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QUARTERLY



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From the Director's Desk



In the first issue I said that the aim of the "Quarterly" would be to inform, and update everyone in NIS of general interest items which would not necessarily be available in official traffic. Now that the first issue is history and has had a chance to sink in, I feel confident in saying that it has accomplished that aim. Feedback from you, the customers, has been overwhelmingly positive. This type of response signals that the "Quarterly" will continue and is also a resounding vote of confidence for its creator and editor, J. Brian McKee.

It's no secret to anyone reading this issue that FY 80 is the toughest budget year in recent memory. Cutbacks in training, inspections, and, finally in operations were extremely difficult to decide, and Headquarters efforts have been almost entirely consumed in attempts to gain maximum return from minimal resources. No NISO nor HQ Department was spared the knife. It has been personally gratifying to see the spirit of cooperation from the people tasked to implement some very distasteful decisions.

Comments from the field both to the staff and to me voiced the sentiment, "We're with you and we'll do what must be done."

The results of this superb support is that we have, in fact, weathered the storm. While not abounding, there has been some fiscal relief. This coupled with



the savings accrued by our cutbacks make me confident that we will be able to selectively reinstate reduced operations and functions for the remainder of the year. This was accomplished through an all hands effort at some personal and professional sacrifices.

Thank you and well done!


JR Soriano

Seven Veterans Retire

February marked the transfer to the honored ranks of the Retired Special Agents Corps of seven of the most experienced Special Agents of the Service. Our first edition of THE NIS QUARTERLY reported the retirement of Deputy Director Earl RICHEY and Regional Director for Operations Dave KERR. Since that edition went to press, five other NIS veterans have "pulled the plug." Together these seven "Old Hands" have accumulated an impressive 176 years of dedicated service to NIS, the Navy and their country.




SAC Ray BROCK, NISRA Newport, retired on 29 February 1980 after close to 23 years of NIS service. Ray served at Norfolk, Charlottesville, Camp Lejeune, Cherry Point, Rota and Newport. Ray was SAC at Cherry Point for nine and a half years and at Rota for almost five years.




SAC Ben ALLRED, NISRA Adak, retired on 27 February 1980 after almost 21 years of service as one of NIS' most experienced field supervisors. Ben joined NIS at Charleston in July 1959 and saw duty at Jacksonville, Nashville, Yokosuka, Portsmouth (VA) and Adak. He has been SAC at Adak since reporting aboard there in July 1978.



SAC George MORSE, NISRA Mare Island, another of the NIS' "old hands" whose high standards of field leadership are legendary, retired on 27 February 1980 after 26 years of service which has included duty at Portland, Seattle, Whidbey Island, Orlando, Keflavik and Mare Island. George has served as an SAC since June 1969.



SAC Chris CHRIST, NISRA San Francisco, retired on 27 February 1980 after 23 years of service with NIS. Chris, one of the legendary group of Greek speaking agents who transferred to NIS from a U.S. Department of State Investigative Squad in Athens in the mid-1950's, has seen duty at Philadelphia, Harrisburg, NISO Japan, Atsugi, NISHQ (as an Assistant Department Head), Athens, Mayport, Keflavik and, most recently, San Francisco. Chris has been a field supervisor since 1972.



SAC Don SCHUNK, NISRA Mayport, retired on 29 February 1980 after more than 26 years of service. Don entered on duty with the old DIO-9ND in Detroit, Michigan, in 1954 and then moved on to Kansas City where he remained until May 1967 when he was promoted to Supervising Agent of NISO Kodiak. Don, one of the most experienced NIS supervisors, transferred from Kodiak in

January 1969 to become Supervising Agent of NISO Vietnam. In March 1970, he assumed the arduous duties of SAC NISRA Camp Lejeune. June 1971 saw Don's reassignment to NISO Philippines as SAC of the Scoutmaster Project. After duty as the DRDO at NISO New York from July 1973 to July 1976, Don headed for the "sunny south" as SAC of NISRA Mayport.

Wrongful Destruction and Aircraft

The following is an excellent article appearing in a recent AFOSI publication and is reprinted with the permission of AFOSI Headquarters.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. Introduction

A. The purpose of this handout is to familiarize investigators with some of the motives which account for "intentional" aircraft damage, and therefore better prepare agents to initiate and develop investigations.

B. The motives in aircraft damage cases vary considerably. This is due in part to the personality of the subjects and in part, to the demands of their situations. The four patterns which seem to consistently emerge are: revenge, demonstration of authority, need for recognition, and cover up of accidental damage. While these motives are discussed with seemingly equal attention, the majority of cases are due to accident and revenge. Your knowledge of all four motives will allow you to deal with these cases more thoroughly.

C. The body of this paper examines common reasons for damaging aircraft and sets forth an investigative logic. Specifically, procedures for initial screenings and subject interview are presented using an empathetic theme which is based on an understanding of the interviewee's position and perspectives. This approach minimizes subject's defensiveness and structures an opportunity for his cooperation.

II. Motives Explaining Intentional Aircraft Damage

A. Revenge

1. Psychological Profile of Subject.

a. Intentional aircraft damage cases often seem to result from persons who act out anger by disturbing or destroying some part of an aircraft they access in their work. Individuals who perform acts such as these are characteristically immature and lack the interpersonal skills that would allow them to settle their affairs in direct and rational ways. Further they are defensive, lack insight (particularly as to their influence upon people and situations) and cannot take responsibility for their difficulties. Rather, they see their problems as resulting from someone else's actions, and therefore they blame others for their misfortune. Their acts are immature attempts to "get even" either with some person or with the AF for what they perceive as an injustice.

b. This type of subject is most probably manifesting a character and behavior disorder, which is not a psychiatric illness in the traditional sense. They behave in ways that have been learned in their developmental years and are therefore incorporated in a characteristic life style. They do

not see anything wrong with their behavior, as they believe their acts are justified by the situation. Often this behavior is an attempt to recoup power stature or authority that they believe to have been tested. In unusually extreme instances, a subject may act due to perceived threats which have no basis in reality. Fortunately, examples of this kind of paranoid logic are uncommon.

c. In further understanding revenge motivated subjects it is important to consider that their motivation may be drawn from both past difficulties and present problems. People such as this often collect their anger, only to express it in exaggerated and extra-punitive ways. Origins for present dissatisfaction may bridge back in their present assignment, or to factors in a previous assignment that were never satisfactorily resolved. For example, the present position could have been contrary to what was a preferred location or duty assignment. The result is that many of the everyday elements of the present job, although objectively or inherently non-provoking, contribute to frustration and add to a prior residue of anger.

2. Suggested Investigative Logic.

a. Have there been any involvements or problems within the squadrons which have contact with the damaged aircraft? When did such problems occur and how were they resolved?

b. Are there records of disciplinary action (formal and informal) that would suggest problems in the squadron (e.g. letters of counseling letters of reprimand, articles 15 etc.)? Have inquiries been made through command, IG or congressional channels, to correct alleged injustices?

c. Are any individuals now in this unit adversely affected by the circumstances of their transfer to this AFB? What difficulties might such individuals be presently experiencing (e.g. work-related, financial, marital)?

d. Have any individuals in the unit been recently passed over for promotion or denied an assignment of choice in their assignment from this AFB?

B. Demonstration of Authority

1. Psychological Profile of Subject.

Some maintenance or security supervisors experience what they perceive as a need to demonstrate their authority. Typically these feelings arise when their advice and/or instructions have been disregarded. These supervisors are uncomfortable with mediocre performance by their subordinates and are prone to think that if their subordinates' efforts are considered to be inferior, that might be a reflection of poor supervisory skill. As a result, these supervisors may come to believe that their ability and authority to be a leader have been challenged and they meet this challenge by demonstrating that they are still in charge. The aircraft damage they cause is felt to be justified to keep the team "on its toes." In actuality, such supervisors reflect many of the same retaliatory or vengeful features seen in the revenge motivated subject. Both types of subjects seek to reassure their personal sense of adequacy by manipulating their work - the maintenance or security of USAF aircraft.

2. Suggested Investigative Logic.

a. What is the status of supervisory relationships in the

crews that access the aircraft? For example, have there been morale concerns in the crews that access the aircraft?

b. Have any of these supervisors been warning personnel that they are lax, work is sub-standard, etc.?

c. Has any supervisor expressed an "I told you so" attitude with regard to the discovery of unsafe aircraft conditions?

C. Need for Recognition

1. Psychological Profile of Subject.

In a system which has high praise for maintaining safety and security there are individuals who create their own opportunities for recognition. These persons seize upon the chance for reward in "discovering" aircraft damage by carefully assuring that there are discrepancies to discover. They are often pressured by perceived or actual competitive requirements, and use their act to overcome a sense of shortcoming. This intentional damage may be promoted by their own marginal performance, stringent demands for excellence, or a preceding episode in which rewards for diligence conveniently modeled how to achieve instant praise. Such behavior is more common in arson cases, and often explains fire setting by firemen. It's simply human nature to capitalize on the potential for good favor.

2. Suggested Investigative Logic.

a. What sort of pressures for excellence have been created in crews that access the aircraft?

b. Has other damage been recently discovered in any

aircraft? If so what have been the effects for the individual who discovered the damage?

c. Who discovered the damage in this case? What has their reaction been (unusually prideful, etc.)? What about their prior work record - has this discovery overcome a record of marginal performance or reflected an accelerated competitive striving within their work unit?

D. Accidental Damage

1. Psychological Profile of Subject.

a. We all make mistakes, yet some people are less comfortable admitting their errors than others. Individuals who masquerade their own unintentional damage as a willfull act, are persons who are particularly ill at ease viewing themselves critically. Yet, they are even more uncomfortable when they are criticized by others. They see the damage they caused as an accident - even if due to imprudent horseplay. Suggesting that the damage was intentional makes it natural for them to deny doing it, for it truly was not expected.

b. As such persons are sensitive to criticism, they would be expected to defend against it. They may rationalize, deny or more frequently, project the causes for difficulty to others. They may even lead attention away from themselves by inflicting significant damage to the aircraft to disguise their "accident" as an act of vandalism or sabotage. In fact, they may be of considerable "assistance" to investigators - pointing them in those directions.

c. What do these individuals look like? Those who damage aircraft while roughhousing seem rambunctious and it is more

likely that several persons are involved. This is in contrast to those subjects who damage aircraft while earnestly at work. At first glance, these latter subjects often appear dedicated to their work, seriously committed to their responsibilities, and organizationally they may be upwardly mobile. Yet in some cases, what may appear to be pride in their work is more clearly attention to detail due to fear of failure. Such persons are particularly pressured when confronted with new or additional responsibilities. In these situations the risks are greater, especially in the face of how insufficient or inflexible personal resources. Thus, it is often at times of increased responsibility that an accident is made to look like something else. For example, this type of behavior may surface more frequently following a duty promotion or during exercises, ORI's, etc.

2. Suggested Investigative Logic.

a. Among the personnel who frequent the aircraft are there individuals who appear sensitive to criticism, and/or who could particularly not afford to be recognized as having inadvertently caused damage?

b. What personnel have roughoused at work, or have been especially playful (e.g. "played" with equipment, humorously posed for photographs with the aircraft, etc.)?

III. Interview Logic in Aircraft Damage Cases

A. Understanding the Context In Which To Develop Information.

1. A primary investigative consideration here is to recognize that by virtue of their access to and responsibility for

the aircraft, personnel who inspect, repair or maintain the aircraft may be suspect. This emphasizes the importance of using uninvolved personnel in examining any aircraft damage.

2. It is also important to understand that in interviewing personnel who had access to or responsibility for the aircraft, any indications of impending severe retribution will only drive the subject further into denial. It is therefore essential to proceed with an investigative "low profile" and to suggest that command also pursue its efforts as a matter of routine.

B. Initial Screening Interviews.

1. First contacts with the many personnel who have access to the aircraft should be approached with a polite, businesslike and matter-of-fact attitude. The subject needs to know that the investigation will be thorough and complete, yet they should not be put on the defensive. Subjects motivated by revenge will feel justified in their acts if they are confronted by heavy handed authorities. Further an oppressive approach will convey to the accidental damage subject that they have the worst to fear, and they will attempt to assure they are not caught. Therefore, be aware that a tough, hard, insensitive portrayal as an investigator will only make your job harder.

2. Polygraph examinations may be helpful in pursuing logical suspects. Again, however, potential subjects who have had their anger or fear increased by investigators are less likely to submit to reinterview, or the polygraph.

C. Subject Interviews: The considerations which follow work nicely in the context to the theme

approach taught at the AFOSI Academy.

1. Rapport is critical; so take time to relate to the subject. Also, do not emphasize the damage as a crime. It is preferable to refer to the damage simply as damage, a broken part, discrepancy, etc.

2. Theme Development.

a. The revenge motivated subject would be expected to consider his actions to be justified retaliation for alleged injustices. Therefore, attempt to diminish the subject's defensiveness. Understand the pressures which gave rise to alleged injustice from the subject's perspective. Avoid being judgmental; rather, be sympathetic to their anger, demonstrate compassion for their feelings and recognition of their anguish. Similarly, subjects who are demonstrating authority or seeking recognition need to be put at ease and understood in terms of the situation as they see it. They need to know that you understand where they are coming from, and that you genuinely appreciate their predicament.

b. The subject who is "covering up" accidental damage needs to know that the investigation will be fair, impartial, but also thorough. It may be helpful to present a low key "show of knowledge" as to how it is logical that someone routinely associated with the aircraft is suspect. Then, draw focus to the potential for accidental damage. Be sympathetic as to how that could be considered difficult to admit to. It might also be helpful to detail how frequently these situations exist, and how natural and understandable it is to have acted that way. Next, adding how responsible it is to set the record straight may allow the

subject to regain some self respect (after all that is what they are trying to protect by denying their role in the incident).

IV. Discussion

While these cases may be complex, the methods discussed can be helpful in identifying subjects. As an investigator, your understanding of the causes for aircraft damage will be indispensable.

Among these causes for aircraft damage several striking consistencies are present. It is, for example, invariably the case that the personality of the subjects combines with circumstances of their situation to result in property destruction. Further, in each of the instances described, subjects are somewhat insecure and/or not confident in their capacity to endure their situation - or the recognition of being responsible for the damage. For instance, consider revenge motivated subjects. They vent their frustrations on the aircraft, which is the object which represents overwhelming demands, estrangement with authority and/or difficulties with the Air Force itself. Similarly supervisors who attempt to reinforce their authority use the aircraft (and its high priority) to overcome their inability to lead, motivate or obtain the respect and attention of their subordinates. Likewise, it is in the face of increasing demands, mediocre performance or competition that the opportunist may seek recognition by "discovering" damage. This need to recoup control (authority, prestige) is also apparent when accidental damage is masqueraded as something else. These individuals' self-respect has little chance to be realized when their sense of failure is compounded by pressure to discover incompetents, or worse, a saboteur.

Arson of the Commandant's Aircraft

At 0205 on a recent morning, NAS Alameda firemen, responding to the activation of a flight line fire alarm box, found a VC-118, assigned to the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a VIP aircraft, engulfed in flames. After the fire was extinguished, personnel at NARF, who had been scheduled to overhaul the aircraft, estimated that the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and reported the value of the loss at 1.25 million dollars.

Since responding firemen noted that power to the aircraft was not existing at the time of the fire and because the first firemen on the scene observed at least one unidentified person running from the immediate area of the parked aircraft, NIS personnel were summoned to investigate.

During the NISRA Alameda investigation that followed, a seaman from the in port USS JASON (AR-8) was identified as the person who activated the fire alarm box. During initial interview, he stated that he had been walking in the area; noticed the fire; and notified the fire department. After NIS investigation disclosed the presence of remnants of the seaman's jacket, with his name stenciled thereon, inside the badly burned cockpit area of the aircraft and extensive canvassing of NARF personnel established that the controls on the aircraft had been moved from the time the aircraft was last occupied by NARF employees, the seaman was reinterrogated as a suspect in the wrongful destruction of the Commandant's aircraft. During the ensuing interrogation the seaman admitted that he and four other Navy men had been




drinking heavily at an off-base bar; had purchased at least three marijuana cigarettes which they shared while enroute back to the base; and that they had separated before the seaman entered the area where the aircraft was parked. He thereupon admitted that he had been "playing pilot" in the cockpit of the aircraft; that somehow the upholstery of the plane had caught on fire; and that he had fled the area to avoid detection. Under further questioning, it was disclosed that the man had disposed of his cigarette lighter after departing the aircraft. He further admitted that after he found himself in the darkened aircraft, he lit some discarded wads of paper for light. During the course of "playing pilot," the seaman dropped the lighted "torch" he was using for illumination and the highly flammable Naughahyde upholstery in the cabin of the aircraft rapidly ignited and spread.

Interview of the seaman's companions earlier in the evening in question confirmed the suspect's consumption of approximately eleven "shots" of rum and four cans of beer and his sharing, with three

others, of the effects of three marijuana cigarettes.

During polygraph examination relative to the truthfulness of the seaman's admissions no deception was noted by the examiner. The seaman is presently pending trial by court-martial.



Background inquiries concerning the seaman disclosed that he had been responsible for an arson in the civilian community prior to entry into the Navy.

Gay Revenge

By: S/A Dan McBride

Early on Sunday morning, 21 October 1979, NISRA Jacksonville was completely gutted by fire as personnel watched helplessly. Flames shot twenty to thirty feet in the air as the base fire department poured in tons of water to contain the fire and to save the adjoining spaces of the Defense Mapping Agency. Realizing little could be done in saving the NISRA, an investigation was immediately

initiated to locate possible witnesses and, while the remains smoldered, it became apparent that NISRA Jacksonville had fallen prey to the work of an arsonist.



A NIS arson expert was requested on the morning of 21 October 1979 and he arrived that afternoon to assist in the crime scene examination. One immediate indication of arson was that upon the arrival of the first personnel at the fire scene, it was obvious that an unsuccessful attempt had been made to burn one of the NIS cars. A gas cap was found on the pavement between one of the parked vehicles and the burning building and a partially burned traffic pylon was found inserted under the right rear tire of the vehicle. The crime scene examination disclosed the fire had apparently been started by a "Molotov cocktail" type device being thrown between the bars of a window into the office of the ASAC. A green scripto lighter was located in the mud and rubbish outside the window.

Working on the revenge angle, NISRA Jacksonville agents interviewed 67 legal hold barracks and 38 alcohol rehabilitation personnel for possible information and to observe each for injury or burn signs prior to 1000 on 22 October 1979, at about which time the first break in the case occurred. The Commanding Officer, Naval Regional Medical Center, NAS Jacksonville telephonically advised that a female member of his command possessed pertinent information relating to the NISRA fire. Upon immediate arrangements, the woman was interviewed and advised the fire had been set by three lesbians who wanted revenge against NISRA Jacksonville. She said one of their girlfriends had made a suicidal gesture because she was reportedly despondent over a pending discharge from the Navy as a result of a recent NIS investigation of her and one of the perpetrators. Notwithstanding the above source, NISRA Jacksonville agents are convinced that the culprits would have been identified because security personnel had advised of a stake-out on the night of 20-21 October 1979 in the barracks parking lot and of overhearing an unidentified female make a statement about getting back at NIS. This was the first clue that females may have been involved. Additionally, plans were being formulated to interview all suspects in recent cases as soon as the files could be retrieved and reconstructed. In regard to this, the case sequential number of the aforementioned lesbian investigation is "45" and the sequential number of the NISRA arson case is "46," and the co-subject of the lesbian case had a black eye as a result of a fight during the commission of the arson.

Investigation disclosed two of the culprits were on active duty and the third had been released from active duty prior to the fire; therefore, the FBI was contacted

and a concurrent investigation was undertaken at this point. Attempted interrogations by NIS of the two Waves on 23 October 1979 resulted, in one requesting legal counsel and the other declining to make any statement. A simultaneous FBI interview of the civilian suspect disclosed no admissions of arson, but she admitted being aboard NAS Jacksonville with her friends and seeing the fire in progress. The Wave who initially remained silent returned later (1800) to the scene and confessed in the large new ventilated NISRA Jacksonville interrogation room, under a pine tree in an open area adjacent to NISRA Jacksonville remains. In her statement of confession the Wave claimed the civilian female had been the instigator and that the civilian and the other Wave had ingested LSD on the evening prior to the fire and that they had all been drinking beer heavily. The affiant mitigated her own involvement and claimed that, although she had driven the other two on base and pointed out the NISRA to them, she didn't think they would actually go through with their fire plan. When they did, she claimed she tried to stop them and a fight ensued at the scene, and another fight occurred after they left the base because the civilian wanted to return to the scene to watch the fire. As a result of the fights, each of the three arsonists ended up with a black eye. The two Waves were placed in a restricted status in the Waves' barracks on the night of 23-24 October 1979. Sometime just prior to midnight, the civilian returned to NAS in search of her co-conspirators as she had heard they had been taken into custody. While aboard the base, apparently high on drugs and drinking beer, she demanded that command authorities summon NIS and the FBI so she could confess. Subsequently, during FBI interrogation with a NIS observer present, the civilian

lesbian confessed, recanted, confessed, recanted and confessed again. She was later to claim in court that since her confession had been given under the influence of drugs, it was inadmissible. However, her objection was overruled and her statements were admitted and used against her.

The following day (24 October 1979), both Navy women were placed in the Clay County Jail and the civilian was locked up in the Duval County Jail. On 25 October 1979, the two Navy women were released by judicial authorities and the civilian was released about a week later.



It was ultimately decided to prosecute all the suspects in Federal Court. Both Navy suspects eventually pleaded guilty to destruction of U.S. Government property. The one who had been most cooperative was convicted and will probably be given probation. The other Navy culprit was found guilty and will probably receive a sen-

tence of four to six years in prison under the Federal Youth Corrections Act. The civilian who tried to claim insanity due to drugs and chronic alcoholism was found guilty of destruction of U.S. Government property by a jury. Her sentence which carries a maximum penalty of \$10,000.00 and ten years in prison is pending pre-sentence investigation. The jury found her not guilty of conspiracy which would have carried a five year sentence.

Concerning the destruction of government property, all office furnishings were destroyed or unsalvageable; however, the evidence and a portion of the technical equipment remained intact except for smoke damage. The evidence and surviving tech gear were located in a concrete vault behind a steel door. All file safes were destroyed except the four fire proof file safes which protected the NISRA files from other than smoke and slight water damage. Since no other fire proof filing safes were available, the NISRA files were removed the safes were steam cleaned, then scrubbed with oven cleaner and finally repainted, making them reusable. The initiative and hard work of NIS personnel had won again. The total damage, including building and contents, amounted to \$106,000.00.

The above cold facts of an arson only tell a small portion of the whole story. It is impossible to describe the feelings one experiences when abruptly awakened from a sound Sunday morning sleep to be informed, "...Your office is burning down." There were the hopeful thoughts that it may be a small electrical fire, but when upon arrival, you actually witness the entire NISRA as an inferno (with giant tongues of flames shooting 30 feet through the roof), the feelings of frustration and helplessness are overwhelming. Of primary

concern were the files and the evidence. Of secondary concern were the photographs, certificates, plaques, and other personal effects collected over the years at far-reaching points on the earth - those things which agents acquire or collect almost casually in their travels, but which mean so much to them in later years.

In addition to the instant self-imposed pressure to solve a major investigation in which NIS is the victim, NISRA JAX personnel were faced with major administrative problems. There were no office spaces, no communications (not even a working telephone), and limited technical equipment. There was not a legible manual left after the fire. Working long hours, day and night, the pieces of the investigation puzzle quickly fell into place, but the administrative problems were not solved so easily.



Special Agents and secretaries waded through mud and dug through ashes and charred remains of the building for days attempting to

salvage anything useful. Meanwhile, a temporary office was set up in a Boy Scout meeting room until more permanent temporary quarters could be found. When a suitable temporary office was finally located, desks, tables and chairs were shipped in from Key West, or scrounged at NAS Jacksonville. The job then remained to find a permanent place to set up shop. That required untold numbers of meetings for the SAC, who had to plan the layout of the office, arrange for modifications, schedule the installation of telephone and teletype lines and arrange for funding. On top of that, the whole thing had to be brought together so that it would be accomplished in an orderly and timely fashion.

In addition to all the inconveniences of working without adequate spaces or equipment, it seemed that the caseload increased, adding that pressure to the problems generated by the fire.

During the Federal trial of one of the arsonists, a local newspaper titled a news article about the trial, "Gay Revenge," and suggested that the fire was revenge for NIS harassment of "gays." In fact, the "harassment" consisted of two interrogations, during which each suspect confessed to "gay" involvement.

According to Webster, "gay" is synonymous with cheerful, happy, joyous, lively, vivacious, frolicsome, and many other pleasant synonyms. However, the word "gay" seldom, if ever, fits any homosexuals investigated by NIS and certainly is not an accurate description of those who torched NISRA Jacksonville.

Residential Burglaries


By: S/A W. J. Klemp

During 1978/1979, burglary investigations (6N cases) accounted for approximately 9.7% of all case openings NIS wide. During this same period, 6N cases within NISPAC accounted for nearly 22% of all case openings, and were the most frequently opened investigations.

The majority of the burglary investigations in NISPAC are of the residential nature. This is not surprising considering the fact that there are over 8,600 individual USN/USMC housing units on the island of Oahu alone. Moreover, the majority of these units are situated in areas having uncontrolled access despite the posting of prohibitive signs. In effect, anyone and his brother can come and go at will, and frequently do. For example, of the nearly 4,200 housing units under NISRA Pearl Harbor, only 97 units (2.3%) are located on installations having controlled access. Furthermore, the tropical nature of housing construction in Hawaii does not lend itself towards deterring burglaries/housebreakings. Screen windows designed for removal from the outside; easily removable louvered window panes; screened lanais (patios); not to mention exterior door hinges and inexpensive/easily by-passed door locks do not, a fortress make. As in other commands, the desire to upgrade housing area security is limited by budgetary restrictions which tend to exacerbate the situation.

The problem in a nutshell appears to be two-fold: (1) the successful resolution of ongoing residential 6N's and (2) the

prevention of further residential burglaries. Regarding the former, established investigative procedures (i.e., in depth interviews of victims/neighbors, detailed crime scene examinations, cultivation of sources; NCIC and local PD pawn shop detail entries, etc.) have been somewhat successful. Other investigative pursuits could include: (a) the use of housing area maps to plot burglaries having a similar MO, with a view towards establishing a trend/pattern; (b) close continuing liaison with local PD's regarding MO's in the civilian community; (c) when juvenile involvement is suspect as is the case in most NISPAC residential 6N's, liaison with local school authorities may result in the identification of a viable suspect owing to recent unexplained affluence on the part of the student; (d) likewise, the identification of recent run-aways could produce a logical suspect. In other instances where juveniles are suspect, and where loose change collections/coin jars are stolen, the alerting of local minimarts/convenience stores may be successful in identifying a suspect who attempts to exchange sizeable quantities of coins for paper money. The recent increase in the price of silver may well result in an increase in burglaries where high silver content objects are taken; accordingly, consideration should be given to checking local precious metal outlets. Recently, a Pearl Harbor housing area was flooded with NISPAC agents on static and mobile stakeout following a rash of burglaries having similar MO's. Although unsuccessful in apprehending the culprit(s), there was a marked decrease in 6N activities within the targeted area. For the most part, the implementation of any innovative investigative technique is only limited by the individual agent's imagination. If it works, and it's legal, use it!



On the PREVENTION side of the house, military members and dependents should be alerted to their vulnerability as potential victims of residential burglaries. This can be accomplished by periodic notices/articles in the Plan of the Day or base paper, or in the form of a base housing office briefing or handout to incoming personnel. Service members can be encouraged to upgrade security in their own residences by investing in more secure door locks or an inexpensive alarm system, as these investments could reap large dividends in the long run. Another consideration could be the initiation of a NEIGHBORHOOD ALERT WATCH, whereby individual families make a conscientious effort to know what is going on in the housing area and promptly report any suspicious or questionable activities to the proper authorities. It is felt that through these and other approaches the housing area residents are made aware of the problem, and hopefully will inspire them to aid in its solution.

NISRA Sigonella Sicily

'Luxury In A Lava Pit'

By: SAC John Olson

Most everyone has heard of Sicily because of the "you know what." But, do you know that the NIS families live on the side of Europe's largest and most active volcano - "Mt Etna"?

We had lived through earthquakes, typhoons, snow, smog, fog, and "Santa Ana" winds, but, the word volcano is a little scary when one finds out they will be living on the side of one.

The Zanes assured the Olsons, before their departure to Sicily, that a trench had been blasted out the top of Mt Etna so when she overflowed the lava would flow down the other side of the mountain knowing that Mary and Al Zane, along with their three children, had been living on Mt Etna for eight months and hadn't had their lives endangered by her. Janet and John Olson decided to become more sophisticated about the matter of moving to Sicily. They assured their families and friends that they would return intact and took off (from San Francisco Airport) with drinks clutched in hand, a baby in arms and two completely relaxed teenagers.

The Olsons were graciously welcomed at Sigonella's air terminal by the Zanes, and then took off for the mountain. It was dark so the Olsons couldn't see much except some cactus along the wayside, a flock of sheep in the road, but, not the volcano. They knew they were going up as their ears started to pop, car gears were being lowered and their daughter was car sick!

The Zanes and Olsons have been living on Mt Etna for a number of months now and feel that they are old hands at living on a volcano and in a lava pit.



The Olson's villa, as shown in the above photograph, is in the middle of a mid 1800 lava flow and obviously built after the trench was blasted out. Across the street from their villa, is an old farmhouse that was buried in the eruption and you can see just the roof of it. Their yard is about a half an acre and fortunately a gardener and water are included in the rent. There are 168 rose bushes and 61 trees in the yard, but, no lava as it was thrown over the wall that surrounds the property. They are becoming true Sicilians as they have three children, a dog and two chickens running around the place.

The Olsons can't brag too much about the age of the lava that they're nestled in because the Zanes have their very own piccolo (small) volcano in their back yard which dates back to 1669. They

have a panoramic view of Catania (second largest city in Sicily), Augusta Bay and at times have viewed Siracusa, which is some distance away. At times they even have sheep and goats grazing by their villa.



The Hammons, the NIS secretary and her husband, also live on Mt Etna, in a pretty villa, with a view of Mt Etna on one side and the coastline on the other.

A search is currently underway to locate a villa with distinct features for the Dipilatos, who will be joining the Mt Etna NIS group soon.

NISRA Sigonella is located aboard the Naval Air Facility, Sigonella, on a plain near the seaport of Catania.

The NIS children, along with many other American children, are bused down the mountain to the base school in grand style. They ride in contracted Italian tourist type buses (Mercedes Benz) that have air conditioning, stereo, cushioned seats and some even with TV.

Mt Etna is very pretty in the winter. The upper portion is covered with snow. At times it snows where the NIS families live which might be considered a major storm in Southern California and a nice day in New York.

We haven't said anything yet about the vino and feel that we should. The Olsons, being from California, had acquired the taste for California wines. After finding out about their transfer to Sicily they began to think about all the wine and started looking forward to living on a volcano. They had sampled the local wines here for a couple of months before they found out about something the California vineyards just don't have. In the local area there is a drive-in vino place. All one has to do is find an empty bottle or jug, drive up to the vino pumps (which are exactly like gas pumps) and say "fill er up"! The white wine (local) here has much to be desired as our visitors to Sicily can testify. Some of us are now buying "Italian Swiss Colony" white wines at the package store on base. Just thought this should be mentioned just in case the word has leaked out about the white wine that some people have been known to serve here.

If living on a volcano and in a lava pit is beginning to sound a little too "soft" we feel that you should know the following: The Olsons, Zanes, and Hammons witnessed at close hand, a major eruption (grandest in 50 years) of Mt Etna this last summer. We can testify to the fact that the lava does indeed flow down the other side of the mountain. Water ceased to flow in our Casa's, our yards and laundry were black and our bodies were grey, but we made it and have pictures to prove it.

The lava problem does not interfere with the NISRA work schedule and duty calls, as the NIS mission must go on in rain, sleet, hail, snow, and lava dust! Ciao.

A KGB Illegal Resident

By: NIS-22 Staff

On 3 March 1980 the FBI in Washington, D.C., gave a press briefing regarding a KGB illegal resident who had been "doubled" by the FBI. Of NIS interest are the facts that two NIS espionage investigations were initiated as a result of information developed from control of the KGB operative and that a modus operandi was disclosed by the KGB tasking of the operative to travel to a given location and develop an acquaintance with military personnel assigned to a sensitive installation. A text of the briefing follows:

The FBI recently concluded a long-term deep cover operation in which a Soviet KGB illegal resident, Col. Rudolph Albert Herrmann, was identified and "doubled" by Bureau Agents. Both Col. Herrmann's wife and teenage son were also cooped into KGB service. The operation was discontinued because of a growing fear that the KGB suspected the Colonel might be cooperating with United States intelligence.

Col. Herrmann's 25 year career with the KGB began in the 1950's while serving in the military of a Soviet-bloc country. His initial training in espionage techniques such as secret writing and cipher systems took place in East Germany. More advanced training was received in the Soviet Union.

Before coming to the United States Col. Herrmann practiced his intelligence skills in West Germany and Canada. Using false identities, the family periodically traveled to Moscow's KGB Center for retraining and debriefing. The last

of these trips was made by Col. Herrmann in 1977. Another factor in the decision to close down the operation was the KGB's insistence that Herrmann's son return to Moscow for advanced training with no guarantee of returning to the United States.

In 1968, after a 6-year residency in Canada, Herrmann was ready for assignment to the KGB's primary target - the United States.

Col. Herrmann and his family illegally entered this country and quickly blended into American society. He established a home and found work as a free lance photographer near New York City. None of his neighbors or friends ever suspected he was a Soviet Spy.

Under the KGB supplied cover name "Douglas," Herrmann received his intelligence assignments by coded radio message. Those assignments included the servicing of other Soviet agents and locating dead drops, or hiding places, which were later utilized by the KGB in other intelligence operations. In carrying out these assignments Herrmann traveled from coast to coast. To highlight a few:

*December, 1969 - Travel to Washington, D.C., to confirm a KGB supplied address for a former Soviet defector.

*January, 1970 - Travel to a northern suburb of Los Angeles, California, to locate a person of interest to the KGB.

*April, 1972 - Travel to Dallas, Texas, to pass on a critical message to a KGB agent.

*September, 1975 - Travel to El Paso, Texas to locate a dead drop and pass descriptive data back to the KGB Center.

*June, 1976 - With his son, travel to Chicago, Illinois, to bury two containers for subsequent retrieval by another intelligence operative. These containers had been previously supplied to Herrmann along with operational instructions by one of his KGB handlers during a personal meeting outside the United States.

*May, 1976 - Travel to an area near Red Bank, New Jersey, with instructions to develop an acquaintance with military personnel assigned to a sensitive installation.

*February, 1976 - With his son, travel to an area near Fayetteville, Tennessee to locate a series of dead drops.

*September, 1978 - Travel to an area near Washington, D.C., to locate a series of dead drops.

Herrmann's primary assignment for the KGB was information of political significance. He was badgered by KGB requests to develop information concerning the American public's attitude toward United States-Soviet Union trade negotiations, the neutron bomb and detente.

To exemplify the KGB's long-term plans for the son, they assigned him the cryptonym of "ERBE" translated as "inheritor."

The KGB ordered the son to enroll in an American college to further his education in the area of political science with the prospect of someday seeking employment with the United States Government.

Another of his son's assignments was to develop friendships with and report on the activities of visiting People's Republic of China exchange students in the United States. Those reports provided by Herrmann and his son were furnished to the KGB in secret

writing through designated dead drops in the New York City area.

One of Colonel Herrmann's first missions in the United States involved an attempt by the KGB to abort a United States space effort. In a lengthy radio message, the KGB Center furnished Herrmann with the exact text of an anonymous letter which the Colonel was to send to United States authorities alleging that the space vehicle may have been sabotaged. Following KGB instructions, Colonel Herrmann bought a used typewriter and typed the letter. Then, using a circuitous route, traveled to Atlanta, Georgia, where he mailed it. This KGB ploy was unsuccessful.

Herrmann has furnished voluminous information pertaining to KGB methods of communication, including accommodation addresses, cipher systems, and secret writings. He has identified and provided a detailed insight into the personalities of the many KGB officers who handled him throughout the years. These included several officials assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and to the United Nations Secretariat.

One of Herrmann's responsibilities was to be prepared to take control of different aspects of the Soviet Espionage network in the United States in event U.S. - Soviet relations deteriorated to the point where these KGB officers were forced to return to Russia.

Herrmann has also provided significant leads on previously unidentified Soviet agents including Hugh George Hambleton, a professor at Laval University in Quebec, Canada. Hambleton, whom Herrmann identified as a long-time and trusted Soviet agent, has recently been interviewed by Canadian authorities.

Through Herrmann's cooperation

the FBI has achieved significant and sustained counterintelligence objectives and is pursuing additional leads developed from Herrmann's information. The Herrmann family has been granted asylum by the United States and has been resettled under a new identity.

NIS And The Master-At-Arms School

By: S/A John Michaud

As a part of the eight week Master-at-Arms course offered at Ft. McClellan in Anniston, Alabama, the Staff Assistant from NISO New Orleans and the Assistant Head of the Agent Training Division spend a full day with each class discussing the Naval Investigative Service. This provides not only an opportunity for NIS to present information to the students, but also a forum for feedback regarding relations between the Master-at-Arms force and NIS in the field.

During the presentations the attendees are given a basic knowledge of NIS structure and capabilities. A significant portion of the time is spent covering SECNAVINST 5520.3 so the jurisdiction of NIS in relation to the Master-at-Arms force is better understood.

The questions asked by class members provide the most valuable portion of the day from the NIS point of view. Occasionally one of the members apparently has a long standing dislike of NIS and little in the way of meaningful progress is made with that individual. More often the person has had a problem that resulted from a misunderstanding and after discussing the situation he feels better about it.

Once the obvious questions regarding jurisdiction are addressed perhaps the most reoccurring problem expressed by the students is a lack of feedback from NISRAs. Most of the students express a desire to be apprised of the outcome of cases they refer to NIS, especially if they have done some preliminary investigative work. This is not a difficult complaint to understand especially when we relate it to situations where we have referred cases to another agency and never hear from them again. It would really take very little time to provide this feedback and it could be done on an informal basis over coffee and the discussion could be in general terms. This would not only satisfy their normal curiosity, but help ensure willing cooperation in the future. Most of the students appear to be dedicated to the field of law enforcement and will do what is required of them; but by showing a bit more consideration, the agent can go a long way in developing a better relationship and ensuring an extra bit of cooperation.

Most of the students appear to have a high regard for NIS Special Agents and identify their problems as slight. They seem to be willing and eager to learn and this eight week course provides them with a great deal of information. The Master-at-Arms force is becoming better trained and therefore capable of being more assistance to NIS agents in the field.

A Skeleton In Every Closet

By: S/A James Kiker

When door locks were changed on BOQ rooms an installer noticed one room was very messy and apparently not occupied by the resident of record, Co-Subj. In fact, records reflect Co-Subj had been transferred to a nearby base but never checked out of the room. Co-Subj was notified to clear up his account, but after six weeks had not done so. The BOQ staff entered the room and cut two padlocks from a closet door in preparation for cleanup. A disassembled Yamaha motorcycle was found neatly stacked into the closet. The VIN had been skillfully removed from the steering neck and the motor number carefully obliterated. Chemical treatment by a NATB expert brought up the motor number which was found to match the VIN, already established by tracing a State of Texas Safety Inspection decal through the Texas Department of Public Safety and NCIC records. The latter reflected Subj had reported to the local police department that his motorcycle was stolen at a civilian shopping center in October 1978. A crime scene search of the BOQ room revealed the motorcycle had been sitting on newspapers dated October 1978 thereby inferring that the machine had been in the room since the date of the theft. Co-Subj invoked his rights and refused to permit a search. Subj was interrogated on three separate occasions and denied culpability each time. Subj, through his attorney, refused to be administered a polygraph examination. Co-Subj, in accordance with provisions of BUPERSMAN 3830320, submitted a letter offering to resign in lieu of court-martial. He attached a confession heavily involving Subj in a conspiracy to defraud the insurance company of \$1,800.00.

Shipmates' Voice

Spotlight on History -

By: S/A Clyde Roach

As the Navy steamed its fleet into the 1930's it was to all appearances impervious to change. Throughout the world, the fleet operated with a tightly disciplined uniformity that brooked no challenge. There were occasional forays against it by activist elements, but the Navy was well insulated by tradition and District Intelligence Officers were on scene to shortstop any serious efforts.

If a certain smugness developed in high Navy circles, it was soon to be dispelled. The first flickers of disquiet came early in 1933, when a 15% pay cut was levied across the board. Cries of outrage from the enlisted ranks were immediate - if \$21 couldn't stretch through a month, how far was \$17.85 expected to go? The protest was genuine, and in due course the government reversed itself. The pay cuts would be restored, but with usual bureaucratic speed it would take better than a year to accomplish.

The rallying of enlisted personnel to fight the "payday crisis" was not lost on a small group of west coast observers. For months their efforts to reach crewmembers of Pacific Fleet ships at San Pedro and San Diego had been met with indifference, and occasional hostility. The hand drawn pamphlets were thrown away unread, and more than once a beating had been the reward for their efforts.

The group came from varying walks - grocery clerk, artist, writer, hunchback - and they shared a common bond of frustration. But

here was something new. If dialectics couldn't bridge the gap, perhaps the route was through the pocketbook. For the beleaguered Young Communist League in Los Angeles, it seemed that for once opportunity was practically kicking in the door.

Hastily called meetings ran long into the night on how to turn the pay cut to advantage. A huddle with the Central Committee brought encouragement, and a closefisted \$25 to further the cause. The step to implementation was not long in coming. One morning in April of 1934 as fog washed over the Long Beach Navy Landing at Pico Street, the first edition of Shipmates' Voice was thrust into the hands of startled working parties. The lines had been drawn, and there was no question as to the target.

With allowances for any new venture, it was not a bad job. The goal was a paper the enlisted men could identify with. If the letters from "anonymous sailors" happened to have been sent before there was a publication to write to, what of it? They had a ring of believability, and were a good platform to air gripes, real or fancied. And the masthead was careful to claim it was produced by and for sailors and marines.

The central issue was money, or lack of it. Articles focused on the pay cut, return of the reenlistment bonus, and variations on the theme. (Wanna buy a pocket lighter, sailor? No thanks - my pocket's a whole lot lighter since the 15% pay cut!)

Woven throughout was the idea that servicemen needed to unite in common cause against the politicians, Navy brass and whoever else might stand in the way. The first issue was a little heavyhanded in its use of "working class strug-

gle," and other Party catchphrases, but there was a certain gleeful zip to its harpooning of the establishment that struck a friendly chord with fleet sailors.

It struck a chord elsewhere, too. As more copies turned up aboard ships on ensuing days, Washington reacted like a scalded cat. The YCL in their enthusiasm had made a tactical error they never repeated. The first edition acknowledged it was "Issued by a Communist fraction and circulated in the Pacific Fleet."

For the conspiracy-minded, this was proof enough that a takeover was in the offing.

Alarm signals flashed at the seat of government. The Navy's Judge Advocate was hustled off to the law library to pinpoint the criminal violations that obviously abounded. When he came back with a pessimistic report, Navy Secretary Swanson bearded Attorney General Homer Cummings; was not the paper clearly seditious? The Attorney General thought not. Undaunted, he sent the Assistant Navy Secretary to Congress to ask for legislation that would make it a crime. (The Secretary was so agitated he was to sputter "These are not my figures, ladies and gentlemen, but those of someone who knows what he is talking about!")

Anti-sedition bills were proposed in both Houses, and the press began to pick up the beat. The Washington Herald reproduced a front page of Voice, labeling it a propaganda sheet to stir up rebellion against Navy life. The Long Beach Police Department established a Special Radical Squad, and managed to nab a distributor red handed. Unfortunately he was only fifteen, and the ACLU promptly brought suit for false imprisonment.

SHIPMATE S' VOICE

ISSUED BY AND FOR SAILORS AND MARINES.

VOL. I. No. I.

APRIL MAY 1934

Price - Two Cents

This is Your Paper

SAILORS AND MARINES:

DO YOU KNOW what's going on in the world?

DO YOU KNOW what is going on all around you in the town, state, and country?

DO YOU KNOW what is going on in the Navy?

What you know couldn't possibly be learned from the meager news that is crammed in between the love stories, snappy cartoons, wise cracks, orders and transfers found in the vast columns of Our Navy, U. S. Navy Magazine, etc.

If you do know anything about these things, it is only from the few bits that may be picked up here and there in daily newspapers which have little or no interest in the enlisted men, and twist and distort the news to suit the views of their publishers and advertisers.

WE DO KNOW that the Navy is one of the most important sections of the population. We know that the sailors and marines can become in the shortest notice, the most important citizens, "the defenders" we are told of the whole population.

In reality we can be used by our government officials against the interests of our own people, the working people.

Why should we remain isolated from the rest of our people on the "outside" and in ignorance of the vital issues facing them and us?

Never since the World War has the world been in such a seething tur-

SAILORS PAY FOR BIG NAVY POLITICS BEHIND MOVEMENT OF FLEET

Men, now that the Roosevelt "economy" government has slashed our pay, that's old news, but how the Roosevelt government economies are wasted makes new news.

It's going to cost four million bucks to put the fleet on the Atlantic Coast. For what reason?

Claude Swanson, a gentleman from Virginia, former Senator from that state, now Secretary of Navy, naturally has a soft spot in his heart for his old home state. A bit too soft, so it appears.

Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia are broke. There hasn't been a

moll as it is today. War preparations are rushing madly forward in every country. A while back, the famous financial gambling house of Lloyd's in London was betting two to one that there would be a major war in Europe within eighteen months, and a great number of authorities agree. This coincides with the fact that off-

payoff in these ports in over two years, and big business of Virginia is howling for their share of government patronage. Secretary Swanson is making certain that Virginia gets it. Of course the presence of the Navy will help to whoop up the war spirit on the Atlantic coast centers of population.

Who pays for this kind of administration? We do!

Well, we all know the Navy is riddled thru and thru with just such practice of the bureaucrats and politicians. First went the bonuses, then the gunnery pay. Roosevelt lopped off another fifteen per cent in the form of a direct pay cut and then tossed in a slick inflation scheme which knocked our dollar's worth to four bits. The officers know only too keenly what is blocking the promotion line. We know what gouges decency out of our standard of living. It's politics. Besides, the fleet lacks twenty per cent of being properly

manned, and that hope up the value received by the government from our services by just twenty per cent. It seems that the government has not only succeeded in having a cake and eating it too, but that someone has invented a cake that doubles with every bite consumed. The point is that we men of the Navy are forced to stand these losses, to pay for stupidities and the expense of maintaining a politicians' Navy.

And that isn't all by a damn sight. It's against regulations to squawk. Any man putting his name to a grievance petition is guilty of breach of discipline and must stand the consequences.

(Cont. on page Four)



icers in the Navy were betting two to one that the Fleet will not go east in April, believing no doubt, that war in the far East is about to break.

We Navy men are the pawns in this international game, as well as in (Cont. on page Four)

(Issued by a Communist "fraction" and circulated in Pacific Fleet)

The publicity was heady tonic for Voice editors, and as supporters continued to stuff copies in lifeboats and behind ventilators, their thoughts turned to

wider horizons. Not long after in the torpor of Shanghai Station, QM2 James Peck trudged up to the tiny bridge of the gunboat Panay. Mail call had brought a letter with a

rather odd newspaper in it. Was the Captain interested? The outraged skipper called for the radio-man - Now the Bastards are Using the Mails!

The law books offered no relief from the gambit either, and in the superheated atmosphere an uncomfortable Director of Naval Intelligence could only affirm that the mail campaign was starting to hit the entire fleet.

Part of the problem was the skill with which Shipmates' Voice was put together. The YCL ranks included an attorney, who carefully screened each issue before it went to press to make sure no federal statutes were trespassed. The substance had shifted from political polemics to an emphasis on complaints and dissatisfaction with enlisted lot. Officers were held up to ridicule. A good deal of space was devoted to poor food, poor pay and poor living conditions, but the line between slander and sedition was carefully regarded.

On the whole they were fairly successful. When two of their number were clapped in jail for distributing Voice aboard the USS MISSISSIPPI, no one could subsequently figure out what to charge them with. In the words of a police spokesman, "We appealed to Federal, state and city authorities but no one could find a statute under which to prosecute."

The record of Naval Intelligence involvement is incomplete, but was probably as considerable as its limited investigative resources would allow. Evidence indicates most of the attention was devoted to keeping track of where Voice would pop up next, and trying to identify any Navy men involved with it. The September 1934 issue carried an alert to its readers in a letter that read:

"To the Editor:

From what I understand there is to be a draft of new recruits coming aboard the Maryland and there is to be two secret service men among them. The conversation concerning this was overheard by a friend of mine and it is the straight dope. It looks to me like the higher ups are really worried about the appearance of Shipmates' Voice, and are planting their spies among us to find out its source.

-- A Sailor, USS MARYLAND"

The same issue lashed out editorially at an aviation carpenter's mate who had commented on it in OUR NAVY. "In behalf of the editorial board," it wrote, "we utterly resent your efforts to trail our publication to find out its origin. Your cooperation with Naval Intelligence will hardly be appreciated by the enlisted men who read and support our paper, and might result in a popular feeling of disgust with such stool pigeon methods. Why should we help the Naval Intelligence Department put our buddies on the spot? Rather than lack of guts, it takes nerve to work secretly against the N.I.D., "Brass Hats," secret service men, and the government apparatus are united in an effort to suppress the voice of the sailors and marines."

Self-proclaimed patriotic groups undertook investigations of their own, in some cases with surprising results. In June of 1935, the Civic Council of Defense of California reported its findings to the then Congressman John W. McCormick, in a remarkably detailed precis of Voice personalities and their daily activities. They warned that their informant had penetrated the innermost circle of the organization, and any leak risked certain compromise.

Liaison In Scotland

By: S/A John Marquette

But the boomlet was nearly over. By now the pay cut issue was moot, and enlisted enthusiasm for the paper had never really materialized to the hoped-for degree. Financial problems dogged the publication, and citizen hostility was beginning to take its toll. Party headquarters wanted its \$25 worth, and was demanding that more and more dogma appear. War clouds were gathering as well, and the atmosphere had substantially changed. Voice had aged prematurely, caught up in a growing national patriotism that was anathema to its thrust. Volume Two, Number One spoke bravely of a design for the future, but the issue of February 1936 was to be the last.

It still spanked the officer corps and derided Navy tradition, but the vitality was gone. The artfully contrived letters seemed mechanical and threadbare. The budget could no longer afford offset printing, and gave way to mimeographed copy. The Party line was barely camouflaged now, the well worn phrases simply dusted off and reinserted. In the end, Voice toppled of its own disingenuousness, and faded into obscurity. The small handful of NIS Agents - then known as the Naval Intelligence Service - turned their attention to German and Japanese Nationals in the U.S. as new concerns occupied the intelligence community.

Yet for all its vagaries, Shipmates' Voice remains a special footnote in history. It was the progenitor of the underground papers of the 60's and shared much the same successes and failures. Both ruffled official feathers and occupied national attention far more than warranted.

Whatever the judgment, Shipmates' Voice remains a lively echo of the past.

Liaison with Scottish law enforcement and Security Services personnel could be classified as hazardous duty and stamped with the warning "Injurious to your Health." This is particularly true if the Special Agent forgets that Scotland has the best football team in the world, (even though they are no longer in competition for the European Cup) or refers to the host as "Jock," or possibly comments on the feminine aspects of the kilt. Mere slips of the tongue in this manner can set the association with the Scottish police back several years and will often require the purchase and consumption of large amounts of the local beverage to overcome the indiscretion.

Certain physical aspects are also a requirement in the conduct of liaison with Scottish police. The first and foremost requirement is the hollow leg. This physical attribute enables the agent to consume large quantities of Scotch whisky and still maintain his equilibrium. Secondly, a good sturdy liver, preferably made of cast iron is required. This physical advantage is not necessary at the outset of the Holy Loch tour and develops quite naturally as the tour and liaison meetings progress. Agents leaving Holy Loch, or other UK offices have been known to have their livers made into souvenir door stops at the conclusion of their tours. Another attribute, although not essential, is to have a bladder somewhat larger than that of a rhinoceros, as frequent trips to the restroom will result in missing salient points of the stimulating conversations about Scottish football and past glories of Scotland. The higher the rank of the police

representative the more humane the subjects of conversation become and are eventually elevated to discussions on golf and cricket, therefore, the agent must be well versed in all UK sports. A sure damper for any conversation is to mention the NFL with a corresponding statement that American football is a rougher sport than either Scottish football (soccer) or rugby.

Finally, last but not least, a good background in languages other than English is helpful. Initially the dialect spoken in Scotland sounds like a cross between Navajo and Gaelic, but after a few months, the ear atunes to the series of "oors," "achs," and "arrs" and the "proper English" begins to make some sense.

Once all of the above have been achieved, then the all important function of liaison can run smoothly and result in many benefits. Without proper liaison in Scotland, the NIS mission would be greatly hampered, and this fact is accentuated by the assignment of a member of the Ministry of Defence Police to NISRA Holy Loch for liaison purposes. Under the Official Secrets Act, Scottish police are not allowed to provide details of criminal investigations to other non-UK police forces without authorization from higher authority. By having a liaison officer assigned to NISRA Holy Loch, the difficulties in obtaining the requested information are greatly reduced.

In the sphere of joint investigations, involving U.S. Navy personnel and local civilians, it must be remembered that the NIS is a guest in the country and at times methods utilized by the local police may not be in line with NIS policy. If good liaison has been established prior to the incident, these blocks can be easily overcome, so that both agencies fulfill

their investigative requirement. A hard line demanding attitude on either side will usually result in a bitter relationship for the next agent to overcome. Since NIS agents are working the locals' "patch" and most local authorities do not concern themselves greatly with the receipt of a Form 9 from some review desk in NISHQ, adequate rapport established early in the association can eliminate a lot of headaches for the NIS agent.

In closing, it should be noted that good liaison does not consist merely of weekly or monthly meetings at a police office. It more often consists of purchasing Police Benefit tickets, the answering of inquiries that normally would not be handled by NIS and providing assistance to the local police requests in a timely and accurate manner. In short, going out of your way to assist them in the same manner you expect them to assist you.

Jungle Environmental Survival Training

By: S/A Bruce A. Smart

During early December 1979, Special Agents and Indigenous Criminal Investigators from offices under NISO Philippines control, participated in a unique type of training. Personnel were provided a different view of the jungle that surrounds the Naval Facility Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines area.

The U.S. Naval Facility, Subic Bay, RP, encompasses 26,000 acres of land which includes 15,000 acres of dense, tropical jungle. Though many investigations may start in a clean and comfortable office or warehouse, some lead to the jungle,

be it a dead body or cache of stolen goods. Many agents are faced with the jungle experience with no idea what to expect. In order to bridge the gap, NISO Philippines in conjunction with NISRA Cubi Point, tasked (JEST) to develop a training plan tailored to NIS personnel.

Fleet Aviation Specialized Operation Training Group Pacific Detachment, NAS Cubi Point, RP, better known as Jungle Environmental Survival Training (JEST), was established in 1965 to train aviators in survival, search and rescue techniques unique to the Asia area. ABHC William Vogel, Officer-in-Charge JEST, commands a group of American and fourteen Negritos (small black) Filipino instructors. The JEST training facility includes a zoo and wildlife area. Within the zoo are monkeys, a bamboo viper, cobra snakes, a wild boar, a Malasian bear, and deer, which are all familiar faces in the Philippine jungle.

The NIS training consisted of a morning classroom session and tour of the facilities. Part of the classroom training consisted of camouflage techniques, tracking, and movement through the jungle. The American is out of his normal environment in the jungle. It was learned that he must sanitize himself by being devoid of jewelry, glasses and shaving lotion, etc. The person normally being surveilled in the jungle has a keen sense of smell and sight and the sanitation must be complete. Another technique learned was to blacken the face with a "black stick" or to use just plain carbon paper smeared on the face. A glance around the JEST classroom makes one respect the jungle as you see a 19 foot python snake skin hanging on the wall or a 16 foot stuffed python curled around a tree branch next to the instructor podium.

A three hour night session consisted of a walk through the jungle. Starting a few minutes before sunset, led by a Negrito instructor, the NIS personnel only had to walk a few feet into the jungle to realize that it doesn't matter whether it is day or night, its dark. Without the benefit of flashlights, it was over hill and dale, fording streams with the benefit of rocks and root bridges (well at least many made a dry crossing.) A camouflage exercise was also a part of the night training.

The most valuable lesson learned was that the NIS agent doesn't belong in the jungle alone without trained personnel to guide and track for him. At least when a NISO Philippines agent does step into the jungle the next time, he will have an appreciation and familiarization for the deep dark jungle that is out there.

Iceland, Weather or Not

By: SAC Dick Wardman

Iceland is slightly smaller than Virginia and three-quarters of the country is a wilderness of deserts, lava fields (location of NISRA KEF), glaciers, and extinct volcanoes. The landscape is almost lunar like in many areas, but it has its own special beauty and grandeur. Lakes and rivers filled with trout and salmon are abundant, but trees are few (old timers say any rock between one and three feet is a bush, over that height it's a tree). In the summer (July 1-4) the inhabited coastal area is green and dotted with sheep, cattle and birds, but in the dark of winter it is windswept and forbidding and many roads are impassable.

Despite its location at 64° N. latitude, close to the Arctic Circle, Keflavik's climate is similar to the U.S. northern marine west coast, though cooler and windier. The Gulf Stream helps keep the annual mean temperature 41° F. Winter temperatures below +20°F are unusual, as are summer temperatures above 60°F. But the wind blows year round and wind chill factor between -15°F and +10°F is not uncommon in winter. The colder weather lasts from October through April. Snow may fall in Keflavik as early as September and as late as June but often doesn't come until October or November and is rarely seen after April. Even in midwinter, rain is as likely as snow and a large accumulation of snow is rare. Average annual rainfall is 50 inches in Keflavik. During winter and spring, winds can reach hurricane force. If this is combined with a heavy snow fall a most interesting and dangerous situation occurs. The snow falls almost horizontally and some already on the ground is swirled back into the air. Visibility is reduced to only a few feet in what is known as a "white out." During such periods, which may last for hours, strange sights have been seen near the NISRA. An ASAC pushing the SAC's vehicle out of a snow drift along the side of a roadway (only because the ASAC volunteered) or agents putting evidence bags to good use as protection as they crossed the lava fields trying to find their quarters. One agent was seen walking in circles, allegedly conducting a crime scene search, around a stolen vehicle under such conditions while another tried to rig alarm wires to the outside of a shipping container. Needless to say, both agents were in their second Icelandic winter and had become "acclimatized," (but neither stayed for their third winter). Overall, the climate is not as bad as most would expect - a New Eng-

land or Great Lakes winter can be considerably more severe - but on a yearlong basis Iceland's weather has rightly never been considered pleasant.

The country is so far north that the amount of daylight varies greatly. In December and January the 4 hours of light are dim unless the weather is clear (good for burglars). In February the days begin to lengthen (good for agents) as rapidly as they shrank in October and November. By April they are as long as midsummer in the U.S., and in June there is no darkness at all - 20 hours of sun (or clouds) and 4 hours of twilight. At this time the annual NISRA KEF open golf tournament is held on one of the four courses in Iceland (yes, four). Despite there being twenty-four hours in which to complete the round the turn-out is surprisingly poor. Last year the Chief of Staff (senile), Flag Lieutenant (would do anything to get away), Transportation Officer (he has the snow-cat) and the SAC (his sanity is doubtful) showed up.

Earthquakes are common in Iceland, but tremors in Keflavik are mild and seldom felt. In May 1970 Hekla, thought to be the mouth of Hell during the the Middle Ages (and still my be), began a series of minor eruptions which lasted for 2 months. The underwater volcano which created the new island of Surtsey in the Westman Islands of the south coast began erupting in November 1963 and remained active through mid-1967. In January 1973 a volcanic eruption on Heimaey Island in the Westman Islands forced the temporary evacuation of all 5,000 residents.

If the agent survives every two weeks of this accompanied tour with free housing he does find the extra incentive of 10 percent in his paycheck. As I am sure you can tell

by now most of us do enjoy our Icelandic stay and keep our sense of humor (?). It makes for a very close office (to stay warm).

WEATHER CHART

Daylight Hours

(Includes useable twilight)

JANUARY	- 8
FEBRUARY	- 11
MARCH	- 13
APRIL	- 17
MAY	- 24
JUNE	- 24
JULY	- 24
AUGUST	- 19
SEPTEMBER	- 15
OCTOBER	- 11
NOVEMBER	- 8
DECEMBER	- 6

Darkness Hours

JANUARY	- 16
FEBRUARY	- 13
MARCH	- 11
APRIL	- 7
MAY	- 0
JUNE	- 0
JULY	- 0
AUGUST	- 5
SEPTEMBER	- 9
OCTOBER	- 13
NOVEMBER	- 16
DECEMBER	- 18

Precipitation

(Average number of days with)

JANUARY	- 19
FEBRUARY	- 17
MARCH	- 19
APRIL	- 19
MAY	- 16
JUNE	- 17
JULY	- 15
AUGUST	- 16
SEPTEMBER	- 20
OCTOBER	- 22
NOVEMBER	- 19
DECEMBER	- 20

Wind Speed
(Average Knots)

JANUARY	- 15.1
FEBRUARY	- 14.3
MARCH	- 14.0
APRIL	- 13.4
MAY	- 11.9
JUNE	- 11.1
JULY	- 10.5
AUGUST	- 10.7
SEPTEMBER	- 11.8
OCTOBER	- 13.0
NOVEMBER	- 13.9
DECEMBER	- 14.3

Temperature
(Mean Fahrenheit)

JANUARY	- 32.3
FEBRUARY	- 33.4
MARCH	- 34.7
APRIL	- 38.3
MAY	- 43.9
JUNE	- 48.7
JULY	- 51.4
AUGUST	- 50.8
SEPTEMBER	- 47.0
OCTOBER	- 41.6
NOVEMBER	- 36.3
DECEMBER	- 33.1

New Office At NISRA Twenty-Nine Palms Nears Completion

By: S/A Al Deahl

After two years of working in the meat locker of a converted messhall and the playrooms of the former base nursery, NISRA Twenty-Nine Palms is looking forward with unabashed enthusiasm to a new \$200,000.00 office. Tragedy struck in April 1978, when an accidental fire gutted the building housing NIS and the USMC Counterintelligence Team (CIT), resulting in the death of a CIT officer agent. The new building, designed by NISRA Twenty-Nine Palms and CIT, will host bullet resistant Lexon plastic windows; steel doors; reinforced concrete and steel block construction. The result is a fire proof, burglar, riot, earthquake resistant and air-conditioned building, unique in the Mojave Desert. Dubbed the "Mausoleum" by local wags, the completion and formal dedication of the building will be held in the summer of 1980. Construction was funded with emergency DOD resources.



TSD Notes

TECHNICAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT NOTES

The following information was provided by Special Agent Thomas F. Boley based on frequent liaison with USACIL - Pacific during his assignment to NISRA Atsugi.

Fingerprints

The fingerprint examiners have often said that they do not mind processing evidence for latent fingerprints and urge that porous items such as wood and paper be forwarded to the lab for latent processing, unless a field agent is particularly adept at that kind of processing. They do ask that agents in the field examine other items for latent fingerprints themselves when possible because it will speed resolution of that case as well as other cases by not taking up the examiners' time at the lab doing something any investigator with basic latent print recovery training could do.

The examiners also pointed out an excellent technique for lifting latent fingerprints from uneven or curved surfaces. They said that a rubber base compound such as Codesco or the Sirchie rubber base product used for tool mark impressions could be very successfully used for lifting dusted prints. They pointed out that the Sirchie product is better for that than Codesco because the Sirchie product is white causing the latent prints to show up better on it. It is important to not dust the surface too heavily or it will tend to mask the prints when lifted. They say that the rubber compound will also work well to lift footwear and hand prints in dust and that a print made by a boot or shoe in dust on a piece of cloth can be easily lifted

NIS

using this technique. It can also be used to directly lift actual finger impressions in soft surfaces. The examiner displayed the results of one case in which a suspect had squeezed a piece of children's modeling clay at the scene, leaving his finger impressions deep in the clay. The clay could not be disturbed without destroying the latent impressions so the Sirchie rubber base impression material, which can be easily poured, was used to fill the impression. When it had set up, the clay was peeled away, leaving perfect impressions of the ridge detail.

NIS

Several months ago Technical Services Department learned that S/A George K. Roberts had found the use of an aviator's clip board a valuable addition to his crime scene processing and general note taking procedures. This piece of equipment is designed to hold a pad of standard 5 x 8 inch note paper; the under surface of the clip board is contoured in a concave manner to comfortably fit the thigh of the user where it may be strapped for use while sitting. S/A Roberts remarks that this feature also allows the clip board to lay securely on many vehicles front transmission humps. The clip board is equipped with two pencil holders, a pencil sharpener, and a battery powered (2 "C" cells) light source with a removable red filter.

The type used by S/ A Roberts is a MYU-163 which is available through the Navy supply system. Technical Services has used one of these for several years which is identified as a type MXU-163/P. Those agents who have felt the need for such a piece of equipment may well wish to locate one of these items and give it a try.

During the past month a "GEN ADMIN" was disseminated to the field from Technical Services Department regarding the temporary problems being encountered by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratories (USACIL) in the field of drug analysis. This particular problem has lessened somewhat over the last few weeks; USACIL continues, however, to experience work backlog pressures within the fingerprint divisions. These problems center around a shortage of qualified fingerprint examiners. A letter from USACIL to all users of their services was issued last year and some of the salient points within this document are repeated here as a reminder to those utilizing the services of the Army how best to prepare evidence forwarded for their fingerprint examiners.

USACIL points out that many agents (from all DOD investigative agencies) continue to submit non-porous material to be processed for latent prints. They stress that the investigating agent must process this type of material as soon as possible with standard brush and powder techniques to avoid loss or destruction of any latent prints. Approximately 1/3 of all fingerprint evidence received by USACIL falls into this category and often results in delays, increased backlog, and in many cases, unnecessary destruction of evidence in transit to the laboratory.

Many submissions do not contain record prints of suspects or elimination of victims. Investigating agents should ensure that such prints are forwarded in pertinent cases with the original evidence, to include major case prints.

Some evidence continues to be sent to the laboratory even though the agent knows that there is no evidentiary value or possibility of

developing prints. When in doubt as to the possibility of recovering latent prints on a given item, the agent should telephonically contact the fingerprint division of USACIL for guidance prior to submitting the evidence.

****NIS****

WARNING: ERASABLE INK PENS TO BE MARKETED BY PAPER-MATE.

A new ballpoint pen that features erasable ink has lawyers and bankers worried because it would make it easy to change signatures and endorsements on legal documents and monetary instruments.

The Paper-Mate Division of the Boston-based Gillette Co. has scheduled marketing this spring for eraser mate, a \$2 pen with ink that for about two days can be erased as easily as a pencil. After two days, according to the manufacturer, the ink sets and becomes permanent.

Bankers are worried that the pen could be used for fraudulent purposes. For example, after a check is written and endorsed, someone could remove the name of the person to whom the money is to go and write in his own.

In fact, a warning from the American Bankers Association will be printed on the back of the pen's package, said Sidney Golub of the ABA in Washington, D.C.

In the message, the association recommends the pen not be used "to sign or endorse checks or other similar documents in order to guard against any possible alterations."

A Paper-Mate spokesman, who asked not to be identified, agreed. "This is a brand new product. And its created a great deal of interest and excitement. But it would

only be reasonable not to use it to sign legal documents."

Paper-Mate says it provided the ABA with 25,000 pens for advance distribution to members. The security committee of the New Jersey Bankers Association met late last month in Newark to examine samples.

The pens "will undoubtedly cause some problems as they find their way into the hands of some people who want to take somebody else's money," said Juris Mednis, president of the Howell State Bank in New Jersey's Monmouth County.

****NIS****

DOD Issues New ID Card Regulations. Changes affecting the issue and renewal of dependent ID cards and ID cards for retired people and reservists are taking place. Highlights of these changes are: Requirements for more frequent renewal of dependent's ID cards, and a "new look" for retired and reserve ID's.

As current retired and reserve ID cards expire, they will be replaced with the new versions. New ID cards for retired personnel will be blue instead of grey. New ID's for reservists will remain red and Geneva Convention information will be added. Neither of the new cards will show fingerprints.

Some principal points in the new DOD Directives on ID cards are:

- ID cards for retired members will be renewable at any Service's Personnel Activity, regardless of the member's previous service branch.

- Active duty dependents' ID's will be valid for a maximum of three years.

- Dependents of retirees and

deceased members will renew their ID's every three years.

- Cards for DOD civilians serving overseas will be valid three years.

- ID's for foreign personnel and their dependents will be valid a maximum of two years.

- Applications for dependent ID cards must list all dependents - not just those for whom cards are requested.

A copy of each completed DD Form 1172 - Application for Uniformed Services Identification and Privilege Card - will be forwarded for inclusion in the new DOD Enrollment/Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS).

Personnel Activity Offices should have complete details concerning new regulations and policies for ID cards. For further information, see NAVMILPERSCOM INST 1750.1 of 1 Nov 1979.

****NIS****

Kodak to Adopt New Film Speeds

Plans are currently underway for Kodak to adopt a set of film standards that were recently completed by the International Standards Organization (ISO). The universally accepted ISO speeds will eventually replace the ASA and DIN on all Kodak publications and packaging.

Currently the emulsion speeds of Kodak black and white and color films are expressed in either arithmetic ASA values, determined according to methods developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), or in logarithmic DIN values determined by Deutsche Industrie Norm, the standards organization in Germany. But because the new ISO standards express

both the arithmetic and logarithmic speed values in one term and is comparable with the American and German standards, Kodak is switching to the ISO speeds.

Whenever possible, the existing ASA and DIN speeds will be indicated along with the new ISO speeds until users become familiar with the new terminology.

The ISO designation will be a simple listing of the ASA and DIN speeds, with the ASA number listed first, and the DIN number second. The two numbers will be separated by a slash mark (/), and the DIN number will be followed by a degree symbol (°). The following format is one that Kodak will use to show the new ISO speeds and this example is for Kodak film with an ASA speed of 100:

ISO 100/21

The number after the ISO is the ASA equivalent; the number with the degree (°) is the DIN equivalent.

If a complete listing of ISO film standards is desired it may be obtained by writing to: ANSI Sales Department, American National Standards Institute, 1430 Broadway, New York, New York 10018.

DIN standards can be obtained from Deutsche Industrie Norm, Beuth Verlag GmbH, D-1000 Berlin 30, Germany.

****NIS****

Identi-Kit Information

One of the many investigative aids being supplied to NIS field components through NIS-26, is the Identi-Kit identification system. Questions are frequently directed to NIS-26 regarding the procurement of Identi-Kit units and updated foils, and training of Identi-Kit operators.

By way of history, NIS purchased its first Identi-Kit in 1973. Between that time, and May 1977, thirty-eight Identi-Kit I units were purchased, at a total cost of \$20,064. Although the Identi-Kit I units provided NIS with the latest method of obtaining a composite likeness of suspects, it left much to be desired with regard to the constructing of composites of some minority races. This weakness was largely corrected with the introduction of the Identi-Kit II units. From May 1977 until January 1980, nineteen Identi-Kits were purchased at a total cost of \$13,205. Additionally, forty-three Identi-Kit units are rented on a monthly basis, at a per annum cost of \$9,018.

It is the goal of NIS-26 to eventually provide Identi-Kit II capability to every field component requiring it. In order to make the determination of which offices should receive Identi-Kit II units, each NISO has provided NIS-26 with a list of its field components, by priority, still in need of the Identi-Kit II capability. These lists included components with no current Identi-Kit capability; components with the Identi-Kit I capability; and, as in the case of some larger components, the need for more than one Identi-Kit II. From these NISO lists, NIS-26 composed a world-wide composite list of components to receive Identi-Kit II units in the future, as money becomes available to obtain them.

In order to keep the Identi-Kit II capabilities as current as possible, updated foils are automatically furnished to unit holders as soon as they are marketed. To date all Identi-Kit II units within the NIS contain the latest foils. For anyone who may not know what a foil is, it is a transparent, plastic overlay containing a drawing of a particular portion of the human

face. When a series of overlays are combined in appropriate fashion, a composite sketch of a human face results.

NIS Special Agents receive Identi-Kit training through two primary means. The first is through a four hour block of instruction presented to each Basic Agents' class. This block is a condensed version of the classes taught by the Identi-Kit company in its own sponsored schools in every geographical area of the U.S. These schools are taught on a no-cost basis, however each NISO must fund all TAD requirements for its own personnel. Generally no more than two openings are allotted to NIS for any one particular school, and personnel attending must make their own lodging arrangements. NIS-252 has furnished each NISO with a list of all schools being taught by the Identi-Kit Company in FY 1980. Each NISO must coordinate with the Identi-Kit Company to enroll students in these schools. NIS-252 will coordinate enrollment for NISHQ personnel. The attendance of NIS Special Agents at the Identi-Kit Company schools is strongly encouraged.

An increase in the use of the Identi-Kit units has been noted. Several cases have been solved as the direct result of the distribution of wanted posters displaying Identi-Kit composites. This proper use of the Identi-Kit units is encouraging. After all "nothing ventured-nothing gained."

****NIS****


Hostage Negotiation Communications

In developing the NISRA Yokosuka Hostage Reaction Exercise with the local command, a prepared kit was borrowed from NISO Philippines. The exercise was conducted in May 1979 and the borrowed kit func-

tioned well, though it was bulky. From that experience it was decided to attempt construction of a similar type kit that would be more compact.

The parameters decided upon were to use readily available parts, to reduce the size of the kit, and to make the operation of the kit simple enough for any agent to set it up in the field. Contact with a local unit with experience in electronics and knowledge of telephone mechanics was done.

The final version was delivered, contained in a briefcase purchased from SERVMART. The telephone operators' headsets and telephone dial were obtained from the local Telephone Exchange office from outmoded stock. The recorder is a Sony TC-55 from the NISRA Yokosuka Technical Equipment inventory. Other items purchased, such as switches and wire, were obtained locally at a cost of less than \$10.00.



A similar second briefcase is used to carry a small tool kit, a speaker, and power cord and was also obtained from the SERVMART.


The recorder is manually switched to record and can be operated either by the rechargeable battery or the AC/DC converter

built into the briefcase. Both headsets are switchable to allow the microphone on either set to be turned off independently.

Operators Instructions: Briefcase Telephone:

This briefcase telephone consists of a telephone dial, recorder, two headset monitors, and a means to operate a remote speaker.

Referring to the photographs, all actions are from the front of the briefcase:



a. The reel of wire with the two alligator clips attached is plugged into the jack at the left rear of the case.

b. The power cord is attached to the center plug at the rear of the case to power the cassette recorder. (If no power is available, the recorder will operate from the rechargeable battery after the power input plug is removed from the side of the recorder.)

c. The headphone jacks are inserted into the respective double jacks, and the switches to the side of each jack control the microphone. The switches are independent and can only turn off the microphone designated.

d. The switch to the left of the dial controls the line to the telephone. With the switch in the on position, the telephone is live. In the off position, the telephone line is "dead" and is used to break the connection.

e. The switch at the left front of the recorder operates the recorder. When the red lamp is lit there is power to the recorder. The record and play buttons on the recorder must be depressed to record any conversation.

f. The plug at the right rear of the briefcase is the line out plug for a remote speaker position.

Postal Investigations -

A Successful Effort

By: S/A J. T. Liehr

During June 1979, a west coast based ship reported a First Class Postal Clerk had departed on authorized leave but had failed to return. His failure to return led to an audit of the ship's postal account which detected a shortage of approximately \$15,700.00 worth of funds and the theft of 5,000 blank postal money orders, a money order imprinter and a money order validation plate. Possession of the blank money order, imprinter and validation plate gave the Postal Clerk the capability to print \$2,000,000.00 worth of money

orders. Preliminary investigation by NIS indicated the Postal Clerk's wife was unaware of his whereabouts, but that he did have a Filipino girl friend from a prior WESTPAC cruise. Based upon this initial information, early efforts to locate the Postal Clerk concentrated in the Philippines. Additionally, the Postal Inspection Service was notified and joined the investigation during its early stages. During the first month of the investigation, the FBI provided informant information that an unidentified man residing in a motel in Mexico had cashed one of the stolen money orders. This information was later debunked when the informant stated the suspect was not the Postal Clerk and the money order was found not to be one of those reported stolen. During this same period, the Postal Inspectors determined that 101 of the missing money orders had been cashed in the San Diego and Los Angeles areas. The Postal Clerk was positively identified as the individual who had negotiated these money orders worth \$40,000.00. As the investigation progressed into its second month, efforts were intensified to determine whether the Postal Clerk had proceeded to the Philippines. These efforts met with negative results and the Postal Inspectors reported the total number of money orders cashed in California was now 115 with a value of \$46,000.00.

As the investigation neared the end of its third month, Postal Inspectors advised that another money order had been cashed by a female in Houston, Texas. Follow-up in this area determined the Postal Clerk had rented an apartment in Houston and had purchased an airline ticket to Portland, Oregon, both with stolen money orders in the amount of \$400.00 each. A search of the apartment disclosed a bank account, containing \$5,000.00, located at a San Diego bank. Post-