

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF CHIEF CABLE CENSOR

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1918.

To: Lieutenant CSo. S. Wheat,
15 Wall Street, New York

Subject: Circular letter of ONI regarding identification
of users of cable.

Reference: Your letter of June 24th.

Enclosure: 1 - Above reference.

1. Enclosure returned as requested.
2. It is very gratifying to know how the arrangement is working out.
3. It is understood that "Pass" and "Hold" in paragraph 4 is a short statement as to the ONI estimate of the character of the person under investigation and has no connection whatever with the disposition to be made of the message except insofar as the character of the party under investigation may affect disposition.

(4) The following is a notation from a letter to New York, in connection with above reference:

"Referring to paragraph 6 of the enclosure. While it is not always desirable to approach the addressee with the request for explanation of a cablegram, this is only true where the addressee is a suspicious person, and in the absence of suspicion, so far from being an unwise step, it is believed it is the most expedient and accurate method of securing the information desired.

(5) Furthermore, it is far more effective to pass a cablegram to a reliable addressee and then ask the explanation of the cablegram than to hold the cablegram pending an explanation from the addressee.

(6) The reason for this is plain, because if you tell the addressee enough about the cablegram to get a satisfactory explanation you will almost inevitably disclose the meaning if not the text of the message, while if you do not convey to the addressee a satisfactory description of the cablegram you are apt to get an unsatisfactory explanation. Censors at other stations are developing the practice of

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passing the message and requesting the explanation from the recipient and it is believed that this may be tried with satisfactory results in New York if it is not already in practice."

(7) This not only applies in cases where a party is under suspicion, but it will be applicable to ONI work, because very frequently the ONI will have in its possession a cablegram to a person who ONI will learn from outside sources is reliable. I cannot see any objection in such a case in going to the person and requesting an explanation of the cablegram.

Thomas P. Ryan

By Direction.

you Par 7. O.H.S., as per ruling of Lt. Commander Baker, never had a cablegram in its possession or any copies.

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington

CONFIDENTIAL.

June 7, 1918.

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: All Aids for Information and Branch Offices.
Subject: Quick identification of users of cable.

1. In order to assist the Chief Cable Censor to expedite the passage of cables, it has been determined that a request for an investigation and a reply thereto may be sent by telegraph.

2. As the majority of the requests for identification come from the New York Cable Censor, requests for investigations will be sent out by the Branch Office of Naval Intelligence, New York, as well as by this Office. The telegrams from New York will be signed Spencer Eddy and the reply should be addressed to Spencer Eddy, 15 Wall Street, New York City.

3. The telegraphic reply to a request for identification should state whether or not cables should be passed by the Censor. A full report of the investigation should follow by mail.

4. In order to standardize the method, telegrams should read as follows:

A request for an investigation will consist of the name and address of the person to be identified, preceded by the word "Cable" and followed with the usual reference number, for example:

Cable George Wise, 110 Dearborn Street, Chicago, 18307.

The reply should consist of the name of the person preceded by the reference number of the telegram making the inquiry and followed by the words "Pass" or "Hold", as the case may be, for example:

18307 George Wise pass.

1. Is the subject of German birth or extraction ?
2. If a firm, was it ever backed or financed by Germans or German-Americans ?
3. Are any of the subject's associates or associations German ?
4. If the party has ever been in Germany, state when last trip was made.
5. Are subject's sympathies pro-German at the present time ?
6. Were they pro-German before the United States entered the war ?
7. Has the subject ever worked for or represented a German business concern in this country or elsewhere ?
8. If a firm, has it any German employees ?
9. Does the subject represent any European neutral concern and, if so, has that concern branches in Germany ?
10. Is the subject in a position where, if he is disloyal, he can obtain or observe information of a military or strategic value ?
11. Could he get military information out of the country easily by means of secret code, messenger or intermediary in foreign country ?
12. Does his business necessitate constant cable communication ?
13. Is his business of a type which will enable him to be an intermediary for communication to Germany ?
14. If a firm, does it carry on business with Germany ?
15. Has subject relatives in Germany ?
16. If married, is subject's wife or husband German or of German extraction ?

6. The Chief Cable Censor has again invited our attention to the fact that it is a dangerous proceeding to personally interview the sender or addressee of the cable and that much harm might be done. An explanation of the cable is seldom necessary.

Roger D. ...

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

20972-23

WME-JCM


CONFIDENTIAL.

May 29, 1918.

From: Director of Naval Intelligence.
To: Officer-in-Charge, Branch Office
of Naval Intelligence, New York.

Subject: ~~Quick identification of senders and
receivers of cables outside Third
Naval District by use of telegraph.~~

Reference: Your letter May 17th, GSW-IH.



1. After discussing the subject matter of the reference with one or two officers-in-charge of branch offices outside of the Third Naval District, the conclusion reached was that the plan as outlined would be cumbersome, expensive and in the end would furnish inadequate service.

2. It is felt that the best and most satisfactory method would be for the officer-in-charge of the branch office or Aid for Information to telegraph to the New York Office that the sender or receiver of the cablegram in question was all right or that he was not. This would facilitate the delivery of the cablegram or its suppression, and then a detailed report would follow by mail.

3. If this plan, as outlined, meets with the approval of the Censorship Intelligence Officer, it will be put into effect at once.

By direction.

Cables

June 1, 1916.
GSW/IH

From: Officer-in-Charge, Branch Naval Intelligence Office, New York.

To: Director of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D.C.

Subject: Quick identification of senders and receivers of cables outside Third Naval District by use of Telegraph.

Reference: Your letter May 29, 1916., WME-JOM 20972-23.

1. The Censorship Intelligence Officer approves the scheme outlined. It is presumed, of course, that the Aides for Information and all the Branch Offices will be advised of the type of information which they must cover in making cable investigations. In other words I presume you will send out the questions although the answers to them will not come by telegraph. Am I also to understand that we will call this List X and may make the inquiry by telegraph?

Lieutenant Commander, USNRF.