

Copy 194 205
 Routed by DED to D. B. 14, B. D. 5, Warehouse
 on 9 Jan 46 (to be sent to OK 206 after Captain K's
 approval)
S-E-C-R-E-T

Honolulu, T. H.,
 17 December 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR: DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
 FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, HONOLULU -- Pre-War Traffic
 in Encrypted Messages.

1. This memorandum is prepared to record my best present recollection concerning Subject. Much of my knowledge came to me as hearsay, but reliable. As to knowledge founded on hearsay, in most instances I cannot recall specifically my source, other than it was one or more of the persons hereinafter named.
2. As part of a DIO-14ND training program, Lt. Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, USN, in the late summer of 1941 talked to us on the subject of elementary cryptanalysis. That kindled interest in the subject among certain DIO-14ND junior officers. It also led to the surmise that perhaps the Navy had a cryptanalysis unit at Pearl Harbor.
3. Sometime after the war started, Chief Ship's Clerk Theodore Emanuel, USN, technical expert in DIO-14ND, told me that six months or more before war began he discussed with Captain Irving H. Mayfield, USN, the DIO, the possibility of securing copies of all incoming and outgoing Japanese Consulate encrypted traffic for cryptanalysis by the Navy; that Captain Mayfield thought well of the suggestion and discussed it with FBI (and perhaps MID, also); that FBI thought the suggestion "too risky", or words to that effect. Nevertheless, Captain Mayfield was determined to do what he could, even without FBI help.
4. On 4 or 5 December 1941 Captain Mayfield called me into his office and stated substantially: David Sarnoff, president of RCA who only recently had visited Honolulu, was a good friend of the ^{14ND} Commandant, Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, USN. While Mr. Sarnoff was in Honolulu,

Original in C242

Enclosure (A)

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority NND 883020

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

Captain Mayfield suggested to the Commandant that the latter use his personal friendship with Mr. Sarnoff to induce the latter to order RCA's Honolulu office to give the Navy copies of Consulate traffic. The Commandant so approached Mr. Sarnoff, who gave the desired orders to Mr. George Street, Honolulu RCA manager.

5. Then, Captain Mayfield handed me a number of neatly typed sheets of white paper, size $8\frac{1}{2}$ by 11 inches, on which were typed what appeared to be encoded or encrypted messages. Each sheet was headed "To Tokyo", or "From Tokyo", or "To Washington", or the like, but was otherwise unidentified as to source or content. Captain Mayfield stated that these were copies (typed by Mr. Street personally) of Consulate traffic beginning December 1, 1945. ^{Should be 1941} He further stated that although Mr. Sarnoff's order had been issued some weeks earlier, in November, the arrangement bore no fruit until December because the Consulate, which used a different communications company each month, was using another company in November and did not use RCA again until December 1. After that, Captain Mayfield directed me to go directly to the Navy Yard and deliver the papers to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort. I delivered the papers to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort personally, approximately 45 minutes after Capt. Mayfield first called me in.

6. I personally visited Lt. Comdr. Rochefort on official business once each day on 3, 4, 5, and 6 December 1941. On December 3, the purpose was to report verbally, for Capt. Mayfield, that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers. (This had been learned about 0930 that day from a reliable informant. It was confirmed about an hour later by FBI. I reported the fact to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort about 1130.)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883020

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

As already stated, on 4 or 5 December I delivered the RCA papers; on the other day (the 4th or 5th, as the case may be) I either delivered more RCA papers or another verbal report of developments at the Consulate. On 6 December I saw Lt. Comdr. Rochefort at his home in Honolulu, about 1330, to verbally report some more Consulate information that might provide "context" for breaking some of the RCA messages.

7. After the Japanese attack, Lt. Comdr. A. J. Lowrey, USNR, the ADIO, moved his desk into Capt. Mayfield's office. That night I was serving in that room as a general handyman for the DIO and ADIO. At a time I would judge to be around 2100, I heard statements (probably from Capt. Mayfield or from Lt. Denzel R. Carr, USNR, or both) that indicated that FBI had certain cryptographic materials that had been taken from the Consulate in a raid earlier that day. I believe Lt. Carr reported that he had seen such materials at FBI, and that Capt. Mayfield ordered him to return to FBI and get them for the Navy; and, that Lt. Carr did return to FBI, but came back empty handed. Sometime later, perhaps about 2330, Capt. Mayfield stated that he was personally going to FBI and would "damned well" (or words to that effect) get the cryptographic materials. He then left the office, taking Lt. Carr with him, and leaving me alone to stand telephone watch in the DIO's office. More than an hour later Capt. Mayfield and Lt. Carr returned, carrying with them a package wrapped in brown paper. Capt. Mayfield then ordered me to awaken Lt. George W. Pease, USNR. When Lt. Pease reported to the DIO, Capt. Mayfield handed him the same package, told him it contained vitally important papers, and ordered him to deliver it to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort immediately and to see that no one else saw it. Lt. Pease left for the Navy Yard on this mission between 0100 and 0200 on 8

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883020

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

December. He returned seasonably, reporting delivery completed. (The DIO-14ND personnel-in-and-out log for 7-8 December 1941 should provide exact information as to the times of the foregoing movements.)

8. Concerning FBI's delay in handing over to the Navy the cryptographic materials: Many months later I heard that FBI had had these materials (consisting of at least one complete cryptographic system key and numerous Consulate file copies of encrypted messages) since about 1200, 7 December; that for the 12 hours or so until they were given to Capt. Mayfield two FBI men, Special Agent Frederick G. Tillman and Saburo Chiwa, Japanese translator, were amateurishly trying their hands at decipherment. (Neither was a professional cryptanalyst.) The story in this paragraph was told me, I believe, by Lt. George P. Kimball, USMR, and I believe that he gave Mr. Tillman as his source.

9. I have always felt reasonably sure that Mr. Robert L. Shivers, FBI head in Honolulu, knew of the existence of Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's cryptographic unit, and knew it before 7 December 1941. I assumed that Capt. Mayfield told Mr. Shivers of our arrangement with RCA. And, I inferred Mr. Shivers' knowledge from the fact that when I visited Lt. Comdr. Rochefort on 3, 4, or 5 December at the Navy Yard, he told me that Mr. Shivers had just been out there to see him. (I recall the latter vividly, because I at the time had reason to believe that Capt. Mayfield was not cognizant that Mr. Shivers was out to see Lt. Comdr. Rochefort that morning, so upon returning to Honolulu I reported to Capt. Mayfield the fact that Mr. Shivers had just been out to the Navy Yard to see Lt. Comdr. Rochefort.)

10. Although I do not recall the details, I have the impression that sometime after 8 December 1941 the FBI secured from Honolulu

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883020

12/17/45

communications offices (other than RCA) some copies of Consulate encrypted traffic as well as coded messages of Japanese commercial firms in Honolulu, and that the same were forwarded to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort. I had nothing to do with those messages until Lt. Comdr. Rochefort returned them. I do recall that several months after 7 December 1941 Lt. Comdr. Rochefort returned to us a file of coded messages with the suggestion that we refer them to the Navy Cable & Radio Censor, since the messages appeared to be in commercial codes (Bentley's, ABC, etc.) and the Cable & Radio Censor had the various commercial code books. This referral was made, and the Censor later returned all this traffic to the DIO, decoded. Analysis showed that all the messages apparently were bona fide commercial messages, most of them to and from the continental United States.

11. The first knowledge that I, or anyone in the DIO to my knowledge, had of Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's success in "breaking" any of the Consulate traffic was on 11 December 1941, about 1100. Capt. Mayfield showed several of us a "clear" English text of a message sent by the Consulate to Tokyo, reporting a system devised for signalling from Oahu and Maui, presumably to submarines off shore. (This message, and the DIO's action on it, from and after 11 December, is fully reported in my DIO-14ND NNI-119 report, dated 9 February 1942, subject: JAPANESE CONSULATE GENERAL, HONOLULU -- Espionage Activities of.)

12. Thereafter, from time to time, other deciphered-translated texts of Consulate messages came to the DIO from Lt. Comdr. Rochefort. I believe that Capt. Mayfield, on his frequent trips to the Navy Yard to see the Commandant, always visited Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's office, bringing back with him any materials that were ready for us. Other than that,

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

I do not recall how the messages might have been returned to us.

13. The deciphered-translated texts always came to us written in longhand. I personally typed copies thereof for FBI, MID, and DIO files. Sometimes the texts came back to us with the original messages (on commercial communications blanks) attached thereto; sometimes without. On other occasions, the cryptanalyst's work sheets were attached. Capt. Mayfield procured a safe which was put between the desks of Lt. Kimball and myself, and to which only we two had access. All Consulate traffic materials-- original encrypted messages, deciphered-translations, etc.-- were kept in there. A minimum of officers in DIO-14ND knew of the contents of the safe, no mention thereof was permitted in our reports except in a manner consistent with the security of Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's cryptographic unit, and the materials were not allowed in the DIO general or secret files.

14. I personally delivered typed copies of the "clear" versions of most of the Consulate traffic we had to FBI and MID. Copies of a few messages may have been delivered by Capt. Mayfield and Lt. Kimball. By perhaps three months after 7 December 1941, we had received our last "clear" text from Lt. Comdr. Rochefort. Some of the original Consulate materials were returned to us, undeciphered, with notations that they could not be "broken".

15. In March 1942, or perhaps later, the question came up about returning the Consulate materials to the FBI. These materials were kept in the safe above mentioned. In addition to Consulate enciphered traffic, there were other items, such as Consulate bank books, a paper that had been found strapped to the Consul General's leg, inside his

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 883020

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

trousers, some currency, etc. I determined from a study of the materials in the safe that we apparently did not have all the original materials and that probably Lt. Comdr. Rochefort still had some. I so reported to Capt. Mayfield, who directed me to go to Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's office and pick up any of the Consulate materials still out there. I saw Lt. Comdr. Rochefort, who spoke to a number of his officers about the matter and consulted his files. He thereby located some of the materials and gave them to me. I placed them with the other things in my safe.

16. When I had assembled all the materials for return to FBI, I asked Capt. Mayfield whether I should ask for a receipt upon delivery. He replied in the negative, stating that he had not given a receipt when he got the materials, and they had not even been inventoried. (The fact that they were not inventoried also is of record in an FBI report; in that of Mr. Shivers of 26 December 1941, I believe.) However, out of caution, I prepared a memorandum listing all the materials I returned to FBI, being all the ^{original Consulate} materials in my safe. My inventory memorandum is filed with DIO-14ND. I personally returned all the materials to FBI, giving them either to Mr. Shivers or Mr. Tillman.

17. My aforesaid NNI-119 report of 9 February 1942, together with another report, same subject, dated five days later, indicated that the DIO possessed "clear" versions of considerable Consulate traffic, although none of it was had in the "clear" until 11 December 1941. Those reports also indicated that we had other Consulate messages whose texts were not being reported ^{to ONI;} those were the messages concerning routine Consulate business matters.

18. Not until about a month ago-- a few days after the Congressional

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

Pearl Harbor inquiry opened on November 15-- did I ever hear any question raised by FBI or anyone concerning an inventory of the Consulate materials, the details as to the dates on which FBI gave us the materials and ^{when} we gave them back copies of the "clear" versions, etc. A few days after November 15, 1945, Mr. Robert L. Moore, now head of FBI, Honolulu, telephoned me and stated, "We have an urgent matter concerning some papers we think you can identify for us", and asked whether I could go right over to his office. I went there, after first checking in personally with and getting permission from Comdr. Otto Ludewig, USNR, Acting DIO-14ND. When I reached Mr. Moore's office I found already there Special Agent J. Sterling Adams and former Special Agent Wayne C. Murphy, No. 2 man in that office when the war started and now privately employed in Honolulu. Mr. Moore had before him several FBI files on the Consulate, principally dealing with the communications traffic previously referred to. The question at hand was: What Consulate communications traffic had we (FBI and/or DIO) gotten from the Consulate premises after the Consul General and his staff left Hawaii (about 9 February 1942)? I stated that, to my knowledge, no such materials were gotten from the Consulate except on 7 December 1941, when Honolulu police raided the Consulate and turned over what they found to FBI. (These are the materials referred to above, Paragraphs 7 and 8.) Mr. Moore then showed me his file copy of a letter written by Mr. Shivers to FBI, Washington, about 16 February 1942, in which Mr. Shivers enclosed many copies of Consulate "clear" messages and stated they were gotten at the Consulate after the Consul General left and were then "broken" by the Navy cryptographic unit at Pearl Harbor. I pointed out to Mr. Moore that Mr.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883020

Reproduced from the Unclassified / Declassified Holdings of the National Archives

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

Shivers obviously was in error as to the date the messages were obtained, since Mr. Shivers' own letter of 26 January 1942 in the same file transmitted copies of ^{some of} the same messages to Washington and since I distinctly recalled having had some of the ^{same} messages in the "clear" in my possession in December 1941 or ~~December~~ ^{January} 1942. Further scanning of the FBI file revealed that Mr. Shivers had written several letters, each enclosing copies of some "clear" messages, to Washington; and, that his ^{later} letter of 16 February 1942 contained a complete duplication of all messages previously sent in to Washington in driblets. Mr. Adams also pointed out that, until after the Consul General left Honolulu, the intelligence agencies made no direct reference in their reports ~~of~~ having secured any materials from the Consulate. This, Mr. Adams stated, might explain why Mr. Shivers might deliberately have written that the originals of the traffic referred to in his letter of 16 February 1942 were secured after the Consul General left, especially since the Consul General had been given the option of destroying or leaving behind, under seal and in custody of the protecting power, Sweden, any papers of the Consulate. (As a matter of fact, MID searches of the Consulate after the Consul General and staff left revealed huge quantities of torn, but unburned, official documents. This material did not include, to my knowledge, any highly classified materials or any cryptographic materials. It should be noted that from 7 December 1941 until he left, the Consul General was confined to his grounds, but not under close arrest. He had ample opportunity to destroy any remaining valuable papers, after the initial police raid on the morning of 7 December.) After our conference, Mr. Moore appeared satisfied on the main question. He also asked me whether we

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 883020

12/17/45

had returned to FBI all the Consulate materials they had given us, whether receipts or inventories were exchanged, etc.

19. In considering the manner in which we dealt with the Consulate cryptographic materials, it is well to recall some of the conditions under which we were working. Some of these I recall to have been:

- a. It was considered vitally important by Capt. Mayfield (himself an experienced communications officer) that the highest degree of security be maintained with reference to cryptanalysis matters. This he impressed on those of us who had to have access to any phases of the work or its product.
- b. Therefore, and pursuant to additional admonition of Lt. Comdr. Rochefort that any misstep might be fatal to his sources, as little dissemination as necessary was made, and the unusual filing arrangement referred to was maintained.
- c. Furthermore, there was to be no disclosure of the "raid" of the Consulate on 7 December 1941, for fear that news of the same might reach Japan prior to the first diplomatic exchange ship (carrying the Consul General) and thereby redound to the detriment of United States personnel held by the Japanese.
- d. The cryptographic materials were not openly referred to as such. Capt. Mayfield once stated that they rated above "secret" and "ultra" materials. He therefore referred to them as "non-existent", and I believe that this code word was used among Capt. Mayfield, Mr. Shivers, Lt. Comdr. Rochefort, and Lt. Comdr. Edwin T. Layton, USN, Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer.
- e. DIO-14ND did not need to make full dissemination of all Consulate traffic, because Lt. Comdr. Rochefort's cryptographic unit was in direct contact with the parent unit in Washington and would forward to Washington anything considered of value to the Navy Department. DIO-14ND limited its dissemination to "clear" versions of messages which the DIO, as a counter-intelligence agency, was interested in.
- f. Admittedly we could have kept better records of names, dates, places, etc., but we had to gauge our course and speed with reference to conditions then existing. There was other more pressing work concerned with the present and future (i.e., winning the war), and this took precedence over any desire to assemble a minutely accurate record of the past history

S-E-C-R-E-T

12/17/45

of the Japanese Consulate. We considered our course endorsed by ONI, since the latter showed no reaction to our 1942 reports on Consulate espionage, and did not request amplification even of the reports dealing with Consulate communications traffic.

20. This report is typed at one sitting, and undoubtedly there are many details, perhaps some important ones, that I have not recalled to mind tonight. If any such matters occur to me, I will report them separately.



W. B. STEPHENSON
Lt. Comdr., USNR