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NIS BULLETIN

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
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THIS BULLETIN IS INTENDED FOR THE USE AND PROFESSIONAL ENHANCEMENT OF ALL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL, SPECIAL AGENTS AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS ASSIGNED TO NIS WORLD-WIDE.

FIELD COMPONENTS ARE ENCOURAGED TO SUBMIT ITEMS FOR PUBLICATION ON A CONTINUING BASIS. AN ARTICLE IN THE APRIL 1972 ISSUE OF THE NIS NEWSLETTER DISCUSSES THE DETAILS REGARDING SUBMISSIONS TO THIS BULLETIN.



FROM THE

DIRECTOR'S DESK



Given the continuing transitional difficulties as the NIS adjusts itself to the advent of the DIS and gears itself to the forthcoming disestablishment of various NISO's, I will forego any comments at this time, and simply invite the attention of all hands to my recent (6 Oct 72) General Admin on NIS Reorganization and Related Matters.

Within the next month or so, the separation between the NIS and its former PSI functions (and our adjustment to the loss of our colleagues who have transferred to the DIS) will be pretty well consolidated. At that time, the shape of our future should be more precise, and I will then attempt a delineation of just where we stand and what course we will take thenceforward.

In the meantime, thanks for your patience and efforts during these difficult times.

J. G. Edwards

NISRA MIRAMAR'S NARCOTIC INFORMANT PROGRAM

By S/A Daniel R. Foley

(Editor's note: Due to its obvious value this treatise by S/A Foley was distributed to all Special Agents in NISO San Diego in July, 1972. It is reprinted in the BULLETIN in its entirety.)

In late 1971 at the direction of the Supervising Agent, an informant program was initiated to combat sales of narcotics aboard NAS Miramar, California. NAS Miramar (Fightertown, USA) is the location for COMFAIRMIRAMAR, Fighter Weapons Training School, Naval Drug Rehabilitation Center, and home base for all the Pacific Fleet fighter (F-4, F-8) aircraft squadrons which will include the F-14 in the Fall, 1972. Since initiation of the program, NISRA Miramar agents have recruited and developed nineteen successful informants who have made 33 controlled buys from 22 USN enlisted sellers and 6 civilian sellers. The informants have also supplied probable cause for 7 Command-authorized searches which resulted in narcotic seizures. Drugs/narcotics which have been purchased or seized have included heroin, cocaine, hashish, marijuana, amphetamines, barbiturates, and LSD.

The purpose of this report is to relate in specific detail NISRA Miramar's experiences in setting up and conducting the program. Successes were cited above, but the results of many of our efforts were frustrating and maintaining the program is time consuming. On an average only one out of three potential informants contacted proved to be useful. The average maximum period of time in which an informant could be successfully worked was considered to be about eight weeks. This was due to inadvertent compromise in various ways and, of course, disclosure at court-martial.

Informants were developed for any one or combination of three purposes:

- (1) controlled buys,
- (2) probable cause for Command-authorized searches,
- (3) general intelligence on narcotic "dealers."

Informants could generally be grouped into one or more of the following classifications according to motive for desiring/agreeing to work as a narcotic informant for NIS:

- (1) Detested drug abuse for whatever reasons (not including reformed drug abusers)
- (2) Desire to become a police officer

- (3) All around "squared away" sailor who considers this an opportunity to "clean up" the Navy
- (4) Command problems because of UA, insubordination, etc., who are facing less than honorable discharges, court-martial, or some other disciplinary action. Also included in this classification are subjects/suspects developed in NIS narcotic or other category investigations
- (5) Reformed drug abusers
- (6) Braggadocio-egotists. Informants who thought being an undercover "narc" would be a "James Bond" experience. In many cases their association with NIS in this capacity apparently filled a void in their ego.

The success of informants in categories (1), (2), (3), and (5), supra, depended solely on the individual. Persons in any of these categories were not particularly good or particularly bad. If the informant was not familiar at least generally with the drug scene and jargon, was too "squared away" or appeared too "clean cut," was too old, or if his normal interests and activities were unlike a typical "doper," he was unsuccessful regardless of how hard he might try. NIS Headquarters statistics indicate that of USN individuals involved in narcotics, the typical user is 19-21 years of age, never married, and he is a high school graduate or at least has some formal high school education. Also, marijuana was the most widely used substance. It follows, and it has been our experience, that the best narcotic informant generally matched the statistics of the most prevalent detected users.

Informants in classification (4), supra, were the most productive for several reasons. They had a motive to work which overcame the fear of possible reprisal or stigma attached to a "snitch." Because of their questionable status within the Command, they were quite easily accepted by target dealers. Their natural general appearance, demeanor, background, mode of dress, interests, and conversation were advantages in quickly establishing rapport and acceptance with drug sellers. Many of this category also had at least some personal experience with drugs. Closer control in the use of these informants was necessary as defense counsel would invariably explore the possibility of NIS pressure on the informant "to produce" or "meet a quota."

For obvious reasons, informants falling into category (6) were the worst and NIS association with them had to be severed as completely and quickly as possible. In looking back on some of the cases where an informant "went sour" it appears that the man's prime motive for working was an intense desire or serious need to "feel important" or to "gain praise." While it would

seem that these would be good motives to exploit, they were not. This motivation demands publicity. They bragged to their girl friends, close friends, military superiors (both officer and enlisted low in the chain-of-command who had no need-to-know) or in some other way advertised or used their association with NIS in such a way that could have resulted in at least embarrassment. It is frequently difficult to detect this during initial interviews or even after an informant has started making controlled buys. In one case the tip-off should have been clear that the informant was unsuitable when, after NISRA Miramar obtained appropriate Command concurrence, he went back to his squadron and informed his immediate superior CPO, leading CPO, and Division Officer that he was working with NIS. Shortly thereafter his name appeared in the Security Department blotter for impersonating a NIS agent. The man had purchased some sort of badge which he "flashed" at the EM Club. Station Security was called, and he also informed them he was working with NIS, all of which was in direct violation of specific instructions he had been provided by NIS agents.

As a result of dealings with the above-type persons, we never give a potential informant a NIS agent calling card or anything else that could be construed as tangible indication of any type of affiliation with NIS. Also, somewhat related to this area, we have found it best never to over-encourage an informant to produce or even make comments like, "We are really counting on you." The best approach was considered to be "low key." If the informant produced, fine, if he didn't, recognize his efforts for trying. Ideally, the informant should be under absolutely no pressure either explicit or implied "to make" a particular deal or buy from a particular seller. This does not mean that we have not prodded informants to keep them working generally but not to the point of forcing any particular issue.

Several young enlisted men were contacted as potential informants, and it was later discovered that they were "sellers" themselves. On occasions we have also made "controlled buys" from unidentified suspects who we later learned were our active "informants." These faux pas are mentioned to emphasize the importance of initial screening interviews from a negative standpoint. No matter how thorough, searching, and complete initial contact with a potential informant is, pitfalls cited above will probably not be detected. Therefore, during initial contact with potential informants do not disclose anything regarding the manner or procedure in which they might be used that you would not want repeated throughout the

base. Usually, once an informant has started making buys for NIS, he has too much at stake personally to blabber about the modus operandi of his association with NIS.

Moreover, it is suggested never to allow one informant to see an agent talking to another informant or in any other way to allow one informant to learn the identity of another informant. This is significant for several reasons. First of all for the safety of the informant which is a prime NIS responsibility. (Thus far no informant used in his program has suffered physical or any other type reprisal from his ship-mates.) Secondly, information provided by one informant can be verified or further explored by another informant. A seller identified by one informant can become a target for other informants, particularly if the seller is working out of a commonly frequented area such as the EM Club. We feel an ideal situation exists when several informants, unknown to each other, all make narcotic purchases from a single target seller. A defense counsel may successfully attack the reliability, reputation, or entrapment issue of one informant, but the odds are increasingly in the government's favor that a defense counsel will not successfully discredit all informants.

Although one informant usually does not know the identity of other informants, occasionally two informants who are associated by friendship or some other tie are recruited at the same time. If the credibility and reliability of both these men can be established, they can effectively work as a team in areas where buys cannot be easily observed by NIS, such as inside the barracks or EM Club. Their joint testimony in court is more credible and convincing than a one-on-one situation.

Potential informants were identified through several means. Generally, either through NIS investigations or through contact with Command representatives. The program and objectives were explained to CO's/XO's and their concurrence obtained. Through interview of these sources and Legal Officers, Leading CPO's, and Senior Petty Officers, names of individuals who may have indicated a desire to work in this capacity were obtained. Potential informants were also developed during interviews of division officers, section leaders, etc., while conducting normal investigations. Agents learned from these sources the identity of sailors who might be willing and suitable to work as informants. Also, names of individuals who were involved in some type of problem within the Command were obtained. Types of individuals sought were those in disfavor with the Command for reasons such as UA, insubordination, less than satisfactory performance of duty, etc. We were not seeking total misfits or incorrigibles, but, rather, sailors who

had made mistakes but had some saving value to the Navy. The "pitch" to these sailors was the opportunity to "look good" or "gain favor" in the eyes of the Command. No promises were made by NIS agents. However, with Command concurrence it was pointed out to the sailor that his efforts in working with NIS would be "taken into consideration" by the Command. In some cases, the Command actually made the informant a promise such as no administrative action, a better type discharge or no prosecution for a recent offense if the informant would make a positive effort while working with NIS. No specific requirements were ever established and the Command generally told the informant that the opinion of the NIS agent would have considerable weight in deciding whether or not he had made a positive effort.

As stated earlier, informants in classification 4 are the most successful because of the essential element--motivation. Serving as an informant is not generally regarded as an enviable task but there is virtually no other way to successfully investigate narcotic sellers. The best way to recruit aggressive, eager, and capable informants is through a reward system which provides the necessary motivation. We are not thinking of financial reward, but rather in terms of Naval administrative benefits such as upgraded discharges, withholding or downgrading prosecution, transfers, etc. Here is the incentive for an informant to perform a necessary and important function although, it must be recognized, a function which is viewed with scorn by an informant's peers in contemporary society.

Once a potential informant has been identified and he agrees to work, our usual procedure is as follows: Command concurrence is obtained, and if possible his service record is discreetly reviewed. He is interviewed in depth and notes are taken regarding his knowledge of the local drug scene. After this, a record will be kept of all contacts we have with him and the information he provides. He is photographed and briefed on the entrapment issue. A method is established for him to contact NIS and NIS to contact him as the informant is instructed never to come to the NISRA. Each agent is assigned a block of numbers; e.g., one agent 1-20, second agent 21-40, etc. The agent controlling the informant assigns him a number which the informant is instructed to use in telephoning the office. This has proved beneficial in receiving calls from informants when the controlling agent is away from the office, using the 'beeper' page system in informing the agent to contact an informant, etc. Thus, regardless of the location of an agent or where a message to call an informant is left, the identity of the informant is protected. Rapid and secure communications between informant and controlling agent is essential. Telephone numbers where the informant can be contacted

both on-duty and off-duty are determined. An agreed fictitious name is established for the controlling agent; usually the name of a CPO gets best response. If the agent wants to contact the informant, he calls and leaves a message to have the informant call Chief SCOTT, Chief LONG, etc. A 3" x 5" card is made out for the NISRA informant box which contains cards of all informants arranged numerically according to the numbers they are assigned. Cards contain a photograph of the informant, biographical data, informant's motive, established method for communication, and anything else considered significant to that informant. Informants are instructed to call the office, preferably from a pay telephone, at least every other day even if they have nothing to report. Our experience has shown that if contact is less frequent, informants lose interest and motivation and the agent loses control of him. Informants are never given the agent's home phone numbers. After working hours an informant calls the local station security supervisor who in turn calls the agent and the agent then calls the informant. Informants give the Security supervisor only their informant number and the telephone number where they can be reached.

During initial contact with an informant, it must be determined whether or not he will be willing to testify in court. If he is not willing to testify, he is useless for controlled buys or as probable cause for searches but he may still be useful for general intelligence on narcotic sellers. He is informed his association with NIS is no authority to use or possess dangerous drugs/narcotics. He is also instructed to advise NIS in advance if he is going to be in a position or with associates where there is a possibility of arrest on drug charges by military or civilian authorities. If he is arrested on drug charges by these authorities and did not inform NIS in advance, he is "on his own" and we will do nothing for him. The informant is also briefed that to the extent possible when setting up plans to make a buy, to arrange for the transaction to "go down" outside in a parking lot or some similar place so NIS agents can observe the buy and possibly photograph it.

Once an informant has made an agreement to buy from a seller, he first meets with NIS agents prior to the transaction. The informant is briefed, thoroughly searched (both his person and mode of transportation, if appropriate), and he is provided the funds to make the buy. Copious notes are kept regarding this entire procedure, including serial number of the bills, time, place, persons present, etc. Following this, visual contact with the informant is maintained en route to the sale location. The informant waits at the agreed spot, and NIS agents position themselves to observe the transaction and photograph it if possible. Hangar, EM Club, and

barracks parking lots have proved to be the most desirable locations for buys. Agents are dressed in dungarees during working hours or appropriate casual attire at night and can usually watch unnoticed from a nearby bus stop or parked car, etc. If agents cannot observe from a close proximity, binoculars are used from a safe distance. The office cars are never used for close cover or transportation/rendezvous with informants. We have used an antiquated VW "bug" with an enlisted sticker on the front bumper with good results. Buys have been easily photographed from the back seat of the VW using an Asahi-Pentax Spotmatic 35mm camera and a 200mm telephoto lens. When shooting, a white ditty bag was wrapped around the camera and we were unnoticed even by persons who were in very close proximity. Following the transaction, visual contact is maintained with the informant until he meets NIS agents at a safe spot and the narcotics are recovered and properly taken into evidence. Detailed notes of the time and place of transaction, as well as information obtained from the informant after the buy, including the dialogue between seller/informant, are recorded.

The briefing of an informant prior to a buy is important. However, you can only foresee so many contingencies and too many or too detailed instructions are self-defeating. In one case, an informant made arrangements with a seller to make a routine \$10 purchase on the steps of a barracks at a certain time. Seller and informant met at the agreed time and place and NIS agents had a good vantage point from the parking lot. When they met, the seller said he was on watch and told the informant to go inside the barracks to the seller's cube and he would be right up to make the deal. The informant, dutifully following his NIS instructions to remain outside where he could be watched, declined to go inside the barracks and in so doing obviously "blew his cover." We now provide more general instructions on the way we would "like a deal to go." If the informant cannot work it exactly as planned, he is instructed to go ahead with whatever deal the seller wants to make within reasonable limitations and if possible at a cheaper dollar value. Thus, even if the first buy from a particular seller takes place in a location where it cannot be observed, still the informant has established a valuable rapport with the seller. Future buys from the seller can usually be arranged more easily and under more favorable conditions.

A question arises in apprehending the seller whether to "buy-bust" or merely to observe several buys and then apprehend at a later time. We have utilized primarily the latter procedure simply because good informants are difficult to find and we try to obtain "all the mileage we can" from a

successful informant. In so doing, we lose the evidentiary value of recovering marked money from the seller, however frequently we discover narcotics on the seller during search of his person incident to apprehension. Therefore, unless there is a large amount of money involved or some other over-riding reason, we do not routinely "buy-bust."

At the time of submission of ROI's or the convening of courts-martial, difficulties may arise in ensuring the safety of informants and protecting their identity until the last possible moment. In every instance where an informant makes a controlled buy or provides probable cause for a Command-authorized search, a sworn statement is obtained. However, the statement is not furnished to the Command until it is necessary to disclose the identity of the informant. In the ROI, the informant is referred to by appropriate symbol and copies of the informant's statement are furnished to NIS Headquarters and NISO SAN DIEGO only and a comment is made in the ROI to the effect that the informant's statement will be furnished to the Command when the need for confidentiality no longer exists. In some cases senior Command personnel are already aware of the identity of an informant but still this system prevents inadvertent compromise of an informant by mailroom personnel, legal and administrative clerks, etc. Defense counsels have agreed to withhold interview of informants until one week prior to trial.

At the time a successful informant's identity is revealed, whether for trial purposes or as a result of inadvertent compromise, arrangements must be made to insure his safety. Liaison was established with EPDOPAC, San Diego, and that office was understanding and cooperative in arranging transfers for informants at the appropriate time. These transfers (TDY until completion of court-martial(s), then a permanent transfer) were arranged in such a way that the informant's new duty station could not be traced. Further, JAG Corps representatives have informed us that when an informant is interviewed by Defense Counsel or testifies in court, he is not required to reveal his new duty assignment. Consequently, of necessity, the NISRA controlling the informant must serve as a pivot point for arranging the informant's availability for interview by defense counsel and his appearance for testimony at trial. If this responsibility is left with the former command, it will invariably result in compromise of the location of the informant's new duty station. Also related, at the time a potential informant's Command is initially contacted for approval, we inform the Command that if the informant is successful, it will probably result in his transfer. After transfer, NISRA located at the receiving Command is

apprised of the informant's identity so that office may in turn utilize his services.

During interview of NIS agents, defense counsels have almost always asked the following type questions:

- (1) How did you brief the informant on the entrapment issue?
- (2) What was the informant's motivation for working?
- (3) Did NIS or the Command make a deal with the informant or extend any promises?
- (4) How did NIS establish the reliability and credibility of the informant?
- (5) Has the informant ever used drugs himself?
- (6) What were the informant's exact words when the arrangements for the controlled buy were made?
- (7) Did NIS provide the information to informant regarding a target dealer or was the dealer identified by the informant?
- (8) How long has the informant been working for NIS?
- (9) What else has the informant done for NIS? Was he successful?
- (10) Has the informant worked on other than narcotic investigations? Was the informant paid?
- (11) Has the informant provided information which was independently corroborated?
- (12) General questions regarding search of informant prior to the buy, date, time, place, witnesses, etc.

Various questions have arisen regarding the issue of entrapment. Is it legally admissible for an informant to "troll" the EM Club in search of narcotic sellers? What if an informant meets a seller at an agreed time to complete a pre-arranged transaction and the seller advises he already sold his "stash" but identifies another seller previously unknown to the informant. May the informant then directly approach the newly identified seller? In discussing the issue of entrapment with various trial and defense counsels there was a difference of opinion as to what actually constitutes entrapment. A question has also been raised by defense counsel that two informants separately buying from one seller is multiplicitious. In another case defense counsel successfully contended that while the seller originally suggested to sell narcotics to our informant, "friendship" was the basis for the suggestion and therefore the accused was entrapped.

The entire narcotic informant program depended on Command support and cooperation which was amply provided. RADM G. E. R. KINNEAR, II, USN, former Commanding Officer, NAS Miramar, was initially approached and he wholeheartedly concurred in the endeavor. This same attitude was universally displayed by the various CO's and XO's of the fleet squadrons home-based at NAS Miramar. In conclusion, we do not contend that narcotics have been "stamped out" at NAS Miramar; however, the word is out that "it's hard to deal aboard Miramar."

EXAMINATION OF 'HASH' PIPES FOR THC

By S/A Bruce W. Given

During the course of a narcotics investigation the agent may be faced with evidence in the form of paraphernalia used for smoking hashish. More often than not these "pipes" will be found empty of all smoking material. The residue left in these pipes is, however, valuable as evidence and amenable to analysis.

The following procedure is recommended for hash pipe analysis. Since this method is a presumptive colorimetric test, the results may be challenged in a courts-martial proceeding. It is therefore suggested that if legal action beyond the Field Board level is anticipated a portion of the sample be retained for more definitive analysis such as thin layer chromatography. As this field test requires special care and two chemicals not included in the NIS Narcotics Kit, the procedure is presented so that the Agent can suggest it to whatever locally available laboratory is utilized for analysis. If a sample is submitted to the U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Laboratory, Ft. Gordon, Georgia (ZIP 30905) or to a BNDD Regional Laboratory, a similar technique will no doubt be utilized.

1. Scrape all inside surfaces of the pipe.
2. Examine scrapings under the microscope for evidence of cannabis plant material by the presence of leaf materials and/or cystoliths and hairs.
3. Wash scrapings with 3-5 ml of hot methanol and then evaporate the extract to dryness. Use an electric hot plate for heating since methanol is flammable.
4. Dissolve the residue from step #3 in approximately 0.25 ml of n-hexane.
5. Place one drop of extract from step #4 in a spot plate and allow the solvent to evaporate. Add one drop Duquenois reagent followed by one drop of concentrated hydrochloric acid. Then add a few drops of chloroform followed by a few drops of water. The presence of a blue-violet color in the chloroform layer is indicative of cannabis.

If the subject of examination is a hookah pipe, wash the water reservoir with a small amount of methanol and combine with the pipe washings in step #3. Any water in the pipe will contain only traces of resin and need not be extracted.

LIAISON - A UNIVERSAL RESPONSIBILITY

By S/A J. Brian McKee

The Naval Investigative Service as its agency name suggests, is a service organization. A significant part of our mission is to provide a professional investigative arm for the Navy and Marine Corps. While service is our mission, case solution is the "name of the game," especially as NIS has evolved into an essentially non-PSI or complaint-oriented agency with world-wide capability. Liaison, like law enforcement or a complaint-type investigation, is a combination of the "art" and the "science" of our profession - it is developed as much as it is innate in the professional investigator or investigative supervisor.

Inasmuch as case solution is the "name of the game," let's take a look at how an effective liaison program may help the professional investigator as he strives to provide the service which is paramount in the mission of the Naval Investigative Service. I'd like to list a few which I'm sure all of you will recognize as important:

- (a) Insure the proper response to "complaints" on a timely basis
- (b) Improve the professional image of NIS thereby raising the level of respect held by those we service
- (c) Remove any erroneous impressions concerning the agency or its personnel which may, for one reason or another, be held by some individuals (e.g., illegal, unprofessional or unethical practices or methods)
- (d) Case solution - increase the degree of cooperation (public and private - official and unofficial-solicited and unsolicited)
- (e) "Fringe benefits" - the improvement to facilities and equipment at limited expense to the agency.

As the title of this article indicates, liaison is a universal responsibility. Supervisory personnel, however, have special responsibilities in the area of liaison. At the Resident Agency level, supervisory personnel should be alert to their responsibilities in the area of attendance at command staff conferences. If not invited to these functions the SRA should indicate his availability to senior command personnel. As a somewhat related matter, supervisory personnel in the field should ensure that senior commanders are apprised of the current status and important developments on all cases

with a "flap potential" as well as those in which the commander has indicated a special interest. When there is a lack of cases for discussion at a command briefing, the supervisor should remember the benefits to be derived from routine courtesy calls on commanders, senior staff officers and such "special contacts" as security officers, base police supervisors, etc.

On the unofficial side of the ledger, the NIS supervisor should give proper attention to his social obligations and those of the personnel who work under his direction. From time to time, commands and counterpart agencies invite NIS personnel to social functions hosted by the command or agency or its individual members. These invitations are undoubtedly extended because of the respect held for the individual NIS member and/or his agency. Despite the inconvenience such invitations may cause, the NIS member should make every effort to respond favorably to the invitation. A social "snub," whether for the Fleet Commander's social gathering or the Marine Ball hosted by the enlisted members of a local Marine Barracks, could set liaison efforts back by various degrees. NIS personnel, especially those serving aboard major CONUS installations and on overseas assignments, have an unofficial obligation to host social gatherings. Those personnel who have served at a Resident Agency which has hosted a steak fry for counterpart commands, a NIS cocktail party for senior staff members of local commands or a "beer blast" for station investigators will attest to the benefits reaped by such expenditure of time, effort and personal resources. Before leaving our discussion of social responsibilities, I'd like to add that while agents have, in almost all instances, been extended "senior officer privileges" and attendant responsibilities, we cannot afford to ignore our responsibilities at lower levels in the military rank structure. To decline an invitation to the Warrant Officers' Mess, a CPO initiation ceremony, the awards banquet for an enlisted sports team or similar functions, without justifiable reason, may be prejudicial to the mission accomplishment of our agency. In other words, every agent, while he need not be a social lion, must be attentive to the social obligations which result from his very employment as a NIS agent. Liaison is a team effort and it should be remembered that one man can destroy in two minutes, through a failure to discharge his liaison responsibilities, what an entire office has taken weeks, months or even years to establish.

Liaison with commands and counterpart agencies should flow across the complete billet spectrum. Moreover, it should be effected at the unofficial as well as the official level.

Considering the flow of information crucial to the successful discharge of an agency's responsibilities in the area of case solution, crime prevention and insuring the security of information, facilities and personnel, it would be well for every agent to remember that important information, contacts and the like are not always available at places frequented by senior personnel of military commands and counterpart agencies. Apart from the information flow aspects of maintaining liaison presence at all levels of a command or counterpart agency, every agent should keep in mind the benefits to be reaped in such areas as crime deterrence and image-building potential.

When dealing with the commanders of military units and counterpart agencies, the agent must be alert for such internal problems as "power struggles" or persons overly jealous of their prerogatives. The agent should be exceedingly discreet and professional in his dealings with such problems. He may find himself expending that extra effort necessary to "keep everyone happy." Moreover, it may be necessary to discreetly maintain liaison with more than one senior commander within a command and/or give more command briefings on an investigation than would ordinarily be necessary. There is no "sure fire" answer to successfully handling such problems; however, common sense and a high degree of professionalism will go a long way toward accomplishing the investigative task with the least inconvenience to all concerned.

Many Resident Agencies which service more than ten to twelve separate commands have found it particularly beneficial to assign particular agents to make periodic courtesy/liason calls on specific command personnel. This procedure permits the journeyman agent to participate in the management function of the Naval Investigative Service, insures continuing contact with those whom we serve and permits the SRA and ASRA to concentrate their liaison efforts on senior commanders and supervisory personnel within counterpart agencies. There should be no hesitancy in assigning journeyman agents to maintain liaison with specific commands or agencies.

The current success of the NIS Special Agent Afloat Program is attributable in part to the active liaison efforts of those agents who are participating in the program. The agent's ability to properly brief senior personnel in the task force depends on his ability to maintain effective liaison with U.S. and host-Government officials in ports being visited by units of the task force. The success of the Agent's informant program within the task force depends on his ability to initiate and maintain "contact" (liaison) with all echelons, military and civilian, aboard the ships within the task group or task force.

Liaison is a never-ending responsibility for all agents. It applies to our everyday contacts as well as our assigned liaison responsibilities. Those we service observe our daily operation and their willingness to cooperate in any aspect of an investigation or operation, whether solicited or unsolicited, may well depend to a great extent on what image we portray. An agent's dress, bearing, professional know-how, ability to communicate and respect for an individual's rights and feelings are but a few of the variables which could effect a citizen's desire to cooperate. In addition, the physical appearance of an agency's facilities and equipment (cleanliness of motor vehicles, organization of crime scene kits, etc.) and its reputation for case solution may effect the decision of the public as to its degree of cooperation with the agency. In essence, liaison is more than making courtesy calls, discharging our social obligations and getting along with others. It is also an integral part of the way we operate on a day-to-day basis. Every NIS agent must earn and maintain the trust and confidence of those with whom he is attempting to establish continuing liaison.

Webster's Dictionary defines liaison as a "close bond or connection...an interrelationship." It is this "spirit of cooperation," especially when dealing with counterpart agencies, that will help to ensure that the "agent on the street" is given the degree of assistance which will help him render the quality of service necessary for accomplishment of the NIS mission. NIS supervisory personnel should not hesitate to assist counterpart agencies in consonance with public law and agency regulations. This willingness to cooperate is readily perceived by other law enforcement personnel and will pay dividends in the long run. NIS personnel should not overlook the opportunity, when permissible, to make Government facilities available to counterpart agencies, to assist in youth programs or to otherwise be active in non-political civic affairs.

In summary, an investigator is often only as good as his sources of information and assistance. It is the failure to heed this principle that has caused some otherwise very capable agents to fall short of their obvious potential in the field of law enforcement and criminal investigations. Be patient. Liaison efforts may be slow in paying dividends but they ultimately reward those who energetically pursue, establish and maintain an active liaison program.

ADDITIONAL TRAINING FILMS AVAILABLE AT NISHQ

The April 1972 edition of the *NIS Newsletter* highlighted three 16mm motion picture films which were available to field components on a loan basis. NISHQ (Code 252) has one copy each of the films listed below which will be mailed to field components upon telephonic request.

HOMICIDE INVESTIGATIONS - Commercial film, 16mm color, 22 minutes, 1966

Texas Highway Patrolman supervises a homicide investigation. Crime scene search produces many items of evidence that are followed through laboratory analysis, i.e., ballistics tests, document and chemical examination, etc. Graphic display of actual autopsy.

LSD - #MN-10507, 16mm color, 37 minutes, 1967

Shows how LSD was discovered, the extreme dangers of using it and how it affects the brain and body.

A TRIP TO WHERE - #MN-10484, 16mm color, 50 minutes, 1968

Effects of unauthorized or non-recommended use of drugs such as barbiturates, amphetamines, marijuana and LSD. Short and long term effects including the bad-trip experience and flash backs resulting from LSD. Results of the use of drugs in the operational effectiveness of the users.

LIMITED NUMBER OF U. S. NAVY FILM CATALOGS AVAILABLE

The U. S. Naval Photographic Center, Washington, D.C., prepares the U. S. Navy Film Catalog (NAVAIR 10-1-777, FOUO) plus periodic supplements. This alphabetical and numerical listing of all 16mm films, film strips and other audio-visual aids available to Naval and Marine Corps activities world-wide is a valuable 654 page document. A limited number of these catalogs may be obtained by major NIS components on a need basis. The ready availability of a catalog will permit supervisory personnel, while planning for in-service training of Special Agents, greater flexibility and accessibility to all Navy audio-visual aids. The catalog listing includes the film titles, description, production year, classification, distribution code and place of availability. Those SRA's desiring a copy of the catalog should notify NISHQ (Code 252).

PROMOTIONS & TRANSFERS

TO GS-13

MC CULLAH, Lanny E.	SRA, NISRA Annapolis, Md.
REILLY, Peter	SRA, NISRA Okinawa
TARDIFF, Byron L.	SRA, NISRA Iwakuni

TO GS-12

COTI, William A.	Technical Investigative Specialist, Europe
FEIGER, Frank E.	Technical Investigative Specialist, NISHQ
HOUGHTON, Michael M.	Technical Investigative Specialist, NISHQ
STEPHENS, Grant J.	Technical Investigative Specialist, NISPAC
WARD, William J.	Technical Investigative Specialist, NISHQ

	From	To
O'RILEY, William C.	NISO Chicago	NISO Philippines
DEMPSEY, John W.	NISRA Little Creek	NISRA Pearl Harbor
GURNEE, George W.	NISO Philippines	NISRA Portsmouth
PANICO, Robert G.	NISRA Okinawa	NISRA Mare Island
LIEHR, Joseph T.	NISRA Los Angeles	NISRA Subic
LEONARD, Clarence C.	NISO Marianas	NISRA San Bernardino
FISHER, Merlin D.	NISRA Manila	NISRA Portland
MC MULLEN, John P.	NISRA Yokosuka	NISRA New London
GIVENS, John C.	NISRA Subic	NISRA San Diego
SCANLAN, James N.	NISRA Baltimore	NISRA Camp Lejeune
BARKER, Lionel A.	NISRA Kodiak	NISRA Annapolis
WARWICK, Maynard C.	NISRA Pittsburgh	NISRA El Toro
CAROLAN, George M.	NISRA Hartford	NISHQ
LARABEE, Raymond H.	NISRA New London	NISSU Sigonella
REILLY, Peter	NISRA Camp Pendleton	NISRA Okinawa
GIBLIN, Edward P.	NISRA Saigon	NISRA Charleston
HICKS, Theodore J.	NISRA Saigon	NISRA Subic
COX, James N.	NISRA Key West	NISRA Washington

MC KENNA, Joseph E.	NISRA Buffalo	NISRA Subic
LARSON, Donald A.	NISRA Minneapolis	NISRA San Diego
BAGSHAW, Robert	NISRA Newport	NISRA Saigon
MEADOR, Hamner W.	NISSU Roanoke	NISRA Saigon
LASHER, David L.	NISRA San Antonio	NISRA Corpus Christi
LAING, William D.	NISRA Great Lakes	NISHQ
DUFFY, Gregory L.	NISO Philadelphia	NISRA Jacksonville
ROBERTS, Randall L.	NISRA Pearl Harbor	NISRA Alameda
WOROCHOCK, William A.	NISRA Saigon	NISO Marianas
WHIDDEN, Marshall T.	NISRA Saigon	NISRA Subic
MORGAN, John W.	NISRA Saigon	NISRA Subic
MOSTELLER, Roy A.	NISRA Camp Pendleton	NISRA San Diego
TEEL, Roger C.	NISRA Pt. Hueneme	NISRA Camp Pendleton
CLEVELAND, Walter G.	NISRA Kaneohe	NISRA MCRD San Diego
HANSEN, Hans P.	NISRA San Diego	NISRA Kaneohe
DOYLE, Thomas G.	NISRA Gtmo	NISSU Austin
COLEMAN, Lawrence A.	NISSU Akron	NISRA Pearl Harbor
GUTSHALL, Stephen C.	NISRA Kodiak	NISSU Adak
BLAKE, Wilbur E.	NISSU Adak	NISSU Beeville
ADDISON, Millard E.	NISRA Washington	NISRA San Francisco
SCHMITT, Frank H.	NISHQ	NISRA Ft. Amador
URIU, Tadashi	NISRA El Toro	NISRA Yokosuka
TAMAE, Seiki	NISRA Yokosuka	NISRA Alameda
COTI, William A.	NISHQ	NISO Europe
CLARK, Paul L.	NISRA Subic	NISRA Pasadena
NESTER, John	NISRA Subic	NISRA Cleveland
HELBOCK, Robert G.	NISRA Subic	NISRA Bremerton

JOHNSON, George B.	NISRA New Orleans	NISSU Yokohama
HUEY, Robert L.	NISRA Harrisburg	NISRA Cleveland
JONES, Michael B.	NISRA Camp Lejeune	NISRA Subic
MC CLELLAN, George C.	NISRA San Bernardino	NISRA Subic
SCHAEFFER, Charles R.	NISRA Bremerhaven	NISRA Athens
JESSE, Albert F.	NISRA San Diego	NISRA Rota
BLOOMINGBURG, Benjamin F.	NISRA Baltimore	NISRA Jacksonville
WILLIAMS, Thomas C.	NISRA Annapolis	NISRA Newport