

ANNEX E

A. SURVEY OF THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM

(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Fascist leadership has faced the problem of persuading a very non-bellicose population, still bearing hurts from the last war, inflation, the depression, Ethiopia, Spain, and over-taxation to fight in alliance with the most feared and hated nation in Europe, for territories few Italians wanted. Added to these problems was the graver one, from the point of view of Fascist leaders, that Italy was wearying of Fascism itself.

The survival of Britain, the terrible costs of the Greek, Russian, and Libyan wars, and the entry of the United States into the war have further encumbered Fascist psychologists. Their efforts have been directed at belittling the enemies, at exalting Axis invincibility, and at making promises, now reiterated over eighteen years, of better times when these glorious tasks have been achieved.

(2) Effect desired

The main tasks of Italian psychological warfare are

B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation

(a) Strengths

1. Fascism's 20-year record. Whatever the facts, it succeeded in convincing a substantial part of Italy's population that it had overcome bolshevism, anarchy, and foreign disdain. It also impressed foreigners with that view of the situation. In these triumphs of propaganda it exploited Italian defeatism, 1919-1923, and succeeded in curtaining off many of its own weaknesses.
2. Strong sentimental affections for Italy found among American and British tourists and residents.
3. The glorious reflections of the Roman Empire and the Italian Renaissance.
4. Catholic respect for the Italian head of the church (exploitable after 1929).
5. The peculiar ties of emigrant Italians to Italy.

(b) Weaknesses

1. All skeptical, shrewd Italians (who prize shrewd skepticism) are now susceptible to a propaganda which compliments them for having taken Fascism with a grain of salt.
2. Discontent with a visibly worsening material situation.
3. Weariness with Fascism.
4. Fear of Italy becoming a battleground.
5. Antipathy to German "occupanti."
6. Low state of Italian morale.

(2) Strength and weakness in the organizational set-up

(a) Strength

The strength in the Fascist set-up for psychological warfare has been chiefly the strength of Mussolini himself as publicity man, editor, mouthpiece, stage designer, plot-writer, and chief actor.

In Italy all information facilities and all propaganda and psychological operations facilities are under the Ministry for Popular Culture. This makes for an effective into-

(b) Weakness

The greatest weakness in the whole imposing pattern of bureaus and organizations lies in the fact that too few of the human beings engaged in doing the actual work care very much that it be done fast and efficiently. That attitude stems partly from quiet contempt for Fascism, partly from indifference, and partly from an attitude toward time and grinding accurate detail work which defies correction. Graft and nepotism have placed incompetents in office and discouraged competent men.

ANNEX F

A. SURVEY OF THE ENEMY'S PROBLEM

(1) Summary of the enemy situation

Japan's decision to take over the Southeast Asiatic and Western Pacific area by force meant declaring war on the United States and Britain because of their interests in the area and presented a situation which needed justification to the people at home and the people in Asia, as well as to such neutral areas as Latin America.

Japan's psychological warfare in Southeast Asia, based upon early studies of the social attitudes of the native peoples, paid her big dividends in her southward drive and is continuing to do so. Thus far her psychological warfare has principally been based upon the appeal of "Asia for the Asiatics" and of freedom of the native peoples from Caucasian rule, although it has also been directed toward capitalizing on existing political, social, and religious lines of cleavage among the United Nations.

(2) Effects desired

(a) In Southeast Asia

the various Caucasian overlords.

2. To intimidate the British, Dutch, and Americans to give up without fighting.
3. To gain the active cooperation of the Malaysians in reestablishing the areas economically and politically, in order to create a Greater East Asia with Japan as the directing (and exploiting) nation.

(b) In the United States

1. To exploit lines of social cleavage in the United States through appeals to ethnic, social, and religious groups with different interests, some of them with grievances against the groups in political power.
2. To divide the United States from Britain and Russia.

(c) In China

1. To persuade the Chungking government that further resistance is useless.
2. To discredit the Chungking government in the eyes of the Chinese people.

(d) In Latin America

1. To persuade these countries to remain neutral.

2. To persuade them to unite in opposing
the United States war efforts.

B. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

(1) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation

(a) Strengths

1. The widespread resentment in Southeast Asia of the white man as ruler and exploiter, together with the fact that Japan is herself an Asiatic nation which has successfully defied the white man in Russia, Manchuria, Burma, N.E.I., the Philippines and more recently in Indo-China - this situation giving great force to the slogan "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere".
2. The extremely small numbers of ruling Europeans in relation to the large native populations.
3. Japan as aggressor is a single unified nation, whereas the defenders of the region are from different nations and speak different languages.
4. Japan's unified communication facilities, compared with the scattered and poorly coordinated ones of the various European powers in the area.
5. Japan's high morale at home. The people

believe wholeheartedly in Japan's mission
and in her ability to win the war.

6. The complete psychological unpreparedness of the United States for the war,
7. America's distance from the field of operations is a psychological as well as a physical asset to Japan.
8. The series of defeats China has suffered during the past decade constitute a Japanese strength. Japan occupied most of the important coastal areas as well as large sections of the interior.
9. The countries of Latin America have always borne the United States a grudge as an overbearing neighbor.
10. The long unprotected coasts of many Latin American countries create a fear of attack that constitutes a Japanese asset.

(b) Weaknesses

1. The prestige of the United States in some parts of Southeast Asia. Many Filipinos are willing to lay down their lives to push the Japanese out of the Philippines.

3. Japan's arrogant policy since her con-

quests may be counted on to have disil-

lusioned many Malayan and Indonesian nation-

alists who now wish to see Japan defeated.

Brutal policy in many conquered areas.

4. The entrance of the United States in the

war and lend lease aid have given China

psychological strength to continue resist-

ance to Japan.

5. In the United States, the will to fight,

once attacked, is great. Japan grossly

underestimated this aspect of American

psychology when she attacked Pearl Harbor.

6. Desire for liberty and revenge on the

part of the more evolved elements such as

the Filipinos, Koreans, and the Thai.

7. Close ties of Latin-American republics

with the United States, and their fear

of Japanese fifth-columns.

(2) Strength and weakness in the organizational set-up

(a) Strength

As a result of a series of government reorgani-

work together in such a way as to reduce inconsistency and conflict. This has given great strength to her psychological warfare, particularly in Southeast Asia.

(b) Weakness

While the various branches of the government in Japan have been coordinated, there is evidence that there still exist inter-bureaucratic jealousies, that the radio broadcasters do not always know what the army is doing, etc.

Japanese intelligence activities have proven weak in their analyses of United States and Latin America, judging from the ineptness of Japanese propaganda to this country.

APPENDIX TO ANNEX F

Aspects of Japanese Propaganda to America

Showing Lack of Insight into American Reactions

The evaluation of the successfulness of broadcast material is usually left to the individual opinion of "competent observers" who may disagree widely among themselves. There is considerable agreement that Japanese broadcasts, especially in the early months of the war, were poor from the technical and propagandistic standpoint. Persons who have heard such broadcasts indicate that the language was often imperfect, and attempts at humor and drama "hammy." More important, perhaps, but at the same time harder to evaluate are instances in which major propaganda themes were so illadvisedly taken as to have exactly the opposite effect intended. The following are thought to be examples of such themes:

1. Telling Americans that they are soft, luxury-loving, unwilling to sacrifice or to fight. Describing to Americans from Tokyo a supposed state of extreme chaos and panic existing in America. Accusing American troops of cowardice. (Errors of this general nature are common to many broadcasters talking to enemy audiences. It is a truism that insulting your audience as a whole is never effective until that audience is near real panic and can be included in the actual sphere of military operations.)

his wife and child and to secure his own personal safety. From the standpoint of Japanese values, MacArthur's act might appear in this light. The Japanese apparently missed the fact, however, that to the American audience, the escape was a morale boost. This is a typical example of expecting an enemy audience's values to be similar to one's own.

3. The extreme claims of "total annihilation" of American naval forces which were made after Pearl Harbor and after every subsequent naval engagement, including Midway and the current Solomons encounter, probably negate some of the propaganda value of the genuine Japanese victories. Such assertions immediately fit into the popular American stereotype of "propaganda," while more qualified descriptions might well have been believed.

4. Other propaganda boners probably include the allegations of American atrocities, especially the Quezon murder which was so completely refuted. A general lack of humor, presence of inappropriate humor, and dullness are also said to characterize Japanese broadcasts.

Appended are excerpts from Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service "Quarterly Review" on Japanese programs to America, and excerpts from Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service "Weekly Analysis" of Foreign broadcasts illustrating various of the points just mentioned.

"Quarterly Review" of the Foreign Broadcast
Monitoring Service of FCC, Covering from
December 1, 1941 to March 1, 1942, pp. 34-35

General characteristics: Tokyo's broadcasts to North America are, on the whole, less organized and show less insight than those beamed to Pacific islands and the Asiatic continent. There is no successful accommodation to the needs and habits of the typical American listener, except perhaps in the case of the "Prisoners' Information Service." Because Americans are accustomed to taking a certain amount of entertainment, subtlety and humor with their "propaganda," Tokyo's humorless attacks on American leaders would antagonize all but the most anti-Administration listeners.

Radio Tokyo has little if any regard for truthful reporting. The speakers regularly and blandly announce the capture of military objectives long in advance of the actual capture, and even in the absence of any capture. It puts words in the mouths of American leaders, and twists events unrecognizably. It never admits a Japanese defeat or setback, and in the four years of war in China the admissions even of "planned withdrawals" could probably be counted on the fingers of one hand. If the broadcasts were watched with this in mind, their lack of reliability and consistency would leave the radio open to almost daily counter-attacks. . . .

Mechanical Characteristics: The broadcasts are often handled sloppily from a purely mechanical point of view. Programs are shifted to different schedules and frequencies without previous notice. The speakers tumble over their lines as though they had never rehearsed. Often the English is very poor, both in pronunciation and grammar. Dozens of completely different news items are crowded into each new broadcast so the listener is apt to carry away no specific clearly-remembered information. Perhaps the best thing that can be said for the mechanics of Japanese broadcasts to North America is that the transmitters operate on such powerful wave-lengths that they can be received on ordinary short-wave attachments, at least on the West Coast.

Excerpts from "Weekly Analysis of Official Foreign
Broadcasts" of the Foreign Broadcast
Monitoring Service of FCC

December 18

The stupidity of the American military command is dwelt on. Tall stories are related of American forces shooting down their own planes, killing their own men, sinking their own boats. Americans are crying with one voice, "Where are our famous defenses?" "Why are we such easy marks for the Japanese," "A winter of discontent is settling down over America."

January 29

Tokyo reports that American sailors on freighters plying between North and South America are going on strike "to the great embarrassment of American marine authorities." The sailors are saying, "We don't want to risk our lives by navigating the dangerous American coast under the unreliable protection of the American Navy."

February 19

The atmosphere in America is one of nightmarish, hysterical insincerity because Americans, like the French, are unwilling to give up their everyday luxuries.

March 5

Helplessness of so-called democracies at war one of the major evils . . . is America's "mixed racial strain" which militates against unity and commonalty of purpose soft living, as Tokyo puts it, is another deep-seated source of American weakness. The defenders of Wake who lived in the lap of luxury in a formidably equipped fortress surrendered mockly after resisting only one day.

March 12

American crimes: the "black crime" being perpetrated against 120,000 innocent Japanese and Nisei on the West Coast is officially condemned by a spokesman of the Board of Information who seizes the opportunity to express their "heart-felt sympathy" for the victims of American xenophobia. Tokyo contrasts its own policy toward civilians

March 26

Nichi-Nichi editorial on "hysterical . . . wanton . . . brutal . . . defeatist" destruction of the Japanese cherry blossoms "on the eve of their blooming."


March 26

"A bunch of suckers": Tokyo describes MacArthur's escape as being a great blow to the rank and file of the men left "in the jaws of death" and "deserted in the hell-hole of Bataan." In Japan, American listeners are repeatedly told, MacArthur would be executed for abandoning his helpless comrades in their hour of greatest need. The radio puts on a playlet, called "MacArthur's Last Stand," laid in the general's "bedroom-study" at Corregidor, in which General and Mrs. MacArthur and High Commissioner Sayre all play ignominious roles. President Quezon, the hero, tries to prevail upon MacArthur to stick to his post, but the General replies, "I'm getting out of here. We've been a bunch of suckers for those blockheads at Washington.... Say, I've got it! The defense of the Philippines will be left to Jonathan Wainwright. He deserves that 'honor,' the rat. I think I've been the cockeyed hero just a bit too long." If Tokyo has its way, General MacArthur will not long remain on the pedestal where the American people have placed him.

April 16


Captured American soldiers are described as telling all in a most unsoldierly manner and making treasonous "confessions" concerning their president and superior officers. "Amazing are the disclosures of these so-called heroes of Bataan."

Possible Organization for Psychological Warfare
 (Corresponding to Second (1946-1947) (1948-1949) (1950-1951) (1952-1953) (1954-1955) (1956-1957) (1958-1959) (1960-1961) (1962-1963) (1964-1965) (1966-1967) (1968-1969) (1970-1971) (1972-1973) (1974-1975) (1976-1977) (1978-1979) (1980-1981) (1982-1983) (1984-1985) (1986-1987) (1988-1989) (1990-1991) (1992-1993) (1994-1995) (1996-1997) (1998-1999) (2000-2001) (2002-2003) (2004-2005) (2006-2007) (2008-2009) (2010-2011) (2012-2013) (2014-2015) (2016-2017) (2018-2019) (2020-2021) (2022-2023) (2024-2025))



* Only those branches and activities concerned with psychological warfare

Existing Organization of Agencies concerned with Psychological Warfare-U.S.



Organization of Propaganda Agencies — Germany

FOREIGN PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

I NAZI PARTY	II FOREIGN OFFICE (Ribbentrop)	III PROPAGANDA MINISTRY	IV REICH GOVERNMENT	V LABOR FRONT	VI HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES	VII CORPORATIONS OF THE PUBLIC	VIII ASSOCIATIONS, ETC.
<p>(A) DEPT. OF FOREIGN POLITICS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reporters on Foreign Countries 2. Foreign Trade 3. Press 4. Cultural Co-operation 5. Dept. of Special Tasks 6. Academy of Foreign Politics, Berlin. 7. German Academy, Munich 8. Geographical Seminary, Munich. <p>(B) FOREIGN ORGANIZATION OF THE PARTY (Dohe)</p> <p>(a) District leaders abroad and on board seafaring vessels. (b) Leaders of bases abroad. (Stützpunktleiter)</p> <p>1-8. Offices of foreign countries: (a) Section III - U.S. (b) Section IX - Latin America</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 9. Shipping 10. Labor Front Abroad 11. Officials Abroad 12. Editors Abroad 13. Teachers Abroad 14. Students Abroad 15. Women & Youth Movement 16. Foreign Trade 17. Foreign Inspection 18. Dept. of Culture 19. Press 20. Speakers' Bureau 21. Dept. of Repatriation 22. Dept. of Education (a) Reich School for Germans Abroad and Seafarers, Danneberg, Altona <p>(C) PROPAGANDA LEADER</p> <p>(D) CHIEF OF PRESS Foreign Press Dept.</p> <p>(E) LABOR ORGANIZATION (NSBO) Foreign Press & Propaganda</p> <p>(F) PEASANT LEADER</p> <p>(G) JUDICIAL LEADER</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alliance of German Jurists, Foreign Dept., Nagan 2. Dept. of International Law 3. Foreign Organizations. <p>(H) YOUTH LEADER Section AR - Foreign Activities</p> <p>(I) STUDENT LEADER Section II - Foreign Office</p> <p>(K) WOMAN LEADER Foreign Organization</p> <p>(L) WELFARE LEADER Organizations to collect donations abroad.</p>	<p>(A) CENTRAL ORGANIZATION</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Section II - West & South-Eastern Europe 2. Section III - Britain and the Americas 3. Eastern Europe, East Asia 4. Section XI - Question of Cultural Politics 5. Section D - Press. <p>(B) BUREAU RIBBENTROP</p> <p>(C) CHIEF OF FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS (In co-operation with the Foreign Organization of the Party.)</p> <p>(D) DIPLOMATIC & CONSULAR CORPS</p> <p>(E) REICH OFFICE OF FOREIGN TRADE</p> <p>(F) GERMANO-ROMAN COMMISSION (Headquarters in Frankfurt a. M., branches at Rome, Athens, Istanbul; Cairo branch now closed.)</p>	<p>Section II - Propaganda and Tourist Traffic. III - Radio IV - Press V - Films VIII - Counterpropaganda. Foreign Press Section</p>	<p>(A) INTERIOR MINISTRY Dept. of Emigration</p> <p>(B) MINISTRY OF SCIENCES Exchange of Students and Educators</p>	<p>Dept. of Travels Foreign Dept. Foreign Propaganda Dept.</p>	<p>Dept. of Propaganda and Publicity Foreign Office</p>	<p>(A) GERMAN INDUSTRIES</p> <p>Section I - International Trade, Radio, Film, Literature. Section II - Foreign Trade Policy, Foreign Trade, Intelligence on Foreign Trade, Co-operation with Foreign Trade Organizations. Section V - Propaganda for special purposes Section XII - Defense</p> <p>(B) STUDENTS Section II - Foreign Bureau</p> <p>(C) JURISTS Friends of the Academy of German Law</p> <p>(D) EX-SERVICE MEN'S ORGANIZATIONS Steinhilber Abroad, Riffhäuser Bund Abroad, etc.</p> <p>(E) EDUCATORS Foreign Dept. of Teachers' Alliance</p> <p>(F) MEDICAL PROFESSIONS Foreign Dept.</p>	<p>(A) Association of German Societies Abroad, Berlin. (B) Alliance of Germans Abroad, Berlin. (C) German Societies Institute, Stuttgart. (D) Alliance of German Physicians, Berlin. (E) Association of German Ethnographical Groups in Europe, Berlin. (F) Alliance of Foreign Germans, Berlin.</p>

DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

I NAZI PARTY	II PROPAGANDA MINISTRY	III REICH GOVERNMENT	IV LABOR FRONT (E. A. G.)	V LABOR SERVICE (G. H. F.)	VI HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES (Field Marshal Keitel)	VII CORPORATIONS OF THE PUBLIC
<p>(A) PROPAGANDA LEADER (Dr. Goebbels)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Active Propaganda 2. Dept. of Radio 3. Dept. of Film 4. Dept. of Culture 5. Dept. of Press Propaganda 6. Dept. of Speaker-Material 7. Reichsring of Propaganda <p>(B) CHIEF OF PRESS (Dr. Dietrich)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Press Politics 2. Information & News Services 3. Press/Political Apparatus <p>(C) INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION (Alfred Rosenberg)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Education 2. Philosophical Information 3. Dept. of History 4. Cultivation of Art 5. Cultivation of Literature 6. Cultivation of Sciences 7. Dept. of Nordic Questions <p>(D) STORM-TROOPS (Viktor Lutza)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Press & Propaganda 2. Dept. of World Outlook 3. Reich Leader School, Munich 4. Regional Leader School, Dresden <p>(E) ELITE GUARD (Heinrich Himmler)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Race & Settlement 2. Dept. of Domestic Security 3. Leader Schools <p>(F) YOUTH LEADER (Baldur von Schirach)</p> <p>Section S - Education P - Press & Propaganda R - Radio E - Sports H - Hostels</p> <p>(G) JUDICIAL LEADER</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alliance of German Jurists 2. Academy of German Law <p>(H) STUDENT LEADER</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Section I - Political Education Section V - Enlightenment and Propaganda. 2. Alliance of Students (a) Education 	<p>(A) CENTRAL ORGANIZATION</p> <p>Section: II - Propaganda. III - Radio. IV - Press. V - Films VI - Theater Music, the Arts VII - Preventive Propaganda.</p> <p>(B) SUBDIVISIONS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 31 Regional Offices. 2. Chamber of Culture. 3. German Academy of Politics. 	<p>(A) INTERIOR MINISTRY (Dr. Frick)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Inner Politics 2. Dept. of German Folkdom 3. Dept. of Education, Sciences, and Sports 4. Advisor on Race Studies 5. Various Scientific Organizations <p>(B) MIN. of AGRICULTURE (Dr. Darré)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political Assistant 2. Dept. of Rural Traditions and Peasant Universities 3. Propaganda 4. Press <p>(C) MINISTRY OF SCIENCES (Ruß)</p>	<p>(A) CENTRAL ORGANIZATION</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Propaganda and Publicity 2. Dept. of Culture 3. Dept. of Education <p>(B) STORM-TROOPS</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Dept. of Propaganda and Publicity 2. Dept. of Culture 3. Dept. of Education 	<p>Section I - Settlement II - Education III - Propaganda IV - Education of Leader Schools V - Political Education VI - Administration</p>	<p>(A) Press Division. (B) Intelligence Division. (C) German Society of Military Politics & Military Sciences.</p>	<p>(A) Jurists. (B) Medical Professions. (C) Physicians and other Technological Professions. (D) Ex-Service Men's Organizations. (E) Welfare Organizations. (F) Teachers. (G) Students. (a) Political Education, (a) Enlightenment and propaganda, and many more.</p>

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
Principal Psychological Warfare Agencies—Italy

(Broad Outline)

FASCIST PARTY (<i>Home and Abroad</i>)	MINISTRY of POPULAR CULTURE	FOREIGN MINISTRY	ARMED FORCES (<i>Army, Navy, Ai.</i>)
<p>Fasci all 'Estero (Directing activist leaders)</p> <p>Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (National association of veterans)</p> <p>Dopolavoro (Recreation and Social—film, radio, print, etc., in cooperation with Ministry of Popular Culture)</p> <p>Opera Nazionale Balilla (Militaristic youth organization)</p> <p>Fascist Militia (Largely in Italy)</p> <p>Opera Volontaria Repressione Anti-Fascista-OVRA (Secret police dominated by Gestapo)</p>	<p>Special bureaus to control and/or operate companies, associations, etc., with respect to:</p> <p>Press Home Stefani Agency</p> <p>Radio Home and abroad</p> <p>Films</p> <p>Publications (Cooperation with Ministry of Education)</p> <p>Cultural Societies Domestic (learned, artistic, etc.) Foreign, especially, Dante Alighieri Society Case d' Italia</p> <p>Intelligence Sections on Activities of Italians abroad</p> <p>Cooperation with Armed Forces</p>	<p><i>Personnel drawn from Fascist Party</i></p> <p><i>Cooperates with Fascist Party and Ministry of Popular Culture in all practical affairs: issues, diplomatic immunity, awards, medals, decorations, etc.</i></p>	<p><i>Assisted by Ministry of Popular Culture in</i></p> <p>(a) <i>Morale-building and indoctrination activities</i></p> <p>(b) <i>Combat propaganda</i></p> <p><i>Also assisted by Fascist Party (especially Dopolavoro personnel) for recreation and social activities</i></p>
<p><i>Other Agencies Integrated into Psychological Warfare Work</i></p> <p><i>All responsible Italian officers, leaders, etc., of schools, universities, factories, business organizations, labor syndicates, banks, shipping and insurance companies, agrarian organizations etc. at home and abroad must use all means to promote Fascist Party propaganda directed by the Ministry of Popular Culture. Party leaders pass down all orders and items of propaganda through the heads of these organizations.</i></p>			

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Principal Psychological Warfare Agencies—Japan (Broad Outline)



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The symbols shown on the charts of United States Organizations

stand for the following agencies:

BEW -- Board of Economic Warfare
 CIAA -- Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs
 FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation
 FBMS -- Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, FCC.
 FN -- Foreign Nationalities Branch, OSS
 JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
 JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
 JPWC Joint Psychological Warfare Committee
 JSP Joint Staff Planners
 MIS -- Military Intelligence Service, G-2
 ONI -- Office of Naval Intelligence
 OSS Office of Strategic Services
 OWI Office of War Information
 PWB Psychologic Warfare Branch, G-2
 PW Unit -- Psychological Warfare Unit
 R & A -- Research and Analysis Branch, OSS
 SSB -- Special Service Branch, OSS
 SA/B) -- Special Activities, OSS
 SA/G)
 WIPC -- War Information Policy Committee