

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.


July 3, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander Riheldaffer

16-12086 GPO

SUBJECT: AMAGANSETT - Landing of Agents at.

1. The complete ONI file of reports and correspondence relating to the Subject is herewith transmitted by hand for futher delivery to Commander Dyer (Cominch).



H. E. Keisker
Comdr., USNR.

Return to R. 4723

↑

Thanks very
much
Dyer

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 3, 1942, 194


MEMORANDUM FOR File

16-12986 GPO

SUBJECT: AMAGANSETT, Landing of agents at.

Mr. Tamm of F.B.I. advised Captain Waller that the interrogation of persons apprehended in connection with subject occurrence, is continuing and that therefore a complete report has not yet been received from New York.

He further stated that in receipt of this report, ONI would be advised.



H. E. Keisker
Comdr., USNR.

CONFIDENTIAL


July 2, 1942.

A8-5 (Serial No. 1891)

~~Commandant's interpretation of that agreement. It is very probable that Army authorities likewise do not hold the Federal Bureau of Investigation's interpretation.~~

RECEIVED ONI MAIL
1942 JUL 7 AM 11

5. It is strongly recommended that this matter be straightened out at the earliest practicable time.


E. J. MARQUART

2ND ENDORSEMENT

Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier
New York, N. Y.

A8-5(CI)
Serial 958


July 4, 1942.

From: Comeastseafon.
To: Vice OpNav.

1. Forwarded.

2. It is considered essential that there be complete coordination and exchange of information between field activities of the Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation if matters of this and a similar nature are to be successfully handled.

3. Comeastseafon and his Task Group Commanders, as well as the military authorities, have a responsibility for naval and military operations that requires they be kept constantly informed of all enemy activities within the Frontier.


ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

FINISHED - WALLER FILE

RECEIVED S-C FILES
Room 2055

JUL 5 1942

ROUTE TO: 16
Op File No. (SO) 1185/1891
Doc. No. 1
Copy No. 1
PRN 802770

1st Endorsement on
D.I.O., 3ND CONF. Att.,
A8-5/EP30 Serial 4786-112,
dated June 30, 1942.

Headquarters, Third Naval District
New York, N. Y.,
July 2, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

A8-5
Serial No. 1891.

From: The Commandant, Third Naval District.
To: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
(The Director of Naval Intelligence)
Via: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
Subject: Investigation in connection with the landing
of foreign agents at Amagansett, Long Island,
June 13, 1942.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commandant called a conference with Mr. T. J. Donegan and Mr. A. M. Thurston of the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on June 30, 1942, with a view to determining the reasons why the District Intelligence Officer, The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, and proper Army officials (as I had been told) had not been kept reasonably informed of developments. The reasons given by these gentlemen were, in effect, that in all cases handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters at Washington, the Federal Bureau of Investigation agency here became in the status of a field office only and was not allowed to divulge anything; that upon making direct inquiry as to whether Navy officials here should be advised, they were directed not to do so, because Mr. Hoover was advising Admiral Wilkinson.

3. Although Naval authorities of this District had first reported this landing of saboteurs to the local Federal Bureau of Investigation, it appears that the Washington Federal Bureau of Investigation took charge of the investigation which placed the matter in the status above described.

4. It thus appears that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's interpretation of the Delimitation Agreement is that their obligation to keep the office of Naval Intelligence informed is fully met by advising the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, D. C. It is obvious that such procedure delays pertinent information valuable to local military and naval commanders vitally affected, and it is contrary to the

Address Communications to the
Commandant Third Naval District

In reply refer to No.

THIRD
(RPS - PERSONAL)

A8-5/EF30

Headquarters of the 1942 JUL 1 AM 9 10

Commandant Third Naval District

SERIAL 4786-42

Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

RECEIVED ONI MAIL ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

June 30, 1942
1942 JUL 7 AM 11 29 / 61

From: The District Intelligence Officer,
Third Naval District

To: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(The Director of Naval Intelligence)

VIA: (1) The Commandant, Third Naval District
(2) The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier

SUBJECT: Investigation in connection with the landing of foreign agents at Amagansett, Long Island, June 13, 1942.

Reference: (a) Delimitation Agreement for Investigative Agencies of February 9, 1942

Enclosure: (A) Detailed report on activities of Naval Intelligence agents in connection with landing at Amagansett.

1. There is forwarded herewith a report on the activities of Naval Intelligence, Third Naval District, in connection with the landings of saboteurs and explosives at Amagansett, Long Island, 13 June 1942. Enclosure (A) gives in more detail the activity of Naval Intelligence agents.

2. On the morning of June 13, 1942, as soon as the explosives and clothing that had been found by the Coast Guard in a cache on the beach at Amagansett, Long Island, had been brought to New York, a conference was held of the investigative agencies, plus the Coast Guard, in the presence of the Commandant of the Third Naval District. The purpose of this conference was to decide on the procedure to solve the case resulting from this landing.

3. It was quite evident that the Navy had a definite interest in view of a probable landing of uniformed personnel of the enemy from an enemy submarine off shore; the Army had a definite interest because of the fact that spies were probably on shore; and F.B.I. had a definite interest because of the fact that sabotage was indicated by the type of explosives and detonating devices found in the cache. The Commandant, Third Naval District, realizing that the solution of the problem was a matter of interest to all three investigative agencies as well as the Coast Guard, and that one agency should head up the case while the others assisted, directed that F.B.I. conduct the investigation with the assistance of Naval

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 813017

Subject: Investigation in connection with the landing of foreign agents at Amagansett, Long Island, June 13, 1942.

and Military Intelligence and the Coast Guard. Action was then started under this controlled operation. Enclosure (A) states the part that Naval Intelligence took in this investigation.

4. The District Intelligence Officer sent a coded dispatch to the Director of Naval Intelligence and to the District Intelligence Officers of the continental United States informing them of the facts of the landing, together with a brief description of the sabotage material landed. This dispatch also expressed the opinion that there would probably be attempts to land similar agents and equipment at other places along the coast.

5. The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, on being informed of the situation, sent a coded dispatch to the Commandants of the Naval Districts under his command informing them of the landing and of the type of sabotage material landed, also directing that they take extraordinary precautions to intercept any attempted landings in their Districts. The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, also took steps to have the Coast Guard patrol doubled and properly armed.

6. The District Intelligence Officer, in close cooperation with the F.B.I. agents handling the investigation, kept in constant touch with the situation and kept informing the Commandant, Third Naval District as to the progress of the investigation. Up until the release of the news through the press the District Intelligence Officer had no information that indicated any arrests had been made, although it is understood arrests had been made as early as June 15. On Friday, June 26, the District Intelligence Officer accidentally learned from the Agent-in-Charge, F.B.I., New York, that a landing had been made in Jacksonville, Florida, and that arrests were being made and that the case was due to break very shortly. On Saturday, June 27, about an hour before the release to the press, the District Intelligence Officer was informed that the agents had been arrested and the news was being released to the press.

7. From that time on the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, the Commandant, Third Naval District and the District Intelligence Officer, Third Naval District, received all the information regarding the apprehension of enemy agents of the armed forces through press and radio comment.

8. The District Intelligence Officer is of the opinion that the Delimitation Agreement for the Investigative Agencies,

6/30/42

Subject: Investigation in connection with the landing of foreign agents at Amagansett, Long Island, June 13, 1942.

which was predicated on a memorandum from the President of the United States, was completely ignored and violated. This directive insists that the agency conducting an investigation has a responsibility to see that the other investigative agencies are kept informed of important developments. This was not done.

9. In time of war it is highly important that the military commanders be kept informed of enemy spies and personnel of the armed forces whenever they are found to be in the country. It was highly important that they be informed when any such agents or spies were apprehended. Over twelve days elapsed before such information was forthcoming, and then it was learned through the press and radio. To the best knowledge of the District Intelligence Officer, neither the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, nor the Commandant, Third Naval District, was given any opportunity to pass upon the type of information that should be properly released to the press.

10. The District Intelligence Officer was placed in a most humiliating position when the officers to whom he is responsible received their information on Intelligence matters from the newspapers. The District Intelligence Officer feels that he cannot accept responsibility for Intelligence matters unless the other Intelligence agencies are required to live up to the spirit and letter of the Delimitation Agreement. If such utter disregard of directives issued by responsible authority is allowed to go unnoted, it will inevitably lead to disaster.

R. C. Mac Fall
R. C. MAC FALL