.

Unity of effort and unity of command within American armed services were achieved during World War II by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and were implemented on lower echelons by the various joint and liaison activities in which Naval Intelligence participated, as described in the first part of this chapter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to exist and to function in peacetime.

#### *Postwar Intelligence Agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

Of the many effective joint intelligence agencies which functioned in wartime under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only the following continue to exist in peacetime:

1. Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
2. Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS).
3. Publications Review Subcommittee (PRS).
4. Joint Committee for the Disclosure of Technical Information (JTI).
5. Joint Map and Photo Committee (JMPC).
6. Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA).
7. Joint Topographical Subcommittee (JTS).
8. Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board (JISPB).

The organization, membership, function, and procedure of the first two, JIC and JIS, will be briefly summarized below.

The Joint Intelligence Committee is the intelligence agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is composed of the following members under the chairmanship of the senior Army or Navy member:

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, now called the Director of Intelligence.

The Chief of Naval Intelligence.

The Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-2, United States Army Air Forces.

A representative of the Secretary of State.

The JIC, as directed or requested, or on its own initiative, provides intelligence for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting agencies, and advises and assists that body in matters of intelligence policy and coordination within JCS jurisdiction.

While the JIC cannot direct anyone except its own subcommittees to perform any action, it is authorized to request such information and assistance as may be required in connection with its duties and to establish special subcommittees on matters of continuing interest.

The Joint Intelligence Staff is the permanent working committee of the Joint Intelligence Committee; its membership consists of one or more full-time members appointed by each member of the JIC, and is under the chairmanship of the

senior Army or Navy member. Among other duties, it is the duty of the JIS to prepare material in answer to requests addressed to the JIC, and to conduct such other studies as may be directed by the JIC. The JIS, like the JIC, has authority to request information and assistance from other Government agencies.

The remaining six committees and subcommittees listed above after JIC and JIS are subordinate in varying degrees to those two bodies, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and perform functions implied or stated in their names.

#### *National Intelligence Authority and Central Intelligence Group*

At the end of the first part of this chapter, which dealt with wartime liaison and joint activities, it was stated that during World War II many degrees of coordination up to and including merger were studied in connection with the problem of integrating Army and Navy Intelligence, and that it was concluded that merger was not feasible during the war because of the separate highly specialized requirements of the Army and the Navy.

Subsequent to VJ-day, however, the question of unification or merger of the armed forces became a live issue, and different plans to that end were advanced. Congressional hearings on the Pearl Harbor disaster highlighted the necessity for streamlining national defense, and the failure of our national intelligence to forewarn us of Japanese attack as brought out in those hearings emphasized the vital role of intelligence in our defense plans.

While the question of the unification of the armed forces was being hotly debated on Capitol Hill and in the War and Navy Departments, President Truman, in a letter dated 22 January 1946, directed to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, directed the establishment of a National Intelligence Authority and a Central Intelligence Group.

The National Intelligence Authority called for in the above-mentioned Presidential directive was established; it consisted of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, plus a representative designated by the President. In addition, the Director of Central Intelligence sat as a nonvoting member. The NIA proceeded to form the Central Intelligence Group.

The duties of the Director of Central Intelligence as set forth in the directive fell within the scope of what is called "strategic and national policy intelligence." It should be noted that no police, law-enforcement, or internal-security functions were to be exercised under the directive. These remained within the province of other Government agencies in accordance with the delimitation agreement discussed in an earlier chapter. This safeguard, and the specific denial of authority to make investigations within the continental United States and its possessions, were necessary to prevent CIG from developing into a police-state organization similar to the Gestapo and NKVD.

It was also provided in the directive that existing intelligence agencies of the three Departments continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence.

On 10 February 1947 George C. Marshall, the New Secretary of State, moved to give the State Department its first centralized, independent research and intelligence organization. The State Department announcement was summarized in the Washington Post on 11 February as follows:

A laconic announcement from the Department marked the end of a long and sometimes bitter internal struggle over the proper functions and structure of the political intelligence units inherited from the wartime Office of Strategic Services.

"A realignment of the intelligence organization within the Department of State is now in process," the announcement said. "The administration of all research and intelligence units, including the regional research divisions, is being centered in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary, William A. Eddy."

Colonel Eddy is the Arabic scholar whom President Roosevelt sent to North Africa to pave the way for the 1942 invasion, and later appointed as the first United States Minister to Saudi Arabia.

This reorganization took authority away from the powerful geographical area desks and placed it under one man, Colonel Eddy, who is now responsible for providing Secretary Marshall and all sections of the Department with the reports and other information they need for deciding policy. Thus the trend toward centralizing and streamlining national intelligence functions may be seen to have extended to at least one of the principal Executive Departments.

The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253)

Bill S. 758, the short title of which is "The National Security Act of 1947," is formally entitled as follows:

A bill to promote the national security by providing for a National Defense Establishment which shall be administered by a Secretary of National Defense, and for a Department of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force within the National Defense Establishment, and for the coordination of the activities of the National Defense Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security.

Hearings on bill S. 758 began on 18 March 1947 before the Senate Committee on Armed Services; interested students are referred to the testimony as printed in three parts by the United States Government Printing Office.

From this testimony, the following statement by Secretary of the Navy Forrestal is quoted because of its reference to the broadened scope of war, to which we have referred in Chapter I of this text:

It is clear to me that the experience of the past war made necessary certain changes in our governmental system for national security. Both World Wars showed that modern total warfare requires more than an army or a navy. It requires the use of agencies of Government other than the military departments, and in fact every department of the Government had a part in the last war. Military strength today is not merely military power but it is economic and industrial strength. I might say also that it is fiscal strength. It is technological resourcefulness, and it touches every field of knowledge. It is science, history, and politics, on the part of the military men, and a perceptive attitude as to the part played by government itself, and I mean by that that the military men have to be conscious of the meaning of democracy. Men fight not for abstractions, but for the concrete things that they can visualize in terms of their own country.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat that this bill, in my opinion, provides an equitable and workable framework for the integration of all the agencies of the Government concerned with national defense. Therefore, it prepares our country for modern warfare which is not only military but is also economic and is world-wide, and it is above all else industrial and scientific in the sense of the uses of applied science.

Secretary of War Patterson, also testifying in support of the bill, maintained that the days were over when the Army and Navy could operate independently, for war was a matter of teamwork now,


and air power had clearly established its right to be placed in a position of parity with land power and sea power. World War II, he continued, proved that unity of command on the battlefield was vital—"the old idea of voluntary cooperation in military operations received its death blow at Pearl Harbor." If unity of command were good on the battlefield, he stated, it was also necessary at the seat of military-naval planning in Washington.

Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, testifying before the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, House of Representatives, in support of the intelligence provisions of The National Security Act of 1947, defined national intelligence, a new concept born of the intelligence experience of World War II. National intelligence supplements but does not, as some people believe, replace, departmental intelligence. The following quotation from General Vandenberg makes clear the distinction:

The importance of research to the Central Intelligence Agency becomes evident when we start to deal with intelligence on a national as distinguished from a departmental level. The research provided by the central agency must be turned to the production of estimates in the field of national intelligence. National intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in character, which is required by the President and other high officials and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war, and for the advancement of broad national policy. National intelligence is that broad political-economic-military area, of concern to more than one agency. It must be objective, and it must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department.

Briefly, bill S. 758 provided for a National Defense Establishment, consisting of the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force, and for the designation of a Secretary of National Defense to head the National Defense Establishment. Within the National Defense Establishment there was to be a National Security Council, composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Secretaries of the three armed services. The Central Intelligence Agency was, in the proposed legislation, to take the place of the then existing Central Intelligence Group, which, as we have shown, had been created by Executive order

ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY



30 SEPTEMBER 1947

of the President in 1946 under an agency called the National Intelligence Authority. The Central Intelligence Agency would be the intelligence section of the National Security Council, just as the Office of Naval Intelligence is the intelligence section of the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations.

After certain changes had been incorporated, The National Security Act of 1947 was passed by both Houses of Congress, was signed by the President, and became Public Law 253. The National Defense Establishment which had been proposed in bill 758 was changed, in the act as passed, to the National Military Establishment, and the title of the Secretary of National Defense was shortened to Secretary of Defense.

Section 2 of Public Law 253 consists of a declaration of policy, as follows:

In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide three military departments for the operation and administration of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified direction under civilian control but not to merge them; to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and for their operation under unified control and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.

Section 101 established the National Security Council, broadened to include more members than originally proposed. In the language of this section, it shall be the duty of the council—

(1) To assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and

(2) To consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.

Section 102 established the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Council, for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and

agencies in the interest of national security, and assigned to it the following duties:

(1) To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

(2) To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

(3) To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: *Provided*, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: *Provided further*, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: *And provided further*, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(4) To perform, for the benefit of the existing agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

(5) To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, a temporary wartime body, was for the first time legally established by section 211 of Public Law 253, which states that it shall consist of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, if there be one. Section 211 further states that, subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it shall be the duty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—

(1) To prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the military forces;

(2) To prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with such plans;

(3) To establish unified command in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

(4) To formulate policies for joint training of the military forces;

(5) To formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the military forces;

(6) To review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; and

(7) To provide United States representation on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

As in World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff act as principal military advisers to the President; they now are charged, under section 211, with act-

ing as principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Section 212 provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a Joint Staff not to exceed 100 officers, and to be composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from each of the 3 armed services. Certain of the joint committees described earlier in this chapter are thus given legal authorization to continue to function in peacetime.

## CHAPTER XVII

## SUMMARY

In this text it has been our objective to present the subject of Naval Intelligence within the broader framework of national intelligence, from the viewpoint of 1947 but with special reference to developments which occurred during and after World War II.

At the very outset, in chapter I, we discussed the enhanced scope and speed of war, the importance of intelligence in peacetime, and certain mental qualities which the intelligence officer ought to possess. The point was made that the distinction between war and peace, and between operational and strategic intelligence, is not clear-cut. These ideas were further developed in subsequent chapters.

Chapter II introduced the reader to the organization and mission of Naval Intelligence; chapter III described the three primary functions which Naval Intelligence officers perform in support of that mission—collection, processing, and dissemination.

While the distinction between operational and strategic intelligence is at best an arbitrary one, we made that distinction in Part Two: Strategic Intelligence, and Part Three: Operational Intelligence. The categories of strategic intelligence were grouped into chapters in Part Two; the principal types of operational intelligence were exemplified in Part Three. The Progression from Part Two to Part Three was, by and large, that from the general to the specific. The emphasis in both parts is historical; war history has both its general strategic and its specific operational aspects, and the latter contain more material of purely naval interest.

Part Three consisted of one chapter on the subject of counterintelligence. Part Four, by way of conclusion, contained a study of the liaison and joint activities in which Naval Intelligence participated in World War II, with reference also to those, in which it continues to participate. The National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253) was discussed, and portions of the legislation which relate to the subject of intelligence were quoted.

The matter of joint and liaison activities was reserved for the last chapter before this brief summary because it represents a trend established in time of war which is even more noticeable in the postwar period, at various institutions of higher military learning, including the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, the Navy War College, and the United States Navy Intelligence School, which is part of the Postgraduate School of the Naval Academy.

Training of the armed forces, including intelligence training, is of urgent importance in time of war, of paramount importance in time of ostensible peace, when wars continue to be conducted on diplomatic, political, and economic levels. The officer who is or aspires to be an intelligence specialist must realize this, and take both his formal and his informal training seriously. His formal training is administered in lectures and discussions and through assignments in such texts as this. His informal training must be self-administered; it should consist of broad reading and deep and narrow research, carried on not as a spasmodic but as a sustained activity, for the purpose of cultivating more comprehensive knowledge and greater flexibility of mind. The student who mistakenly assumes that this text is the final word on the subject of naval intelligence will have sadly misjudged its content; on the other hand, the student who reads it critically, regarding it rather as a springboard from which his own thoughts may soar, will have correctly evaluated its purpose. But even the inquiring mind is not enough; it must be supplemented by the active will to undertake independent research and analysis.

If it is true that intelligence is our first line of defense in time of ostensible peace, then it follows that our intelligence officers must be aware of and equal to the role they are called upon to play. It is hoped that this text will help to prepare them for the execution of their lifetime mission, than which no other mission is more important and more exacting.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the material covered in the preceding chapters. It is intended to serve as a guide for the student in his study of the subject of intelligence and related subjects. The material is presented in a logical and systematic manner, and it is hoped that this text will help to prepare the student for the execution of their future assignments which are of great importance and value.

The first part of the chapter deals with the history of intelligence and the role of the intelligence officer. It is pointed out that intelligence is not a new phenomenon, but has existed since the beginning of time. The role of the intelligence officer is to gather, analyze, and disseminate information that is useful to the command. This role is of great importance, and the intelligence officer must be well trained and equipped to perform his duties.

The second part of the chapter deals with the organization of intelligence. It is pointed out that intelligence is a complex activity, and it requires the cooperation of many different agencies and individuals. The organization of intelligence must be such that it can function effectively and efficiently. This requires a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each agency and individual, and a system of communication that allows for the free flow of information.

The third part of the chapter deals with the methods of intelligence. It is pointed out that there are many different methods of intelligence, and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. The intelligence officer must be able to use all of these methods, and must be able to evaluate the results of each method. This requires a high degree of skill and judgment, and the intelligence officer must be well trained in all of these areas.

The fourth part of the chapter deals with the dissemination of intelligence. It is pointed out that intelligence is of little value unless it is disseminated to the command. The intelligence officer must be able to communicate the results of his work in a clear and concise manner, and must be able to answer questions and provide explanations as needed. This requires a high degree of communication skills, and the intelligence officer must be well trained in this area.

The fifth part of the chapter deals with the future of intelligence. It is pointed out that intelligence is a constantly evolving field, and the intelligence officer must be able to keep up with the latest developments. This requires a high degree of flexibility and adaptability, and the intelligence officer must be well trained in these areas.

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APPENDIX A

SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography has been compiled for the purpose of assisting readers of this text to broaden their knowledge of intelligence and related subjects. It does not pretend by any means to completeness. Official United States Navy manuals and directives have been omitted, largely because they tend to be highly classified and highly specialized, with the exception of the following basic publications with which all Naval Intelligence officers should be familiar:

- Naval Intelligence Directive (Operational Intelligence).
- Naval Intelligence Manual (ONI-19 (A)).
- Operational Functions of Command, including Sound Military Decision.

Because of space limitations, no attempt has been made to list the many magazine articles which are pertinent to the subject of intelligence in modern war.

Some books on public speaking and written English have been included because fluency in his native tongue is essential to the intelligence officer.

The major emphasis in this bibliography has been placed on the interim period between World Wars I and II, and on World War II. Most of the books listed are available in, or can be obtained by, the average library. Following the date of publication, brief descriptive phrases have been added, where necessary to identify the subject matter of the book. The inclusion of a title does not necessarily mean that the Chief of Naval Intelligence concurs in the ideas expressed by the author. It is desired that students cultivate their own judgments, and that this bibliography be supplemented by each student, on his own initiative, as research turns up other titles, or as new titles are published.

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